Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
November 17, 2016
Document Release Date: 
July 27, 1998
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Content Type: 
PDF icon CIA-RDP85-00671R000200260001-3.pdf1.23 MB
Approved For Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000200260001-3 RETIRED FILE JOB ?5 -OO_lr. BOX_Q FOLDER CQ7 DESENSITIZED PLANNING OUTLINE FOR KIDNAP-HOSTAGE SITUATIONS Approved For Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000200260001-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000200260001-3 INDEX INTRODUCTION........ . .. ..... ...... ......... .... SUMMARY............. .......... a.. CHECKLISTS TERRORIST THREAT ANALYSIS Page i Threat Analysis ................................. 5 Possible Terrorist Objectives,........ 6 Terrorist Fact Sheet.......,,..............,..... 6 Personal Security ......... ................. ,.... 7 Local Security Measures ......................... 9 Communications-Related Defense..... ........ ..... 11 Records Systems............................,..... 14 TERRORIST INCIDENT PROCEDURES Reaction Questionnaire.....................,,., 15 Incident Procedures... ......................,.... 18 Potential Hostage Notes....................,,.... 20 DEFENSIVE TECHNIQUES SUPPLEMENT Hostage Codes ......... ......................... 21 Command Center Operations.......... 22 Skyjacking Precautions.......................... 23 m &Q60-11-T) TQ.SE Approved For Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000200260001-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000200260001-3 INTRODUCTION This working paper presents a set of basic outlines and checklists as a quick reminder of planning factors to be con- sidered when official personnel to kidnap-hostage threats. Manpower and other resource limitations, political sensitivities, environmental factors and varying degrees of threat will determine which of the suggested points will apply in any given situation. For this reason, this paper should not be considered an absolute guide for contingency planning and is not intended to represent Headquarters doctrine. Further, no attempt is made in this paper to make specific recommendations or to detail individual actions which should be implemented. Adjustments must be made to meet each threat in its own environment. The outlines provided in this paper are based on analysis of several kidnap-hostage operations conducted by different terrorist gangs including Al Fatah, the Black September Organization and various other national groups. The conceptual approaches indicated herein are oriented toward preventing or recovering successfully from future acts of terrorism regard- less of their sponsorship or intended impact. The contents which follow are divided into five categories for convenience in reference; i.e., Summary, Threat Analysis, Defensive Measures, Incident Procedures and Defensive Techniques Supplement. Approved For Release 1999/09/24.: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000200260001-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000200260001-3 SUMMARY Overall 1. The large number of unresolved national and inter- national conflicts and socio-political revolutions undoubtedly will lead to further terrorist acts by discontented persons who see no other alternative for achieving their goals. Terrorism begets terrorism; thus the impact and frequency of terrorist acts will rise or fall with the success of the terrorists. 2. Since terrorist demands cannot be met without encouraging further acts of terrorism, there are no simple solutions for resolving a hostage situation. The key to the solution lies in repidly collecting intelligence on the circumstances under which the hostages are being held. This permits an assessment of the possibilities for saving the hostages before time becomes critical. In some cases the terrorists can be convinced of the futility of their operation, and thus be motivated to release hostages in exchange for their own safe passage to a friendly country. Fanatical terrorists should not be expected to accept this latter solution, commonly referred to as "The Bangkok Solution" because of its successful use by the Thai Government in that city on 29 December 1972. Local Government 3. The local government usually is anxious to end the incident quickly without providing a target for terrorist retaliation and will favor the least amount of adverse pub- licity. There is a strong tendency for top government officials to become directly involved, which usually com- plicates the situation unnecessarily and gives the terrorists an inflated idea of their power. The government usually is experiencing the hostage situation for the first time, for terrorists tend to pick an area where they can achieve surprise. The effectiveness of the government's :response hinges on the magnitude of the threat perceived against its national interests, and demands for its success the presence of skilled intelligence and security officers. Vjr) ''()prrr_WT i_ ifi fi i Approved For Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000200260001-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000200260001-3 Holding Site 4. The site chosen for holding hostages in public view is usually a building associated with the hostage's pattern of action and which can be guarded by a limited number of people. It can be assumed that the terrorist has preplanned the location of the holding site but that the location is not necessarily invulnerable to rescue attempts. Vulnerabilities might include such things as a power supply which can be cut, food supplies which are limited or can be denied, lines of approach unknown or unobserved by the captors, and communication facilities which permit outside monitoring or control by the host government. -5. Most terrorist spectaculars are planned to obtain the greatest possible media coverage. The Munich Olympic Village and Khartoum incidents are examples of terrorist operations designed with the media in mind, Captital cities and multi- national events can and do attract terrorists simply because of the presence of the international press. Thus, control of media coverage of the'incident becomes a significant negotiating factor. Permitting publicity for the incident in return for the release of hostages becomes a possible basis for saving hostages. Terrorists 6. These are usually young men or women who are reasonably well educated and generally come from middle-class families. They often are stimulated by Communism or other revolutionary ideologies and may be willing to die for their "cause". Generally speaking, terrorists have few interests, affairs, sentiments, attachments, or property -- they have broken their connection with the social order, law, convention and morality. In one way or another they are psychotics who ideally ought to be dealt with only with the assistance of a psychiatrist. Understanding their objectives can be a great help in analyzing their motivation. They usually are engaged in their first operation of this kind and are subject to fatigue, which becomes a vulnerability if the operation can be stalled long enough. Evidence of poor planning on the part of their sponsors or local support organizations also serves to weaken their resolve. Approved For Release -00671 R000200260001-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000200260001-3 Hostages 7. Except for mass hostage situations, such as an airline skyjacking, individual hostages usually are selected from those persons, groups, or governments that the terrorists regard as symbols or instruments of oppression. The potential hostage is selected because of his relative importance to the target group or government which might be asked to make concessions in exchange for the hostage's safe return. Thus, the victim is targeted for what he represents rather than for himself. Experience shows it is very important for the hostage to retain his dignity and to be unrelenting in his efforts to discover vulnerabilities in the terrorists' defense. Communications 8. Couriers, deaddrops, cutouts, voice radio, CW, tele- phones, mails and the diplomatic pouches of sympathetic governments all provide a variety of communications options that can be used by terrorists to support an operation. Each terrorist group is likely to favor one system over another. Under most circumstances, simple voice codes or phrases are used for safety signals or for controlling an operation. Several major terrorist organizations operate their own radio stations and can use these to pass coded voice commands that may determine the final disposition of a hostage. Cutting communications between the terrorists and their sponsoring organization can adversely effect their leadership and thus produce a vulnerability for exploitation. The Intermediary 9. Negotiations for concessions in exchange for hostage release usually are accomplished via an intermediary who is thought to be sympathetic to the terrorist cause ?-- or, if the terrorists have no choice, represents a group or government that is neutral. Such intermediaries will sometimes be given access to hostages to prove that the latter are still alive, or they at least will meet with individual terrorists under prearranged conditions. This access is frequently the only opportunity for obtaining intelligence necessary to develop a rescue operation. Approved For Release 1999/09/24: dlA-RDP85-00671 R000200260001-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000200260001-3 Tactics 10. Experience shows that it is usually inadvisable to attempt an assault on the terrorists' position, as this probably means the instant death of the hostages. When there is sufficient intelligence to indicate a reasonable vulner- ability in the terrorists' defense, a rescue operation may be planned, but it should be undertaken only if it is easily within the capabilities of the personnel involved. Granting the terrorists safe departure from the country in return for the safety of the hostages is one possible alternative, but it depends upon complete control of the situation surrounding the terrorists' location. Time 11. Local terrorist groups have held hostages for weeks or months, whereas most of the international terrorist organizations attempt to complete their hostage operations within 12 to 48 hours. This time limitation is intended to prevent the target government from developing an effective response. Terrorists have learned from experience that their best chance of success lies in an operation of short duration. Because of the importance of time in hostage rescue operations, it is essential that maximum advance preparations be made. Approved For Release : CIA-RDP85-00671 R000200260001-3 4 Approved For Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000200260001-3 I M_ TERRORIST THREAT ANALYSIS Threat Analysis 1. What dissident, subversive, terrorist or other elements reside within the host country? 2. Do international or third-country terrorist organi- zations have support and/or action components assigned to the host country? 3. What is the record and modus operandi of past terrorist operations, and what is the frequency of incidents? 4. If you were targeted as a potential victim, where would terrorists probably initiate the kidnapping, or seizure? 5. Assuming any specific terrorist group succeeded in taking you as a hostage, where would you probably be held? 6. What factors regarding your activities and/or move- ment patterns unnecessarily expose you to a possible kidnapping? 7. In cases of seizures, airline skyjackings, or other mass hostage operations, why might you be singled out for special attention? 8. What unusual events normally precede a terrorist kidnapping or seizure -- either within or outside the host country? 9. What disposition is usually made of the hostages of those terrorist groups with which you are familiar, and what time factors are involved? 10. In cases of negotiated release, what individuals or groups might be used as a go-between? 11. What are the usual communication channels or systems used by terrorists for command control and/or negotiations? Approved For Release 1999/09/24: C$A-RDP85-00671 R000200260001-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000200260001-3 . 12. What is the ethnic and psychological profile of those terrorist leaders with whom you might come in contact, and what are their grievances or political objectives? 13. Have terrorists tended to panic upon learning they are threatened or that governments will not bargain for release of hostages? 14. Under what conditions have most hostages been held, and what circumstances have led to their release or execution? Possible Terrorist Objectives 1. Publicity, propaganda, and/or influence. 2. Political concessions. 3. Finance by ransom of hostages and/or aircraft, etc. 4. Release of fellow terrorists. 5. Expanded control via induced fear. 6. Worldwide attention to grievances they have been unable to resolve by legal means. 7. Elimination of principal opponents. 8. Consternation among all the groups, factions, and/or nations who oppose their "cause". 9. Expanded use of target government repressive measures which tend to create sympathy for the terrorists. Terrorist Fact Sheet NOTE: All potential hostages should memorize the following assuming that they may be the primary source of intelligence on the terrorists during an on-going incident -- provided that some means of clandestine communication an/or monitoring capability can be made available, Approved For Release 1999/09/14: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000200260001-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000200260001-3 1. Who are they, how many, how organized, what; is their motivation, and what are their basic objectives? 2. What are their linguistic, technical, and communi- cations capabilities? 3. Where located, how armed, how equipped, current status, and degree of mobility? 4. What are their psychological and/or physical vulnerabilities? 5. How is command and control exercised? 6. What are the terrorists, probable courses of action under any given set of circumstances? 7. When, where and how might outside support be provided? 8. What are the minimum concessions the terrorists will accept in exchange for hostage release? DEFENSIVE MEASURES Personal Security 1. Instruct all personnel to periodically alter modes, times and routes of movement. 2. Where possible, avoid making advance appointments or establishing routine schedules. 3. Limit regular travel by personal vehicle unless appropriate plans are made for en route protection, e.g., armed escort, scout vehicles, car swapping, random routes or other techniques. 4. For private residences consider fences, dogs, geese, ducks, and/or guinea fowl to provide exterior alarm -- while Approved For Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000200260001-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000200260001-3 installing adequate hardware to preclude a hasty forced entry. (If the situation warrants, guards also should be considered.) 5. Consider armed guards, alarms, fences, control zones, hardware and other protective procedures to deter all possible types of hostile action against office facilities. 6. Conduct periodic security investigations on all indigenous employees having access to officers' residences, vehicles, and/or place of work. 7. Initiate or accelerate intelligence/counterintelligence efforts focused on terrorist organizations and their sponsors or supporters. 8. Assist host government security forces in screening internal and external travelers for suspected terrorists or persons having similar profiles. 9. Surveil the movements of foreign diplomats or other persons who might offer communications or other support for terrorists. 10. Photograph and surveil all'strangers moving in or out of foreign embassies sympathetic to the terrorist cause. 11. Establish "block warning systems" whereby local residents can immediately alert security forces if suspect persons or activity is observed. 12. Train all personnel in countersurveiilance techniques and other clandestine tradecraft that may be used for personal defense. 13. Qualify selected individuals in the use of small arms and provide them with appropriate weapons. Headquarters approval., in accordance with FR 10-27, is needed in each case. 14. Retain maps of all potential target areas to include floor plans and defense plans for key buildings. 15. Check airline passenger lists and hotel registrations on a daily basis .against known terrorist lists by true names and aliases. Approved For Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000200260001-3 8 Approved For Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000200260001-3 16. Stimulate host government security forces to maintain port of entry surveillance and tighten passport/visa control. 17. When possible, utilize technical penetration and/or wire taps to monitor points of terrorist contact or support. 18. Watch for thefts of automobiles, explosives or weapons and relate stolen items to plausible terrorist operational concepts. 19, Restrict movement and set curfews as needed. Local Security Measures 1. Establish a focal point for all terrorist control operations. 2. Develop special skills needed for counterterror programs. 3. Assign functions by order of priority. 4. Create filing and records management system designed to facilitate identification and control of terrorists. 5. Identify intelligence gaps. 6. Survey and assess priority targets. 7. Determine what existing or potential assets might be exploited to cover key targets -- assuming access exists or is readily obtainable. 8. Solidify collection goals and performance standards desired. 9. Develop overt and covert collection operations. 10. Monitor travel, activities, and communications of suspected terrorists or potential support assets for same. 11. Target suspect foreign nationals and obtain available intelligence data from third-country/international services or sources. Wno Approved For Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000200260001-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000200260001-3 12. Establish priorities for human and/or technical exploitation. 13. Identify existing and/or potential terrorists and their sponsors or supporters on a local, national, multi- national or international scale. 14. Collect all pertinent data on terrorist modus operandi. 15. Develop access to, and informant capability within, those dissident elements which have provided personnel or support for terrorist operations. 16. List and refine essential types of support needed by terrorists, and attempt to control, reduce, and/or eliminate. 17. Separate, control, and/or isolate those persons who provide the leadership, motivation, dedication or expertise essential to the conduct of terrorist operations. 18. Locate and exploit all safe havens, contact points, training sites, caches, communication facilities, and other fixed/mobile installations used by suspected terrorists. 19. Review the intelligence and counterintelligence apparatuses of human and technical sources that can be redirected to neutralize terrorist organizations. 20. Develop the capability to monitor, exploit, and control those terrorists under judicial control. 21. Arrange for third-country monitoring of key terrorist personalities within their areas of influence. 22. Provide for detailed collation, analysis, targeting, and exploitation of all information and/or intelligence. 23. Utilize agents of influence to stimulate the formation of popular attitude and laws which will create the basis for dealing effectively with terrorists, 24. Implement political and propaganda operations designed to erode the terrorist's base of support. 10 Approved For Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000200260001-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000200260001-3 25. Develop counterterror contingency planning, placing emphasis on non-repressive action which will avoid antagonizin the general populace. 26. Stimulate the creation of programs designed to bring dissident eloments into the national, social, economic, and political "mainstream" thereby reducing the terrorists potential base of support. 27. Discourage media coverage of any and all terrorist incidents while th yg are in progress -- then after the fact, attempt to encourage reporting derogatory to terrorists. 28. Create plans for limiting knowledge of how the govern- ment will deal with terrorists duri.-tg an on-going incident and avoid statements of specific intent regarding future terrorist action. 29. Identify and develop potential intermediaries who would be acceptable to potential terrorists, but who likely could be influenced to assist hostage release. Communications-Related Defense NOTE: The application of technical equipment to counterterror operations is a particularly frustrating area. if everything was on hand as needed, counterterror would be a lot easier to handle. However, there is no way to stockpile enough technical equipment for everybody and there is usually not sufficient time after an incident has started to get needed equipment into place. It should also be noted that in many cases the actual equipment desired does not exist on the shelf but is something which may have to be fabricated to fit a given situation. 1. Establish periodic radio or telephone check-in procedures whereby all personnel advise their location and status to an alert center having the authority and capability to immediately react to determine why an officer has failed to make his safety report on time -- and to initiate appropriate action as needed. 2. Consider equipping potential target personnel and/or their cars, homes and offices with miniature self-activated "bugs" or beacons that can be used to relay immediate alert when Approved For Release 1999/09/241 CIA-RDP85-00671 R000200260001-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000200260001-3 an attack occurs. NOTE: The equipping of personnel, etc. with beacons is definitely subject to technical limitations. In general, beacon performance is in inverse proportion to the density of buildings. They are much easier to locate in a small town than in a major metropolitan area. If their intended use is primarily to set off an alarm, as opposed to serving as a means of following a person or vehicle, a specific alarm system would have to be created for each person or place. It would have to cause an action that would draw attention, such as set off a siren, and be readily identifiable as to who or what was under attack. The greater the number of persons, vehicles and places so equipped, the greater, of course, would become the complexity of monitoring the systems. 25X1 C8 4. Provide for alternate means of communications with higher headquarters in the event primary facilities are seized or otherwise rendered inoperative. 5. Prepare and advise all personnel of word, phrase, gesture, or other codes which may be used by hostages to realy information by phone, letter or via intermediaries. 6. Consider contingency plans to control, monitor, block, jam or cut all communications which might be used by a terrorist group. NOTE: This is also a complex problem. communicating within a citvialem. Two groups of thing. One y portamobiles is one g. group receiving instructions via conventional radio broadcasts fr d om a istant country is another. The range of 25X1A3b Approved For Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000200260001-3 12 Approved For Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000200260001-3 25X1A3b 7. Predetermine probable conditions under which media coverage may be granted in exchange for concessions from terrorists. In any event, arrange to prevent, guide, limit, and/or control media coverage of any terrorist incident until it has reached a conclusion. 8. Consider two-way communications between teams of officers assigned to backstop each other during vulnerable periods of movement or operation -- and schedule activities so that oneofficer may come to the immediate aid of his "buddy". If circumstances warrant, two-way masked communications between teams of officers can be readily provided -- for example RS 523s or SRS 45s. 9. Install push-button activated sirens, flares, flood- lights or other systems at offices, homes, and on cars for emergency alert and/or as a means to foil an attack. 10. Create a bilateral or multilateral command control center with constant 24-hour communications, and the established capability to coordinate all resources that might be used to deter, negate or react to a terrorist attack. (Therein, establish the focal point for intelligence collation and analysis to provide potential advance alert to all hostile actions.) 11. Be prepared to record all conversations during any terrorist incident to facilitate on-going and/or after-action analysis. In this connection it is suggested, in addition to tape recorders and actuators, that an induction coil be com- bined with a tape recorder to record conversations on an untapped phone wire -- for example, an embassy phone which the terrorists have called in order to announce their demands. 12. Maintain an open communications or dialogue with liaison services and/or potential intermediaries. Approved For Release 19 71 R000200260001-3 13 Approved For Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000200260001-3 Record Systems 1. Maintain biographic and essential data files on all personnel (plus dependents) who may be subjects of terrorist attack. 2. Establish record systems for emergency communication, escape, evacuation and contact plans relating to all personnel. 3. Record points of contac and contact instructions individuals who would be called upon for assitance in event of a terrorist attack. 4. Repeat the above procedure for previously identified technicians, specialists, potential intermediaries, support personnel and other unilateral assets. 5. Create and/or expand all source intelligence files on terrorist leaders, groups and individuals, plus their sponsors or supporters. 6. Record modus operandi for all terrorist organizations and retain mug shots and/or biographic profiles for all known terrorists regardless of status or location. 7. Establish a target and op plan record for all previous incidents of terrorism. 8. Record all information relating to meeting sites, safehouses, cover organizations, support elements, personnel, and/or mechanisms having any known or suspected connection with terrorists. 9. Obtain maps, diagrams, and defense plans of all potential target and operational areas to include transpor- tation terminals, e.g., airports, docks and rail stations. 10. Maintain in the duty officer book a detailed list of instructions on specific actions to be taken in event of a terrorist threat or incident -- this instruction to contain command control procedures, alteiring sequence, chain-of-command, and other pertinent data. Duty books also should contain a Reaction Questionnaire and/or Incident Procedure as exemplified in the following two sections. Approved For Relea 5-00671 R000200260001-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000200260001-3 TERRORIST INCIDENT PROCEDURES Reaction Questionnaire 25X1 C8a Communication 8. What types of communication are believed or known to be available to terrorists, and how might these be employed for command/control? 9. Has action been taken to disrupt terrorist com- munications, and if not, why not? 10. What types of communication systems are being -used by liaison services, and how are these employed? Approved For Release 1999/09/24 :IA-RDP85-00671 R000200260001-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000200260001-3 11. What capability exists for immediate communication 25X1C8a between ommand elements at the embassy, and/or the host government leadership? 12. What is the status of embassy communication with Washington, and is there a possiblity that such commu- nications might be delayed or disrupted? 13. In the case of a hostage, is the victim equipped with any clandestine communication system? Physical 14. Where, how and under what conditions are terrorists deployed? 15. What routes of entry and/or escape might be used to gain access to, or exit from, the terrorists' present: location? 16, If terrorists use hostages to demand safe passage, what routes might be used? 17. What physical attributes of the terrorist's present location, or probable movement routes, would facilitate an ambush and/or other surprise action? 18. Have detailed maps, building blueprints, utility layouts, and other physical data being used in answering ques- tions 14 through 17 above? 19. In cases of skyjacking or use of aircraft for escape, what physical attributes of airports and/or aircraft might be used to negate on-going or indicated terrorist action? 20. What are the physical advantages and disadvan- tages of the terrorist's current location and/or disposition? Logistics 21. What items of equipment are immediately avail- able to support operations against terrorists? (Consider weapons, ammo, explosives, starlight scopes, cameras, heli- copters, vehicles and other appropriate items.) Approved For Release 1999/09/4 : CIA-RDP85-00671 R000200260001-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000200260001-3 22. What equipment is now in sue by 23. What equipment is knwon to be available to terrorists? 24. How might available equipment be employed to negate pr.esent and/or intended terrorist action(s)? Negotiations 25, Have the terrorists been told that their demands will be met in order to gain time to develop the best possible response? 26. Has every effort been made to conceal the fact that terrorist demands might not be met? 27. What preparations have been made to meet terrorist demands in the event no other alternative is possible? 28. If inaction or a no bargaining position is to be taken, have all the consequences been evaluated fully? 29. How can any bargaining be conducted best to facilitate release of any hostages while increasing chances that terrorists will be killed or captured? Expertise 25X1C8a 30. What special skills are available from (Consider bomb disposal squads, snipers, radio direction finding units, teletap teams, camera crews, tech- nical personnel, communicators, and other that might be appropriate to the situation.) 31. What special skills are available from the American and/or foreign community such as intermediaries, and would the host government permit their use during the current crisis? 32. What special skills have been evidenced by the terrorists, and what other might they probably have? 25X1 C8a 25X1 C8a Approved For Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000200260001-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000200260001-3 1T,.1 Tli1}7T Tr wY TT hT*R 33. Has a senior officer been put in charge of counterterror operations and does he have the ability and authority to really take command in time of crisis? Incident Procedures 1. Consider a joint crisis management staff composed of representatives from and appropriate foreign 25X1C8a governments. 2. Activate the Joint Operations Center to assure effective command/control of any rescue attempt. 3. Monitor, control, cur and/or "jam" all communication systems that might be used by the terrorists. 4. If feasible, deploy host government security forces to create a tight, effective, and inconspicuous "cordon" which isolates the terrorists, prevents their escape, and precludes any outside assistance. 5. Arrange the removal of all unauthorized personnel from inside the above "cordon", and advise security forces to keep out of terrorists' view so as not to exacerbate tensions. 6. If terrorists escape by foot, consider use of trackers and/or tracking dogs. 7. Screen and question local residents near kidnap scene to attempt to determine routes of travel. 8. Be prepared to trace telephone calls and/or surveil couriers as one means to locate general area where hostage is being held. 9. Select possible locations "where a specific terrorist group might hold the hostage in question, assuming you have determined who is responsible. 10. Organize a systematic search procedure using several small teams composed of local residents to avoid giving terrorists any advance alert. Approved For Release 1999/09/24 l :IA-RDP85-00671 R000200260001-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000200260001-3 11. Utilize intelligence/informant networks too obtain leads on terrorist safehouses or known locations where hostage might be held. 12. Consider selective use of mobile surveillance teams to help pinpoint hostage location. 13. If feasible, employ direction finding techniques for those hostages previously equipped with concealed beacons. 14. Contact terrorists to determine if and with whom they will negotiate for release of hostages. Use communication techniques which will avoid exposure during initial contact. 15. Select potential intermediaries to deal with the terrorists. 16. Once terrorists agree on a specific intermediary, a decision must be made regarding whether or not this individual can be trusted with the secret words, phrases or gestures the hostage has been instructed to use for passage of information. 17. Instruct the intermediary to try to see the hostage to assure that he is alive. He might even ask that the hostage be allowed to write a note stating that he is alive and safe. This might then be used to pass code words, phrases and/or punctuation marks. 18. Avoid terrorist contact with members of the press, and control all details concerning the incident reaching the press until the incident has reached a conclusion. 19. Inform appropriate government agencies and leaders immediately and fully of all the factors concerning the terrorist incident and present specific terrorist: demands with a request for guidance on how to respond to them. 20. The negotiations with terrorists in hostage situa- tions will fall within the official responsibilty of the concerned foreign government. Personnel are reminded that the U.S. Government will not compromise with terrorists and that it is contrary to U.S. policy to submit to international black- mail or extortion any place in the world. In past incidents Approved For Release 1999/09/24: QM -RDP85-00671 R000200260001-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000200260001-3 . involving terrorist operations the U.S. has consistently both encouraged and solicited foreign governments to main- tain a firm posture with relation to terrorist demands. Implementation of this policy by the negotiator must obviously be undertaken very carefully in order to avoid precipitous action on the part of the terrorists. 21. Plan a release operation in detail as son as it is knwon that a hostage has been taken. When it is impossible to bargain with the terrorists, one must assemble all necessary forces, weapons, equipment, and/or expertise and place them under a centralized command -- preferably that of the Joint Operations Center. Rehearse the operation to avoid the usual pitfalls occurring in "ad hoc" operations. 22. Accomplish the above actions within a 12-to 24-hour time period, with the knowledge that most terrorist groups plan to conclude their operation: before adequate responses can be developed. (Experience has shown that a delay beyond 48 hours heightens the risks that the terrorists will kill their hostages.) Potential Hostage Notes 1. Maintain your dignity and avoid taking any action which might provoke the terrorists, 2. Start thinking about escape the minute you are captured. Your best chance to escape will usually occur during the confusion of the attack. 3. Do not volunteer information about yourself or any other subject. 4. Attempt to convince terrorists that the only hope of accomplishing their objectives is to assure your safety. 5. Make careful observations regarding the terrorists and the situation so you can provide vital intelligence to your potential rescuers -- assuming a means of communication has been or will be provided. 6. As one possible means of communication, remember "key" words, phrases, and gestures you will need to signal a friendly intermediary and/or other contact. Approved For Release 1999/0/4 : CIA-RDP85-00671 R000200260001-3 ? ? Approved For Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000200260001-3 7. Assess the determination of the terrorists to accomplish their mission. 8. In appropriate situations, sympathize with the terrorist cause and attempt to convince them of your desire to cooperate, within limits, which would not embarrass you with your government. 9. Avoid any outward expression of fear, panic, or hatred which might stimulate an automatic hostile reaction from the terrorists. 10. Convince the terrorists that patience will gain them at least some the objectives they seek, that delays or negative responses are inevitable but that the local government eventually will meet part of their demands. 11. Attempt to buy time with the above techniques and any other you can improvise, as you must give your potential rescuers a chance to fully prepare their response. DEFENSIVE TECHNIQUES SUPPLEMENT Hostage Codes 1. Establish key punctuation codes to be memorized by all potential kidnap victims for possible use in written communications, e.g., small open circles for periods might indicate the authentication and'safety of a victim. 2. Written words or phrases should also be preplanned to further facilitate possible victim communication. For example, the phrase "I am safe" could be followed by "as always" to relay the victim's message that his kidnappers probably do not intend to take no for an answer. 3. Single written code words can be used but must be carefully selected to avoid error. Specific colors, clock times, or direction offer possible options for relaying a particular message. 4. Signature codes can be used by preplanning certain unusual characteristics in a person's signature, This is '1'1 T T III PI _ - ~ - 1\V 1 Approved For Release 1999/09/24 :241A-RDP85-00671 R000200260001-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000200260001-3 also a good way for a victim to indicate that he has been told exactly what to write, and that he had no chance to use other written codes. 5. Voice codes must also be preplanned in the event the victime is allowed to verbally communicate by phone or via a controlled intermediary. Usually these are short simple sentences which convey a prearranged message in the context of making another open statement, e.g., "give Mag and the children my love if I don't return." 6. Gesture codes are simply prearranged signals that provide a restrained victim with the means to relay programmed messages to an intermediary or other controlled persons who might be allowed to see him. Normally, these gestures would have no meaning to anyone else not having access to the signal plan. Examples include twitching of the mouth or eye or jerking the shoulders as if the arm were asleep. 7. In an emergency when no communication code is available a "sound-code chart" can be made. This is a means of identifying a phrase -- "I'm ok" or "they mean business", etc. If nine phrases were each located in a box on a nine box diagram and the columns of boxes numbered three across and three down then the intended phrase could be easily identified. One tap or cough followed by two would indicate one over and two down, etc. 8. Codes must be kept secure and they should be developed specifically for a particular situation including the specific personalities involved. It is for this reason that detailed codes are not provided herein. Command Center Operations 1. Provide or otherwise identify a six- to ten-man physical facility easily secured and limited in access. 2. Equip this facility for eventual use as a joint crisis control center (C3) by installing primary and emergency commu- nications with all internal security services. 3. Select and train a six- to 10-man C3 Staff in the alerting, responsive reaction, and command-control procedure to be used in the event of a terrorist incident. m WaLAZ__Ja_Y C, C4 ""R ? Approved For Release 1999/09$4 : CIA-RDP85-00671 R000200260001-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000200260001-3 4. Identify, train and prepare those internal security elements who will be immediately responsive to C3 requests for commo teams, cordon units, sniper squads, technical support, intelligence research, recovery action, medical assistance, release negotiations, or other specializations as required. 5. Install maps, city plans, building blueprints, air- port layout and other essential reaction data within immediate area of the C3 communications systems. 6. Establish necessary legal and jurisdictional authority for operations of the C3 as the only authoritative command- control element during a kidnap-hostage situation. 7. Initiate operation of the C3 with a "gamed" kidnap- hostage operation or other terrorist incident, and repeat these practice exercises on a monthly basis with the objective of upgrading performance. 8. Seek outside assistance in C3 organization as required remembering that efficiency and a high standard of performance will be required in an actual kidnap situation. 9. If government elements resist organization of a separate C3, a similar capability may sometimes be developed within an existing police dispatch or complaint center, or a Joint Operations Center used by military forces. Skyjacking Precautions 25X1 C4e 2. Avoid airlines and airports not using normal security precautions. 3. Do not reveal travel plans in advance, and deal with cleared booking agents to make reservations within the minimum time frame. Approved For Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000200260001-3 Approved For Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000200260001-3 4. If possible, route yourself around those airport facilities and/or areas where terrorists have been active within the last six months. 5. Observe for suspicious persons based on profiles of known terrorists and be prepared to take another flight if the situation seems insecure. 6. Survey protective cover and routes of emergency exit from waiting areas in air terminals, and be prepared to use if necessary. 7. Be prepared to take quick protective action while boarding. 8. If seat selection available on aircraft, choose window seat near emergency exit or aisle seat near doors. 9. Read and familiarize yourself with airline provided evacuation diagrams. 10. Be prepared for a quick exit from your seat at all times, but make sure that your seatbelt is fastened while airborne. 11. If skyjacked, remain calm and observant while following directions of flight crew. Few persons have the opportunity for heroism aboard a skyjacked aircraft. Approved For Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000200260001-3