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Approved For Releas1999/09/24 : CIA-RDP85-00671 00300050001-5 . Cr f/ 1yJt/ZFsIhF - RETIRED FILE JOB 5 -b&!a7/ R BOX FOLDER DESENSITIZED 'The following discussion of Communist guerrilla warfare takes its lead from principles outlined for that type of war by Communist China's leader, Mao Tse-tung. Mao's guerrilla catechism was tested in action by Chinese Communists in battles against the Japanese and against the National- ist Chinese forces of Chiang Kai-shek. The Mao concepts were later to be used by Communist Chinese terrorists in Malaya, where the enemy included native Malay forces and specially trained British troops. Communist Viet Minh President Ho Chi Minh and General Vo Nguyen Giap adopted Mao's guer- rilla principles to the war for "liberation" from the French in Indochina. Mao's guerrilla doctrines have become the manual for Communist guerrilla action in the Far East. Since Communist guerrilla moves are always a possibility in future Communist aggression in the area, antiguerrilla tactics must evolve from efforts to meet the type of guerrilla action Mao prescribes and that Communist forces are known to use. British and French forces developed military tactics to meet guerrilla .situations. The British succeeded, and the French failed, though admitted- ly in a more difficult set of circumstances. Much can be learned from both experiences, and this study goes into the strategy of both nations. .Approved For Release 1999/0 40671 R000300050001-5 Approved For Releasej999/09/24 : CIA-RDP85-00671 R,Q,p0300050001-5 UNCLASSIFIED 'No one will think of taking over the leadership in a war without knowing its laws. But in addition to the traditional .type of war there exists the revolutionary war, which has its own characteristics, its own laws. Be who is not familiar with them has not the slightest chance to catty away the victory in such a war.' Mao Tse-tung ? . 11 Approved For Release 1999/09/24 : P85-00671 R000300050001-5 UNCLASSIFIED . 1Z 30CWWW" J6 AZ-&" TABLE OF CONTENTS Approved For Release4999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 RW0300050001-5 Relationships of Commands . . . . . . . . 10 Operations in Malaya Mao's Principles of Guerrilla Warfare . . . . . . . . . . I Coordination of Guerrilla and Regular Warfare 5 Establishment of Base Areas . . . . . . 6 Strategic Offense and Defense in Guerrilla Warfare. . . . . . 8 Guerrilla Warfare Becomes Mobile Warfare. . . .. . . 9 Communist Concepts for Revolutionary War Communist Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 The Min Yuen Movement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Communist Tactics in Malaya . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Types of Guerrilla Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Anti-Communist Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , 20 The Briggs Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . e . . . . . . 24 British and Colonial Anti-Guerrilla Tactics . . . . . . . 28 Areas of Unrest (map of trouble-areas) . . . Operations in Indochina Communist Forces. Viet Minh Strategy and Tactics. Organization for Combat . . . . . . . ... Importance of Guerrilla Warfare . . . . Anti-Communist Forces . . . . . . Summary. . a . . . . . . . 32 . . . . . 33 34 . . . . . . . 36 40 . . . . 42 45 Approved For Release 1999/09 9S7l R000300050001-5 Approved For Release999/09/24 :CIA-RDP85-00671 8000300050001-5 UNCLASSIFIED DEF?INITI0NS These Terms Have the Following Specialized Meanings in This Study DISSIDENT: One of a group in disagreement with the established order. The differences usually result in passive acts rather than individual or organized collective violence. REBEL: An individual who is plotting to or is actually resisting the established order by force. The aim is to overthrow the established order, and to accomplish this the rebel may resort to terrorist or guerrilla activities. INSURGENT: A member of a group engaged in an upri sing against the established order, where the revolt has not yet reached the stage of a revolutionary government nor a belligerency. GUERRILLA: A combatant member of an organized or partially organized militant force, the functions of which include harassing, delaying or disruptive action against the enemy, and the destruction of an enerry either by independent small unit action or coordinated action with the regular force. TERRORIST: One who uses intimidation or violence or both to demoralize either the civilian populace or the military forces or both as a means of opposing or disrupting the established order with the aim-of assisting in seizure and subsequent control of an area. Approved For Release 1999/09Ua& & RgP85-00671 R000300050001-5 Approved For Release,,V99/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 RQ0 300050001-5 UNCLASSIFIED COMMUNIST CONCEPTS FOR REVOLUTIONARY WAR Mao Tse-tung developed the following strategic uses for guerrilla war- fare and adhered to them when he led guerrilla foroes against the Japanese, during World War II in China and against Chiang Kai-shek before and after World War II. Ho Chi Minh, from 1954 in the war against the French in Indochina, followed these principles. Communists will doubtlessly con- tinue to follow than in any expansion of their aggression in Southeast Asia or elsewhere in the Far East. Mao stated that the following six principles constituted his strategic program during the entire guerrilla war against the Japanese and that these principles serve as the necessary means for pre- serving and expanding our (Ceannunist) forces, annihilating or ousting the enemy, and coordinating with regular warfare to win final victory. Six Principles of Guerrilla Warfare -- Mao Tse-tung 1. On our own initiative, with flexibility and according to our own plan, carry out offers r. battles of quick decision in a protracted war, and exterior ne operations within in- terior line operation. .2. Coordination with regular warfare. I 3. The establishment of base areas. 00 4. Strategic defensive and strategic offensive in guerrilla warfare. u/ 5. Development into mobile warfare. - 6. Relationship of commands. Mao's discussion of these principles follows. FIRST PRINCIPLE: On our own initiative, with flexibility and according to our own plan, carry out offensives in a defensive war, battles of quick decision in a protracted war, and exterior line operations within interior line operation. It is possible and necessary to make, in a strategically defensive war, offensives in campaigns and battles; to wage campaigns and battles of quick decision in a strategically protracted war; and to wage campaigns and battles on the exterior line within the strategic interior line. Offensives in guerrilla warfare generally take the form of surprise attacks, while in regular warfare, although surprise attacks should and can be adopted, relatively few opportunities arise whereby the enemy can be caught unprepared. 1 Approved For Release 199@IA4SIAj-RDP85-00671 R000300050001-5 Approved For Release499/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R00300050001-5 UNCLASSIFIED b~. . In guerrilla operations, concentration of the biggest possible force, secret and swift actions, surprise attacks on the enemy, and quick decisions in battles are required. Passive defense, procrastination, and dispersion of forces immsdiats],y before combat mast be carefully avoided. Although there is strategical and tactical defense to inflict attrition on the enemy and to wear him out, the basic principle of guerrilla warfare must be one of offense and its-offensive character must be more pronounced than that of regular warfare. Further, such offensives must take the form of mtrprisp_ attacks. Display and showiness are even more impermissible in lUa- uerr warfare than in regular warfare. Although on occasion, guerrilla battles may continue for several days, as in a battle against a small, isolated, and helpless enemy force; in general, Eck battle decisions are vital to successful guerrilla warfare. Because of its dispersed nature, guerrilla warfare can be spread wide, and the principle of dividing up the forces applies in many of its tasks, such as in harassing, containing, and disrupting the enemy, and in mass work; but when a guerrilla detachment or corps is performing the tasks of anni- hilating the enemy, particularly when it is striving to smash an enemy of- fensive, its main force must be concentrated. "Gather a big-force to strike at a small enemy segment," remains one of the guidelines for field operations in guer lea f are. We must concentrate a preponderant force in every battle and adopt, whether in the period of strategic defense or in the period of strategic counteroffensive, exterior line operations in every campaign or battle to encircle and annihilate the enemy. We must encircle a part of the enemy, i not the whole, annihilate a part of the encircled, if not the whole, and inflict heavy casualties upon them, if not capture them. Initiative:' Initiative for an army means choice of action. Any army that loses its initiative will be forced into a passive position, be deprived of its freedom of action, and will run the risk of being exterminated or de- feated. To obtain the initiative is more siiffa strategic defensive and interior line operations and easier ih offensive ext rior line operations. Initiative is vital to guerrilla warfarey.for a guerrilla unit usually finds itself in grave circumstances: the absence of a rear for its operations, its own weak force pitted against the enemy's strong force, and in the case of a newly organized guerrilla unit, its lack of experience and of unity. Nevertheless, we can gain the initiative in guerrilla warfare, the essential condition being the utilization of the enemy's defects. The initiative results from a correct estimation of the situation (of both the enemy's and ours), as well as correct military and political dis- positions. Pessimistic estimatios at a variance with objective conditions and the passiv'e`d'lspos tions which they entail will undoubtedly deprive one of the initiative and throw him into a passive position. Similarly, over- optimistic estimations at variance with objective conditions and the 2 Approved For Release 1999/9w2& Jj DP85-00671 R000300050001-5 Approved For Release 99/09/24 : CIA-RDP85-00671 RO,0300050001-5 venturesome dispositions (an uncalled for venturesomeness) which they entail will also,deprive one of the initiative and eventually lead him to the same path as do pessimistic estimations. The it i iee is not the natural gift of a ps, but ramethi Iohirrrd by an intelligent leader who-studies with a recep ve mind and makes correct estimations of objective conditions and correct military and political dispo- sitions. Therefore, it is something to be consciously striven for, not ebme-i thing ready made. A guerrilla unit should carry out the tasks of extricating itself from a passive position when forced into one through some incorrect estimation and disposition or scsme overwhelming pressure. Circumstances are often such as to make it necessary to run a ._ Running away is the chief means of getting out of passivity and regaining the initiative, but not the only means. Frequently the initiative and an advantageous position are gained through one's effort at holding,, out _ a .bit_ longer. Flexibility: Flexible employment of forces is the most important means of changing the situation between the enemy and ourselves and gaining the initiative. Guerrilla forces must be flexibly employed according to con ditions such as the tar sk the enemy disposit~.on, the terrain, and the in- hab4.tants. The chief ways of employing the forces coz -I-W-of dispersing, concentrating, and shifting them. When guerrilla forces are dispersed we must not incur losses through an ignorance of the situation and mistakes in actions. In employing the forces it is necessary to maintain liaison and communication and to keep an adequate portion of the main force on hand. Guerrillas should constantly shift their positions. Generally speaking, the dispersion of guerrilla forces is employed mainly in the following circumstances: 1. When we threaten the enemy with a wide frontal.,attsc1c..because he is on the defensive, and we are still una'5Ie_to mass our-1forces to engage him. 2. When we widely harass and disrupt the energy in an area where his forces are weak. 3. When unable to break through the enemy's encirclement, we try to divert his attention in order to get away from him. 4. When we are restricted by the condition of terrain or in matters of supply. 5. When we carry on work among the people over a vast area. In dispersed actions under any circumstances, attention should be paid to the following: 3 Approved. For Release I 999/0 & fJBP85-00671 R000300050001-5 Approved For Release 1,999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 P400300050001-5 1. No absolutely ev _diapersion of forces should be made. A larger part of the forces should be kept at a place conveniently situated for its flexible employment so that, on the one hand, any possible exigency can be' readily met and, on the other, the dispersed units can be used to fulfill the main task. 2. The dispersed units should be assigned clearly defined tasks, fi_QJ s _of Q eration, specific time limits and rendezvous, and ways and means of liaison. Concentration: Forces are concentrated largely for the annihilation of an enemy on the offensive but sometimes for the annihilation of certain statiori" f orces when the enemy is on the defensive. Concentration of forces does not mean absolute concentration, but the massing of the main forces in a certain important direction while retaining or dispatching a part of the forces in other directions for containing, harassing, or disrupting the enemy, or for work among the people. Shifting of forces: Although flexible dispersion or concentration of forces is the principal method in guerrilla warfare, we must also know how. to shift our forces flexibly. When the enemy feels seriously threatened by the guerrillas he will send troops to suppress or attack theca. Guerrilla leaders should ponder the situation and: 1. If possible fight on the spot. 2. If not possible to fight, shift rapidly to another position. Sometimes the guerrilla units for the purpose of smashing the enemy units separately may, after annihilating an enemy force in one place, shift immediately to another to wipe out another enemy force. Guerrillas, finding it inadvisable to fight in one place, may sometimes have to disengage immediately from the enemy at that position and engage him elsewhere. If the enemy's forces at one position are particularly strong, the guerrilla units should not engage him there for long, but should shift their positions as speedily as possible. In general, th see hiftin_of forces, should be done secretly and swiftly. Ingenious devices such as making a noise in the east while at the west, appearing now in the south and then in the north, and hit-and-run, and night action should be constantly employed to mislead, entice, and. confuse the enemy. Planning: Without planning it is iVolnible- to win a guerrilla war. The idea of fighting a haphazard guerrilla war means nothing but making a game out of it, the idea of an ignoramus. 4 Approved For Release 199910~1 5 jqjjDRDP85-00671 R000300050001-5 Approved For Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R pO300050001-5 UNCLASSIFIED Operations within a guerrilla area must be preceded by the most compre- hensive planning possible. Guerrilla leaders must consider how to grasp the initiative, define the tasks, dispose the forces to carry out military and. political training, procure supplies, make arrangements for equipment, and how to secure the help of the people. These steps should all be carefully worked out by the leader and rechecked. Without this there could be no initiative, flexibility, or offensive. The conditions of guerrilla warfare do not permit so high a degree of planning as in regular warfare; consequent- ly, to attempt highly comprehensive planning in guerrilla warfare is a mis- take, butte it is still necessary so far as obi ective conditions permit to make plans as comprehensive as possible. The initiative can be gained only after success has been scored in an offensive. All offensives must be organized on our own initiative and not launched under compulsion. The flexible employment of forces centers around the endeavor to take the offensive; likewise, planning is necessary chiefly for victories in offensives. Tactical defensive measures beceane meaningless when divorced from their roles of supporting an offensive directly or indirectly. Quick decision refers to the t__~e~n~~po of an offensive, and by the exterior line is meant-the bco a of the offensive. The offensive is the only means of annihilating the. enemy as well as the principal means of preserving oneself; pure defense and withdrawal can play only a tempo- rary and partial role in preserving oneself and are utterly useless in annihilating the enemy. SECOND PRINCIPLE: Coordination with regular warfare. There are three kinds of coordination between guerrilla warfare and regular warfare: in strategy, campaigns, and in battles. Strategy: The roles played by guerrilla units behind the enemy's rear, i.e., crippling and containing the enemy, disrupting his supply line, and raising the morale of both the regular army and the people, all point to the need for strategic coordination with the regular army. In coordinating with the regular army, the guerrillas will play a strategic defensive role when the enemy is launching a strategic offensive; will handicap the enema defense when the enemy concludes his strategic offensive and turns to de- fendthe areas he has occupied; and will also repulse the enemy forces recover all lost territories when the regular army launches a strategic counteroffensive. Campaigns: When participating in a campaign, the leader of each guerrilla base in the enemy's rear should properly dispose his forces and adopt different tactics according to prevailing local conditions. So that he may succeed in crippling and containing the enemy, he should take posi- tive action against the enemy's most al and vulner be points, dis- rupting his transport and raising the morale of our own es engaged in interior line-camps ns. By so doing t`fiie guerr a leader thus will ful- fill his responsibility of campaign coordination. To attain the end of coordination in campaigns it is absolutely necessary to equip all larger guerrilla units with radio equipment. Approved For Release I 999/Q L Q r P85-00671 R000300050001-5 Approved For Releas?999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 RQP0300050001-5 UNCLASSIFIED Battles: Coordination of battle actions is the task of all guerrilla units in the neighborhood of the battlefield on the interior line. in each case the guerrilla units should take up the tasks assigned by the commander of the regular force, usually tasks to contain part of the enemy disrupt h., , r n o '' , sP~' an him, and sat as uid Without aar direction from the commander o}" fie regular ford's;-i;Fie 'guerrilla units should carry out such tasks voluntaril . There must. be no sitting back and watching, or moving about wit Gt 1ghting. THIRD PRINCIPLE:: The establishment of base areas. Base areas are the strategic bases on which a guerrilla unit relies for carrying out its strategic tasks as well as for achieving the goals of preserving and expanding the unit and annihilating or expelling the enemy. Without such bases there would be nothing to depend on for carrying out all the strategic tasks and fulfilling all the war objectives. Oper- ating without a rear area is a characteristic of guerrilla warfare behind the enemy linerfor it is detached from the nation's general rear. Guerrilla war could not be maintained and developed for long without base. areas which are indeed its rear. Types of base areas: Bases are mainly of three types: those in the mountains, those in the plains, and those in the river-lake estuary regions. We must develop guerrilla warfare and set up base areas in all mountain regions behind the enemy lines. Mountain base areas are places where guer- rilla warfare can hold out for the longest time. Plains are inferior to mountains, but one must not rule out the possibility of developing guerrilla warfare or establishing some sort of base area on the plains. The establish- ment of base areas that can hold out for a long time is not confined, but the establishment of temporary base areas has been proved possible and that of base areas for small, units or for ryseasonal use ought to be possible. The possibility of developing guerrilla warfare and establishing base areas in the river-lake estuary regions is greater than on the plains, but less so than in the mountain regions. Conditions for establishment of base areas: The basic condition for the establishment of base areas is that there should be an armed force em- ployed to defeat the enemy and to arouse the people into ac#ion~". ~" ewers in guerrilla war must exert their utmost_to'build up one or several guerrilla units and in the course of the struggle must develop them gradually into guerrilla corps and eventually into regular u ,i.ts and regular corps. With- out. an armed force or with one that is not strong enough, not can be done. The armed forces must be employed in coordination with the masses of the people to defeat the enemy. If we do not repulse the enemy's attacks and defeat him, those regions under our control will become enemy controlled, and then the establishment of base areas will become impossible. 6 Approved For Release I 999M&OS &J RDP85-00671 R000300050001-5 Approved For Releag& 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-0067W00300050001-5 UNCLASSIFIED All power should be employed to arouse the people to struggle against the enemy. We must arm the people, organize self-defense corps and guerrilla units. We must form mass organizations. Workers, peasants, youths, Women, children, merchants, and members of the free professions, according to their political consciousness and fighting artthusi&wn, should be organized into the various indispensable public bodies which are to-expand gradually. We must eliminate the collaborators in the open or under cover, a bask that we can accomplish only by relying on the people. We =at arouse the people to establish or consolidate the local organs of enemy political power. Where the original organs of political power have not been destroyed by the enemy, we must, on the basis of the support of the masses, proceed to reform and consolidate than. Where destroyed by the enemy, we Waist rebuild them. Consolidation and expansion of base areas: If we only attend to ex- ,pans on and forget consolidation in guerrilla warfare, we not only lose- r pined but the very existence of vast areas is endangered. tots ser nation due to lve_.szf.. Wort or an incorrect estimation of the enemy's strength can only bring losses and harm guerrilla war. The correct principle is e2gsflsion through gp.@4 ti to n. Choose a base area where we can be on the defense or offense as we choose. As tasks of expansion and consolidation are different in nature, mili- tary dispositions and the execution of our tasks will differ accordingly. To. shift the emphasis from one to the other according to the time and the circumstances is the only way to solve the problems properly. Guerrilla areas as opposed to base areas: In guerrilla war conducted in the enemy's rear, guerrilla areas are distinguished from guerrilla base areas. Guerrilla areas: Areas which the guerrillas can not completely occupy but can only constantly harass and attack, which are recovered by the guer- rillas only when they arrive and are lost to the puppet regime as soon as they leave and which consequently are not yet guerrilla base areas but are only guerrilla areas. Guerrilla areas will be transformed into base areas when they have gone through the necessary processes of guerrilla war; that is, when a large number of enemy troops have been annihilated or defeated, the puppet regime destroyed, the activity of the people called forth, the people's government formed, and the people's armed forces developed. To develop a guerrilla area into a base area is therefore a painstaking pro- cess. Whether a,guerrilla area has been transformed into a base area de- pends on the extent to which the enemy is annihilated and the masses of the peop.,Je are used. As a result of our erroneous leadership or the enemy's strong pres- sure, the guerrilla base area may change into a guerrilla area and a guer- rilla area may become an area under the relatively stabilized occupation of the enemy. This may occur sometimes and deserves the vigilant attention of the leaders of guerrilla war. 7 Approved For Release I 99W Q Si?IDRDP85-00671 R000300050001-5 i Approved For Release4,999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 RQA0300050001-5 UNCLASSIFIED As a result of guerrilla warfare and the struggle between the enemy and ourselves, any of the enemy occupied territories falls into one. of the following three categories: (1) areas controlled by o gue farces and our organs of political power, (2) areas in the grip of the_, ney e and the puppet regime, and (3) arsas ooz tssts4 by both sides or srr3.L1a areas. FOURTH PRINCIPLE: Strategic defensive and strategic offensive in guerrilla warfare. After a guerrilla war has been started and considerably developed,, especially when the enemy has ceased his strategic offensive against us on a nationwide scale and has adopted instead a policy of defending the areas under his occupation, he will inevitably attack the guerrilla base areas. It is essential to recognize this inevitability for otherwise the leaders in a guerrilla war will be caught unprepared, will certainly fall into panic and confusion, and will be routed by the enemy. To eliminate the guerrillas and their base areas, the enemy will re- sort to converging attacks. When the enemy is launching a converging at- tack in several columns each consisting of only a single unit, big or small, without reinforcements, and if he is unable to man the route of advance, we should then construct _ of4 .tificai ons,, build_ motor .roads. In our dis- positions we should contain a number of enemy columns with our supplementary a surprise attack on it in campaign-s- amp gns and battles mainly sties) and- strik-ing at it while it is on the move. The enemy weakened by our repeated surprise attacks will often withdraw halfway.- By then the guerrillas may spring more surprise attacks during their pursuit of the enemy so as to weaken him further. We should en ircle the town ortpwrs which the enemy occupied before he stops his offensive or begins to withdraw, cutting off his foodfiupply and com- munications. When he fails to hold out we should pursue and attack him. After. smashing one column, we should shift our forces to smash another, thereby shattering separately the enemy's columns taking part in the converg- ing attack. In an operational plan for coping with a converging attack, our main forces are generally placed on the interior line. 16 the case when we are superior in strength, it is necessary to use supplementary forces such as county or district guerrilla units and sometimes even detachments from the main forces on the exterior line to disrupt the enemy's communication lines and. to contain his reinforcements. In the case when the enemy remains for a long time in our base area, we may reverse the scheme, that is, leave a part of our forces in the base area to besiege the enemy while employing the main forces to attack the region whence the enemy came and to intensify our activities there, so that the enemy long stationed in our base area may be enticed to cane out and engage us. During retreat the enemy often sets fire to the houses in the villages and towns he has occupied and in the villages along his route, with the Approved For Release 1999/09/24 - DP85-00671 R000300050001-5 UNCLASSIFIED Approved For Release4999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000300050001-5 UNCLASSIFIED purpose of destroying the base areas for guerrilla warfare. In so doing he is depriving himself of shelter and food in his next offensive, and the damage will recoil upon himself. ' - A leader in a guerrilla war should not think of abandoning his present base area and shifting to another unless many attempts have been made to smash the enemy's converging attacks, and it is conclusively shown that'they cannot be smashed there. In such an event he must carefully guard against pessimism. So long as the leader commits no blunder in principle, it is generally possible for the guerrillas to smash the enemy's converging at- tacks and to hold on to the bases in mountainous areas. It is only on the plains that the guerrilla leader, confronted with a vigorous converging attack, should consider temporarily shifting the main guerrilla corps to some mountainous region. If a shift is made, numerous small units should be left to operate in dispersion, thereby facilitating the return of the main corps when the main forces of the enemy move away. After we have smashed the enemy's offensive and before his new offensive starts, the enemy is on the strategic defensive and we are on the strategic offensive. At this time, our operational direction lies not in attacking enemy forces holding stoutly to their defensive positions, which we may not be able to defeat, but in annihilating or expelling small enemy units and puppet forces which our guerrilla units are strong enough to attack. In expanding the areas under our occupation, we must annihilate small enemy units and-arouse the people into action. The difficult problems of provisions, of bedding and clothing are usually also tackled at this time. It is necessary to give the t oo s res and training. and the best time for this is when the enemy is on thee di During the strategic offensive, the leaders in the guerrilla war should not be so elated with success as to underrate the enemy and forget to strength- en internal solidarity and consolidate the base areas and the troops. They should watch carefully every move of the enemy and see if there is any sign of an offensive against us, so that the moment it comes we can properly bring our strategic offensive to close, turn to the strategic defensive, and smash the enemy's offensive. FIFTH PRINCIPLE: Development into mobile warfare. It is necessary for guerrilla units to change gradually into regular armies in a protracted war. The development of guerrilla warfare into mobile warfare does not mean the abandonment of guerrilla warfare but the gradual formation in the midst of an extensively developed guerrilla warfare of a main force capable of conducting a mobile war, round which there should still be numerous guerrilla forces carrying on extensive guerrilla operations. To raise the quality of the guerrilla units we must improve them politi- cally and organizationally. We must improve their equipment, military train- ing, and their tactics and discipline, gradually remolding them on the pat- tern of the regular army. Approved For Release 1999IQg1~22449. CI~Aq-RDP85-00671 R000300050001-5 / CLASSIFIED Approved For ReleasW 999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 P400300050001-5 UNCLASSIFIED Organizationally it is imperative to establish step by step such mili- tary and political setups as are required in the regular corps. All regular armies have the responsibility of assisting the guerrilla units in their development into regular armed units. SIXTH PRflC>yL1: Relationship of commands Guerrilla units are armed bodies on a lower level than a regular army ,.-. and are characterized by dispes. operations. The high degree of 11-Z . zation in directing regular warfare is not permitted in directing guerrilla warfare. A highly centralized command is opposed to the high degree of as cit of guerrilla warfare. Guerrilla warfare, however, cannot be developed steadily if centralized command is done away with altogether. When extensive regular and guerrilla warfare go on at the same time, it is essential to coordia to the operations of both by unified command. The principle of cormand in a guerrilla war demands a centralized command in strategy and a decentralized command in campaigns and battles. Centralized strategic command includes: planning and direction of the entire guerrilla war by the state; coordination between guerrilla and regular war in. each zone; and unified direction of all the armed forces in each guerrilla area or base area. If centralization is not effected where it should be, it would mean a neglect of duty on the part of the higher echelon and usurpation of power on the part of the lower ranks-neither is permissible in the relationship between the higher and lower bodies, especially in military matters. If decentralization is not effected where it should be, it is monopoly of power on the part of the higher echelon and lack of initiative on the part of the lower ranks-neither is permissible in the relationship between the higher and lower bodies, especially in the command in a guerrilla war. Such a principle is the only, correct directive for solving the problem. Approved For Release 1999/09/2410 CIA-RDP85-00671 R000300050001-5 UNCLASSIFIED Approved For Release4999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000300050001-5 nnnrr.+r^--- CCNMUNIST FORCES The Oc=ulist moveosnt in Mal+ *a it unlike the Ca=unist movements in other Southeast Asian countries in that it is not indigenous, nor did it develop from the grievances of a down-trodden peasantry, an oppressed' laboring class, or from any frustrated desire for national independence. Communism in Malaya results from the direct introduction of the Cammmuniat virus into a mall vein of the Chinese comminity by the Communist Party in China. In the immediate postwar period the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) functioned as a legally recognized political party and devoted its attention to gaining control of the new trade union movement, organizing youth groups, and infiltrating various political organizations. These relatively peaceful tactics changed abruptly in early 1948 after two international Comn- munist conferences in Calcutta, where Moscow ordered the MCP and other Asian Communist parties to instigate a program of violence that would lead to armed revolt. The MCP soon instituted a campaign of indiscriminate terrorism and mass strikes that caused painful unrest in Malaya and Singapore. To cope with ..the alarming situation, the British imposed emergency regulations in Jun 48 and. outlawed the MCP and its affiliates one month later. By then, most leading MCP personnel had vanished into the dense jungle that covers four- fifths of the country. Underground Communists organized themselves into the Malayan People's Anti-British Army, which later became the Malayan Race's Liberation Army (MRLA). When they entered the jungle, the Communists had an estimated force of between 3,000 and 4,000 guerrillas. By recruitment and intimidation, they were able to field, during the height of their terrorism and up to 1951, a maximum force of 8,000 to 9,000 fanatics. Between 1948 and 1951, the Com- munists were able to replace casualties with new recruits. It is'estimated that the guerrilla war-still going on-has resulted in at least 11,000 Communist casualties. The Red insurgents have killed about 4,300 security forces troops and civilians and have wounded an almost equal number. MRLA recruitment in recent years has been negligible, but the estimated 700 terrorists still in the jungle are hard core terrorists who work under tight discipline in mall units. They have hideouts throughout the Federation of Malaya, but the largest concentrations are in the extreme southern state of Johore and the northwestern states of Kedah and Perak, both of which border on Thailand. To combat the Communists, the Malayan Government has had to maintain a fairly large force of about 150,000 troops, including British, Australian, New Zealand, Gurkha, and Malayan elements. Fighting the Red guerrillas has also been costly. In 1956 alone, expenditures for defense and internal security amounted to $70 million. 11 .Approved For Release 19 &WAQW5-00671 R000300050001-5 Approved For Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000300050001-5 Malayan Communist Military and Political Organization: Communist parties in Russia and China guide MCP policy. The aim has always been to establish a Communist People's Republic in Malaya by overthrowing the law- ful government. 'Though this objective has never changed since the MCP was created in 1927, the plan to achieve it has altered frequently. Every aspect of the political and economic life of the country ha, been watched and, where expedient, has been exploited to further Communist Party aims. The MCP is organized on orthodox Communist Party lines. The Central Executive Committee is composed of some 12 ranking MCP executives under the Secretary General's direction. This committee rarely assembles, and actual policy direction emanates from a Politbureau consisting of three or four members including the Secretary General. The Politbureau determines overall policy in the name of the Central Committee. The Politbureau is responsible for liaison with the Communist Party outside Malaya, controls MRLA, and directs the propaganda of the Party Education and Propaganda Committee. The Military High Command is believed to exist in name only. It is probably the title assumed by the Central Committee when it issues directives to the Armed Forces. State and Regional Committees: Although operational control normally exists at the State Committee level there are cases where, because of geo- graphic reasons, control in large states has been split between two Region- al Committees. State and Regional Committees are, in fact, combined poli- tical and military commands and issue directives on broad policy matters in the name of the Regimental Headquarters. Each State and Regional Committee directs a number of District Committees. The number of districts varies from about four to seven according to the size and geography of each state and region. The district is the main functional level of the MCP. Branch Committees work under the direction of District Committees. Each District Committee supervises about four Branch Committees. The Branch Committees control units known as Armed Work Forces. The rank and file of these units are the link between the Terrorist Organization in the jungle and their supporters living in the open. The Min Yuen Movement: The Min Yuen Movement is controlled by District and Branch Committees, which spearhead MCP political organization and are in direct contact with the masses. Local Min Yuen organizations are called by many names: Workers Protection Corps, People's Defense Corps, Peasant Union, and so on. In spite of the variety of names, the general functions of these organizations are similar and include the collection of funds for the opera- tion of the MRLA, provision of supplies and intelligence information, dis- semination of propaganda, provision of recruits for the party and the MRLA, sabotage and participation in guerrilla warfare. Little is known about Min: Yuen's inner organization other than that its leadership is very tightly knit and consists of trusted Communists who maintain effective independent liaison with MCP and MRLA units operating in their home areas. 12 Approved For Release 1999/09/ : CIA-RDP85-000671 R000300050001-5 Approved For Release ,999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 RU-0300050001-5 Tf= MALAYAN COMMUNIST MILITARY AND POLITICAL OPLGANIZATION CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE (Politbureau) (Military High Command) Regional Bureau Party Education and Propaganda Department District Committee State and Regional Committee Armed Forces Department MRLA Regimental HQ Branch Committee Min Yuen Movement (Local Organs) "Workers Protection Corps" "People's Defense Corps" "Anti-British Alliance" "Peasants Union" Company, Platoon, Section 13 Approved For Release 199 ~-006718000300050001-5 Approved For Release, 999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000300050001-5 Following a decision by the Central Committee in Jun 49, District Committees organized and controlled their own armed units to back tip.Com-, munist civil activities. Min Yuen executives have invariably led these units. The n Y M.9 activist are truited Communists who have been given some military raining and are empowered to form their own coaznande. These commands are established to protect the political organization in the area by conducting terrorist activities as needed to support either the MRLA or other factions of the Min Yuen. The Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA): The MCP's full time mili- tary organization is MR A, which carries out the military tasks of the MCP. It was originally organized in regiments, but due to logistic dificulties these were disbanded though their headquarters still exist in name. MRLA now consists entirely of independent platoons,some of which are employed on bodyguard duties and other Min Yuen activities. At the beginning of the emergency, MRLA strength was estimated at be- tween 4,000 and 5,000. Min Yuen's strength has never been accurately estab- lished, but esti-aates both armed forces and the Malay police have put it at between 15,000 and 25,000 during various stages of the conflict. The MCPts Central Executive Committee (CEC) exercised control over the MRLA, but since CEC lacked communications and had no fixed location, actual control was limited to issuing policy directives and general instructions. These were passed on to the regional bureaus which in turn disseminated them to the State and Regional Committees. Regional Committees were organized into various functional departments, the most important being the Organiza- tion and Propaganda Department. In theory, each State or Regional Committee controlled one MRLA regiment, each of which contained three battalions organized triangularly down to platoon level. In practice considerable variation in.the composition and strength of the various regiments has existed. None,of the regiments developed fully. MCP's strategic policy was laid down by its Central Committee in the Kerdau Document, which states that in order to achieve victory the Commu- nist campaign was to be carried out in three phases. Only in the third phase would guerrilla warfare become a conventional war of movement. The phases are: One -- Guerrilla warfare is envisaged from Malaya-wide temporary bases. During this phase enemy strength will be worn down. At the same time, the MRLA will be built up. and all its forces will be battle tested. The Min Yuen will also be expanded, and the MCP's civil strength will be increased. Two -- During this phase actions begun in Phase One will be intensified. Communist forces will undergo a further expansion and will occupy enemy bases in smaller villages and towns throughout the Federation. 14 Approved For Release 19 I -RDP85-00671 R000300050001-5 Approved For Release-4999/09/24 : CIA-RDP85-00671 R000300050001-5 CCiiFi. Three -- Min Yuen's gradual assumption of administrative control of areas abandoned by the enemy is envisioned. This would allow large con- centrations of Communist forces and the establishment of permanent bases. At this time, warfare will pass from the guerrilla phase to the war of movement. Guarril3.a forces will, then be converted into a regular army. Communist leaders apparently have not set a timetable for advancing through the stages of their strategic policy. They have realized that wide popular support must be obtained before the achievement of ultimate victory. The gaining of such support from Malaya's diversified races has proved a major problem. Communist strategy called for the correct treatment of the .masses so that the masses would cooperate with guerrilla forces. When cer- tain elements of the masses did not respond to this treatment, terror riould be used to compel cooperation. Communist Tactics in Malaya: Communist guerrilla tactics were those best suited to the jungle, which covers four-fifths of Malaya. The MRLA was 15 Approved For Release 199 -00671 R000300050001-5 Approved For Releas;999/09/24 : CIA-RDP85-00671 F000300050001-5 characterized by the lack of permanent bases from which to operate. Its operations were launched from temporary bases close to its targets. Since the MLA relied on its civilian organization, the 11i.n Yuen, for supplies and intelligence,_mobility was increased. As a result, MRLA was able to main- tain the initiative against bass-bound, goverrnaent security forasa. a , Basic units of the MRLA are the company and the platoon. To them is alloted the mission of attacking the hard targets such as the federation .security forces, police stations, and guarded estates. The armed members of the Min Yuen attack minor targets and commit sabotage. As the occasion demands, armed Min Yuen personnel will join MRLA units for specific operations. In practice, guerrillas attack only when their forces are superior. In addition, they depend on surprise coupled with hit-and-run tactics to assure victory. Since the Communists have no facilities for the production of arms, ammunition, or equipment, they emphasize the use of captured items. To supplement supplies of ammunition, Communist armorers have resorted to ingenious methods of refilling used cartridge cases. Tactical Principles: Tactical principles taught by the MRLA were those ..used successfully by Chinese Communist guerrilla units during World War II in China. These principles include the following: a. Refuse to enter an engagement unless there are strong indications that the outcome will-be favorable. b. Use the element of surprise. c. Do not be drawn into conventional warfare. It favors the enemy's superior armament, training, and manpower. d. Intelligence on the enemy must be detailed, complete, and timely. e. Before entering an engagement prepare a detailed plan which takes into consideration all phases of the operation including withdrawal. f. Practice camouflage, g. Risk engagements with security forces only when guerrilla forces exceed enemy strength. .h. Attack aggressively, use initiative. i. Practice deception; never let the enemy-know where your main effort will be made. J. Familiarize yourself with enemy weapons so as to be able to use captured arms immediately. Approved For Release 1 85-00671 R000300050001-5 Approved For Release4999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R0.00300050001-5 k. Practice dispersion; it will prevent the enemy from defeating the main guerrilla force and at the same time will force him to employ more troops to defend vital areas. 1. Constantly seek to improve tactics and techniques, des of Guerrilla Operations: The MRLA uses several different types of operations. They consider the ambush and the raid the most important, .but they use the surprise attack and sabotage most frequently. eAmbush: The MRLA attaches great importance to the technique of ambush, Th an operation MELA utilized whenever possible. The chief purpose of the ambush appears to be the seizure of arms and equipment. On other occasions the ambush is used to embarrass the government, to lower civilian morale, or to eliminate government officials, estate managers, and other people who are cooperating with the goverment. Whatever the motive for the ambush, always present are the elements of surprise, detailed planning to include concealment, well-located firing positions, and a means of rapid withdrawal. The MLA constantly seeks to improve its ambush tactics. This is evi- dent-from a captured MRLA document summarizing the good points, defects, and lessons learned from ambushes accomplished. Good points observed were: m. Harass the enemy constantly. 1. Proper selection of the ambush site. 2. Good firing positions. 3. Courage in the assaults. 4. Ability to wait long periods in position in order to carry out the ambush. Defects noted were: 1. Attempts to seize arms and equipment before the enemy is eliminated, 2. Failure to place the proper reliance on covering fire. Inability to use weapons captured. 4. Failure to use cover in the assault phase. Lessons learned from past ambushes were: 1. Casualties can be lessened by delaying the assault until op- position has been reduced by casualties. Approved.For Release 19 -00671 R000300050001-5 Approved For Releas%,1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R,.00 .,,,0300050001-5 2.' Armored vehicles need not be feared if the ambushing unit is well dug in. 3. When ambushing a patrol consisting of a Jeep and an armored ve- hicle, one section of the attacking unit is required to prevent the armored vehicle from assisting the Jeep. The assault must be resolute, but sources of active resistance must first be located. The ambush of 6 Oct 51 in which High Commissioner of the Federation of Malaya Sir Henry Gurney was killed is a classic example.of the care and detailed planning involved in this type of operation. Tactical surprise, complete intelligence, and careful selection of the ambush site were ex- ploited by the MRLA with the result that Sir Henry was killed and seven police constables were wounded. There were no known MRLA casualties. The guerrillas apparently arrived in the area on 4 Oct, two days be- fore the ambush. Firing positions were selected high above the road and well sited to give both enfilading and flanking fire on all sections of the ambush position where there were numerous large rocks. The ambush ex- tended over about 400-yards of narrow winding road, which any passing ve- hicle would be forced to negotiate at reduced speed. Charging sections were organized and stationed so as to be in position to assault any vehicle stopped within the position. Whether the guerrillas knew of the impending visit of the High Com- missioner is unknown; however, shortly after occupying the position, guer- rilla intelligence apparently notified the unit of the impending visit of the High Commissioner to Frasers Hill and that he might pass the ambush area. Thereupon numerous vehicles that would have been profitable targets were allowed to pass through the ambush positions unmolested. The guer- rillas kept a detailed log of the time of arrival, description of vehicles, and personnel or supplies carried.- Notations in the log covered a 36-hour period. The High Cammissionerts party consisting of four vehicles passed through Kuala Kuba Bahru without incident. Just north of the village one vehicle, a radio truck carrying six policemen, broke down and was left be- hind. The rest of the party traveled another six miles and entered the am- bush area. Guerrilla fire was directed initially at the lead vehicle and the second vehicle. No effective fire was returned until the third ve- hicle, an armored scout-car, arrived and engaged the guerrillas with its Bren gun. At the sound of a bugle, the guerrilla firing ceased, and the guerrillas withdrew. The Raid: This type of operation has not been used as extensively as the ambush. The main purpose of the guerrilla raid is to annihilate small security detachments. Benefits to MRLA from such raids are the capture of arms and equipment, economic damage to installations, and a lowering of civilian morale, which in turn makes the masses more vulnerable to Com- munist intimidations. As in the case of the ambush, guerrillas depend upon surprise and de- tailed planning to insure victory in the raid. As a basis for accurate Approved For Releas P85-00671 R000300050001-5 Approved For Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 000300050001-5 NO. I FIRING SECTION Guerrilla Ambush of the Sir Henry Gurney Party Plan reduced from captured map NO. 3 FIRING SECTION - NO. 3 CHARGIN SQUAD r` wm --------------------------=~--- f. --i ROUTES TO BE USED. BY RETIRING SENTRY SECTIONS Y#HICL ;:Zw PE`D BYf/RE NO. 2 FIRING SECTION 11 NO. 2SQUADGING 19 Approved, For Release 19 5-00671 R000300050001-5 Approved For Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671$000300050001-5 U-1-1 L LA-L" planning, they insist on complete and detailed intelligence. Detailed re- connaissance of the target area prior to the attack is stressed. .This is accomplished sometimes by a guerrilla disguised as a rubber tapper br by a Y member living in the area. A detailed report to include a sketch map is submitted after the reco msiasanOS. captured germ ea document shows the detailed type of sketch map guerrillas to obtain prior to attacking a target. The Surprise Attack: This type of operation is particularly annoying to Federation Security Forces. It usually involves only one or two guer- rillas who fire at passing trains or at home guards as they open resettle- ment area gates. Sabotage: The manin purpose of sabotage is the destruction of the economy of a country. A secondary consideration is the embarrassment of the Security Forces in the eyes of the civilian population. Since this type of operation is frequently carried out and usually affects the common man in one way or another in his attempt to earn a living, each act lowers popular faith in the Government's ability to protect life and property. ANTI-COMMUNIST FORCES Goverment Program: At the end of World War II, some colonial powers realized it was impossible to hold their colonies indefinitely. Great Britain gave independence to Burma and India, and created Pakistan short- ly after the war. In Malaya, nationalism threatened to aid the Communist insurgents materially by uniting all elements in an anti-British crusade. Recognizing this danger and realizing that Immediate withdrawal would create a political vacuum into which the Communists could move, Britain decided that an immediate pullout was unwise. The Federation of Malaya agreement was proposed. It provided for a degree of self-government,, Malayan citizenship for all who acknowledged Malaya as their permanent home, and restoration of considerable power to state rulers. The agreement was signed on 21 Jan 48 and became effective one month later. A few weeks after the signing of the agreement, the Communists began a campaign of indiscriminate terrorism, rich included murder, arson, ex- tortion, and intimidation. To protect the country from this virtual siege, the Federation Government declared an emergency in Jun 48, and in July the Government outlawed the MCP. The responsibility for conducting the anti-guerrilla campaign in Malaya rests with the civil government. The Government's normal instrument for the maintenance of civil authority is the police, but in the current emergency the armed forces have been called" in to support the civil power in seeking out and destroying armed Communist terrorism. In addition, a home guard has been formed. Since nearly every function of goverment is affected by the emergency, a special system of control of operations was established to provide intimate cooperation at all levels between departments of government and the security forces. 20 Approved For Release 199 -00671 R000300050001-5 Approved For Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671-- Q00300050001-5 MALAYAN RUBBER ESTATE RUBBER STORE ROOM 2 CHA/NS 2 CHAINS Special Constable Post Special Constable Sentry Post TO.BIDOR MA/N ROAD SMOKE HOUSE FACTORY Ca/rr $6 fee/ THE MALAYAN RACES LIBERATION ARMY (MRLA) TRIES TO OBTAIN EXTREMELY DETAILED INFORMATION ON POTENTIAL TARGETS. THE DRAWING ABOVE, COPIED FROM A CAPTURED GUERRILLA DOCUMENT, SHOWS A SCHEMATIC LAYOUT OF A RUBBER ESTATE AND THE TYPE OF INFORMATION DESIRED BY THE MRLA. UUUUUU 21 Approved For Release 1999/ 0671 R000300050001-5 Approved For Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000300050001-5 Emergency Operations Council (SOC): This committee is responsible to the Government of the Federation of Malaya for the overall conduct of the campaign and for ensuring full integration of civil government and security force measures. EOC comprises: the Prime Minister (Chairman), Aiinisters of Defense, Finance, Health, Interior, Agriculture, Labor and Commerce, the Federal Director of Emergency Operations, the General Of- ficer commanding the Federation Army) Secretary of Defense, Commissioner of Police, the Flag Officer Malayan area, the General Officer commanding Overseas Commonwealth Land Forces, and the Air Officer commanding RAF in Malaya. The Federal Director of Operations is responsible for the day- to-day conduct of emergency operations. He is not in command of any se- curity forces but exercises operational direction and control of forces assigned for operations against Communist terrorists through respective security force commanders. If appropriate, he issues instructions to State War Executive Committees. Commanders Subcommittee: This group makes policy on the use of se- curity forces within the overall plan approved by EOC. This committee includes: the General Officer commanding the Federation Army, Police Commissioner, Flag Officer Malayan area, Federal Officer commanding Over- seas Com-onwealth Land Forces, and the Air Officer commanding the RAF in Malaya. The EOC Director is the chairman of the Commanders Subcomittee. To assist him, especially in implementing EOC and Commanders Subcommittee decisions, there is a small joint staff headed by the principal staff officer. State Warfare Executive Committees: In each Malayan state a State War Executive Committee exists that is responsible for waging the "war" in the state. The committee consists oft the Chief Minister, the State Secretary, Chief Police Officer, Senior Military Commander, State Hoare Guard officer, the Executive Secretary, and other selected community leaders. District War Executive Committees: In almost every civil adminis- trative district a District War Executive Committee is responsible for waging war in that district. The committees are made up of a District Officer, Acainistrative Officer, Senior Police Officer for that district, Senior Military Commiander, Home Guard officer, and others. The emergency operational chain of command starts at the BOG and goes down through the Commanders Subcommittee, State War Executive Ccsn- mittees, and District War Executive Committees. The services chain of command is used only to enable respective com- manders,to give orders to their own forces. For emergency operations, however, security forces are placed at the disposal of State and District War Executive Committees. The police force is a federal organization commanded by a police commissioner. It consists of 10 contingents, with each contingent commanded 22 Approved For Release 85-00671 R000300050001-5 Approved For Releae ,,1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-0067WO0300050001-5 OPERATIONAL COMMAND AND POLICY LINES UNCLASSIFIED FEDERATION OF MALAYA STATE WAR EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE 23 Approved For Release 1990&9SI fgWRDP85-00671 R000300050001-5 Approved For Release.1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 8000300050001-5 by a chief police officer. Contingents are further divided into police circles; these are supervised by the next lower ranking police officers. The police circles are themselves divided into police districts and are directed by police of appropriate rank, The police are divided into regular, temporary, and volunteer police. Police force duties are: a. Maintenance of law and order. b. Preserving public peace. c. Prevention and detection of crime and the capture of offenders. d. Protection of life and property. e. Collection of information relevant to these tasks and to internal security and dissemi i , nat on of this information to the Government. f.. Paramilitary duties necessitated by the Emergency. The primary role of the army is to seek out and destroy Communist terrorists in the jungle and on its fringes. The secondary role of the army is that of supporting the federal police in the populated areas by helping to enforce food denial measures, curfews, and so forth. The Royal Air Force and Army Air Corps are available to support emergency, operations. The RAF may operate independently or in direct cooperation with ground forces. The main RAF and Army Air Corps assign- ments are air reconnaissance, offensive air support, air supply to ground forces deep in the jungle, troop lift, casualty evacuation, and psycholog- ical warfare (aircraft fitted with special broadcasting apparatus and used for making voice broadcasts over parts of the jungle known to be oc- cupied by Communist terrorists and for the dropping of leaflets). The Royal Navy assists by carrying out antismuggling and anti- piracy around the coast of Malaya, amphibious landings, and bombardment of Communist terrorist areas. The Home Guard has a part time force composed of all races. This force is more closely linked to the people and the Government in the fight against the Communist terrorists through: efforts to protect homes and villages and to deny the enemy access to such areas; cooperation with the security forces in passing information on Communist terrorist move- ments and agents, assuring that from the artic l H ' p u ar ome Guard s area no food reaches Communist terrorists, and active assistance to the security forces in offensive operations. At the beginning-of the emergency in Jun 48 the security forces in Malaya were charged with guarding the countr 's d y pro uction centers, such as the rubber estates and tin mines. As the security forces grew and be- came K., better organized, tactics changed In J 51 . un , the Briggs Plan came into effect. It was aimed at bringing proper administrative control to a Population-which had never before been controlled. The main aspects of the plan were: 1. Rapid resettlement of squatters (Chinese refugees who many times provided Communist guerrillas with food, medicine, clothing, money, and Approved For Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000300050001-5 ALAL" Approved For Release4999/09/24 : CIA-RDP85-00671 RQ90300050001-5 shelter) under the surveillance of police and auxiliary police. 2.. Regrouping' local labor in mines and on estates. The recraitment and training of special branch police personnel. 4. The army would provide a minimum number of troops throughout the country to support the police and would simultaneously provide.a con- centration of forces for clearing of priority areas. The police and army were to operate in complete accord. To facili- tate this joint operation, control was established at all levels, and .there. was a close integration of police and military intelligence. The Plan also established the State War Executive Committee and the District War Executive Committee chain of command which has functioned ever since. This organizational setup has insured: .1. Complete integration of emergency effort. 2. Constant security force action in support of civil power. CONSTANT PATROLLING BY HOME GUARD UNITS A SIGNIFICANT FACTOR IN ELIMINATING COMMUNIST TERRORISM. Approved For Release P85-00671 R000300050001-5 Approved For Releas"1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 000300050001-5 ,The plan was dssentially a'thorough but long-term proposition. It envisaged a logical clearing of the country from south to north,"leaving behind a strong police force and civil administration once an area or state had been cleared. It also wined to isolate the ) LA from the rest of the rural population, thus enabling the people to feel safe to come forward with information and thereby depriving the MRLA of their means of support. This forced MRLA members into the open where they could better be dealt with by the security forces. While the Briggs Plan did not achieve a clearing of the country from south to north, Cannunist terrorist organizations have been decisively eliminated in roughly 5413 of the Federation's territory. Consequently, emergency regulations in these areas have been lifted. Malayan officials explained to the people in the cleared areas that the responsibility was theirs for keeping the area "white" and that they could do this by refusing to cooperate with terrorists and by promptly reporting any Communist terrorist activity to the authorities. In Dec 52, the Malayan Goverment decided that a forward policy would be adopted for the control of Malaya's aboriginal tribes. This would in- volve bringing protection and administration to the aborigines in their own areas. Resettlement of aborigines who live in the deep jungle would hence- forth be avoided. This policy has been implemented by the following: 1. Expansion of the Federal Government Department of the Aborigines by the appointment of additional officers as protectors of aborigines in the states concerned and in recruitment of field teams to work in aborgi- nal areas. 2. Establishing a series of jungle forts in selected deep jungle areas. 3. The initiation of special operations to find parties of aborigi- nes under Communist domination in the deep jungle and to bring them under Government protection. The aims of the jungle forts were defined as follows: To establish bases from which the federal police can give local protection to the aborigines and from which offensive operations can be mounted when the occasion arises. To allow the aborigines in the selected areas to continue their normal way of life without risk of Communist terrorist domination and to permit an intelligence penetration of terrorist activity. To improve the morale of the aborigines by having permanent security force garrisons in aboriginal areas and eventually by the recruitment of~ selected men to assist in local defense. Approved For Release 1999/09/24 16cI - P 5-00671 R000300050001-5 Approved For Release 1,999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 ROD0300050001-5 To provide centers from which medical and trading. facilities can be made available to the aborigines. Pattern of Operationss Operations against the Communists in Malaya are categorized as: Mopping-Up O-perations: Operations to complete the destruction. and to prevent revival of the terrorist organizations in "white" or selected areas. Communist organizations of the masses in such areas are usually disrupted, and the Communists terrorists rely for supplies on casual beg- ging and extortion. Relaxation of emergency regulations prevents denial of food to Communists. Operations consist mainly of patrols to prevent con- tact between the terrorists and the population. The police and home guard make jungle patrols. Framework Operations: These are the normal offensive operations by which a District War Executive Committee reduces its Communist terrorist organization when no state or federal priority is allotted. It may in- clude any or all the parts of a major operation on a limited scale, i.e., gate checks, patrols to prevent contact between the terrorists and the population, ambushes, cordon and search operations, jungle patrols, central cooking or rationing in certain villages, and mass arrests. The essentials for success are resources, economy of effort, and a variety of methods. State Priority Operations: Operations in which the State War Executive Committee decides to transfer security forces to exploit opportunities in specific areas, usually for limited periods. Examples are large-scale cor- don operations, multiple ambushes, intensive patrols in areas where Com- munists terrorist groups are said to be, or strict food denial in certain areas for a short time. On occasions the State War Executive Ccimnittee may be provided with federal reinforcements, including air support for state priority operations. Federal Priority Operations: Major food-denial operations are planned on a federal level, for which security force reinforcements are provided be- tween target dates laid down b,-,r the director of operations. Priority is also given before and during the operation to the provision of civil and police officers, and for central cooking accommodations, roads, wiring, and so forth. Deep Jungle Operations: Operations separate from the above are mounted to gain intelligence of Communist terrorist organization in the deep jungle, to deny the terrorists areas for rest and retraining, to protect and bring administration to aborigines, and to isolate the aborigi- nes from Cammznist terrorists. After eleven years of guerrilla warfare, Camiunist terrorists in Malaya apparently realize the futility of achieving their goal by force. Malayan Communists now are trying to infiltrate legitimate organizations and-thereby overthrow the Government. The guerrillas have lost ap- proximately 11,000 men, and their remaining paramilitary manpower, re- duced to an estimated 700, has been driven deeper into the jungle; over half the number have been pushed into the rugged Thai-Malayan border area. 27 Approved For Release 19 . CIA. 85-00671 R000300050001-5 Approved For Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 FQ00300050001-5 The guerrillas have,largely lost-contact with the local populace that former- ly was the principal source of recruitment and supplies; they thus have lost' the capability for launching any organized offensive action. British Com- monwealth and Malayan army and police elements in cooperation with Thai police continue to press the campaign to sxtsz%d=te the last of the ' guer- rillas; yet that all /CO will be captured or killed is unlikely. The Malayan guerrillas no longer are a danger to the Malayan Government, and no resurgence of terrorism is expected. British and Colonial Anti-Guerrilla Tactics British and colonial forces in Malaya have developed no new principles of jungle warfare since the 1948 State of Emergency. They did discover that tactics used against the Japanese in World War II, modified to suit a different enemy, were applicable to Malayan operations. While the Japanese were organized, ready and willing to fight, the enemy in Malaya is most unwilling to risk combat; instead, it uses intimidation, extortion, and murder to coerce the civil population into supplying food and money. It also employs hit-and-run tactics against the army, police patrols, and outposts to procure ammunition and equipment. To meet the guerrilla policy of avoid- ing combat with the security forces and to overcome the challenge of the Malayan jungle, the British High Command in Malaya developed_a special train- ing course in guerrilla warfare. Points eihasized were: 1. Rigid individual and collective discipline. 2. Endurance through physical fitness. 3. Expert marksmanship. 4. Automatic security precautions, including a proficiency in con- cealment and silent movement. 5. Practice in immediate action battle drills to promote instan- taneous reaction to ambush. In addition to these basic requisites, warfare in the jungle demands rigid observation of these other cardinal principles: 1, Survival in the jungle depends upon close observation; individuals must train themselves to look through, not at the jungle. 2. Patrol carnmanders must be in a position to control their units at all times. They should not use guides as scouts, for the function of guides is primarily to advise patrol commanders. 3. Though sufficient distance must be maintained between individuals and groups to prevent ambushes, visual contact should be maintained so that silent signals can be passed between individuals and so that no part of the patrol becomes lost. Approved For Release 199 I~00671 R000300050001-5 Approved For Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R0000300050001-5 29 Approved For Release 1 P85-00671 R000300050001-5 Approved For Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 P4W0300050001-5 Since the guerrillas would not stay to fight after successful raids or ambushes, British forces had to go into the jungle after them.--Since M. Yuen intelligence precluded any success by patrols operating from static bases and since principal HRLA headquarters and larger supply caches are located deep within the jungle, British forces found the best chance for success came when patrols of platoon strength departed from static bases at night, maintained complete security, and penetrated the jungle for a distance of four to twenty miles to operate from a platoon base for a period of five to thirty days. The troops carried rations for the first two to four days. After that the platoon was supplied by air. These bases should be situated near but not on water. They should be far from trails and villages, and should be near an open highground area for airdrop resupply. (See layout for a patrol base). If enemy concentrations are found to be too large for the platoons to handle, the platoons will be supported by battalion reserve elements, held at the static base. Clashes with Communist terrorists are sudden, short,, and often so un- expected that the opportunity to inflict casualties is lost if a leader has to give orders at the time of the encounter. For this reason, im- mediate action drills were and are stressed so that the immediate reaction from a well trained patrol will be immediate offensive action. Four basic `immediate action drills are taught on a section or patrol level. 1. The encircling attack: Intended for use only against a bandit ambush; the Malayan guerrilla tends to fight solely from fixed ambush positions. 2. The immediate ambush: Used when a bandit party is sighted but is unaware of the patrol's presence. 3. The immediate assault: Used in a situation when the patrol and the guerrillas simultaneously are aware of contact. 4. The assault on a bandit camp: Security measures employed by the guerrillas make i.T:nnediate attack an absolute necessity once a bandit sentry is contacted. The patrol at once discards its equipment and moves on the double to positions according to instructions received through prior brief- ings'and training. The military forces in Malaya, supported by the federation police, are using the foregoing methods to eliminate guerrillas. Approved For Release 199~5/ E)PBS-00671 R000300050001-5 Approved For Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000300050001-5 NOTE: Minimum distance, between men - 5 yards; between groups -.30 yards. PATROL, PORMA IONS ALONG TRAILS IN CLdSE COUNTRY N:REIA-TIVeLY,.,OPEN COUNTRY LEGENp Section Commander Groue.Com mander Group Membon; Group'. 0 Guide S Stn (Ran) ''B Bran R Rifle - - "Obcervotlppn 'rosponsibil itles ,~ DORING-::1UNGLE: 4PBRA'~ip 31 Approved For Release 1 !MIS RDP85-00671 R000300050001-5 Approved For Release,) 999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000300050001-5 i4ow GULF of SIAM ; .. IOTA SHARD ?KuE1-L114 SINGAPORE 104? SOUTHEAST ASIA HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMY, PACIFIC Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2 AREAS OF UNREST Approved For Release 1 RDP85-00671 R0003000500 LEGEND CONMtINIST CONTROLLED REBEL ACTIVITIES DISSIDENT OR TERRORIST ACTIVITY Approved For Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 000300050001-5 A 'P OPEUTIONS IN INDOCHINA At the outbreak of World War II in Europe, France was compelled-to withdraw her best troops from Indochina for employment in the European theater. This action reduced the Prarah fighting capability in Indoahi a and laid the colony open to vastly superior Japanese forces. On 10 Mar 45, Japanese troops and secret police imprisoned all French administrators and most Eurasians in Indochina. The colonial status of Indochina had ended. Elimination of the French force and its contacts severely reduced Allied intelligence, but into the gap stepped various nationalist and Communist groups that continued to fight the Japanese as guerrillas and passed information to OSS. When supplying these groups with weapons, radios, and other equipment, no distinction was made between their politi- cal ideologies or subordination to a recognized liberation movement of the various groups. Ho Chi Minh's guerrillas, who were better organized and trained, emerged as the dominant force. On 6 Aug 45, Ho's guerrillas be- came the Vietnamese Liberation Army. Two weeks later Ho claimed that the Viet Minh controlled all of Vietnam. French forces arrived in Saigon in Oct 45 in sufficient strength to secure 70,000 square miles in Indochina and force Ho Chi Minh to dissolve his divisions and regiments in the south and return to guerrilla warfare. During the next several months the French and Viet Minh held negotiations. Throughout the period of negotiation France landed troops at Hanoi and established small garrisons, but incidents and fighting continued until 19 Dec 46, when the Viet Minh attacked French installations throughout Indochina and started the war between the French and the Viet Minh. Basic objectives of the Communists in Indochina were to drive the French out of Indochina forever and to replace the French colonial govern- ment with a Communist-controlled "Democratic Republic of Vietnam." The war ended on 21 Jul 54 with a cease-fire negotiated at Geneva. The Geneva Agreements gave the Ccwunists control of all of Vietnam north of the 17th parallel. The Vietnamese Peoplets Army was the final product of the original bands of Vietnamese guerrillas who entered Binh Ca Valley in North Vietnam late in 1944 under the command of a young Communist professor of history, Vo Nguyen Giap. Organized officially in 1946, the Army of the Democratic Republic was, in the words of its leader Giap, first and foremost a political army. The Central Executive Committee controlled the Communist armed forces. A dif- ference existed between the measures of control the committee had over reg- ular and semiregular forces. The Ministry of Defense took control of the regular army while local executive committees became primarily responsible for use and maintenance of regional and militia forces. Approved For Release 1 J 671 R000300050001-5 Approved For ReleaseVO1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000300050001-5 The Viet Minh forces were organized under a General Headquarters com- posed of three bureaus or directorates; General Staff., Political,- and Rear Service. The General Staffs' field forces branch aontrolUard the regular forces and units whose requirements took priority over those of all other branches. The Static Forces Branch provided the staff link between Area Commands and the Ccoamander in Chief. The. Viet Minh envisaged three phases in the struggle: 1) The guerrilla phase, 2) an intermediate period, and 3) the general counteroffensive. In the first phase, emphasis was placed almost completely on widespread guerrilla activity. Most of the rebel forces during this phase were engaged in establishing and consolidating guerrilla bases in the enemy's rear areas. Towards the end of the phase, selected units were grouped together into pro- gressively larger concentrations. These units were formed into an offensive mass for manuever, the Viet Minh Regular Army. In the second phase, considered as beginning in 1948 by the Viet Minh, emphasis was shifted gradually from purely guerrilla activities to a war of maneuver. The offensive striking force made a series of sharp attacks de- signed to annihilate enemy forces rather than to capture territory. Mean- while guerrilla forces continued to weaken the enemy by continuous activity in rear areas. The third phase commenced in Dec 53 with the general counteroffensive of Communist-forces under General Vo Nguyen Giap. This phase was under- taken when the Viet Minh believed that the military, political, and eco- nomic strength of the enemy had been sufficiently weakened through a wear- ing down process. VIET MINH STRATEGY AND TACTICS Viet Minh strategy and tactics were conditioned by geographic and po- litical factors. Indochina's wealth and its population were concentrated in the fertile lowlands of the Red River delta in Tonkin and in the Mekong delta. Since the French occupied these important areas, the Viet Minh were restricted principally to the economically poor and sparsely populated mountainous regions of Indochina. The Red River delta was the primary tar- get of Viet Minh strategy because the delta was a source of food and man- power and close to Communist supply bases in South China. The Communists concentrated 60% of their forces in that area. In addition, the Viet Minh by defeating the largest concentration of French forces in Indochina could eliminate a major barrier to the establishment of Communist control over the rest of the country. Throughout the war the Viet Minh made great efforts to win the people to their side. Indoctrination of their armed forces stressed the inter- relationship, of the array and the people. Communist political commissars Approved For Release 199 -00671 R000300050001-5 Approved For Release1,999/09/24 : CIA-RDP85-00671 R000300050001-5 MEMO, MILITARY COMMAND LINES (VIET MINH) MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE COMMANDER IN CHIEF EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE POLITICAL BUREAU GENERAL STAFF FIELD FORCES BRANCH REGULAR ARMY FORCES STATIC FORCES BRANCH AREA COMMANDS REGIONAL TROOPS REAR SERVICES BUREAU POPULAR TROOPS at every echelon were responsible for constantly impressing upon the troops a respect for the rights and property of the people. Although the majority of the people attempted to remain neutral, they tended to drift towards support of the faction dominant in their particular area. Civilians in Viet Minh-controlled territory were subjected to continual anti-French prop- aganda. In areas occupied by the French, the regional and popular forces often engaged only in propaganda. Other factors which aided the Viet Minh in gaining support of the people were: 35 Approved For Release 1 -00671 R000300050001-5 Approved For Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000300050001-5 1) In newly captured areas the Viet Minh were lenient towards those who had collaborated with the French. 2) The French were unable to provide complete protection for the people within areas nominally under French military control. 3) The apparent endlesensss of the struggle disrupted many aspects of native life. 4) The,Bao Dai Vietnamese Government was pro-French, and it demon- strated an inability to deal effectively with Indochina's political and economic difficulties. 5) The potential for attrition was inherent in widespread guerrilla activities, and the Viet Minh tried to give the struggle the characteris- tics of a popular crusade. ORGANIZATION FOR COMBAT As an instrument of Communist aggressive expansion in Indochina, the Viet Minh created an armed force consisting of three distinct but close- ly allied types of combat forces. The Popular Troops: These forces were organized to function as intel- ligence agents, propagandists, informers, guards, terrorists, and laborers. They would also perform guerrilla functions within their capabilities, such as assassinations, minor ambushes, small-scale warfare, and sabotage of communications. The popular forces played a major role in the success, of the Communist politico-military effort in Indochina, which culminated in Communist control over North Vietnam after the 1954 armistice. The popular forces had a three-fold purpose: 1) To create a large reserve of partly trained manpower for the regu- lar army. 2) To provide a means of identifying the peasant masses with the Com- munist struggle. 3) To wage guerrilla warfare in enemy rear areas as a means to cause dissipation of military strength. Although the status and evolution of the popular troops depends in large measure upon future political developments in North Vietnam, these quasi-military troops constitute a formidable fb rce, one to be reckoned with in any future combat action. Popular Force Tactics: The military efficiency of the popular forces varied widely from area to area, and was largely based on the ability, ex- perience, and initiative of the cadre personnel. Generally, the degree?of ideological indoctrination was more intense in North Vietnam; thus the degree of fanatic support was correspondingly greater. 36 Approved. For Release 1 85-00671 R000300050001-5 11 Approved For Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000300050001-5 Elaborate preparations were made to resist mopping up or pacification in areas captured by the French Union forces. Villages located near im- portant road srr" canal junctions or at critical terrain features were desig- nated as combat villages. Fences of sharpened bamboo stakes were construc- ted around such sites. 1!!!..I TYPICAL FORTIFIED VILLAGE UNDER CONSTRUCTION; THE TYPE USUALLY CONSTRUCTED BY VIET. M1NH POPULAR TROOPS. The villagers became expert in the construction of underground shel- ters that varied in shape and size. Shelters for protection against aerial bombs and napalm normally were undercut with a minimum of 20 inches of earth. Caches for materials, rice, and munitions were large, and the en- trances ingeniously contrived to prevent easy discovery. Entrances favored by the Viet Minh guerrillas have been located under ashes of fireplaces, in buffalo stables, in pig pens, or in the midst of thorny hedges. Time permitting, tunnels were expanded to the point where the guerrillas could remain in hiding for days at a time, or if necessary slip through the 37. Approved For Release c~ ' . I - tDP85-00671 R000300050001-5 +r li r.rt wr.. +,~a " ~C~ llli:~::? fti ^, *Moe Approved For Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-006711000300050001-5 tunnels to camouflaged exits on the outskirts of the village, and thus escape enemy forces surrounding their village. In many cases tunneling was extended to link up with that of neigh- boring villages. In this way if escape from an encircling enemy-was impos- sible by surface means, the underground routes were used. The result at times was an apparent dissolving of villagers into thin air, to the baffle- ment and frustration of the French Union Forces. . The Popular Forces proved ingenious and imaginative in the employment of ruses, mantraps, ambushes, and delaying actions between their combat villages and strongpoints. A favorite effective mantrap was the submerging of sharpened bamboo barbs below the surface of the mud along muddy trails. The barbs easily penetrated the rubber-soled sneakers worn by French troops. These troops were organized at the district and provincial level to train and support the popular troops; assist regular units; provide trained replacements for the regular army; and, within their zones of action, con- duct guerrilla warfare on an extensive scale. The organization and equip- ment of the regional forces generally matched that of the regular army through battalion level. The tactics of the regional and popular units were similar to those employed by Communist guerrillas in other countries, i.e., harassment, ambush, and sabotage. Viet Minh tactical doctrine teaches that to be ef- fective, guerrilla action must be continuous and must be pursued wherever the enemy is found. The principles.of guerrilla activity as revealed in captured Viet Minh documents emphasize secrecy, speed, deception, flexi- bility, surprise, mobility, initiative, persistency, planning, and numeri- cal superiority over the enemy when attacking. THE REGULAR ARMY These forces constituted the tactical and strategic nucleus of the rebel forces charged with conducting offensive warfare. The regular army's organizational development and equipment decreased in direct pro- portion to its distance from supply bases in China. Operations were con- ducted on an individual level at Tonkin, regimental level in Annam, and battalion level in Cochin China. Viet Minh units in Tonkin were well supplied and attained a combat effectiveness which compared favorably with France's Vietnamese units. The regular units in Cochin China were weak in supporting weapons and ammunition. The regular army employed a mixture of guerrilla and conventional tactics. In a divisional attack, one regiment would infiltrate enemy lines to ambush reinforcements, another would infiltrate to harass ad- jacent enemy strongpoints, while the third would make a frontal attack on the main objective. This combination of tactics was partly developed by the Viet Minh but based for the most part on the guerrilla experiences of the Chinese Communists as handed down by the Chinese Communist advisers to the Viet Minh. The campaign for Hoa Binh, which lasted from Nov 51 Approved For Release X85-00671 R000300050001-5 Approved For Relea e1999/09/24 : CIA-RDP85-00671 800300050001-5 PEOPLE'S MILITIA main assault on flank "or rear` of enemy strong point. Other rear to": block,reinforceme REGIONALd TROOPS Create `diversion at adjacent `strong point,; harass enemy posts,: assist Infiltrated regulars in'blocking reinforcements., PEOPLE'S. MILITIA Mine roads, destroy bridges, carry. out acts of terrorism designed to pin enemy'down in. static defense REGULAR 39 Approved For Release 1 85-00671 R000300050001-5 Approved For Release4999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000300050001-5 through Feb 52, illustrates tactics employing all three types of forces. When the French seized Hoa Binh, a major Viet Minh communication center on 14 Nov 51, strong reactions from the rebels were expected. Although prep4ring for an autumn winter offensive elsewhere, the Viet Minh high command quickly modified its plans and within two weeks begin concentrating three regular infantry divisions and one artillery division in the Hoa Binh sector. The remaining two regular-divisions in Tonkin were deployed northeast and southwest of the French perimeter. The announced objective of the Viet Minh was to destroy the maximum number of French troops while driving them from Hoa Binh. To do this the Viet Minh had to create a threat elsewhere to divert powerful French mo- bile groups from the Hoa Binh sector. Normally regional and guerrilla forces within the French perimeter would have been entrusted with this mission. But these forces had been so weakened by a series of French clear- ing operations earlier in 1951 that they were no longer capable of posing a dangerous threat. To overcome this weakness, two remaining regular divi- sions were infiltrated into the delta to harass the French, to divert them from Hoa Binh, and to reconstitute the weakened regional and guerrilla forces. Viet Minh units in the rest of Indochina were ordered to carry out extensive activity to prevent the French from reinforcing Tonkin. Concurrently with these moves, the divisions in the Hoa Binh area began a series of frontal assaults on 10 Dec 51 against the French strongpoints. These troops conducted numerous ambushes of supply and reinforcement columns on the main French line of communication. These actions, in which the Viet Minh suffered losses almost 20 times those of the French, continued with diminishing strength through early Feb 52. In the mean- time the French position in the delta had so deteriorated that only the intervention of strong mobile forces could prevent the Viet Minh from gaining complete control over large portions of the population. Accord- ingly, the French withdrew their forces from Hoa Binh on 24 Feb 52 to prepare for operations against the infiltrated regular Viet Minh units and the rejuvenated regional and popular forces. Despite heavy losses to them- selves, the Viet Minh achieved their objective--the French were forced from Hoa Binh with heavy losses, and guerrilla activity in the Delta reached a new high. In these operations, the Viet Minh demonstrated an unprecedented staying power, the result of improved logistic support from Communist China. Viet Minh operations showed improved tactical coordination with the grouping of several task forces from elements of several divisions which alternated between frontline duty, rest, and resupply in the rear. Importance of Guerrilla Warfare: General Vo Nguyen Giap, who is one of the most important North Vietnamese commanders and who has been describ- ed by the French as a master of guerrilla warfare strategy, issued in Dec 51 a directive emphasizing the importance of guerrilla warfare. Following are quotes from this directive: 40 ? . Approved For Release - DP85-00671 R000300050001-5 Approved For Release,-,.1.999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 RQ00300050001-5 It has been noted that in certain cases, although our main forces have succeeded in annihilating only certain small posts, we manage, nevertheless, to seize extensive areas in the free zone. In other cases, in spite of several victories won by our troops not only did the free zone fail to expand, but on the contrary, it shrank. In certain places, although our troops may have eliminated 70 to 80 watchtowers, we have not been successful in establishing bases in the region in question. In other cases, although our troops managed to des- troy only five or six village posts and subdue a dozen or so other small posts, we were able to set up bases in relatively strong enemy country. The aforementioned facts prove that in order to create, protect, and enlarge guerrilla activities, the following points must be given prime consideration. 1) We must win the people to our cause. 2) We must issue propaganda which will permit the merging of the people's action with military action. 3) We must attach great importance to the consolidation of our guer- rilla bases with the local forces and to the cooperation of the latter with the regional troops and the main forces. In a case where the enemy attacks our guerrilla bases with superior forces and temporarily overruns them, the consolidation of the peoples bases and those of the communal guerrilla forces should remain our most important concern because by consolidating these bases we will maintain the people's support. We must follow up our minor mopping-up operations or those made in more important raids. We must conserve our forces and use them only on those occasions which will be to our advantage, profiting from every oppor- tunity to reinforce or expand our bases. We must intensify our guerrilla activity against all enemy operations whether large or small, and finally we must protect and enlarge our bases and positions. This is the imme- diate mission. To succeed in this mission the most important consideration is that we attach proper importance to the cooperation of the people to our cause, to the consolidation of the people's bases and those of the communal guer- rillas. When this mission is accomplished we will have created a condition favorable to the development of guerrilla warfare, and we will have per- mitted regional formations to harass and exterminate enemy elements and to perfect their own degree of technical and tactical training. We must never fail to remember this very important principle, not only in the occupied zone but also in the free zone. 41 Approved For Release 199 -00671 R000300050001-5 Approved For Release4999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000300050001-5 The Third. Phase: General Qiap, who had successfully avoided commit- ment of his main force, started his general offensive in Dec 53.C==. nist forces invaded central Laos, put northern Laos under attack, threat- ened Dien mien-Phu, and deeply penetrated the Red River Delta. On 7 May 54, Dien Bien Phu fell after a terrific battles Hostilities ended on'- 21, Jul 54 after a.cease-fire had been negotiated at Geneva. The Geneva Agreement placed all of Vietnam north of the 17th Parallel under Communist control. ANTI-Caf?4UNIST FORCES During the first six years of the war, the French forces developed tactics for combat against the Viet Minh that checked the Viet Minh threat but did not grasp the initiative from them. These tactics were influenced particularly by geographic factors, the nature of the enemy, and French strength and capabilities. Organization: The French forces were organized on a territorial basis into four major regional commands. Each of these regions was divided into zones, the number varying with the geographic nature of the region. The zones were subdivided into sectors, which in turn usually were composed of several subsectors. During the war there was no unified effective military control de- spite moves to accomplish this. Administration, command, and deployment of the French Army were hampered by complexity and division of authority at the goverrnnental level. In addition, significant nonmilitary partic- ipation in control of operations added to the difficulties. Political agreements were signed with Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos in 1949. Under the agreements the prewar French Provinces of Tonkin and Annam and the prewar French colony of Cochin?China combined to form the new state of Vietnam. Cambodia and Laos had been semi-independent French protectorates. Upon ratification of agreements with these states by the French Government on 2 Feb 50, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos became associat- ed states within the French Union. The military agreements providing for continued French operational responsibility were to remain in force until the military situation enabled the Associated States to maintain their own internal security. During the war, the French Training Missions exercised all command and staff functions on behalf of the Associated States. These missions also functioned as the General Staffs of the country to which they were assigned. Each country had some degree of political and policy control through its Prime Minister, Defense Minister, or Minister of the Armed Forces. Vietnamese Chief of State Bao Dai, Cambodian King Norodom Sihanouk Varmen, and Laos King Sisavong Vong (now dead) were titular heads -of their respective armies. Activities of the French Training Missions were supervised by the Associated States and Logistic Sections of the French Permanent Secretariat 42 AMLA Approved For Release 1 -00671 R000300050001-5 Approved For Re1ease4999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-006718000300050001-5 AW "VIAMMAM of National Defense, which fozms part of the staff of the French High Commissioner and Commander in Chief. French and Associated States m1l- itary cooperation was further assured by permanent military committees composed of Frettieh and Associated States representatives. The subsector generally comprised the defensive zone of a single battalion and sometimes was 150 square miles in size. Within the sub- sector, the battalion was deployed in a number of small posts,with the garrisons ranging from a platoon to a company in size. The infantry bat- talion usually was augmented by several national guard and militia com- panies, which either reinforced the garrisons of the posts occupied by the battalion or occupied separate posts and watchtowers in the subsec- tor. In some instances individual friendly villages were provided with weapons and organized for their own defense. The total armed strength of some subsectors ran as high as 5,000 troops. Mobile reserves or intervention units were maintained at most ech- elons. These units varied from platoon or company size in the subsector to a mobile division at regional level. The mobile division was a tac- tical command post established to coordinate the operations of two or more regimental combat teams. These intervention units were employed to relieve posts under attack or in offensive operations. A vast net ork of static defense posts was organized in the areas under French control. These posts varied in size and construction de- pending on local conditions. In South Vietnam, where the Viet Minh forces were relatively weak, the posts were mostly of mud and brick with bamboo and barbed-wire barricades. In Tonkin, where Viet Minh units possessed bazookas and recoilless guns, there were many reinforced con- crete strongpoints. Centrally located posts were allocated one or two artillery pieces of various types and calibers. Little or no night patrolling was carried out by the garrisons of these static defense posts. The Viet Minh were free to move over the countryside during darkness. Posts under harassment or attack at night were supported by artillery fire from neighboring positions if possible. Relief forces were dispatached at night if absolutely essential; but normally they were not sent out until after daybreak. Viet Minh assaults continuing after daybreak were subject to air counterattacks, and mobile relief forces attempted to encircle and destroy the Viet Minh forces. Isolated posts in outlying areas were reinforced by paratroops unless an adjacent landing field permitted air landing of standard-infantry units. The motor, river, and particularly air mobility of the French forces enabled them to carry out extremely flexible defensive operations. 43 Approved For Release 199 00671 R000300050001-5 Approved For Release4999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R O.00300050001-5 Offensive Operations: Short-range offensive forays occasionally were made into Viet Minh-held areas as a means of forcing combat with-Viet Minh regular forces. under conditions favorable to the French-Vietnamese troops. In this type of action several regimental combat teams, with aunor and artillery support, would seize an important objective, such as an enemy' communications center, and organize positions. for all-around defense in anticipation of counterattacks. If the objective was sufficiently im- portant, the Viet Minh would execute repeated frontal assaults on the de- fensive positions, thus suffering heavy losses. The operation at Hoa Binh is an example of this type of French operation. Since the French were usually denied military initiative, such oper- ations were infrequent. Counter Guerrilla Operations: The objective of these operations was to expand the area of French-Vietnamese control or to destroy enemy units. Operations designed to incorporate a now area into the defensive zone usually involved the encirclement of the area by local detachments, rein- forced by mobile elements from a higher echelon, with subsequent sweeping of the area. Occasionally the area was cleared by establishing a single line of departure with all elements advancing simultaneously on a broad front between neutral boundaries. The mobile units remained in the area ? until the new posts were constructed and the garrisons installed. The largest counterguerrilla operations were conducted in Tonkin, where elements equivalent to five regimental combat teams supported by medium artillery were employed in a single operation. Complete encircle- ment was almost always the goal but was seldom achieved. The use of naval river-craft to secure one or more of the flanks was common, and the employment of parachute elements-frequently as many as three bat- talions--to seal a flank or rear of the area was not unusual. Once all units were in position, one of several methods were employed to reduce the pocket. The "hammer and anvil" method, a simultaneous in- ward movement of all elements, or partition of the area into several pockets, which were then reduced individually, are two maneuvers that were tried. Frequently no enemy units were encountered during the sweeping of an area. This failure to make contact was occasionally caused by an in- complete encirclement but more often by the disappearance of the Viet Minh. PATROL IN THE JUNGLE Approved For Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000300050001-5 Approved For Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000300050001-5 Supposedly the groups were caught in the pocket. The difficulty of screening all individuals in the heavily populated zone of operations en- abled the guerrillas to hide their weapons and mingle with local inhabi- tants. Many time the rebels escaped encirclement through prior know- ledge of the operation. False intelligence planted by agents led the offensive forces astray, or the lack of accurate up-to-date intelligence resulted in encirclement of an area from which the guerrillas previously had moved. The lack of adequate administrative, political, and economic follow- up to otherwise successful clearing operations often resulted in the sub- sequent infiltration by and re-establishment of Viet Minh forces in areas cleared. Attempts were made to execute the follow up with mobile adminis- trative groups organized by the French-Vietnam Government, but funds needed for organization and support of these groups were limited and the follow up proved inadequate to the task of consolidation. Individual provinces were left with the responsibility of political and economic re- habilitation of pacified areas. The Viet Minh were active in subverting the population outside their areas, and by threat of reprisal prevented the natives from cooperating with the French-Vietnamese forces. Although not actively hostile to the French-Vietnamese forces, the people seldom would reveal Viet Minh loca- tions and plans. The attempt to overcome this by utilizing local troops, both regular and militia, had mixed results. The militia were not com- pletely reliable as they were inclined to surrender without fighting when confronted by a superior enemy force or when under threat of reprisal against their families. For this reason they were not issued automatic or heavy weapons, further reducing their effectiveness. Special antiguerrilla units were of relatively little importance during the.war. Some small lightly armed commando units were used, and plans for their expansion were under way at the and of the war. Psychological warfare likewise was not emphasized, apparently in the belief that the primary task was the defeat of enemy troops and that once the populace was free of Viet Minh intimidation and pressure, local Viet Minh organizations would collapse, and the people would rally to the French- Vietnamese side. Communist aggression in the Far East, particularly in Southeast Asia, is likely to follow in part Mao Toe-tung's principles of guerrilla warfare. Mao emphasized flexible yet carefully planned offensive action and close coordination of guerrillas with the regular army. He calls for strategical- ly located base areas from which continued guerrilla offensives can emanate. Mao advises guerrilla leaders to learn to recognize the correct timing for offensives and withdrawals. He points up the need for a centralized com- mand in planning broad strategy and the necessity for decentralized command' in battle. Approved For Release 1 mor.5-00671 R000300050001-5 Approved For Releas999/09/24 : CIA-RDP85-00671 R000300050001-5 affiv Communist actions against the British and French in Southeast Asia were patterned along similar lines. The aims were to 1) wear down the enemy and build up Communist military and civil strength through guerrilla'. warfare from temporary bases; 2) expand continuously civil and military strength and intensify attacks on communications while occupying addition- al bases in smaller towns and villages; and 3) establish large permanent bases and convert guerrilla forces into regular units. MRLA'e failure and Viet Minh's success may be traced to the degree and type of antiguerrilla operations opposing them during the war. The British succeeded in antiguerrillA warfare where the French did not because the British recognized Communist tactics and created success- ful counteractions. The British effectively controlled the Malayan people and got support from them. The French did-not accomplish this in Indochina. Maximum Communist strength in Malaya was estimated at between 25,000 and 30,000 against British combined forces that numbered about 250,000. Ex- pansion of Communist control would have increased Communist total forces considerably and would have forced the British to augment their forces in proportion. Communist forces in Vietnam were estimated at about 300,000 .while the total anti-Communist forces under the French numbered same 560,000 in mid-1954. The British concentrated on training troops for jungle warfare; the French stuck mainly to World Wai II strategies.a Britishular strategy prevented the Communists from establishing permanent bases in the field. French tactics failed to accomplish this. The British exploited psychological warfare techniques and protected the people from Communist terrorism; the French failed to do this effectively in Indochina. The British seized the intitiative.from the Communists and went on to victory; the French did not. 46 Approved For Release 85-00671 R000300050001-5