I. (S) CAUSATIVE FACTORS OF THE INSURGENCY IN COUNTRY OR AREA.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85-00671R000300070016-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 15, 2001
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: July 20, 1967
• Content Type: REPORT

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Cowitry: Bolivia
Dobriof deport bys Donn W. Yoder
Duty Asaignments* US Army Al ,cho for
1 months end Uufe _:se
tt:acho for l4xaonths
Date of deporbse 20 July, 1987 .`____
1. (S) CAiUSATI VR FACTORS OF TVII IrN SURGiN CY Iii CO1I TRY OR AI EAt
Until March of 17967 there was no known insuroonoy in Bolivia. However,
on March 23rd a Bolivian Army patrol of the 4th Divisicn was ambushed in
the area of NANCAHUAZU (1930S/6340if) while investigating a report that there
were possibly I;uorrlllas in the area. This action resulted in 7.KIA, 6 WIA
and 14 PIT's whom were later released. This was the beginning; of guerrilla
warfare in $olivia and it is still in progress at this moment. To this date
the total casualties of Bolivian Forces are as follovwss KIA 34 (6 officers,
4-I1CO+s, 20 ~ f, 3 civilians and 1 Guardia (Policeman); TaA 27; and although
several priacnors wore taken by the guerrillas they have all been rolciased
unharmed. The Bolivian Array has reported many guorrillan killed and wounded,
however, the only one oonfirsaed so far is one of the Guerrilla leaders
Moises GUVARA Rodriguez, a Bolivian, whose corpse was pictured in the local
`paper ?ro ucia to-ay,, 20 July. He was killed by a Bolivian Army patrol in
the area of M. DORADO (1927S/6348W) on 11 July 1967. The only other tangible
evidence so far provided by the Bolivian Army is the capture of three so-
called guerrille.st Jules Regis DEBRAY, from Frar-ooj Carlos Alberto BUST03,
fir m Argentina; and George Andrew ROTH, an Rnglishmsn from Chile. These
three mm claim to be newspaper reporters. ROTH has boon released but is
still required to stay in Bolivia; howc ver, the Bolivians plan to try by
military tribunal both DEz3RAY and BUSTOS as participants' in guerrilla war-
i'c.ro a., -ainat the government of Do? ivies.
It appears evident that the guerrilla group in Bolivia is professionally
led by Cuban oriented guerrillas from Cuba, Argentina and other Latin Ar arican
coun arias, and includes a substantial number of Bolivians trained in guorril?
la warfare in Cuba and other oommunistio countries. UZiARLIA ustiraatoa the
u:rr~ilus to total no store than 100 at the present time, and fortunately this
DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS;
lJ"T I,'Jr?;O;-ATICALLY DECLASSIFIED
DIA D8? USA1D Declassificati
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guorrilla aotivtty in Bolivia vma discovered prior to the phase of
reortd.tment. This group which opurutes at. tiolusa in smaller groups is
nrxn d with moloxrn automatic woapotas and has boon able to oonsistently
outraanouvor and outsmart the Bolivian Army units,
The Conm'nuniets have probably chosen Bolivia as another country in
which to b,, in inaurt,ene r because Bolivia is a poor cowitry with a lar e
portion of the population illiborerte Indians who can be easily influenced.
Bolivia also is a large country with tremendous areas of sparsely populated
jun los which are ideal for guerrilla traiuing. ARR& believes that the
"Cuban-lad guerrillas had planned to establish a base and train a urge
force prior to be inning oporations; hcnruvor, their plans were chw,,God
when, they were inadvortontly iii scovcrod by a Bolivian Army' patrol in
IAarch. An effective uorrilla bao in Bolivia would give the Oo:;uaunints
a base of opsratiou in thj huart of South ..morica from vrhioh they could
op?rat:o in all ctireetions and not just against Bolivia, Proof of their
effect upon the Bolivian economy is slroady evident As much of the limited
money pla and for social and economic deevelopmc ,t is Bolivia for 19007 has
had to be diverted to support the efforts of the Anod Forces against the
guorrill aa.
Lifer in Bolivia h:::s boon eocziomically and socially better each year
since the Junta took over on 'e November 1964, and the Armed Forces turned
over to 3csrriento3 and the people a constitutional ;overnraent and returned
to the barracks on 6 August 1966 as heroes in the eyes of the people. The
Bc,rric tttos govorzmnt has boon roruacouably stable and continued prot;rosss avers
boinu made until the rooont ;uorrilla situation bop,cn to adversely affect the
noels of the poople, the Arraod Forces, saui the ccor.ormy.
It is true that the guerrilla activities during 1067 have made the
$raaod forces look bc:d and have put heavy pressure on the Barricntoo uovom?
taunt booauao it has been forced to divert larLo sums of money which had
boon pro?ram:aod for use to raise the economic standards of Bolivia to sup-
,,ort the `'rid Forces* The recant trans crisis has also caused additional
economist problems for the Barriontos govor?nmont beotiuse the mince are the
prim ry source of revenue for the Bolivian govornmonb, and when they are
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not oporratin the GOD is loom; ncmoy.
Th~iro is no strong political party in ljolivia, but the small oom-
munistio aoni loi't out parties are always ready to seize an opportunity
to Garin popularity with the maloonte3ats and to harass the current
ovear;.rae3alt in every voaay poraasible. Co equ qtly, we have recently had
students taifestations, strikes in the mines, etc., led by Communists
labor loaJors, and politically left out aC,itators.
Up to the present time there is no isidioation that the guerrilla
move ont in the jungle areas has any ties with the mine crisis and
i tudoat end labor demonstrations*
Ii. (S) TIDE INStrM34T,
The guerrillas are woll-orggaazizod and apparently Oubcn lode They are
a wall-txsaiiod group of hard corps pr; ofesssionals who are well led and who
have tho nsooazary oomaunioaations to control their operations. Their
tacti is are sound and they set up aartbuvhou in dance jungles which have
proven oonsiatently effective especially against the now, poorly trained
and terribly soared tolivien soldiers. They have ap;;~arontly been in the
C4111'a VALLS GrW"IDE area for a lout; time and know this area like a books
thorofore, thxsy are able to outmaneuver and break contact with the Bolivian
Army ForoQu at eiill. All reports indicate that they are armed primarily
with autos atio tisoaions, have plenty of aamrauta.itioa and have sot up many
.di ' crorst arras cachos and o nap sites so that they oen rapidly morns from ono
locaaticua to &aother and oonAmee the Bolivtem Army as to their whereabouts
sad their rise.
Trans ortaatiosa is one of -their problems, but so far whomever they have
.c~odeod transportation they heave soiled it from the local populace with no
sal parent problems.
Their rucont move into aA`TAIPATA (10001.63537) to buy drugs, olothoas
cad food is an iniloation that lo,;istioally theyaare be inning to fool the
constant, although not very effective, pressure of the Doliviaan Army
pursuit dahioh has caused them to be continuously on the move.
There are indications that they have radios to control oporaticns
within tho guerrilla area, and it I ass also boon reported, but unconfirmed,
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that glory have radio curt tact iLith Ziuvnuxa,
AR beliov4au this is defihitoly a ?ooa:aautaist led and ooa nunist sup.
ported a.rL'ort iron ou Ms ido of Bolivia. They hove pl .n ty of money as
ovikterood by their Aturerwus purohases for i,riooa far above rogular,
.
aaa:a;r^ ,ot prlavsa,
There 4 Q Ao indl atirris of as:p,,ort for the cuorrilla raovo.aimt within
lose loorl opulaco mid politi.,al parti,a>a. In fact, so fare the people of
3olivia soma to be defixaltoly CA the aide of t1 Sovorrinent ruin, the Arnod
Forces.
r
Tbo aerrillaa inwalligonoe capability I-a s made the Bolivian Arm'
look. like ?a bo i, nor as they are a ale to move at will undetected in all
p;rta or the arrow. ;:rorat every oontaot he boon initiated no na + ibuah
by the ~uorrillaai and they bavo broken eontaot and disaplieared whenever
they do sit*d..
the other :WsurG arat activity in liailivia recently by the taixaors mad
the toacthera, at clan to faot:,ry workers in the opinion of AMU,, have
riot boon directly related to the ;u rrilla activity. lnstoae3, it is TV
Opinion that bhOOO M1001eteznta ux'rc t by 20ft out political p&\rti?ls,, union
leaders? uiaa'Uafied teachers an co.= iiatio paid profoanional atudenta
ltavo ao Zed this opportunity to umke life dl l'r cult for thu farri =ntoa
?oVerrraant? This Iris be= a way of life in Dolivia for s zaiy years.
ZarriQuitoa, with full bac;;i: ; of the llrra~r4 forcott, rooaitly ordered
trco 3s into the lUAWi l on i c'ATAVI-SI GLO IQG ninvu to rid t? on of subversive
l- a-.iers rare} to restore order is the :aiuase This r.utution of the Armed Forces especially In
the country sideo liowevor, the projrcua has alov;ed dozen this year beoarse:
1) Tho U.3, is put-.inj lean vrc:.zoy into the proj;rem and, 2) The pro-rum is
divided botwevn the Ministry of Looaoray and the Aruwd Foroos, ilowwover, such
projects as potable water to a small community and roads built by the Army
l''aGlaaor$ into areas wvho.,-o there previously were no roads hero boon most
i olpful in assisting in the oac ,omio and social dovolopmc t of rural areas.
OLITI& AL I CTIais
1. Proprzr;cnda ?
a, and b. The 04B has used radio broadcasts and newspaper
articles to spread desired propar,nnc1a to the people. The Ar, ied Forces also
now have their own radio station in La Paz and President Barriontos holds
weekly prose conforoncos which are broadcast over the radio. The biG
problem in the opinics of the inou mbarnt AR1tt is the lack" of c ntral control
a
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for the dis eeininat, l.on of infornantion to the public, What in needed is a
cairn t;r inftarn ati ore center is the ;o ; err rneat and a central information cen-
ter for the Armed l?oracea with close coordi.reuti,on between the two cantors.
Ac it is now e'?.oh cabinet minister can be his om public information
con-Ar, and the various military core trtmiors in fihe field are also providing
information to the public without ooor:ilz aticn with higher hoadquarbora.
A well control led and hono et Public Informr ati ca system for both the govorn-
mont and th:e Arm,-,id Forces would greatly enhance the public imn o of the GOD
and the Armsd Forces. At timoa the Armed Forces merely by a show of force
in an mote of uareab has stopped a subversive activity from aottins off
the Ground.
2. Isolation Toohaiquos to Deny Guerrillas Support m The Dolivian
Armed Forces so foxy have boon unable, to isolate the guerrillas who are able
to move al.moat at will within the large area whore they are now opo rating.
They have boon able to move into small towns and villages at will and
although they have forood the local populace to sell thorn food, modioines,
clothes, etc., they have always paid high prices for what they took and
have never raoloetod the local po; ulaca Isolatlerx techniques were effeoti?
voly used reoo'xtly in the RUA UtNI and OATA I- IGLO XX mine areas. That
military out all lines of oornrmuiic~:ttons an.1 then n ovod in and took over
the mines. 2.li wary control is still in effect and will be until the GOD
in satisfied that the a;itayors are gone from the mIncs and that complete
order and normal worl:inZ coaditions again prevail. Then after the trc,ops
have wiihdrnisat the National Guard troops will be loft to maintain law and
try cier.
U. S. RCLi I: sC3i'a'OR1 OF LOCAL GGVTall:lii;1 Te
A. U.S. CQUJTRy Tf~W L
The U.?s. Country Team in Bolivia is a well coordinated team with
rep:?v sent ation, from all the key staff sections and inoludinj~ both Attaches
e d the U311ILGP Corxaanlor. Unuor the guidance of the Ambassador we discuss
in detail in advance the potential threats to the interrwa security of the
ooiatry and how they can be not. In this country whore the military is
actually the only real base for stability the Attaches and the US:IILGP
Co m:n:3or are exyromoly important to the Country Team effort, Coord nation
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amiai the mombers of this Country Team is outsta.4ding and v pool our
resources to the good of the over-all United Btatos effort. We do have
political influence oaspooially with President Barrientoa who frequently
iavitos the Ambassador, the DCM, the Attaches and the USMILG? Co::anrunder
to his home for early morning breakfast to discuss current problems.
Barriontoa is a man who makes his own decisions and who at times lots
loyalty over-rule good judgement, but he does liston to advise before
deciding what ho will do, The Director of USAID also has influence over
some of the Ministers in the Cabinet and is able to help guide their
efforts in the economical and fiscal areas.
B. US* MILITARY FORCE&
The U.S. military forces in Bolivia consists oft 1) The Army and
Air Forco Attaches in the Dofense Attache Office, and 2) The US~ffLGP which
has an Army Section and an Air Force Jecbicm with an advisory and training
mission. Frequently, the USI1ILGP has LtTTt a in country to assist in the
training; of the Bolivian Army and Air Force such as the ]ut"'''T now training.
the 2d Ranger Battalion in Santa Cruz. The U.S. military personnel are
not allowed to participate in the opurational areas, however? the ;oneral
staffs of both the Army and the Air Force seek advice constantly from
the m. mbors of the USMILGP and the Attaches. Thera is a very close working;
relationship botweon the Bolivian military and the United States military.
DIA -25X1
DIA 25X1 The Army Socticn of the U&!ILGP is located within the oomp6und
of the Army headquarters and can work daily with the Army connsandor and
his staff. The Air Force Section of the U:IIILGP is looatod in the same
building as the Bolivian Air Force Headquarters. Thus the U.S, military
inonnuors have a positive influence on the training and planning for the
internal security of the GOBI however, we are never involved directly in
incorral security operations. The advisor depending upon his ability can
definitely influence his counterpart, i.e., just this past week the Bolivian
Army Gr2 and 0-3 asked ARL if it would.be possible for. their advisors to
have a desk in their section and work part time with them daily. The many
10
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mobile training -teams have had positive influcuce in tho training of the
i3olivlszta officora and anon. There have boon sevorril COIN coursoso courses
in riot control, ; couratoririeurgoncy course for key officers from all ton
Amy divisions, and currently we have the Special Vorooa 10T training thi
2d Ranl ore in Santo. Cruz and a 2-man HTT working with Ministry of Defense
to assist in nodoriaizingv the planning and fiscal procedures, The United
States Military Aaaistanoo pro ;ram (MttP) with its training and hard gar.
is the main roaaur.'that the Bolivian Armed Forces have boon successful
,in mainta Bing in-torn l security. The Defence Budget has not in the
past provided sufficient mmUes to the throe services for them to properly
maintain their equipment, i.e., un l the current guerrilla omergonoy there
was not aufficicat money to buy tiros, batteries, groaoe and oven gasoline
for vehicles. The asia problem in the over all offootivoneas of the
Axed O'o,rcac is that they have dopwrided entirely sass U.S. 71 P support culd
have not purchased the necessary equipment for naas.ilAP units such as arms,
csorvaut4cat?ona equipment and transportations in addition, they have not
provided the necessary "soft goods" to keep the oquipmont in first
olnsa condition, The U.S. Uilitsury 1,eeistanco Program is well planed
w.-id pro:;rosuivo and without it Bo1ivl.a would have gone dotim the drain.
The Ministry of Defense controls the money to the nth degroe except for
the Air Force which is allowed to plan its cam budget and utilize its
monies as doomed appropriate by the Air -Force Comnander. The Army and the
Navy oomrtarsdors virtually havo no control over the money alloted to their
units. Th,iw is done at the idinistry of Defense lovel. Thus a fair haired
Lary unit co)?;mander in the eyes o:' the L(inistor of Defense may got much
ro t'?siuuoial support for his unit than another Army unit which tactually
noodst far more. The Army Commander has the responsibility for maintaining
the internal security of Bolivia but his hands are tied because ho has no
control over his logistical support except for that which hq receives from
our Milii ary Assistance i'ro;',ram? It is hoped that the two man Di 'TT now
vrorking in the Ministry of Defense will be able to help alleviate this bottle
noon. The Bolivian military at all levels are easy to work with =4 most
appreciative of our help. In the opinion of the Afl the real bottle neck
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,,;, ,t + t_j lire it
to prof resss has boon lank of ouffioi ant zaanayr poor plans in for how the
m,_nios would be usod by the P inietry o:.' Defense (especially by the
Min"tor of Dufonso who has successfully maintained complete oo v`crol
over the moznios for the Army and Navy). It is rumored that be will be
roplaood vilthin the next two works band if this is true there is reason
to hope for definite pro rona in the future.
USISS
The United States Infor ation Service in Bolivia is really
"topnotch and has Ixad a group of real professionals aporatin3 for the good
of the Coy xtry Teem o: fort. Th.=se people have boon able to reach the
I3oliviaaa with their inforr aticm end Bolivians from all walks of life. They
have also materially helped the Attaches by providin, us with books in
Spanish which we give to Bolivian miii ary friends and military schools.
This has opened rugy doors for the moor )ent AMA- and ultieatately proved
lucrative to our over-all mission. The United :itatmp iuf luenos has been
substantial in Bolivia end our USIS has boon a primary factor in this
suoo0sss
D. UrAIDs
Our USAI.D program. in Bolivia in per capita one of the larroat in
the world and it has been prof easioria ly operated and controlled during nsy'
tie plus years in Doliviea. Tho cilrront dirootor of USAID Is one of the
most capable' asad intolli cnt men I have ever known and ho works
clo.c sly with the Bolivians for the In'ceeraal Dcvelopnent of Bolivia. USAID
in Bolivia is not a Iva away pro,-r=. Before tho GOB rots money they
must have an approved plan end a,roo to do their part in each proposed
project. This has loaf to bettor plann , mutual rospoot sold more value
re ooived for ovary dollar utilized, UaiAII) Is prim?trily a loaning ra?oiioy
:now to assist the GOD in such pi o-locts as transportation (road coustrruo'Gi{::n)s
water projects, oduoatiaa, electrical, power projects, a rioulture, mining
and puhito safety. U:SAIU has i orkod closely and effectively with the
United :itatoa and Bolivian Armies conoorriinr, Civic Action projects. They
have also wor}a d with the Poaco Corps and developed what we call a
Community Dovolopnor4t Program. This pvo:,ro has had a real impt.ot on the
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emall rural oon uuitioa whore Poaoo Corps workoro with the self-help of
the loons populace and support from U AIJ have boars able to help tho
pooplo in the rural areas to help thoaasolvoa by doing such things as
oonatruoting sohaole end dispazzsarios, davelopinp potable water projeots,
and a~ricYultural projects. USIt3 also worka olosely with tJ3AID to make
sure that the publio is aware of what our aid is doing for the develop-
mont of Bolivia.
E. 0 1i : .
The Peace Corps with approxtmately 350 young volunteers wor ring
and living raith the poople in almost every part of Bolivia have had a most
import aunt role in developing a rvupoot for the United States especiully
&iong the illiterate populace in t o rural and nin ng meas. Eowevvr,
their prot;ruma go far beyond eomaunity develapcaont,, and. have also oven
influenced the uaiveraity students. .
(S) THIRO CO1JNTJSUPPORT TO L0C1rL GOVL'Ttdl NTs
Arc oiatina - Was allowed to establish a 'SavaI Mission in Bolivia in.
early 1964. This mission in consn~ut d 1tY the Armtno Naval Attache and
so far has provided only training support to the Bolivian Uavy. Although
their reason for ooming to Bolivia alas to teavYt the Bolivian 1 avy how to
uzo the ii boats that Argcnti.na promL:ed Bolivia in late 1966, to this
date not cne 'boat has bon given to the fiolivio Navy by Argentina.
.. Coordination with the U.S. nssious is practically n =uxlatnnt? Ties
primAry reason that Argontina wanted this naval miesic in Bolivia was
to gather iiztellig,once for the government of Argentina. Althc~uf* the
Bolivian Navy 1 Iowa that it has not received anything but training, its
oi'ieore and won are influenced by the presence of to Argentine Li salon.
G?rrxu - has no mi7.ftwry prorama and no attaches in Bolivia, but
i3 one of the partners in they CC1 IBGL tri::ngular plan. Germany has also
ocontly sold Bolivia a e~voral million dollar tin smelter which is to
be oo tstruet?d in ORUR0. Germany dons have favorable reputation an has
influence in Bolivia.
Israel ~- has several army officers in Bolivia organized as an
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a ricultural team. Thi:i team is working with GOB to improve farming
tooh;airtua#. They have, bean beneficial to the GOD, and this has I also
provided I sruol with a good intelligence source. There is minimal
coordination botwoon this team and the United Staten,
I. (3) Ai mu it; 1411Y,im o r c,,IiA2E4 3aWEASi$i
The major road block to modernizing the Bolivian Armed Forces is
money and thoir proneat use of military maupowor.. As long as Gunoral,
OVIPmO, Coma rider--in-Chief of the Armod Forces aG4 the ?iinistar of
Defense bolieve that largo numbers of soldiorn are more imports nb than
a crrnaller force "o-.,up of offootive vrell-trained and well-equipped units
there '411 be no significant ii-q)rov+emont in the Bolivian Atrmod Forces
except whoa the U.S. provides training and equipment to MAP support
a.dditicnaal unite. If the Bolivian ArW had maintained- a seller Army
our the past several years and u:sod the money waved, by not having to
supi:art several th:;usaad alditional and not requirod soldiers, to
aodar aizo read re-equip their non-MP supported unite, they would now
have a pro.Ccsnional a l well-equippod army of at least 10,000 coldiors.
Ins Lad the; have an Army of 15,OU0 men of utiich only about 51,000 are
Tell equipped soldiore and all of these are in US MAP supported units.
\A1tii&, has convinced the Army Co.-mmzdor and his staff of the need for
o'fvotive units and not a large number of poorly equipped magi in uniform,,
but so far no ono has been able to convince Genoraal OV& DO and the Minister
of De ie .se of this key requirement for an effective Armed Force .
Listed below are areas whore increased emphasis is roquiroda
1. Mo avrai po the Do fenao Department a ad allow each service to prepare
its annual budget roquiremnts.
2. Sutfici~mt money from the GOB to properly opaarate the Armed Forces.
Goixw.ad supervision at all lovola. (Orders are issued but seldom
does anyone chock to see if they are carried out.)
d. Establish a sta; gored two yaer period of service for conscripts
to insure that a minim= of 50 percent of the conscripts in the Armc,d
1:'orcas at ar-W time will have heed at least once year of tra ning.
5. Ro-?oquip at least one not-LAP' unit each year even if it mans
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having a stt :itor Arxa r.
a. Develop an intolligonoo system that -f~anotiono at all levels in
all throe eorvicos sad in the Ministry of Governncnt. (At present an
intelligenco gathering repability is practically non-oxtotant and this
is a serious problem in the ourreeat guerrilla situation.)
7, establish an effective systems of debriefing patrols for intel-
liganco infor...ation in the uorrilla area.
8. Establiah? an offootiva oc:naui ication system from the 'division
level darno
9, Utilize more time oaoh day for traiiciaan and improve training
mathoda.
10. 8tabali::e officer aaeiparinte. (The Bolivians rotate too
o: toe from one position to another in fact many officers change
aaeigaraent every year) r
11. Develop an Armed Forooo Qonoral staff that actually operates.
(The current cot-up is only en informatics gathorin service for Ctonoral
)
Ova Do,
12, Develop inter-3orvioo coordination and cooparaation.
23, Asaig a. strong loadora to oa>,:nmand the 3 servioen. (The preacant
Ar,r and Air Force Conaanders area fine gont;leraca and intolli,+ tt, but
are lac: g in loadorahip.)
14, Develop a bettor logistical system.
16. Itatablizh a system of co..raand raainternnoe inspections of unite,
and prov .do units with the a soft goods" nos canary to properly maintain
L .oi.r' oquipmont.
16. Improve porso.nsol ansignmonta and use the U,Bp and Panama
school trained po r soLaael in their spooialtlos.
27, Enta'oliah a system for improving the morale o the military to
include better and more mili-~aryt ho-..sing.
18. Develop, train, equip and modernize the Natir:nal Police Force
so that it can be an offootive buffer botvrrren the people and the Armed
Forces.
10. Establish a'Taetioal Oporotions Center (TOO),
16.E
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Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP85-00671 R060300070016-7
 Approved F elease 2001/0103 : CIA-RDP85-006 000300070016-7
20, Develop a national Cournteransur5oznoy plan.
21. Oovolop and publish dotailvd ooatin(eaoy plauu in' advaneo for
possiblo prob1oms w,rhioh any do tial :p n ; hin tho country.
22. The Prooidoait booc*i is too much involvad 'vith the Army during!
oriaia such as the aurront guor illa situatim, ? (lie should run the
F;ovorx t and lot the C'o.ieander-in-Chief of the Armod Forma control
the militarj problems).
23. i; abiiah? offootive ?ublio Infornatica Centers at the Covor nt
t 4 . ..d Yoroos loyal with closo cooperation botwaaa the trio oentors.
(In this manner the publio imams of the GOB and the Armed Yoroos oould be
ly onlianoo-i)$
-rout
IN W. MY11t
Colonal, C
lArr Attache
EC ET
Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP85-00671 R000300070016-7