SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SECURITY POLICY ALTERNATIVES (C)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85-00821R000100110001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 30, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 15, 1978
• Content Type: MF

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy to the DCI for Resource Management
FROM: John F. Blake
Deputy Director for Administration
SUBJECT: Satellite Reconnaissance Security
Policy Alternatives (C)
/9-787
1. (C) We have reviewed the final issue paper on
Satellite Reconnaissance Security Policy Alternatives and
find the paper basically incorporates the conflicting views
of the differing parties on this matter. It would appear
that probably more weight was given in the editing process
to the State/ACDA position of opting for declassification
of "fact of" without further study.
2. (C) We did note that under the heading IMPLEMEN-
TATION CONSIDERATIONS, the final paper confines those con-
cerns as solely related to release of imagery. The point
was made more than once to OSTP that we believed that these
considerations applied to both declassification of "fact of"
and release of imagery, and that the original Work Group
paper had stated it in that fashion. It was our belief
that OSTP had agreed to incorporate that belief into the
paper during a ,final consultation last week.
3. (U) The paper contains some unfortunate redundancies
which we aftribute to hurried editing but, since the paper
is now on the street, it is not worth dwelling on at this
time.
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4. (C) We believe that the points that need to be
addressed during the Space Policy Review Council (SPRC)
meeting include:
a. Declassification of "fact of" solely
for SALT II without proof of capability, i.e.
release of imagery, is an empty shell which will
not convert any Doubting Thomases.
b. The thought of. merely informing the
Soviets of our declassification intentions as
opposed to entering into consultation with them
strikes us as ill advised in view of past Soviet
concerns. The State Department representative
should be asked to shed light on this problem
as well as advising if there have been any recent
discussions with the USSR in this area. The same
would apply vis-a-vis the allies and the lesser
Developed Countries.
c. Assuming all agree that at least some
imagery must be released to reflect the ability
of the United States to monitor arms verification,
an expression of concern should be made to reflect
Intelligence Community concern about enabling the
USSR to take action to take better protective and
concealment action against observation.
d. We continue to be concerned with the
possible loss of classified information with the
declassification of "fact of." Although the paper
suggests that a security plan to maintain intelligence
discipline, there will remain a body of formerly
cleared people who will react with a variety of
interpretations over the meaning of declassification
of "fact of" and some will undoubtedly believe that
such declassification includes declassification of
"facts about," and this may do serious harm to over-
head collection programs.
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e. Most importantly, we understand there are
political reasons for desiring an immediate decision
to delcassify, followed by development of an imple-
mentation plan. However, we are hard pressed to
understand why any adviser would suggest to the
President that he make a decision without adequate
prior staffing. We would hope that the DCI, or
his representative, would raise that point at the
SPRC and recommend that the suggested two month
study be undertaken prior to a decision to declassify
"fact of."
S. (U) We will continue to follow this issue with interest
as it makes its way toward decision.
cc: D/Security
Distribution:
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2 - DD/A
1 - D/Security
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ORIGINATOR:
131
John F. Blake
1 1 SEP 1978
Robert W. Gambino Date
Director of Security
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Under Secretary of the Air Force
4C1000 Pentagon
697-8531
Director, National SecuritY Agency
9A197 Ft. Meade
688-7111
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
3E258 Pentagon
695-7353
Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State
6531 New State
632-0342
[I
Deputy Director for Administration
I
7018 CIA Hqtrs.
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
E60 CIA Hqtrs.
Director, National Foreign Assessment Center
E62 CIA Hqtrs
Thanks,
Beverly,
?
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5 SEP lam
MEMORANDUM FOR: dader Secretary of the Mr Force
Wrectear, Natiattal Security Agency
Director of Intelligence and Research,k
Department of State .
Director, National Foreign Assessment Center
Deputy Director for Administration
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Deputy to. the DICI for Collection Tasking
lirector, De7ense Intelligence Agency
FROM:
eputy to the ll for Resource Management
SUBJECT: Satellite Reconnaissance Security Policy Alternatives (C)
1. (C) An issue paper on this subject is forwarded for your review
and comment (see Attachment 11. It will be the basis for discussion at a
special Space PRC meeting on 13 September.
2. (C) We have participated in the preparation of this paper and
have sobetted staff eve conreats OR two previous 6raFts.
some of our significant comments have not been incorporated. The comments
we submitted were coordinated with your representative on the Intelli-
gence Community Civil Space Policy Working Group (-see Attachment 2).
-3. (C) I would appreciate it if you would provide me with your
formai comments on this issue by COB. Erlday, lie 197a. Please
forward these comments to (CHB. Room telephone
Attachments:
7. Sate7iite Reconnaissance Security .
Policy Alternatives
L. Intelligence Community
Space Policy Working Group
Representatives
?
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MEMORANDUM FOR!
August 31, 1978
-The Secretary of State
Sectetarj' of t?eiense
Director, Office of Management and Budget
Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Director of Central Intelligence
Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space
Administration
P,Irect4m. effi44 4f Scince mad Teclmology Policy
SUBJECT: Space Policy Review Committee Meeting
The attdel-hed document was extracted from the ongoing civilian space policy
review-. Bccauge of it national security elements, declassification of the
'facc of" photoreccanalssance satellites wiI1 e discnssed- separately LI:1:17;:g
a Space Policy A-eview Committee meeting- on September ll,
Christine Dodson
:Staff Secretary
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:SATELLITE R PNAIScC., ECUR
T RNA IV
A. POLICY SETTING
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When the f.fnitecl 5,tates started its space reconnaissance program in the late
1930's and early 1960's, thre was considerable uncertainty as to foreign
reaction. The Powers U-2 incident in 1960 emphasized the high potential for a
major confrontation and embarrassment, yet the need for strategic intelligence
was overpowering. The US strategy was to be as unobtrusive as possible,
keeping the existence of the program covert and _avoiding the necessity for
foreign acknowledgment. In concert, the civil space program and benign appli-
cations were emphasized in public and led, over the years, to implicit general
acceptance of remote earth sensing for a variety of purposes.
It ts common knowledge that the US and ,.the USSR use satellite reconnaissance
monitoring techniques. For example, a recent book by former DCI William
Colby--cleared by the CIA prior to publication--discusses the use of overhead
photography for arms control verification purposes. Secretary of State William
Rogers stated. in 1972 that surveillance satellites were one of the means used
Co monitor SALT I. Back in the mid-1960's President Johnson An a speech in
Tennessee extemporaneously stated that the US used satellite photography to
observe Soviet ICBM deployment. He added that this activity alone justified
the expenitures on our space program. Furthermore, President Carter stated
cluri-cg a March 1977 radio call-in program that "as you probably knov, with
space satellite photography we . guarantee the security of our
? ,"
PD/NSC-37 revised the security policy for space intelligence activities by
downgrading the fact chat che VS conducts satellite recmnai5sance for intent-
gellce purpses--wieaout cliscIcslag the geneTit typs--tr. (IGDS).
PD/NSC-37 specifies that the special product controls (over imagery and other
space-derived data) is to be used sparingly by the DCI.
This section examines two possible revisions to the current policy:
First, a aizple deciztatine dec_lassification only of the fact that satel-
lite phteconnaissance is one of the national technical means used by
che 3.5 for verlficsclon of c4mpIlance vitb SA1T ant!. oVnex alma tontrol
agreements.
*On the recent Yampiles espionage case-.7-involving alleged sale of sensitive
dovzmetattan. to the Soviets?there is presently no
izaszci.n.a the_ 17-Kia.1 a.s evidence- Presently. it
is planned to enter evidence or.. the satellite document in question under pro-
(ective seaL What must be divulged openay in court viIi kift
:rime. It mray 1-eiTes3. nts1 onl:i to. admit the "fact of' photoreconnaissance
but also facts about the capabilities of VS systems In order to prosectzte
Kampiles.
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Second, a passible extension of this declassification to selectively
declaskalr?081FtRctEealmg4PPAC?iigikaiiiPP8MR416,Q4110(114Sptly3 for -
furthering economic, social, foreign policy, defense, and political
objectives of the US.
B. DECLASSIFICATION OF TE "FACT OF"
Benefits and Risks. Claim is made in public forums that the SALT II agreement
now being negotiated is unsound, in part because of public perceptions that the
covets cannot be trusted to comply with its terms. Opponents of a SALT agree-
meryr earge t'etat te oviets "etave daeatea oa SALT and. that- ti-re U5 17as aw
Inadequate ar'ility tz, IN?-rify cDmplian.ce le-al, SALT Ir. _T;) ansuerz:ng these -
charges, government spokesmen are prohibited from "officially" stating that the
US conducts sate/lite photography to monitor Soviet compliance with SALT. They
are .,restricted to using the euphemism National Technical Means (NTM) when
describing rhoce elements of our verification capability. Members of Congress
have been briefed on US monitoring techniques, however, and the fact that NTH
includes satellite photography is widely recognized and accepted by the press.
and much of the informed foreign affairs community. Thea term NTM, however, may
be lost on less-aware segments of the lay public. Direct referral to satellite
photoreconnaissance can alleviate any feeling in the. public mind that the
Administration is being evasive and is trying to cover up an inherently weak
case for SALT_ This, however, may be inadequate and it may also be necessary
to discuss facts about these capabilities io help allay public concern that we
ran adequately verify Soviet compliance with the terms of the agreement.
Declass.ifylng the "fact of" photo-satellite reconnaissance might enable govern-
ment spokesmen to make a more effective case for a SALT TT agreement. The
rA-,--kv7 to- refer
to erothle intalligenee capabilities mie.ht help allay public
concern that we can adequately verify Soviet compliance with the terms of the
agreement.
Mere are, risks ass,nciata,e with the declosification of the 'fart
of.' They are:
The classification of the "fact of satellite reconnaissance has served as
the first line of defense for the security of overhead intelligence
proRrams. After declassIficacion, US agencies and officials could be
under pressure, both 1e,ai (Freedom of Information Act (FOIA 1( and other-
w?;ee, to provide ever increasing information about the recoanaissJace
programs, as -wen as imagery itself. Acknowledgment of imagery could lead
to ferter pro:e_thg and speculation about even more tzensittve saceLlites,
Some agencies believe this pressure may be virtually irresistible and
irreversible. DiAler agencies believe that the line can be drawn in this
case as in others (e.g., nuclear weapons deployments), especially since
the 'fact of' is already widely known, even it not otEiciaIly acknowledged.
A
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Soviet reaction to a public statement to the effect that we use photo-
-reconnaissance satellites. Subsequent harmful. consequences in various
arms control discuszdons (e.g., ASAT, CM) and other outer-space issues
also could result. At a high level we would need to inform or consult
with the Soviets on the scope of and reasons for any change in US policy
prior to any announcement that might ensue.
There may be adverse reaction in the UN Outer Space Committee to official
US acknowledgment of its photoreconnaissance activities, particularly on
the part of the developing countries. Some have already expressed concern
that civil remote sensing activities pose a threat to their military and
economic security. Such acknowledgment could result in increased pressures
for controls on remote sensing from satellites and possibly demands that
"military" satellites be banned. On the other hand, the fact is already
widely known, and increased demand for access could likewise result.
Acknowledgment in the context of SALT verification, however, would likely
be applauded by developing countries. .
C. ISSUE FOP. DECISION ON "FACT OF"
Some believe that, with appropriate preparation, the "fact of" can be decladsi-
fled now with real but acceptable risks to intelligence security and to US
foreign and domestic policy. According to this view, we could proceed to
publicly acknowledge that photo-satellite reconnaissance programs are among the
moans used by the US to verify Soviet compliance with SALT and other arms
control aereements. They believe there is an obvious, commonsense value to the
forthright admission of what is already widely known. Furthermore, they
believe that implementation plans should be developed prior to public announce-
ments on this matter. Such plans could be prepared within a few weeks and
would include:
A ?residential directive that (1) declassification of "fact of" is limited
to photoreconnaissance for verification of SALT and other arms control
agreements and that (2) all data derived from overhead reconnaissance
remain tlassitied and compartmented in accordance with existing guidelines.
A security plan to maintain intelligence discipline.
A plan of action for informing Congress, our allies, and the Soviets prior
to a public a000-,;ncement.
Contingency pLanning to deal with reactions of other countries and a
thorough set. of Q's and A's.
Others believe that the "fact of" can be declassified but that not enough ig
presencly known about the near- and long-term impacts on US satellite reconnais-
sance and suggest that a study of a few months is required to make the best
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_RX11119ffe?2/AL 4KW-P?Wirg63?011q864-& from
ormation or
imagery from space reconnaissance, is of limited value. Further, they believe
that prior to a decision on implementation more study is needed over the next
few months. This study would evaluate the ramifications of declassifying the
"fact of" and develop a full and detailed execution plan that would include: a
security plan to maintain intelligence discipline; a detailed consultation
strategy with the Congress, our allies, the Soviet Union, and members of the UN
Outer Space Committee; and contingency strategies by responsible agencies. They
also believe that the implementation considerations outlined in the discussion
on declassification of photographic imagery should be taken into account in any
decision on the "fact of" as well. Essentially, under this approach the
decision on declassification of the "fact of" in the context of SALT verifica-
tion would be deferred for the few months necessary to complete the more
detailed review.
D. DECLASSIFICATION OF PNOTORECONNAISSANU DIAGERY
Any decision to go beyond declassification of the "fact of" and to additionally
include a selective and phased public release of'photoreoonnaissance imagery or
information from space reconnaissance increases both risks and benefits. Any
steps taken in this area either measured or decisive would represent a signifi-
cant Administration initiative in space that would have worldwide impact.
1..nlike other major space initiatives--Apollo OT solar power satellites--
declassification -would not have a budget impact. It is believed that the risks
and the potential long-term benefits of such a policy revision warrant a care-
ful assessment of this possibility before acceptance or rejection. But, of
course, such an assessment would be pursued only if the "fact of" were
declassified.
Por.:-.nrial Benefit,: and. Risks. The broader use- of presently-clasaffied- data
could well be an efficient means of meeting certain domestic needs for an
authoritative data base supplementing (or In some cases replacing) imagery
sources currently available to the private and public sector. For example,
stereoscopic imagery of cartographic quality has already been collected over
mur_h ef the world. Its exploitation has been largely limited to government
intelligence and mapping functions. Its value to mineral and petroleum
exploration?either in raw image form or as analyzed thematic geological map
products-1s )recely to be high, representing a quantum increase in the eNplpra-
lion data base.
Other potential economic applications of such data include: land use, disaster
assessment and relief, environmental monitoring, forestry inventories, and crop
productivity. Some of these applications require the repetitive coverage being
offered by civil systems and not envisaged for intelligence systems which might
be availaI/le to the civil community. Same civil uses would benefit from the
availability of a high-quality imagery data base in many instances even if it
were quite old. If a decision were made to do so, much stored imagery could be
made availlabSe today from Sower performance reconnaissance systems 130 Longer in
Operation RS well as curriently collected imagery.
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decla*pro
,- -
Th Ii Pbtf*letei2odroti/68 ? dRbAniersiii4666-1 ertif5'
SALT 21, flexzbi/ity cou d e provided in the DS in international aftairs by
less-constrained use of remote sensing data. Verifiability and verification
could be mote credibly demonstrated with the release of imagery or information
derived therefrom. Peacekeeping possibilities might include private or public
release of visual evidence or information and f analysis of- impenaIng
hostile acticins, or threatening situations (weapons shipments, border viola-
tions, nuclear ca;abilities); economic development information could be pro-
vided without sub7erfuge as to data sources.
-
The risks associated with limited declassification of satellite imagery can be
categorized as follows:
Imagery from intelligence systems provides information on militarily
significa= targets such as airfields, missile deployments, etc. With
frequent monitoring, military deployment and levels of military production
can be determined. As these capabilities are appreciated?more directly
relevant to the national interests of the non-major powers---we could
expect resistance and pressure for restrictions by other countries.
Sth ?'i bexpeaed to Lead to. questions as to the legiti-
macy of military uses of outer space systems. The Outer Space Treaty
reserves the use of space for "peaceful purposes." Some states, such as
Japan,
have already called for demilitariaation of spase. The release of
imagery could exacerbate these demands.
The Soviets have maintained the basis for fleIih/y distinguishing between
legitimate and illegitimate remote earth sensing. They recognize a
sanctuary only for "NTM's." Use of cameras in space for other purposes
z-j-Vaa arMS =Ireito.rire-e. they czr,sizler r.liclos.,2.re of Tzhe
imagery surely would stimulate discussion throughout the international
co?luniry--uct just the communist bloc, but the non-alligned countries
as Well As our allies?of limitations on remote sensing. The Soviets may
also use the release of imagery to attempt to justify their ASAT activities.
Disclosure of selected imagery provides some information on the design and
capabilities of the imaging system. For film return systems, this may be
more gcceptable, althaugh the implies-clans could cause adversary natlons
to increase concealment measures.
The security risk in unclessifled use of the products of the latest
operational systems would be high- A po:ticy of uncIassified release o.
rhe most current imagery could nor be readily reversed. Thos, the eAtent
to which the decision to declassify satellite imagery would impact on a
later option to provide special security protection for new systems must
be carefully weighed.
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SheelA the seeetrna71 ,e.cision be taken to selectively release imagery, a
number of additional factors would have to be taken into account in formulating
an e-mpIementatfon plan. Certain of rhe factors are summarized heioue
The USSR. The is sensitive to world opinion about the relative techno-
logical capabilitees of the US and the Soviet Union. Comparisons between
Soviet and US imagery capabilities produced by US release of imagery, would
tend to cast t:le )SSR in an unfavorable light. -Second, the Soviets could view
a public_ policy change as casting doubt on their ability to prevent "espionage"
from outer space. For internal and international prestige reasons, they might
choose to take a hard line, including a more negative posture in ASAT negoti-
atious, auemented development of their ASAT systems, and renewed efforts in the
UN'to estabLisn stringent limitations on. the conduct of remote sensing activi-
ties_ _Last, declassification could be viewed as a form of international "one-
upsmanship" by the IS, especially in light of current US-USSR tensions. If
imagery release were contemplated, any assessment would have to examine whether
to inform the Soviets beforehand of the stope, purposes, and timing of any
release. The Soviets would react more strongly to a US decision to release
imagery than to declassification of the "fact of." Eigh level prior consulta-
tion with the USSR may be necessary in view of our tacit agreement with them on
photoreconnaissance use. hs such, a risk-benefit analysis of declassifying
imegery must take Soviet reactions into account.
Intelligence Security. The classification of the "fact of" satellite recon-
nnieeance has served as the first line of defense for the security of oeerhead
space intellieeence proesams. After declassification, US agencies and officials
would he under consideraSle pressure to provide more information. More
importantly, however, information obtained from photography alone is often
aMbiguous; intelligence judgments are derived from analysis of data from a
variety of sources. We should not compromise other intelligence sources and
meOwds as acesultoicelea,zlag Ototography. Well-thought-out strategies of
intormatton release and management of requests are necessary preconditions to
tlyn cake sceps toward declassification of imagery.
rm.pact u,n Decislons on the future orsanization of the VS remote
,:ensJng prngram wond be impacted by decisions to Telease ptevivosi7p tlassi_fled
imazery. If the US sets up a new organization structure for remote sensing
irmu space, !:or tle. ivi.5 could raise issues concerning the future manag,e-
ment of satelilte reconnaissance, particularly if the imagery presently classi-
fied were declassified for wider civil application. Selective release of
imaem.7 alsv t,TAls ,;_heIciiIn andmilicary-incenigewLe
remote sensing. Our heretofore highly touted international policy of open
dissemination of :remote sensing data (based on acknowledgment only of MASA
data would lose credibility, and new policies would have to be examined.
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There is no question that data on space intelli ence would be sousht under the
FCL and t Amp roiNecla 9r ROMA giV)2/PliPliP6-131f 1192113g9g1TAIRVil closures
tlee intelliganeee azed earezioneel seceerirT. Been IF cable guidelines guidelines were established and maintained as to what is classified and
why, the courts would not be bound to adhere to them in deciding MA cases.
Such guidelines could be established by Presidential Directive.
Allies. Civen that. US friends and allies are either direct or indirect
riciaries of the US intelligence programs, their interest in preserving
peded ac:ess to valid intelligence information would have to be assured
consultations that
political
lar
che
care
outlined the limits
assessment of external (i.e.,
would
have
bene-
through
and extent of planned disclosure and the
Soviet and other) reactions. Particu-
to given question of possible imagery release by
VS of data taken over Allied countries.. Mueh of the foreign iete/Ifgence
supplied to NATO about Warsaw Pact. countries comes from US overhead sources.
As such, diplcmatic repercussions might-arise-when it became known that some
a221es in Ole pzi-C had received satellite-derived data and others had not.
be
to the
rnternationai Reactions. With the release of imagery, countries previously
quiescent about overhead reconnaissance might decide to take a stronger
pcsitica co the basic questioses toncerning sovereignty and expleitatien by more
powerful states. Many developing countries (LDC's) increasingly recognize that
they can benefit from remote sensing. However, the LDC's generally have in the
past argued for a restrictive legal regime governing these activities. The
effect of a US release of imagery could be to stiffen their resolve toward a
restrictive regime. One might expect that the obvious international benefits
0E ereeateeceie arm caxeeeol woaald vaftes such arguments. M4ny, indeed, Temgniza
that satet]ites are essential for arms control. The record of the LDC's in the
United Nations
some LDC's may
better quality
may not be an accurate measure of real LOC responses. Tti fact,
in the long run see it in their interest to gain access to
imagery.
US Public Reactions. The announcement of the "fact of" would serve te! affirm
the commitment of the Admintstration to greater openness in government and the
promotion of space operations for keeping the. peace. Without public examples
of data. aualic\l, (lowever, there will be many questions as to the dtee et
public confidence in verifiability.
F. RECC-nnENZ-TD ACT-70ZZ CN VECLASSTIFICATION OF MAGERY
Preliminary review
of remotel-;-s+2nsed
and foreign. This
jiLl be on the use
derived therefrom,
acquire such data.
detailed execution
suggests the need to study a new national policy in the use
fruaged data for a spectrum of US interests, both domestic
cannot be decided now without a thorough review. The focus
of remotely-sensed data and the information that can be
not on the management of the collection systems which
Further study is necessary that would include full and
and contingency plans developed well in advance of policy
revision to release photereconnaissance imagery. Analyzing the concept of a
space intelligence policy which looks beyond the "fact or will fall Into four
phases:
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An in rorq90kFetiTbikRellea42bb2/CP1768tINACIMAi3E41-10661661frib01-113this paper
by selected indivduals from the Departments of Defense and State, the
Intelligence Community, the Executive Office of the President, and others
as appropriate under the direction of the Space Policy Review Committee.
This will be accomplished in 3 months.
Z. FTesfdent:lai revie%i and decision on desitalstalty aE change and: a7p-co7rt.,rte
scope.
3. DetaLled development and setting in place of the imp1ementatfon e2erpents--
consu1tation stra:egies, security planning, contingency plans--by the
responsjbie agencies over a period of at least 3 months.
Execution after final ?residential review and approval.
4
SECRET XGDS 'CB) (2)
-8-
SECRET
Approved For Release 2002/01/08 :.CIA-RDP85-00821R000100110001-3
Approved For Release 2002/01/08 : CIA-RDP85-00821R000100110001-3
CIVIL SPACE POLICY IC WORKING GROUP
ORGANIZATION NAME
SAFSS Capt. David A. Messner
NSA
State/INR Joseph E. Hayes
DIA Cdr. R. 1. Seger
NFAC Robert A. Johnson
DDA
DOIS&T
D/DCUCT
DIDCl/RM
COM/REX
Of XI/ RM
DIDCIRM
CONFIDENTIAL
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25X1A
25X1A