WHAT BRIEFING, IF ANY, WAS GIVEN THE BRIGADE OR THE BRIGADE'S STAFF ON GOING GUERRILLA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85-00664R000300100011-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 15, 2006
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: May 31, 1961
• Content Type: SUMMARY

se 2006/09/15
SECRET Al
31 May 19 61
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4,VAt- 16-"l
SUBJECT: What briefing, if any, was given the Brigade
or the Brigade's staff on going guerrilla.
REFERENCE: Paragraph F. of Memorandum Dated 22 May 1961.
The following is a summation of actions involving pre-
paration and instruction for contingency employment of the
2506 Brigade in the event elements of the Brigade or the unit
in total suffered defeat and were forced to operate as
guerrillas.
1. All officers and the original cadre (some 375
personnel) which formed the 2506 Brigade received exten-
sive instruction (in excess of 13 weeks) in guerrilla war-
fare organization tactics and techniques. It was with
considerable difficulty and only after strenuous instruction
on conventional operations that the officers of the Brigade
were weaned from their marked inclination to guerrilla
operations. Many of the unit leaders had in fact operated
as guerrillas either with Castro forces in the fight against
Batista or in the later operations against Castro after he
had seized power.
2. During the evening, staff and operations classes
conducted during the Brigade training cycle extending from
November 1960 through,March 1961, several discussions were
held on the subject of a conventional force defeated in the
field and forced to continue resistance as a guerrilla
element. Circumstances and ways of means of organizing and
operating in various parts of Cuba were discussed in detail.
These discussions_,~.d not. cover the. Zapata area specifically
for security reasons, but covered the other feasible areas
to iiclude the Escambrays, Pinar del Rio and the Oriente.
These discussions were not covered with any specific direc-
"CIA HITF L P1~ the R c.gade operation in these locales but were
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IS I EC ET
in the nature of contingency operations planning, i.e., "in
the event we suffered defeat and it was physically possible,
we would attempt to break contact and retire to.a redoubt
area where we would initiate guerrilla activities." The
stated mission of the Brigade for which it was organized and
trained was to land by sea and air and fight a conventional
conflict as an organized military force. At no. time...did_ the
Brigade once organized receive training to fight as._..a.
guerila force. To have'attemted to conduct such training
tocT ha..,ew~.ds
v etrac" 'e?cT" rom the purpose for w i c t le Br%.giide
was oranize anc woutc have been .m 9TPor An
d9
indigenous ]~orce of die s_ g_ .the _ $r~gade .cannot be ora-_
nized and trained in the time allocated ._to .,concurrently
accomplish both missions (conventional military role and
guerrilla force role) satisfactorily.
4.. During the pre-staging briefings of commanders and
key staff officers at the training base in Guatemala (period
25 March to 7 April 1961) the operation plan (less locale and
target date) were briefed to the Brigade Commander, Deputy
Commander and S-3. Contingency provision in the event of the
defeat of the Brigade involving fragmentation of the unit and
attempts to initiate guerrilla operations were discussed. It
was mutually agreed that these contingency plans would be
discussed only down to the level of battalion commanders
prior to the landing to avoid defeatist talk and apprehension
concerning success of the operation. These discussions
covered both the aspects of an element or elements of the
Brigade becoming cutoff from the main body and attempting to
break contact with the enemy, and assume guerrilla posture,
as well as the possibility of the Brigade as a whole being
cutoff from. the sea as it advanced inland and the possibility
of its assuming a defense in a redoubt area or fragmenting
for guerrilla operations. It was mutually agreed that no
specific plans for this eventuality could be pre-planned insofar
as ground actions were concerned due both to the security pro-
visions prohibiting early briefing of any Cuban personnel as
.to the specific locale of the landing and the circumstances
surrounding the combat action which might lead to an element
or the whole of the Brigade to assume such a contingency plan.
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However, the following general provisions governing such
operation were mutually agreed to:
a. Resupply to the Brigade would be primarily by
air with secondary reliance on clandestine maritime craft.
Drop procedures would be provided for in the Operation Plan.
b. Communications would be directed to the base
control outside the target area by the five RS-l's and
seven TPL radios in operation with the Brigade. (Not in
the command commo trailer.)
c. Tactical integrity would be preserved wherever
possible and the operational size of guerrilla units would
be dictated by the specific local conditions prevalent in
the operation area.
d. Command lines would be preserved with the Bri-
gade Commander or his designated representative, preferably
a,senior unit commander exercising operational control of
specific operational areas.
e. Local recruits and volunteers would be accepted
but the Brigade would maintain the 2506 personnel in command
and key positions in all formations.
f. Local law and customs would be observed, pro-
visions or resources commandeered would be paid for or receipts
given.
g. Terrorist operations effecting personnel other
than GOC governmental or military personnel would be avoided.
5. At Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua, subsequent to briefing
on the target area, these contingency provisions were further
discussed with the same individuals (Brigade Commander, Deputy
Commander and S-3) with further specifics addressed to the
terrain of the Zapata area. The following points were covered:
a. Red Beach Task Force (2nd Bn, 5th Bn and Co. A of
1st Airborne Bn) would hold Red Beach area in the event'Blue
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Beach was forced to withdraw to the north. Blue Beach Force
would withdraw to the north along the coast road. Upon
junction with Red Beach Task Force at the head of the bay,
the Brigade would withdraw to the south and west into the
greater Zapata area, breaking contact with the enemy and
assuming guerrilla operational status or preparing for
evacuation in increments as feasible. Alternate courses of
action (evacuation or guerrilla status) were to be imple-
mented as dictated by the circumstances.
b. In the event Red Beach was cutoff by the enemy
from contact with Blue Beach, the same course of action was
to be followed by the Red Beach Force. If, however, the
coast road to the Blue Beach area was open and the Blue
Beach Force holding, the Red Beach Force was to retire to
the south to effect junction with Blue Beach.
c. Blue-Beach Force, if cutoff from Red Beach and
capable of breaking out, was to move as appropriate to either
or both the following areas bordering Blue Beach and attempt
to evade pursuit.and initiate guerrilla operations.
(1) The area bounded on the north by El Jiqui
and the Jaguey Grande Red Beach road to the northeastern edge
of the swamp and thencesouth to the Covadonga/San Bias road
and the road southwest to Playa Giron.
(2) The area to the east and north of Blue
Beach bounded by the Playa Giron, San Blas, Covadonga road
on the west thence southeast along the edge of the swamp to
the western edge of Cienfuegos Bay.
d. It was mutually agreed that this plan might not
be feasible if either major force (Red or Blue) were closely
pressed by the enemy. Evacuation by sea was deemed unde-
sirable by the three officers concerned who stated that they
must fight and win or go down in defeat without recourse to
evacuation and that they would not consider or discuss evacua-
tion.
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6. The Brigade Commander prior to embarkation stated
that he had discussed the details of this contingency plan
with the commanders he considered appropriate. He stated
that he considered this plan to be particularly suitable for
the small airborne contingents dropping on DZ's 4 and 5 at
Jocuma and San Miguel de Pita respectively. This contingency
was further discussed with the Airborne Battalion Commander
De Valle on the night of 17 April prior to takeoff by Lt. Col.
Egan.
7. In summation it must be stated that little interest
or enthusiasm was displayed by the Brigade personnel con-
cerned for any aspect of the plan that involved retreat and
defeat, to include this contingency for guerrilla operations
plan. It was generally recognized and openly stated by the
key officers that any military force involved in an airborne/
amphibious landing and subsequent field operations against an
enemy defending his homeland would have an extremely difficult
time assuming a guerrilla role in any substansive force sub-
sequent to defeat in the field. The defeat itself implied
that the enemy in close combat had surrounded or ruptured and
destroyed the Brigade as a military force, thus allowing only
a fraction of its combat effectives to escape to assume a
role as escapees and evaders with a limited potential for
later guerrilla operations.
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