INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT ACT OF 1980

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85-00003R000300010007-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 16, 2007
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: May 15, 1980
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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Calendar No. 780
Mr. BAYH, from the Select Committee on Intelligence,
submitted the following
REPORT
The Select Committee on Intelligence, to which was referred the
bill (S. 2284) to authorize the intelligence system of the United States
by the establishment of a statutory basis for the national intelligence
activities of the United States, and for other purposes, having con-
sidered 4 he same, reports favorably- thereon with amendments and
recommends that the bill, as amended, do pass.
AMENDMENTS
Strike all after the enacting clause and insert in lieu thereof the
following :
That this Act may be cited as the "Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980".
SEC. 2. Section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2422)
is amended by striking out in subsection (a) "and reports, in a timely fashion"
and all that follows down through the period in subsection (b) and inserting
in lieu thereof a period and the following : "Each such operation shall be
considered a significant anticipated intelligence activity for the purposes of
section 501 of the National Security Act of 1947.".
SEC. 3. (a) The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) Is
amended by adding at the end thereof the following new title :
"TITLE V-ACCOUNTABILITY FOR INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
"CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
"SEC. 501. (a) To the extent consistent with all applicable authorities and
duties, including those conferred by the Constitution upon the executive and
legislative branches of the Government, and to the extent consistent with due
regard for the protection from unauthorized disclosure of classified information
and information relating to intelligence sources and methods, the Director of
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Central Intelligence and the heads of all departments, agencies, and other
entities of the United States involved in intelligence activities shall-
"(1) keep the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives
(hereinafter in this section referred to as the `Select Committees') fully
and currently informed of all intelligence activities which are the respon-
sibiilty of, are engaged in by, or are carried out for or on behalf of, any
department, agency, or entity of the United States, including any significant
anticipated intelligence activity, except that (A) the foregoing provision
shall not require approval of the Select Committees as a condition precedent
to the initiation of any such anticipated intelligence activity, and (B) if
the President determines it is essential to limit prior notice to meet extraor-
dinary circumstances affecting vital interests of the United States, such
notice shall be limited to the chairmen and ranking minority member of
the Select Committees, the speaker and minority leaders of the House of
Representatives, and the majority and minority leaders of the Senate;
"(2) furnish any information or material concerning intelligence activi-
ties which is in the possession, custody, or control of any department,
agency, or entity of the United States and which is requested by either of
the Select Committees in order to carry out its authorized responsibilities ;
and
I" (3) report in a timely fashion to the Select Committees any illegal
intelligence activity or significant intelligence failure and any corrective
action that has been taken or is planned to be taken in connection with
such illegal activity or failure.
"(b) The President shall fully inform the Select Committees in a timely
fashion of intelligence operation in foreign countries, other than activities
intended solely for obtaining necessary intelligence, for which prior notice was
not given under subsection (a) and shall provide a statement of the reasons
for not giving prior notice.
"(c) The President and the Select Committees shall each establish such
procedures as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of subsections (a)
and (b).
"(d) The House of Representatives and the Senate, in consultation with
the Director of Central Intelligence, shall each establish, by rule or resolution
of such House, procedures to protect from unauthorized disclosure all classi-
fied information and all information relating to intelligence sources and
methods furnished to the Select Committees or to Members of the Congress
under this section. In accordance with such procedures, each of the Select
Committees shall promptly call to the attention of its respective House, or to
any appropriate committee or committees of its respective House, any matter
relating to intelligence activities requiring the attention of such House or such
committee or committees."
Amend the title so as to read :
A bill to strengthen the system of Congressional oversight of intelligence
activities of the United States.
S. 2284 was introduced on February 8, 1980, as the National In-
telligence Act of 1980, by Senator Huddleston, chairman of the Sub-
committee on Charters and Guidelines of the Select Committee on
Intelligence. The bill was cosponsored by Senator Mathias, vice-chair-
man of the Subcommittee on Charters and Guidelines, and by Senator
Bayh and Senator Goldwater, chairman and vice-chairman of the
Select Committee. It was introduced in the House as H.R. 6588 by
Representative Boland, chairman of the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence.
Hearings on the bill began before the Select Committee on Intelli-
gence on February 21, 1980. From the outset a principal issue was
the provision for congressional oversight of intelligence activities,
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including modification of the Hughes-Ryan Amendment of 1974
requiring reports on CIA covert operations to as many as eight
committees of the Congress. As introduced, S. 2284 repealed that
requirement and would have substituted in its place a general provi-
sion requiring prior notice to the two intelligence oversight committees
and full access by those committees to information concerning all
intelligence activities. The Administration initially opposed this pro-
vision. While strongly urging the repeal of the Hughes-Ryan report-
ing requirement, Director of Central Intelligence Stansfield Turner
testified that the Administration desired to "continue the current
reporting standard under the Hughes-Ryan Amendment by requiring
that special activities [covert operations] be reported in a timely
fashion.' 11
In addition to congressional oversight, S. 2284 as introduced would
have provided a comprehensive statutory charter for the intelligence
community. The Select Committee had'held 13 days of hearings in
1978 on an earlier version of the charter, S. 2525, introduced by
Senator Huddleston and other Committee members in the 95th Con-
gress. During 1980 the Committee held an additional 9 days of hear-
ings on S. 2284 covering the full range of charter issues. However, at
meetings of the Committee held May 1, 6 and 8, 1980, two weeks after
the end of these hearings, it was decided to focus on the congressional
oversight provision of S. 2284, with other matters to be considered
as separate legislation.
During the preceding weeks, an amended version of the congres-
sional oversight provision had been developed through lengthy de-
tailed consultations with the Administration. Additional language
providing for prior notice in extraordinary circumstances to 8 com-
mittee and congressional leaders (section 501(a) (1) (B), proposed
by Senator Inouye) and for the reporting of significant intelligence
failures (section 501 (a) (3), proposed by Senator Wallop with modi-
fications by Senator Moynihan) was adopted by the Committee on
May 6, 1980. S. 2284, as amended, was approved unanimously by the
Committee on May 8, 1980, as the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980,
with a recommendation for favorable action.
With respect to comprehensive charter legislation, the chairman
of the Select Committee, Senator Bayh, stated at the May 6 meeting:
"There is no question that such a charter is essential to place the
intelligence community on the firmest possible constitutional founda-
tion, and the Select Committee is fully committed to carrying that
enterprise forward to completion.
The Administration fully supports S. 2284, as reported by the Select
Committee on Intelligence with amendments, and the report of the
Select Committee thereon.
GENERAL STATEMENT
The purpose of this Act is to place in statute the oversight process
that has been in effect since 1976. It is based on the cumulative experi-
ence of successive oversight bodies since 1947, but primarily on the
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experience of the Select Committee on Intelligence since 1976. The
language derives from Section 202 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946,
from Senate Resolution 400, May 19, 1976, and from Executive Order
12036, January 26, 1978. The only present statutory provision for in-
telligence oversight is the Hughes-Ryan Amendment of 1974 (Section
662 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961), which requires timely
reporting of CIA covert operations to as many as eight congressional
committees. This requirement is repealed by Section 2 of this Act, and
such operations are expressly included in the provisions of this Act
for "significant anticipated intelligence activities."
Section 3 of this Act amends the National Security Act of 1947 to
add a new Section 501, Congressional Oversight. Section 501 estab-
lishes statutory requirements for congressional oversight of the activ-
ities of the intelligence community and for the provision to the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence of information necessary for this purpose.
In general terms, subsection (a) requires the Director of Central
Intelligence and the head of each agency involved in intelligence
activities to provide information to the two oversight committees.
These obligations, however, are conditioned by two separate limita-
tions. The obligations apply : (1) to the extent consistent with all
applicable authorities and duties, including those conferred by the
Constitution upon the executive and legislative branches of the Gov-
ernment; and (2) to the extent consistent with due regard for the
protection from unauthorized disclosure of classified information and
information relating to intelligence sources and methods. Consistent
with these conditions, the two oversight committees are to be kept fully
and currently informed of intelligence activities, including any sig-
nificant anticipated intelligence activity.
The separate amendment to Section 662 of the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961 provides that each CIA covert operation is included as a
"significant anticipated intelligence activity" to be reported in advance
to the two intelligence committees. This requirement of prior notice of
significant activities does not require committee approval as a condi-
tion precedent to their initiation. Provision is made for prior notice
only to the chairmen and ranking minority members of the committees,
and to the leaders of each House, if the President determines such
limitation is essential to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting
vital national interests. Subject to the two conditions under subsection
(a), each committee is also to be furnished any information or mate-
rial concerning intelligence activities which it requests to carry out its
authorized responsibilities and to be informed in a timely fashion of
any illegal intelligence activity or significant intelligence failure and
any corrective action that has been taken or is planned.
Subsection (b) requires timely notice to the committees of intelli-
gence operations in foreign countries, other than activities intended
solely for obtaining necessary intelligence, for which prior notice was
not given under subsection (a), and a statement by the President of the
reasons for not giving prior notice.
Subsection (c) provides for the establishment of procedures by the
President and by each oversight committee to carry out the foregoing
provisions. Subsection (d) recognizes the responsibility of each House
to ensure, by rule or resolution, the protection from unauthorized dis-
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closure of sensitive information furnished under this section, and the
responsibility of each oversight committee under such procedures to
bring to the attention of its respective House, or the appropriate com-
mittees, any matter requiring their attention.
Out of necessity, intelligence activities are conducted primarily in
secret. Because of that necessary secrecy, they are not subject to public
scrutiny and debate as is the case for most foreign policy and defense
issues. Therefore, the Congress, through its intelligence oversight com-
mittees, has especially important duties in overseeing these vital activ-
ities by the intelligence agencies of the United States. Section 501 is
intended to authorize the process by which information concerning in-
telligence activities of the United States is to be shared by the two
branches in order to enable them to fulfill their respective duties and
obligations to govern intelligence activities within the constitutional
framework. The Executive branch and the intelligence oversight com-
mittees have developed over the last four years a practical relationship
based on comity and mutual understanding, without confrontation.
The purpose of Section 501 is to carry this working relationship for-
ward into statute.
"Section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2422)
is amended by striking out in subsection (a) "and reports, in a timely
fashion" and all that follows down through the period in subsection
(b) and inserting in lieu thereof a period and the following: `Each
such operation shall be considered a significant anticipated intelligence
activity for the purposes of section 501 of the National Security Act
of 1947.'."
This amendment repeals the congressional reporting requirement of
the Hughes-Ryan Amendment of 1974, which provides that no funds
may be expended for any CIA covert operation unless and until the
President "reports, in a timely fashion, a description and scope of
such operation to the appropriate committees of the Congress, includ-
ing the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United ~tes Senate
and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the United States House of
Representatives." This language is replaced by a requirement that
each such operation be considered a "significant anticipated intelli-
gence activity" for the purposes of the new Congressional Oversight
provisions. The effect is to limit reporting to the two intelligence over-
sight committees, as compared with the seven committees that now
receive such reports, and also to substitute for "timely" reporting the
procedures for prior notice discussed below. There is no change in the
Hughes-Ryan requirements for Presidential findings. The waiver
which applies during a period of operations initiated under "an
exercise of powers by the President under the War Powers Resolution"
is repealed.
Section 501 (a)-Preambular Clause: "Authorities and Duties"
"SEC. 501. (a) To the extent consistent with all applicable authorities
and duties, including those conferred by the Constitution upon the
executive and legislative branches of the Government...."
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The first preambular clause is intended to make it clear that the
obligations imposed by subsection (a) are to be carried out to the
extent consistent with all applicable authorities and duties including
those conferred by the Constitution on both the Executive and Legis-
lative branches. There is a recognition that such constitutional au-
thorities and duties of the branches may sometimes come into conflict
with one another. Subsection (a) does not prescribe hard and fast
requirements for what may be a gray area resulting from the overlap
between the constitutional authorities and duties of the branches.
There is no mention in the Constitution of intelligence activities.
Whatever constitutional authorities may exist must follow from other
constitutionally conferred duties, such as the power of the President
to act as Commander-in-Chief and to make treaties with the advice
and consent of the Senate, or the power of the Legislature to "provide
for the common defense," "to define and punish piracies and felonies
committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations,"
"to declare war, . . . and to make rules concerning captures on land
and water," "to make rules for the government and regulation of the
land and naval forces," "to make all laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into execution . . . all other powers vested by
this Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any
Department or officer thereof," and to insist that `.`no money shall be
drawn from the Treasury, but in consequence of appropriations made
by law."
Nothing in this subsection is intended to expand or to contract or to
define whatever may be the applicable authorities and duties, including
those conferred by the Constitution upon the Executive and Legislative
branches.
Section 501 (a) -Preambular Clause: "Protection from Unauthorized
Disclosure"
"SEC. 501. (a) ... and to the extent consistent with due regard for
the protection rom unauthorized disclosure of classified information
and information relating to intelligence sources and methods...."
The clause in Section 501 (a) concerning the protection of classified
information and intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized
disclosure is intended to recognize the shared responsibilities of the
Executive and Legislative branches for such protection.
The Administration recognizes that the intelligence oversight com-
mittees of the House and Senate are authorized to receive such infor-
mation. However, it is recognized that in extremely rare circumstances
a need to preserve essential secrecy may result in a decision not to
impart certain sensitive aspects of operations or collection programs
to the oversight committees in order to protect extremely sensitive
intelligence sources and methods. This statute does not provide a statu-
tory right to withhold information from Congress when subpoenaed
by Congress.
Subsection (d), discussed below, provides expressly for the fulfill-
ment by each House of its responsibilities for the protection of sensi-
tive information from unauthorized disclosure. -
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Section 501 (a) (1) -Informing the Intelligence Commmittees
"SEC. 501. (a) ... the Director of Central Intelligence and the heads
of all departments, agencies, and other entities of the United States
involved in intelligence activities shall-
(1) keep the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate
and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House
of Representatives (hereinafter in this section referred to as the
`Select Committees') fully and currently informed of all intelli-
gence activities which are the responsibility of, are engaged in by,
or are carried out for or on behalf of, any department, agency,
of entity of the United States, including any significant antici-
pated intelligence activity, except that (A) the foregoing
provision shall not require approval of the Select Com-
mittees as a condition precedent to the initiation of any such
anticipated intelligence activity, and (B) if the President deter-
mines it is essential to limit prior notice to meet extraordinary
circumstances affecting vital interests of the United States, such
notice shall be limited to the chairmen and ranking minority
members of the Select Committees, the Speaker and minority
leader of the House of Representatives, and the majority and
minority leaders of the Senate;
"FULLY AND CURRENTLY INFORMED"
Under Section 501(a) (1), the intelligence agencies shall have the
affirmative duty to keep the two intelligence committees fully and
currently informed. The origin of the phrase "fully and currently
informed" is the requirement contained in Section 202 of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1946. For over thirty years this authority served the
information needs of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy well by
assuring it complete and timely notice of actions and policies of the
Federal government in the field of atomic energy. The language is also
contained in Senate Resolution 400, 94th Congress, and has served
the Select Committee well by ensuring that the Committee is informed
of intelligence activities in such detail as the committee may require.
The responsibility of the Executive here is not limited to providing
full and complete information upon request from the committees; it
also includes an affirmative duty on the part of the head of each
entity to keep the committees fully and currently informed of all
major policies, directives, and intelligence activities. The references
to "any" department, agency or entity in subsection (a) impose obli-
gations upon officials to report only with respect to activities under
their responsibility, subject to the procedures established by the Presi-
dent under subsection (c).
"SIGNIFICANT ANTICIPATED INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES"
Section 501 (a) (1) specifically states that the committees will be
kept "fully and currently informed . . . of significant anticipated
intelligence activities." Such activities include CIA covert operations
and, among other things, certain collection and counterintelligence
activities. As was stated in the legislative history of S. Res. 400, Re-
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port of the Committee on Government Operations, U.S. Senate, to
Accompany S. Res. 400,1976, pages 26-27:
An anticipated activity should be considered significant if
it has policy implications. This would include, for example,
activities which are particularly costly financially, as well as
those which are not necessarily costly, but which have ...
[significant] potential for affecting this country's diplo-
matic, political, or military relations with other countries
or groups ... It excludes day-to-day implementation of pre-
viously adopted policies or programs.
The Executive branch and the Committee expect to work together,
'as we have in the past, to delineate the matters covered by this
provision.
The intent is that the Committee will indicate to the Executive
branch those categories of intelligence activities for which it expects
advance information, and that those categories will be discussed fully
with the Executive branch. As required by the separate amendment to
Hughes-Ryan, CIA operations in a foreign country, other than activi-
ties intended solely for obtaining necessary intelligence, are to be con-
sidered "significant intelligence activities" for this purpose. It is
intended that such intelligence operations abroad by other agencies
would also be subject to the prior notice designation. In addition, cer-
tain intelligence collection and counterintelligence activities may be
included if, for example, they are governed by high-level Executive
branch approval requirements similar to those that apply to CIA
covert operations. Such collection activities are not, however, subject
to the separate provisions of subsection (b), discussed below, for timely
notice and a statement of the reasons for withholding prior notice. Any
collection activity that has not been designated by the Committee as
"significant" or that is not governed by the type of approval require-
ments applying to CIA covert operations would, of course, be subject
to the requirements to keep the Committee "fully and currently in-
formed." Special procedures for handling highly sensitive information
in these areas may also be established by each committee under sub-
section (c).
Prior notification of intelligence activities that affect foreign policy
encourages consultation between the branches and offers the possibility
that better decisions might be made. In testimony on February 21,
1980 before the Select Committee, Admiral Turner stated that "the
actions of both [intelligence] committees in reviewing these covert
action findings [have] influenced the way in which we have carried
them out.'? He said further that the influence had been "absolutely"
beneficial. Similarly, former Director Colby said in testimony on March
24 that discussion of significant planned activities "enables the Execu-
tive to get a sense of congressional reaction and avoid the rather clam-
orous repudiation which has occurred in certain cases . . . and I think
that is a helpful device."
The Executive Branch has argued that the President's "constitu-
tional authorities and duties," mentioned in the preamble, might per-
mit a withholding of prior notice through the exercise of the Presi-
dent's constitutional authority. The Constitution does not specifically
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address the allocation of powers to the President associated with na-
tional security and foreign policy matters beyond such functions as
the duties of the Commander-in-Chief and the power of the President
to appoint ambassadors. Congress is given the powers to declare war,
raise and support armed forces, and make rules and regulations gov-
erning their use, and, in the Senate, give advice and consent to treaties
and the appointment of ambassadors. Those powers concerning na-
tional security and foreign policy are in a "zone of twilight" in which
the President and Congress share authority whose distribution is
uncertain.'
Former DCI Colby has given an example of a rare extraordinary
emergency situation when the President might be required to act to
defend the vital interests of the nation and there might not be time to
provide notice until the plan had begun. Mr. Colby stated :
I can conceive of a cable arriving in the wee hours of the
night which says that you have an opportunity to do some-
think of vast importance. It makes a great deal of sense but ...
the return cable has to go out in a matter of three hours. It
will be a little hard in that situation to be able to go through
the procedure [of notifying Congress] ... but to hold it be-
cause you couldn't get to the Committee at that point I think
would be a mistake.
The requirement to "fully and currently inform" the oversight com-
mittees of "any significant anticipated intelligence activity" is in-
tended to mean that the committees shall be informed at the time of
the Presidential finding that authorizes initiation of such activity.
Arrangements for notice are to be made forthwith, without delay.
Congress, of course, has the power to attach the condition of prior
notice to expenditure of funds for intelligence activities. The pre-
ambular clause referring to authorities under the Constitution is an
indication that a broad understanding of these matters concerning in-
telligence activities can be worked out in a practical manner, even if
the particular exercise of the constitutional authorities of the two
branches cannot be predicted in advance.
Section 501 (a) (1) (A) -Approval of Committees Not Required for
Anticipated Intelligence Activity
Section 501 (a) (1) (A) states simply that prior notice is required
but "the foregoing provision shall not require approval of such com-
mittees as a condition precedent to the initiation of any such antici-
pated intelligence activity." This intent can be traced to S. Res. 400
where it is expressed in different terms in Section 11(A). During de-
bate on the measure, Senator Howard Baker requested such a proviso
to be added :
"to make absolutely clear that the inclusion of the words 'includ-
ing any significant anticipated activities' did not constitute a
requirement that the Select Committee either give its consent or
approval before any covert action or intelligence activity could be
implemented by the Executive branch. Rather, the intent of [in-
U.S. v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., 567 F.2d 121, 128 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Young8town
Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637-638 (1952), opinion of Mr. Justice
Jackson.
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eluding, those words] is to require prior consultation between the
Committee and the intelligence community, but not prior consent
or approval." 2
Section 501 (a) (1) (B) -Limited Prior Notice
Provision has been made in (a) (1) (B) for those rare cases in which
the President determines it is essential to limit prior notice to meet
extraordinary circumstances affecting the vital interests of the United
States. For these cases, the President shall limit prior notice to the
Chairmen and ranking minority members of the House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, the Speaker and the minority leader of the House of Rep-
resentatives, and the majority and minority leaders of the Senate.
The purpose of this limited prior notice in extraordinary circum-
stances is to preserve the secrecy necessary for very sensitive cases
while providing the President with advance consultation with the
leaders in Congress and the Chairmen and ranking minority.members
who have special expertise and responsibility in intelligence matters.
Such consultation will ensure strong oversight, and at the same time,
share the President's burden on difficult decisions concerning signifi-
cant activities. This limited prior notice calls only for prior consulta-
tion, and in no way suggests prior approval.
Section 501 (a) (2)-Access to Information
"SEC. 501. (a) ... the Director of Central Intelligence and the heads
of all departments, agencies, and other entities of the United States
involved in intelligence activities shall-
* * * * * * *
(2) furnish any information or material concerning intelligence
activities which is in the possession, custody or control of any de-
partment, agency or entity of the United States and which is
requested by either of the Select Committees in order to carry out
its authorized responsibilities;"
Section 501 (a) (2) states that agency heads are to furnish the com-
mittee any document or information which the agency has in its
possession, custody, or control. The purpose of this section is to sup-
plement subsection (a) (1), which requires that the committees be kept
fully and currently informed, by permitting the committees to obtain
information upon request that is relevant to its authorized responsi-
bilities.
Many of the mandated duties of the Committee do not require access
to sources and methods, but some do. In the usual course of the Com-
mittee work, the identities of human sources are not needed, nor have
they been requested. A hypothetical case would serve to illustrate the
point. An ally of the United States has a source highly placed in the
cabinet of Ruritania. This ally is willing to give the information to
the United States provided that the nature of the source is disclosed to
the President and the Director of Central Intelligence only and no one
else. The information is of critical importance to the United States. The
President therefore would agree to such a condition, and the commit-
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tees would not seek nor expect to receive the source of such information.
However, in the event that the information turned out to be spurious
and was actually contrived by the Ruritanian government and caused
harm to the United States in some way, the intelligence oversight com-
mittees would, in the course of their proper inquiries, have every right
to learn the identity of the source. This underlines the general ap-
proach of the oversight committee. The right of full access to any
intelligence information implies some measure of discretion. It does
not mean trucking the entire product of the intelligence community
each day to the Committee offices. It does mean, however, that should
the Committee believe it necessary, in the conduct of its mandated
duties, all the information it desires shall be supplied consistent with
subsection (a). The occasions when any information including sources
and methods might be sought are almost always confined to abuse or
misuse situations or in the case of intelligence failures. The Committee
has exercised this authority on a number of occasions over the past five
years without any unauthorized disclosure of classified information or
sensitive sources and methods.
Section 501 (a) (3)-Reports on Illegal Activities or Significanit Intel-
ligence Failures
"SEC. 501. (a) ... The Director of Central Intelligence and the
heads of all departments, agencies, and other entities of the United
States involved in intelligence activities shall-
* * * * *
(3) report in a timely fashion to the Select Committees any
illegal intelligence activity or significant intelligence failure and
any corrective action that has been taken or is planned to be
taken in connection with such illegal activity or failure."
Section 501 (a) (3) provides that the head of each intelligence agency
is to report any intelligence activity that violates any law of the
United States, including violation of any Executive Order or Presi-
dential Directive, or significant violation of an entity rule or regula-
tion issued pursuant to law. A report would be made to the intelligence
oversight committees upon confirmation of any violation, and would
include a description of what corrective action has been taken or is
expected to be taken by the entity with respect to such violations.
This requirement parallels similar language in section 11(c) of
Senate Resolution 400 for reporting activities which "constitute vio-
lations" and in section 3-403 of Executive Order 12036 for reporting
activities that "are illegal." It is not intended in any way to affect or
alter the responsibilities and practices of the Executive branch for
reporting to appropriate authorities, including the Attorney General,
evidence of possible violations and activities which raise questions of
legality. (See, inter alia, sections 1-706, 1-709, 3-102, 3-2, and 3-3 of
Executive Order 12036.)
The Director of Central Intelligence and the head of each agency
are also to report to the intelligence oversight committees each sig-
nificant intelligence failure in the work of that entity or for which
that entity is responsible; this report would likewise contain a descrip-
tion of any corrective actions which have been taken or which are
planned to ensure that such a failure does not recur. Significant fail-
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ures to be reported would include major errors in analysis and/or
prediction, failures in technical collection systems or other clandestine
operations, and failures to protect sensitive sources and methods infor-
mation from unauthorized disclosure.
Section 501(b)=Timely Notice
"SEC. 501. (b) The President shall fully inform the Select Com-
mittees in a timely fashion of intelligence operations in foreign coun-
tries, other than activities intended solely for obtaining necessary
intelligence, for which prior notice was not given under subsection
(a) and shall provide a statement of the reasons for not giving prior
notice."
The Senate Select Committee and the Executive branch and the
intelligence agencies have come to an understanding that in rare ex-
traordinary circumstances if the President withholds prior notice of
covert operations, he is obliged to inform the two oversight committees
in a timely fashion of the action and the reasons for withholding of
such prior notice. This requirement retains in full force the current
statutory obligation under the Hughes-Ryan Amendment for the re-.
porting of covert operations in a timely fashion to the two oversight
committees (but not to other committees). The further requirement
of a statement of the President's reasons for not giving prior notice
is intended to permit a thorough assessment by the oversight commit-
tees as to whether the President had valid grounds for withholding
prior notice and whether legislative measures are required to prevent
or limit such action in the future.
The term "intelligence operations in foreign countries, other than
activities intended solely for obtaining necessary intelligence," is
drawn directly from the Hughes-Ryan Amendment and applies to,
covert operations abroad by any department, agency, or other entity'
of the United States. It does not apply to activities intended solely to
collect or otherwise obtain necessary intelligence. Collection activities
are intended, however, to be covered by the requirements of subsection
(a) for informing the committees of "significant anticipated intelli-
gence activities" in the circumstances described previously, as well as
by the requirements of subsection (a) for keeping the committees
"fully and currently informed of all intelligence activities," for fur-
nishing "any information or material concerning intelligence activi-
ties" requested by the committees to carry out their responsibilities.
and for reporting illegal intelligence activities and significant intelli-
gence failures.
The provisions of subsection (b) are expressly not conditioned upon
the preambular clauses that apply to subsection (a).
Section 105(c) -Presidential and Committee Procedures
"SEC. 105. (c) The President and the Select Committee shall each
establish such procedures as may be necessary to carry out the provi-
sions of subsections (a) and (b)."
The authority for procedures established by the President is based
on Executive Order 12036 and is intended to apply to the Executive
branch. The President may, for example, prescribe procedures under
which certain information is to be furnished by a designated official.
Such procedures shall ensure that the oversight committees are fully
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and currently informed, that they are furnished requested informa-
tion, and that they receive reports of illegal activities and intelligence
failures in accordance with subsections (a) and (b).
The authority for procedures established by the Select Committees
is based on the current practice of the committees in establishing their
own rules. One or both committees may, for example, adopt pro-
cedures under which designated members are assigned responsibility on
behalf of the committee to receive information in particular types of
circumstances, such as when all members cannot attend a meeting or
when certain highly sensitive information is involved.
Section 501(d)-Congressional Procedures to Protect National Se-
curity Information
"SEC. 501. (d) The House of Representatives and the Senate, in
consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence, shall each
establish by rule or resolution of such House, procedures to protect
from unauthorized disclosure all classified information and all in-
formation relating to intelligence sources and methods furnished to
the Select Committees or to Members of the Congress under this sec-
tion. In accordance with such procedures, each of the Select Commit=
tees shall promptly call to the attention of its respective House, or to
any appropriate committee or committees of its respective House, any
matter relating to intelligence activities requiring the attention of
such House or such committee or committees."
Under the preambular clause in subsection (a), the responsibility
of each agency head to inform the intelligence committees is to be
carried out "to the extent consistent with due regard for the protec-
tion of classified information and intelligence sources and methods
from unauthorized disclosure." The Congress recognizes that it has
a similar responsibility to that of the Executive branch, to protect
national security secrets from unauthorized disclosure. Subsection 501
(d) requires both the House of Representatives and the Senate in con-
sultation with the Director of Central Intelligence to establish pro-
cedures to protect national security information from unauthorized
disclosure. Establishment and implementation of such procedures is
intended to ensure consistency with "due regard" for protection of
such information. The procedures of both Houses under subsection
(d), as well as the procedures under subsection (c), will presumably
be worked out with the Executive branch in the same healthy spirit
of give-and-take that has prevailed since this Committee began its
work in 1976. These procedures will not constitute a "standing sub-
poena"; in fact, while operating under the provisions of Senate Reso-
lution 400 which also used the phrases fully and currently informed".
"furnish any information", and "significant anticipated activities",
the Committee has not once found it necessary to issue a subpoena to
obtain information from the Executive branch.
Both the House .of Representatives through H. Res. 658, 05th Con-
gress, and the Senate through Senate Resolution 400, 94th Congress,
have already established certain procedures to protect-national security
information or materials provided to them from unauthorized dis-
closure as called for in subsection (d). The provisions that contribute
to effective physical security and sound security practices which would
protect against unauthorized disclosure are contained in these resolu-
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tions and are envisioned by subsection (d). Under the procedures
required by subsection (d), the Select Committee is to call to the
attention of the Senate, or any appropriate Senate Committee, intelli-
gence matters requiring its attention.3 This provision is subject to the
security restrictions in the procedures adopted under subsection (d).
The relevant sections of Senate Resolution 400 are as follows :
"SEC. 6. No employee of the select committee or any person engaged
by contract or otherwise to perform services for or at the request of
such committee shall be given access to any classified information by
such committee unless such employee or person has (1) agreed in writ-
ing and under oath to be bound by the rules of the Senate (including
the jurisdiction of the Select Committee on Standards and Conduct
and of such committee as to the security of such information during
and after the period of his employment or contractual agreement with
such committee; and (2) received an appropriate security clearance
as determined by such committee in consultation with the Director of
Central Intelligence. The type of security clearance to be required in
the case of any such employee or person shall, within the determination
of such committee in consultation with the Director of Central Intelli-
gence, be commensurate with the sensitivity of the classified informa-
tion to which such employee or person will be given access by such
committee.
"SEC. 7. The select committee shall formulate and carry out such rules
and procedures as it deems necessary to prevent the disclosure, without
the consent of the person or persons concerned, of information in the
possession of such committee which unduly infringes upon the privacy
or which violates the constitutional rights of such person or persons.
Nothing herein shall be construed to prevent such committee from
publicly disclosing, any such information in any case in which such
committee determines the national interest in the disclosure of such
information clearly outweighs any infringement on the privacy of any
person or persons.
"Snc. 8. (a) The select committee may, subject to the provisions of
this section, disclose publicly any information in the possession of such
committee after a determination by such committee that the public
interest would be served by such disclosure. Whenever committee ac-
tion is required to disclose any information under this section, the
committee shall meet to vote on the matter within five days after any
member of the committee requests such a vote. No member of the select
committee shall disclose any information, the disclosure of which re-
quires a committee vote, prior to a vote by the committee on the ques-
tion of the disclosure of such information or after such vote except in
accordance with this section.
"(b) (1) In any case in which the select committee votes to disclose
publicly any information which has been classified under established
security procedures, which has been submitted to it by the executive
branch, and which the executive branch requests be kept secret, such
committee shall notify the President of such vote.
B Inclusion of this provision was specifically requested by the Chairman and Ranking
Minority Member of the Committee on Foreign Relations. Letter from Senator Church and
Senator Javits to Senator Bayh and Senator Goldwater, Apr. 30, 1980.
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"(2) The select committee may disclose publicly such information
after the expiration of a five-day period following the day on which
notice of such vote is transmitted to the President, unless, prior to the
expiration of such five-day period, the President, personally in writ-
ing, notifies the committee that he objects to the disclosure of such in-
formation, provides his reasons therefor, and certifies that the threat to
the national interest of the United States posed by such disclosure is of
such gravity that it outweighs any public interest in the disclosure.
"(3) If the President, personally in writing, notifies the select com-
mitee of his objections to the disclosure of such information as pro-
vided in paragraph (2), such committee may, by majority vote, refer
the question of the disclosure of such information to the Senate for
consideration. The committee shall not publicly disclose such informa-
tion without leave of the Senate.
"(4) Whenever the select committee votes to refer the question of dis-
closure of any information to the Senate under paragraph (3), the
chairman shall, not later than the first day on which the Senate is in
session following the day on which the vote occurs, report the matter
to the Senate for its consideration.
"(5) One hour after the Senate convenes on the fourth day on which
the Senate is in session following the day on which any such matter is
reported to the Senate, or at such earlier time as the majority leader
and the minority leader of the Senate jointly agree upon in accordance
with section 133 (f) of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, the
Senate shall go into closed session and the matter shall be the pending
business. In considering the matter in closed session the Senate may-
"(A) approved the public disclosure of all or any portion of
the information in question, in which case the committee shall
publicly disclose the information ordered to be disclosed,
"(B) disapprove the public disclosure of all or any portion of
the information in question, in which case the committee shall
not publicly disclose the information ordered not to be dis-
closed, or
"(C) refer all or any portion of the matter back to the com-
mittee, in which case the committee shall make the final determina-
tion with respect to the public disclosure of the information in
question.
"Upon conclusion of the consideration of such matter in closed ses-
sion, which may not extend beyond the close of the ninth day on
which the Senate is in session following the day on which such
matter was reported to the Senate, or the close of the fifth day
following the day agreed upon jointly by the majority and minor-
ity leaders in accordance with section 133(f) of the Legislative Re-
organization Act of 1946 (whichever the case may be), the Senate
shall immediately vote on the disposition of such matter in open
session, without debate, and without divulging the information with
respect to which the vote is being taken. The Senate shall vote to
dispose of such matter by one or more of the means specified in
clauses (A), (B), and (C) of the second sentence of this paragraph.
Any vote of the Senate to disclose any information pursuant to this
paragraph shall be subject to the right of a Member of the Senate
to move for reconsideration of the vote within the time and pursuant
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to the procedures specified in rule XIII of the Standing Rules of
the Senate, and the disclosure of such information shall be made
consistent with that right.
"(c) (1) No information in the possession of the select committee re-
lating to the lawful intelligence activities of any department or agency
of the United States which has been classified under established se-
curity procedures and which the select committee, pursuant to sub-
section (a) or (b) of this section, has determined should not be
disclosed shall be made available to any person by a Member, officer,
or employee of the Senate except in a closed session of the Senate or
as provided in paragraph (2).
"(2) The select committee may, under such regulations as the com-
mittee shall prescribe to protect the confidentiality of such informa-
tion, make any information described in paragraph (1) available to
any other committee or any other Member of the Senate. Whenever
the select committee makes such information available, the committee
shall keep a written record showing, in the case of any particular
information, which committee or which Members of the Senate re-
ceived such information. No Member of the Senate who, and no
committee which, receives any information under this subsection,
shall disclose such information except in a closed session of the Senate.
"(d) It shall be the duty of the Select Committee on Standards and
Conduct to investigate any unauthorized disclosure of intelligence
information by a Member, officer or employee of the Senate in viola-
tion of subsection (c) and to report to the Senate concerning any
allegation which it finds to be substantiated.
"(e) Upon the request of any person who is subject to any such in-
vestigation, the Select Committee on Standards and Conduct shall
release to such individual at the conclusion of its investigation a
summary of its investigation together with its findings. If, at the
conclusion of its investigation, the Select Committee on Standards
and Conduct determines that there has been a significant breach of
confidentiality or unauthorized disclosure by a Member, officer, or
employee of the Senate, it shall report its findings to the Senate and
recommend appropriate action such as censure, removal from com-
mittee membership, or expulsion from the Senate, in the case of
Member, or removal from. office or employment or punishment for
contempt, in the case of an officer or employee."
COST ESTIMATE OF CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE
U.S. CONGRESS,
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE,
Washington, D.C. May 9, 1980.
Hon. BIRCH BAYH,
Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence,
U.S. Senate,
Washington. D.C.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN : Pursuant to Section 403 of the Congressional
Budget Act of 1974, the Congressional Budget Office has reviewed S.
2284. a bill to strengthen the system of Congressional oversight of
intelligence activities of the United States, as ordered reported by
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the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on May 8, 1980. Based on
this review, the CBO estimates that this bill will have no budget
impact.
Should the Committee so desire, we would be pleased to provide
further detail.
Sincerely,
In compliance with subsection (4) of rule XXIX of the Standing
Rules of the Senate, changes in existing law made by the bill, as
reported, are shown as follows (existing law proposed to be omitted
is enclosed in black brackets, new matter is printed in italic, and
existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in roman) :
(61 Stat. 497)
CIiArTER 343
AN ACT To promote the national security by providing for a Secretary of De-
fense ; for a National Military Establishment ; for a Department of the Army,
a Department of the Navy, and a Department of the Air Force ; and for the
coordination of the activities of the National Military Establishment with
other departments and agencies of the Government concerned with the na-
tional security
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SHORT TITLE
That this Act may be cited as the "National Security Act of 1947".
TABLE OF CONTENTS
* * * * * *
TITLE V-ACCOUNTABILITY FOR INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES
Sec. 501 Congressional oversight.
DECLARATION OF POLICY
TITLE I-* * *
TITLE V -ACCOUNTABILITY FOR INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
SEC. 501. (a) To the extent consistent with all applicable authori-
ties and duties, including those conferred by the Constitution upon
the executive and legislative branches of the Government, and to the
extent consistent with due regard for tprotection from unauthor-
ized disclosure of classified information and information relating to
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intelligence sources and methods, the Director of Central Intelligence
and the heads of all departments, agencies, and other entities of the
United States involved in intelligence activities shall-
(1) keep the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate
and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
House of Representatives (hereinafter in this section referred to
as the `Select Committees') fully and currently informed of all
intelligence activities which are the responsibility of, are engaged
in by, or are carried out for or on behalf of, any department,
agency, or entity of the United States, including any sign fieant
anticipated intelligence activity, except that (A) the foregoing
provision shall not require approval of the Select Committees as
a condition precedent to the initiation of any such anticipated
intelligence activity, and (B) if the President determines it is
essential to limit prior notice to meet extraordinary circum-
stances affecting vital interests of the United States, such notice
shall be limited to the chairmen and ranking minority members
of the Select Committees, the Speaker and Minority Leader of
the House of Representatives, and the majority and minority
leaders of the Senate;
(2) furnish any information or material concerning intelli-
gence activities which is in the possession, custody, or control of
any department, agency, or entity of the United States and which
is requested by either of the Select Committees in order to carry
out its authorized responsibilities; and
(3) report in a timely fashion to the Select Committees any
illegal intelligence activity or significant intelligence failure and
any corrective action that has been taken or is planned to be
taken in connection with such illegal activity or failure.
(b) The President shall fully inform the Select Committees in a
timely fashion of intelligence operations in foreign countries, other
than activities intended solely for obtaining necessary intelligence,
for which prior notice was not given under subsection (a) and shall
provide a statement of the reasons for not giving prior notice.
(c) The President and the Select Committees shall each establish
such procedures as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of
subsections (a) and (b).
(d) The House of Representatives and the Senate, in consultation
with the Director of Central Intelligence, shall each establish, by rule
or resolution of such House, procedures to protect from unauthorized
disclosure all classified information and all information relating to
intelligence sources and methods furnished to the Select Committees
or to Members of the Congress under this section. In accordance with
such procedures, each of the Select Committees shall promptly call
to the attention of its respective House, or to any appropriate com-
mittee or committees of its respective House, any matter relating to
intelligence activities requiring the attention of such House or such
committee or committees.
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19
(75 Stat. 424)
PuBLic LAW 87-195
AN ACT To promote the foreign, security, and general welfare of the United
States by assisting peoples of the world in their efforts toward economic
development and internal and external security, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House Of Representatives Of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SEC. 101. SHORT TrrLE.-This part may be cited as the "Act for
International Development of 1961".
PART III
SEC. 662. LIMITATION ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.-(a) No funds
appropriated under the authority of this or any other Act may be
expended by or on behalf of the Central Intelligence Agency for
operations in foreign countries, other than activities intended solely
for obtaining necessary intelligence, unless and until the President
finds that each such operation is important to the national security
of the United States [and reports, in a timely fashion, a description
and scope of such operation to the appropriate committees of the
Congress, including the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United
States Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the United
States House of Representatives]. Each such operation shall be con-
sidered a significant anticipated intelligence activity for the purposes
Of section 501 of the National Security Act of 1947.
[(b) The provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall not apply
during military operations initiated by the United States under a
declaration of war approved by the Congress or an exercise of powers
by the President under the War Powers Resolutions.]
O
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