REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OF ORAL PRESENTATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85-00024R000300430003-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 26, 2007
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: April 1, 1981
• Content Type: MEMO

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?
1 April 1981
9
J DD/S!T /97 r-1s
MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Officer, Directorate of Science and Technology
VIA: Director, Foreign Broadcast Information Service
Chief, Analysis Group, FBIS
SUBJECT: Request for Approval of Oral Presentations
1. I request approval to present orally the attached discussion
outlines, one on political events in Beijing since December last year
and another on skills and background from my own educational experience
that I have found to be valuable for service as a government foreign
affairs analyst.
2. When approved, I intend to give the oral presentations on
9 April at a faculty seminar and a careers forum at Pennsylvania State
University.
3. None of the material presented in the discussion outlines is,
to my knowledge, classified.
4. I am not under cover. I will be identified as.an Agency
employee but will append the standard disclaimer indicating that the
views expressed are my own and not necessarily those of the Agency.
STAT
STAT
Attachment:
As stated
I have reviewed the attached texts and
to the best of my knowled
e
,
g
,
have found them to be imclacci-ied.
erector, FBIS
D e
I have reviewed the attached texts and, to the best of my knowledge,
have found them to be unclassified and approve them for presentation
--- ?_,
6 ,APR ;981
Directorate of Science and Technology
STAT
STAT
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SUBJECT: Request for Approval of Oral Presentations
Distribution:
Original & 1 - Addressee, w/att.
1 - DDS$T Registry, wo/att.
1 - D/FBIS, w/att.
1 - C/AG, w/att.
1 - DC/AS/FBIS, wo/att.
1 C/LRB, w/att.
LY FBIS Registry, w/att.
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TALK TO PENN STATE FACULTY/GRADUATE STUDENTS SEMINAR, 9 April 1981
The Beijing Leadership's December Revolution
--Through most of 1980 Deng Xiaoping seemed unmistakably to be
gaining ground toward goals he had long pressed:
?16 Jan,-:speech (Hong Kong CHENG MING): keynote for year's reforms
*Feb 80 Fifth CCP Plenum: party reforms (restoration of Secretariat,
preparation for rehabilitation of Liu Shaoqi in April, propagation
of Guiding Principles and draft constitution as beginning of
rectification drive; call for convening of 12th CCP Congress ahead
of schedule to deal with outstanding issues). Most decidedly and
onesidely Dengist of plenums.
*Sep 80 5th NPC 3rd session: state reform: Zhao replaces Hua in
surge of reformist rhetoric, etc.
*Opening of Beijing trials of Cultural Revolution cliques
?Progress toward unseating of Hua Guofeng as CCP Chairman amid
press signs critical of Hua, calls for abolition of lifetime
tenure,: feudal succession.
?Hong Kong press, Beijing press signs of anticipated plenum to
prepare way for 12th party congress early in 1981.
--At year's end, however, no plenum in sight despite convocation of
central work conference in mid-December; Hua Guofeng's_status remains-
unclear with peculiar public appearance record; variety of media
indications suggest anomalously that Hua, and not Deng, has gathered
momentum. Why?
--Key issue in turnaround was clearly economic: while a highlevel
leadership meeting in late November (Hong Kong press, Beijing press)
probably received Hua Guofeng's resignation, at same time it appears
to have discussed the national economic situation assessment emerging
was overwhelmingly pessimistic:
?2 Dec People's Daily editorial
?1 Jan People's Daily editorial
?1 Jan Hu Yaobang acknowledgment that Central Work Conference
discussed economy, not historical/political issues.
--To understand political significance of this new assessment, must
review debate over economic policy over past year:
?April-June discussion s- of readjustment, capital construction
curtailment, pace and scope of, reform.
?NPC session as.hightude of economic reform, based on optimistic
appraisal of economy by Deng, Yao Yilin in particular (XINHUA
quotes).
?Early November indications of more pessimistic appraisal in press.
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December evaluation of economy negatively, with consequent emphasis
on recentralization of economy and postponemtnt of reforms seems a
setback for Deng.
--This conclusion is strengthened by appearance of political and
social themes in press which are unmistakably not Dengist; but
associated with Hua:
?Hua speech to P1A conference late April: material incentives,
political-ideological work, spiritual civilization; miezi
xingwu slogan.
?Dengist counterattack: emphasize spiritual incentives,
belittle ideological-political work; feudalism, not bourgeois
ideology as main danger; materialist definition of spititual
civilization theme (Hu Yaobang speech).
Current Dec-Jan commentary has reversed Deng's counterattack:
?Stresses ideological-political work in currently constrained
economic situation..
?Restores legitimacy of voluntarist slogans and models (fearing
neither death nor hardship, foolish old man, seizing turtles
deep down)
?Launching of nationwide campaigns to promote communist morality
and spirutual civilization (1 January People's Daily editorial
slap at Hu Yaobang): morality codes (Hunan in particular); Lei
Feng as current model in PLA and out.
--Impetus for these themes is, again clearly economic and out of
concern for anticipated social consequences of economic retrenchment:
unemployment, etc.
+Also apparent concern over implications of Polish situation for
parallel conditions in China: TU policy reversal most telling
in this regard: Dot-Nov press encourages more activist TU _
policy; Jan People's Daily editorial explicitly warns against
efforts to throw off party control/supervision of trade unions.
--Turnaround in economic policy has had other political consequences:
the big slowdown in party rectification, again in a manner favorable
to party moderates rather than Deng group: 3-yr. pattern of diver-
gence overissue main danger is party left vs. main danger = society
right, as relates to "lingering fear" and "crisis of confidence."
--M st ominous consequence, however, has been apparent reopening of
leadership debate over PRC foreign policy orientation:
?Recap argument on April 79 opening to USSR and impact of
subsequent domestic developments on its demise.
?Questions over Deng's reformist program's failure raises
questions about wisdom of foreign policy program; this seems
all the more to have gained impetus from uncertainties,of U.S.
China policy and obvious sensitivity on Beijing.
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*What are the indications: +8 Jan People.ls Daily article on
Zhou Enlai
+Jan RED FLAG article on advance and
retreat
+4 Feb Workers Daily article on
Wang Jiaxiang
+10 Feb Guangming Daily article on
Zuo Zongtang
--What are the implications of all of this?
?Beijing leadership is going through a period of extensive disarray;
Deng Xiaoping, far from having situation in hand, has lost
initiative that he had over previous year and a half, has suffered
setbacks politically, and-'-there appear to be few signs that he has
yet reasserted himself.
*Chen Yun:clearly has come to fore; role of mediator between Deng
reform group and Hua/Ye moderate"-group all the more clear;
certainly running the economic show; political/social policies
depending on assessment of economic situation seem strongly to
favor moderate group, for time being at least.
?Potential for significant modification in PRC foreign policy;
but unclear as yet how great.
?Convocation of party plenum will signal resolution of current
conflicts; how addresses current questions will provide immediate
answers to questions currently ambiguous.
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TALK AT CAREERS FORUM, PENN STATE, 9 APRIL 1981
--Worked for nearly 7 years at FBIS as a Chinese affairs analyst;
am formally described as a "propaganda analyst": specifically
attempt to learn as much as can be learned about the motivations,
substance and results of Chinese foreign and domestic policies and
about Chinese domestic politics from China's open media:lits
newspapers, radio broadcasts, journals and magazines.
--This process of intensive, systematic scrutiny of China's open
media has over the years frequently provided highly accurate
judgments about the foreign policy and domestic politics of a
country that has been and continues to be among the most closed
societies in the world.
--The process of gleaning information about Chinese politics::.from
China's open media, variously called "China-watching" or
"Pekingology--its counterpart with respect to the Soviet Union is
called "Kremlinology"--has frequently been compared to other sexy,
mysterious arcane arts like astrology, reading oracle bones or tea
leaves, etc. Actually it is a painstaking laborious process of
meticulous scrutiny of.-statements.iin.the Chinese press resting on
two fundamental assumptions:
?Everything in the Chinese media is controlled;
?Everything that appears in the Chinese media therefore is there-- -
for a reason.
Since nothing appears in Beijing's press except for some purpose,
that purpose or intention can be inferred from the way the media treat the issue; the reasons may often be mundane or commonplace,
but often they are not. The art of China-watching thus draws on
the very same assumptions and principles that the Chinese use in
operating their controlled media. Examples: atmospherics used
by XINHUA in talks between Chinese leaders with visitors from foreign
countries: North Korea/Romania/France/USSR.
--The process of building accurate judgments about Chinese politics
and Chinese foreign policy thus is a laborious process of careful
comparison of media treatment of similar events or topics over
broad periods of time. It is frequently frustrating, often tedious,
but it is sometimes spectacularly successful at illuminating the
intentions and policies of a very secretive political system, and
it exemplifies the best efforts of the government's analytical
community. Success at this kind of work requires:
*The capacity to scan large bodies of frequently diverse infor-
mation from China's media and to retain sometimes minute but
sometimes extremely revealing--when juxtaposed alongside other
minutiae.
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?
?Ability to arrive at accurate judgments about frequently
ongoing events on basis of often fragmentary or ambiguous
bits of information; opportunity to take longrange perspective
on various issues and problems does exist, but frequently
it does not seem relevant to the attempt to understand the
cold realities of everyday events in China on a day-to-day
basis.
--Analysts naturally are successful at this effort in varying degrees,
and in my opinion, the following abilities and skills--all procur-
able at your local university--are most important:
*Language: No skill has proven to be more decisive in attempting to
unders aand.a.'society's ongoing political affairs than the ability to
understand a society's, langauge read its press: accurately in original.
?Historical ers ective: Not to slight the insights provided by
the theoretical models and comparative procedures of political
"science," nothing can compensate for ignorance of a country's
past, its political traditions and history and the evolution of
its social, economic and cultural institutions and concepts.
If.you'.re interested in a communist country like China, then a
thorough background in the history of Marxism and with the
history of the Soviet Union is also indispensable.
'The ability to write concisely and rapidly: Most policymakers
who mig t read what a government analyst writes do not have
the time or interest in reading a 30-page analysis of China's
latest leadership crisis; most of the time most analysts do not
have time to prepare papers of that length; they__do,-neverthe_
less have to do the research that might go into such a paper-'---
and then compress it into a page or, two of clear, well-reasoned
expository prose.
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