TERRORISM REVIEW (U)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85-01095R000100120002-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 17, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: September 6, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence MASTER COPY
.S d Y ~v i+ a, iii
61
Terrorism Review
Secret
GI TR 84-019
6 September 1984
Copy 494
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Secret
Terrorism Review I
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6 September 1984
1
Highlights
5
Perspective-Soviet Involvement in Terrorism
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9
Saudi Arabia: Attempts To Disrupt the Hajj
11
Zaire: The Opposition Turns to Terrorism
This review is published every other week by the Directorate of Intelligence.
Appropriate articles produced by other elements of the CIA as well as by other
agencies of the US Intelligence Community will be considered for publication.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Executive Editor
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Key Indicators Colombia
Cease-Fire Agreements Signed. The People's Liberation Army (EPL) and the 19th
of April Movement (M-19) signed cease-fire agreements with the Government of
Colombia on 23 and 24 August 1984, respectively. The two groups announced
their intentions to join with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
in pursuing their objectives by peaceful means. However, the National Liberation
Army (ELN), Colombia's other guerrilla movement, refuses to sign a truce and
intends to continue its armed struggle. Dissidents from FARC, M-19, and EPL are
also likely to continue acts of terrorism.n
Spain
GRAPOActivities May Soon Increase. The small leftwing terrorist organization 25X1
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GRAPO
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A
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G
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roup (
) reporte
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initiate a new terrorist campaign this fall in an effort to force the Spanish
Government to agree to release imprisoned GRAPO members in return for a
While the group probably lacks the capability to
carry out a large-scale attack, it can try for selective assassinations. GRAPO has
occasionally targeted US interests in the past.
Significant Developments United Kingdom
Pro-QadhtfI Libyan Murdered. Ali El-Giahour, one of six Libyans awaiting trial
for bomb attacks in London last March, was found shot to death in a London
apartment on 20 August. The victim was one of two suspects who had been
released on bail. British police have no clues as to who did the killing but say it has
the earmarks of a professional job. El-Giahour apparently was lured to the
apartment by his assassin. F-]
Because the victim was not a hardline member of the pro-Qadhafi group that
carried out the bombings, we suspect the Libyan Government may have been
responsible-perhaps Tripoli believed he was an opportunist who became involved
in the bombing effort simply to prove his revolutionary credentials. On the other
hand, Libyan dissidents may have killed the man as an act of revenge
Iran
Massive Bomb Kills 18, Wounds 300. On 23 August, a 25-kilogram bomb hidden
in a juice vendor's cart exploded outside the Tehran railroad station, leaving at
least 18 people dead and more than 300 others wounded, according to Tehran
radio. F__1
1 Secret
GI TR 84-019
6 September 1984
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The Iranian Government blamed the opposition group Mujahedin-e Khalq, now
based in Paris, but a group spokesman denied the charge and condemned the
attack on civilians. Although the group has conducted attacks like this in the past,
it has recently been trying to improve its image and now routinely denies
responsibility for attacks that hurt innocent civilians. Meanwhile in Tehran, an
anonymous phone caller claimed that the "Unit of Martyr Khalaghi," a previously
unknown group, had been responsible for the blast. Baghdad, which has ties both
with the Mujahedin and with various other dissident Iranian minority groups and
has sponsored similar attacks in Iran in the past, may have been somehow
involved.
This explosion, the first in Tehran in two years, came one week before the third
anniversary of the bombing that killed Prime Minister Muhammad Ali Rajai in
1981. Official Iranian media say that whoever set the bomb intended to discredit
the government's publicity campaign-scheduled to begin the next day-to tout its
domestic achievements. F-1
Lebanon
Reuter Correspondent Kidnaped. Jonathan Wright, a British correspondent for
Reuter news service, was kidnaped on 30 August. Wright left Beirut by car,
intending to go to the Bekaa Valley to report on the results of the 28 August Israeli
raid, but he never arrived there. On 3 September, an anonymous caller to AFP in
Paris claimed Wright is being held by the Revolutionary Organization of Socialist
Muslims (ROSM) as a protest against the "colonialist role" of Britain, which he
claimed was in league with "imperialist plots against Muslims throughout the
world." ROSM surfaced in March, claiming responsibility for the murder of
Kenneth Whitty, an official of the British Council in Athens. We have no other
information about the group.
Attacks on Embassies. Two recent attacks on foreign embassies in West Beirut
indicate the implementation of the security plan in the capital has not hindered
terrorist operations. F_~
On 24 August, some 300 pro-Iranian Shias stormed the consular section of the
Saudi Embassy and set the building on fire, allegedly because of difficulties in
obtaining visas to attend the Hajj. There were no Saudi diplomats in the building
during the attack, which may have been made under Tehran's instructions. An
anonymous caller to a news agency in Paris later claimed the Islamic Jihad
Organization would attack Saudi interests throughout the Muslim world if Riyadh
does not ease restrictions on Hajj pilgrims. The Saudis accused the Lebanese
Government of knowing about the attack in advance but still not preventing it.
Because of the continuing threat to its personnel, the Saudi Government closed its
embassy and withdrew the remainder of its diplomatic mission from Beirut.
Earlier in the day, gunmen fired two rocket-propelled grenades at British Embassy
offices in West Beirut, causing extensive damage but no casualties. The Lebanese
National Resistance Front, a loosely organized group of Palestinians and mainline
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Shias, which usually targets Israeli interests in southern Lebanon, claimed credit
for the attack, charging that the United Kingdom is supporting Israel's operations 25X1
in Lebanon. fl
Pakistan and Afghanistan
Soviet Targets Attacked. On 18 August in Karachi, the office of the Soviet airline
Aeroflot was damaged by a bomb thrown from a car carrying four men. Two
police guards were injured by flying glass as was one of the attackers, who
subsequently fled the scene. Police later arrested four suspects, probably Afghans.
Although no group has claimed credit for the attack, some Afghan resistance
groups had vowed increasing attacks on Soviet facilities in retaliation for the 28
July car bombing of a resistance headquarters in Peshawar, Pakistan.
On 19 August in Kabul, several rockets reportedly hit the Soviet Embassy 25X1
compound, causing some damage and wounding three Soviets. On the evening of
19 August, the Soviet-built polytechnic college was rocketed, and six Soviets may
have died. The Soviet Embassy was reportedly fired upon again on 22 and 24
August, but we have no information about any damage. On the evening of 22
August, mortar and rocket rounds intended for the Soviet cultural and housing
complexes narrowly missed their targets, killing as many as 17 Afghan civilians.
India-UAE
Second Sikh Skyjacking Resolved. On 24 August Sikh terrorists hijacked an
Indian domestic airliner and diverted it from Srinagar to Lahore, Pakistan.
Although armed initially only with their ceremonial daggers, the seven skyjackers
apparently obtained one or two pistols from accomplices in Lahore. They
demanded to speak with the hijackers of the Indian flight on 5 July, now being
held in a Lahore jail, and wanted the plane to be refueled for a flight to the United
States. F-1
After an intermediate stop in Karachi, the plane was permitted to land in Dubayy.
There the hijackers surrendered after the UAE Defense Minister, acting under the
erroneous impression that the United States would consider accepting them,
granted them a week's grace period to arrange onward passage to the United
States. After a week of intense US-UAE negotiations, on 2 September the
skyjackers were returned to India aboard a US-chartered aircraft.=
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Colombia
Terrorist Threat Forces Evacuation of US Ambassador. On 23 August the US
Ambassador was advised by the Colombian Foreign Minister to "take a vacation"
out of the country for the next eight days. The Foreign Minister was concerned
that the Ricardo Franco Front was
becoming increasingly determined to kill the Ambassador, even if it suffered
casualties of its own in the process. The group has been plotting for several months
to try to kill him using a car bomb. In response to the warning, the Ambassador
and his family departed Bogota the same day, ostensibly for consultations in the
United States.
Guatemala
US Peace Corps Volunteer, Guatemalan Citizen Kidnaped. On the evening of 14
August, an American and a Guatemalan were kidnaped from their homes by six
armed men and driven to an unknown site where they were kept overnight,
handcuffed and blindfolded. The next morning they were interrogated separately.
The American was asked questions indicating his captors had read letters from his
girlfriend in the United States; he was also asked about "the codeword" and about
"making contact." Apparently satisfied with their answers, the captors drove the
two to a drainage ditch where they were released. At that time, the captors stated
they were from the Guatemalan Communist Party, an insurgent group. Despite
this claim, the Peace Corps volunteer believes his captors worked for the
Guatemalan Army because:
? The weapons used resemble ones he previously saw in Army hands.
? The kidnapers operated openly, and police took no action although they were
aware of the incident.
? He overheard the captors discussing the Army Academy.
? He thinks he could discern berets and hear practice range gunfire at the
interrogation site.
The US State Department has directed the US Embassy to make a formal protest
to the Guatemalan Government.n
Civilians Executed by ORPA. On 31 August, a local bus traveling between
Quezaltenango and Colomba was stopped by three members of the Organization 25X1
of People in Arms. According to press accounts
the guerrillas collected money from passengers, and then asked if anyone 25X1
aboard the bus was a member of the Civil Defense Force (CDF), a kind of local
militia. One man who answered yes was taken from the bus and shot. After
checking the identification cards of all passengers, the guerrillas identified 13
others as CDF members and shot them too. In all, eight civilians were killed and
six wounded. We do not know whether all those shot were lined up execution style,
as a local newspaper reported, or whether some were shot while trying to flee.
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Perspective-
Soviet Involvement in Terrorism
The nature and extent of Soviet involvement with terrorism are much debated. We
know that the Soviets at least indirectly have given material support to terrorists;
we do not know how much, if any, direct support Moscow has provided to terrorist
groups or individuals. As long as terrorist groups identify ideologically with the
Soviet Union and continue primarily to attack non-Bloc targets, however, the
Soviets benefit from the disruptive and destabilizing effects of terrorism, which
partly explains why they do not support international efforts to combat it.F__~
Underlying Attitudes
Historically, the Soviet Union has viewed terrorism as a valid weapon to be
employed under appropriate circumstances. Lenin and Trotsky rationalized its use
and Stalin applied it extensively both inside and outside the USSR. Although the
Soviets in recent years have publicly disavowed any connection with international
terrorist groups-which they consider to be overly adventurous and ideologically
simplistic-they nonetheless consider terrorism to be a manifestation of the
internal problems afflicting a declining capitalist society. Moreover, they view the
use of terrorist tactics by leftist insurgents as legitimate under many
circumstances. Thus they see no reason to cooperate with Western nations in
combating terrorism, and they have adamantly opposed most international efforts
to outlaw terrorists and eliminate their sanctuaries.
Where Soviet interests have been specifically threatened, however, Moscow has
been more cooperative. Thus the Soviet Union is a party to the international
antiskyjacking convention. The Soviets, of course, have absolutely no toleration for
terrorism in their own or allied countries. In their ideology there can be no
justification for terrorism in a socialist state.
Support of Terrorist Groups
Terrorist Contacts. The Soviets have a long history of maintaining relations with
groups that have participated in-or are linked to-terrorism. As far as we can
determine, such support-for example, to Palestinian groups-has largely
consisted of political backing, funding, and the provision of conventional arms and
military training.
Secret
GI TR 84-019
6 September 1984
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Training. The Soviets continue to train personnel belonging to "national liberation
groups"-such as the African National Congress of South Africa-with the
knowledge that some of the persons they have trained have later committed
terrorist acts. At a minimum, the fact that the Soviets have not ended training for
such groups suggests that Moscow is little concerned about the potential misuses of
its instruction. It is hard, if not impossible, to verify that the Soviets have
conducted training tied specifically to terrorism. The nature of terrorist tactics-
bombings, assassinations, kidnapings-does not require any particular kind of
In any event, this distinction is basically artificial, since
whether an act is terrorism or not depends not so much on its nature as on
motivation, target, and context. Thus the key is whether Moscow trains people in
combat skills knowing that they intend to use this training to engage in terrorist
activities. To answer this question, one would need confirmed collateral
information from participants or persons close to them.
Arms Supply. The Soviets openly supply arms to numerous governments and
groups that conduct terrorist actions. These arms often have strings attached, but
apparently Moscow does not restrict the end use of the weapons. Libya, a major
Soviet arms customer, has supplied numerous terrorist groups from its stockpile.
Although we have no indications that the Soviets are using Libya as a front to
supply international terrorists, they apparently view Libya's disbursement of these
weapons to terrorist groups with equanimity.
We have no reports that terrorists have obtained weapons directly from Soviet
sources or that the Soviets have supplied weapons precisely for use in terrorism.
The existence of the gray arms market, however, obviates any need for the Soviet
Union to risk international disapproval by directly arming known terrorist groups.
Tracing the flow of arms from the manufacturer through this market to the
terrorist end user is extremely difficult, and any attempt to establish the guilt of
the originator founders on the ambiguity the number of intermediaries gives to the
gray arms market. Some East European countries deal extensively in the gray
arms trade. Bulgaria's KINTEX and Czechoslovakia's OMNIPOL are among the
more prominent companies whose weapons eventually have appeared in terrorist
hands. We doubt that the Soviets would long tolerate such trafficking if they
objected to it
The Role of Soviet Surrogates
Soviet influence over Bloc allies, particularly strong in the intelligence and security
area, provides Moscow ample opportunity to stimulate Bloc support for terrorist
activities. In general, our information on Bloc support to terrorism provides
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extensive evidence of indirect support and only scattered information about direct
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we doubt that conclusive evidence of Soviet 25X1
orchestration of some act or aspect of terrorism will ever be unearthed. Acquisition
of anything closer than thirdhand evidence-if it exists-has been and will
continue to be extremely difficult. The small size of most terrorist groups, their
compartmentation and the likely 25X1
use of cutouts to conceal any Soviet contacts with terrorists all serve to drastically
reduce the prospects for successful acquisition of information. F_~ 25X1
Furthermore, the Soviets may not need-or even desire-direct control. Many
terrorist groups are headed or dominated by borderline psychopaths who are hard
to deal with and impossible to control. As long as the terrorists confine their
activities largely to non-Bloc countries and base their rationale on some form of
Marxist-Leninist ideology, they tend to serve Soviet ends. By simply providing the
means to conduct terrorism-training, arms-and by refusing to cooperate with
international efforts to cope with the terrorist problem, Moscow has already
achieved a great deal and can continue to do so at little political cost.
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Saudi Arabia: Attempts
To Disrupt the Hajj F-
Saudi Arabia's customs and immigrations inspectors,
the country's first line of defense against potential
troublemakers and terrorists during the Hajj, have
been sorely tested during the past few weeks:
? On 17 August, 2 kilograms of Semtex-H, an
explosive of Czechoslovak origin, were discovered in
the false-sided suitcase of an arriving Afghan
pilgrim.
suspect the Afghan is an Iranian agent, given
Tehran's involvement with some of the Afghan
rebels.
? On 18 August, a Libyan aircraft carrying an
"official Hajj delegation" refused to submit to
customs inspection, presumably claiming diplomatic
status. As many as 1,000 Saudi troops surrounded
the aircraft, and Saudi authorities were
subsequently allowed to search the pilgrims'
luggage. The luggage contained 58 handguns the
Libyans claimed were for self-defense against
Libyan dissidents. The Libyan delegation was
forced to fly home.
? After 18 August, at least four Libyan aircraft
arrived carrying young, strapping male pilgrims-
unusual since Hajj pilgrims are mostly elderly men
and women. The Saudis sent the aircraft back to
Libya.
? A Libyan ship carrying pilgrims was refused entry
into the port of Jiddah until it submitted to a search.
Libyan passengers on the ship reportedly had an
altercation with Saudi authorities because they were
carrying Qadhafi's "Green Book."
? In late August, Saudi authorities found about 10
kilograms of plastic explosive in the luggage of two
Iranian "pilgrims" arriving on a flight from Tehran.
Saudi security measures are unlikely to deter Libyan
and Iranian efforts to make trouble during the
pilgrimage. In a speech to his followers in June,
Qadhafi said that the Saudis have no right to prevent
attacks on Libyan dissidents during the Hajj. Iran
had seemed to pose less of a terrorist threat than
Libya because Tehran has been trying to improve
relations with Jiddah.
Secret
GI TR 84-019
6 September 1984
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Zaire: The Opposition
Turns to Terrorism F
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Zaire has remained remarkably free of terrorism until
this year, but now some militant opposition groups
appear to have adopted terrorist tactics in their
struggle to overthrow the Mobutu regime. Since
January, Mobutu's opponents, encouraged and
supported by Libya, have mounted at least five
operations against Zairian interests both at home and
abroad. Although there is currently no indication that
US interests in Zaire are being targeted, the
involvement of Libya increases the possibility of
violence against US and other Western personnel and
facilities in Zaire.
Only a Few Groups Pose Threat
Of the many Zairian opposition groups, only the
National Movement of Congo/Lumumba (MNC/L)
and some factions of the Front for the National
Liberation of Congo (FLNC) appear to be involved-
or planning to become involved-in the violence.
Although we have little direct reporting on the
strategy of the MNC/L, the group demonstrated its
violent intentions in March 1984 when it bombed the
buildings housing the Voice of Zaire and the Post
Office in Kinshasa. The MNC/L, in fact, is the only
opposition group that we know has actually mounted
terrorist attacks so far.
there
may now be as many as eight factions in the FLNC.
The two biggest factions are the FLNC organization
in Angola (estimated a few years ago to command
3,000 to 7,000 fighters), headed by Mbumba
Nathaniel, and the FLNC-Eastern Front in
Tanzania, headed by Antoine Kibungu. The
somewhat smaller FLNC-Eastern Front was
integrated with and subordinated to the FLNC
organization in Angola until May 1984, when the
groups apparently split.
Libyan Involvement Crucial
A number of President Mobutu's actions have
angered the Libyans. Mobutu has strongly backed the
Habre regime in Chad, reopened diplomatic relations
with Israel, and proposed a black African league
separate from the OAU. In retaliation, Libya has
provided increased military and terrorist training,
equipment, funds, and logistic support to Mobutu's
Zairian opponents. Moreover, Libyan agents were
probably responsible for a bomb that exploded in
Kinshasa's airport in January, causing considerable
damage. F__1
the leaders of the FLNC
organization based in Angola decided in January
25X1 1984 to abandon their ineffective semiconventional
warfare tactics and turn to guerrilla and terrorist
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GI TR 84-019
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Potential for Terrorist Violence Remains Limited
Despite all the Libyan aid and encouragement, the
fragmented and disorganized opposition appears to
present only a moderate terrorist threat to Kinshasa
over the near term. The MNC/L has demonstrated
that it is both willing and able to mount terrorist
operations with Libyan assistance. The arrest of as
many as 10 of its 50 known Libyan-trained operatives
was probably not a serious enough setback to make
the group abandon its new program, but it may well
try to refine its tactics. The larger FLNC-Eastern
Front, which has reportedly received similar Libyan
training and support is probably capable of mounting
comparable operations in Kinshasa and the urban
areas of Shaba Province. The largest opposition
group, the Angolan-based FLNC, has proved
ineffective since 1978, and the threat of terrorism
from this quarter is probably low. F_~
The opposition groups may be weak, but Zaire is
nevertheless vulnerable to terrorism. The country's
borders are generally poorly controlled-though more
carefully watched in the Kinshasa area-and provide
ample opportunity to infiltrate men and material. The
government appears better prepared to handle the
threat of another invasion of Shaba by more or less
conventional forces than the threat posed by small
Low Threat to Americans-For Now
We judge that these opposition groups currently pose
little threat to US interests in Zaire. They have not
traditionally been anti-American, and there is no
evidence that they are considering attacks on US
targets. Their Libyan backers have become involved
in order to harrass Mobutu, not to attack the United
States.
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Chronology
Below are described noteworthy foreign and international terrorist events and
counterterrorism developments that have occurred or come to light since our last
issue. Events and developments that have already been described elsewhere in this
publication are not included.=
Portugal: New Attacks by FP-25
In Barcelos, members of the radical leftist group Popular Forces of 25 April
(FP-25) fired automatic weapons at a Republican National Guard post. In
Mazarefes, a bomb planted by members of FP-25 exploded at the residence of an
industrialist. The bomb caused structural damage to his and other nearby homes.
11 August 1984 Costa Rica: Terrorist Cell Discovered
In San Joaquin de Flores, during a raid on a suspected safehouse, the Rural Guard
discovered terrorist paraphernalia and arrested several suspects. The leader of the
group of eight to 10 people appears to be a US citizen. F-1
Mid-August 1984 Portugal: Arrests of Suspected FP-25 Members
On 14 August in Oporto, police arrested a man suspected of being a leading
member of FP-25. A subsequent search of his home revealed an arms cache. On 21
August in Lisbon, six people suspected of belonging to FP-25 were arrested. This
brings the total number of FP-25 arrests to around 50 since police sweeps began in
June.F_1
Spain: More ETA Bombings
On 16 August in Madrid, a bomb exploded at a trade union office. The same day
in San Sebastian another French car was burned. The following day in Salinas
police safely detonated a bomb discovered outside the offices of the Popular
Alliance Party. On 19 August in Bilbao, a bomb explosion injured a Spanish
policeman and an elderly man. On 24 August in Pamplona another bomb exploded
in a bar. ETA Military is believed to have been responsible for all of the
bombings.
21 August 1984 France: Jewish-Owned Bank Bombed
In Paris, a bomb exploded outside a Jewish-owned bank, causing considerable
damage but no injuries. No group has claimed responsibility for the explosion.
Secret
GI TR 84-019
6 September 1984
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22 August 1984 Israel: Bomb Defused in Jerusalem
Police successfully defused an explosive device found in the Jewish quarter of East
Jerusalem. No group has claimed responsibility for placing the bomb. F-]
Chile: Syrian Embassy Bombed
In Santiago, an explosion at the Syrian Embassy caused property damage but no
injuries. No group has claimed credit for the bombing. F-]
23 August 1984 Argentina: Naval Facility Bombed
In Mar del Plata, a powerful bomb at the headquarters of the Naval Training
Directorate caused structural damage but no injuries. No group has claimed credit
for the attack.F-7
Israel: Bomb Defused
In Tel Aviv, police dismantled a small bomb near a snack stand. The bomb, which
was probably planted by a Palestinian group, apparently was targeted at Arabs
who work in Israeli factories nearby. Police arrested 20 Arabs for interrogation. F_
25-26 August 1984 Spain: Basque Supporters Protest Extradition Ruling
On 25 August in Pamplona and Bilbao, four French-registered cars were burned
and hundreds of Basque youths fought with police in protest of the 24 August
French court ruling that four Basque separatists should be extradited to Spain. On
26 August in Bilbao, hundreds of Basque youths burned cars and attacked police
with gasoline bombs, bottles, and rocks in the second day of protests. Other related
acts of terrorism included an arson attack upon a house in Zumaya and the
burning of a French-owned car in PamplonaF--]
25 August 1984 Lebanon: Bombs Found in Beirut
A Western press service reports Lebanese police dismantled a large bomb found in
a suitcase outside Beirut International Airport. Police also found a car loaded with
150 kilograms of explosives near an Army checkpoint in a Shia suburb of Beirut.
Late August 1984 Corsica: Yet More Bombings
On 26 August in Ajaccio, eight bombs caused serious damage to government and
private buildings. On 29 August in Ajaccio four bombs damaged a bank, a police
station, a commercial building, and an apartment building but caused no injuries.
The bombings mark a resurgence of violence after this month's regional elections
in which hardline separatists won three seats in Corsica's assembly. There was no
claim of responsibility, but police suspect the attacks were the work of the
Corsican National Liberation Front (FLNC). F-]
27 August 1984 Nicaragua: Bomb Explodes in Radio Station
In Puerto Cabezas, a bomb exploded in the state-owned "La Voz del Poder
Popular," wounding two people and causing an unknown amount of damage. The
explosion occurred just a few hours after Daniel Ortega, leader of the ruling junta,
ended a presidential campaign visit to the city.
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28 August 1984 Iraq: Iranian Hijackers Surrender
At a military airfield near Baghdad, a young couple who had hijacked an Iranian
airliner with 200 people aboard surrendered to Iraqi authorities and released the
passengers unharmed. The couple apparently used no weapons to force the
diversion and made no demands beyond passage to Kuwait. Although they only
went to Iraq after being denied permission to land in Kuwait, Baghdad wasted no
time turning the "defection" to its advantage in its propaganda war with Iran. F_
29 August 1984
Lebanon: Israel Attacks Another Palestinian Base
Israeli aircraft bombed a base occupied by Fatah dissidents near the town of
Madjal Anjar in the Bekaa Valley. According to initial press reports, 15 people
were killed and 25 wounded. Later, Fatah Deputy Commander Khalil al-Wazir
(Abu Jihad) said that 80 mainline Fatah members being held prisoner at the base
had also been killed in the raid; leading Fatah dissidents, however, denied holding
any Fatah members prisoner
France: Basque Supporters Occupy Town Halls
In Ispoure and in Hendaye supporters of seven Spanish Basque refugees
threatened with extradition from France occupied the town halls in a peaceful two-
hour protest calling on the government "to spare the refugees' lives by avoiding
their extradition to Spain."I
been responsible.
Spain: More ETA Violence
On 29 August in Usurbil, a French tractor-trailer was burned. In Renteria a bank
was robbed. On 30 August in Bilbao, a bomb exploded at a Peugeot-Talbot car
showroom, damaging the building and 10 cars. ETA/Military is believed to have
30 August 1984 Colombia: Hostage/Barricade Situation Peacefully Resolved
In Bogota, 11 members of the Secretariat of the Coordinating Board of Colombian
Civic Movements, a previously unknown group, occupied the Consular Section of
the French Embassy and took five hostages. The self-described "labor
organization" apparently took this step to protest civil rights violations by the
Colombian Government. After negotiations between the occupiers and security
forces who surrounded the installation, the government agreed to address their
grievances and gradually withdrew the security forces. The occupiers then slipped
away, leaving the hostages and the building unharmed. F7
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/17: CIA-RDP85-01095R000100120002-0
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/17: CIA-RDP85-01095R000100120002-0
Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/17: CIA-RDP85-01095R000100120002-0