APPENDIX F RICHARD M. NIXON'S MEMORANDUM ON MEETING WITH FEDEL CASTRO, 19 APRIL 1959

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85-00664R000200130001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 20, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 29, 1960
• Content Type: MF

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vallINIMINIMINIMENIMININNIMMmomm?0\00, _
Appendix F
Richard M. Nixon's Memorandum
on Meeting with Fidel Castro.
19 April 1959
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? Nmer.wir
?
RICHARD NIXON
July 27, 1979
LA CASA PACIFICA
SAN CLEMENTE, CALIFORNIA
I am enclosing copy of the summary
of my conversation with Fidel Castro
in 1959, as you requested in your
letter of July 19th.
With best wishes,
Sincerely,
Dr. Jack B. Pfeiffer
CIA Historian
Washington, D.C. 20505
enclosure, 4 pages
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# vaor Tor .1 NI 1111111V
CONFIDENTIAL
April 19, 1959
Summary of conversation between The Vice President and Fidel Castro:
When Castro arrived for the conference he seemed somewhat nervous and
tense. He apparently felt that he had not done as well on "Meet the Press" as he
had hoped. He was particularly concerned about whether he might have irritated
Senator Smothers for the comments he made with regard to him. I reassured him
at the beginning of the conversation that "Meet the Press" was one of the most
difficult programs a public official could go on and that he had done extremely well --
particularly having in mind the fact that he had the courage to go on in English rather
than to speak through a translator.
The subjects we discussed were no different from those on which he had made
public statements on several other occasions. A brief summary, however, might
be of interest, particularly in view of the comments I made with regard to the positions
he took.
I suggested at the outset that while I understood some reasonable time might
elapse before it would be feasible to have elections it would nevertheless be much
better from his viewpoint if he were not to state so categorically that it would be
as long as four years before elections would be held. I urged him to state Ms
position as being in favor of having elections at the earliest possible date and that
four years would be the maximum amount of time that would elapse before elections
were scheduled. He went into considerable detail as he had in public with regard to
the reasons for not holding elections, emphasizing particularly that "the people did
not want elections because the elections in the past had produced bad government."
He used the same argument that he was simply reflecting the will of the
people in justifying the executions of war criminals and his overruling the acquittal
of Batista's aviators. In fact he seemed to be obsessed with the idea that it was his
responsibility to carry out the will of the people whatever it might appear to be at a
particular time. It was also apparent that as far as his visit to the United States was
concerned his primary interest was "not to get a change in the sugar quota or to get
a government loan but to win support for his policies from American public opinion."
It was this almost slavish subservience to prevailing majority, opinion -- the
voice of the mob -- rather than his naive attitude toward Communism and his obvious
lack of understanding of even the most elementary economic principles which con-
cerned me most in evaluating what kind of a leader he might eventually turn out to be.
That is the reason why I spent as much time as I could trying to emphasize that he
had the great gift of leadership, but that it was the responsibility of a leader not
always to follow public opinion but to help to direct it in the proper channels -- not
to give the people what they think they want at a time of emotional stress but to make
them want what they ought to have. I pointed out that it might be very possible that
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the people of Cuba were completely disillusioned as far as elections and represen-
tative government were concerned but that this placed an even greater responsibility
on him to see that elections were held at the very earliest date, and thereby to restore
the faith of the people in democratic processes. Otherwise, the inevitable result
would be the same dictatorship against which he and his followers had fought so
gallantly. I used the same argument with regard to freedom of the press, the right
to a fair trial before an impartial court, judge and jury, and on other issues which
came up during the course of the conversation. In every instance he justified his
departure from democratic principles on the ground that he was following the will of
the people. I, in my turn, tried to impress upon him the fact that while we believe
in majority rule that even a majority can be tyrannous and that there are certain
individual rights which a majority should never have the power to destroy.
I frankly doubt that I made too much impression upon him but he did listen
and appeared to lie somewhat receptive. I tried to cast my appeal to him primarily
in terms of how Ms place in history would be affected by the courage and statesman-
ship he displayed at this time. I emphasized that the easy thing to do was to follow
the mob, but that the right thing in the long-run would be better for the people and,
of course, better for him as well. As I have already indicated he was incredibly
naive with regard to the Communist threat and appeared to have no fear whatever
tthat the Communists might eventually come to power in Cuba. He said that during
the course of the revolution there had been occasions when the Communists over-
played their band and "my people put them in their place." He implied that this
would be the situation in the future in the event that the Communists tried to come
to power. As a matter of fact, in his attitude toward Communism, both internally
and from an international standpoint, he sounded almost exactly like Sukarno had
sounded to me when! visited Indonesia in 1953. In our discussions of Communism
I again tried to cast the arguments in terms of his own self-interest and to point out
that the revolutiOn which he had led might be turned against him and the Cuban people
unless he kept control of the situation and made sure that the Communists did not get
into the position3 of power and influence. On this score I feel I made very little
impression, if any.
Speaking to him from a personal standpoint I urged him at the earliest possible
moment to bring good strong men into his government and to delegate responsibilities
to them in the economic and other areas where he presently was making many decisions.
I tried to point out that unless he did this he would have a workload which would be so
great that he could not provide the leadership and the vision that the Cuban people
needed for the great issues. I put as much emphasis as possible on the need for him
to delegate responsibility, but again whether I got across was doubtful.
It was apparent that while he paid lip service to such institutions as freedom
of speech, press and religion his primary concern was with developing programs for
economic progress. He said over and over that a man who worked in the sugar cane
fields for three months a year and starved the rest of the year wanted a job, something
to eat, a house and some clothing and didn't care a whit about whether he had freedom
along with it. I of course tried to emphasize that here again as a leader of his people,
he should try to develop support for policies which could assure economic progress
with freedom rat her than without it.
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He indicated that it was very foolish for the United States to furnish arms to
Cuba or any other Caribbean country. He said "anybody knows that our countries
are not going to be able to play any part in the defense of this hemisphere in the event
a world war breaks out. The arms governments get in this hemisphere are only used
to suppress people as Batista used his arms to fight the revolution. It would be far
better if the money that you give to Latin American countries for arms be provided
for capital investment." I will have to admit that as far as his basic argument was
concerned here I found little that I could disagree with!
We had a rather extended discussion of how Cuba could get the investment
capital it needed for economic progress. He insisted that what Cuba primarily
needed and what he wanted was not private capital but government capital. He gave
me some rather confused arguments as to why plants that were licensed and/or
owned and operated by the government would serve the best interests of Cuba better
than privately owned enterprises. I told him quite bluntly that his best hope as far
as the United States was concerned was not in getting more government capital but
in attracting private capital. I explained that government capital was limited because
of the many demands upon it and the budget problems we presently confronted. I
pointed out that private capital on the other hand was expansible and that he would be
serving the interests a Cuba far better by adopting policies which would attract it.
I pointed out that there was competition for capital throughout the Americas and the
worlct and that it would not go to a country where there was any considerable fear
that policies might be adopted which would discriminate against private enterprise.
At this point he, at considerable length, tried to explain why he had said and done
some of the things which had appeared to be anti-private enterprise up to this time.
Here again on this point I doubt if I made too much of an impression.
He explained his agrarian reform program in considerable detail justifying
it primarily on the ground that Cuba needed more people who were able to buy the
goods produced within the country and that it would make no sense to produce more
in factories unless the amount of money in the hands of consumers was increased.
He rather bitterly assailed the United States press for what he called their
unfair reporting of the revolution after he came to power. I, of course, tried to
explain that speaking fromsorne personal experience, it was necessary to expect and
to learn to take criticism both fair and unfair. I would not be surprised if his
sensitivity with regard to criticism might eventually lead him to take some rather
drastic steps toward curtailing freedom of the press in the future.
He also spoke rather frankly about what he felt was a very disturbing attitude
on the part of the American press and the American people generally. His argument
went along this line: 'yours is a great country--the richest, the greatest, the most
powerful in the world. Your people, therefore, should be proud and confident and
happy. But everyplace I go you seem to be afraid -- afraid of Communism, afraid
that if Cuba has land reform it will grow a little rice and the market for your rice
will. be reduced -- afraid that if Latin America becomes more industrialized
American factories will not be able to sell as much abroad as they have previously.
You in America should not be talking so much about your fear of what the Communists
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may do in Cuba or in some other country in Latin America, Asia or Africa -- you
should be talking more about your own strength and the reasons why your system
is superior to Communism or any other kind of dictatorship."
In my turn of course I tried to explain that we welcomed the industrialization
and development of Latin America, that one of our best customers was Canada, for
example, which was highly industrialized and that as economic conditions improved
in any country this was not only good for that country but good for us as well. I also
tried to put our attitude toward Communism in context by pointing out that Communism
was something more than just an idea but that its agents were dangerously effective
in their ability to grasp power and to set up dictatorships. I also emphasized, how-.
ever, that we realized that being against Communism was not enough -- that it was
even more important that we make it by our actions, by what we say and what we do
abroad that we convince people every place that we want to help them achieve
economic progress in a climate of freedom.
Several other subjects were discussed blit none that I think are worth noting
at this point. Significantly enough, he did not raise any questions about the sugar
quota nor didhe engage in any specific discussions with regard to economic assistance.
His primary concern seemed to be to convince me that he was sincere, that he was
not a Communist and that his policies had the support of the great majority of the
Cuban people.
My own appraisal of him as a man is somewhat mixed. The one fact we can
be sure of is that he has those indefinable qualities which make him aleader of men. ,
Whatever we may think of him he is going to be a great factor in the development of
Cuba and very possibly in Latin American affairs generally. He seems to be sincere.
He is either incredibl naive about Communism r wider Communist disci -- my
guess 10 the former, and as I have already implied his ideas as to how to run a
government or an economy are less developed than those of almost any world figure
I havemet in fifty countries.
But because be has the power to lead to which I have referred, we have no
choice but at least to try to orient him in the right direction,
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Py
Cuba, Castro and John F. Kennedy
Amin. 19, 1959, I met
A for the first and only
t ime the man who was
to he the major {reign-
policy issue of the 191'xo Presidential
campaign; who was destined to be
a hero in the warped mind of Lee
larvey Oswald, President Ken-
nedy's assassin; and who in 104 is
still a major campaign issue.
The man, of course, was Fidel
Castro. It is safe to say that no other
individual in the world has created
qach a conflict of opinion in the
United States. Many foreign-policy
experts strongly support Sen. J.
Fulhright's view that Castro
is merely "a nuisance but not a grave
threat to the United States." The
opposing view, which I share, is that
Castro is a dangerous threat to our
peace and security?and that we
cannot tolerate the presence of his
communist regime 91) miles from
our shores. Tile primary evidence
which caused me to reach this con-
clusion was provided by Castro him-
scli in the conversation I had with
hIFYI more than five years ago.
it WAS /I Sunday afternoon, and
there was nothing I wanted less to
do than to go down to my Capitol
,ifice for a meeting with the new
Cohan dictator. But there were spe-
cial circumstances which prompted
e' ' /711(1
(1)/(1
mc to schedule the appointment.
Castro had come to power in Cuba
a little more than three months be-
fore. I le was now in Washington at
the invitation of the American So-
ciety or Newspaper Editors. Because
his visit was L1110InCial, and because
he had been making violent anti-
American statements, President FA-
senhower had declined to see him.
Since I had had considerable
experience in dealing with Latin
American problems and because
they thought some special treatment
might change Castro's unfriendly at-
titude, our ambassador to Cuba,
Philip Bonsai, itnd Secretary of
State Christian I lerter urged me to
meet with him. I agreed, on the
condition that the two of LIS would
talk alone, without members of his
stall or mine present, and that there
should be no photographs taken
or other attempts made to exploit
our conference or publicity pur-
poses. It seemed to me that until he
demonstrated some intention of
modifying his anti-American stand
Ile should not be accorded the same
treatment I would give to other vis-
iting fOreign officials.
Apart Prom the beard and the bat-
tle-fatigue unifOrm which are now
his trademarks, Castro was one of
the most striking foreign officials I
met during my (.?- gilt years as Vice
283
44,
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284 CUBA, CASTRO
President. As I told President 1..c
howcr later, he seemed to haveNilet
indefinable quality which, lor good
or evil, makes a leader of men.
I le had a compelling, intense
voice, sparkling black eyes, and he
radiated vitality. After,--;1/2 hours of
discussion I summed up my impres-
sions in this way?he looked like a
revolutionary, talked like an-idealis-
tic college professor and reacted likc
a communist, lie was intelligent,
shrewd, at times eloquent. lie gave
an appearance of sincerity, but what
he said followed a pattern all too
familiar to mc. I had had conversa-
tions with many communist leaders
abroad and in the United States.
The answers to questions came back
almost parrotlike from them, as they
now did from Castro.
Q. Why don't you have free elec-
tions?
A. The people of Cuba don't want
tree elections; they produce bad gov-
ernment.
Q. Why don't you give fair trials
to those whom you charge oppose
the revolution?
A. The people of Cuba don't want
them to have fair trials. They want
them shot as quickly as possible.
Q. Aren't you afraid the commu-
nists in your government will even-
tually take it over?
A. I. am not afraid of the commu-
nists; I can handle them.
I made no headway in attempting
to convince him 'that international
communism is more than just an
economic and political idea and that
its agents arc dangerously effective
AND JOHN B. KENNEDY
in their ability to grasp power ad;
to set up dictatorships.
At the conclusion of our confer-
ence I wrote a four-page secret
memorandum, and sent copies to
President Eisenhower, Secretary
I leiter and Allen Dulles, head of
the Central Intelligence Agency. MV
C011CIUSinll was, "Castro is either in-
credibly naive about communism or
is under communist discipline."
In the the weeks immediately Ater
Castro left 'Washington, several spir-
ited policy discussions on Cuba took
place within the Eisenhower admin-
istration. The majority view in the
State Department was in sharp dis-
agreement with my appraisal of Cas-
tro. Most of the career foreign-policy
experts argued vigorously that Cas-
tro was "liberal" but that, despite
some communist ;issociations, he
definitely was not a communist.
Their view prevailed over mine at
the outset, and their recommenda-
tions were followed. From that day
to this, the lack of a firm and con-
sistent policy toward Castro has
caused the United States to accept
a continuing series of defeats, per-
mitting our avowed enemies to be-
come entrenched in the Western
1 lemisphere.
Castro presented a complex prob-
lem from the very start. Ile had
come to power with the tacit sup-
port and encouragement of the ma-
jority of the foreign-policy experts
in the State Department, as well as
with the enthusiastic approval (,f
powerful elements cif the Anief,,,
press. Cuba A that time, a (1,?!-
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286 CCB/I, C,1,87.R0 AND
of Batista's misrule, was in need of
a revolution. The tragedy was that
Castro turned up as its leader. The
mistake made by some of our gulli-
ble State Department officials and
by certain influential columnists and
editorial writers was that they failed
to recognize the real problem we
laced. Our choice was not between
Batista and somebody better, butj
between Batista and somebody far
worse.
It was not long before President
.1isenhower began to realize that the
original appraisal of Castro was
wrong. Within months, bloody
purges, illegal confiscations of prop-
erty and Moscow-line attacks on the
United States completely unmasked
Castro and exposed him for what he
really is.
By early f96o President Eisen-
hower reached the conclusion that
Castro was an agent of international
communism and a menace to peace
in this hemisphere. In a top-secret
meeting in his office, it which I was
preseffl, he authorized the CIA to
organize and train Cuban exiles for
the eventual purpose of freeing their
homeland from Castro's communist
rule,
Six months later, on October at,
1 960, just lour years ago, it was the
C,7777-- issue which forced me to
make the most difficult and, as it
turned out, the m()st costly decision
of my political career.
Castro in the 1960 Campaign
1 WAS in my suite in the Waldorf-
Astoria in New 'i irk, preparing for
JOHN F. KENNEDY
the lburth and last of my television
debaKs with john U. Kennedy. The
subject was to be foreign policy, an
area in which most observers con-
sidered me to have the advantage
because of my wider experience in
that field. But the headlines in the
afternoon papers forced mc to make
a critical decision which put me at a
serious disadvantage in discussing
the m,ijor foreign_policy issue of thc
961) campaign.
Ile issue was then, as 11 is in 1964,
what should be American policy
toward Castro's communist gov-
ernment in Cuba. For several
weeks Kennedy had been criticizing
our administration's policy without
making specific recommendations as
to how it should be changed. A
few days earlier, in a speech before
the American Legion Convention
in Miami Beach, I had gained the
initiative on the issue by calling for a
quarantine of the Castro regime and
setting forth a specific program to
accomplish that objective. And now,
just before we were to debate this
issue face-to-face on television before
70 million voters, Kennedy counter-
attacked. Eight-column headlines in
the afternoon papers read: KENNEDY
ADVOCATES U.S. INTERVENTION IN CUBA;
CALLS FOR All) '1'0 REBEL FORCES IN
CUBA.
In his statement he declared, "We
must attempt to strengthen the
non-Batista, democratic, anti-Castro
forces iii exile and in Cuba itself
who oiler eventual hope (if. over-
throwing Castro. Thus far, these
fighters or freedom have had vir-
Don't.
11, hate\ yr ti
trail r a
a
. Lict. fly 1,)
whcre maw
a mu Ira\ 01,
,?? ?,11.seasou
Nrki,
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288 THE READ
tually no support from our govern-
ment."
As I finished reading the story, I
realized the difficulty of the decision
I had to make. For months I had
: I known that we had been doing ex-
actly what Kennedy seemed to be
advocating?supporting and train-
ing Cuban exiles so that they could
free Cuba from communist control.
But this was a top-secret CIA pro.-
ect. I was one y iree 1TleM
hers of the President's cabinet who
had been briefed on it, and the irony
was that I had been the strangest
and most persistent advocate for set-
and supporting such a pro-
lung up
gram.
Now the question was, did John
Kennedy know of the existence of
the pro.eqjPresident Eisenhower
instructed Allen Dulles, head of
the CIA., to brief the Democratic
candidate on all operations, includ-
ing top-secret operations. I knew
that. Kennedy had already received
two briefings from Dulles. I imme-
diately had a member of MN' staff
call the White House on the secur-
ity line to ask if these briefings cov-
ered Cuba. A member of the White
House stall indicated they had. (Sev-
eral months after the election, Allen
Dulles was to state that his briefing
of Kennedy had included Cuba but
not the training program for Cuban
exiles.) At the time of the debate,
however, and after checking with
the \\lite House, I had to proceed
on the assumption that Ken nedv
had been briefed on the secret pro-
gram.
ER'S DIGEST
1\ 0 re 112
I was faced with a heads-he-wins.
tails-I-lose proposition. If in the TV
debate I were to reveal the existence
of the training program and point
out that I had been one of its strong.
est advocates. I would pull the rug
out from under Kennedy's positiun.
But if I did so, the project would he
doomed, and also the lives of brave
men, both inside and outside of
Cuba, who were receiving trainiii4
and assistance.
Decisive Consideration: Security
I HAD only one choice: to protect
the security of the program, I had In
oppose Kennedy on his position of
advocating that the United States
openly aid anti-Castro forces inside
and outside Cuba.
The decision was right from the
standpoint of the country. It was
wrong politically. When the tele-
vision debate was concluded, Ken-
nedy emerged as the man who seas
advocating a "get-tough policy"
toward Castro. I seas the man wilt,
was "soft" on Castro?the exact op-
posite of the truth.
Any manlier of factors could have
made the difference in what was to
be the closest Presidential election in
history, where a shift of less than
one-halt* a vote a precinct would
have changed the result. Most ob-
servers agree that our positions on
the Cuban issue could well have
been the decisive factor. lint I have
never had any regrets about this dc-
cisimi, or any .doubt that it was the
only one I could make under the cir-
cumstances.
1964
CUB /I, CASTRO
5'
AND JOHN F. KENNEDY
I had known, of course, that
invasion was in progress, but it n
er crossed my mind that it would CU
allowed to fail.
On April 19, 1961, three months
after President Kennedy's inaugu-
ration, I flew to Washington from
my home state of California, to
which I had returned to practice law
after 14 Years in government service.
I Was scheduled to make a foreign-
policy speech in Chicago the follow-
ing week, and I had written Allen
Dulles to ask that he brief me on
some of the latest developments.
President Kennedy readily gave his
approval; I had tin appointment to
meet with Dulles at six o'clock on
the afternoon of the 19th.
The appointment was to be in my
Washington home. I arrived there
from the airport shortly before six,
to find a message from the CIA that
Dulles would be delayed for at least
an hour. It was after 7:30 before the
doorbell rang, and I went to greet
him.
The Bay of Pigs
I HAD known and worked with
Allen Dulles since the sun-mier of
1947 when he was one Of the advisers
to the Herter Committee, of which
I was a member. The minute I saw
him I realized that lie was under
great ernotional stress. I asked him if
he 'would like a drink. Completely
out of character for the smooth, cool
professional I had seen handle so
many difficult situations through
dae years, he answered, "I certainly
would. I really need one. This is the
worst day of my life!"
I asked, "What's wrong P He
replied, "Everything is lost. The
Cuban invasion is a total failure."
Dulles now filled me in on IN
att
details. After the election, belt 0-
President Kennedy took office
January, Dulles had brief -ed rlfo
completely on the training prog
The President-elect had indicat-0
that he felt the program should 1:33
forward, and said he would folk <
through on it after his inauguratit
But, as had happened in the Eis(
hower administration, a sharp
ference of opinion about Cast
developed among President Kent (cf))
dy's advisers. One group of activi
urged him to go forward with t (Dm
invasion plan. I lis liberal advist 0
from the State Department and r.,)
his personal staff took the line ti 0
if American support of the inyasi
became known, world opini 01
would react unfavorabl v. This 0-ro
0
advised that the United Stat.=
should either try to get along- is "Ir
Castro or find some other metn,0
for dealing with him. -0
co
President Kennedy finally ovqia
ruled his soft-line advisers lind c0
cided to go forward with the pia 09
"It took great courage," DuE 4?2
told me, "for the President to ovt (72.
rule some of his advisers and or(] 0
the invasion to proceed." But in 1 2
end the soft-liners won_ their poi 8
and, by last-minute compromistr,)
doomed the operation to failui 0
More COnCernt'd with an adverse 18
action from "world opinion" th,',
with the threat of communism cri
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0
(D
2,0
the Western Hemisphere, they per-
suaded the President to curtail the
original concept of the operation.
Two of the three Free Cuban air
strikes designed to knock out Cas-
tro's air force were canceled, depriv-
ing the invasion of air support."' The
result was a disaster both for the
Cuban Freedom Fighters and for the
United States. \Ve got the blame for
intervening; we were denied the
credit we would have received for
winning; and Castro was more firm-
ly entrenched than ever.
President Kennedy's Reaction
ii ut \-Ex-it DAY, April 20, when I
returned to mv home after a visit to
the Capitol. I found a note by the
telephone, left hr my 15-year-old
daughter, Patricia. It read: "Presi-
dent Kennedy has tried to reach you
several times in the last hour. Please
call the White Nouse operator,"
I placed the call, and the operator
put the President on immediately.
lis voice was tense but friendly as
he said, "Dick, could you drop by to
see me? Any time will be all right.
I have appointments with Dick Rus-
sell and with members of the Cuban
Revolutionary Council, but other-
wise my calendar is free this after-
noon.- I told him that I would be at
Ins 011-1Ce at four o'clock and would
be available to see him at any time
his schedule permitted.
I was escorted into the President's
private oflice a few minutes after I
THE READ!
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truth Thc R:acitr's
I )i,2.-(:st. S no mix r
::R'S DIGEST No.f;en71,0.
arrived at the White House. I hadn't
been in that historic oval room since
1 had said good-by to President Ei-
senhower there on January 19, three
months before. The President was
standing at his desk talking with
Vice President Johnson. "Lyndon k
going down to see if he can't get thc
Mexicans to support us on this Cu-
ban business. I have just told him
to tell the Mexicans they owe LIS a
vote. Don't you think we should be
tough with them It"
I replied, "Well, the Mexicans of'-
ten take the soft line where the com-
munists are concerned, because ol
the Girdenas inducnce, but thcy
need LIS as IMICh or more than we
need them today, and this is one time
when I think we should insist that
they stand with us." Shortly there-
after, Johnson left the room, and
the President sat down in his famous
rocking chair. He proceeded to give
his reactions to the events of the past
few clays.
"I have just come from a meeting
with the members of the Cu! nut
Revolutionary Council," he said.
"Several of those who were there
had lost their sons, brothers or other
close relatives or friends in this ac-
tion. Talking to them and seeing the
tragic expressions on their faces was
the worst experience of my life.
"Last night," he continued "they
were really mad at us. But today
they have calmed down a lot and,
believe it or not, they are ready to
go out and fight again, if we will
give them the word and the sup-
port."
1964 CURl, CAS -1W) A '11)
Kennedy did not try to hide his
frustration, disappointment and fury
over the failure of the operation.
Pacing around the room and using
his down-to-earth Irish, rather than
his Harvard vocabulary, he told me
how disappointed he had been in the
advice he had received.
"I was assured by everyone I
checked with?all the military ex-
perts and the CIA ?that the plan
would succeed.- Over and over
again, he reiterated the fact that
these assurances had been given to
him. He did not mention the fatal
advice?given him by some of his
liberal State Department and White
House advisers?to cancel the two
air strikes?and, in effect, destroy
the plan.
Finallv he put the key question
to me, bluntly and directly: "What
would you do now in Cuba ?-
"I would find a proper legal cover
and I would go in,- I answered. I
suggested three possible legal justi-
fications for taking such action: i. A
new definition of aggression, based
on the premise that Soviet-bloc
equipment was useci by the Castro
forces, and that we had an obligation
to see that the Freedom Forces were
at least equally supplied. 2. Send
American forces in under our treaty
right because of the potential threat
to Guantdnamo. 3. Send American
forces in to protect the lives and
rights of the several thousand Amer-
ican citizens still living in Cuba. I
emphasized that I felt we must do
whatever was necessary to rid Cuba
of Castro and communism.
1011.V F. li.L.V.VEDY 291
Kennedy heard me out without
comment, and then replied, "Roth
Walter Lippmann (who had recent-
ly had an interview with K hat-
slit:hey) and Chip Bohlen (who had
been our ambassador to Moscow)
have reported that Khrushchev is in
a very cocky mood at this time. It
(I)
(D
0_
0
-0
their appraisal is correct, he may be- r
lieve this is the time to move against >
us and he might seize upon any ac-
tion on our part in Cuba as an eXCLISe
for doing so. This means that there
is a good chance that, if we move
on Cuba. Khrushchev will move on
Berlin. I just don't think we can take
the risk, in the event their apprai3t,t1
is correct.
-
Our conversation then turned
briefly to Laos, where American
support of a neutralist regime
seemed to be leading to an eventual
comm umkt takeover.
I told President Kennedy I
thought that in both Laos and Cuba
the important thing was to take
some affirmative action, including,
if necessary, at least a commitment
of American air power.
He said, "I just don't think we
ought to get involved in Laos, par-
ticularly where we might find our-
selves fighting millions of Chinese
troops in the jungles.- His next re-
mark underlined how the failure to
come to grips with communism in
one part of the world has weakened
our position in every other part of
the world. -In any event," he said.
"I don't see how we can make any
move in Laos, which is 5000 tildes
away, if we don't make a move in
192 (. LI 11 t, 4 S7' k /1,\I 1) 1011N F. KENNEDY
FIRM Arit,
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side door to one of the White I louse
cars which he had ordered to be sent
for me, and which was waiting in
the driveway on the South Lawn. As
we walked to the car, he threw out
another strangely prophetic remark:
"I hope you take the time to write a
book. It's really a good idea, even if
it sells only a few copies. There's
something about being ,fn author
which really builds the reputation
of a political figure. Look what The
Col/science of a Conservative has
done for harry Goldwater!"
Wc shook hands, and he turned
and walked back up the path to his
office. As he walked away, his head
bowed, Isis hands januncd character-
istically into his pockets, he seemed
literally to be carrying the weight of
the world on his shoulders. As I
watched his weary, stooped figure,
usually so erect and buoyant, disap-
pear into the terrible loneliness of
the White I louse office, I had an
overwhelming sense of how de-
pressed and discouraged he must
have felt. I realize that political fig-
ures are not supposed to experience
ordinary emotions?particularly
where their political opponents are
concerned. hut I can truthfully say
that, in this darkest hour of his polit-
ical career, my heart went out to my
I riend, Jack Kennedy, the man who
had come to Congress the same year
I (lid, 14 years before.
The Lesson of the Bay of Pigs
THE.000ttE RoosEvELT's daughter,
J\ lice .Longworth, once told me,
I replied, "[Isis, of course, is a de-
cision which only y,,u can make, in
the light
o: your inlormation as to
what our strength is and your intelli-
gence reports on enemy strength
and intentions. I Waist to tell you
that I will publicly support you to
the hilt if you make such a decision
in regard to either Laos or Cuba,
and I will urge all other Republicans
to do likewise. I. realize that some
political observers say you might risk
political defeat in 1961. if either the
Cuban or Far East crises involves an
American armed forces commit-
ment. I want you to know that I am
()Ise who will 'sever m,tke that a po-
litical issue if such action becomes
necessary."
I lis reply, hs the light of what
happened three years later, was
prophetic, although I do not think
he intended it that way. "The way
things are going and with ill the
problems \se have, if I do the right
kind of a job, I don't know whether
I .ins going to be here four years
Irons now."
I was not sure at the time what he
meant by this. I .issumed that Presi-
dent Kennedy foresaw that he might
now have to take risky military ac-
tion. And with the hay of Pigs flail-
ore fresh in his mind, he realized
that another such defeat could be
disastrous [Or him politically in io61.
Nevertheless, he said firmly, "YoLl
can be sure the political conse-
yiences will have no effect (111 the
(ICHS1011 I Mak(' 111 this crisis."
By that time we had talked for .t1-
Water dries you
Ordinary bath 6
Not Helene Curt
.as it bathes dry
and dewy-fresh ;
"moisturizing bath
Helene Ci.
the light moistu
0196411,
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-ith the family?
's the
g there.
h Co
CUBA. C.1,,I.R0 -1?VD /MIN Kl':,\INEDY
"Fat! never believed in the old
sayni*Ononi cry over spii led milk.'
Ile always said, `01 cot/it:4' you cry
over spilled milk?you cry and you
stamp up and down to make some
YOU don't spill it again!'"
Because Cuba is a classic example
of how not to conduct_ foreign policy
in dealing with the communists, it
is essential that we see where we
went wrong in the past in order to
determine what policy we should
adopt in the future.
There are two major lessons to
be learned from the Bay of Pigs:
First, when a decision has been
made to commit American prestige,
we must be prepared to commit
an adequate amount of American
power. As former Secretary of State
James Byrnes, whose 82nd birthday
celebration 1 attended shortly after
the Bay of Pigs crisis, said, "We
Americans must not begin anything
we aren't prepared to finish."
Second, American foreign policy
must alwa1-)e dictated b tfirt?s'e-
rests 0 tie nited States,
-ty some Vaalic Coneept of
-wor c pu ) opinion." The United
Slates should-always have a concern
tor the o_pinions of our friends in
uther nations. But, as the strong_est
nation in the world, it is our res
ion-
-,iliilit
inaommeglIMINIIM011111
with
ili
In the Kremlin, Khrushchev must
Lye watched with interest Amer-
inept and fainthearted efforts
tree Cuba. Ile drew his own con-
insions from the spectacle, and he
29
now had (t-oo," .tason to doubt our
resolve to stakruitp Ibr our own in-
terests. As he later said to Robert
Frost, "The Americans are too lib-
eral to fight."
The Cuban Missile Crisis
A row months afterward, on June
4, 1961, Khrusheliev had an oppor-
tunity to size up the new President
and his advisers, at Vienna. What-
ever his impression may have been,
it is clear from the entire chain of
events that our lailure at the Bay
of Pigs led directly to the Soviet
decision to move into the Western
Hemisphere in force, with both men
and missiles.
The history of this infitmous and
secret action by Khrushchey has
been recorded elsewhere,* but it is
perhaps instructive to note that once
again the powerfhl State Depart-
ment clique and the "liberal" mem-
bers of the White I louse staff chose
to ignore warnings, chiefly by the
CIA and by Sen. Kenneth Keating,
who repeatedly stated that Soviet
forces of men and missiles were be-
ing landed ill Cuba.
By October 16, 1962, there was no
longer any doubt. The CIA laid on
the President's desk photographs of
Soviet missiles in place in Cuba.
The photos had been taken by the
de_fru-tia-4.1.L....CIA's U-2 planes, and the evidence
could not be brushed aside.
On October 22, 1962, President
Kennedy made his dramatic an-
nouncement that the Soviet Union
*Sec "While America Slept,- The Reader's
Digest, March '6.;.
e-
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Declassified in
GA ,'?11:0 AND 101IN P. Ii7P;NIVIDY 297
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ballismissilcs and jet bombers the United States became committed
into Cuba. I le ordered a f.lockade,
and demanded the removal Of exist-
ing missiles, with on-site inspection
to make certain that the job was
done.
This was the finest hour of his
Presidency. People, not only in this
country but throughout the free
world, ,Ipplauded this fOrcefid com-
mitment of American strength to
the defense fi-cedom the cause
of peace. By finally calling K hru-
shchcv's 1)1011, President Kennedy
assured his own place in history as
the man who made nuclear black-
mail an obsolete form of diplomacy.
But, again, the tragic history of
American indecisiveness repeated it-
self. The persistent clique of ad-
visers \vho had stayed Kennedy's
hand at the Bay of Pigs began at
once to nibble away :it the new
strong policy. They insisted that the
whole dispute be turned over to the
United Nations for negotiation and
settlement. By convincing the Presi-
dent that he should back away from
the strong course of action he had
initially outlined, they enabled the
United States to pull defeat out of
the jaws of victory. These were the
results of following their incredibly
had advice:
? There was no insistence on On-
site inspection. "OfTensive" missiles
were apparently removed, but "de-
fensive" missiles were allowed to
remain.
? Not only were the Cuban exiles
prohibited from engaging in In rifer
ig out of other catsup
!re poured.
ore for Heinz.
to a no-invasion policy.
? This weak-kneed foreign policy
encouraged the enemy to bolder and
bolder action. Shiploads of Soviet
arms have continued to pour into
Cuba?until today, except for the
United States and Canada, the is-
land is the strongest military power
in the Western 1 Iemisphere.
? Khrushchey's gamble in put-
ting missiles into Cuba was merely
another application of the time-test-
ed communist doctrine?"Two steps
forward, one step backward." The
operation turned out to be a net gain
for the Kremlin.
ON NOVENniEli 20, 413, I flew to
Dallas to mend a meeting with one
of the clients of the New York law
firm with which 1 am associated.
At in informal news conference,
which 1 held on November 21, the
questions were concerned chiefly
with the visit of President Kennedy,
who was scheduled to arrive in Dal-
las the following day. One of the
questioners pointed out that consid-
erahle opposition had developed to
some of the President's programs
and that there might be some dem-
onstrations against him and Vice
President Johnson, who would he in
the party. I urged, in a staterncra to
the press which I later repeated on
television, that the President and
Vice President he shown the respect
to which their offices entitled them.
I stated, "Disagreement with his
views is no CXCUSC for discourtesy to
Pt,
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298
THE READI
the office of President of the United
States."
'Castro and Lee Harvey Oswald
Ti ft roLLowiNG morning, Novena-
22, I boarded a plane to New
York. We arrived on schedule at
12:56 after an uneventful flight. I
hailed a cab and asked the driver to
take me to my office. We were
waiting for a light to change when
a man ran over from the street
corner and called out, "Do you have
a radio in your cab?' The cab driver
answered, "No. Why"- The man
replied, "The President has just been
shot in Dallas."
This is the way I learned the news
of President Kennedy's assassina-
tion. I asked the cab driver te take
me to my apartment rather than to
my office. And then, for the next
hour, I sat back in the cab wonder-
ing- what had happened.
When we arrived at the apart-
ment, the doorman told me that the
news had just been flashed on tele-
vision: the President had died.
I called J. Edgar Hoover, in 'Wash-
ington, and asked him what infor-
mation he had. He told me that a
Lee Harvey Oswald, known to the
FBI as a member of the pro-Castro
Fair Play for Cuba Committee, was
the alleged assassin.
Oswald, without question, was a
demented character who, accord-
ing to the reports, had also tried to
kill Gcn. Edwin A. Walker and
had threatened to make an
attc rn pt on my life rs well.
What brought him to this con-
:RS DIGEST November
dition is still unknown. But certain-
ly one of the major factors which
warped his mind and drove him to
this terrible deed was his contact
with communism generally, and
with Castro's fanatical brand of
communism in particular.
Fidel Castro, therefore, proved to
be the most momentous figure in
John F. Kennedy's life. It was Castro
who provided the major foreign-
policy issue in Kennedy's camp:lig-1i
for the Presidency; it seas Castro
who brought him to the lirwest point
of his career, at the Bay of Pigs; it
was Castro who supplied the oppor-
tunity for Kennedy's greatest act of
leadership as President, during the
blockade; and, finally, Castro was
an indirect Cause of the tragic snuff-
ing out of John Kennedy's life at a
time when, be reason of experience,
added to his keen intelligence, his
great vision and vitality, he Was
Coming into the most productive pe-
riod of his leadership of the nation.
Where Are We Now?
Ti-ns twisted and tragic chain of
events brings us to r964. Cuba, alon
with Vietnam, is the major foreign
policy issue of the 1964 Presidenth
campaign, as it was in 1960. Why.
Cuba such a key issue' Preci,isc
because it symbolizes our entire',
proach to the menace of con a?
nism, our entire approach to for
policy.
The answer to the qUestir
What We must do about Cuba c
determined only after we have found
an answer to the much o'aail-
1964
1964 CUBA, C ASTRO 457)
inclusive question: How does the
United States propose to deal with
communist aggression throughout
the world This is the actual for-
eign-policy issue we face today.
There is strong support in the
State Department and in the admin-
istration for Senator Fulbright's
view that Castro is not a danger but
just a nuisance, and that we should
be more flexible and more concilia-
tory in our policies toward the So-
viet Union and other communist
countries.
'Those who urge a more flexible
response to communism point out
that there are difficulties in the com-
munist bloc. There is a split between
Communist China and the Soviet
Union. There is the trouble that the
Soviet Union is having with its
satellites in Eastern Europe, whose
people are overwhelmingly against
their communist government. And
there is the fact that communism.
.conomically, has not been working
Soviet Europe or in C.'onim twist
?.hina or in Cuba or in the satellite
cern tries.
'Putting these developments to-
g ther, those who formulate our
'Fign policy say that the world
- ration has changed in our favor.
lug the test-ban treaty, the sale
of ...hcat to the Soviet Union and a
. elligerent attitude by Khru-
s!..,--\ //they argue that the cold war
wing and that a new period of
niodation with the commu-
nist in order.
My own evaluation leads to a
totally different conclusion. This is
JOHN F. KENNEDY
299
rio ti rue to be complacent about our
position in the world. The last four
years have seen the greatest series of
foreign-policy failures of 'any com-
parable period in our history. In Eu-
rope, the Grand Alliance is in a
shambles, with several of our allies
refusing to support the United
States in our policy toward Latin
America and Asia. In Germany, the
Berlin Wall stands as a grim monu-
ment to American weakness and
indecision in the face of a flagrant
communist challenge. In Asia, Viet-
nam is only the most recent and
most shocking of a series of foreign-
policy disasters that has reduced
American prestige to an all-time low
in that part of the world. Laos is
practically gone. Cambodia is going.
Burma and Indonesia are on the
brink.
In countries scattered around the
world, acts of mobs descending on
American embassies, stoning our
representatives and tearing down
the flag have becorne commonplace.
We have been humiliated, frus-
trated, outguessed and outmaneu-
vered at every turn. In the face of
this record, how can anyone in a
responsible policy-making position
say that the cold war is thawing
The cold war isn't thawing: it is
burning with a deadly heat. Com-
munism isn't changing; it isn't sleep-
ing; it isn't relaxing; it is, as always.
plotting, scheming, working, fight-
ing.
Soviet weapons arC available to
any group anywhere that is seeking
to blow up the social order and
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/25: CIA-RDP85-00664R000200130001-5
CUBA, CAS1'R.0 AJ!) IN.LV A 1EDY
create the char 'n which commu-
nism thrives. iijoittsands of young
people from non-communist coun-
tries are today being trained in the
arts of subversion?from the staging
of riots to guerrilla tactics. In the
bloodletting in Southeast Asia, Cy-
prus, the Congo, Yemen, British
Guiana and in other areas, commu-
nists are directly or indirectly in-
volved.
While the danger of destruction
by total war has gone down, the dan-
ger of defeat without total war has
gone up. Those who urge that we
seek an "accommodation" with the
communists fail to realize that when
the communist leaders talk softly
they are increasing their subversive
and revolutionary activities. This is
the situation with which the United
States is presently confronted. It is
a situation which calls for realistic
thinking about communist strategy
and tactics, and for a new policy to
meet the threat that faces us.
We must understand that the com-
munist threat is worldwide, and if
communism takes over in one coun-
try the tremors are felt clear around
the world. We need, therefUre, a
worldwide approach. I completely
reject the idea that there are so-called
peripheral areas, collateral areas ?
like Cuba and Vietnam?that are
not important.
For world communist leaders the
battle for Cuba is llot about Cuba.
It is about Latin America. And the
eventual target is the U ril States.
Cuba, for example, is*fteitur very
doorstep. All the world looks on and
sees that we do nothing to help our
neighbors who are enslaved by a
communist dictator. Is it any won-
der that they are doubtful that we
mean to resist communism in other
parts of the world ?
At this critical period, we must
make up our minds that there can-
not be one further retreat any place
in the free world. We must have the
military strength, the economic pro-
grams and the political-action pro-
grams to resist any further retreat.
Rather than a policy of flexibility, of
softening, of conciliation, we must
have a strong and determined pol-
icy. We must let those in the target
nations know that the non-commu-
nist world has had enough of this
continued encroachment, and that
we arc now ()Join, to stand firm.
As I reflect on all that has hap-
pened in recent years, one thing
stands out clearly : the troubles our
nation has experienced have come
when we have failed to stand firm
against the communist dictators. We
have too often backed down?and
backed away. It is time for us to put
an end to this disgraceful, self-defeat-
ing behavior. It is time to stand firm
?and then move forward in Cuba,
in Vietnam and in any other area
where freedom is denied or threat-
ened by the forces of world corn-
rnunism.
0A-MX.
Special Christma5
OneNe'
Subscrii
and you need PA
after January 10,:
"A truly wonderful 12.ifi!
Digest for the first time
you's than any Christm:
To help you get star
invite you to order on
of only $2.
If you have previous
already recei?
with a s:
But if yo
take advai
air
Wa.
The announcement card telli
to receive the Digest for anoth
nlaced on our tree, among
ents, as a reminder that mc,
_N-it is on the way."
it.oheria Houston,
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