CIA REPRESENTATION TO NATIONAL DISCLOSURE POLICY COMMITTEE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85-00821R000100120009-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 14, 2001
• Sequence Number: 9
• Content Type: MF

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Deputy Director of Security (PFM)
TATINTLFROM:
Acting ie , Policy and Plans Group
SUBJECT: CIA Representation to National Disclosure
Policy Committee
REFERENCES: (a) Memorandum from Chief, Coordination Staff/
NFAC, to Director of Security, dated
8 May 1978, same subject
(b) Memorandum from Mr. PPG, STATINTL
to Chief, PPG, date 15 June 1976,
subject: Office of Security Representation
on National Disclosure Policy Committee
1. Reference (a), in requesting that the National Foreign
Assessment Center provide the primary DCI representative to the
National Disclosure Policy Committee (NDPC), injects a condition
STATINTLnot present when Mr. wrote Reference (b) and recommended
ransfer of the function to the'Security Officer, Office of the
DCI', viz. the willingness of NFAC to assume primary NDPC repre-
sentation. But, in my opinion, there is a factor common to both
recommendations, viz. that the DCI would be more appropriately
represented by someone other than a representative of Policy angTATINTL
Plans Group, Office of Security.
2. The above is not to diminish the role that-,Mr.
has played in raising the level of participation and in
in NDPC matters not merely within the Office of Security but,
I suspect, throughout the Agency. He has brought about, through
his energetic and conscientious. participation, an interest on
the Agency's part, on the one hand, and a respect for and even
a positive solicitation of the Agency's views by the NDPC, on
the other, which were not previously discernible, by all
accounts. But the void which Mr. has filled, he has STATINTL
done so as a surrogate for Agency interests other than those
of th
Offi
e
ce of Security, in most instances, and that burden
is one which, in my view, can now be better assumed by NFAC.
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3. CIA's participation in NDPC decisions is rarely of
a security nature in the organizational sense. The recommen-
dations sought from and provided by CIA are usuall based on
analyses outside the purview of OS. In fact, Mr. k NMI
Pctimatte that QQ nercent of the issues he has handled ha
fication level of certain military hardware information to
potentially interested component, the DDO might more logically
experience to deal with such issues and ends up merely serving
as a messenger. This is not a cost-effective use of a GS-14,
and it deprives both CIA and the NDPC of the benefits of on-
the-spot contributions by those more expert in these types
of questions.
4. The fact that it is valuable for the CIA represen-
tative to be able to say that he must consult before offering
his agency's views (see page 4 of Reference b). does not justify
assigning a person who is least likely to have the professional
competence to address matters directly as they arise in NDPC
meetings, for any representative would still maintain the need
to consult. However, that.line of reasoning underscores that
security matters rarely arise since it is thought "safest" to
be represented by an individual.who can most logically buy
time pleading lack of expertise and need to consult. I
believe that an organization should always be represented
by individuals having expertise in the matters likely to
be discussed and who will be actively engaged. in the internal
analyses leading to that organization's official position.
5. It is believed that NFAC, as outlined in Reference (a),
is the component best suited to fulfill the above role. It
seems to me, further, that the alternate member should
logically also come from NFAC if one concurs with my under-
standing that the alternate is to replace the primary represen-
tative when the latter is unable to attend. If the alternate
is conceived as a stand-by representative from some other
TATINTL be chosen. Mr. anticipates that there will be
increased secure y survey activities in which CIA will be
invited to participate, but I do not believe that this single
recurring item will require regular attendance at NDPC meetings.
I would suggest that PPG be designated as the focal point for
OS-related NDPC activities but that OS pull out of membership
per se.
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6. It is, accordingly, recommended that the Director of
Security approve the transfer of primary representation on the
NDPC to NFAC and that he decline retention of alternate repre-
sentation responsibility.
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15 JUN 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chiefl, Policy and Plans Group, OS
STATINTL FROM
WW.e , Plans Branch, PPG/OS
SUBJECT Office of Security Representation on
the National Disclosure Policy Committee
1. Pursuant to my Letter of Instruction, a review
and analysis of the Office of Security's representation
and the CIA's participation on the National Disclosure
Policy Committee (NDPC) has been conducted. It included
the following:
a. A historical review,of the Office of
Security's and the Agency's participation in
the NDPC.
b. An evaluation of the Agency's and the
Office of Security's current participation in
the NDPC.
c. Discussions with the representatives of
the DDI, DDO, and DDSF,T who serve as focal
points within their Directorates for NDPC
matters.
2. The historical review, summary at=tached, drew
heavily on a 1975 similar aid more detailed study con-
STATINTL ducted by Mr. Several identical points
emerge from both studies:
a. The Agency; is not the "favorite child"
of the NDPC. I
b. The NDPC would prefer that the DCI repre-
sentative not be selected from the Office of
Security. (In 1966 they stated their preference
that the DCI representative not be drawn from a
Security Division.) The DCI stated he saw no
reason to change his representative and has
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continued to use
to represent him
the Office of Security
on the NDPC. .
c. In the last five years there has
been an erosion, especially in NDPC security
surveys, in the Office of Security partici-
pation and, therefore, the Agency's partici-
pation relative to NDPC matters. Secondly,
the Agency has not submitted an NDPC request
in approximately four years.
3. Without suggesting that the Office of Security
and, therefore, the Agency has reached anywhere near its
full potential relative to the NDPC, it would seem that
in some aspects we havle been able to enhance our position
over the last year. This results from:
a. In the past, it has been our practice
to have a seniorlsecurity officer named as the
prime representative while it was his alternate,
a junior officer,) who carried out all the day-
by-day transactions with the NDPC. The prime
alternate was only a name to the NDPC. In 1976,
the Office of Security installed a junior officer
as the prime representative and a senior officer
as his alternate. Consequently, day-by-day
activities are handled by the prime representative.
b. The Agencyy recently initiated, and
received approval on, an NDPC case whose process-
ing required considerable interface between the
Agency and the NDPC.
c. During the past year, the Agency has had
reason to challenge two NDPC actions. In one
instance, the Agency wished to voice a precautionary
note relative to an NDPC decision concerning
In the second instance, the Agency
c a enge the approach NDPC was taking concerning
a report they were preparing for the White House
on security compromises of NDPC releases. Both
cases were literally "hammered out" before the
entire Committee and in both cases we achieved
accommodation without compromise. Those days
"in court" did well for the Agency. Committee
members from other government agencies volunteered,
almost to a man, that they supported both our
position and the manner in which we presented it.
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d. As a coro
a noticeable incr
representative by
It appears they a
Mary to c., there has been
ease in contact of the CIA
other members of the NDPC.
re more prone than formerly
to call. Although most contacts do concern
NDPC, Committee members call occasionally for
assistance on other Agency related matters.
4. The evaluation of our current participation also
revealed that there islstill much work to be done:
a. Over the years we have accumulated six
full safe drawers
never used.
b. The Agenc
to participate on
brief those repre
on a survey.
c. The Offic
is that of a cond
Agency component
in NDPC actions.
5. It was with t
that PPG initiated dis
the DDI, DDO, and- DDS&
for their respective D
centered upon the "def
corrected.
6. It was agreed
material should be des
the material were diss
ponents upon receipt.
within the Pentagon if
location of a past ref
In brief, the material
and is not needed as a
y has still not been asked
an NDPC security survey or to
sentatives who will participate
e of Security's primary role
uit between the NDPC and the
that has an actual interest
hese three "deficiencies" in mind
cussions with representatives of
T who serve as the NDPC focal points
irectorates. The discussions
iciencies" and how they could be
that the stockpile of unused NDPC
troyed as duplicate copies of all
eminated to appropriate Agency com-
We could draw upon the NDPC Office
a requirement necessitated the
exence, even under a short deadline.
takes up space, contributes nothing
reserve.
7. Concerning thle Agency's lack of participation in
the NDPC's security survey program, it was also agreed
that we could reflect an increased interest by inviting
those NDPC officers selected to participate on a security
survey to come to the Agency for a "country" briefing.
It was recognized that this could not be done in every
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case. Appropriate clearances would be involved as
well as decisions by the "country" desk that they had
pertinent information and the time to prepare and
present a briefing. However, it was the consensus that
if such briefings could be presented even a fraction of
the time, it would definitely show a genuine desire to
participate and contriibute.
8. Concerning to Office of Security role, all
three representatives from the other Directorates believe
that the central NDPC focal point for the Agency should
remain within the Office of Security. Historically,
the Directorates have been happy with the service.
Historically, a past LCI has gone on record stating that
he opted to have his representative on the NDPC come
from the Office of Security. It was also conceded
during the discussion with the representatives from the
other Directorates that it is a very practical gratuity
that the present system allows the CIA representative to
candidly state he must consult with an appropriate desk
before voicing an Agency opinion; that as a Security
Officer, he is not an area specialist, and cannot be
expected to be an authority on a particular country.
There are times when-questions before the NDPC require
that the Agency be deliberately precise in what it says
and how it says it. The conduit role, because we must
consult, allows time for studied preciseness.
9. The discussions with the other Directorate
representatives also developed that it would be a very
difficult task to select a more appropriate component to
represent the DCI on the NDPC. In almost all NDPC cases,
both the DDI and DDO have a concern from the standpoint
that they want to know what information or material is
released, or requested by a foreign country. The DDS$T
also has a very pertinent interest in some of the hardware
that is released and to whom it is released. In summary,
from the viewpoint that there is no other component that
would more naturally fit the role, it was concluded that
the Office of Security should continue to provide the
DCI representative on the NDPC.
10. Upon completion of these discussions, PPG then
investigated the possibility that there is some-other
Office of Security component better suited for the task.
This investigation developed that there would be consi-
derable merit in having the Security Officer for the Office
of the DCI also serve as the DCI representative on the NDPC.
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The reasons for this conclusion are:
a. The position title of "DCI Repre--
sentative to NDPC" implies that if the
selectee were part of the DCI Staff, he
would be in a better position to serve as the
.DCI representative. The Security Officer
for the Office of the DCI is part of the
DCI Staff.
b. As the focal point within the Agency for
the NDPC, a position on the DCI Staff appears
to be much more catholic in scope than if the
representative were drawn from any of the four
Directorates.
c. Any conflict, or even any potential
conflict, that could develop between the CIA
and NDPC would necessarily involve the DCI's
attention. The Security Officer for the Office
of the DCI would have the best vantage point
for knowing who on the DCI Staff should be
advised of the situation and how it should
be done.
d. The overall effect of the change would
be good on the ND PC. They would view it as a
decision of the DCI to select his representative
from his own personnel staff as opposed to
having the designee come from one of the four
Directorates.
e. "d." would honor the NDPC request of
1966. However, it would be done within the
DCI's decision to maintain an Office of Security
representative as his representative on the NDPC.
11. In summary, as a result of this study,
recommend*:
a. With the 'lifting of the destruction
moratorium, and after the Records Management
Schedule has been appropriately changed, all
six drawers on NDPC material be destroyed.
b. All future correspondence from the
NDPC will be sent directly to the appropriate
CIA components for their retention or destruction.
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The Office of Security should retain copies
of this materiallfor three months after which
it should be destroyed. This would keep
accumulation to 'a minimum.
c. Working with the DDT and DDO repre-
sentatives, the Agency should take positive
steps to reflect the CIA desire to participate
and contribute to the NDPC security survey
program.
d. The Security Officer for the Office of
the DCI should bl named as the DCI repre-
sentative on the NDPC.
12. In presenting recommendation d., it is recog-
nized that this can only be effected when that officer
has the concurrence of his own supervisor on the DCI
Staff and when his own workload allows him to accept the
additional task. It also recognizes that the PPG
Security Officer would function as an alternate until
that time when a more appropriate Office of Security
representative could be selected for that position.
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 ATTACHMENT
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SUBJECT: Historical ReIview of Office of Security
and Agency Participation in the National
Disclosure Policy Committee
1. CIA involvement in the National Military Infor-
mation Disclosure program commenced in .1949 when an
Agency representative was given an "observer" status
on the State - Defense Military Information Control
Committee. In 1959 the observer status was challenged
in a survey of the S-DMICC by a National Security
Council representative who recommended that membership
be limited to State--DDOi=Army, Navy, Air Force, and
AEC with participation by other agencies only when the
subject matter involved their interest. The final. NSC
action, September ?95-9, signed by the President,
established that :here would be voting representation
by the CIA on items of concern to them under consideration
by S-DMICC.
2. The rig at of vote did not resolve the issue of
membership which was left open until 1964 when the
"United States National Disclosure Policy" issued by
the Secretary of State stipulated for the first time
that the representative of the Director of Central Intel-
ligence was a reg- ? a- voting member.
3. In 1969 the State Department, in the first draft
of a National Disclosure Policy revision, dropped the
DCI representative from membership. In effect, the
membership had resulted from the State Department's 1964
policy paper which was above the intent of NSC's 1959
action to give CIA voting- representation on items of
concern to them. The DCI strongly demurred and opted
for continual general membership. The matter was resolved
by the establishment of the Categories of General and
Special Membership. The DCI, as Chief Intelligence Officer
of the United States, accepted Special Membership on
the basis that "my representative will be kept informed
on all matters brought before the NDPC."
4. Other problems of the NDPC which have a direct
interest to the DCI are the selection of the CIA represen-
tative for the NDPC and the Committees Security inspection
function.
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S. In 1966, two studies of Committee activities by
the Department of State and Defense, concluded that the
CIA appointees should be from a high enough level to per-
mit decision making and from a non-technical or operational
directorate- One report actually stated a preference for
representation other than from the Security divisions.
The DCI responded that he saw no impediment to NDPC efforts
caused by having his representative selected from the
Office of Security- If problems developed concerning
timely and adequate responses, he was to be advised and
would then take corrective action. There has been no
question on choice- of the CIA representative since that
time.
6. The proble.- -.of Agency participation in NDPC
Security inspec-i- appears to be one of erosion. Since
1949 the NDPC condhted approximately 90 surveys and
the Agency provide-d representation in fifteen instances.
The last survey-t?zz accompanied by a CIA representative
was in 1968 anc she Agency has not been asked to
participate since 170 when Chairmanship of the NDPC
passed from the State Department to'the Department of
Defense. On 17 April 1~~975, the NDPC issued its tentative
schedule for f 9 - 7 _ 5 through CY 1977. Ten surveys., .are
planned. The CIA has u, t been invited to participate.
Although not officiailyPstated, the Committee has limited
survey team membership in the past because (a) budget
restrictions and (b) because Ambassadors prefer small
groups. Furthermore, team membership generally goes
to the military who have a primary interest in the
hardware involved.
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