INTELLIGENCE IDENTITIES PROTECTION ACT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85-00003R000200090016-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 29, 2008
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: August 1, 1980
• Content Type: REPORT

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96m CoNo as HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES RErT. 96-
Ed Session I 1219 Part 1
INTELLIGENCE IDENTITIES PROTECTION ACT
Mr. BOLAND, from the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
submitted the, following
REPORT
The permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, to whom was
referred the bill (H.R. 5615) to amend the National Security Act of
1947 to prohibit the unauthorized disclosure of information identifying
certain U.S. intelligence officers, agents, informants, and sources, hav-
ing considered the same,. report favorably thereon with an amendment
and recommend that the bill do pass.
The amendment is as follows:
Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert in lieu thereof the
following :
That this Act may be cited as the "Intelligence Identities Protection Act".
Sze. 2. (a) The National Security Act of 1947 is amended by adding at the end
thereof the following new title :
"TITLE V-PROTECTION OF CERTAIN NATIONAL SECURITY
INFORMATION
"DISCLOSURE OF IDENTITIES OF CERTAIN UNITES STATES UNDERCOVER INTELLIGENCE
OFFICERS, AGENTS, INFORMANTS, AND SOURCES
"BEG. 501. (a) Whoever, having or having had authorized access to classified
information that identifies a covert agent, intentionally discloses any Informa-
tion identifying such covert agent to any individual not authorized to receive
classified information, knowing that the information disclosed so identifies such
covert agent and that the United States is taking affirmative measures to con-
ceal such covert agent's intelligence relationship to the United States, shall be
fined not more than $50,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.
"(b) Whoever, as a result of having authorized access to classified information,
learns the identity of a covert agent and intentionally discloses any information
identifying such covert agent to any individual not authorized to receive classi-
fied information, knowing that the information disclosed so identifies such covert
agent and that the United States is taking affirmative measures to conceal such
covert agent's intelligence relationship to the United States, shall be fined not
more than $25,000 or finpt'lstltie8' tbt" mom' tbai 'n've years, or both.
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"(c) Whoever, in the course of an effort to identify and expose covert agents
with the intent to impair or impede the foreign intelligence activities of the
United States, discloses, with the intent to impair or impede the foreign in-
telligence activities of the United States, to any individual not authorized to
receive classified information, any information that identifies a covert agent know-
ing that the information disclosed so identifies such covert agent and that the
United States is taking affirmative measures to conceal such covert agent's in-
telligence relationship to the United States, shall be fined not more than $15,000
or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.
"DEFENSES AND EXCEPTIONS
"SEC. 502. (a) It is a defense to a prosecution under section 501 that before the
commission of the offense with which the defendant is charged, the United States
had publicly acknowledged or revealed the intelligence relationship to the United
States of the individual the disclosure of whose intelligence relationship to the
United States is the basis for the prosecution.
"(b) (1) Subject to paragraph (2), no person other than a person committing
an offense under section 501 shall be subject to prosecution under such section
by virtue of section 2 or 4 of title 18, United States Code, or shall be subject to
prosecution for conspiracy to commit an offense under such section.
"(2) Paragraph (1) shall not apply in the case of a person who acted in the
the course of an effort to identify and expose covert agents with the intent to
impair or impede the foreign intelligence activities of the United States.
"(c) In any prosecution under section 501(c), proof of intentional disclosure
of information described in such section, or inferences derived from proof of such
disclosure, shall not alone constitute proof of intent to impair or impede the
foreign intelligence activities of the United States.
"(d) It shall not be an offense under section 501 to transmit information de-
scribed in such section directly to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
the Senate or to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives.
"PROCEDURES FOR ESTABLISHING COVER FOR INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS AND AGENTS
"SEC. 503. (a) The President shall establish procedures to ensure that any
individual who is an officer or employee of an intelligence agency, or a member
of the Armed Forces assigned an officer, employee, or member agency, whose
identity as such an officer, employee, or member is classified information and
which the United States takes affirmative measures to conceal, is afforded all
appropriate assistance to ensure that the identity of such individual as such an
officer, employee, or member is effectively concealed. Such procedures shall
provide that any department or agency designated by the President for the pur-
pose of this section shall provide such assistance as may be determined by the
President to be necessary in order to establish and effectively maintain the sec-
recy of the identity of such individual as such an officer, employee, or member.
"(b) Procedures established by the President pursuant to subsection (a)
shall be exempt from any requirement for publication or disclosure.
"SEC. 504. There is jurisdiction over an offense under section 501 committed
ouside the United States if the individual committing the offense is a citizen of
the United States or an alien lawfully admitted to the United States for perma-
ment residence (as defined in section 101(a) (20) of the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act).
"PROVIDING INFORMATION TO CONGRESS
"SEC. 505. Nothing in this title shall be construed as authority to withhold in-
formation from Congress or from committee of either House of Congress.
"DEFINITIONS
"SEC. 506. For the purposes of this title :
"(1) The term `classified information' means information or material desig-
nated and clearly marked or clearly represented, pursuant to the provisions
of a statute or Executive order (or a regulation or order issued pursuant to a
statute or Executive order), as requiring a specific degree of protection
against unauthorized disclosure for reasons of national security.
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"(2) The term 'authorized', when used with respect to access to classified
information, means having authority, right, or permission pursuant to the
provisions of a statute, Executive order, directive of the head of any depart-
ment or agency engaged in foreign intelligence or counterintelligence activi-
ties, order -of a United States court, or provisions of any Rule of the House
of Representatives or resolution of the Senate which assigns responsibility
within the respective House of Congress for the oversight of intelligence
activities.
"(3) The term `disclose' means to communicate, provide, impart, transmit,
transfer, convey, publish, or otherwise make available.
" (4) The term 'covert agent' means-
"(A) an officer or employee of an intelligence agency or a member of
the Armed Forces assigned to duty with an intelligence agency-
" (I) whose identity as such an officer, employee, or member is
classified information, and
"(1i) who is serving outside the United States or has within the
last five years served outside the United States ;
" (B) a United States citizen whose intelligence relationship to the
United States is classified information and-
" (I) who resides and acts outside the United States as an agent
of, or informant or source of operational assistance to, an intelligence
agency, or
" (ii) who is at the time of the disclosure acting as an agent of,
or informant to, the foreign counterintelligence or foreign counter-
terrorism components of the Federal Bureau of Investigation ; or ,
" (C) an individual, other than a United States citizen, whose past or
present intelligence relationship to the United States is classified and
who is a present or former agent, of or a present or former informant or
source of operational assistance to, an intelligence agency.
" (5) The term 'intelligence agency' means the Central Intelligence Agency,
the foreign intelligence components of the Department of Defense, or the
foreign counterintelligence or foreign counterterrorist components of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation.
"(6) The term `informant' means any individual who furnishes information
to an intelligence agency in the course of a confidential relationship protecting
the identity of such individual from public disclosure.
" (7) The terms `officer' and 'employee' have the meanings given such terms
by sections 2104 and 2105, respectively, of title 5, United States Code.
"(8) The term 'Armed Forces' means the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine
Corps, and Coast Guard.
"(9) The term `United States', when used in a geographic sense, means all
areas under the territorial sovereignty of the United States and the Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands.".
(b) The table of contents at the beginning of such Act is amended by adding
at the end thereof the following :
"TITLE V-PROTECTION OF CERTAIN NATIONAL SacuarrY INFORMATION
"See. 501. Disclosure of identities of certain United States undercover intelligence officers,
agents, informants, and sources.
"Sec. 502. Defenses and exceptions.
"Sec. 503. Procedures for establishing cover for intelligence officers and employees.
"Sec. 504. Extraterritorial jurisdiction.
"Sec. 505. Providing information to Congress.
"Sec. 506. Definitions.".
INTRODUCTION
A critical need for the effective conduct of U.S. foreign and defense
policy is the production and analysis of high quality. intelligence infor-
mation. Further, U.S. policy interests and involvement have expanded
in both these areas so that the demand for intelligence has also increased
dramatically. The President and an ever larger group of high-level
policymakers want an increasingly sophisticated, highly specialized
flow of information on such broad-ranging topics as strategic" force
structure, nuclear proliferation, international terrorism, oil pricing
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policies, drug trafficking, Third World economic growth, and the
Iranian hostage crisis-not to mention the activities of hostile intelli-
gence services.
As critical as the need for finished intelligence products is the need
for the means to collect intelligence. A variety of methods-some highly
technical and sophisticated-are employed by the U.S. intelligence
community for this purpose. Notwithstanding the essential contribu-
tion of these systems, however, there continues to be a need for tradi-
tional human intelligence collection. Without the often unique contri-
bution of human collectors-undercover intelligence operatives and
those who aid them-the U.S. Government would be without needed
insights into the actual plans and intentions of foreign powers it must
confront or the international problems it must solve. Further, as the
United States seeks to implement its foreign policy objectives, it re-
quires in unusual and important situations the capability to use clan-
destine operators to compliment its overt policy initiatives.
Intelligence operatives have aways faced risks from exposure.
Espionage is criminal activity in the country in which it occurs. In
many countries today, to the threat of expulsion or imprisonment for
spying must be added the possibility of terrorist attack targeted on in-
telligence operatives who are exposed as such. Thus U.S. intelligence
operatives are provided protection in the form of alias identification
and disguise. They in turn conceal through thadecraft their relation-
ship to those from whom they seek information or assistance in carry-
ing out their intelligence assignments. Such arrangements-cover and
candestine means of communication-are employed by all intelligence
services throughout the world. They seek to protect the viability of the
intelligence services' operations and the personal safety of their offi-
cers and agents. In the process, they avoid the embarassment exposure
would bring to the countries on whose behalf these services operate.
The exposure of a U.S. intelligence officer abroad aways carries with
it the loss or diminution of that officer's cover, with a concommitant
loss in his effectiveness as a secret operative for his Government. Fur-
ther, in some circumstances, his life or the lives of his family may be
jeopardized. These results are always harmful to U.S. interests since,
beyond these most basic divadvantages, such an exposure embarasses
the U.S. Government and may complicate its relations with another
government while demoralizing, or resulting in the loss of, the officer.
Yet such exposures sometimes occur and it is a measure of the resil-
iency of an intelligence agency in how it adjusts to such setbacks.
It is more than a setback, however, when undercover intelligence op-
eratives become the target of repeated, systematized exposures by
individuals or groups bent on the production of all the above enumer-
ated effects and with the goal of destroying this essential U.S. intelli-
gence capability. Yet, such has been the experience of the Central In-
telligency Agency in recent years. Individuals-former employees
among them-and several publications have taken it upon themselves
to discover and disclose wholesale the identities of undercover CIA
and other intelligence officers and those foreign nationals with whom
they work.
Further, the motivation for these acts has been advanced clearly and
repeatedly-that exposure of all U.S. intelligence operatives will pre-
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vent them from pert it duties and thereby render powerless
the agehcielt or iwhi ` .
These activities have been successful to a point. They have resulted
in the loss-measured in terms of training, expertise, morale and ex-
pense-of seasoned clandestine officers and valuable agents of U.S.
intelligence agencies. That loss in turn has affected adversely the flow
of intelligence necessary for the formulation of U.S. policies. Lament-
ably, the clear indication; has been that an exposure of undercover CIA
officers has played a part in attacks on. the lives of those individuals.
In one tragic instance, the attack was fatal. In many more eases,
harassment, threats and - the; -fear of them have takes thair,titoll on
ther expeeed ers-aanndtheir- families.
jn01ion unauthorized disclosure of the
names, es u t 'is a 'Pernicious act that serves
no V far-,1: to
r'~e~;;zt does not eghteft public
abuses; dyes not orv ' s ?, "."
1 debat'; and It'deee not `eahtributa iieft4o=the gavel of an educated-a..
Whatever the, motives ef?theee ensaes in-such: activity, the 2pily
e progra
-afthe near . the
en an , e rican people. 49uah , a aultTe
aaa~avggr;,rL~1pgg~~
oo..disaster, or : its stepchild terror, stalks those whose lives
have been troubled. by, this casepa of disruption. It is the opinion
of the committee that it is euou,gh that covert agents must expect a life
of adversity as a result of-their realling The Congress and the Ameri-
can people .cannot ask them-and their many, colleagues to continue-to
travel tlis secret ways of the- world's capitals without a recognition and
a responseto the perils they face and can ill-avoid.
It is in this context that the committee has considered and marked up
H.R. 5615. The bill criminalizes disclosure of intelligence identities as
a direct result of the committee's conclusion that such disclosures harm
the Nation's ability to conduct foreign policy and provide for the com-
mon defense and that disclosure can place in jeopardy or severe appre-
hension of harm dedicated and loyal men and women who serve their
country in a difficult and dangerous profession.
SUMMARY OF LaoffiI.ATION
Although the committee condemns witting disclosures of undercover
intelligence identities, it does not seek to criminalize such acts in every
context. The committee recognizes fully that the bill's proscriptions
operate in an area fraught with first amendment concerns ands has
limited its scope in order to criminalize only those disclosures which
proceed in violation of an express duty. of care assumed by the dis.,
closer or where the disclosure occ in?tkeontext of4 pattern or prac-
tice of identification and disclosures rinteaded:to impair U.S. intelli-
gence capabilities..
Thus, the bill applies to three welLdpfuwL&W limited cla
individual . The first consists o ose who have had authorized tat
is, recor a access to classified information identifying un-
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dercover operatives, or "covert agents", as they are termed by the bill.
This class would include only those individuals-principally Govern-
ment coworkers or supervisory officials-who would have had a need
to know the identity of an undercover officer or an agent. This class
therefore includes only those who have undertaken never to reveal in-
formation to which they have been given access. Their promise of
secrecy was the reason for their being provided access to the identities
of covert agents, and disclosures-and disclosures alone-of the iden-
tities they learned in this fashion are the most heavily penalized by
the bill.
The Y, 0 "c of individuals also includes those who have access
to classi information, but not necessarily that which explicitly iden-
tifies covert agents. For a member of this class, however, it must be
shown that as a result of that access to classified information be learned
can intelligence identity. This class would include those in Government
whose jobs place them in a position to meet or learn the identities of
covert agents. Although the Government need not be able to prove
that individuals in this class have had officially processed and approved
no o
access to the actual idetit' f
t
r
cove agents, rt must show that as a
result of the position which they held they learned such identities.
Within certain higher level circles of Government such circumstances
are not uncommon. Since individuals in this class have also sworn to
maintain the secrecy of classified information provided to them, they
are believed by the committee to have a duty of care parallel to, but
less than, that binding those individuals included in the first class.
Thus, disclosures by the second class are penalized less severely than
those of the first class but still more severely than the third class.
The third and last claassss of individuals affected by the bill are those
who, although ey never have had the kind of security clearance with
its accompanying duty of care which typifies members of the first and
second classes, engage in a deliberate effort or practice to identify and
expose covert agents "with the intent to impair or impede the foreign
intelligence activities of the United States" and whose disclosures are
made with that same intent. Since this class potentially includes any
discloser of an undercover intelligence identity, the committee has paid
particular attention to limiting its embrace to those whose clear plan
and practice is to identify and then place on the public record the
secret identities of covert agents with the deliberate aim of disrupting
a legitimate and highly valuable function of Government.
This class does not include those who, in disclosing a secret intelli-
gence identity, merely voice criticism of, or display animus toward, in-
telligence agencies. Rather, they must be those whose intentional, well
evidenced purpose it is to (1) identify and (2) expose covert agents
(3) with the intent to impair or impede U.S. intelligence activities and
(4) whose disclosure, the subject of the prosecution, must be made with
the same intent to impair or impede.
It is the purpose of the committee in limiting the, above class to
thereby preclude the inference and exclude the possibility that any
speech-be it casual discussion, political debate, the journalistic pur-
suit of a story on intelligence, the disclosure of illegality or impropriety
in Government-other than that so described will be chilled by the
enactment of the bill. Further, the bill also provides that no prosecu-
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tions for ~lspiracy, aiding or or misprision in the eoiliiaiis-
sion of an offense by a member o1anf three clseses of individuals
affeetedsby the bill can occur unless the individual accused also evi-
denced; in the course of eonduct, the intent to impair or impede the
foreigwintelligence, activities of the United States.
Beyond its concern for narrowing the application of the bill to those
whose duty of care or activities render disclosure criminal, the com-
mittee devoted great care in limiting the scope of the intelligence
identities the disclosure of which should be criminalized. In so doing,
the committee relied on three principles of selection. First, it required
that identities, to be protected, must be properly classified. Second,
the disclosure of the identity must produce the possibility of harm be-
yond the reasonable expectance ,of the U.S. Government to prevent.
Last, the intelligence identity must be such that disclosure would
likely reduce the individuals future=-effectiveness for inte ce
!5t
pa sing these criteria, the committed h -u fashioned the defini in
s of
to include only
, II
i-
ents of the Departme o e mind
gence cam n
t
term ce a Doan is
era bureau of
e committee fort er defines the ?t agent to`include only
three t ' ls. Th consists of pre
o cars or employees or members of the arm services of the a
name a% curving outside the United States or those who pro-
a involvement in clahdetine ope tions will result in their serv-
ing overseas again. Such individuaI~ all serve undercover, for ex
ample, using alias or disguise. Serving overseas, they cannot claim the
protection of U.S. laws or the police power of the Government. Ex-
posure broad or within 5 years from last returning abroad (a provi-
sion calculated to include those who may be home in the U.S. for
tour or a visit) could-es it has already-result in heightened dange
for these individuals or their families. Clearly, it would diminish thei
effectivene destine operators.
The n eludes . ca ' ut
side t rations r ---- -
coMiterintelligence or counterterrorism units wherever they may be.
These individuals are those whoa because of their operations overseas
(although not necessarily continuous in span) or their involvement in
the dangerous fields of counterintelligence or counterterrorism, could
suffer severely because of public identification with a U.S. intelligence
agency. In the case of the FBI agents or informants, even though they
may be present in the United States, the nature of the individuals and
groups with which they come into contact suggests strongly that
physical danger is a part of their operational milieu.'
The identity of each such individual in this second category must
be properly classified. This group of individuals is one whose impor-
tance to U.S. intelligence operations is real. The category has been
1 The merits of the, inclusion of these FBI personnel were brought out in an exchange
of corresnondenee between Hon. C. W. Bill Young, a member of the committee, and Hon.
William Webster, Director of the FBI.
STAT
STAT
STAT
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defined in such a way as to exclude those U.S. citizens residing in the
United States whose relationship with an intelligence agency may be
concealed but who would suffer at most embarrassment from the disclo-
sure of this relationship. The committee believes that physical danger
or some reasonable expectation thereof serves as a good selector among
others in shaping this and other categories of covert agents. Such a
criterion serves to exclude relationships which public policy may wish
to conceal but the protection of which does not require the onus of
The ..sate o of covert agent consists of all aliens serve. or
who have erve ents, inf rmants_nr sm]reas n n* ernttional as-
sistance ce intelligence agencies. To be included, their relationship
mu emain classified. '111117 -committee feels that this more broadly
defined group also reflects the realities of life for an alien who has
assisted a U.S. intelligence agency and who remains overseas or ever
hopes to return to his country. Without the anonymity of silence about
a present or past relationship with the U.S. Government, such indi-
viduals would neither continue the association nor-in some coun-
tries-hope to survive revelation of that relationship. The further
ramifications of a public disclosure could include reprisals against
family and friends, imprisonment or death.
In addition to the care with which the classes of individuals affected
by the bill and those whose identities are to be protected have been de-
fined, the committee has also devoted care to the other elements of the
offense noted in H.R. 5615. All disclo ill
must be intentional, that is, the defendant must. have cn_nsciously~nd
was iuii aware. r urtner, the Uovernment must prove that what he
knew ine u e e full realization that the sum of his acts was the
disclosure of a protected intelligence identity, one which he knew the
Government was taking affirmative steps to conceal. In effect, he must
be shown to have known that he was disclosing an undercover rela-
tionship, one protected by the statute the bill would create.
The bill additionally creates an affirmative defense to the effect that
no offense has been committed where the defendant can show that the
Government has publicly acknowledged or otherwise publicly revealed
the intelligence identity the disclosure of which is the subject of the
prosecution.
The committee believes that it has considered and crafted the pro-
visions of H.R. 5615 with care. Its simple purpose has been to prevent
the disruption of legitimate, important intelligence operations while
avoiding the proscription of merely critical or newsworthy publica-
tions. The principle thrust of this effort has been to criminalize those
disclosures which clearly represent the conscious and pernicious effort
to eliminate the capability to conduct intelligence operations. Yet the
committee also recognizes that there is another aspect of this prob-
lem which requires a different solution.
The committee is compelled to note, although a full discussion of
cover for intelligence operatives abroad is inappropriate in the context
of this pbulic report, that provisions for the concealment of intelli-
gence operatives are not fully adequate. Accordingly, the committee
has included a provision requiring the President to promulgate pro-
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the defendant need not have. acquired.,from classification- (that is,
sure o rmation which the Government seeks to protest but which
cedures that will help to rectify this situation. These procedures are
to ensure that intelligence cover agents are effective. They are to pro-
vide that departments and agencies of Government designated by the
President are to afford all appropriate assistance-determined by the
President-to this end.
This provision of the bill does not require the President to do an -
thing not now being done about intelligence cover arrangements. It
does not stipulate which elements of Government shall provide assist-
ance or what that assistance must be. It requires only that the Presi-
dent of the United States review these questions and determine the
appropriate interest of. the United States.. In so doing, the provision
recognizes the fact that only the President has the authority and duty
to truly resolve this question and only he will have the requisite de-
tachment to make a decision that can result in the adequate provision
of cover to undercover intelligence operatives.
Notwithstanding the above, and recognizing the fact of recent im-
provements, the committee notes that the reason for the inclusion of
the cover provision in the bill stems from a grave concern shared b
all members that insufficient foresight has led to the atrophy of U.S.
Government policy in this area which does not contribute to the best
possible U.S. intelligence effort. The committee feels constrained to
say no more about this subject except.to note that it will communicate
its strong feelings in this regard directly to the President in hopes
that current policies can be reexamined.
CONCLUSION
The committee does not pretend to believe that H.R. 5615 will solve
all the problems associated with preserving undercover intelligence
identities, nor, as noted above, would it be constitutionally or practi-
cally prudent to so. What H.R. 5615 represents is the committee's
best judgment on a combination of pro ons which, if implemented,
will remove,present dangers -and. those which are reasonably fore-
seeable. To critics of this carefully balanced approach this committee
can only offer its belief that the bill's strictures and requirements are
quires very explicit involvement in systematized identification and
disclosure of covert agents with asimilwly clear and pernicious intent.
The choices involved a w,ed, no resort t simile answers, no comfort
in exclusise prineiplr or authority, no hope in present alternatives.
The committee strove to choose wisely. Careful application of the pro-
visions of H.R. 5615 will insure the appropriateness of the choices
made.
HISTORY of THE BILL
H.R. 5615 was introduced by Mr. Boland, chairman of the Commit-
tee, on October 17, 1979. It was cosponsored by all the members of the
committee.
In January of 1980, the Subcommittee on Legislation, with Mr.
Mazzoli presiding, conducted two full. days of hearings on H.R. 5615
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and other proposals which would establish criminal penalties for the
unauthorized disclosure of the names of undercover U.S. intelligence
officers and agents. The subcommittee heard from the following
witnesses :
Representative James C. Wright (D-Texas) ;
Representative Charles E. Bennett (D-Florida) ;
Hon. Frank C. Carlucci, Deputy Director of Central Intelli-
gence;
Robert L. Keuch, Associate Deputy Attorney General ;
William E. Colby, former Director of Central Intelligence;
Floyd Abrams, esq., Cahill, Gordon & Reindel;
Jack Blake, president, Association of Former Intelligence
Officers;
Morton Halperin, Director, Center for National Security
Studies;
John Shattuck, director, Washington Office, ACLU;
Jerry J. Berman, legislative counsel, ACLU;
Ford Rowan, assistant professor of journalism, Northwestern
University;
M. Stanton Evans, political commentator and director, National
Journalism Center;
William H. Schaap, coeditor, CovertAction Information
Bulletin;
Ellen Ray, coeditor, CovertAction Information Bulletin; and
Louis Wolf, coeditor, CovertAction Information Bulletin.
On July 25, 1980, the full committee met to consider intelligence
identities legislation. H.R. 5615, as amended, was approved by voice
vote and ordered reported favorably.
SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS
Section 501-Di8clo8ure of Identities
Section 501 establishes three distinct criminal offenses for the inten-
tional disclosure to unauthorized persons of information identifying
covert agents. The distinction among the offenses is based on the de-
fendant's previous authorized access to classified information, or lack
thereof. The greater the degree of such access, the greater is the duty
of trust assumed by the defendant and the greater is the penalty for
breach of such duty. In addition, the elements of proof are fewer
against defendants with authorized access to classified information.
Section 501 (a) applies to those individuals who have been given
authorized access to classified information which identifies a covert
agent. Such individuals, usually employees of the United States with
the most sensitive security clearances, have by their own affirmative,
voluntary action undertaken a duty of nondisclosure of the nation's
most sensitive secrets. It is appropriate, in the committee's view, to
impose severe penalties for the breach of this duty and to hold a de-
fendant in such category to stricter standards of liability.
Therefore, an individual who has had authorized access to classi-
fied information identifying a covert agent would be subject to a fine
of $50,000 or imprisonment for 10 years, or both, if he or she-
Intentionally discloses, to any individual not authorized to re-
ceive classified information, any information identifying such
agent;
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Knowing that the information disclosed identifies such agent;
and
Knowing that the United States is taking affirmative measures
to conceal the agent's intelligence relationship to the United
States.
The word "intentionally" was carefully chosen to reflect the com-
mittee's intent to require that the Government prove the most exacting
state of mind element in connection with section 501 offenses.s
It should be evident, but the committee wishes to make perfectly
clear, that the words "identifies", "identifying", and "identity", which
are used throughout section 501 are intended to connote a correct status
as a covert agent. To falsely accuse someone of being a covert agent
is not a crime under this bill.
The reference to "affirmative measures" is intended to narrowly
confine the effect of the bill, to relationships that are deliberately con-
cealed by the U.S. Government.
The bill would apply to disclosure of an identity only where affirma-
tive measures had been taken to conceal such identity, as, for example,,
by creating a cover or alias identity or, in the case of intelligence
sources, by using clandestine means of communication and meeting to
conceal the relationship involved. Proof of knowledge that the United
States takes affirmative measures to conceal the relationship will de-
pend' upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Proof of knowl-
edge could be demonstrated by showing that the person disci the
information has or had an employment or other relationship wit the
United States that required or gave him such knowledge It could also
be demonstrated by statements made in connection with a disclosure
or by previous statements evidencing such knowledge.
It also is to be emphasized that though the identity disclosed must
be classified (see section 506(4)) the actual information disclosed
need not be. For example the phone number, address, or automobile
license number of the CIA. station chief in Ruritania is not classified
information; the disclosure of such information in a manner which
identifies the holder as the CIA station chief is an offense under the
bill. However, the connection between the information disclosed and
the correct identity of the covert agent must be direct, immediate, and
obvious.
Finally, in connection with section 501 (a), it should be noted that
the identity which is disclosed and which is the subject of the prose-
cution must be an identity to which the offender, through authorized
access to classified information, was specifically given access.
Section 501(b) applies to those who learn the identity of a covert
agent "as a result of having authorized access to classified informa-
tion". Basically, it covers those whose security clearance place them in
a position from which the identity of a covert agent becomes known
or is made known. For example, such a person could be one who worked
at the same location as an undercover CIA officer. The distinction be-
tween this category of offenders, and the category covered by section
501(a), is that under section 501(a) the offender must have had au-
thorized access to specific classified information which identifies the
2 Lesser degrees of mental culpability are knowing. reckless, and negligent. See 8. Rept.
96-668, pa s 62-69 (Criminal Code Reform Act of 1979, Report of the Committee on the
Judiciary, ~l S. Senate, to accompany 8. 1722.)
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covert agent whose disclosure is the basis for the prosecution. Section
501(b), on the other hand, requires that the identity be learned only "as
a result" of an authorized access to classified information in general.
As with those covered by section 501(a), those in the 501(b) cate-
gory have placed themselves in a special position of trust vis-a-vis the
U.S. Government. Therefore, it is proper to levy stiffer penalties and
require fewer elements to be proved than for those who have never had
any authorized access to classified information (see section 501 (c) ).
However, the committee recognizes that there is a subtle but signifi-
cant difference in the position of trust assumed between an offender
within the section 501 (a) category and an offender in the section 501
(b) category. Therefore, the penalty for a conviction under section
501(b) is a fine of $25,000 or 5 years imprisonment, or both.
With the two exceptions discussed above-the relationship of the
offender to classified information and the penalty for conviction-the
two offenses, and the elments of proof therefor, are the same.
Section 501(c) applies to any person who discloses the identity of
a covert agent.
As is required by subsection (a) and (b), the Government must
prove that the disclosure was intentional, that the relationship dis-
closed was classified, and that the offender knew that the Government
was taking affirmative measures to conceal the intelligence relation-
ship of the covert agent.
Furthermore, as is also the case with sections (a) or (b), the actual
information disclosed does not have to be classified.
Unlike the previous two sections, authorized access to classified in-
formation is not a prerequisite to a conviction under section 501(c) .
An offender under this section has not voluntarily agreed to protect
any Government information nor does he owe the Government any
particular duty of nondisclosure. Therefore, section 501(c) estab-
lishes two elements of proof not found in sections 501 (a) or (b). The
United States must prove that-
The disclosure was made in the course of an effort to identify
and expose covert agents, which effort was undertaken with the
intent to impair or impede the foreign intelligence activities of
the United States; and
The disclosure itself was made with such intent.
H.R. 56115, as introduced, required that to be criminal the disclosure
made by those with no access to classified information would have to
be made "with the intent to impair or impede the foreign intelligence
activities of the United States." Both public and Government witnesses
criticized this provision as too sweeping. They stated their belief that
it could be used to punish journalists and others who wrote stories or
spoke out about intelligence failures or wrongdoing or Government
whistleblowers, even though the bill states in section 502(c) that the
specific intent element cannot be proved solely by the fact of the dis-
closure itself.
As reported, the bill seeks to meet these criticisms by requiring that
the disclosure must be "in the course of an effort to identify and expose
covert agents with the intent to impair and impede the foreign intelli-
gence activities of the United States." The added requirement that the
disclosure be "in the course of an effort to identify and expose" under-
cover officers and agents makes it clear that the defendant must be
engaged in a conscious plan to seek out undercover intelligence opera-
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tives and expose them with the intent to destroy U.S. intelligence
efforts. The defendant, in other words, has made it a practice to ferret
out and then expose undercover officers or agents for the purpose of
damaging an intelligence agency's effectiveness and the disclosure
whicii is the subject of the prosecution must be made with that intent.
It should be noted that, though in most cases an offense will require a
series of disclosures, in some circumstances, where other evidence can
demonstrate a plan or practice, one disclosure would be sufficient to
establish an offense under this subsection. Whistleblowers, those who
republish previous disclosures, and critics of U.S. intelligence would
all stand beyond the reach of the law if they made their disclosures for
purposes other than the impairment of U.S. intelligence activities.
A journalist writing stories about the CIA would not be engaged in
the requisite "effort", even if the stories he or she wrote included the
names of one or more covert agents, unless the Government proved that
there was a specific effort to identify and expose agents and that this
effort was intended to impair or impede. For example, an effort by a
private institution to determine if, against its policy, an employee is
also an employee or agent of an intelligence agency, would not be
covered.
The Government, of course, can attempt to demonstrate such dis-
closures were made with the intent to impair or impede and in the
course of an effort so intended. It would not be sufficient to show that
the discloser had reason to believe that the release would impair or im-
pede, rather the Government must show that that was the purpose of
the disclosure.
Section 50$-De f en8es and Exceptions
Section 502 (a) states that-
It is a defense to a prosecution under section 501 that before
the commission of the offense with which the defendant is
charged, the United States had publicly acknowledged or
revealed the intelligence relationship to the United States of
the individual the disclosure of whose intelligence relation-
ship to the United States is the basis for the prosecution.
This provision is intended to encompass such public activities as
official publications of the United States, or official statements or press
releases made by those acting on behalf of the United States, which
specifically acknowledge or reveal an intelligence relationship. In addi-
tion, the United States has "revealed" an intelligence relationship if it
has published information which directly and immediately identifies
someone as a covert agent. An identification is not direct and immediate
if it can be made only after an effort to seek out and compare, cross-
reference, and collate information from several publications or sources.
Section 502 (b) (1) and (2) insure that a prosecution cannot be main-
tained under section 501 (a), (b), or (c), upon theories of aiding and
abetting, misprison of a felon, or conspiracy, against an individual
who does not actually disclose information unless the Government can
prove the "in the course of an effort" and the intent elements which are
part of the substantive offense of section 501 (c). A reporter to whom is
leaked, illegally, the identity of a covert agent by a person prosecutable
under section 501 (a) or (b) would most likely not possess the necessary
intent or be engaging in the requisite course of conduct.
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Section 502 (c) states that
In any prosecution under section 501 (c), proof of inten-
tional disclosure of information described in such section, or
inferences derived from proof of such disclosure, shall not
alone constitute proof of intent to impair or impede the for-
eign intelligence activities of the United States.
This provision is intended to require the Government, when attempt-
ing to prove the intent elements of section 501(c) , to produce some evi-
dence of intent in addition to the inferences that may be drawn from the
fact of intentional disclosure. Thus the evidentiary rule that a person is
presumed to intend the foreseeable consequences of his actions cannot
be used as the sole basis to prove that the "effort" was undertaken with
the requisite intent or that the disclosure was made with the requisite
intent.
Section 502(d) is intended to make clear that disclosures made di-
rectly to the House or Senate Intelligence Committees are not criminal
offenses.
Section 503-Procedures for Establishing Cover for Intelligence Offi-
cers and Employees
Section 503 requires the President to establish procedures to ensure
that undercover intelligence officers and employees receive effective
cover. To this end, the section also stipulates that the procedures shall
provide that those departments and agencies of the government desig-
nated by the President to provide assistance for cover arrangements
shall provide whatever assistance the President deems necessary to
effectively maintain the secrecy of such officers and employees.
This provision of the bill does not require the President to do any-
thing not now being done about intelligence cover arrangements. It does
not stipulate which elements of Government shall provide assistance or
what that assistance must be. It requires only that the President of the
United States review these questions and determine the appropriate
interest of the United States. In so doing, the provision recognizes the
fact that only the President has the authority and duty to truly resolve
this question and only he will have the requisite detachment to make a
decision that can result in the adequate provision of cover to undercover
intelligence operations.
Section 503(b) excepts the mandated regulation from any require-
ment for public disclosure. In lieu of such disclosure, the committee
expects the regulations to be made available to the House and Senate
Intelligence Committee. The committee would also note that it is not
its intent that section 503 be interpreted to require or suggest that exist-
ing public regulations concerning use of clerics, academics, and media
for cover be made secret.
Section 504-Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
This section is intended to remove any doubt of the Congress's in-
tent to authorize the Federal Government to prosecute a U.S. citizen
or permanent resident alien for an offense under section 501 committed
outside of the United States.'
a For discussion of Congress's power to authorize such prosecution, see Notes, "Extra-
territorial Jurisdiction-Criminal Law" 13 Harv. Int. Law Journal 347: "Extraterritorial
Application of Penal Legislation," 64 Mich. Law Rev. 609; and Working Papers of the
National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, Vol. I, p. 69 (1970).
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Section 505-Providing Information to Congress
This section is intended to make it absolutely clear that no provision
of the legislation may be relied on in any manner by the executive
branch as a basis for withholding information from the Congress.
Section 506-De funition8
Section 506(1) defines "classified information". It means identifi-
able information or material which has been given protection from
unauthorized disclosure for reasons of national security pursuant to
the provisions of a statute or Executive order.
Section 506 (2) defines "authorized". When used with respect to
access to classified information it means having authority, right, or
permission pursuant to the provisions of a statute, executive order,
directive of the head of any department or agency engaged in foreign
intelligence or foreign counterintelligence activities, order of a U.S.
court, or the provisions of any rule of the House of Representatives
or resolution of the Senate which assigns responsibility within the re-
spective House of Congress for the oversight of intelligence activities.
Section 506(3) defines "disclose". It means to communicate, provide,
impart, transmit, transfer, convey, pubish, or otherwise make
available.
Section 506(4) defines "covert agent". The term encompasses three
distinct groups. In the first group are officers or employees of (or mem-
bers of the Armed Forces assigned to) an intelligence agenc whose
identity is classified and who are serving outside the United States at
the time of the disclosure or have so served within the previous 5 years.
In the second group are U.S. citizens in the United States who are
agents of, or informants or sources of operational assistance to, the
foreign counterintelligence or counterterrorism components of the
FBI, or U.S. citizens outside the United States who are agents of, or
informants or sources of operational assistance to an intelligence
agency. In each instance the intelligence relationship must be properly
classified.
In the third group are present or former agents of an intelligence
agency and informants or sources of operational assistance to an in-
telligence agency whose identity is classified and who are not U.S.
citizens.
The committee intends the term' "agent" to be construed according to
traditional agency law. Essentially, an agent is 'a nonemployee over
whom is exercised a degree of direction and control. A "source of op-
erational assistance", on the other hand, is a nonemployee who is not
subject to direction and control, but who supports or provides assist-
ance to intelligence activities which are under direction and control.
The committee has given long and careful thought to the definition
of "covert agent" and has included within it only those identities which
it is absolutely necessary to protect for reasons of imminent danger to
life or significant interference with legitimate and vital intelligence
activities. Undercover officers and employees overseas are in special
danger when their identities are revealed, as recent events indicate. In
addition, U.S. intelligence activities are disrupted severely when the
identity of an officer in the clandestine service is disclosed, even when
he or she is temporarily in the United States for rest, training, or re-
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assignment. Thus, the definition includes those intelligence agency
officers or employees whose identities have a classified cover and who
have served overseas within the previous 5 years.
Overseas agents and informants who are not U.S. citizens can expect
instant retribution when their relationship to the United States is ex-
posed. If they reside in the United States their relatives abroad are
endangered. In both instances, important sources of information are
denied by disclosure, and possible future sources are less forthcoming.
For these reasons the bill protects the identities of foreign agents, in-
formants and sources be they within or without the United States at
the time of the disclosure.
The committee has carefully crafted H.R. 5615 to insure it does not
chill or stifle public criticism of intelligence activities or public debate
concerning intelligence policy. An example of such drafting is the
manner in which the definition of "covert agent" treats U.S. citizens
who are not intelligence agency officers or employees. If such individ-
uals-informants or sources-reside and act outside the United States,
the revelation of their relationship would expose them to immediate
and serious danger, and so their identity is protected.
However, the physical danger element is much less, if present at
all, within the United States. Furthermore, U.S. citizens residing
within the U.S. who assist intelligence agencies, may be employees
of colleges, churches, the media, or political organizations. The de-
gree of involvement of these groups with intelligence agencies is a
legitimate subject of national debate and intragroup discourse. There-
fore, the bill, in establishing criminal offenses for disclosures of the
identities of covert agents, includes U.S. citizens residing within the
United States within the operative definition only if the citizen is an
agent of or informant to the foreign counterintelligence or foreign
counterterrorism components of the FBI. These components are espe-
cially significant in terms of the country's real national security in-
terests and maintain particularly sensitive relationships with their
agents and informants. Domestic agents and informants of the CIA
or the DOD who are U.S. citizens are not included within the
definition.
Section 506 (5) defines "intelligence agency". It means the Central
Intelligence Agency, any foreign intelligence component of the De-
partment of Defense, or the foreign counterintelligence or foreign
counterterrorism components of the FBI.
Section 506 (6) defines "informant". It means any individual who
furnishes information to an intelligence agency in the course of a
confidential relationship protecting the identity of such individual
from public disclosure. This definition, along with that of "covert
agent", insures that the term "informant" does not include all possible
sources of assistance or information, but is narrowly defined to bring
within it a limited number of individuals whose identity is classified
and whose relationship with an agency is or has been conducted on a
regularized and ongoing basis as part of an established informant
program.
Section 506 (7) defines "officer" and "employee" with the definition
given such terms by section 2104 and 2105, respectively, of Title 5,
United States Code.
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Section 506 (8) defines "Armed Forces" to mean the Army, Navy,
Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard.
Section 506 (9) defines "United States". When used in a geographic
sense it means all areas under the territorial sovereignty of the United
States and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.
COMMFITEE PosrrION
On July 25, 1980, a quorum being present, the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence approved H.R. 5615, with amendments, by
voice vote and ordered that it be reported favorably.
OVERSIGHT FINDINGS
With respect to clause 2(1) (3) (A) of rule XI of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, the committee notes that it has conducted
an extensive investigation, which has included both public and execu-
tive session hearings, on the ability of the United States to keep secret
the identities of its undercover intelligence officers and agents. The
committee findings in this area have resulted in its recommendation
that new legislation (H.R. 5615) be enacted. The committee's reason-
ing is set out in the body of this report.
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET ACT
Pursuant to clause 2 (1) (3) (B) of rule XI of the Rules of the House
of Representatives, the committee notes that this legislation does not
provide for new budget authority or tax expenditures.
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE ESTIMATE
Pursuant to clause 2 (1) (3) (C) of rule XI of the Rules of the House
of Representatives, the committee notes that it has not received an
estimate from the Congressional Budget Office under section 403 of the
Congressional Budget Act.
RECOMMENDATION OF THE COMMITTEE ON GovERNMENT OPERATIONS
Pursuant to clause 2(1) (3) (D) of rule XI of the Rules of the House
of Representatives, the committee notes that it has not received a report
from the Committee on Government Operations
INFLATION IMPACT STATEMENT
Pursuant to clause 2(1) (4) of rule XI of the Rules of the House of
Representatives, the committee finds that enactment of H.R. 5615 will
have no inflationary impact on prices or costs in the operation of the
national economy.
FIVE-YEAR PROJECTION
Pursuant to clause 7 (a) (1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House
of Representatives, the committee has determined that no measurable
additional costs will be incurred by the Government in the administra-
tion of H.R. 5615.
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ExEcurivE BRANCH ESTIMATES
The committee has received no cost estimates from the executive
branch and is therefore unable to compare the Government's cost esti-
mates with its own estimates pursuant to clause 7(a) (2) of rule XIII
of the Rules of the House of Representatives.
CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW MADE BY THE BILL, AS REPORTED
In compliance with clause 3 of rule XIII of the Rules of the House
of Representatives, changes in existing law made by the bill, as re-
ported, are shown as follows (new matter is printed in italic, existing
law in which no change is proposed is shown in roman) :
NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947
,AN ACT To promote the national security by providing for a Secretary of De-
fense ; for a National Military Establishment ; for a Department of the Army,
a Department of the Navy, and a Department of the Air Force ; and for the
coordination of the activities of the National Military Establishment with
other departments and agencies of the Government concerned with the national
security
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SHORT TITLE
That this Act may be cited as the "National Security Act of 1947".
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TITLE V-PROTECTION OF CERTAIN NATIONAL
SECURITY INFORMATION
Sec. 501. Disclosure of identities of certain United States undercover intelligence
officers, agents, informants, and sources.
Sec. 505. Defenses and exceptions.
Sec. 503. Procedures for establishing cover for intelligence officers and employees.
See. 504. Extraterritorial jurisdiction.
Sec. 505. Providing information to Congress.
Sec. 506. Definitions.
TITLE V -PROTECTION OF CERTAIN NATIONAL
SECURITY INFORMATION
DISCLOSURE OF IDENTITIES OF CERTAIN UNITED STATES UNDERCOVER
INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS, AGENTS, INFORMANTS, AND SOURCES
SEC. 601. (a) Whoever, having or having had authorized access to
cla8si Fred information that identi free a covert agent, intentionally dis-
closes any information identi f yang such covert agent to any individual
not authorized to receive ckssi fled in f ormation,knowing that the in f or-
mation disclosed so identi foes such covert agent amd that the United
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States is taking a f fIrmative measures to conceal such covert agent's in-
telligence relationship to the United States, shall be fined not more
than $50,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.
(b) Whoever, as a result of having authorized access to classified
vn f ormation, learns the identity o f a covert agent and intentionally
dascloswres any information identifying such covert agent to any indi-
vidual not authorized to receive claesi fled information, knowing that
the information disclosed so identifies such covert agent and that the
United States is taking affirmative measures to conceal such covert
agent's intelligence relationship to the United States, shall be fined not
more than $$5,000 or imprisoned not more than five yearn, or both.
(e) Whoever, in the course of an effort to identify and expose covert
agents with the intent to impair or impede the foreign intelligence
activities of the United States, discloses, with the intent to impair or
impede the foreign intelligence activities of the United States, to any
individual not authorized to receive classifed information, any infor-
mation that identifies a covert agent knowing that the information dis-
closed so identifies such covert agent and that the United States is tak-
ing a f lrmative measures to conceal such covert agent's intelligence rela-
tionship to the United States, shall be fined not more than $15,000 or
imprisoned not more than three years, or both.
DEFENSES AND EXCEPTIONS
Sec. 50$. (a) It is a defense to a prosecution under section 501 that
before the commission of the offense with which the defendant is
charged, the United States had publicly acknowledged or revealed the
intelligence relationship to the United States of the individual the dis-
closure of whose intelligence relationship to the United States is the
basis for the prosecution.
(b) (1) Subject to paragraph (2), no person other than a persona
committing an offense under section 501 shall be subject to prosecution
under such section by virtue of section $ or 4 of title 18, United States
Code, or shall be subject to prosecution for conspiracy to commit an
offense under such section.
(2) Paragraph (1) shall not apply in the case of a person who acted
in the course of an effort to identify and expose covert agents with the
intent to impair or impede the foreign intelligence activities of the
United States.
(c) In any prosecution under section 501(c), proof of intentional
disclosure of information described in such section, or inferences de-
rived from proof of such disclosure, shall not alone constitute proof of
intent to impair or impede the foreign intelligence activities of the
United States.
(d) It shall not be an offense under section 501 to transmit informa-
tion described in such section directly to the Select Committee on In-
telligence of the Senate or to the Permanent Select Committee on Intel-
ligence of the House of Representatives.
PROCEDURES FOR ESTABLISHING COVER FOR INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS AND
AGENTS
SEC. 508. (a) The President shall establish procedures to ensure that
any individual who is an officer or employee of an intelligence agency,
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or a member of the Armed Forces assigned to duty with an intelli-
gence agency, whose identity as such an officer, employee, or member
is classified information and which the United States takes affirmative
measures to conceal is afforded all appropriate assistance to ensure
that the identity of such individual as such an officer, employee, or
member is effectively concealed. Such procedures shall provide that
any department or agency designated by the President for the pur-
poses of this section shall provide such assistance as may be determined
by the President to be necessary in order to establish and effectively
maintain the secrecy of the identity of such individual as such an
officer, employee, or member.
(b) Procedures established by the President pursuant to subsection
(a) shall be exempt from any requirement for publication or dis-
closure.
SEc. 504. There is jurisdiction over an offense under section 501
committed outside the United States if the individual committing the
offense is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted
to the United States for permanent residence (as defined in section
101 (a) (20) of the Immigration and Nationality Act).
Sic. 505. Nothing in this title shall be construed as authority to
withhold information from Congress or from a committee of either
House of Congress.
SEc. 506. For the purposes of this title :
(1) The term "elassi feed information" means information or
material designated and clearly marked or clearly represented,
pursuant to the provisions of a statute or Executive order (or a
regulation or order issued pursuant to a statute or Executive
order), as requiring a specie degree of protection against unau-
thorized disclosure for reasons of national security.
(2) The term "authorized", when used with respect to access
to elassi fied information, means having authority, right, or per-
muisaion pursuant to the provisions of a statute, Executive order,
directive of the head of any department or agency engaged in
foreign intelligence or counterintelligence activities, order of a
United States court, or provisions of any Rule of the House of
Representatives or resolution Of the Senate which assig ns re-
sponsibility within the respective House Of Congress for the over-
sight of intelligence activities.
(3) The term "disclose" means to commuunicate, provide, im-
part, transmit, transfer, convey, publish, or otherwise make avail-
able.
(4) The term `covert agent" means-
(A) an officer or employee of an intelligence agency, or a
member of the Armed Forces assigned to duty with can in-
telligence agency-
(i) whose identity as such officer, employee, or member
is classified information, and
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ai) who i8 serving outside the United States or has
within the last five years served outside the United States;
(B) a United States citizen whose intelligence relationship
to the United States i8 classified information a nd-
(i) who resides and acts outside the United States as
an agent of, or informant or source of operational assist-
ance to, an intelligence age~ , or
(ii) who is at the time of the disclosure acting as an
agent of, or informant to, the foreign counterintelligence
or foreign counterterrorism components of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation; or
(C) an individual, other than a United States citizenn,,
whose past or present intelligence relationship to the United
States is classified and who is a present or former agent o t, or
a present or firmer informant or source of operat' as-
si8tance to, an intelligence agency.
(5) The term "intelligence agency" means the Central Intelli-
gence Agency, the foreign intelligence components of the De-
partment of Defense, or the foreign counterintelligence or for-
eign counterterrorist components of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation.
(6) The term "informant" means any individual who furnishes
information to an intelligence agency in the course of a con faden-
tial relationship protecting the identity of such individual from
public disclosure.
(7) The terms "officer" and "employee" have the meanings given
such terms by sections 2104 and 2105, respectively of title 5,
United States Code.
(8) The term "Armed Forces" means the Army, Navy, Air
Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard.
(9) The term "United States", when used in a geographic sense
means all areas under the territorial sovereignty of the United
States and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.
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Approved For Release 2008/10/29: CIA-RDP85-00003R000200090016-0