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Approved For- Release 009/09124: CIA-RDP85-00671'R000200240001-5 ~ w ?~ r * n r u T T A 1 RETIRED FILE 1 L:,OX FOLDER_ S' DESENSITIZED " DEFEATING 'URBAN VIOLENCE Approved For-Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000200240001-5 Approved For Releasers 999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 8000200240001-5 NOTE This publication is intended for general guidance of officials charged with combating urban violence. Concepts presented are in summary format only, and emphasis is on "what. to do" and not how to do it. The intention is to provide an overview and composite of systems recommended for defeating urban violence. Approved for Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000200240001-5 Aproved For Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000200240001-5 CONTENTS PAGE '.1. PREFACE .........???...??.?...? ..............?.......e.??... 2. URBAN ENVIRONMENT .........................?e............... 3. OPPOSITION TACTICS ......................................... 4. CONTROL MEASURES ..............?.....................?...... - Psychological and Political ............................ - Terrorist .............................................. - Sabotage.. ............................................. - Propaganda and Agitation ............................... - Armed Violence ......................................... - Assassination and .Kidnapping .....................,...... - Infiltration ....................................,,....:. - Mob Violence...... .. .......:.......................... 5. CONCLUSION ........ ......... .........:...................,.. 6. BIBLIOGRAPHY Approved For kelease 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000200240001-5 Approved For Release7.1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000200240001-5 PREFACE Whether nationalist or Marxist in ideology, many present day sub- versives have opted for urban-oriented violence. They have largely rejected the rural-based guerrilla tactics advocated by Mao Tse-tung, Ho Chi Minh, and Ernesto "Che" Guevara, among other insurgent theoreticians. The change urban focus is attributable to a combination of factors to include (1) accelerated urbanization; (2) massive discontent among students, intellectuals, labor, minorities, and impoverished ghetto residents; (3) non-adaptability of guerrilla tactics for largely passive rural populations; (4) conspicuous failure of recent rural-oriented sub- version; and (5) significant success achieved by urban terrorist groups. Thus, kidnapping, hijacking, assassination, bombing, riots, strikes, and other forms of urban violence will probably continue to be familiar hazards of life in the 1970's. The sponsors of such acts are essentially political partisans. Success or failure depends on the partisan's ability to.induce a "climate of collapse" which stimulates the defeat or overthrow of a target regime. Such a climate is created by the effective use of violence designed to gain control of men's minds, erode moral consensus, harden political battle lines, and stimulate radical right-wing response. This violent battle of psychological manipulation has appeared in Montevideo, Guatemala City, Sao Paulo, New Delhi, Calcutta, Saigon, Belfast, Montreal and other cities. Urban violence has also occurred _ iin the United States, but its scope and influ- ence Is far greater in.the less developed nations. Given the expanded threat, it is the purpose of this study to explore the various forms of violence and recommend adequate control systems. Approved For Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000200240061-5 Approved For Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000200240001-5 URBAN ENVIRONMENT Most urban centers generally afford a "hot bed" for political dissidence. The growth media&+"e the various discontented population elements to include (1) idealistic students and intellectuals frus- trated by the status quo; (2) underpaid and underemployed labor antagonized by corporate exploitation; (3) religious, ethnic, class, or social groups who suffer from inferiority complexes; (4) unemployed slum dwellers out- raged by their inability to achieve even marginal subsistence within the existing social-political-economic systems; and (5) other groups who sense some relative deprivation. If any combination of the above circumstances exist, violence only awaits the addition of leadership, organization, agitation, propaganda, support, and development of a "cause". All of these factors can be provided by a small-clandestine cadre dedicated to defeat or overthrow of the existing target government. These cadre can readily recruit action agents from among dissident population elements. Funds are often obtained via kidnappings, bank robberies, extortion, or other similar actions. Food and other basic supplies can be purchased or stolen as needed. Medical supplies and services are generally available from hospitals, pharmacies, universities, and medical students. Chemicals, explosives, arms and ammunition may be purchased openly or on the Black Market. Failing this, these items can be stolen from manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers or depots such as armories. Intelligence on government forces may be obtained via human or technical penetration operations, bribery, communications intercept, and simple theft of documents. Target acquisition is a relatively simple process since most urban areas contain government facilities or installations, official or diplomatic personnel, foreign embassies, business firms, etc. Meeting places can be located in residences, offices, factories, parks, public facilities, or any other location where small groupings of personnel can gather with some degree of secrecy. Likewise, safe sites and "drops" are also readily available in similar locations. Mobility options include movement by foot, private or stolen vehicles, and public transport. Route selection is relatively simple given the quantity of streets, alleys, and walkways. Cover and concealment is achieved by blending with metropolitan population masses which accept "casual" contact Approved For kelease 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000200240001-5 Approved For Release=,11999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R00d200240001-5 with strangers and generally ignore unusual activity undertaken by any individual. Communication techniques include use of telephone, tele- graph, mails, couriers and radios with appropriate utilization of simple word or phrase codes to provide security. Terrain advantage can be gained by using tops of buildings. Underground structures such as base- ments, subways and sewer lines may also be used to facilitate movement or concealment. In brief, a metropolitan area affords the total gamut of resources (men, money, material and intelligence) needed for the conduct of violence operations. The only remaining ingredient is the development of sub- versive tactics, strategy and organization. OPPOSITION TACTICS In terms of tactics, urban violence is similar to rural-oriented guerrilla warfare. From the communist point of view, the former is basically an extension of guerrilla principles to a metropolitan setting. However, the rural-based operatives have a much greater capability to maneuver using isolated or controlled "sanctuaries" to facilitate the conduct of extensive paramilitary warfare tactics. The urban insurgents are confined to a potentially hostile environment. This necessarily limits their efforts to small-scale clandestine acts of violence which will avoid direct sustained confrontation with superior security forces. An urban and/or rural-based subversive effort may be simultaneous but separate, mutually supporting or limited to a singular approach. Primary doctrinal emphasis has been on rural-oriented guerrilla warfare. It is for this reason that communist urban violence doctrine is not particularly well developed. However, even if detailed concepts existed, there would be great variation of form since approaches will vary according to the social, economic, political, psychological and security factors relating to a specific urban environment. The primary communist input (from Moscow, Peking, Havana or elsewhere) is the offer of sympathy, training and limited support to dissidents who are the potential or existing cadre for a subversive movement. % Creation of various national cadre elements can result from recruitment programs conducted by external and/or internal forces of subversion, or the necessary leadership may arise from internal conflicts Approved For-Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000200240001-5 Approved For Release i 9/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000.200240001-5 causing the aggravated "elite" citizen to seeks ways and means to over- throw his government. In either case, communist models of revolution are usually duplicated because they offer the most prevalent example of a proven means for dramatically and forcibly altering conditions per- ceived as being intolerable. Once the leader elements are created, the process of clandestine organization may be initiated. The basic principle is that personnel, mechanisms, modus operandi, ideology and goals of subversion must necessarily remain secret to survive repressive government reaction or to maintain deception. Further, experience has proven that personnel can most effectively and safely function in small specialized clandestine "cells each compartmented. from the other. Types of cells include cadre, agitators, saboteurs, terrorists, informants and agents, propagandists, political activists, psychological and action elements, communication nets, support assets, "front" or population organizers, and other functional units contributing to the conduct of subversion. Sources of recruits are as indicated in the previous section. The existence of elite direction and effective clandestine organi- zation facilitates the implementation of propaganda, agitation, and action programs designed to erode popular confidence in the target regime. These efforts combine grievance, exploitation and fear inducing terror designed to cause a target population to ignore, condone or support sub- versive activities. Approaches include (1) the "carrot" which promises to somehow eliminate all those conditions the target populace conceives as being intolerable, and (2) the "stick" which threatens to punish government supporters and all those who resist the forces of subversion. Both techniques are designed to allow a small activist force to gain positive or negative psychological control over a population majority. Once this situation is achieved, it is assumed that subversive elements will have sufficient power to force the collapse, defeat, or overthrow of a target government. Failing the achievement of these primary methods, a subversive force may attempt coups, palace revolutions, election engineering or induced social-economic-political "collapse" to accomplish an expedient victory. Examples of urban guerrilla tactics include (1) terrorism or the systematic use of intimidation for political ends; to disrupt socio-economic development and impede government's gability nto meet the population's "felt needs"; (3) propaganda and agitation oriented toward creating a "crisis of confidence" regarding government's intent or ability to resolve major problems; (4) armed violence intended to expose Approved For-Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000200240001-5 Approved For Release ,, 1.999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R0O0200240001-5 the weakness of government security forces; (5) kidnapping operations to free political prisoners, extract concessions, capture publicity and provoke controversy; (6) demonstrations, strikes, and riots to exploit popular grievances or establish a mutuality of "cause" between subversives and dissident population elements; and (7) infiltration and selective assassi- nation designed to neutralize the effective functioning of security forces or other government agencies. Despite the multiplicity of tactical options, the perpetrators of contemporary urban-oriented subversion have frequently failed to mobilize popular support. This failure is due largely to the inability of sub- versive elements to convince potential supporters that there are no prospects for constitutional change or non-violent reform. Future doc- trine on urban violence techniques may therefore concentrate on better tactics to erode public confidence in any governmental system. Possible conceptual solutions include a massive breakdown of internal security, economic chaos, and a polarization of political forces around-the "law and order" issue. Ideally, this approach would also cause'target govern- ments'to implement repressive measures which would help convince the population that non-violent change is impossible. Urban violence tactics and strategy arethus in an evolutionary process which has yet to produce the ultimate conceptual or doctrinal approach. Unfortunately, as various-revolutionaries learn by trial and error, previous weaknesses will be noted and appropriate corrective action taken. ., Despite the fluid status of urban-oriented.xpvolutionary doctrine, essential working principles should remain the same as those discussed herein. Given the valjdity of this assumption, we will attempt to out- line appropriate urban violence control systems in the next section. NOTE: Reference materials will include a listing of contemporary urban guerrilla doctrine for individual officers who may be concerned with a more detailed tactical or strategic analysis. CONTROL SYSTEMS Psychological and Political Attitudes of the target population must be manipulated to create favorable impressions regarding government and unfavorable opinions of Approved Forlelease 1999109/24: 1 - P8 - 0 71 R000200240001-5 Approved For Release '4 999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000200240001-5 the urban guerrillas. In the battle for men's minds, essential actions should include (1) development of programs designed to meet "felt needs" and resolve conditions perceived as being intolerable by various popula- tion elements; (2) upgrading of security force capabilities to provide population protection and freedom from fear; (3) effective utilization of "law and due process" to convince the populace that government will defeat the subversives without utilizing repressive measures; and (4) creation of institutional and governmental mechanisms that provide the means for effective "change" without violence. The developmental or modernization approach usually requires human, technological and capital inputs at a rate which will provide substantial agricultural and/or industrial growth. This is a long-term and complex solution which cannot be achieved easily without adequate savings,trade, aid, or credit. In addition to the above inputs, markets must be developed; producer incentives created; income and employment levels increased; educational programs expanded; birth rates reduced to something less than Gross National Product increases; and skilled manpower, energy sources, raw materials, machinery or other capital items must be assembled at the production point. Apart from these overall development efforts, dissident Wi. overished population elements should be provided with basic minimal e" 5~ e-e plus the opportunity Tor socio-economic self-advancement. Security improvement programs should be based upon legislative actions which provide the police and other internal defense forces with appropriate increases in leadership, manpower, training, finance, commu- nications, mobility, weapons, equipment and material. Essential tactical innovations will be discussed under the sections or 'terrorism, sabotage, riots, etc. The fundamental basis for improving security operations is via better intelligence collection and collation. Human/technical pene- trations, agent or informant operations, prisoner interrogation, communications intercept, and investigative techniques all provide essential information inputs. Effective collation of this data should result eventually. in the identification of subversive leadership, cadre, action and suooort elements ,-ideoloc modus operandi, organizational patterns, strength, capability, plans or intentions, facilities, mechanisms, and other details. In turn, the finished intelligence product is used to provide targets or operational leads and as legal evidence for judicial processing of subversives. Regarding "law and due process", it is essential that judicial pro- cedures be established to assure that violence control measures are politically, legally and morally justifiable. This is particularly true of methods used to arrest, detain, interrogate, convict and imprison or execute individual members of a subversive movement. If repressive, brutal, or illegal tactics are used by the government to attack subversive forces, popular sentiment may favor success of the latter. Approved For Release 199 QL9~ ' rLA rPnRRA_anA71 R000200240001'-5 Approved For Release 19 9/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R600y 00240001-5 Creation of adaptive and responsible institutions provide government with its most effective psychological weapon against violence. Assuming such organizations provide the basis for peaceful constructive change, the perpetrators of violence cannot justify their methods to a target populace. In fact, history has proven that the urban guerrilla cannot long survive in an environment where popular political, economic, or social aspirations can be achieved by non-violent methods. Subversion and social unrest thrives on the inability of a nation to modernize existing private or governmental institutions in a manner which will facilitate the effective, peaceful resolution of intolerable conditions, It is therefore essential that government assure that there is an adaptive organizational basis for reform, modernization and progres- sive change. This process must include government bureaucracy, political parties, unions, cooperatives, youth groups, and other private institutions. Past experience has shown that governments or societies least vul- nerable to subversion are those at the political extremes, to include (1) the most permissive and pluralistic because they are best able to remove the causes of revolt; and (2) the most repressive and totalitarian because they are best able to supress the first stirrings of revolt. Since the U.S. must necessarily reject the latter, we have attempted to outline effective approaches to the former, as indcated above; Terrorist 0 fensive terror tactics involve the use of.discriminate or indis- criminate v o ence designed to aid the subversive overthrow of a target government, or to expand the influence of terrorist sponsors. By exten- sive use of assassination and bombing, the terrorists' primary objective is to__cow a target population and create a crisis of confidence in government. As a result, the terrorists hope to isolate the population from target government influence for the purpose of control, or to erode socio-economic development and the effective employment of security forces. In addition, terrorist action may be undertaken to expand the potential source of intelligence, recruitment, sympathy or support. The strategic intent of offensive terror is oriented toward stimu- lating massive population agitation over goverments seeming inability to Drovide freedom from fear and developmental progress designed to meet felt needs.-- As previously noted, additional purposes are to erode moral consensus, harden political battle lines, and stimulate radical right-wing response. Terror is thus primarily political in nature and normally a Approved For Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000200240001-5 Approved For Release,"..' 9/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R0OOO00240001-5 tactic of subversive or criminal elements who seek viability and power by creating an antagonistic barrier between a population and its government. To be effective, the terrorist is dependent upon clandestine organi- zation, leadership, target intelligence, ideology, tactical mobility, technical skills, cover and concealment, plus a neutral target population. However, an exception to this latter requirement must be made for inter- national terrorists who operate from "base areas" outside the target nation. A current example is provided by Arab terrorist organizations operating against Israel. Although the objectives of international terrorists usually conform to the norm, they may have the additional goal of influencing other nations not to support a particular government against which they are targetted. It is a kind of influencing subversion designed to erode! the political, economic and defensive strength of any country the terrorists are attempting to destroy. Defensive terror is the employment of violence against the offensi ve errorists. This may be overtly or covertly undertaken by a target government, or it may be employed by independent groups who are in oppo- sition to terrorist forces and objectives. The key to defensive terror is intelligence collection and collation for the purpose of identifying the principal personalities and action elements of a terrorist movement. Overt, covert or semi-covert operations may then be mounted to eliminate violently terrorist cadre, functionaries. and supporting imechanisms. The fundamental problem with this approach_ is that terror begets more and the_general_population usually becomes anta on si tic towar 9 government because of this consequence. Even if government is not the overt or covert sponsor of defensive terror, suspicion and accusation will eventually lead to an official image of brutal repression which does not enhance the legal government's chances for survival. Counterterror is often mistaken for defensive terror to which it is only remotely related. The technique of counterterror employs intelligence to identify terrorists who are then neutralized by organized controlled government forces within accepted parameters of Justice within the law. The basic ingredientsfbr an effective counter- terror program are as follows: . a. Terrorist Profiles - can'be used to provide security per- sonnel with a classic thumbnail description of individuals-who warrant r- - Approved ForRelease 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000200240001-5 Approved For ReIease- lp. 99/09/24 : CIA-RDP85-00671 R009200240001-5 = r, j .+ r ~t T T A 1 close scrutiny as potential participants in acts of violence. This approach facilitates narrowing the focus of investigative and intelligence operations designed to identify members of terrorist organizations. Further, the pro- file improves routine observation by police and other authorities responsible for internal security. An example profile of a potential terrorist might indicate `basic characteristics to include (1) male or female age 16 to 58; (2) 'member of potentially dissident group; (3) person with emotional or fanatical tendency; (4) individual who has evidenced violent behavior or emotional instability; (5) citizens who are isolated from the national socio-economic or political "mainstream"; (6) radicals who have engaged j in demands for revolutionary change; and (7) individuals who obviously have nothing to lose by engaging in terrorism. Potential terrorist traits should be evaluated in accordance with each particular local or national environment. The main objective being to create a system that is easily developed and readily applied by all. security or intelligence personnel. b. Documentation Controls - facilitate security forces in their efforts to identify suspect terrorists and their supporters. Popu- lation identification papers should be designed to allow the police to spot-check any individual's name, date and place of birth, residence, family status, employment, race, religion, and physical description. Photographs and fingerprints can also be added to documents. In cases of emergency, citizens may be required to obtain special documentation for travel and resource control permits for the purchase of any item that might be used to aid a terrorist act. The intended objective of detailed documentation is to aid the-screening of an entire population. When used in conjunction with terrorist profiles and when properly focused on areas where violence has occurred, the system can be effective in providing investigative leads., c. Biographic Registry - involves the establishment of a W~l central security reference containing biographic card files or computer data on all known criminals, subversives, terrorists, dissidents and suspicious personalities. Each security and intelligence service would provide appropriate biographic inputs, and have controlled access to the complete registry. Sources and information would be protected by appro- priate compartmentation and security clearance procedures. Approved For Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000200240001-5 r- Approved For Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000200240001-5 YdI In effect, a national biographic reference is created to facilitate collation of all-source intelligence on confirmed or suspect terrorists. If the quality and quantity of information inputs are ade- quate, all security personnel can use existing files as the basis for rapidly determining any person's possible association with terrorist. or subversive activity. By establishing secure radio procedures for \. sending queries to the biographic registry, any policeman with appropriate communication can immediately validate the suspect status of individuals .stopped for spot-checks. The biographic registry does not negate the need to investi- gate or collect intelligence on potential terrorists having or not having files, but it does preclude suspect persons from going unnoticed easily. d. Personnel and-Physical Security - must necessarily be provided for the indigenous leaders and government personnel who will likely be targetted for terrorist violence. This requirement. includes protection of individuals from threats, coercion, assassination and bombing: the latter action will prompt the need for physical security of offices, homes, meeting places and transportation facilities. General defensive procedures include (1) personnel security clearances; (2) entry and exit control for offices; (3) protective fences for fixed facilities; (4) guards for. personnel and buildings;.(5) screening of communications, mail and cargo; (6) use of metal detectors for routine weapon's search; (7) utilization of bomb squads with dogs trained to smell out plastic explosives; (8) travel control procedures emphasizing alternate routes and various methodsof transportation; (9) street patrols in the area of offices and individual homes; and (10) other tar-hniniine __.._.. - _ to The-primary objective of such elaborate precautions is to frustrate the effective conduct of terrorist actions and thereby prevent those spectacular successes which encourage expanded future violence. To focus defensive efforts better and conserve resource allocation, it is essential that hard intelligence be obtained on terrorist intentions and modus operandi. This intelligence effort also provides the basis for offensive actions designed to negate terrorist violence before it can be employed. Personnel and physical security is thus achieved by a combination of defensive and offensive programs, the latter of which can be the most effective. The offensive methods will be discussed further in subsequent sections. Approved ForRelease 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000200240'001-5 Approved For Release 19,99/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000200240001-5 e. Intelligence Collection - is essential to the conduct of effective counterterror operations. Neutralization of violence is dependent upon government having some knowledge of terrorist personalities, organi- zation, plans, intentions, ideology, modus operandi and support mechanisms. Without such knowledge, security forces will be unable to focus properly defensive or offensive actions. Unfocused countermeasures are usually doomed to failure since the terrorists will be largely unaffected. Detailed information on terrorists can best be obtained by clandestine human or ? technical penetration operations. Failin this, intelligence must be gathered by alternate means to include (13 recruitment of informants; (2) suspect surveillance; (3) police investigation of potential terrorists; (4) search for weapons, explosives or other incriminating evidence; (5) prisoner interrogation; (6) monitoring of possible targets and suspected terrorist supply sources; and (7) mass population education in observation and reporting techniques related to terrorist activity. To narrow the focus of the above collection operations, demographic data and terrorist profiles can be used to fix specific geographic areas where terrorists could reside and organize with some degree of relative safety. Although terrorists may operate anywhere, they normally maintain their residence and meeting places among dissident population elements who evidence negative or hostile reaction to government security forces. This fact, therefore, allows selective elimination of those urban and rural areas which would not provide a hospitable terrorist environment. Physical data on roads, communication facilities, residential patterns, buildings and isolated areas can also be used to help determine likely patternsof terrorist organizational activity within suspect geo- graphic areas. Trash.collectors, building inspectors, electricians and other personnel with natural access can be recruited to aid collection of this physical information. Again, this effort further serves to pin- point where intelligence operations should be targetted. Counterintelligence/counterespionage operations will also be needed to supplement the above efforts. The objective of these operations include (1) penetrating and manipulating terrorist cells; (2) stopping, disrupting, misorienting or negating terrorist intelligence collection activities; and (3) developing passive or specialized defenses against planned terrorist acts of violence. In summary, intelligence and counterintelligence operations form the foundation for counterterror campaigns. Those security services /' P A a~ r T r% f Pt T T w Approved For,-Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000200240001-5 Approved For Release J999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000200240001-5 or personnel not familiar with essential clandestine'tradecraft should seek appropriate guidance and assistance. f. Intelligence Collation - provides the detailed compilation and analysis of information needed to help identify, arrest and convict the _perpetrators of violence. and their leaders or directors. It also facilitates the location and elimination of terrorist support mechanisms and other hard target To function effectively, any collation center must have access to all sources of information. This implies cooperation with all security and intelligence services using appropriate clearances, "'source" protection and compartmentation. In addition, the centers must have the legal right and authority to pinpoint specific targets and assign collection or action requirement to individual government components. Without such follow-on authority, the collation centers become little more than repositories of unexploited intelligence. All source information inputs should include (1) biographic data; (2) pertinent socio-economic, demographic and geographic publications; (3) details on transportation, communications and material resources; (4) target assessments; (5) analysis of terrorist organizations and modus operandi; and (6) all reporting on criminals, dissidents,, radicals, sub- versives or terrorists. After collecting every scrap of available information, trained analysts then collate data with the objective of developing inves- tjgatiye and target leads and detailed target folders for use by the operating e men s. The primary advantage to central collation is simply that all available pieces of an investigative puzzle are laid before personnel experienced in the art of formulating a composite intelligence picture which provides the sharpest available detail on any terrorist organization. If this collation process is absent or fragmented, any intelligence product cannot be properly exploited and subsequent counterterror activities may be expected to be largely ineffective. It is, therefore? imperative that any government targetted by terrorists. seek to establish the best possible intelligence collation system. g. Security Force Requirements - generally include (1) defense of officia personnel and physical facilities; ('.).riot control, bomb disposal and population protection from acts of viollence;. (3) enforcement of law and order; (4) preparation for national defense against internal or external acts of aggression; (5) investigation leading to location, arrest and conviction of criminals, dissidents, subversives or terrorists; and (6) other actions required to resist lawlessness, violence, subversion and warfare originating within or outside the state. Approved For.Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000200240001-5 Approved For Release. 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671.R000200240001-5 44 The conduct of counterterror operations burden police forces with the requirement to provide the population freedom from fear and violence, while undertaking legal investigation which will ultimately result in con- viction and punishment of terrorists after "due process". As previously stated, the foundation for this effort is based upon adequate intelligence collection which may be a primary or secondary function of various security services. Once., intelligence leads are provided, the lengthy and arduous process begins to. obtain sufficient evidence for a court trial which will attempt to prove the suspect terrorist guilty of accomplished or planned crimes of violence. This requirement demands the skilled and extensive application of modern criminal investigation. It is, therefore, essential that police or other security forces be provided with adequate authority, leadership, manpower, funds, training and equipment needed to accomplish the task. Defensive terror and other repressive acts can be covertly or overtly undertaken by government security forces to avoid massive investi- gative requirements. However, both covert and overt actions present the definite possibility that populations concerned will become agitated with their government. Further, some elements may actually sympathize with or support terrorist organizations because of illegal acts of repression. (See comments on defensive terror.)" Illegal acts of repression by government or "private" elements are generally counterproductive in the long run and should be avoided. Under most circumstances, it is recommended that target governments seek whatever resources deemed necessary to upgrade security forces and give them-the capability to deal with terrorists by acting within existing legal parameers. Even though this is often the most difficult course of action, it has proven to be the most successful. h. Population Mobilization - is initiated by advising and informing the target nation's citizenry of the nature of any terrorist threat and motivating mass popular participation in negating acts of violence. To accomplish this objective, the populace should be organized and instructed in the techniques of aiding security forces in the identi- fication of possible terrorists and otherwise assisting in their apprehension. The latter may be accomplished by launching an aggressive educational program designed to establish citizen procedures for reporting suspicious activities or personalities that are observed by local inhabitants. Carried to Its ultimate conclusion, each village and Approved For'Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000200240001-5 Approved For Release.-1,999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000200240001-5 city block would have resident protection committees with direct commu- nications to local police forces. Possible investigative leads would thus be immediately relayed for exploitation by security forces. The unique advantage of such citizen participation is based on the fact that local residents are most keenly aware of unusual events or the appearance of strangers in their neighborhoods. Another obvious benefit is the increase in the number of eyes and ears that terrorists will be forced to avoid. Actual techniques of population mobilization will vary according to environmental situations and citizens' receptivity or moti- vation. Procedural approaches are the same as for so-called "block warning systems." As stated in the introductory note? implementation should not be attempted prior to consultation with appropriate specialists. i. Judcial Base - is created by formulating those laws which support fully security forces in their conduct of counterterror operations. In addition, such laws should insure that all efforts are politically, legally and morally justifiable. This i_s particularly true of methods used to arrest, detain, interrogate, try, convict and imprison or execute ihndividual members of a.terrorist movement, as well as; to search suspected eou s an caches. . As previously stated, populations are not likely to support fully and consistently any government that engages in brutal, repressive, illegal or indiscriminate actions, regardless of the intenIed target. Sabotage The essential purpose - of sabotage is effective disruption of the economic-political-security activities within a state whose government is targetted for ruin or overthrow. It is a tactic that may be employed by urban guerrillas and terrorists, or by specialized "cells" of saboteurs. Fundamental objectives include (1) reduction of agricultural and indus- trial production; (2) impeding the effective functioning of essential services such as communication, transportation and utilities; and/or (3) limiting the conduct of various government activities with emphasis on internal security services and political machinery. Most sabotage is based upon covert destruction attack using explo- sives, combustibles, abrasives or subtle disruptive action. Other methods include (1) mechanical breakage; (2) use of damaging chemicals; (3) arson; (4) electronic'interruptions; (5) pilferage of vital components; Approved For Release 1999/09/24: IA-RDP85-00671 R000200240001-5 Approved For Releas-,1999/09/24 : CIA-RDP85-00671 R000200240001-5 can have disastrous consequences on the economy and security of a state. Further, the systematic employment of sabotage erodes public morale and confidence in government while advertizing the success and apparent invincibility of subversive forces. roof of sabotage is frequently difficult since-the ultimate target may not be apparent, and specific evidence destroyed in the act of destruction. Individual saboteurs will frequently maintain the cover of a normal life and commit their disruptive actions during the course of regular work or travel. It is for this reason that sabotage is such a potent revolutionary tactic. Fortunately, saboteurs have a general tendency to become overly confident or aggressive, thereby exposing them- selves. The lack of rigid compartmentation may stimulate the use of saboteurs for violent acts which unnecessarily expose their cover. In addition, saboteurs may be asked or forced to provide their own sabotage materials, thereby risking identification during procurement activities. Effective control of saboteurs requires a combination of psycho- logical and terrorist control systems discussed in the previous sections. These techniques must be supplemented by extensive security procedures for industry, communication and transportation facilities, government offices, or other lucrative targets. Emphasis is placed on physical protection, repetitive screening of personnel, and strict control of potential sabotage materials. If such systems still fail to deter the saboteur, it may be necessary to install television monitors to observe all human activity in the area of critical targets, Further, a rotating "buddy system" can be used to assure that individual saboteurs are con- stantly observed by a fellow worker. In sum, effective prevention of sabotage is a difficult but not impossible task. Governments confronted with this problem will need to seek further guidance and assistance on implementation of plant and physical security procedures. Moreover, they must recognize that they are dealing with a movement which is conspiratorial in nature and organization. (6) dissemination of incorrect information, falsification of data,mis- filing and records manipulation; (7) tampering; (8) fatal "flawing" of materials or equipment; (9) work slowdowns; (10) interruption of command or control procedures; and (11) use of laws, courts, and parlimentary rules to impede the effective functioning of government. The extensive employment of various sabotage techniques affords the revolutionary with a relatively secure and inexpensive weapon that Approved ForRelease 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R00020024(1001-5 Approved For Releas'e_1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000200240001-5 Propaganda and Agitation In order to be successful, most subversive movements must convince a majority of a target population that the conditions under which they exist are intolerable. This attitude will then provide the motivation and "cause" needed to stimulate the popular dissidence essential to ruining or overthrowing any government. Propaganda comes in many and varied forms to include (1) leaflets; (2) letter campaigns; (3) wall slogans; (4) rumors; (5) oratory; and (6) radio, newspapers or other media. However, the latter forum exists only where free speech is guaranteed or for low-level efforts which might not be supressed. Agitation is usually accomplished by influence agents who seize upon controversial issue to "inflame" specific audiences for the purpose of stimulating the development of particular attitudes, actions or reactions. These individuals usually focus their attention on labor, student or other population organizations that have banded together because of common interests they wish to protect or promote. By identifying with their cause, the agitator can thus seek to exploit any known grievance. Once again, the previously discussed psychological control systems afford. on effective means to negate the influence of subversive-sponsored agitation and propaganda. The most important technique beinq the guarantee of,credible, institutional and constitutional processes for non-violent reso-___ -lution of conditions that any population segment conceives"as being intolerable To enhance the above, government should ativertize merits of its own efforts to institute reform and constructive change. They must discredit the subversives and prove that government will and can overcome major problems while defeating the urban guerrillas within established parameters of law and order. Any government also has the option of silence or direct counter- propaganda activities. Leaflets can be discredited, manipulated or answered, Letter campaigns may be countered by confusing the issues, mail censor- ship, and letters containing alternative opinions. Wall slogans can be painted out, sand-blasted or sometimes manipulated by adding or sub- tracting letters and words. Rumors can be distorted, discredited or burried in an avalanche of other rumors. Oratory is negated by argumen- tative oratory. Media owners can usually be influenced or pressured to avoid "playing" issues giving credibility to the subversive cause. Additionally, government can effectively utilize various media to convey its counterpropaganda message. w n u r T n r U r T A 1 Approved For RrAease 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R00020024000,1-5 Approved For Release1999/09/24 : CIA-RDP85-00671 R000200240001-5 Agitator activity may be observed by low-level informants recruited from among those organizations or institutions the former is attempting to influence. Specific agitators can then be harassed, surveiled, detained or arrested until they cease and desist their activity. The government can also recruit their own agents of influence to be targetted against potential dissident groups. These individuals act as counteragitators who attempt to "dampen" subversive attitudes or actions, and convince their audiences to seek desired changes by legal and peaceful.means. This latter approach, of course, assumes that government is not repressive and has provided some basis for reform. Armed Violence Snipers or "firing groups" of four or five men may undertake limited hit and run attacks to erode popular confidence in government security forces and to force the initiation of repressive acts antagonistic to a target populace. Weapons include rifles, shotguns, pistols, grenades, Molotov cocktails, explosives and other light-weight, easily concealable items. Targets may be discriminately or indiscriminately selected. Police, firemen, government officials, foreign diplomats or businessmen and leaders of moderating forces are high on the discriminate list. Indiscriminate targets are usually selected to incite population fear. These armed action groups may also be used to undertake robbery, kid- napping, assassination or other select activity in support of overall subversive objectives. In the urban environment, such guerrilla action is at close quarters for extremely short duration. Specific, tactics will depend on the target, the metropolitan terrain, attack options, movement alternatives, type of, weapons, accepted modus operandi and the potential for surprise/retreat. The net effect being a great diversification of tactical approach from one situation to another. The sniper or armed guerrilla squad often appear to have little distinction from terrorists; however, the latter are usually limited to covert acts of assassination and bombing. Whereas the so-called "fire teams" engage in more overt and flagrant hostilities that separate them from the normal terrorists. A basic difference in tactics also necessitate handling the two groups separately. Effective intelligence collection and collation or other tech- niques discussed under terrorist control may aid the apprehension and arrest of snipers or members of fire teams. However, defeat of these Approved For Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000200240b01-5 Approved For Release:,1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000200240001-5 particular urban. guerrilla components will require-a major effort on the part of internal security forces. Snipers are a specialized problem in themselves. The instant a sniper opens fire, the police and/or other security elements must have the immediate capability to "cordon" the fire zone and safely remove all civilians or other targets enclosed within. Security forces must then utilize available protective cover while moving to locate, encircle and entrap the sniper. Any counterfire should be undertaken only by skilled marksmen using high-powered rifles with scopes. Massive amounts of uncontrolled firepower only serve to endanger civilians and property while providing the sniper with addi- tional targets. Terrain advantage may be achieved by use of multi-storied buildings or helicopters. The overall objective being to quickly and efficiently eliminate the sniper while protecting the populace and avoiding any retaliatory action which could serve the guerrilla cause. Fire teams are the urban guerrillas' paramilitary arm and must usually be countered by employment of basic counterguerrilla tactics. Police and other internal security elements will need the type of training, arms, equipment, communication and mobility that will prepare them to undertake such action. This normally will involve some funda- mental changes in the organization and deployment of all internal security forces. An "initial reaction force" may be composed of specially augmented police squads that are strategically deployed throughout the urban target area. These units should be capable of momentary response to any guerrilla attack and they must be`prepared to immediately engage guerrilla fire groups in a street battle. How- ever, counteraction must be delayed until such time as the civilian populace. has been lead to escape from the fire zone. Reserve units should be created to provide a backup for the initial reaction forces. The reserve is normally composed of police companies or specially trained military organizations held on a stand- by basis. Such units can be called in to cordon and search an area or they may be deployed to directly engage guerrilla elements. It is also essential that military reserve forces be prepared to react against a series of widely dispersed guerrilla actions designed to overwhelm the police. Assassination and Kidnapping The urban guerrillas may employ assassination and/or kidnapping operations to eliminate "key" leaders within government or the private Approved For Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000200240001-5 ? Approved For ReleasaeA999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000200240001-5 sector. Liquidation of existing leadership is the oldest method of. revolution and affords a relatively simple means to dislocate or dis- organize political-social-economic institutions. Targets may be limited to "heads" of state, representatives of government, local leaders, or other individuals who act to support the status quo. The primary aim of a systematic campaign of assassination is to alienate a populace from their government by establishing the omni- potent power of the guerrillas. Kidnapping operations may also be designed to accomplish this same objective, and to extract concessions, capture publicity, provoke controversy or free political prisoners. Targets for kidnapping may also include foreign diplomats or business executives and various personalities who might be useful for propaganda purposes. In some cases, the kidnap victim may be executed after his usefulness has ended, so the net effect is that of a combined kidnapping and assassinW on. Individuals or select three- to five-man guerrilla teams are usually employed to conduct the above types of operations. Normally, such individuals are selected on the basis of their proven courage, dedication, resourcefulness and cunning. Preferably, they are not persons wanted by the authorities, but ordinary citizens capable of moving about freely. Assassinations or kidnappings are planned in detail and special surveillance parties first check on the movements of propective vistims. The target is shadowed to learn his habits, hours, movement patterns and usual security procedures. When a pattern is established, the guerrillas then develop and rehearse their specific modus operandi. To counter the threat of assassination or kidnapping, all potential targets must be advised to constantly vary their routes of movement and patterns of activity. Prospective security procedures should be devised fQr all key personalities. Every effort must be made to avoid unneces- sarily exposing potential targets. When they must be exposed, threatened subjects should not be at a specific location at the time guerrilla elements might expect them to be there. Special security arrangements may be required for routine travel between a target's home and office. In urban areas where a high threat exists, special buses with armed guards can be used to pick up and escort key leaders between home and office. Physical security of offices can be increased and potential target personalities, plus their families, may all be moved into a ? protected residential compound with fences, guards, etc. Approved For I o1ease 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000200240001-5 Approved For Release,.1,999/09/24 : CIA-RDP85-00671 R000200240001-5 Additional countermeasures include the various control systems discussed under the previous section on terrorists. Primary emphasis is on intelligence operations designed to identify assassins and kidnappers. Infiltration The security and operational potential of an urban guerrilla force is usually predicated on the quantity of intelligence obtained by successful-infiltration. If police and internal security organi- zations can be penetrated, the guerrillas may thus be forewarned of actions planned against them. The infiltration of security forces was seen by Lenin as one of the essential preconditions for a successful urban uprising. Lenin's theory being that urban guerrillas would always be outgunned unless they neutralized the police and other security elements by infiltrating their own agents at all levels. In addition, the subversive movement cannot be expected to succeed unless it attacks and erodes any official programs designed to establish or sustain population confidence in government. To help accomplish this goal, the urban guerrillas will attempt to infiltrate all elements of the target regime. The net objective is to obtain information which can be used to plan disruptive or destructive attacks against socio- economic development projects or other programs designed to alleivate popular grievances. Select infiltration operations may be used'-to obtain specific target intelligence, particularly as regards procurement of funds, weapons, or other supplies. Penetration agents can also provide information on potential targets for terrorist, sabotage, assassination and kidnap operations. Classic clandestine "tradecraft" techniques are used as the basis for organizing and accomplishing infiltration operations. We are first concerned with human penetrations and to a lesser degree, theft,tribery, technical penetrations and other ancillary types of espionage. However, the primary danger is that guerrillas may obtain a popular following from among elements of the population having existing intelligence access. This situation will then create a more spontaneous flow of information which the urban guerrillas can use for protection or advantage. Approved For Rpl-ease 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000200240001-5 Approved For Release _1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-006718000200240001-5 An effective counterintelligence operation requires (1) trained espionage officers; (2) secure communication and facilities; (3) bio- graphic files to facilitate security clearances and name traces; (4) physical securit and document control systems; (5) human and electronic surveillance; (6) informant nets; (7) double agents; (8) "block warning systems"; and (9) a variety of other specialized techniques. All of this should be supplemented by modern criminal investigative practices usually requiring an upgrading of overall police capabilities. Thus, a major and essential function of target government is. to stop, disrupt, manipulate or negate rebel intelligence operations. Accomplishment of this objective requires massive utilization of counter- intelligence procedures and police investigative techniques. The initial action is to identify specific agents, their guerrilla contacts, their couriers and courier routes, dead drops, and other communication or con- tact procedures. Once a subversive agent is identified? an operation may be carefully planned to attempt to double the agent. Failing this, the agent should be apprehended, interrogated, convicted and imprisoned according to "due process". Mob Violence Street tactics of the urban guerrillas include the instigation and/ or manipulation of demonstrations, mobs, and strikes. The objective is to create a situation wherein peaceful protect groups can be agitated to participate in acts of civil disobedience or riot. Agents of influence and subversive agitators may seize upon any popular grievance to stimulate the formation of protest: groups. The next objective is for agitators to encourage the type of public demon- stration that could easily "flare" into a confrontation with police. Having created a proper environment, various guerrilla elements can infiltrate the street mobs to incite a riot or undertake acts of violence using the protestors for cover. Guerrilla tactics are simple. Bottles, bricks, and stones can be hurled at police. Hasty barricades may be used to block streets. Business establishments, factories and/or government buildings can be looted or burned. Snipers can-be deployed to fire at police, hoping they in turn will retaliate by killing innocent members of the mob. When the police attempt to arrest an agitator, a larger group of urban Approved For Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000200240001-5 Approved For Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000200240001-5 guerrillas may attempt to aid his escape. If internal security forces effectively contain the riot, the guerrillas will retreat along pre- planned avenues of escape. The primary objective of such group agitation is to force the government to take strong repressive measures, thereby further alienating the population. Promoting general disorder also helps to disrupt the economy and undermine the government. Last but not least, by organizing social discontent, the urban guerrillas induce the population to accept their leadership while demonstrating the regime's lack of authority. Basic ingredients for group agitation include (1) leadership trained in mob psychology and tactics; (2) an executive committee responsible for overall planning and execution; (3) propaganda efforts to rally public sympathy for a cause; (4) compilation and continuous review of exploitable grievances; (5) registration of potential dissi- dents; (6) study of overall environment; (7) profiling of radical organizations; (8) enlistment of financial and moral support; (9) tactical training for agitators; (10) development of community support; (11) recruitment of "crowd-roving" orators; (12) preparation of music, chants and slogans; (13) creation of demands and ultimatums; (14) planning for pivotal events designed to precipitate conflict; (15) public announcement of time and place for planned demonstration; (16) stimulation of actions to incite media coverage; and (17) encouraging demonstrators to participate in dramatic mass arrests. By effective manipulation of mob psychology, the urban guerrilla thus plans to push the aggrieved citizen into outright breaches of law that will lead to heightened outbursts of violence. In addition, all-out revolution must be rapidly precipitated or mob participants will lose stamina in the face of prolonged adversity. To succeed, group agitation must be carefully timed to coincide and "peak." with other guerrilla actions. A target government has only two types of countermeasures for controlling group agitation. The first is to quickly and mercilessly crush any protestors by use of totalitarian force. Obviously, this is not feasible for any democratic society. A second option is to institute political and psychological control systems previously dis- cussed and to prepare internal security forces for non-violent mob/riot control. The principal technique being to control effectively a mob without repressive or brutal tactics which further agitate the population mass. Approved Fo Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000200246Q01-5 Approved For Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 RO6 0200240001-5 CONCLUSION Throughout history, violence has been an integral part of the political process. Urban guerrillaHarfare is a modern ,popular form of this activity advocated by communists and various national revolu- tionaries. More civil and humane states have limited violence by developing the type of laws, custom, consensus and responsiveness which limit the need or purpose of such hostility. However, no system has eliminated violence on the periphery of its consensual and support base. When violence remains peripheral, police powers of the state are usually adequate to "deal" with the problem in a manner acceptable to the population majority. If dissident forces are more than peripheral, the typical response is one of absorption, cooptation, and acceptance of essential reform as the basis for re-establishing a broad popular consensus. Those. governments which fail to perceive the significance of popular grievance are inviting an outbreak of violence. The same is true for regimes that fail to move toward accommodation when they are unable to repress significant population demands for reform. Even though a subversive conspiracy may exist, it. is not the revolutionaries or social deviates who cause the major problem. They are merely the tip of an iceberg which government may take repressive action to destroy. However, a new peak may be pushed to the surface by that "base" of popular dissent which originally stimulated and supported the initial violence. An urban guerrilla organization cannot be a serious threat unless it maintains a_symbiotic relationship between themselves, as the tip of the iceberg, and their underwater population base. Thus, any acts of violence must be controlled politically as regards timing, target, theater of operation and precise selectivity; the primary purpose being augmentation of the subversive base and not annihilation of an enemy. In essence, the damage to a regime is incidental to political objectives. It is for this reason that subversive elements seek to force government .to engage in repressive acts which will alienate the population. The incumbent target regime must avoid use of repression and take those actions necessary to expand its political base commensurate with the threat imposed by urban guerrillas. In this regard, the age-old techniques of cooptation and absorption are often more important than security measures in dealing with the threat of violence. Hostilities Approved For Release 1999/ 8000200240001-5 :Approved For Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000200240001-5 do not alter effectively the political process, but intensify the diffi- culty of coalition building to arrive at a consensual agreement that will create the basis for popular support. Only a totalitarian state has the potential for the type of complete repression that does not require cooptation or adaptation. The absorption of an urban guerrilla movement requires modification of governmental policy, which is seldom severe or detrimental to an existing regime if initiated during early stages of violence. In sum, we. can conclude that increased government fire power or external aid to a'regime does not alter the political reality of the situation so long as subversive forces retain minimal viability. In the final analysis, the remediat actions suggested in this study are of little value unless accompanied by enlightened political solutions. Approved For Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R0002002401 01-5 Approved For Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000200240001-5 BIBLIOGRAPHY Andies, Helimut. Rule of Terror New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1969. Assassination and Political Violence, a task force of the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969. Arther, Richard 0. Interrogation for Investigators. William C. Copp & and Associates, New York, 1959. Caputo, William C. 41 Bain, Chester A. Vietnam--The Roots of Conflict. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.9 1967. ? Bennett, Richard L.. The Black and Tans. Boston: Houghton Miff in o., 1999. ? Bern, Major H. von Dach. Total Resistance. Boulder, Colorado: Panther u ications, 1965. Black, Cyril E., and Thornton, Thomas P. Communism and Revolution. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 19 . Bocca, Geoffrey. The Secret Arm Z. Englewood Cliffs, NJ.: Prentice- =1968. a 14 Brown, Robert M..__The Electronic Invasion. 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