DDS&T POSITION ON U.S. DIRECT BROADCAST SATELLITE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85-00024R000400270014-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 13, 2007
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: October 5, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2007/06/14: CIA-RDP85-00024R000400270014-3
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/FBt3
.DD/FOS
C/E&PS
C/LRS
5 October 1982
_C/AG
__C/PROD
C/OPs
C/ADMtN
201 FILE
MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Officer, DDS$T
Director, Foreign Broadcast Information Service
.EXEC. REG.- -
-_.
FROM:
25X1
SUBJECT:
ie , Field ve
DDS&T Position on
rage Staff
U.S. Direct Broadcast Satellite
Following is a proposed DDS$T response on the question of whether DDSFT
programs and capabilities would be affected by U.S. direct broadcasts via
satellite:
Those intelligence targets and activities which operate in the
26 mHz range (Soviet mobile force communications, certain late genera-
tion satellites, terrestrial public radio relay transmitters, and
covert agent HF broadcasts) could be affected by direct or spurious
interference from the DBS transmissions. However, DDS$T believes that
the overall impact of such transmissions on DDS&T programs and
capabilities would be minimal. This impact would not in itself
provide sufficient justification for opposing such an effort by the
U.S. Government.
As for the cost-effectiveness of such a U.S. effort, DDS&T
questions whether.the possible slight improvement in broadcast
reception would justify the costs of such a system. Improvements in
existing terrestrial transmitting facilities, at a far more modest
cost, would likely be just as, or more, effective in improving the
quality of the broadcasts and reaching a larger audience. A U.S.
initiative to engage in international broadcasting by means of DBS
would certainly be seen by the communist bloc and many Third World
countries as a new form of Western interference and would be strongly
opposed. Improvements in existing terrestrial transmitting
capabilities, if effective, would also be unwelcome by the USSR and
some other countries, but would not provoke the sort of response that
we could expect if the U.S. went to a DBS system. The USSR would
probably counter the DBS transmissions by increasing terrestrial
jamming or by orbiting a satellite capable of jamming the DBS trans-
missions from outer space. In either event, the effectiveness of
the U.S. transmissions would be undermined by the Soviet response.
Approved For Release 2007/06/14: CIA-RDP85-00024R000400270014-3
 Approved For Release 2007/06/14: CIA-RDP85-00024R000400270014-3
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SUBJECT: DDS$T Position on U.S. Direct Broadcast Satellite
The likelihood of reaching a larger audience with DBS transmissions
also seems a dubious proposition. We believe the USIA radio receiver
survey will confirm that there is not an abundance of shortwave
receivers in use in the USSR and that many in use do not have the range
to monitor broadcasts on 26 m;-iz. While 25.67 to 26.1 mHz is designated
as a broadcasting band, few countries actually use those frequencies
for public broadcasting.
In brief, the DDS&T has no significant operational concern, but
questions the cost-effectiveness of such a system.
FBIS/Ops/FCS
4 (5Oct82 )
Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
1 - D/FBIS
1 - AC/Ops
L1-- FBIS Registry
2 - C/FCS
Approved For Release 2007/06/14: CIA-RDP85-00024R000400270014-3