AGENCY LONG-RANGE PLANNING(Sanitized)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85-00988R000500060016-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 2, 2004
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: October 26, 1979
• Content Type: MF

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MV1ORANDUM FOR:
ecretary, ecutive Committee
FROM : Bruce C. Clarke, Jr.
SUBJECT : Agency Long-Range Planning
1. Over the past several months, in response to Executive
Committee (ExCom) guidance provided at the 11 April meeting, the NFAC
has been developing a list of candidate critical long-range problems
that the Agency will have to address over the next decade (Attachment 1).
During the course of this activity it has become apparent that we are
unaccustomed to thinking in the terms required for long-range planning.
It is now obvious that the NFAC must take additional steps to fully
develop an intelligence-driven, long-range problem set, and a mechanism
for attacking them, before we can be of hel to the DDS &T and the DDO i
their own long-range planning efforts.
2. In order to get: this process started in the NFAC, I intend to
take the following steps over the next several weeks:
a. I will meet with my office directors to review
and discuss the problems that have been identified.
Criteria must be developed for distilling the problem set
to the most important problems and to examine approaches
for the NFAC to use in our long-range planning.
b. The office directors will be asked to identify
individuals in their offices for the purpose of assembling
a small group in each office to refine the problem set.
c. With the assistance of my office directors, four
to six individuals from these office working groups will
be selected to form a core group for develo in the NFAC
planning process to continue this effort.:
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3. Considerable attention also has been given to developing a
flexible long-range collection strategy for attacking the large number
and variety of intelligence problems that have been identified. Con-
tinuation of the Pilot Collection Program (PCP) approach would require
that only a few problems be selected from the many facing the NFAC. An
alternate approach to the PCPs is presented in Attachment 2 which pro- 25,
vides a more comprehensive concept of addressing our problems. I be-
lieve that this approach will be more cost-effective, and allow us more
flexibility in the use of the Agency's limited resources.
4. Reports on our progress will be made to the ExCom over the next
several months. Once sufficient progress has been made in the NFAC on
this effort, it would be of help to us if representatives from the D/O
and D/SET would review our work and assist us in planning our course of
action. One or two individuals from each directorate would be suitable
for this interaction.
f) GV-1
Bruce C. Clarke, Jr.
Attachments:
1. Candidate Long-Range Intelligence Problems
2. Long-Range Collection and Production Planning
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CANDIDATE LONG-RANGE Ih=IGENCE PROBLEMS -
SOVIET UNION
*1. Balance of Power. The Soviet Union continues to increase the
capabilities o t eir strategic weapons systems and may, during the next
decade, obtain offensive weapon superiority over the United States. It
is vital to assess what changes would take place'in the areas of Soviet
foreign policy goals, objectives and strategy were this superiority to
take place and what action needs to be taken to counter. these changes.
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city interests for the foreseeable future. Soviet nuclear. weapon capa-
*2. Camouflage, Concealment, and Deception--the Effect on
Intelligence Production. We have long recognized that t e Soviet Union
has expressed a basic policy wherein deception is a major goal in all
military and political activities. Many instances of deception applica-
tions have been observed, although usually in isolated occurrences. It
can be anticipated, however, that the USSR has the capability to engage
in widespread, organized, and comprehensive deception practices if they
should decide that the advantages will offset the costs in terms of
resource and program inefficienc`Tes. Should this occur, the Intelligence
Community needs to understand how and where intelligence production will
be affected, and take steps to nullify the effects of deception activities
if necessary.
*3. Indications and Warning. Over the past several years, the
Soviet Union has been able to greatly increase their knowledge of-the US
Intelligence Community's collection. capabilities. As a result of this
recent knowledge, they will undoubtedly make a number of changes in
operating procedures for both their offensive and defensive programs.
The Intelligence Community needs to assess how these changes will affect
our I&W ca abilities and what action needs to be taken to counter these
changes.
*4. Nuclear Weapons Research, Development, Testing and Production.
The Soviet Union will remain the single greatest threat to the US secu-
bilities will continue to be central to this threat.
integrated efforts of a variety of collection and analysis assets.
and CTBT. Effective monitoring of these types of treaties will require
*S. Treaty Monitoring. We will have to monitor treaties such as
SALT II and posse ly SALT III as well as other treaties such as the ASAT
?Problems which appear to merit additional attention.
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*6. Future ii.lz ystems. Intelligence prod ions of future
Soviet military systems, especially for aerospace defense, are criti-
cally important to US defense policymakers for their impact on SALT as
well as on US weapon decisions. Of particular concern are the tech-
nological options open to the Soviets to improve their ability to
counter the present and projected US low-altitude air-breathing missile
threat and the time frame when relevant stems may enter the inventory.
7. Applied Sciences and Emerging Technologies. Present day
physical and life sciences and emerging technologies can be expected to
contribute to future civilian and military systems developments and
perhaps form the basis for the-emergence of military and economic threats.
Of particular concern are foreign, notably Soviet., science and technology
policies, research capabilities and activities in the physical sciences
and advanced technologies, as well as the transfer of technology to the
USSR and its assimilation there.
8. Biological/Chemical Warfare. Independent judgments are con-
tinually being sought on a range of assessments on the current BW/GV
threat to NATO and in a2 port of CW treaty negotiations
*9. Military Technology Developments. Extremely important policy
questions in US strategic posture hinge on. Soviet capabilities in ad-
vanced technologies in a number of key areas such as:
a. Acoustic and non-acoustic technologies appli-
cable to ASR' and their impact on future Soviet ASR' force
capabilities.
b. Directed energy, including the pace, scope and
direction of Soviet programs and likely availability dates
of potential directed energy weapon systems.
c. Microelectronics and the application of this
technology to military systems. New Soviet weapon systems
will depend on improvements in onboard electronics for
their effectiveness.
.d. Advances in inertial guidance components are of
particular relevance in understanding Soviet efforts to
improve missile accuracy. Such developments as maneuvering
reentry vehicles and homing cruise missiles would further
threaten the US land-based missile force.
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they are king progress in improving their defenses
against penetration at low altitudes. Stile must monitor
their activities over the next 5-10 years very closely to
determine whether they can develop effective counter-
measures to US weapons like the cruise missile.
f. Effectiveness of Soviet ABM and ASAT efforts may be
curtailed somewhat by arms agreements, but the Soviets con-
tinue to conduct RFD programs in these areas. We must be able
to assess the results of these programs which will incorporate
higher forms of technology in future years.
*10. Soviet Reliance on Spacecraft and Their Vulnerabilities.
The Soviets are expected to continue their emphasis on space with
improv systems for intelli ence atherin warning and weapons sup-
port.
11. The general area relating to Soviet science policy (as opposed
to analysis of specific SF,T disciplines or areas) that governs current
and will govern future performance of Soviet SF1T, including military
research and development will continue to be of major concern. The per-
formance of the Soviet S&T community is a major key to USSR's policy and
capabilities because its leadership heavily depends on that performance
for the implementation of its policies at.home and abroad. The future
performance of that community (including military RFD and production)
will be specifically affected by a number of developing systemic and
societal problems such as: the impact of increasing, already-pervasive
Party rule on the SF~T community; the changing composition of the nation-
alities and the growing social stratification with their impact on the
training, utilization and attitudes of future Soviet S$T personnel; the
growing complexity of inter-elite group relations (e.g., between the S&T
community on the one hand, and the Soviet military, governmental bureau-
cracy, and the Party apparatus on the other); the demographic changes
with the resulting implications of upcoming labor shortages; the effect
of looming generational changes on the Soviet S&T hierarchy and ranks;
the problem of misemployment of Soviet S&T personnel; organizational
problems related to interactions among the Academy of Sciences, the
ministries, the State Committee for Science and Technology, and Gosplan.
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Consideration should o be given to.unique policy c m s per ining
to the relationships of the Academy of Science to the Academy of Medical 25~
Science, the Ministry of Health and the military medical academies with
regard to research and development, development of health care delivery
systems and health and environmental regulations.
12. Soviet dependence on foreign (and particularly US) science and
technology will be a key issue during the next decade. Analysis of this
question would further illuminate the amount and kind of possible lev-
erage the US might have in influencing Soviet internal and external 25
policies and developments affecting US national interests and security.
Such an analysis could also contribut to our assessment of current and
future Soviet military capabilities.
*13. Domestic Stability. The Brezhnev regime may very well have
mortgaged future for current stability in the political, social, and
cultural spheres by striving generally to preserve the status quo,
pursuing a nondisruptive incremental.ism to achieve modest improvements,
and avoiding the really hard issues. While the prospects for continued
stability in the short run (3-5 years) are relatively good, in the long
term the cumulative effects of two decades of conservatism will be felt
in several areas that are key to the regime's stability. The most
salient of these areas, which will require close monitoring through
intensified collection and analytical efforts, are the following:
a. A generational change in the Soviet political
elite, that could result in a regime more dynamic, aggres-
sive, and possibly threatening to Western interests;
b. Severe economic resource strains, exacerbated by
growing consumer expectations, that will require adjust-
ments in economic, military and foreign policy priorities;
c. Worsening demographic trends that could result in
social and labor dislocations, intensification of national-
ist antagonisms, and military discipline problems; and
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d. Increased popular demand for freer movement of
people and ideas (human rights) and closer observance of
the letter of the law, under the influence of international
CHINA
*1. Nuclear Weapons Research, Develo n ent, Testing and Production. 25X1
Essential to PRC military capabilities, which have significant growth
potential, is the growing nuclear component.
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*2. Missile and Space Programs. China's missile and space pro-
grams have been limping along for anumber of years. However, there
are recent signs of increased activity in both areas. We expect the
quality and quantity of these systems to reach threatening levels over
the next decade.
3. Science and Technology Policies, Strategies and Developments.
Policy and strategy may be determinants of long-range trends in China's
technological development. S&T developments, including the assimilation
of both indigenous and imported technology derived from both the physical
and life sciences, will provide the base for the modernization of China's
industry and the military.
4. Domestic Stability. The PRC's record for preserving political..
stability is not one which encourages predictions of long-term tran-
quility. The death of Mao Zedong in 1976 and the ensuing purge of his
radical supporters, however, have brought about a major change in the
character of domestic politics in China. The new leadership, though
still itself divided over several fundamental issues, is firmly com-
mitted to setting China on a course of stable economic growth and pros-
perity and has vowed to abandon the kind of mass mobilization campaigns
that so disrupted political and economic routines in the past. To pre-
serve their rather fragile political unity, however, the leadership has
tended to avoid the most difficult policy decisions and postpone making
a clean and complete break with the past. While this probably has been
necessary to avoid a serious collapse of authority, it has heightened
tensions within the leadership itself, and hobbled the bureaucracy in
dealing with the accumulated problems of 20 years of Mao's misrule.
Wile it is unlikely that the political infighting that still character-
izes the regime will lead to widespread instability in the short term
(3-5 years), it will continue to have a negative effect on the regime's
ability to deal effectively with the more serious problems confronting
it. These problems, which merit increased collection and analytical
efforts, include'the following:
a. The grooming and promotion of capable, young
leaders to replace the current gerontocracy;
b. The continued alienation of many young people
and intellectuals, angered over past treatment and pes
simistic about the current government's ability to deal
with China's problems;
c. The continuation of serious economic problems, com
pounded by a weak infrastructure, insufficient planning,
bureaucratic inertia, =inept management and rising consumer
expectations;
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d. Increas demand for greater personal f can in
such areas as employment, education, residence and politi
cal expression and for a more responsive, less repressive
government apparatus; and
D hic and social pressures resulting from
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a relatively young population of nearly one billion.
NON-SOVIET
1. Nuclear Proliferation- The potential destabilizing effects on
regional kid world geopolitical balances of nuclear weapons development
by states that now have no nuclear weapons will continue to be of major
concern to US administrations. Specific areas of concern over the next.
decade will be: .
a.., Early de monitoring of clandestine nuclear -ec=on and Weanons ro ams
mig
developed by North Korea, Iraq, Libya, perhaps others.
b. Monitoring the nuclear weapons-related activities and
intentions of increasingly capable countries (including
c. Assessing the institutional perceptions, individual
attitudes, and particular objectives that will govern changes
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in policy, ttoward the development, deployment and employmen
of nuclear weapons.
2. Nuclear Power Technology. The entire gamut from fuel produc-
to waste
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tion and fabrication, reactor design, and
storage will remain high-priority issues.
3. Technolo Transfer. The Less Developed Countries (LDC) have
seized on t e issue o technology as a. key to their future progress.
Important policy decisions related to this issue will require intelli-
gence on LDC technology needs, acquisition strategies, and assimilation
of technoloc-ry. and olicies of the industralized nations toward such
transfer.
4. Civil Technologies. Technological advances of future economic
or political significance to the US are of increasing concern to those
at the national-level responsible for policy review and decisions. Areas
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of particular interest include science policy and tec ology strategies
of the industralized nations, focusing on national RFD programs, inno-
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vation, international SFT cooperation and industrial policies;
6. Biomedical Sciences. Foreign, notably Soviet, activities in or
related to the biomedical. sciences continue to be of great interest to a
wide range of US policymakers. Of concern are the biomedical implica-
tions of operations in space; implications of the radiobiological
effects of devices emitting radiation; impact of advanced biological
techniques (e.g., recombinant DNA) on industry; agriculture, medicine
and. possibly military capabilities; the extent and nature of biomedical
support for military operations and civil defense; and to population
control techniques and to export by several countries, notably the USSR
and China, of health care delivery systems to third world countries as
*7. Monitoring of Social Change and Political Stability of Foreign
Countries. Cross-cultural indicators of social changes need to be iden-
tified s- that the relationships between social change and political
stability can be developed. Methodologies are needed that address the
questions of change and stability. At this point, it is not known what
social changes really are or how they can. best be measured. The ideal
program would be one that resulted in a model of relevant factors associ-
ated with social change. This model would be based upon valid empirical
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aggregate to some set of overall measures of political and social' sta-
bility that could be maintained over time. F
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8. African Stability:
a. Long-term effects of climatic variations in Africa
and similar type regions. Good crop years presumably ve
some effects on the political situations (short-term) and
on social changes (long-term) such as population movements,
rates of reproduction, styles of life, satisfaction with
social forms, etc. Such concerns are likely to be of greater
importance-to us as our interdependence-with these less insu-
lated peoples grows.
b. Longer-term intellectual and ideological currents
in Africa and the Third Worl The disappointments an rus-
trations that the political and social elites of these regions
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the nature of our relationships in the future.
will inevitably encounter are likely to affect, in various
ways and to various degrees, their images of themselves, of
us, and of how we got into the kinds of relationships we
have. Marxism of various kinds have been the main going
thing for at least the past 50 years. As Marxist formulas
fail to produce the desired results, something else (worse,
from our standpoint?) is likely to come along. Whatever it
is, it will have resonance in the rest of the world and color
9. Food and Nutrition Prospects. Agrotechnological capabilities
of nations t e limits scientific and technological improvements
attainable in food production affect significantly the availability of
food and are of particular interest in regard to countries of high US
political concern.
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11. Rising energy costs and potential future shortages of conven-
tional ~._
energy supplies (oil, gas,. etc.) are placing increased priority
on the development of alternative energy technologies, technologies for
the utilization of fossil fuels (coal conversion, oil shale,-etc.)
largely untapped at the present time and non-petroleum energy technolo-
gies (solar, wind, geothermal, etc.). Foreign countries may emerge as
leaders in the development or commercial application of these tech- 25X1
nologies. Some of these technologies may also serve as important dip-
lomatic levers in establishing international S&T cooperation and in
improving relations with the developing world.
*12. International Monetary System. Pressures will continue to
build on t Se international monetary system over. the next several years
as it tries to cope, inter alia, with periodic bouts of dollar weakness,
the impact of higher oil prices and attendant growth, inflation, trade
and debt nroblens.
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*13. Growth, Inflation and Trade. As the world moves into a period
of energy--inspirecl lower growt and-'Higher inflation, countries. will be
faced with adjustments in. economic policy that will be disruptive to
industrial nations and LDCs alike. These will have a profound effect on
US policy. The trade effects will be increasing) important as'the US
competitive position continues to erode.
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GENERAL PRODUCTION AID ANALYSIS
*1. Requirements to Store, Manipulate, Disseminate, and Display
Large Volumes of Data. As new SIGINT, imaging, and other collection
systems become operational we will. be faced with handling even larger
volumes of data. Our ability to exploit these data will depend on
having the proper too and fa ilities. There also is a need for
having more intelligence originate in machine-readable form, for more
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sophisticated ways of manipulating and retrieving data and for more
accurate and more rapid means of disseminating information.
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Weapons Sysstemm. There is an increasing requirement or analysis of
tactical and ground force weapons systems. At the same time, the require-
ments for strategic weapons analyses increase. Consequently, we face a
crisis in resource allocatipn which t be resolved if we are to handle
both problems effectively.
*3.. Lon -Term Intelligence Problems. While there appears to be
general agreement that the Intelligence Corm unity should project its
resource needs (especially for long-lead-time programs) for at least 5-
10 years in the future, attempts to do so have been ad hoc and frag-
mentary.- This is particularly true for defining .the long-term intelli-
gence problems which should.. form the basis for. all resource planning.
An organizational and methodological approach needs to be developed and
established for the purpose of identifying our future needs in terms
which will allow realistic program planning through the next decade.
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expertise is absolutely required.
both manpower and equipment, except where state-of-the-art external
5. Development of Increased In-house Analytic Resources: `-'t'he
increased cost of external manpower, institutional biases developing in
some contractors, the cost of TDYs, and the need for the Agency to main-
tain an independent perspective in an increasingly polarized community
will require greater reliance on and development of in-house resources,
posture, and for implementing these approaches.
for determining practical approaches for improvin our analytical
than heretofore should be examined. If feasible, a continuing project
should be established for identifying elements of intelligence analysis,
*4. The.Elements of Intelligence Analysis. In order to make more
efficient use of our existing analytical resources, to improve training
and recruiting, to develop better computer support and other aids to
analysis, and to more realistically accomplish planning for the future
within NFAC, it is important to-better understand the analytical pro-
cesses. The feasibility of describing these processes in greater detail
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COLLECTION AND PRODUCTION PL. NG
PURPOSE
To develop an approach to long-range planning which is comprehen-
sive in.terms of the collection and production of intelligence, and
emphasizes efficient use of resources. 17
SUbMARY
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- The PCP approach, by its very nature, requires that a few problems
be selected from the many facing NFAC. Limited collection resources are
then focused on those selected problems, if not to the exclusion of the
remaining problems, at least to their detriment. Such an approach is
good, if a few problems stand out as being far and away critically more
important and of greater interest than all the others. This does not
appear to be the case. Of the 35 problems identified, we are hard-
pressed to select a few which affect national security, or even national
interest, to a markedly greater extent than the others. This indicates
that a collection strategy needs to be developed and implemented for -
attacking as many different problems as possible. By first identifying
the intelligence problems which will confront us in the future, then
defining overall collection strategies, and finally developing collec-
tion assets which can satisfy data. requirements for many of the future
problems, it will not be necessary or appropriate to artificially limit 25
our attention to a small fraction of our future needs. A broad, compre-
hensive planning approach is recommended in this paper that will be more
cost effective than the continued use of the PCP approach.
RECC 4IENn.4TIONS
--The NFAC establish a small, dedicated working group to begin
work on long-range planning for production and analysis. The
main task would be to develop a realistic intelligence "future"
to be used to derive an intelligence-driven, long-range problem 25,
set. Once completed, it can be used as guidance for formulat-
ing the Agency's long-range plans for production and administra-
tion as well as human and technical collection.
--The ExCom approve and support the development of a flexible
long-range collection strategy that:
is based upon the knowledge gained over the past
four years from using the PCP approach;
is capable of attacking a nz ber of intelligence
problems simultaneously;
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makes the maximum use of current and pro ted
assets; and
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. can be developed within the limited resources that
the Agency will have during the next decade.
DISCUSSION
The primary approach to solving critical intelligence problems has
been to focus high-level attention on them and to apply more resources.
The PCP approach is a current example of using this technique for prob-
__lem solving... It has served to:
define and describe these intelligence problems;
? perform detailed target analysis.to determine
possible vulnerabilities to collection;
? encourage and support new collection initiatives;
? fine tune existing analysis and collection tech-
niques; and ? assure adequate management attention.
Several factors become evident while reviewing the report written
by the ExCom Staff on the effectiveness of this approach against the two
current PCP problems.
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ere ore, o y a
few highest priority problems requiring these particular
kinds of collection can be handled simultaneously. Since
the senior staff of the NFAC identified more than a dozen
Soviet problems they believed needed the attention of
senior Agency management to solve, it is readily apparent
the Agency needs to develop a long range collection
strategy that is capable of:
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(1) attacking a number of problems simultaneously;
(2) making the maximum use of assets; both those
that presently exist and those that are cur-
rently under development; and
(3) being implemented within the limited resources
that the Agency will have during the next decade.
c. Not all problems lend themselves to being
attacked by the PCP approach. Unless other methods of
attacking them are developed, the needed intelligence
may never be collected. The problem sets need to be
studied to develop collection strategies that address
most, if not all, of the problems. Critical problems for
which potential solutions cannot be found may need special
treatment.
d. It probabl takes about five ears for a PCP
effort to pay off.
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Thus there
is no apparent time advantage to concentrating resources
on a specific target if other collection approaches
with much broader capabilities could be developed in the
same length of time.
These limitations need to be taken into account when consideration
is being given to developing methods to attack critical, long-term
intelligence problems. It is clear that the Agency does not have the
resources to attack more than one additional Soviet problem using the
PCP approach. Yet a number of high-priority Soviet problems have been
identified that need to be addressed by the Agency during the next dec-
ade. The only reasonable solution is for the Agency to develop and
implement a flexible long-range collection strategy for attacking the
number and variety of intelli ence problems that have been and will
continue to be identified.
The NFAC must take the lead in beginning the planning cycle which
will ultimately lead to the Agency being in the best possible position
to answer critical intelligence questions. Steps that should be taken
are the development of:
a realistic intelligence "future," derived
from data provided by NFAC offices and pre-
sented in a manner conducive to RFD and
resource planning;
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S E C R E T
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? an intelligence-driven long-range problem
set closely meshed with the Agency's mission
and objectives;
a prioritized target list based upon the value
of the intelligence expected to be collected;
. a comprehensive collection strategy to attack
the critical problems; and
. the necessary procedures for implementing the
strategy developed.
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