COUNTERTERRORIST PROGRAM PRIMER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85-00671R000200250001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 68
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 27, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: REPORT

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COUNTERTERRORIST PROGRAM PRIMER
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This working paper contains a series of summaries and
checklists suggested as planning aids for officials concerned
with the initial development of counterterror programs. No
attempt has been made to recommend specific solutions to par-
ticular terrorist situations since these will vary in accordance
with the nature of the threat and with the social, economic,
psychological, political, and security factors in any given
situation---local, national, or international.
It is assumed that readers will already have a working
knowledge of those specific terrorist groups and techniques
with which they are confronted---and that essential expertise
and resources for effectively conducting a counterterror pro-
gram are readily attainable.
For the purpose of this presentation, the terms terrorist,
subversive or guerrilla are synonymous. They are used without
particular distinction in any situation where violence is the
vehicle for increasing political influence and power at the
expense of law and order.
Readers will observe that the overall paper is actually
a collection of several different drafts. As a result, depth
and focus of individual subjects varies between sections. There
are also some minor redundancies and a few English errors.
However, these problems are not detrimental to general or
specific utility, and they are being temporarily overlooked
e o t to mmediate requirements.
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INDEX
1. SUMMARY . ... . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . 1
1. Offensive Terror . . . . . . . . . ? . . . 1
2. Defensive Terror . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Counterterror . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
II. TERRORIST METHODS . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1. Propaganda and Agitation . . . . . . . . . 8
2. Assassination and Kidnapping . . . . . . . 9
3. Infiltration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4. Bombing and Sabotage . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5. Armed Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6. Mob Violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
III. COUNTERTERRORIST TOOLS . . . . . . . . 16
IV. THREAT ANALYSIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1. Terrorist Fact Sheet . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2. Possible Terrorist Objectives . . . . . . . 26
3. Terrorist Potential . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
DEFENSIVE MEASURES . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1. Essential Elements of Support . . . . . . 28
2. Local Security Checklist . . . . . . . . . . 30
3. Prepara`:ion of Operational Environment. . . 31
4. Personal/Physical Factors . . . . . . . . 33
5. Communication Related Defense . . . . . . 35
6. Terrorist Activity Gaming . . . . . . . . . 37
7. ITC System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4:1
8. Deception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4:7
9. File Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
10. Essential Equipment. . . . . ? ? ? ? ? ? 49
11. Pre-Crises Pointers . . . . . . . . . ? ? 53
VI. INCIDENT PROCEDURES . . . . . . . s . . 54
1. Protective Reaction Chart . . . . . . . . . 54
2. Reaction Questionnaire . . . . . . . . . . 57
3. Immediate Response . . . . . . . . . . . 60
4. Hostage Location . . . . . . . . . . . 63
5. Potential Hostage Notes . . . . . . . . . . 64
VII. TERRORIST EXEMPLARS . . . . . . . . . 66
VIII. BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
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I. SUMMARY
1. OFFENSIVE TERROR
Threats, violence and coercion form the basis of offensive terror.
Terrorism is used to reduce effectively resistance to the aims of its
proponents. It is the means to (1) demoralize governmental authority;
(2) separate a people from their leaders; (3) paralyze opposition forces;
(4) shock the indifferent; (5) agitate and influence; (6) 'build terrorist
morale; (7) enforce conformity or compliance; (8) eliminate an enemy;
(9) advertise and initiate a revolutionary movement; (10) destroy group
or population solidarity; (11) disorient a target mass; and (12) provoke
repressive government countermeasures which will antagonize the
population concerned.
Terror ruthlessly applied is a powerful and effective weapon so
long as it is not employed clumsily or to excesses which stimulate
general population alienation against the terrorists. Further, it can
only be applied for short durations or its effectiveness will be diminished
as the population becomes accustomed to living under these conditions.
It is, therefore, imperative that terrorist actions be planned to evoke a
high but short-term state of fear, dread, or anxiety among its target
population. If terror is not measured to accomplish these conditions,
it cannot hope to attain favorable results for the terrorists or their
sponsors.
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Given the above considerations, terrorism may not be effective
unless it is climactic and successful in its initial stages. All prepara-
tory action must therefore be clandestine and premature acts of vio-
lence cannot be permitted.
The preparatory phase of terrorism represents the most important
and crucial period. Dedicated covert leadership is needed to begin the
process of clandestine organization. Motivated manpower with fanatical
ideology must be spotted, recruited, trained and secretly formulated
into small compartmented action "cells. " Financial and material re-
sources, plus related supporting mechanisms are essential if terrorist
action is to be undertaken with sufficient impact. Agents or informant s
must be recruited and trained to provide target intelligence required
for discriminate or indiscriminate acts of violence. Technical skills
and specialized equipment will need to be acquired for bombing opera-
tions or unique approaches to assassination. Tactics must be re-
hearsed generally without secure use of any geographic; area or
facility. And last but not least, the means must be achieved to provide
communication dispersion of assets, command and control plus tactical
mobility.
Having completed all preparatory action secretly among an in-
finitesimal portion of the population, a well-planned terrorist campaign
is launched suddenly by the conduct of massive acts of violence that
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occur simultaneously over a wide area. The resultant shock effect may
be expected to create highly desirable psychological responses, and per-
haps temporarily neutralize opposition security forces. Taking advantage
of this situation, the effective terrorist organization can rapidly expand
the level of violence until a balance of power is achieved favoring the
originators. Acts of terrorism can then be dramatically decreased or
curtailed until future needs demand a resurgence.
During the conduct of the terror campaign, discriminate terrorism
targets selected leaders or individuals whose loss will severely handi-
cap the "cause" they represent. This selective violence is also used
to disrupt government machinery or impress specific groups by elimina-
tion of key personnel. Indiscriminate terror is utilized to spread panic
among the general population, with the aim of eroding trust, authority
and security. The general technique includes bombing of restaurants,
movies, hospitals, religious centers, and transportation services,
or assassination of people in the street. As a general rule, this type
of terror is most effective when it appears to have no specific targets
even though particular acts of violence may be highly selective.
2. DEFENSIVE TERROR
If governments or independent groups become frustrated over their
inability to negate offensive terror by legal means, they may resort to
the employment of violence to counter violence. The targets of such
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defensive terror include opposition cadre, terrorists, and their
supporting mechanisms. Since regimes or individuals do not normally
wish to become overtly involved in any terrorist action, most defensive
terror campaigns are conducted on a covert basis.
Primary tactics of defensive terror include selective assassination
and bombing. Ancillary efforts may involve raids, ambush, kidnapping,
torture and harsh punishment without "due process. " Normally, defen-
sive acts of violence are discriminate unless an easily identifiable
population group is directly responsible for offensive terror. Under
such circumstances, indiscriminate action against such groups may
be thought justifiable, but the government concerned would probably
reap a harvest of accusations charging brutal repression -- regard-
less of where the guilt may lie.
The fundamental problem with defensive terror is that violence
begets more violence and the general population usually becomes
antagonistic toward government because of this consequence. Even
if government is not the actual sponsor of defensive terror, suspicion
and accusation will eventually lead to an official image of brutal re-
pression which does not enhance the legal government's chances for
survival. This reason, plus ethical and moral considerations, will
usually preclude any regimes consideration of this technique.
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3. COUNTERTERROR
First and most importantly, counterterror has no relationship to
defensive terror. Counterterror usually involves a combination of
social, economic, psychological, political, propaganda, intelligence,
and internal security actions designed to neutralize a terrorist force.
Further, these actions must be individually and/or collectively structured
to erode the terrorists basis of popular support.
Essential counterterrorist actions should incude (1) development
of programs designed to meet "felt needs" and resolve conditions per-
ceived as being intolerable by various population elements; (2) upgrading
of security force capabilities to provide population protection and freedom
from fear; (3) effective utilization of "law and due process" to convince
the populace that government will defeat the subversives without utilizing
repressive measures; and (4) creation of institutional and governmental
mechanisms that provide the means for effective "change" without
violence.
The developmental or modernization approach usually requires
human, technological and capital inputs at a rate which will provide
substantial agricultural and/or industrial growth. This is a long-term
and complex solution which cannot be achieved easily without adequate
savings, trade, aid or credit. In addition to the above inputs, markets
must be developed; producer incentives created; income and employment
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levels increased; educational programs expanded; birth rates reduced
to something less than Gross National Product increases; and skilled
manpower, energy sources, raw materials, machinery or other capital
items must be assembled at the production point. Apart from these
overall development efforts, dissident and impoverished population
elements should be provided with basic minimal subsistence plus the
opportunity for socio-economic self-advancement.
Security improvement programs should be based upon legislative
actions which provide the police and other internal defense forces with
appropriate increases in leadership, manpower, training, finance,
communications, mobility, weapons, equipment and material. Es-
sential tactical innovations will be discussed under the following section.
The fundamental basis for improving security operations is via better
intelligence collection and collation. Human/technical penetrations,
agent or informant operations, prisoner interrogation., communications
intercept, and investigative techniques all provide essential information
inputs. Effective collation of this data should result eventually in the
identification of subversive leadership, cadre, action and support
elements, ideology, modus operandi, organizational patterns, strength,
capability, plans or intentions, facilities, mechanisms, and other details.
In turn, the finished intelligence produce is used to provide targets or
operational leads and as legal evidence for judicial processing of
subversives.
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Regarding "law and due process", it is essential that judicial proce-
dures be established to assure that violence control measures are
politically, legally and morally justifiable. This is particularly true
of methods used to arrest, detain, interrogate, convict and imprison
or execute individual members of a subversive movement. If repressive,
brutal, or illegal tactics are used by the government to attack subversive
forces, popular sentiment may favor success of the latter.
Creation of adaptive and responsible institutions provide government
with its most effective psychological weapon against violence. Assuming
such organizations provide the basis for peaceful constructive change,
the perpetrators of violence cannot justify their methods to a target
populace. In fact, history has proven that the urban guerrilla cannot
long survive in an environment where popular political, economic,
or social aspirations can be achieved by non-violent methods.
Subversion and social unrest thrives on the inability of a nation to
modernize existing private or governmental institutions in a manner
which will facilitate the effective, peaceful resolution of intolerable
conditions. It is therefore essential that government assure that there
is an adaptive organizational basis for reform, modernization and pro-
gressive change. This process must include government bureaucracy,
political parties, unions, cooperatives, youth groups, and other pri-
vate institutions.
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II. TERRORIST METHODS
The following sub-sections provide a general synopsis of terrorist
methodology.
1. PROPAGANDA AND AGITATION
In order to be successful, most subversive movements must con-
vince a majority of a target population that the conditions under which
they exist are intolerable. This attitude will then provide the motivation
and 17cause" needed to stimulate the popular dissidence essential to ruining
or overthrowing any government.
Propaganda comes in many and varied forms to include (1) leaflets;
(2) letter campaigns; (3) wall slogans; (4) rumors; (5) oratory; and
(6) radio, newspapers or other media. However, the latter forum
exists only where free speech is guaranteed or for low-level efforts
which might not be supressed.
Agitation is usually accomplished by agents of influence who seize
upon controversial issue to "inflame" specific audiences for the pur-
pose of stimulating the development of particular attitudes, actions or
reactions. These individuals usually focus their attention on labor,
student or other population organizations that have banded together
because of common interests they wish to protect or promote. By
identifying with their cause, the agitator can thus seek to exploit any
known grievance.
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2. ASSASSINATION AND KIDNAPPING
The urban guerrillas may employ assassination and/or kidnapping
operations to eliminate "key" leaders within government or the private
sector. Liquidation of existing leadership is the oldest method of re-
volution and afford a relatively simple means to dislocate or disorganize
political- social- economic institutions.
Targets may be limited to "heads" of state, representatives of
government, local leaders, or other individuals who act: to support
the status quo. The primary aim of a systematic campaign of assassina-
tion is to alienate a populace from their government by establishing the
omnipotent power of the guerrillas. Kidnapping operations may also
be designed to accomplish this same objective, and to extract conces-
sions, capture publicity, provoke controversy or free political pri-
soners. Targets for kidnapping may also include foreign diplomats or
business executives and various personalities who might be useful for
propaganda purposes. In some cases, the kidnap victim may be executed
after his usefulness has ended, so that net effect is that of a combined
kidnapping and assassination.
Individuals or select three to five-man guerrilla teams are usually
employed to conduct the above types of operations. Normally, such
individuals are selected on the basis of their proven courage, dedication,
resourcefulness and cunning. Preferably, they are not persons wanted by
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the authorities, but ordinary citizens capable of moving about freely.
Assassinations or kidnappings are planned in detail and special sur-
veillance parties first check on the movements of prospective victims.
The target is shadowed to learn his habits, hours, movement patterns
and usual security procedures. When a pattern is established, the
guerrillas then develop and rehearse their specific modus operandi.
3. INFILTRATION"'
The security and operational potential of an urban guerrilla force
is usually predicated on the quantity of intelligence obtained by suc-
cessful infiltration. If police and internal security organizations can
be penetrated, the guerrillas may thus be forewarned of actions planned
against them. The infiltration of security forces was seen by Lenin
as one of the essential preconditions for a successful urban uprising.
Lenin's theory being that urban guerrillas would always be outgunned
unless they neutralize the police and other security elements by in-
filtrating their own agents at all levels.
In addition, the subversive movement cannot be expected to succeed
unless it attacks and erodes any official programs designed to esta-
blish or sustain population confidence in government. To help accomp-
lish this goal, the urban guerrillas will attempt to infiltrate all elements
of the target regime. The net objective is to obtain information which
,',,As used in this case, the word infiltration is synonymous with
penetration.
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can be used to plan disruptive or destructive attacks against socio-
economic development projects or other programs designed to alleviate
popular grievances.
Select infiltration operations may be used to obtain specific target
intelligence, particularly as regards procurement of funds, weapons,
or other supplies. Penetration agents can also provide information
on potential targets for terrorist, sabotage, assassination and kidnap
operations.
Classic clandestine "tradecraft" techniques are used as the basis
for organizing and accomplishing infiltration operations.
We are first concerned with human penetrations and to a lesser
degree, theft, bribery, technical penetrations and other ancillary types
of espionage. However, the primary danger is that guerrillas may
obtain a popular following from among elements of the population having
existing intelligence access. This situation will then create a more
spontaneous flow of information which the urban guerrillas can use
for protection or advantage.
4. BOMBING & SABOTAGE
The essential purpose of bombing or sabotage is effective disrup-
tion of the economic- political- security activities within a state whose
government is targeted for ruin or overthrow. It is a tactic that may
be employed by urban guerrillas and terrorists, or by specialized
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"cells. " Fundamental objectives include: (1) reduction of agricultural
and industrial production; (2) impeding the effective functioning of
essential services such as communication, transportation and utilities;
(3) limiting the conduct of various government activities with emphasis
on internal security services and political machinery; and/or (4) "cowing"
of a target population.
Most of the above is based upon covert destructive attack using
explosives, combustibles, abrasives or subtle disruptive action.
Methods include: (1) descriminate or indescriminate bombing; (2)
mechanical breakage; (3) use of damaging chemicals; (4) arson;
(5) electronic interruptions; (6) pilferage of vital components; (7) dis-
semination of incorrect information, falsification of data, misfiling
and records manipulation; (8) tampering; (9) fatal "flawing" of materials
or equipment; (10) work slowdowns; (11) interruption of command or
control procedures; and (12) use of laws, courts, and parliamentary
rules to impede the effective functioning of government.
The extensive employment of various bombing and sabotage techniques
affords the revolutionary with a relatively secure and inexpensive weapon
that can have disastrous consequences on the economy and security of
a state. Further, the systematic employment of same: erodes public
morale and confidence in government while advertising the success and
apparent invincibility of subversive forces.
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5. ARMED ATTACKS
Terrorist groups may employ snipers or "firing groups" of four or
five men which may undertake limited hit and run attacks to erode popular
confidence in government security forces and to force the initiation of
repressive acts antagonistic to a target populace. Weapons include
rifles, shotguns, pistols, grenades, Molotov cocktails, explosives
and other lightweight, easily concealable items. Targets may be
discriminately or indiscriminately selected. Police, firemen, govern-
ment officials, foreign diplomats or businessmen and leaders of mo-
derating forces are high on the discriminate list. Indiscriminate tar-
gets are usually selected to incite population fear. These armed action
groups may also be used to undertake robbery, kidnapping, assassina-
tion or other select activity in support of overall subversive objectives.
In the urban environment, such guerrilla action is at close quarters
for extremely short duration. Specific tactics will depend on the target,
the metropolitan terrain, attack options, movement alternatives, type
of weapons, accepted modus operandi and the potential for surprise/
retreat. The net effect being a great diversification of tactical approach
from one situation to another.
6. MOB VIOLENCE
Street tactics of the terrorist or urban guerrillas include the in-
stigation and/or manipulation of demonstrations, mobs, and strikes.
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The objective is to create a situation wherein peaceful protect groups
can be agitated to- participate in acts of civil disobedience or riot.
Agents of influence and subversive agitators may seize upon any
popular grievance to stimulate the formation of protest groups. The
next objective is for agitators to encourage the type of public demon-
stration that could easily "flare" into a confrontation with police.
Having created a proper environment, various guerrilla elements
can infiltrate the street mobs to incite a riot or undertake acts of
violence using the protestors for cover.
Tactics are simple. Bottles, bricks, and stones can be hurled
at police. Hasty barricades may be used to block streets. Business
establishments, factories and/or government buildings can be looted
or burned. Snipers can be deployed to fire at police, hoping they in
turn will retaliate by killing innocent members of the rr.Lob. When the
police attempt to arrest an agitator, a larger group of urban guerrillas
may attempt to aid his escape. If internal security forces effectively
contain the riot, the guerrillas will retreat along pre-planned avenues
of escape.
The primary objective of such group agitation is to force the
government to take strong repressive measures, thereby further
alienating the population. Promoting general disorder also helps
to disrupt the economy and undermine the government. Last but
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not least, by organizing social discontent, the urban guerrillas induce
the population to accept their leadership while- demonstrating the re-
gime's lack of authority.
Basic ingredients for group agitation include: (1) leadership
trained in mob psychology and tactics; (2) an executive committee
responsible for overall planning and execution; (3) propaganda efforts
to rally public sympathy for a cause; (4) compilation and continuous
review of exploitable grievances; (5) registration of potential dissidents;
(6) study of overall environment; (7) profiling of radical organizations;
(8) enlistment of financial and moral support; (9) tactical training for
agitators; (10) development of community support; (11) recruitment of
"crowd-moving" orators; (12) preparation of music, chants and slogans;
(13) creation of demands and ultimatums; (14) planning for pivotal events
designed to precipitate conflicts; (15) public announcement of time
and place for planned demonstration; (16) stimulation of actions to
incite media coverage; and (17) encouraging demonstators to partici-
pate in dramatic mass arrests.
By effective manipulation of mob psychology, the urban guerrilla
thus plans to push the aggrieved citizen into outright breaches of law
that will lead to heightened outbursts of violence. In addition, all-out
revolution must be rapidly precipitated or mob participants will lose
stamina in the face of prolonged adversity. To succeed, group agitation
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III. COUNTERTERRORIST TOOLS
An effective counterterrorist program must incorporate most if not
all of the working tools described herein.
Terrorist Profiles - can be used to provide security personnel with
a classic thumbnail description of individuals who warrant close scrutiny
as potential participants in acts of violence. This approach facilitates
narrowing the focus of investigative and intelligence operations designed
to identify members of terrorist organizations. Further, the profile
improves routine observation by police and other authorities responsible
for internal security.
An example profile of a potential terrorist might indicate basic
characteristics to include: (1) male or female age 16 to 58; (2) member
of potentially dissident group; (3) person with emotional or fanatical
tendency; (4) individual who has evidenced violent behavior or emotional
instability; (5) citizens who are isolated from the national socioeconomic
or political "mainstream"; (6) radicals who have engaged in demands
for revolutionary change; and (7) individuals who obviously have nothing
to lose by engaging in terrorism.
Potential terrorist traits should be adjusted to fit each particular
local or national environment. The main objective being to create a
system that is easily developed and readily applied by all security or
intelligence personnel.
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Documentation Controls - facilitate security forces in their efforts
to identify suspect terrorists and their supporters. Population identi-
fication papers should be designed to allow the police to spot-check any
individual's name, date and place of birth, residence, family status,
employment, race, religion, and physical description. Photographs
and fingerprints can also be added to documents. In cases of emer-
gency, citizens may be required to obtain special documentation for
travel and resource control permits for the purchase of any item that
might be used to aid a terrorist act.
The intended objective of detailed documentation is to aid the
screening of dissident population elements. When used in conjunction
with terrorist profiles and when properly focused on areas where vio-
lence has occurred the system can be effective in providing investiga-
tive leads.
Biographic Registry - involves the establishment of a central security
reference containing biographic card files or computer data on all.
known criminals, subversives, terrorists, dissidents and suspicious
personalities. Each security and intelligence service would provide
appropriate biographic inputs, and have controlled access to the com-
plete registry. Sources and information would be protected by appro-
priate compartmentation and security clearance procedures.
In effect, a national biographic reference is created to facilitate
collation of all source intelligence on confirmed or suspect terrorists.
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If the quality and quantity of information inputs are adequate, all
security personnel -can use existing files as the basis for rapidly
determining any persons possible association with terrorist or sub-
versive activity. By establishing secure radio procedures for sending
queries to the biographic registry, any policemen with appropriate
communication can immediately validate the suspect status of indivi-
duals stopped for spot-checks.
The biographic registry does not negate the need to investigate or
collect intelligence on potential terrorists having or not having files,
but it does preclude suspect persons from easily going unnoticed.
Personnel& Physical Security - must necessarily be provided
for the indigenous leaders and government personnel who will likely
be targeted for terrorist violence. This requirement includes pro-
tection of individuals from threats, coercion, assassination and bombing;
the latter action prompting the need for physical security of offices, homes,
meeting places and transportation facilities.
General defensive procedures include: (1) personnel security
clearances; (2) entry and exit control for offices} (3) protective fences
for fixed facilities; (4) guards for personnel and buildings; (5) screening
of communications, mail and cargo; (6) use of metal detectors for routine
weapons search; (7) utilization of bomb squads with dogs trained to
smell out plastic explosives; (8) travel control procedures emphasizing
alternate routes and various methods of trans o p trols
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in the area of offices and individual homes; and (10) other techniques
appropriate to environmental situations.
The primary objective of such elaborate precautions is to frustrate
the effective conduct of terrorist actions and thereby prevent those
spectacular successes which encourage expanded future violence.
To better focus defensive efforts and conserve resource allocation,
it is essential that hard intelligence be obtained on terrorist intentions
and modus operandi. This intelligence effort also provides the 'basis
for offensive actions designed to negate terrorist violence before it
can be employed. Personnel and physical security is thus achieved
by a combination of defensive and offensive programs, the latter of
which can be the most effective. The offensive methods will be dis-
cussed further in subsequent sections.
Intelligence Collection - is essential to the conduct of effective
counterterror operations. Neutralization of violence is dependent
upon government having some knowledge of terrorist personalities,
organization, plans, intentions, ideology, modus operandi, and support
mechanisms. Without such knowledge, security forces will be unable
to properly focus defensive or offensive actions. Unfocused counter-
measures are usually doomed to failure since the terrorists will be
largely unaffected. Detailed information on terrorists can best be
obtained by clandestine human or technical penetration operations.
Failing this, intelligence must be gathered by alternate means to include:
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(1) recruitment of informants; (2) suspect surveillance; (3) police
investigation of potential terrorists; (4) search for weapons, explo-
sives, or other incriminating evidence; (5) prisoner interrogation;
(6) monitoring of possible targets and suspected terrorist supply
sources; and (7) mass population education in observation and reporting
techniques related to terrorist activity.
To narrow the focus of the above collection operations, demographic
data and terrorist profiles can be used to fix specific geographic areas
where terrorists could reside and organize with some degree of relative
safety. Although terrorists may operate anywhere, they normally main-
tain their residence and meeting places among dissident population ele-
ments who evidence negative or hostile reaction to government security
forces. This fact, therefore, allows selective elimination of those urban
and rural areas which would not provide a hospitable terrorist environ-
ment.
Physical data on roads, communication facilities, residential patterns,
buildings, and isolated areas can also be used to help determine likely
patterns of terrorist organizational activity within suspect geographic
areas. Trash collectors, building inspectors, electricians and other
personnel with natural access can be recruited to aid collection of this
physical information. Again, this effort further serves to pinpoint where
intelligence operations should be targeted.
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Counterintelligence/counterespionage operations will, also be
needed to supplement the above efforts. The qbjective of these
operations includes: (1) penetrating and manipulating terrorist
cells; (2) stopping, disrupting, misorienting or negating terrorist
intelligence collection activities; and (3) developing passive or
specialized defenses against planned terrorist acts of violence.
In summary, intelligence and counterintelligence operations form
the foundation for counterterror campaigns. Those security services
or personnel not familiar with essential clandestine tradecraft should
seek appropriate guidance and assistance.
Intelligence Collation - provides the detailed compilation and
analysis of information, needed to help identify, arrest and convict
the perpetrators of violence. It also facilitates the location and elimina-
tion of terrorist support mechanisms and other hard targets.
To function effectively, any collation center must have access to
all sources of information. This implies cooperation with all security
and intelligence services using appropriate clearances, "source" pro-
tection and compartmentation. In addition, the-centers must have the
legal right to pinpoint specific targets and assign collection or action
requirements to individual government components. Without such
follow-on authority, the collation centers become little more than
repositories of unexploited intelligence.
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All source information inputs should include: (1) biographic data;
(Z) pertinent socioeconomic, demographic and geographic publications;
(3) details on transportation, communications, and material resources;
(4) target assessments; (5) analysis of terrorist organizations and
modus operandi; and (6) all reporting on criminals, dissidents, ra-
dicals, subversives or terrorists. After collecting every scrap of
available information, trained analysts then collate data with the ob-
jective of developing investigative and target leads.
The primary advantage to central collation is simply that all.
available pieces of an investigative puzzle are laid before personnel
experienced in the art of formulating a composite intelligence picture
which provides the sharpest available detail on any terrorist organi-
zation. If this collation process is absent or fragmented, any intelli-
gence produce cannot be properly exploited and subsequent counter-
terror activities may be expected to be largely ineffective. It is,
therefore, imperative that any government targeted by terrorists seek
to establish the best possible intelligence collation system.
Security Force Requirements - generally include: (1) defense of
official personnel and physical facilities; (2) riot control, bomb disposal
and population protection from acts of violence; (3) enforcement of law
and order; (4) preparation for national defense against; internal or
external acts of aggression; (5) investigation leading to location,
arrest, and conviction of criminals, dissidents, subversives or
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terrorists; and (6) other actions required to resist lawlessness, vio-
lence, subversion and warfare originating within or outside the state.
The conduct of counterterror operations primarily burdens police
forces with the requirement to provide population freedom from fear
and violence, while undertaking legal investigation which will ultimately
result in conviction and punishment of terrorists after "due process."
As previously stated, the foundation for this effort is based upon adequate
intelligence collection which may be a_primary or secondary function of
various security services.
Once intelligence leads are provided, the lengthy and arduous process
begins to obtain sufficient evidence for a court trial which will prove the
suspect terrorist guilty of accomplished or planned crimes of violence.
This requirement demands the skills and extensive application of modern
criminal investigation. It is, therefore, suggested that appropriate
actions be undertaken to provide police or other security forces with
adequate authority, leadership, manpower, funds, training and equip-
ment needed to accomplish the task.
Under most circumstances, it is recommended that -target govern-
ments seek whatever resources deemed necessary to upgrade security
forces and give them the capability to deal with terrorists by action
within existing legal parameters. Even though this is often the most
difficult course of action, it has proven to be the most successful.
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Population Mobilization - is initiated by advising the target nation's
citizenry of the nature of any terrorist threat and motivating mass popular
participation in negating acts of violence. To accomplish this objective,
the populace should be organized and instructed in the techniques of
aiding security forces in the identification of possible terrorists.
The latter may be accomplished by launching an aggressive educational
program designed to establish citizen procedures for reporting suspi-
cious activities or personalities that are observed by local inhabitants.
Carried to its ultimate conclusion, each village and city block would
have resident protection committees with direct communications to
local police forces. Possible investigative leads would thus be immediately
relayed for exploitation by security forces.
The unique advantage of such citizen participation is based on the
fact that local residents are most keenly aware of unusual events or
the appearance of strangers in their neighborhoods. Another obvious
benefit is the increase in numbers of eyes and ears, that terrorists
will be forced to avoid.
Actual techniques of population mobilization -will vary according to
environmental situations and citizen receptivity or motivation. Pro-
cedural approaches are the same as for so-called "block warning
systems. " As stated in the introductory note, implementation should
not be attempted prior to consultation with appropriate specialists.
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Judicial Base - is created by formulating those laws which fully
support security forces in their conduct of counterterror operations.
In addition, such laws should insure that all efforts are politically,
legally and morally justifiable. This is particularly true of methods
used to arrest, detain, interrogate, convict and imprison or execute
individual members of a terrorist movement.
IV. THREAT ANALYSIS
1. TERRORIST FACT SHEET
1. Who are they, how many, how organized, what is their motivation,
and what are their basic objectives?
2. What are their linguistic, technical and communications capa-
bilities ?
3. Where located, how armed, how equipped, current status, and
degree of mobility?
4. What are their psychological and/or physical vulnerabilities ?
5. How is command and control exercised?
6. What are the terrorists' probable courses of action under any
given set of circumstances?
7. When, where and how might essential and/or minimal outside
support be provided?
8. What are the minimum concessions the terrorists will accept
in exchange for hostage release?
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2. POSSIBLE TERRORIST OBJECTIVES
1. Publicity,` propaganda, and/or influence
2. Political concessions.
3. Finance by ransom of hostages and/or aircraft, etc.
4. Release of fellow terrorists.
5. Expanded control via induced fear.
6. World-wide attention to grievances they have been unable to
resolve by legal means.
7. Elimination of principal opponents.
8. Consternation among all the groups, factions, and/or nations
who oppose their "cause".
9. Expanded use of target government repressive measures which
tend to create sympathy for the terrorists.
3. TERRORIST POTENTIAL
1. What dissident, subversive, terrorist or other elements re-
side within the country?
2. Do international or third-country terrorist organizations have
support and/or action components assigned to the country?
3. What is the record and modus operandi or post terrorist op-
erations, and what is the frequency of incidents?
4. If specific persons were targeted as potential victims, where
would terrorists probably initiate the kidnapping or seizure?
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a hostage, where would they probably be held?
6. What factors regarding activities and/or movement patterns
unnecessarily expose potential victims to a possible kidnapping?
7. In cases of seizures, airline skyjackings, or other mass
hostage operations, why might particular individuals be singled out
for special attention?
8. What unusual events normally proceed a terrorist kidnapping
or seizure -- either within or outside the country?
9. What disposition is usually made of the hostages of those
terrorist groups with which you are familiar and what time factors
are involved?
10. In cases of negotiated release, what individuals or groups might
be used as a go-between?
11. What are the usual communication channels or systems used
by terrorists for command control and/or negotiations?
12. What is the ethnic and psychological profile of those terrorist
leaders with whom you might come in contact, and what are their
grievances or political objectives?
13. Have terrorists tended to panic, upon lea-rning they are threatened
or that governments will not bargain for release of hostages ?
14. Under what conditions have most hostages been held, and what
circumstances have led to their release or execution?
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V. DEFENSIVE MEASURES
1. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF SUPPORT
1. Judicial: Laws must be established which facilitate the effective
functioning of those intelligence and security operations essential to
the conduct of counterterror programs without the creation of a re-
pressive police state which will antagonize the populations concerned.
2. Legislative: Governing bodies must enact and sustain the above
process of law, while creating the financial and other resources needed
to accomplish same.
3. Social: Institutional process should be created to provide op-
portunities for personal social advancement and the peaceful resolution
of individual grievances regardless of sex, religion, creed, language,
ethnic origin, status, or other differences.
4. Economic: Each individual should be afforded the means of
subsistance, and the opportunity to attain basic felt needs, e. g. ,
housing, clothing, and essential material goods.
5. Psychological: Popular attitudes must be created which dis-
credit the terrorist "cause" and the violent methods used to attain
their objective -- and at the same time the population must be con-
vinced that the government should, can, and will prevail without re-
sorting to violence to counter violence.
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6. Political: Governments should create and/or sponsor a political
system which foste-rs the means for peaceful changes of leadership,
thereby negating the need or justification for violent overthrow of any
regime.
7. Media: Newspaper, radio, and television should be encouraged to
avoid giving terrorists free publicity of the type which would engender
sympathy or support from the general population.
8. Security: Intelligence and internal security services must provide
the population with freedom from fear while identifying, apprehending,
convicting, and imprisoning terrorists via due process of law.
9. Population: Various elements of the populace should be organized
into "block" or village security committees to provide advance alert to
any terrorist activity -- assuming all the above actions have first been
implemented and have motivated the population to become so involved.
10. Leadership: All government and institutional leaders/adminis-
trators should fully support and underwrite the counterterror campaign.
They must provide the management, direction, coordination, and re-
source inputs which assures the development and continuation of an
effective program.
NOTE: It is imperative that advance determination be made regarding
establishment of priorities and division of labor regarding what private
and/or governmental institutions have responsibility for the above actions.
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25X1 C10c
4. PERSONAL /PHYSICAL FACTORS
1. Instruct all potential targeted personnel to periodically alter
modes, times and routes of movement.
2. Where possible, they should avoid making advance appointments
or establishing routine schedules.
3. Limit regular travel by personal vehicle unless plans are made
for en route protection, e. g. , armed escort, scout vehicles, car ar-
moring, street patrols, defensive driving, car pool, car swapping,
random routes or other techniques.
4. Fence private residences and utilize dogs, geese, ducks and/or
guinea fowl to provide exterior alarm -- while installing adequate hard-
ware to preclude a hasty forced entry. (If the situation warrants, guards
should also be considered.
5. Armed guards, alarms, fences, control zones, hardware and
other protective procedures should be used to deter all possible types
of hostiles against office facilities.
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6. Periodic security investigations should be conducted on all
employees having access to residences, vehicles and/or places of
work of potential targets.
7. Initiate or accelerate intelligence /counterintelligence efforts
focused on terrorist organizations and their sponsors or supporters.
8. Assist security forces in screening all internal and external
travelers for suspect terrorists or persons having similar profile.
9. Surveil the movements of all foreign diplomats or other persons
who might offer communications or other support for terrorists.
10. Photograph and surveil all strangers moving in or out of foreign
embassies sympathetic to the terrorist cause.
11. Establish "block warning systems" whereby local residents
can immediately alert security forces if suspect persons or activity
is observed.
12. Train all potential targets in counter surveillance techniques
and specific security precautions that may be used for personal defense.
13. Qualify selected individuals in the use of small arras and pro-
vide them with appropriate weapons.
14. Retain maps of all potential target areas to include! floor plans
and defense plan for key buildings.
15. Check airline passenger lists and hotel registrations on a daily
basis against known terrorist list by true names and aliases.
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16. Stimulate security forces to maintain port of entry surveillance
and tighten pa~-:sport/visa control.
17. When appropriate, utilize technical penetration and/or wire
taps to monitor points of terrorist contact or support.
18. Watch for thefts of automobiles, explosives or weapons and
relate stolen items to plausible terrorist operational concepts.
19. Restrict movement and set curfews as needed.
5. COMMUNICATION RELATED DEFENSE
1. Establish periodic radio or telephone check-in procedures
whereby all personnel advise their location and status to an alert
center having the authority and capability to immediately react to
determine why an officer has failed to make his safety report on time --
and to initiate appropriate action as needed.
2. Equip potential target personnel with beacons or other emergency
devices that can be used to relay immediate alert when an attack occurs.
3. Organize and periodically test various lines of expedient communi-
cation with internal security services who will be called upon to react
in the event of any hostile action against personnel.
4. Provide for alternate means of communications with all higher
headquarters in the event primary facilities are seized or otherwise
rendered inoperative.
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5. Prepare and advise all personnel of word, phrase, gestures
or other codes which may be used by hostages to relay information by
phone, letter or via intermediaries.
6. Develop necessary contingency plans to control, monitor,
block, jam or cut all communications which might be used by any
terrorist group.
7. Pre-position equipment and technicians to facilitate immediate
employment of remote listening devices, direction finding systems and
other specialized communication related items.
8. Pre-determine probable conditions under which media coverage
may be granted in exchange for concessions from terrorists. In any
event, arrange to prevent, guide, limit and/or control media coverage
of any terrorist incident until it has reached a conclusion.
9. Equip potential targets with push-button activated sirens, flares,
floodlights and other systems should be considered for aiding emer-
gency alert and/or as a means to "foil" an attack.
10. Create a command control center with constant 24-hour communi-
cations, and the established capability to coordinate all resources that
might be used to deter, negate or react to a terrorist attack. (Therein,
establish the focal for intelligence collation and analysis to provide
potential advance alert to all hostile actions. )
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11. Be prepared to record all conversations during any terrorist
incident to facilitate on-going and/or after-action analysis.
12. Maintain an open communication or dialogue with all security
services and/or potential intermediaries.
6. TERRORIST ACTIVITY GAMING
Experience has generally proven that various terrorist groups
eventually evolve stereotyped operational procedures that develop as
a result of: (1) standardized organization, doctrine and training; (2)
limited quantity or quality of available men, money and material; (3)
target area social, economic, political, psychological and security
strengths or weaknesses; (4) communication, transportation, support
and intelligence limitations; (5) climate, weather, demography and
geography; and (6) types of countermeasures which must be overcome.
Systematic analysis of these influencing factors thus facilitates the
development of hostile activity signal patterns which may be used as an
aid in estimating terrorist strength, location, deployment, modus op-
erandi, and planned or intended actions.
A basic problem in developing such patterns is that most intelli-
gence analysts are unwilling or unable to postulate plausible theories
relating to suspected terrorist activity. A natural tendency is to avoid
theoretical hypothesis and relay solely on indicators substantiated by
multiple source intelligence. The lack of a theoretical framework thus
deters sequential logic de
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plausible operational approaches can be proven or disproven by available
data and known events. To further complicate the analytical process,
it is also recognized that sufficient intelligence is seldom available in
the quantity or quality needed to forecast operational stereotypes. It
is therefore essential that "gaps" be filled by developing and testing
all possible action options expressed as theoretical operational alternatives.
Probable terrorist actions should be advanced by personnel. experienced
in operating with or against the types of militant organizations with
which any analysis is concerned. If such expertise is not available,
it is suggested that indigenous personnel be employed in a role casting
exercise. Ideally, groups of prisoners or defectors can also be used
"game" particular problem situations confronting those terrorist
groups which they previously represented.
Initial operational theory should disregard available intelligence data.
Once all probable action alternatives are postulated, training analysts
may then be used to prove or disprove theoretical concepts. However,
actual events may be more useful in determining the validity of particular
theories. This, of course, assumes a careful analysis of causal factors
contributing to the timing and accomplishment of any particular terrorist
action.
Application and usefulness of any gaming model is thus dependent
upon proper development of a logic sequence predicted on theoretical
concept evaluated against intelli ence data a QWM
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The logic sequence itself is nothing more than the studied formulation
of operational hypothesis which are then supported or challenged by all
available evidence and the process of deductive reasoning. As theoretical
concepts are proven valid, this then facilitates advance prediction of in-
tended terrorist action in situations where "hard" intelligence is lacking.
Those persons attempting to use initial TAG models should not expect
100 percent accuracy. Basic pitfalls include: (1) failure to properly
read indicators; (2) signal patterns can be read out of context; (3)
terrorists may cancel or postpone intended actions; and (4) the absence
of partial reading of indicators may lead to false conclusions.
In addition to the above pitfalls, the system will probably not be
effective unless it is managed by an officer with some previous operational
experience against the general type of opposition force being evaluated.
The officer must also have: (1) courage of conviction; (2) a
willingness to develop and express "gut" feeling; (3) basic tactical
aptitude; (4) an ability to explore theoretical hypothesis; and (5) skill
in developing indicators without substantial multiple source intelligence.
Assuming the above conditions are met, the TAG systems should have
a reasonable chance of success. Further, it is assumed that a carefully
structured TAG system would produce effective results against any type
of terrorist force operating in a rural or urban environment. The basic
difference is that evaluative criteria must be adjusted to fit each unique
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set of circumstances. Additionally, the TAG system must be employed
by operatives with relevant tactical experience, basic analytical ability,
and a large measure of common sense.
Prior to developing a TAG model, the following questions must be
carefully answered for each specific terrorist group considered:
a. What ideological, organizational and tactical patterns
are clearly evidenced?
b. How do known doctrinal or training concepts compare
with specific operational approaches?
c. What tactics would be feasible given probable limitations
of men, money and material?
d. How do various subversive elements overcome the social,
economic, political, psychological and security strengths of the
target area?
e. What types of activities are being directed against the
target and how do these relate to known vulnerabilities ?
f. What are the probable limits of available communication,
transporatation, support and intelligence?
g. How do terrorists adapt themselves to limit handicaps
caused by adverse climate, weather, demography or geography?
h. What types of countermeasures must be overcome and
how will these effect operational concepts ?
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i. What is the best estimate of probable modus operandi
given known limitations ?
In short, the effective development of a workable TAG system is
predicated or minimal all-source intelligence and a studied evaluation
of specific subversive forces in the local, national or international en-
vironment in which they exist. Each scrap of information is then evaluated
to determine the validity of activity patterns which are initially presented
as plausible theories. A logic sequence is then developed to relate theories
to available data, terrorist operational options, and probable events.
7. ITC SYSTEM
The Intelligence-Targeting Collation or ITC System has been effectively
used to provide a visual system for displaying, locating, and dating large
quantities of information on a terrorist or guerrilla force. It is basically
a plot-board technique that makes data easier to interpret when compared
with most map and/or record systems.
In the course of daily plotting, an analyst uses the ITC Plot Board
to closely observe developing patterns of activity. He contemplates the
purpose of any single action as it relates to potential target proximity
and sequential relationship to all other intelligence data. After a brief
period, trends will begin to emerge, thus allowing the analyst to make
accurate projections on terrorist or guerrilla strength, location, de-
ployment, modus operandi and/or intentions.
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The ITC System clearly reveals activity signatures that generally
hold true for all opposition forces operating in,a particular area. This
allows an analyst to assume the role of a master chess player who can
view the board and determine various logical moves of an opponent.
Obviously, these signatures will vary according to environment,
types of conflict and standard methodology of the hostile force. As an
example, urban terrorist signatures might be revealed by the following
types of information input:
a. Police report increasing theft of explosive or incendiary
materials.
b. Informant observes suspect dissidents conducting a
"casual meeting.
c. Intelligence asset discovers a terrorist surveillance
operation against a likely target for violence.
d. A technical penetration operation reveals intentions
for future terrorist actions.
e. Surveillance team follows suspect terrorist during his
recon of local airport.
Although certain specific intelligence reports may clearly indicate
intended hostile actions, the ITC System can provide a much broader and
deeper insight regarding the total threat. It also facilitates the expedient
collation of intelligence that might otherwise be handled on a fragmented
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counteraction within a limited time frame.
An ITC System may be established for a rural or urban environ-
ment using the following procedural approach:
a. Obtain a roll of lined graph paper with grids on an
approximate map scale of 1:25, 000 for rural areas, or 1:10, 000
for urban areas.
b. Bind the graph paper to chartboards or cardboard squares
roughly 3 x 4 feet in size.
c. Number graph lines on bottom and right side of chartboard
to correspond with Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) grid
numbers for selected target areas.
d. Match and bind corresponding map sections to reverse
side of each board or on a feasible alternate location.
e. Establish secure work area where analyst may handle
and plot sensitive intelligence data on boards.
f. Develop symbol code to identify plotted sources of
information, e. g. :
SOURCE SYMBOL
(1) Agent
(2) Informant
(3) Penetration
(4) Incident
(5) Photography
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SOURCE
SYMBOL
(6)
Historical
0
(7)
Prisoners
A
(8)
Civilian
r
(9)
Research
(10)
Rumors
g. Establish color codes for various time periods of informa-
tion acquisition, and plot source symbols in appropriate time color.
(NOTE: Color normally should indicate specific 10 - 30 day time
periods. )
h. If sourcing of data and dates must be exacting, develop
sequential number codes for intelligence reports and place same
numeric code beside plotted symbol, e. g. , 3 - 84 for the 84th report
during March of that year. (Use card box to maintain record of codes
and reference to source reporting related to same. )
i. In conjunction with source codes, utilize two-letter
alphabetic vocabulary code to identify and plot critical information
reported, e. g. :
ACTIVITY CODE
Action AC
Agent AG
Assassination AS
Base BA
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ACTIVITY CODE
Bombing BM
Cache CH
Cadre CA
Clandestine Meeting CM
Communication CN
Demonstration DM
Enemy Agent _ EA
Espionage ES
Explosives EX
Facility FA
Guerrilla GU
Headquarters HQ
Homicide HC
Hospital HS
Hostage HT
Incendiary Device ID
Kidnapping KN
Killed KL
Prison PR
Raid RD
Route RU
Signal SG
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ACTIVITY CODE
Supplies ' SU
Supply Cache Sc
Terrorist TR
Traffic TF
Unknown Activity UA
Vehicle VH
Weapons (Small Arms) WP
(NOTE: Vocabulary code symbols given are exemplary only and may
be reduced or expanded as the situation dictates. These codes may
also be used on combination as appropriate, e. g. , SQ/AB for squad
sized ambush. )
j. Supplementary symbols can be added as needed, e. g. ,
small arrows attached to source code symbols to indicate
direction of movement.
Example ITC Plot Board
Hq
TK/TF
agq
SD
CH
aPA
CO/AB
X
30
29
12 13 14 15 16 17 18
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NOTE: Use fine-line ink pens to record symbols on plot board. Make
symbols and alpha-numeric lettering as small as possible without being
unreadable.
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11. PRE- CRISES POINTERS
1. Plan im-.ginative delaying tactics that can be used to "stall"
negotiations with terrorists and gain time needed to fully explore
various options for attaining hostage release.
2. Design contingency plans to avoid premature and unplanned
direct confrontation with terrorists.
S
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3. Develop themes for humanitarian appeals designed to persuade
terrorists that they are losing support for their "cause. IT
4. Game probable negotiated release situations to determine
advance guarantees needed to assure that hostages will be returned
unharmed simultaneous with the granting of any concessions to
terrorists.
5. Determine transportation and security options assuming
terrorists will probably demand aircraft for flight to a safe haven.
6. Establish various contingency reaction plans among and
between all governments that might possibly be concerned with any
anticipated terrorist action.
7. Take necessary steps to be prepared to control terrorist
communications and movement to prevent guidance, direction or
assistance from outside sources.
8. Game all possible future actions with various government
security elements to preclude uncoordinated panic reaction during
any terrorist incident.
VI. INCIDENT PROCEDURES
1. PROTECTIVE REACTION CHART
TERRORIST ACTION EXAMPLE REACTION
1. Assault Escape, evade, initiate
emergency commo and/or
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PROTECTIVE REACTION CHART (continued)
TERRORIST ACTION EXAMPLE REACTION
1. Assault (continued) until security reaction force can
2. Kidnapping
3. Ambush
4. Bombing
break attack.
If possible and advisable, attempt to
escape and evade. Activate emer-
gency or other warning device. If
captured, cooperate with your captors
without divulging sensitive intelligence
or compromising information. In
response to kidnapping, pre-planned
rescue and/or negotiated release to
be attempted.
Move away from fields of fire, seek
protective cover, and if armed,
immediately return fire. Initiate
emergency commo and take evasive
action avoiding exposed or open areas.
Dive for protective cover and lie flat
with feet toward explosion. Activate
bomb squads and fire teams to attempt
to limit further damage. Be alert for
second bomb.
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TERRORIST ACTION
5. Hijacking
7. Sabotage
EXAMPLE REACTION
Do not attempt to overpower hijackers
unless given a very reasonable chance
for success. Avoid attracting attention
to yourself. If kidnapped as a result
of hijacking, follow above para 2.
guidance.
Encirclement or entrapment of
terrorists accompanied by no-bar-
gaining position with demand that
terrorists surrender. Armed surrep-
titious entry team should be prepared
to attempt release of any captives.
Attempt to rapidly identify exact
type and source of sabotage. Use
search and security teams to locate
follow-on sabot age actions. Screen
personnel with access to target and
implement protective security procedures
Immediate reaction must be spontaneous
defensive maneuver to escape particular
type of attack. Then initiate emergency
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TERRORIST ACTION EXAMPLE REACTION
8. Assassination (continued) procedures and take evasive action until
security forces arrive. Practice
counter surveillance and good security
to avoid future assassination attempts.
9. Deception and threats Take immediate defensive action until
such time as proven. false, particularly
in situations where deception or threats
are a prelude to actual attack.
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Communication
8. What types of communication are believed or known to be avail-
able to terrorists, and how might these be employed for command control?
9. Has action been taken to disrupt terrorist communications, and if
not, why not?
10. What types of communication systems are being used by security
services, and how are these employed?
11. What capability exists for immediate communication between various
services, command elements within government, and/or the responsible
leadership ?
12. What is the status of critical communication, and is there a
possibility that such communications might be delayed or disrupted?
13. In the case of a hostage, is the victim equipped with any clandes-
tine communication system?
Physical
14. Where, how, and under what conditions are terrorists deployed?
15. What routes of entry and/or escape might be used to gain access
to, or exit from the terrorist's present location?
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Physical (continued)
16. If terrorists use hostages to demand safe passage, what
routes might be used?
17. What physical attributes of the terrorist's present location,
or probable movement routes, would facilitate an ambush and/or other
surprise action?
18. Have detailed maps, building blueprints, utility layouts, and
other physical data been used in answering questions 14 through 17 above?
19. In cases of skyjacking or use of aircraft for escape, what physical
attributes of airports and/or aircraft might be used to negate on-going or
indicated terrorist action?
20. What are the physical advantages and disadvantages of the
terrorist's current location and/or disposition?
Logistics
21. What items of equipment are immediately available to support
operations against terrorists? (Consider weapons, ammo, explosives,
starlight scopes, remote listening devices, cameras, helicopters, ve-
hicles and other appropriate items. )
22. What equipment is now in use by security services ?
23. What equipment is known to be available to terrorists?
24. How might available equipment be employed to negate present
and/or intended terrorist action(s)?
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Negotiations
25. Have the terrorists been told that their demands will be met
in order to gain time to develop the best possible response?
26. Has every effort been made to conceal the fact that terrorist
demands might not be met?
27. What preparations have been made to meet terrorist demands
in the event no other alternative is possible?
28. If inaction or a no bargaining position is to be taken, have all
the consequences been fully evaluated?
29. How can any bargaining best be conducted to facilitate release
of any hostages while increasing chances that terrorists will be captured?
Expertise
30. What special skills are available from internal security services ?
(Consider bomb disposal squads, snipers, radio direction finding units,
teletap teams, camera crews, technical personnel, communicators,
and others that might be appropriate to the situation. )
31. What special skills are available from the foreign community?
32. What special skills have been evidenced by the terrorists,
and what others might they probably have?
3. IMMEDIATE RESPONSE
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4. HOSTAGE LOCATION
1. If foot movement involved, consider use of trackers and/or
tracking dogs.
2. Screen and question local residents near kidnap scene to attempt
to determine routes of travel.
3. Be prepared to trace telephone calls and/or surveil couriers as
one means to locate general area where hostage is being held.
4. Game possible locations where a specific terrorist; group might
hold the hostage in question assuming you have determined who is res-
ponsible.
5. Post rewards for information leading to the hostages safe recovery.
6. Organize a systematic search procedure using several small
teams composed of local residents to avoid giving terrorists any advance
alert.
7. Utilize intelligence /informant networks to attain leads on terrorist
safehouses or known locations where hostages might be held.
8. Attempt to monitor all telephone calls and other communications
going to or from suspect area(s).
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9. Consider selective use of remote listening devices to help
pinpoint hostage location. (Hopefully, the victim may already be
equipped with a self-j=ctivated "bug" so that he and/or the terrorists
may reveal their location. )
5. POTENTIAL HOSTAGE NOTES
1. Maintain your dignity and avoid taking any action which might
provoke the terrorists.
2. Start thinking about escape the minute you are captured. Your
best chance to escape will usually occur during the confusion of the
attack.
3. Do not volunteer information about yourself or any other subject.
4. Attempt to convince terrorists that the only hope of accomplishing
their objectives is to assure your safety.
5. Make careful observations regarding the terrorists and the
situation so you can provide vital intelligence to your potential
rescuers -- assuming a means of communication has been or will
be provided.
6. As one possible means of communication, remember "key"
words, phrases, and gestures you will need to signal a friendly inter-
mediary and/or other contact.
7. Assess the determination of the terrorists with regard to the
accomplishment of their mission.
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8. In appropriate situations, sympathize with the terrorist
"cause" and attempt to convince them of your desire to cooperate,
within limits, which would not embarrass you with your government.
9. Avoid any outward expression of fear, panic, or hatred which
might stimulate an automatic hostile reaction from the terrorist.
10. Convince the terrorists that patience will gain them at least
some of the objectives they seek, that delays or negative responses are
inevitable but that, the local government will eventually meet part of
their demands.
11. Attempt to buy time with the above techniques and any others
you can improvise, as you must give your potential rescuers a chance
to fully prepare their response.
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 4 - TERRORIST OPERATIONAL EX04F AR CHART
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MOONS OPF.RANDL INTERNATIONAL PROFILE - LOCAL/' NATIONAL PROFILE
1. Organization Patriotic front, e.g., Palestinian Fedayeen. Communist or
other radical organizations. Fanatic individuals.
2. Sponsorship and External to target area. Communist bloc, patriotic
Leadership front, dissident elements and/or governments sympathetic
to terrorist "cause".
Detailed and specific with emphasis on high impact opera-
tions having maximum propaganda potential and/or the means
to extract concessions, Plans are also designed to directly
or indirectly undermine the strength of a particular target,
e,g., Israel.
4. Target Analysia Vulnerable to classic or improvised terrorist attack. Target
and?llntelligence meeting above planning criteria. Objective with known and
fixed pattern of activity, or one exposed to detailed tar-
getting assessment by informants, intelligence agents, or
other methods.
Subject to element of surprise, Unprepared for hostile
action, Limited physical defense if fixed, or exposed
and undefended if mobile. Known to lack effective intelli-
gence and/or counterintelligence capabilities. Meets
criteria in 3. and 4, above,
Couriers, deaddrops, cutouts, radio, CW, microdot and
diplomatic pouch of governments sympathetic to terrorist
cause. Usually no direct communication between leadership
and operatives. -
7. Coordination Decentralized, compartmented and specifically geared to
particular operations. All coordination begins at planning
stage and is designed to provide direction for independent
support, intelligence and action cells.
8. Funding and
Logistics
Governments sympathetic to terrorist cause provide clandestine
funding and act as a conduit for explosives, weapons, equip-
ment, or other items. t:onsidcrable quantities of logistics
originate from Communist Bloc countries, but Seldom pass
directly to terrorists.
9. Personnel Selection Any fanatic organization may provide sources of personnel.
and Training Actual selection depends on individual motivation, skills,
and potential cover for access and/or action. General
and specific target training generally accomplished within
countries sympathetic to terrorist cause,
International airlines, stolen vehicles, boats, and/or any
other method compatible with cover and movement requirements
related to covert preparation to hit a particular target.
World-wide network of small clandestine cells designed to
provide intelligence and operational support for specific
and isolated acts of terrorism. In some cases AL FATAH
and possibly other terrorist groups also have legal
representation in a number of countries. Individual
terrorists may or iiay not he associated with local
revolutionary and/or subversive organizations,
12, Documentation Stolen and altered, Obtained under false pretense,
Provided by sympathetic governments. Fabricated and/or
obtained in name of unwitting or deceased subject.
13. Basing and Staging Generally non-specific and located as required to facilitate
attack against a specific target, However, governments sym-
pathetic to terrorist cause will usually provide training
bases and temporary staging areas as needed.
14. Attack Methods Hijacking, kidnapping, bombing, assassination, seizure,
threats and deception, Isolated attacks covering
wide geographic area.
15, Operational
Execution
Compartmented, specific, exacting, with attack group(s)
usually isolated from planning or support elements.
Terrorist action may be unwitting individual, composite
groups or dedicated team,
Subversives or extremists. Fanatics and nuts. Armsl
guerrillas and/or revolutionaries. Action arm and/,t
legal apparrat of international terrorists. 't'hird
country groups or individuals.
Internal and/or external to target nation. Subver-
sives or revolutionaries acting alone or in conjunc-
tion with third country governments or movements.
General and non-specific with emphasis on operation:+
designed to force a target regime to undertake
repressive acts which will alienate a government
from their national population.
Exposed to type of attack normally employed by loc.,1
terrorist groups. Discriminate or indiscriminate
with primary objective being to "cow" a target p,.pu-
lation. Intelligence only required for discrimin.ct,?
targets and this usually provided by existing net-
work of agents and/or informants.
Random target of opportunity hit because of im-
mediate undefended exposure to terrorists, or dis-
criminate and specific target relatively undefended
and/or Subject to element of surprise. Selection
primarily based on probable impact as regards objec-
tive to "cow" population or force target regime to
initiate repressive acts.
Local mail, bamboo telegraph, couriers or runners,
deaddrops cutouts, radio, and direct passage between
terrorist cells or from leadership down.
Centralized with limited compartmentation and mini-
mal directional. control. Designed to provide over
all guidance on psychological, political, opera-
tional and other objectives for a subversive move-
ment in which the terrorists may play a major or
minor role.
Robbery, theft, extortion and kidnap operations
used to raise all or portion of needed funds. Log-
istics items are stolen, purchased on black market
or clandestinely provided by external sponsors.
Recruits are primarily drawn from dissident ele-
ments of population who are aggravated with thaa1r
personal situation and the target regime. Train-
ing of cadre usually takes place in Communist or
other revolution exporting third countries. How-
ever, many terrorists receive clandestine train-
ing within target nation.
Primarily by foot, local transportation facili-
ties, and/or stolen vehicles. Sustained rate of
high mobility.
Support cells are usually an integral part of any
terrorist or subversive organization. They may
or may not have independent functional and/or geo-
graphic responalbilities, but are noreslly located
within the immediate area(s) targetted by terro-
rists.
Rural based guerrillas seldom use docv-entation,
whereas urban oriented terrorists or .Subversives
tend to rely on their cover rather than false
documentation. If papers needed, the are
usually bought or obtained under falr.~ pretense.
Safe areas and houses are normally used to pro-
vide fixed facilities where operations may be
planned, prepared, and rehearsed. Sins target
options limited to confined geographlc area,
basing must be relatively static.
Assault, ambush, sabotage, and other methods as
indicated in international profile. kopetitive
attacks usually limited to single national
environment.
Discriminate, indiscriminate, random, or targets
of opportunity usually hit by compartmented ter-
rorist cell. Local terrorist elements cites
engage in their own planning and support activi-
ties. Action may be undertaken by unwitting in-
dividual, composite group or dedicated team, as
in the case of international terrorists.
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VIII. BIBLIOGRAPHY
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16, Dienstein, William, Technics for the Crime Investigator. Charles C.
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32. Janowitz, Morris, Social Control of Escalated Riots. Chicago, University
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48. Moss, Robert, The War for the Cities. New York, Coward, McCann &
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000200250001-4
64. Reed, David, 111 Days in Stanleyville. New York: Harper & Row, 1965.
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"Prevention and Control of Mobs and Riots. " Washington, D. C.
FBI, 3 April 1967.
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Approved For Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000200250001-4