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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
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Document Creation Date: 
December 21, 2016
Document Release Date: 
June 20, 2008
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Publication Date: 
March 9, 1982
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PDF icon CIA-RDP85-01156R000100010007-9.pdf81.85 KB
Approved For Release 2008/06/20: CIA-RDP85-01156R000100010007-9 ? SECRET Ir THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE National Intelligence Council MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, National Intelligence Council FROM: Maurice C. Ernst NIO for Economics SUBJECT: Memo on marketing of Intelligence 1. Although brings up some useful points, I believe his memo is mmisleading in certain respects. My reactions no doubt are colored by the fact that I took an "old hand" DDI perspective for many years, but I believe the problem is not well understood and has been misinterpreted many times in the past. 2. In the first place, the term "marketing of intelligence" is inappropriate. What is needed is not marketing the CIA product but rather gaining a sufficient understanding of the actual and potential policy concerns of the US government, so that the CIA product may become more relevant. This is not just a semantic problem. DIA, for example, has been strong on "marketing," but has rarely been involved meaningfully in the policy process. 3. The allegation that CIA (NFAC, DDI) did not make much effort to deal with policymakers is greatly overdrawn. Since military, technical, and scientific analysis consisted mainly of basic research which took highly institutionalized forms--largely, contributions to elaborate national estimates--there was relatively little reason for many direct contacts with consumers. In economic intelligence, OER prided itself on developing and maintaining a wide network of contacts throughout the economic policy community. Indeed, OER took Schlesinger's criticisms very much to heart and shifted resources substantially in favor of what came to be called "policy support." In the political area, the record was a mixed one, with some division chiefs maintaining close relations with their counterparts at State and the NSC, while others stayed close to home. The main problem in political intelligence was, and to some extent still is that much of the product is driven by cables rather than by issues. 4. I agree with 0 that NIOs have and can play a crucial role in developing a sophisticated understanding of US policy issues and processes. They can thereby help make DDI intelligence product more relevant, more timely, and generally more useful. DDI office and division SECRET 25X1 -~-~ Approved For Release 2008/06/20: CIA-RDP85-01156R000100010007-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/20: CIA-RDP85-01156R000100010007-9 ? SECRET chiefs, however, should be strongly encouraged to develop their own customer' network. NIOs should help to stimulate this process and assure that the linkages are at a sufficiently high level so that we can be confident that requests for intelligence support are on issues of truly high priority and not just grist for the desk officer's mill. It is useful to support lower level requests as well, but not with the same resource commitment. 5. I am very skeptical about the notion of establishing a "systematic marketing program;" if by "systematic" 0 means establishing a formalized system, including consumer surveys, etc. Surveys will give you any answer you want. The important thing is for the NIOs, the DDI line of command, and some senior analysts to understand that dealing with customers is an important part of their responsibility. -77 Maurice C. Ernst Approved For Release 2008/06/20: CIA-RDP85-01156R000100010007-9