COORDINATION OF OSWR PAPER: USSR: ACQUISITION OF JAPANESE TECHNOLOGY IN LIGHT OF USSR'S PERCEPTIONS OF FUTURE RAW MATERIALS SHORTAGES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85-01156R000100010025-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 20, 2008
• Sequence Number: 25
• Publication Date: January 11, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2008/06/20: CIA-RDP85-01156R000100010025-9
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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Council
DDI. #196-82
11 January 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Office of Scientific and Weapons Research
FROM: Maurice C. Ernst
National Intelligence Officer for Economics
SUBJECT: Coordination of OSWR Paper: USSR: Acquisition of
Japanese Technology in Light of USSR's Perceptions of
Future Raw Materials Shortages
1. I have read the draft paper and do not believe that it should be
published. I have several fundamental problems with the paper:
o The thesis that one of Moscow's main objectives in developing
its raw materials and energy is to acquire major leverage against the
West in a future period of scarcity is weak. Although no doubt some
Soviet statements can be interpreted in this way, what matters is what
the Soviets actually do. All of their actions in developing raw
material sources, both at home and abroad, are consistent with the view
that Moscow's dominant objective is to meet its own needs. Although
the OSWR paper gives lipservice to this view on page 4, it then
proceeds to ignore it.
o The OSWR paper puts great stress on Japan's. vulnerability to
interruptions in supplies of raw materials and energy. Japan has given
a high priority to developing stable sources of energy, but its
dependence on imported raw materials has become more of an asset than a
liability because Tokyo can,buy from the cheapest source. Tokyo was
interested in Siberian raw materials. Several projects were started in
the early 1970s and others were seriously discussed, but since then
interest has waned. Certainly the Japanese do not feel under pressure
because they must import most raw materials.
o All the analysis I have read of Soviet-Japanese relations
suggests-that Moscow badly mishandled its economic negotiations with
Tokyo. Japan had a great deal to offer the Soviets in the way of
markets, technology and, to a lesser extent, capital. But Moscow
missed the boat by being inflexible on the Kurile Islands issue and
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because of sheer bureaucratic foot-dragging. None of these aspects of
the Soviet-Japanese relationship are mentioned in the paper..
2. In sum, the draft paper is contrary to all published CIA
assessments on related topics, confuses propaganda with policy, and in my
view does not make a serious case to support its conclusions.
Maurice C. Ernst
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Approved For Release 2008/06/20: CIA-RDP85-01156R000100010025-9