REVIEW OF ANALYSIS GROUP ROLE IN FBIS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85-00024R000300120004-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 5, 2007
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: February 29, 1980
• Content Type: MEMO

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't`E MORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Science and TechnoI '
Director, Fore n Broadcast Information Service
Review of Analysis Group Role in FBIS
Advance Work Plan for Director, FBIS
OVERVIEW
1. This responds to your request for a report on the utility of
the services and products of the FBIS Analysis Group (AG): In the
Advance Work Plan you asked that the report include an evaluation of
the utility and focus of the FFIS media analysis activity and its
usefulness to consumers. You also directed that we identify to what
extent Analysis Group's resources go to the production of a useful
intelligence product as opposed to internal FBIS operational management
objectives.
2. In accordance with this directive, we have reviewed prior
studies of AG's role in FBIS, examined consumer responses on the
utility of AG's products and services, and have taken another look at
the functions of the Analysis Group within the integrated FBIS media
collection structure. There is no clearly defined distinction between
those Analysis Group's resources that are allocated to intelligence
production and those allocated to internal FBIS operational objectives.
This is because in practice the two functions are intertwined; one
function cannot be performed without the other. To produce good media
analysis requires careful and continuous monitoring of the source
collection process; conversely, useful advice and guidance in source
collection cannot be provided without the knowledge and insights
derived from analysis production. Each individual analyst in the
Analysis Group performs three functions in his area of expertise:
analytic reporting, substantive collection guidance, and special
services to FBIS consumers. During any given period, an analyst
typically devotes 30-40 percent of his time directly to preparing
specific items for publication. This time does not reflect the
continuing process of reviewing and discussing material that has
potential value for publication and that is also relevant to the
guidance responsibility.
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3. The following are our principal conclusions:
--Analysis Group's products and services are regarded as
valuable inputs into the Intelligence Community's analyses
and research on communist affairs, according to consumer
surveys, including the Inspector General's January 1980
report on FBIS.
--The value of AG's contribution is significantly enhanced
by the fact that it is totally integrated into the overall
FEIS effort and makes a major contribution to it. As
resident substantive and media experts, AG analysts
guide and monitor the FBIS collection effort worldwide
and service special requirements levied on FBIS by Agency
and other U.S. Government offices that could not be
handled by other FBIS components.
--Without this resident expertise to guide and monitor its
efforts, FBIS collection and reporting would suffer
significantly, and the potential of FBIS monitoring to
provide meaningful political insights and respond to
Community needs would be seriously weakened.
BACKGROUND
1. The question of the utility and location of the Analysis
Group in FBIS--an analytic component in what is essentially a collection
office--has generated a number of studies over the years. A USIB
Human Sources Committee survey in the fall of 1973, for example,
concluded that AG's input to USIB intelligence producers is a "major
one highly valued" by the Intelligence Community and that AG's
analytical function could not be performed as effectively outside
FBIS. The most exhaustive examination of AG's role was done in late
1974 by the DDI Management Staff, which concluded that the removal of
the Analysis Group from FBIS was "neither desirable nor feasible" for
the following reasons:
--The quality of the unique product and service of the
Analysis Group would not thrive in an all-source
environment.
--The independence of Analysis Group is the key to its
ability to provide Agency and non-Agency consumers
with this unique form of intelligence support.
--The removal of the Analysis Group would seriously
impair FBIS' ability to guide and monitor collection
and deprive the Community of a "highly valued"
product.
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--Transfer of the group into either the Office of Political
Research or the Office of Current Intelligence would not
result in resource saving.
--Space consideration alone--the need for 5,200 square feet
currently, occupied by the Analysis Group---makes such a
move impossible in -the"foreseeable f uture.
2. During the recent IG inspection of P1.IS, the question of the
location of the Analysis Group was again reviewed, and consumers were
surveyed on the usefulness of AG products. The IG report singled out
a com lent in the DDI study that AG is "a case where bureaucratic
untidiness makes for the most sensible use of resources and for the
best intelligence production." "Five years later," the IC report said,
"we have no reason to question this viewpoint."
~'.G' S NET3tODOLOCY AND FOCUS: A~yALYTIC REPORTI C ON_ COMMUNIST : DIA
1. Although political analysts throughout the Cot' unity use the
public Media as one of many sources, AG is unique in its focus on the
media and its comprehensive collection of and familiarity with materials
drawn from them. The AG analyst engages in close scrutiny and
comparison of themes and formulations to discern early signals that
may point to potentially major changes in policy or relations (the
Sino-Soviet conflict is a notable example). The underlying premise
is that FRIS sources, particularly authoritative statements and
couuientary, register the behavior of a highly purposive, controlled,
and sensitive instrument of a communist regime. It is AG's job to
monitor that instrument--contained in the daily FPIS collection
take--screen the wheat from the chaff, and interpret the meaning of.
significant material in a political context. Analysis Group has
been applying this methodology for some three decades with highly
successful results. A recent Senate Intelligence Committee staff
report on intelligence on China observed that F33IS analysts have
provided "some of the earliest and most acute alerts to changing China
patterns."'
2. AG's analytic reporting appears in the weekly Trends in
Communist Media; studies and articles in greater depth are published
in in his Reports or 53 ecial MMemoranda. tgajor Government consumers
also receive the Trends through the FJ3IS Wire as well as ad hoc
Analysis Notes on significant Soviet, Chinese or other communist media
comment on urgent topical developments. AG's analytic output is
occasionally used by Y:FAC and other elements of the Government in
finished intelligence items. An example of the latter is a paper
written by I4R for Dr. Brzezinski in February 1979 on Soviet media
treatment of Iran, which was largely based on an item in the Trends.
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AG' S FILES: COLLECTION AND RETRIEVAL OF POLICY PRONOLYr.CE,I1ENTS
Essential to the validity of AC's methodology is the integrity
of its files of source materials, maintained by AG's 'Research Branch.-
These materials include comprehensive files of public statements over
three decades by top communist leaders, as well as official government
and party statements, diplomatic notes and major press articles.
Extracts of communist materials on critical themes and issues are
computerized in Project PASKEY--a program that permits retrieval by
thevatic category and keyword of Soviet, Chinese, and North Korean
material. In its role as author of the mandatory processing require-
ments and monitor of the collection effort, AG insures the completeness
and consistency of the basic community research file of cour,unist
political-materials. And as attested to by the recent IG report,
Research Branch's services are in demand not only by AG analysts but
by intelligence components throughout the Community.
AG' S INTEGRATED ROLE IN FBIS
1, Collection Guidance: This function takes the form of day-to-
day monitoring of the daily FEIS collection take of 280,000 words from
14 field bureaus and two units. This daily review, which insures
relevance to requirements and substantive control of quality,
simultaneously serves both the operational and the analytical functions.
In addition to levying mandatory texting requirements, AG maintains
a continuous exchange of messages with the field eliciting information
on specific points that arise in the course of the analyst's review
of the FBIS field take. While VDIS editors regularly rotate among
various field bureaus and assignments I n headquarters, AG is a
relatively stable component in which the same analyst covers a
particular area or subject for years at: a time. The editors are
generalists, while the analyst is a specialist keenly aware of
patterns of media behavior as well as of substance. Key tools which
assist the analyst in making decisions on processing are daily lists,
supplied by the field, of communist radio, television, and press agency
items which have been monitored but not always filed.
2. Publications Guidance: The analyst as a substantive expert
also is in daily contact with FBIS Headquarters editors and other
FBI S offices on questions regarding translation, coverage, and
processing. In order to safeguard the Community against publication
omissions, the AG analyst is responsible for reviewing the "discards"
from the Daily Report books (i.e., those field bureau its not
published in the DR) and making a decision as to whether the material
should be published in the Daily Report or forwarded to JPRS for
publication. AG analysts also participate in working groups, task
forces, and joint projects within FBIS components on such questions
as field bureau performance, coverage, requirements, and quality
control of FBIS publications.
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* 0
3. Special Consumer Services: As RBIS' substantive and media
specialists-with an intimate knowledge of coverage arrangements and
media behavior patterns--AG analysts are called upon to perform
various services for major U.S. Government agencies not handled
elsewhere in FBIS. These special services include daily responses
to inquiries and special requirements freaa Agency components, the
Itiational Security Council Staff, the Department of State, ICA, and
other offices concerned with foreign affairs. Requests relate to
radio, television, and press material (including content, volume, and
audience targeting) of immediate relevance to policymakers. AG also
services U.S. negotiators at major international conferences such as
BFR and SALT. Analysis Group also prepares world reaction reports
at the request of high-level consumers (including the Vhite House)
on significant developments, such as foreign reaction to the Vienna
summit conference. (attachment A)
4. AG Analyst's Crisis Role: AG's integrated role in FEIS'
total structure is dramatically heightened during crisis situations
far beyond the normal daily routine of coordination on operational
and substance matters. Since the onset of the hostages crisis in
Iran and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, for example, AG's
senior analyst on the 2'tiddle East has played a pivotal role in
directing the FBIS effort, in responding to inquiries and special
requirements levied on EFTS, and in reporting and interpreting for the
Community Soviet media treatment of the crises. The following are
examples of this effort:
--Provided initial guidelines and continued supervision
of daily roundups of Soviet media treatment of Iran
prepared by field bureaus for the DISCI;
--Requested a study of Tehran radio's Arabic-language
programs by Jordan Bureau for the State Department's
Policy Planning Staff and an update of the study for
NIAC;
--Provided an overview of content of Soviet broadcasts to
the Middle East and South Asia as part of a memorandum
requested by the DCI;
--Levied requirements for lateral field filing of selected
Moscow materials to the Embassy Kabul and responded to
frequent requests by State's Afghan Desk for information
on Soviet media behavior and for assistance to the
Embassy.
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USFFULN ESS TO CONSUMERS
AG consumers have repeatedly confinoed throughout the years
that the Group's products and services are valued highly and provide
a valuable input into the Intelligence Community's analysis of
communist affairs. One of the most noteworthy assessments of Analysis
Group's contribution was contained in a Senate Cor.ittee on Intelligence
report on China in April 1978, which consented that " . . . in terns
of the cost effectiveness of intelligence on China the taxpayer
probably gets the most for his money, out of . . . FBIS reports and
analyses . . . ." The most recent survey of consumers of AG's
products was contained in the Inspector General's January 1980
report on FBI5. Based on interviews in the Intelligence Community
and a survey conducted by the Collection Tasking Staff (CTS), the
IG report concluded that "the production of the Analysis Group is
well received by a select but important group in Washington and abroad.
AG analysts perform various ad hoc services for the U.S. Government
not handled elsewhere in l'hIS. The Research Branch is efficient
and well led, and its services are in demand." A sampling of the
consumer comment in the IG report included:
--In Bangkok, the Lmbassy political section noted that the
Trends was "very good," commented that
the Trends is the "best analysis they get and is better
than that from OPA or elsewhere."
--The political officer in Seoul described the analytical
pieces from FBIS as "extremely useful" and "top notch."
the Trends
items on North Korea were "provocative" and generated
a dialogue between Washington and the U.S. Mission In
Seoul which was "healthy." The NFAC representative in
Seoul noted that the Analysis Group products were a
major source of information for him.
--One of the political officers in the Hong Kong Consulate
General noted that the Trends were superior to the
analyses on China produced locally by various official
and private analytical services. The NFAC representative
in Hong Kong stated that the FBIS product, including the
Trends, was "indispensable."
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--In the Washington area, we found that the analysts
covering the USSR, East Europe, China, and the rest
of Asia in NFACt a office of Political Analysis
considered the Trends to be "essential," "important,"
or "useful for background."
--In like manner, National Intelligence Officers
involved in Soviet, East European, and Chinese
affairs were pleased with the Trends.
--In the Department of State (INR as well as the policy
desks), those working on the ,soviet Union, East
Europe, and Asia found that the Trends made a real
contribution; the work done onhorth Korea was
singled out for praise.
--In the Washington area, the CTS survey indicated that
Trends was well received by U.S. military elements
working on Soviet, East European., and Asian develop-
ments.
The attached documents present t;sore detailed information on AG
special services to Agency and other L.S. Government offices and
comment from OPA on AG's analytic'output.
Attachmuents:
A. Special P= edia Analysis
Services Provided by AG
B. AG Services to
DD0/'Covert Action
Staff (1973 and 1979)
FBIS /AG
29Feb80)
STAT
Distribution:
Orig - DDS&T
1 - D/FBIS
1 -
1 -'~~0-1 Reg .
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0 1P
SPECIAL MEDIA ANALYSIS SERVICES
--From fall 1978 through 1979 provided guidance and analysis to
Intelligence Community on Moscow treatment of Iran, including
content of Moscow Persian-language broadcasts and Baku-based National
Voice of Iran. In December 1978 published Special Memorandum on
National Voice of Iran. Memo sent to.NSC, praised by Brzezinski,
shown to President.
--At Brzezinski request published Special 1bmorandum analyzing
content of Turkish-language clandestine radios.
--At White House request prepared a paper on Soviet media treatment
of new Afghan regime.
--For White House prepared analysis of Soviet reaction to proposed
boycott of Olympics.
-Trends articles provided to DCI on Pyongyang treatment of U.S.-ROK
proposal for tripartite talks.
--For DCI prepared world reaction report on Indochinese refugee crisis.
I
--For White House Office of Science and Technology Policy provided
foreign media reaction report on Skylab reentry.
---Contributed to DCI Presidential briefing on Moscow attitude toward
L.S.
--Recent ?ITO study on Soviet succession reported that AG follows the
succession problem as a topic of highest importance. JITU noted that
AG analyzes Soviet media output against the historic record and that
open sources will likely provide important indications of leadership
maneuvering.
--At White House request provided Trends articles on SALT and computer
printout of Soviet elite statements on SALT for preparation of briefing
folders for White House staff members..
--At DCI request for meeting with President, sparked by LCI
conversation with D/NFAC Bowie, provided memo on Moscow's propaganda
on bilateral relations with U.S. and Moscow's depiction of U.S. role
in various areas of the world.
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-Providing to OER periodic assessments of Soviet reaction to U. S.
sanctions against USSR in wake of Afghanistan.
--Provided. State computerized printout of 0iinese elite statements
linking the L.S.-Taiwan defense treaty with Sino-1;.S. normalization,
as well as Trends analysis, for State use in court suit challenging
abrogation of treaty.
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STAT
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