SECTION 412(A) ALLOWS THE PRESIDENT TO SPLIT THE DNI AND THE D/CIA POSITION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85-00003R000300010009-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 16, 2007
• Sequence Number: 9
• Content Type: MISC

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TITLE IV - Q's & A's
1. Section 412(a) allows the President to split the
DNI and the D/CIA position, by appointing the DDNI or an
ADNI to head the CIA or to transfer any of the duties or
authorities of the D/CIA to the DNI (there may be questions
as to whether this is good or whether the split should be
made now in statute). What is the need for such a provision
and doesn't such a provision invite trouble?
-- This provision confirms present organizational arrangements
(DCI has two roles);
-- provision does give President organizational flexibility:
would allow DNI to devote more time to Community
managerial responsibilities;
. would allow the DDNI or an ADNI to direct the
clandestine collection function of CIA; and
. . . would allow the DDNI or an ADNI to direct the
analysis function of CIA.
-- change in present arrangements indicated above would be
subject to advice and consent of the Senate.
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2. We understand there is an internal dispute within
the Administration, between CIA and DOD, over Section
414(b)(4) which authorizes the Agency to:
"analyze foreign intelligence collected by any entity
of the intelligence community, and process such intelli-
gence as necessary to fulfill its responsibilities
under this Act."
Could you explain?
Executive Order 12036 (Section 1-605) provides authoritative
basis:
"1-605. Responsibility of Executive Branch
Agencies. The heads of all Executive Branch departments
and agencies shall, in accordance with law and relevant
Attorney General procedures, give the Director of
Central Intelligence access to all information relevant
to the national intelligence needs of the United States
and shall give due consideration to requests from the
Director of Central Intelligence for appropriate
support for CIA activities."
Background to this is that CIA has had trouble obtaining
intelligence collected by sensitive DOD collection systems.
?
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3. Both Sections 414(b)(7) and 414(d) deal with the
Director of the Agency's (D/CIA'S) authorities to function
at home and abroad in the area of counterintelligence and
counterterrorism activities. Isn't this dual authority (FBI
Director involved domestically) issue problematic and
counterproductive?
The question you have asked essentially goes to the rationale
for the jurisdictional boundaries between departments and
agencies embodied in the Charter bill. It was the decision
of the Administration to leave these jurisdictional boundaries
where they are today as a result of many years of accommodations
among the departments and agencies in the Intelligence
Community. The current arrangements represent a balance
of competing interests, competences and responsibilities
that cannot easily be restructured. It is the Admin-
istration's position that minor tinkering with this balance
would be destructive of the entire system and that a radical
restructuring at the present time would cause damage to the
entire national intelligence effort. Therefore, the Admini-
stration feels that these Charter provisions, which essentially
reflect t_he provisions of Executive Order 12036 and longstanding
practice within the Intelligence Community, should not be
changed. It should be noted, however, that the Charter bill
contains ample authority for the President to make such
changes in authorities as may be necessary to fine-tune the
present arrangements within the Intelligence Community. If a
radical revision of existing Community structure appears
appropriate at some time in the future, new legislation can
be introduced for this purpose.
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4. Section 426(d)(2) provides a procedure whereby the
d d in 4-1, f, t
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Agency can raw own on mon
Fund (CRF). This procedure is based on a 72 hour "prior
notification" of the HPSCI, the SSCI, and the two Appropriation's
Committees with an exception for "extraordinary circumstances."
Is this a departure from current practice? Do you agree
with Section 426(d)(2) as drafted. If so, doesn't this run
counter to the position taken by Admiral Turner with regard
to other "prior notification" provisions in the Charter?
This would be a departure from current practice to the
extent that this procedure would be codified in statute. I
would object to the need for any such codification. Moreover,
if, as seems intended, that the provision would require
detailed reporting on the purpose of the withdrawal, it is
objectionable because it would make notification a condition
precedent to the expenditure of funds withdrawn from the
Reserve Fund.
Current procedures with regard to CRF "draw-downs" for
special activities are as follows:
(1) the President makes a covert action "finding"
(Hughes-Ryan) ;
(2) "appropriate" Committees are notified of the c.a.
finding;
(3) DCI requests approval from OMB of CRF "draw-down;"
(4) Concomitantly with step No. 3, the two Oversight
Committees and the two Appropriations Committees are
notified of the DCI's request for OMB approval of
"draw-down."
[NOTE: OMB approval usually takes several days. We do
not go back to the Committees to notify them that OMB
has approved. OMB has never disapproved.)
it is clear from the procedure outlined above that the
Committees, as a matter of course, do have prior notification
in either the context of a Hughes-Ryan finding or.a CRF
"draw-down." This procedure has worked well. There is no
need to codify the notification process and thereby make
"notification of the purpose" a condition precedent to
expenditure.
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 Apl5rpve(tE-atReifia POD tV): q&d REA iJ qEt @3QWap4j~-l with
the State Department in the area of "benefits." It is our
understanding that the Administration does not approve of
retention of these provisions in the Bill. Could you explain?
Covered in statement.
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6. Why is there a need for Criminal Penalties for the
"misuse of the name, initials, or seal of the CIA?"
(Section 443)
The CIA does not have a specific statute like the FBI
does, which broadly protects its name from false advertising
or misuse. CIA must rely upon several criminal statutes
generally applicable to the entire Federal Government for
the protection of the Agency's seal. The statutes are very
narrow in terms of what they will protect and the types of-
uses they will proscribe. Therefore, the present statutory
machinery available to the CIA for the protection. of its
seal and initials is neither sufficient nor complete.. The
mission and functions of the CIA are clearly as important
and sensitive as those of the FBI. Further, in the light of
the past abuses ascribed to CIA, the integrity of the CIA's
seal and initials must be preserved, with the seal and
initials protected from any possible misuse. This section
would protect the name and initials of the CIA, and also
protect the CIA seal or any facsimile..
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7. Section 431(b)(4)(A) and (B) grants authority to the
Director of the Agency to pay a "death graturity."
(a) is this the same as the State benefit?
Answer: No
(b) how different?
Answer: the standard contained in 431(b) is the one
approved by OMB and subsequently introduced by Representative
Derwinski (H.R. 5666) and Senator Bentsen (S. 1930)
(c) would you want an "in the performance of duty"
Answer: Yes; we may want to draft language in conjunction
with the Committee's recommendations.
(d) what about retroactivity? Does this provision
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8. This bill allows targeting U.S. persons who are not
acting on behalf of foreign powers who may possess information
the Government believes to be essential. In what circumstances
and how often would the CIA want this authority used? What
would be the role of the CIA in gathering it.
-- This authority is essentially an escape provision for
collection of foreign intelligence in situations which
involve vital national security interests. We contemplate
that the authority would be used rarely, if at all. Further-
more any use of an intrusive technique would require a
court order (electronic surveillance or surreptitious
entry).
-- For example, the situations described by Morton Halperin
in a 24 February article, New York Times, would not meet the
high standard for collection in Section 213 of the Bill.
Those situations are:
. . columnist Joe Kraft in Paris interviewing represen-
tatives of Hanoi's government; the U.S. wants to know what
Kraft learned. Clearly there are no facts to show that
the information sought is essential to the national
security;
. . Daniel Schorr being considered for a job;
. . Vice President Agnew under FBI surveillance because
President Johnson thought he was working with the Saigon
government.
. . . the question of foreign control of the anti-war
movement.
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9. Under current law CIA is to perform no internal
S security functions. In this charter the CIA in limited
circumstances could direct intelligence activities against
Americans in the U.S. and against foreigners in the U.S. as
well. What kinds of activities are envisioned here? Should
all these be left to the FBI?
There are circumstances where CIA has unique access to
Americans and foreigners in the U.S. who possess essential
foreign intelligence not otherwise obtainable. In such
circumstances, the sensitivity of the collection activity
would preclude CIA turning the entire. activity over to the
FBI. This would be particularly true if the collection
involved the utilization of an established source. Since
the collection of foreign intelligence is a foreign affairs
function, domestic internal security concerns are not an
issue.
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10. You agreed in your confirmation hearings that
S Secretary Vance's statement that covert operations should be
limited to extraordinary circumstances. Do you still agree
with that statement. If no, why not?
We live in a world of ever-increasing danger. A
flexible foreign policy must be able to take in account the
grim realities of that world. The extraordinary nature of
the world situation today would, in my opinion, justify the
undertaking of appropriate covert operations in response to
specific foreign policy requirements. What may constitute
"extraordinary circumstances" in the future should be
determined in light of significant and contemporaneous
world events.
-- covert action is one aspect of foreign policy
implementation;
-- still agree with the statement: it is preferable to
work out foreign policy problems in open diplomatic
channels, however we must recognize that this is not
always possible.
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11. The counterintelligence activities of hostile
intelligence services transend international boundaries and
concern such broadly distinct and separate problems as
security, HUMINT activities, and strategic deception. Using
the facts involved inthe Kampiles and Boyce-Lee affairs
where does the responsibility lie within the Intelligence
Community for coordinationg the separate problems in counter-
intelligence?
Many counterintelligence problems also involve security
issues because employees of contractor or the Government are
involved. There is ample authority in such cases for each
Agency to deal with the problem. The real issue is how to
address these CI concerns when persons outside the Government
are involved. Historically, the FBI has handled these cases
within the U.S. while CIA has had responsibility abroad in
this area.
Should the charter create an overall counterintelligence
umbrella in place of the present division of responsibility
within the Intelligence Community?
See standard jurisdictional answer (Question 3).
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12. Is the authority of the DCI to accept "gifts" as
crated in Section 421(j) satisfactory?
Subsequent to the introduction of S. 2284, negotiations
between CIA and the Office of Management and Budget continued
with a view to working out an agreed upon version of the
"gift" authority. These negotiations resulted in a slightly
modified version of this proposal being granted Administration
approval. The modified version has been sent to the Hill as
a separate title to the FY 81 Intelligence Authorization
Bill. We will be glad to supply the Committee copies of the
modified version. I would venture to say that the modified
version will in all likelihood be acceptable to the Committee.
A copy of the Administration approved version follows:
. . Accept, hold, administer, and utilize for
artistic or general employee or dependent welfare,
educational, recreational or like purposes, gifts,
bequests or devises of money, securities or other
property of whatsoever character whenever the Director
determines that it would be in the interest of the
United States to do so, but he shall accept no gift
which is expressly conditioned upon any expenditure not
to be met therefrom or from the income thereof unless
such expenditure has been approved by act of Congress.
Unless otherwise restricted by the terms of the gift,
bequest or devise, the Director may sell or exchange,
and invest or reinvest such property in interest-bearing
obligations of the United States or in obligations
guaranteed as to both principal and interest by the
United States. Gifts, bequests, and devises of money,
securities and other intangible property accepted
pursuant to this subsection, and the earnings and
proceeds thereof, shall be deposited in a separate fund
to be called the Central Intelligence Agency General
Gift Fund and shall be disbursed upon the order of the
Director. For purposes of Federal income, estate and
gift taxes, gifts, bequests and devises accepted by the
Director shall be deemed to be to or for the use of the
United States.
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13. In your 20 February testimony on FOIA before the
House Government Operations Subcommittee on Government
Information and Individual Rights you said, "Admiral Turner
and I, as congressionally approved Presidential appointees,
insure that these committees [SSCI and HPSIC] are now and
will continue to be supplied with whatever information they
need in order that the Congress may be satisfied that the
Central Intelligence Agency is conducting its activities
within the law." [emphasis added] Isn't this statement
inconsisent with Admiral Turner's insistance last week that
Section 142 of the Charter be changed to include a reference
to sources and methods in the language pertaining to the
intelligence committees' right to access to information from
the Intelligence Community?
No; I do not believe there is any inconsistency whatever.
As far as we are aware there has never been a problem with
either the House or Senate Select Committees on the question
of access to information. The Committees have refrained
from requesting information that identified specific
sources, agents, or relationships. On the other hand, we
have been forthcoming with sensitive information when the
Committees have had a clear need for such information. The
Administration's position is that Section 142 should reflect
the language currently in Section 3-4 of Executive Order
12036. In several years of evolving oversight relationships
this language has not proved to pose any impediment to
your Committee's access to information required for oversignt
purposes. The Administration's proposed language would
essentially codify intelligence reporting and oversight
arrangements in the mutually satisfactorily fashion in which
they now exist.
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But suppose the Committee did request information on
S specific sources. Are you saying that you would not give
this to us?
L
N
I am saying that this kind of information has not thus
far been thought to be necessary of effective oversight.
Should a situation arise in the future where the Committee
insisted upon such information and the Executive Branch did
not agree that it was necessary for oversight purposes we
would obviously try to arrive at some accommodation. If
there was a confrontation between the Legislative and
Executive Branches, a reference to sources and methods in
Section 142 would probably not be determinative of the
outcome but the damage that would be done by omitting the
language would be real and immediate. We must be able to
give the sources and organizations who cooperate with us
believable assurances that their identities and cooperations
will be safe from disclosure. In this regard, the omission
of reference to the proteciton of sources and methods in
Seciton 142 must be read in conjunction with the provisions
on congressional release of information in Section 143,
which provide for public disclosure in accordance with S.
Res. 400 and H. Res. 658. These resolutions provide for
public disclosure despite presidential objection. Mr.
Chairman an intelligence service which cannot assure its
sources of information and assistance that their cooperation
with the United States is safe from public disclosure will
not be able to produce the kind of intelligence our country
must have in the dangerous decades ahead.
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