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December 12, 2016
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August 15, 2001
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July 20, 1967
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P Approved For F ease-2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP85-00671 O30007001'6-7 SECRET Cowitry: Bolivia Dobriof deport bys Donn W. Yoder Duty Asaignments* US Army Al ,cho for 1 months end Uufe _:se tt:acho for l4xaonths Date of deporbse 20 July, 1987 .`____ 1. (S) CAiUSATI VR FACTORS OF TVII IrN SURGiN CY Iii CO1I TRY OR AI EAt Until March of 17967 there was no known insuroonoy in Bolivia. However, on March 23rd a Bolivian Army patrol of the 4th Divisicn was ambushed in the area of NANCAHUAZU (1930S/6340if) while investigating a report that there were possibly I;uorrlllas in the area. This action resulted in 7.KIA, 6 WIA and 14 PIT's whom were later released. This was the beginning; of guerrilla warfare in $olivia and it is still in progress at this moment. To this date the total casualties of Bolivian Forces are as follovwss KIA 34 (6 officers, 4-I1CO+s, 20 ~ f, 3 civilians and 1 Guardia (Policeman); TaA 27; and although several priacnors wore taken by the guerrillas they have all been rolciased unharmed. The Bolivian Array has reported many guorrillan killed and wounded, however, the only one oonfirsaed so far is one of the Guerrilla leaders Moises GUVARA Rodriguez, a Bolivian, whose corpse was pictured in the local `paper ?ro ucia to-ay,, 20 July. He was killed by a Bolivian Army patrol in the area of M. DORADO (1927S/6348W) on 11 July 1967. The only other tangible evidence so far provided by the Bolivian Army is the capture of three so- called guerrille.st Jules Regis DEBRAY, from Frar-ooj Carlos Alberto BUST03, fir m Argentina; and George Andrew ROTH, an Rnglishmsn from Chile. These three mm claim to be newspaper reporters. ROTH has boon released but is still required to stay in Bolivia; howc ver, the Bolivians plan to try by military tribunal both DEz3RAY and BUSTOS as participants' in guerrilla war- i'c.ro a., -ainat the government of Do? ivies. It appears evident that the guerrilla group in Bolivia is professionally led by Cuban oriented guerrillas from Cuba, Argentina and other Latin Ar arican coun arias, and includes a substantial number of Bolivians trained in guorril? la warfare in Cuba and other oommunistio countries. UZiARLIA ustiraatoa the u:rr~ilus to total no store than 100 at the present time, and fortunately this DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS; lJ"T I,'Jr?;O;-ATICALLY DECLASSIFIED DIA D8? USA1D Declassificati ~`'x~ C AAA .iL:/ 9 l:S ARMA .t NIA . Y fl Vrr F_ I IV Approved For Release 2001/09/03: CIA-RDP85-00671 R000300070016-7 Approved For ease 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP85-00671 10300070016-7 SEC 2-liT guorrilla aotivtty in Bolivia vma discovered prior to the phase of reortd.tment. This group which opurutes at. tiolusa in smaller groups is nrxn d with moloxrn automatic woapotas and has boon able to oonsistently outraanouvor and outsmart the Bolivian Army units, The Conm'nuniets have probably chosen Bolivia as another country in which to b,, in inaurt,ene r because Bolivia is a poor cowitry with a lar e portion of the population illiborerte Indians who can be easily influenced. Bolivia also is a large country with tremendous areas of sparsely populated jun los which are ideal for guerrilla traiuing. ARR& believes that the "Cuban-lad guerrillas had planned to establish a base and train a urge force prior to be inning oporations; hcnruvor, their plans were chw,,God when, they were inadvortontly iii scovcrod by a Bolivian Army' patrol in IAarch. An effective uorrilla bao in Bolivia would give the Oo:;uaunints a base of opsratiou in thj huart of South ..morica from vrhioh they could op?rat:o in all ctireetions and not just against Bolivia, Proof of their effect upon the Bolivian economy is slroady evident As much of the limited money pla and for social and economic deevelopmc ,t is Bolivia for 19007 has had to be diverted to support the efforts of the Anod Forces against the guorrill aa. Lifer in Bolivia h:::s boon eocziomically and socially better each year since the Junta took over on 'e November 1964, and the Armed Forces turned over to 3csrriento3 and the people a constitutional ;overnraent and returned to the barracks on 6 August 1966 as heroes in the eyes of the people. The Bc,rric tttos govorzmnt has boon roruacouably stable and continued prot;rosss avers boinu made until the rooont ;uorrilla situation bop,cn to adversely affect the noels of the poople, the Arraod Forces, saui the ccor.ormy. It is true that the guerrilla activities during 1067 have made the $raaod forces look bc:d and have put heavy pressure on the Barricntoo uovom? taunt booauao it has been forced to divert larLo sums of money which had boon pro?ram:aod for use to raise the economic standards of Bolivia to sup- ,,ort the `'rid Forces* The recant trans crisis has also caused additional economist problems for the Barriontos govor?nmont beotiuse the mince are the prim ry source of revenue for the Bolivian govornmonb, and when they are ~~++ 2 -~e 1J Ya to A Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP85-00671 R000300070016-7 Approved ForWase 2001/09/03: CIA-RDP85-00671p0300070016-7 SECRET not oporratin the GOD is loom; ncmoy. Th~iro is no strong political party in ljolivia, but the small oom- munistio aoni loi't out parties are always ready to seize an opportunity to Garin popularity with the maloonte3ats and to harass the current ovear;.rae3alt in every voaay poraasible. Co equ qtly, we have recently had students taifestations, strikes in the mines, etc., led by Communists labor loaJors, and politically left out aC,itators. Up to the present time there is no isidioation that the guerrilla move ont in the jungle areas has any ties with the mine crisis and i tudoat end labor demonstrations* Ii. (S) TIDE INStrM34T, The guerrillas are woll-orggaazizod and apparently Oubcn lode They are a wall-txsaiiod group of hard corps pr; ofesssionals who are well led and who have tho nsooazary oomaunioaations to control their operations. Their tacti is are sound and they set up aartbuvhou in dance jungles which have proven oonsiatently effective especially against the now, poorly trained and terribly soared tolivien soldiers. They have ap;;~arontly been in the C4111'a VALLS GrW"IDE area for a lout; time and know this area like a books thorofore, thxsy are able to outmaneuver and break contact with the Bolivian Army ForoQu at eiill. All reports indicate that they are armed primarily with autos atio tisoaions, have plenty of aamrauta.itioa and have sot up many .di ' crorst arras cachos and o nap sites so that they oen rapidly morns from ono locaaticua to &aother and oonAmee the Bolivtem Army as to their whereabouts sad their rise. Trans ortaatiosa is one of -their problems, but so far whomever they have .c~odeod transportation they heave soiled it from the local populace with no sal parent problems. Their rucont move into aA`TAIPATA (10001.63537) to buy drugs, olothoas cad food is an iniloation that lo,;istioally theyaare be inning to fool the constant, although not very effective, pressure of the Doliviaan Army pursuit dahioh has caused them to be continuously on the move. There are indications that they have radios to control oporaticns within tho guerrilla area, and it I ass also boon reported, but unconfirmed, 3 SECRET Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP85-00671 R000300070016-7 Approved For Lease 2001/09/03: CIA-RDP85-00671 80300070016-7 E that glory have radio curt tact iLith Ziuvnuxa, AR beliov4au this is defihitoly a ?ooa:aautaist led and ooa nunist sup. ported a.rL'ort iron ou Ms ido of Bolivia. They hove pl .n ty of money as ovikterood by their Aturerwus purohases for i,riooa far above rogular, . aaa:a;r^ ,ot prlavsa, There 4 Q Ao indl atirris of as:p,,ort for the cuorrilla raovo.aimt within lose loorl opulaco mid politi.,al parti,a>a. In fact, so fare the people of 3olivia soma to be defixaltoly CA the aide of t1 Sovorrinent ruin, the Arnod Forces. r Tbo aerrillaa inwalligonoe capability I-a s made the Bolivian Arm' look. like ?a bo i, nor as they are a ale to move at will undetected in all p;rta or the arrow. ;:rorat every oontaot he boon initiated no na + ibuah by the ~uorrillaai and they bavo broken eontaot and disaplieared whenever they do sit*d.. the other :WsurG arat activity in liailivia recently by the taixaors mad the toacthera, at clan to faot:,ry workers in the opinion of AMU,, have riot boon directly related to the ;u rrilla activity. lnstoae3, it is TV Opinion that bhOOO M1001eteznta ux'rc t by 20ft out political p&\rti?ls,, union leaders? uiaa'Uafied teachers an co.= iiatio paid profoanional atudenta ltavo ao Zed this opportunity to umke life dl l'r cult for thu farri =ntoa ?oVerrraant? This Iris be= a way of life in Dolivia for s zaiy years. ZarriQuitoa, with full bac;;i: ; of the llrra~r4 forcott, rooaitly ordered trco 3s into the lUAWi l on i c'ATAVI-SI GLO IQG ninvu to rid t? on of subversive l- a-.iers rare} to restore order is the :aiuase This r.utution of the Armed Forces especially In the country sideo liowevor, the projrcua has alov;ed dozen this year beoarse: 1) Tho U.3, is put-.inj lean vrc:.zoy into the proj;rem and, 2) The pro-rum is divided botwevn the Ministry of Looaoray and the Aruwd Foroos, ilowwover, such projects as potable water to a small community and roads built by the Army l''aGlaaor$ into areas wvho.,-o there previously were no roads hero boon most i olpful in assisting in the oac ,omio and social dovolopmc t of rural areas. OLITI& AL I CTIais 1. Proprzr;cnda ? a, and b. The 04B has used radio broadcasts and newspaper articles to spread desired propar,nnc1a to the people. The Ar, ied Forces also now have their own radio station in La Paz and President Barriontos holds weekly prose conforoncos which are broadcast over the radio. The biG problem in the opinics of the inou mbarnt AR1tt is the lack" of c ntral control a ?iv All, Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP85-00671 R000300070016-7 Approved For Rase 2001/09/03 CIA-RDP85-00671 OF 00300070016-7' for the dis eeininat, l.on of infornantion to the public, What in needed is a cairn t;r inftarn ati ore center is the ;o ; err rneat and a central information cen- ter for the Armed l?oracea with close coordi.reuti,on between the two cantors. Ac it is now e'?.oh cabinet minister can be his om public information con-Ar, and the various military core trtmiors in fihe field are also providing information to the public without ooor:ilz aticn with higher hoadquarbora. A well control led and hono et Public Informr ati ca system for both the govorn- mont and th:e Arm,-,id Forces would greatly enhance the public imn o of the GOD and the Armsd Forces. At timoa the Armed Forces merely by a show of force in an mote of uareab has stopped a subversive activity from aottins off the Ground. 2. Isolation Toohaiquos to Deny Guerrillas Support m The Dolivian Armed Forces so foxy have boon unable, to isolate the guerrillas who are able to move al.moat at will within the large area whore they are now opo rating. They have boon able to move into small towns and villages at will and although they have forood the local populace to sell thorn food, modioines, clothes, etc., they have always paid high prices for what they took and have never raoloetod the local po; ulaca Isolatlerx techniques were effeoti? voly used reoo'xtly in the RUA UtNI and OATA I- IGLO XX mine areas. That military out all lines of oornrmuiic~:ttons an.1 then n ovod in and took over the mines. 2.li wary control is still in effect and will be until the GOD in satisfied that the a;itayors are gone from the mIncs and that complete order and normal worl:inZ coaditions again prevail. Then after the trc,ops have wiihdrnisat the National Guard troops will be loft to maintain law and try cier. U. S. RCLi I: sC3i'a'OR1 OF LOCAL GGVTall:lii;1 Te A. U.S. CQUJTRy Tf~W L The U.?s. Country Team in Bolivia is a well coordinated team with rep:?v sent ation, from all the key staff sections and inoludinj~ both Attaches e d the U311ILGP Corxaanlor. Unuor the guidance of the Ambassador we discuss in detail in advance the potential threats to the interrwa security of the ooiatry and how they can be not. In this country whore the military is actually the only real base for stability the Attaches and the US:IILGP Co m:n:3or are exyromoly important to the Country Team effort, Coord nation Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP85-00671 R000300070016-7 Approved F elease 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP85-0067 RR000300070016-7 amiai the mombers of this Country Team is outsta.4ding and v pool our resources to the good of the over-all United Btatos effort. We do have political influence oaspooially with President Barrientoa who frequently iavitos the Ambassador, the DCM, the Attaches and the USMILG? Co::anrunder to his home for early morning breakfast to discuss current problems. Barriontoa is a man who makes his own decisions and who at times lots loyalty over-rule good judgement, but he does liston to advise before deciding what ho will do, The Director of USAID also has influence over some of the Ministers in the Cabinet and is able to help guide their efforts in the economical and fiscal areas. B. US* MILITARY FORCE& The U.S. military forces in Bolivia consists oft 1) The Army and Air Forco Attaches in the Dofense Attache Office, and 2) The US~ffLGP which has an Army Section and an Air Force Jecbicm with an advisory and training mission. Frequently, the USI1ILGP has LtTTt a in country to assist in the training; of the Bolivian Army and Air Force such as the ]ut"'''T now training. the 2d Ranger Battalion in Santa Cruz. The U.S. military personnel are not allowed to participate in the opurational areas, however? the ;oneral staffs of both the Army and the Air Force seek advice constantly from the m. mbors of the USMILGP and the Attaches. Thera is a very close working; relationship botweon the Bolivian military and the United States military. DIA -25X1 DIA 25X1 The Army Socticn of the U&!ILGP is located within the oomp6und of the Army headquarters and can work daily with the Army connsandor and his staff. The Air Force Section of the U:IIILGP is looatod in the same building as the Bolivian Air Force Headquarters. Thus the U.S, military inonnuors have a positive influence on the training and planning for the internal security of the GOBI however, we are never involved directly in incorral security operations. The advisor depending upon his ability can definitely influence his counterpart, i.e., just this past week the Bolivian Army Gr2 and 0-3 asked ARL if it would.be possible for. their advisors to have a desk in their section and work part time with them daily. The many 10 I fj Iff Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP85-00671 R000300070016-7 Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP85-006 18000300070016-7 SEC ET mobile training -teams have had positive influcuce in tho training of the i3olivlszta officora and anon. There have boon sevorril COIN coursoso courses in riot control, ; couratoririeurgoncy course for key officers from all ton Amy divisions, and currently we have the Special Vorooa 10T training thi 2d Ranl ore in Santo. Cruz and a 2-man HTT working with Ministry of Defense to assist in nodoriaizingv the planning and fiscal procedures, The United States Military Aaaistanoo pro ;ram (MttP) with its training and hard gar. is the main roaaur.'that the Bolivian Armed Forces have boon successful ,in mainta Bing in-torn l security. The Defence Budget has not in the past provided sufficient mmUes to the throe services for them to properly maintain their equipment, i.e., un l the current guerrilla omergonoy there was not aufficicat money to buy tiros, batteries, groaoe and oven gasoline for vehicles. The asia problem in the over all offootivoneas of the Axed O'o,rcac is that they have dopwrided entirely sass U.S. 71 P support culd have not purchased the necessary equipment for naas.ilAP units such as arms, csorvaut4cat?ona equipment and transportations in addition, they have not provided the necessary "soft goods" to keep the oquipmont in first olnsa condition, The U.S. Uilitsury 1,eeistanco Program is well planed w.-id pro:;rosuivo and without it Bo1ivl.a would have gone dotim the drain. The Ministry of Defense controls the money to the nth degroe except for the Air Force which is allowed to plan its cam budget and utilize its monies as doomed appropriate by the Air -Force Comnander. The Army and the Navy oomrtarsdors virtually havo no control over the money alloted to their units. Th,iw is done at the idinistry of Defense lovel. Thus a fair haired Lary unit co)?;mander in the eyes o:' the L(inistor of Defense may got much ro t'?siuuoial support for his unit than another Army unit which tactually noodst far more. The Army Commander has the responsibility for maintaining the internal security of Bolivia but his hands are tied because ho has no control over his logistical support except for that which hq receives from our Milii ary Assistance i'ro;',ram? It is hoped that the two man Di 'TT now vrorking in the Ministry of Defense will be able to help alleviate this bottle noon. The Bolivian military at all levels are easy to work with =4 most appreciative of our help. In the opinion of the Afl the real bottle neck C -01 Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP85-00671 R000300070016-7 Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP85-006 18000300070016-7 C7 ( -4 rT 77 7" ,,;, ,t + t_j lire it to prof resss has boon lank of ouffioi ant zaanayr poor plans in for how the m,_nios would be usod by the P inietry o:.' Defense (especially by the Min"tor of Dufonso who has successfully maintained complete oo v`crol over the moznios for the Army and Navy). It is rumored that be will be roplaood vilthin the next two works band if this is true there is reason to hope for definite pro rona in the future. USISS The United States Infor ation Service in Bolivia is really "topnotch and has Ixad a group of real professionals aporatin3 for the good of the Coy xtry Teem o: fort. Th.=se people have boon able to reach the I3oliviaaa with their inforr aticm end Bolivians from all walks of life. They have also materially helped the Attaches by providin, us with books in Spanish which we give to Bolivian miii ary friends and military schools. This has opened rugy doors for the moor )ent AMA- and ultieatately proved lucrative to our over-all mission. The United :itatmp iuf luenos has been substantial in Bolivia end our USIS has boon a primary factor in this suoo0sss D. UrAIDs Our USAI.D program. in Bolivia in per capita one of the larroat in the world and it has been prof easioria ly operated and controlled during nsy' tie plus years in Doliviea. Tho cilrront dirootor of USAID Is one of the most capable' asad intolli cnt men I have ever known and ho works clo.c sly with the Bolivians for the In'ceeraal Dcvelopnent of Bolivia. USAID in Bolivia is not a Iva away pro,-r=. Before tho GOB rots money they must have an approved plan end a,roo to do their part in each proposed project. This has loaf to bettor plann , mutual rospoot sold more value re ooived for ovary dollar utilized, UaiAII) Is prim?trily a loaning ra?oiioy :now to assist the GOD in such pi o-locts as transportation (road coustrruo'Gi{::n)s water projects, oduoatiaa, electrical, power projects, a rioulture, mining and puhito safety. U:SAIU has i orkod closely and effectively with the United :itatoa and Bolivian Armies conoorriinr, Civic Action projects. They have also wor}a d with the Poaco Corps and developed what we call a Community Dovolopnor4t Program. This pvo:,ro has had a real impt.ot on the Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP85-00671 R000300070016-7 Approved Felease 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP85-0067000300070016-7 B E C R E T emall rural oon uuitioa whore Poaoo Corps workoro with the self-help of the loons populace and support from U AIJ have boars able to help tho pooplo in the rural areas to help thoaasolvoa by doing such things as oonatruoting sohaole end dispazzsarios, davelopinp potable water projeots, and a~ricYultural projects. USIt3 also worka olosely with tJ3AID to make sure that the publio is aware of what our aid is doing for the develop- mont of Bolivia. E. 0 1i : . The Peace Corps with approxtmately 350 young volunteers wor ring and living raith the poople in almost every part of Bolivia have had a most import aunt role in developing a rvupoot for the United States especiully &iong the illiterate populace in t o rural and nin ng meas. Eowevvr, their prot;ruma go far beyond eomaunity develapcaont,, and. have also oven influenced the uaiveraity students. . (S) THIRO CO1JNTJSUPPORT TO L0C1rL GOVL'Ttdl NTs Arc oiatina - Was allowed to establish a 'SavaI Mission in Bolivia in. early 1964. This mission in consn~ut d 1tY the Armtno Naval Attache and so far has provided only training support to the Bolivian Uavy. Although their reason for ooming to Bolivia alas to teavYt the Bolivian 1 avy how to uzo the ii boats that Argcnti.na promL:ed Bolivia in late 1966, to this date not cne 'boat has bon given to the fiolivio Navy by Argentina. .. Coordination with the U.S. nssious is practically n =uxlatnnt? Ties primAry reason that Argontina wanted this naval miesic in Bolivia was to gather iiztellig,once for the government of Argentina. Althc~uf* the Bolivian Navy 1 Iowa that it has not received anything but training, its oi'ieore and won are influenced by the presence of to Argentine Li salon. G?rrxu - has no mi7.ftwry prorama and no attaches in Bolivia, but i3 one of the partners in they CC1 IBGL tri::ngular plan. Germany has also ocontly sold Bolivia a e~voral million dollar tin smelter which is to be oo tstruet?d in ORUR0. Germany dons have favorable reputation an has influence in Bolivia. Israel ~- has several army officers in Bolivia organized as an 13 SECRE1 Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300070016-7 Approved Foelease 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP85-0067000300070016-7 0CYET a ricultural team. Thi:i team is working with GOB to improve farming tooh;airtua#. They have, bean beneficial to the GOD, and this has I also provided I sruol with a good intelligence source. There is minimal coordination botwoon this team and the United Staten, I. (3) Ai mu it; 1411Y,im o r c,,IiA2E4 3aWEASi$i The major road block to modernizing the Bolivian Armed Forces is money and thoir proneat use of military maupowor.. As long as Gunoral, OVIPmO, Coma rider--in-Chief of the Armod Forces aG4 the ?iinistar of Defense bolieve that largo numbers of soldiorn are more imports nb than a crrnaller force "o-.,up of offootive vrell-trained and well-equipped units there '411 be no significant ii-q)rov+emont in the Bolivian Atrmod Forces except whoa the U.S. provides training and equipment to MAP support a.dditicnaal unite. If the Bolivian ArW had maintained- a seller Army our the past several years and u:sod the money waved, by not having to supi:art several th:;usaad alditional and not requirod soldiers, to aodar aizo read re-equip their non-MP supported unite, they would now have a pro.Ccsnional a l well-equippod army of at least 10,000 coldiors. Ins Lad the; have an Army of 15,OU0 men of utiich only about 51,000 are Tell equipped soldiore and all of these are in US MAP supported units. \A1tii&, has convinced the Army Co.-mmzdor and his staff of the need for o'fvotive units and not a large number of poorly equipped magi in uniform,, but so far no ono has been able to convince Genoraal OV& DO and the Minister of De ie .se of this key requirement for an effective Armed Force . Listed below are areas whore increased emphasis is roquiroda 1. Mo avrai po the Do fenao Department a ad allow each service to prepare its annual budget roquiremnts. 2. Sutfici~mt money from the GOB to properly opaarate the Armed Forces. Goixw.ad supervision at all lovola. (Orders are issued but seldom does anyone chock to see if they are carried out.) d. Establish a sta; gored two yaer period of service for conscripts to insure that a minim= of 50 percent of the conscripts in the Armc,d 1:'orcas at ar-W time will have heed at least once year of tra ning. 5. Ro-?oquip at least one not-LAP' unit each year even if it mans li Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300070016-7 Approved Foelease 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP85-0067-00300070016-7 having a stt :itor Arxa r. a. Develop an intolligonoo system that -f~anotiono at all levels in all throe eorvicos sad in the Ministry of Governncnt. (At present an intelligenco gathering repability is practically non-oxtotant and this is a serious problem in the ourreeat guerrilla situation.) 7, establish an effective systems of debriefing patrols for intel- liganco infor...ation in the uorrilla area. 8. Establiah? an offootiva oc:naui ication system from the 'division level darno 9, Utilize more time oaoh day for traiiciaan and improve training mathoda. 10. 8tabali::e officer aaeiparinte. (The Bolivians rotate too o: toe from one position to another in fact many officers change aaeigaraent every year) r 11. Develop an Armed Forooo Qonoral staff that actually operates. (The current cot-up is only en informatics gathorin service for Ctonoral ) Ova Do, 12, Develop inter-3orvioo coordination and cooparaation. 23, Asaig a. strong loadora to oa>,:nmand the 3 servioen. (The preacant Ar,r and Air Force Conaanders area fine gont;leraca and intolli,+ tt, but are lac: g in loadorahip.) 14, Develop a bettor logistical system. 16. Itatablizh a system of co..raand raainternnoe inspections of unite, and prov .do units with the a soft goods" nos canary to properly maintain L .oi.r' oquipmont. 16. Improve porso.nsol ansignmonta and use the U,Bp and Panama school trained po r soLaael in their spooialtlos. 27, Enta'oliah a system for improving the morale o the military to include better and more mili-~aryt ho-..sing. 18. Develop, train, equip and modernize the Natir:nal Police Force so that it can be an offootive buffer botvrrren the people and the Armed Forces. 10. Establish a'Taetioal Oporotions Center (TOO), 16.E ml Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP85-00671 R060300070016-7 Approved F elease 2001/0103 : CIA-RDP85-006 000300070016-7 20, Develop a national Cournteransur5oznoy plan. 21. Oovolop and publish dotailvd ooatin(eaoy plauu in' advaneo for possiblo prob1oms w,rhioh any do tial :p n ; hin tho country. 22. The Prooidoait booc*i is too much involvad 'vith the Army during! oriaia such as the aurront guor illa situatim, ? (lie should run the F;ovorx t and lot the C'o.ieander-in-Chief of the Armod Forma control the militarj problems). 23. i; abiiah? offootive ?ublio Infornatica Centers at the Covor nt t 4 . ..d Yoroos loyal with closo cooperation botwaaa the trio oentors. (In this manner the publio imams of the GOB and the Armed Yoroos oould be ly onlianoo-i)$ -rout IN W. MY11t Colonal, C lArr Attache EC ET Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP85-00671 R000300070016-7