BOLIVIA AND THE GUERRILLA EXPERIENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85-00671R000300070003-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 17, 2000
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: October 27, 1967
• Content Type: MEMO

~tJCKET NO FoR~Tr7 DT
Approved For Rele 2002/05/02: 2W-08k
U.S. utrAR MENT OF STATE
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH
To : The Secretary
Through: S/S .}~
From INR - Thomas L. Hughes MAj.
Subject:
AIL
Bolivia and the Guerrilla Expe fence
For almost a year Bolivia has been the target of one of Latin
America's seemingly most professional communist guerrilla movements
under the leadership of Ernesto "Che" Guevara. The initial success
and the final defeat of the insurrection provides a test history of
the Castro-Debray-Guevara thesis of rural revolution. This memo-
randum describes and analyzes the history of the movement, the
reasons for its failure and the effect of the experience on Bolivia.
AB TRACT
For geographical, sociological, and political reasons, Bolivia
would appear to offer an ideal setting for a communist guerrilla
movement. A very low standard of living, a tradition of political
instability, and a potential as a base of operations against
neighboring countries, made Bolivia a particularly tempting target
for Argentine revolutionary Ernesto "Che" Guevara and his Cuban
and Bolivian followers.
The guerrillas settled in the sparsely populated southeastern
part of the country to begin training and reconnaissance in late
1966, but hard evidence of their existence and potential threat
did not appear until March, when a Bolivian army patrol stumbled
uppn the group and was quickly defeated. In the following few
months, other clashes between the ill-trained, ill-equipped
GROUP 1
Excludrd from automatic
doarw rad1ng and
declassification
This report WAS pmduced by the Bnrasa
of lnlolligence and Rnseamh. Aside
from normal subrdanlive enrhsngo With
whir agencies At tho wading level,
it has nw 'wen eowdloMeJ clsnwhem.
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State Dept. declassification instructions on file
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Bolivian army and the guerrillas proved disastrous for the govern-
ment forces. Concur, n w i t.hi n the 1io1 i vi .an Government and among
B liv to s neighbors grew, and the Be] 1 v i an Government requested TIS
training and material. assistance. The insurrection gained inter-
national attention with the capture of French marxist Jules Regis
Debray and the growing evidence that Guevara was leading the band.
By July, however, the situation had begun to improve as the
Bolivian soldiers held their ground instead of fleeing in the face
of the guerrillas. Captured documents and other evidence
strengthened Bolivia's contention, later to be presented at the
Twelfth Organization of' American States Meeting of Consultation on
Foreign Ministers, that the insurrection was inspired by Cuba.
In late August and again in late September, the guerrillas suffered
significant defeats and lost several of their principal foreign
and Bolivian leaders. The final. blow came shortly after the US-
trained 2nd Ranger Battalion was committed to the guerrilla zone
when, on October 8, "Che" Guevara and several other guerrillas
fell In battle. The remnants of the band are now reportedly trying
to break out of the area and escape.
There are several reasons for the guerrillas' defeat. They
apparently were wedded to thee t;hcesi s out.l. i ned in Debra.yT s Revolution
Within the Revolution? that the movement, must be rural based,
that formal association wit;h the local communist pa.rt.i_cs is to be
avo .deda and that the cooperation of the local camposinos must be
won. The failure of the campesinos, conservative by nature, to
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support the movement actively was critical. The lack of meaning-
ful coordination with the communist parties or other dissident
elements (e.g., the miners, the students, the urban labor unions)
precluded the possibility of opening other rural or urban fronts
which could have seriously strained the government's limited cap-
abilities to deal with the situation. And the fact that the
group was foreign-led not only created resentment among the Bolivian
communist parties but allowed the Barrientos regime to play on
Bolivian nationalism and picture the movement as an aggressive
adventure by the Cuban Government. Isolated and without
campesino support, the movement was doomed to defeat at the hands
of; the inferior in quality but numerically superior Bolivian army.
The Bolivian Government and military are currently enjoying a.
rare period of self-confidence and pride--even they were surpri sed
at their success. Barrientost domestic position has been
strengthened, although the revitalized military, proud of its first,
major military success in memory, may be somewhat less subject to
presidential control. Still, the basi c economic, political anti
social problems that make commun ,st-lcd =i_nsurvocti on possible con-
tinue to exist. A new movement, perhaps under the banner of a
martyred "Cho" Guevara, but adopting tactics more suitable to the
Bolivian situation, cannot be ruled out.
SECRET/NO FOREIGN DTSSEM
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