REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OF ORAL PRESENTATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85-00024R000300430004-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 26, 2007
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: March 6, 1981
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2007/09/26: CIA-RDP85-00024R000300430004-1
?
?
MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Officer, Directorate of Science and Technology
VIA: Director, Foreign Broadcast Information Service
Chief, Analysis Group, FBIS
SUBJECT: Request for Approval of Oral Presentation
1. I request approval for oral presentation of the attached text
entitled "Chinese Foreign Policy in the 19801s: A United Front Against
Hegemonism."
2. When approved, I intend to present the topic at the conference
of the International Studies Association in Philadelphia on 18 March 1981.
The presentation is a summarized version of a monograph cleared by DOD
and published by the National Defense University in 1980 before I became
an Agency employee.
3. None of the material in the presentation is, to my knowledge,
classified.
4. I am not under cover. I will be identified as an FBIS employee
but will state the standard disclaimer indicating that the views expressed
are my on and not necessarily those of FBIS.
STAT
STAT
Attachment:
As stated
I have reviewed the attached text and, to the best of my knowledge,
have found it to be unclassified.
a',r;~~ !S81 STAT
Director, FBIS Date
I have reviewed the attached text and, to the best of my knowledge,
have found it to be unclassified, and approve it for oral presentation.
Executive Officer
Directorate of Science $ Technology
Approved For Release 2007/09/26: CIA-RDP85-00024R000300430004-1
 Approved For Release 2007/09/26: CIA-RDP85-00024R000300430004-1
SUBJECT: Request for Approval of Oral Presentation
Distribution:
Original and 1 - Executive Officer, DDSET, w/att.
1 - DDSFT Registry, wo/att.
1 - D/FBIS, w/att.
1 - C/AG, w/att.
1 - DC/AS/FBIS, wo/att.
1 - C/LRB, w/att.
1 - FBIS Registry, w/att.
Approved For Release 2007/09/26: CIA-RDP85-00024R000300430004-1
 Approved For Release 2007/09/26: CIA-RDP85-00024R000300430004-1
? 0
CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY IN THE 1980' s: A UNITED FRONT AGAINST f GEMONISM
by
STAT
This is a summary of a monograph prepared earlier and has been prepared for
presentation at the meeting of the International Studies Association, March 18,
1981. is a China Analyst with the Foreign Broadcast Information STAT
Service. The views presented are those of the author and do not nedessarily
reflect those of FBIS or any other US government agency.
Approved For Release 2007/09/26: CIA-RDP85-00024R000300430004-1
 Approved For Release 2007/09/26: CIA-RDP85-00024R000300430004-1
. .
For purposes of this discussion I will try to summarize a longer
monograph I wrote last year dealing with the same subject; though it was
written more than a year ago, I believe the central thesis remains valid.
In saying that, I am reminded of the story about a speaker at a party
congress who reportedly said: "Comrades, the future is always certain;
it is only the past that changes!"
Chinese Perceptions
It is my central thesis that Chinese foreign policy decisions arise
from two aspects: the first is Chinese perceptions; the second is what
may be termed bureaucratic politics. Chinese perceptions have historical
and ideological roots. The modern Chinese revolution owes much to
China's "century of humiliation" in its interaction with the West follow-
ing the opium war. The Chinese Communist effort to achieve power,
successful after a long period of revolutionary turmoil, centered on its
program of restoring China's international status and prestige and on
its promise of social change. The present program of "four modernizations"
is a continuation of this historical quest; thus an editorial in RENMIN
RIBAO celebrating the Fifth National People's Congress declared that only
when China had overcome its technological backwardness and changed its
social system could it become a modern, powerful nation.
Ideology has been an important factor in how the Chinese Communist
leadership perceives that the goal of modernization may be accomplished.
While there is considerable debate over what precisely constitutes
Approved For Release 2007/09/26: CIA-RDP85-00024R000300430004-1
 Approved For Release 2007/09/26: CIA-RDP85-00024R000300430004-1
? 0
"Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought," it has been explained as an
effort to integrate the principles of dialectical materialism with the
concrete experiences of the Chinese revolution. Slogans and exhorta-
tions such as "Be a thoroughgoing materialist" or "Seek truth from
facts" underlie a basic commitment to some form of socialism based on
the leadership of the Communist Party, although the leaders are willing
to experiment extensively in finding policies that work under the rubric
"socialism."
Chinese perceptions of the international situation have changed
considerably during the more than 30 years of Communist Party rule. The
general dynamics of the shift from a close alliance with the Soviet
Union to opposition to the USSR and detente with the United States are
well known and need not be discussed in great detail here. It is
important to say, however, that when the Chinese believe that a country's
policies are in harmony with its goals of achieving modernization and
prestige, it enjoys good relations with that country; but when those
policies are not in harmony with its goals, there has been a deteriora-
tion in relations.
The Chinese perception of the international situation was summed up
succinctly in an authoritative editorial in November 1977 outlining a
"three worlds" hypothesis and calling for a united front against the
Soviet Union. Inasmuch as the Soviet Union had become the most
aggressive superpower, it was vital that other countries unite to oppose
Soviet "hegemonism." In 1979, following the normalization of relations
between China and the United States, Chinese Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping
said that the United States, the other superpower, was also qualified to
Approved For Release 2007/09/26: CIA-RDP85-00024R000300430004-1
 Approved For Release 2007/09/26: CIA-RDP85-00024R000300430004-1
be part of the united front. Though the United States remains a super-
power and practices hegemonism (particularly in Latin America), it
presumably qualified for membership because it is on the defensive and
is not trying to expand.
The need for unity against Soviet aggression has been particularly
stressed since the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea and the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan. The Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea, coming
shortly after the conclusion of a treaty of peace, friendship, and
mutual assistance between Vietnam and the USSR, seriously damaged
China's status and prestige in Southeast Asia. China hoped to regain
some prestige with its punitive "counterattack" against Vietnam in 1979,
but the continuing ability of Vietnam to exercise control in Indochina
and China's inability to get Vietnam to pull out are constant reminders
of China's weakness. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is a reminder
of Moscow's military superiority over China and its ability to act in
areas adjacent to China with little regard for China's ability to
respond.
China's tactic in these situations has been to try to portray the
Afghan and Indochina situations as part of the USSR's strategic con-
spiracy to encircle Western Europe and Japan and isolate the United
States. Beijing argues that these actions are just the first step in
Moscow's plan to gain control of vital sea lanes and to seize control
of the Middle East energy supplies in its program of conquest. Beijing
plays down the prospect of a threat to China in all this, alleging
that the principal thrust is aimed at the West, and it uses this
allegation to support its call for a united front with Western Europe,
Japan, and the United States, as well as with the Third World.
Approved For Release 2007/09/26: CIA-RDP85-00024R000300430004-1
 Approved For Release 2007/09/26: CIA-RDP85-00024R000300430004-1
?
0
Bureaucratic Politics
Besides Chinese perceptions of the international situation as stated
in various interviews, articles, and editorials, there is another
important facet of Chinese foreign policy decisionmaking--bureaucratic
politics. The term "factional politics" is perhaps too strong to apply
to China since the Chinese, unlike the Japanese, do not have highly
coherent and identifiable factional alignments; but there have been
shifting informal coalitions among China's political elites. Since the
death of Mao and the purge of the "gang of four" there have been several
shifts in Beijing's ruling coalition.
Much of Beijing's internal politics has been characterized by Deng
Xiaoping's effort to enhance his power and preferred policies, some-
times at the expense of rivals, and in turn by their efforts to resist
his ambitions. Deng's moves resulted in the purge of a so-called
whatever group from the Politburo last year, and now he is apparently
trying to move against Party Chairman Hua Guofeng. Recent evidence
suggests that in moving against Hua, he has had to compromise some of
his policy preferences to build a coalition. This ongoing factionalism
centers on personality conflict, ideological commitment differences,
bureaucratic interests, and policy divisions stemming from the attempt
to achieve modernization.
Clearly there is strong disagreement among various groups over
how to manage the economy and over a wide variety of other domestic
questions, but there have also been important differences in foreign
policy. Within the broad framework of building a united front against
hegemonism, there are apparently those who want to adopt a less hostile
Approved For Release 2007/09/26: CIA-RDP85-00024R000300430004-1
 Approved For Release 2007/09/26: CIA-RDP85-00024R000300430004-1
position toward the Soviet Union in return for greater assurance of a
stable international environment in which development can be pursued.
Evidence suggests that when Deng's policies have been under attack,
there has been a corresponding interest in improving relations with
the USSR, and that when he has been more securely in control, there
has been a more hostile line toward the USSR.
Bureaucratic politics is also an important factor in Beijing's
sensitivity over Taiwan in its relationship with the United States.
Obviously Taiwan is of great symbolic importance to Beijing and there-
fore sensitive. An upgrading of relations between the United States
and Taiwan could be perceived as a serious challenge to Beijing's
prestige in Asia, and Beijing reacted strongly when the Republican
candidate suggested he would consider such a relationship. Neverthe-
less, Beijing was willing to make concessions on the Taiwan issue as
part of the arrangement to normalize relations with the United States.
Deng even went so far as to tell U.S. Congressmen that Taiwan would
keep its own economic system, military and police forces, and a high
degree of autonomy in its political relationships, even if it were
reincorporated into the mainland.
Nevertheless, such signs of flexibility have not been as forth-
coming in recent months, probably because of political wrangling
among the Chinese leadership. In addition to the downgrading of
relations with the Netherlands after the Dutch went ahead with the
decision to sell submarines to Taiwan--an action which doubtless was
intended to warn the Reagan Administration--the Chinese press,
particularly the PRC-controlled press in Hong Kong, has kept up a
Approved For Release 2007/09/26: CIA-RDP85-00024R000300430004-1
 Approved For Release 2007/09/26: CIA-RDP85-00024R000300430004-1
shrill barrage of reporting on the Taiwan question. Just as the subject
of relations with the USSR has become a subject of contentious debate in
China, so apparently has the relationship with the United States.
The economic debate within China has already dramatically affected
Chinese relations with Japan. Japan was eager to participate in the
modernization of China and pushed rapidly for Japanese corporate involve-
ment in Chinese development. But the Chinese decision last fall to
readjust the national economy and slow economic reforms resulted in the
cancellation of several projects in which Japanese companies had heavy
stakes. While both sides attempt to put the best face on the situation,
the Japanese Government feels that unilateral Chinese cancellations
without adequate compensation could result in a major deterioration of
Japanese-Chinese relations.
These brief examples serve to illustrate that while the united front
against hegemonism is a strategy based on Chinese perceptions, its
application is affected by domestic factional political conflict. In
the instances mentioned previously, the long-range strategic interest of
improving relations with the United States and Japan, a frequent thesis
of Chinese statements, has been modified by immediate political concerns;
therefore, both perceptions and factional politics must be taken into
account in understanding Chinese foreign policy decisions.
Conclusions
It is tempting to state here that the foregoing is merely a re-
statement of what should be obvious to serious students of Chinese
foreign policy. Nevertheless, there has been a tendency among some
observers to forget one or the other element, and this has given a
6
Approved For Release 2007/09/26: CIA-RDP85-00024R000300430004-1
 Approved For Release 2007/09/26: CIA-RDP85-00024R000300430004-1
somewhat distorted picture of Chinese actions. I submit that it is
essential to take both into account to understand the issues I have
briefly outlined above, as well as other currents of Chinese foreign
policy. For example, the Chinese position of maintaining relations
with insurgent parties in Southeast Asia while adopting a policy of
better government relations with these countries reflects both
Beijing's strategic perceptions and internal politics. And China's
current effort to improve party ties with communist and socialist
parties in various countries reflects both elements.
I could cite further examples, but it is sufficient to conclude
that Beijing's foreign policy will continue to reflect a mixture of
the two variables in the coming decade. We can expect that while
Beijing may articulate a fairly clear vision of how it perceives
the international environment, its actual policies will also reflect
an ongoing change of factional coalitions. Given the serious economic
and political problems facing China, over which there is apparently
considerable disagreement among the leadership, there is little reason
to anticipate a prolonged period of political stability. Hence,
Beijing's call for a stable international environment in which it can
achieve modernization, free of the machinations of Soviet hegemonism,
must certainly be affected by China's internal political situation.
China's changing past suggests an uncertain future.
Approved For Release 2007/09/26: CIA-RDP85-00024R000300430004-1