LETTER TO JAMES WOOLSEY FROM WILLIAM J. CASEY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85-01156R000100040020-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 4, 2008
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: December 2, 1982
• Content Type: LETTER

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The Deputy Dired? Central Intelligence
WzNVmCLC2D506
2 December 1982
Mr. R. James Woolsey
Counsel, CSIS, and
Chairman, Contingencies Project
The Center for Strategic and International Studies
1800.K Street, Northwest
Washington, D.C. 20006
Dear Mr. Woolsey:
Thank you for sending me Dr. Thunberg's report on
the "Vulnerabilities of the International Financial
System." There is no doubt that the implications of
LDC financial problems are far-reaching and closely
interlinked. Dr. Thunberg presents an excellent
review of these issues. Maurice Ernst, National
Intelligence Officer for Economics,*has been covering
some of the same ground, and will be in touch with
Dr. Thunberg in the near future so that they can
exchange views.
PREPARES by NIO/ECON
Orig - Addressee
0/DCI
6- NIO/ECON
1 - ER File
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 CONFIDENTIAL
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? 0
30 November 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR: National Intelligence Officer for Economics
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: CSIS Contingency Report, "Vulnerabilities of the
International Financial System"
Although this paper sort of falls off at the end it presents
a very interesting picture in a way which I don't think I've seen
before. I would like your evaluation of how it compares with our
paper on the financial crisis and what additional insights this
provides a reader.
Attachment:
CSIS Contingency Report
and covering letter of 16 Nov 1982
CONFIDENTIAL
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EXECUTIVE SE(TARIAT
Routing Slip
ACTION
INFO
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DDI
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DDA
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DDO
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DDS&T
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Chm/NIC
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Compt
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D/EEO
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 The Center for Strategic and International Studies
Georgetown University/ 1800 K Street Northwest/ Washington DC 20006/Telephone 202 / 887-0200
Cable Address: CENSTRAT
TWX: 7108229583
November 16, 1982
The Honorable William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C., 20505
I'd like to call your attention to the latest CSIS Contingency Report,
"Vulnerabilities of the International Financial System," by Dr. Penelope
Hartland-Thunberg, CSIS Senior Fellow in Economic Studies. A copy is
enclosed.
Dr. Thunberg's report analyzes what might happen if a panic took hold
in the international financial system and how this could lead to de-
pression, or, conversely, hyperinflation. She calls for the convening
of an international conference to avert these dangers by setting up a
short-run safety net capable of supplying liquidity across borders and
devising ways to refinance the huge amounts of long-term foreign debt.
As always, CSIS welcomes any comments or reactions you might have to
our Contingency Reports. We look forward to hearing from you.
Sincerely yours,
Chairman, Contingencies Project
R.mes Woolsey
Counsel, CSIS, and
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4P 49
CSIS CONTINGENCY REPORT #8
November 15, 1982
Vulnerabilities of the International Financial System
This report reflects only the views of its author, Dr. Penelope
Hartland-Thunberg, CSIS Senior Fellow in Economic Studies..
The international debt structure has
been described as "the- largest and most
remarkable financial house of cards ever
created." Many now believe it may collapse.
This appears unlikely. The costs would
be, too great. Instead, it seems more
probable that rapid world inflation will be
rekindled by frantic attempts to pump
liquidity into the system.
To avert these dangers the United States
should organize an international financial
conference to provide: 1) a short-run safety
net capable of supplying liquidity to the
world in an emergency; and 2) the long-term
refinancing of the existing foreign indebted-
ness of sovereign states.
CSIS Contingency Reports are for limited circulation only and
cannot be quoted or reproduced without the permission of the
author. For further information, contact: R. James Woolsey,
Counsel, CSIS, and Chairman, Contingencies project; Center for
Strategic and International Studies; 1800 K St., NW; Washington,
DC 20006. Phone: (202) 887-0200.
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a 1P
TABLE OF CONTENTS
BACKGROUND: CREATING A "FINANCIAL HOUSE OF CARDS"
Coping with the 1973-1974 Oil Price Shock.......... 1
Changed Circumstances of the 1980s ................. 2
The Winding-down Process ........................... 4
CONTINGENCIES
A Financial Panic .................................. 5
A Debtor's Cartel .................................. 6
Economic Recovery ............... ................... 6
U.S. INTERESTS AND POLICY OPTIONS......... .............. 7
The Inadequacy of Today's Financial Institutions... 8
ENDNOTES ................................................ 10
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BACKGROUND: CREATING A "FINANCIAL HOUSE OF CARDS"
In 1974, after the first oil price shock, media commentators
.around the world viewed the ability of the international finan-
cial system to cope with imminent, massive financial flows across
the foreign exchanges with varying degrees of concern, ranging
from apprehension to alarm. At the time, bankers quietly pooh-
poohed the concern, assuring everyone who would listen that the
commercial banking system was quite capable of handling the
petrodollars.
In 1980, after the second massive oil price shock, roles
were reversed; the media essentially ignored the challenge (not
to mention the hazards) of the newly generated wave of
petrodollars, while the bankers in their own cloistered forums
fretted over the gravity of the problem. David Rockefeller, then
Chase chairman, warned of the "treacherous economic seas and
gale-force financial winds strong enough to capsize" even the
most prosperous of the LDCs.j/ At the time, the media 'viewed.
his language as merely colorful. The sharp difference between
the two petrodollar innundations was clear even in 1980, however,
although changes in the world environment after that were to.make
the difference even more acute.
Coping with the 1973-1974 Qi Pric Shock
Within 12 months after the first price shock of 1973-1974
the share of fuels in the value of world trade rose from 12 to 20
percent, and the current account balance of the OPEC countries
was multiplied by a factor of seven.,/ Unspent petrodollars were
placed on deposit with the large international banks in Europe
and the United States, and, despite warnings of financial chaos
or collapse, the international financial system successfully
recycled the funds, lending them to those countries that. chose to
maintain growth rates rather than to deflate in response to oil-
induced balance-of-payments deficits. The rapidly growing
countries, who were the large borrowers, were the non-OPEC LDCs,
the smaller industrial countries (for example, Spain, Austria,
and Sweden), and the countries of Eastern Europe including the
USSR. At the same time, the United States, in choosing to fight
unemployment rather than inflation, maintained an expanding
market for LDC exports. So successfully did the international
financial system cope with the flood of petrodollars that by 1979
the OPEC surplus had virtually disappeared. From more than $68
billion in 1974 the OPEC balance-of-payments surplus had been
reduced to $3 billion by 1979.
Success in coping, of course, was not attributable solely to
the international commercial banks. The OPEC countries them-
selves astonished all observers by their ability to absorb
imports from the industrial countries and the rest of the world.
Between 1973 and 1979 their spending on imports increased at an
average annual rate of 15 percent.j/ The fact that the non-OPEC
high borrowers were.willing and able to go into debt at commer-
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cial rather than concessional rates of interest in order to
maintain high growth was equally important. In addition, the
borrowing was undertaken primarily to expand export capacity. and
thus provided the additional foreign exchange necessary for
servicing the resulting external indebtedness. Finally, the
.successful adjustment of the world economy and the international
financial system was accelerated by the post-1974 decline in the
real price of oil. By 1978, inflation in the industrialized
countries had caused the terms of trade of the oil-exporting
countries with the industrial world to decline by nearly 20
percent below their 1974 level-A/ Also of great importance for
the successful adjustment of the world economy was the fact that
the real price of oil was not expected to change abruptly again.
.Changed Circumstances gf thg 1980s
The outlook for successful adjustment to the 1979-1981 oil
.price escalation is not nearly so favorable. Although the
increase was smaller in percentage terms than that of 1974 (200
vs. 400 percent), because it started at a much elevated level
(roughly $13 a barrel as compared with $3 a barrel) the dollar
effects were much greater. The very fact of a second oil price
shock, moreover, severely jolted confidence in the stability of
relative prices; that, by itself, helped to depress investment
in the industrial countries.
The basic difference between the 1970s and the 1980s in the'
ability of the international financial system to cope with
recycling problems lay in the decreased ability of the borrowers
to borrow and of the international banks to lend. The success of
the earlier recycling effort created serious difficulties for
the later challenge.
Between 1973 and 1979 the LDCs were able to grow almost
three times more rapidly than the large industrial- countries
largely by expanding their external indebtedness from less than
$100 billion at the end of 1973 to nearly $400 billion in 1980.
.Nearly two-thirds of that was borrowed from commercial banks at
market rates of interest. The non-OPEC LDCs accounted for nearly
60 percent of all new Eurocurrency credits in 1980, compared with
35 percent in 1974. Service charges on their external debt rose
from 14 percent of exports of goods and services in 1973 to 18
percent in 1979.5j More important, interest rates.paid by these
borrowers averaged 4 percent in 1973 but were approaching 20
percent by the end of 1980.
Borrowing, of course, was not spread evenly among all LDCs
but was largely concentrated among a few. Twenty borrowing
countries accounted for more than 80 percent of all Euromarket
lending from 1974 to 1979 and just five (Brazil, Mexico,
Argentina, South Korea, and the Philippines) accounted for more
than 40 percent.f./
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During the 1970s, the net hard currency debt of Eastern
Europe and the USSR (CMEA) rose from less than $6 billion in 1971
to more than $60 billion in 1979.1/ Nearly two-thirds of this
total was accounted for by Poland, East Germany, and Hungary. As
was the case with the LDCs, the burden of servicing this 'hard
currency debt increased, although not to the same degree.
Even before the second oil price shock in 1979-1980, concern
was spreading about the amount of exposure to "country risks" in
the investment portfolios of the large international banks. Not
for a century or more had private banks financed the external
requirements of sovereign nations to such a degree. The
accumulated debt of Brazil, the largest borrower, had reached $55
billion in 1980, including $37 billion owed to private banks.
Oil imports and interest payments together absorbed about 80
percent of Brazil's foreign exchange receipts in that year. For
the Philippines, the burden of this national overhead (oil
imports plus interest charges) was 70 percent; for Thailand, 50
percent; for Turkey, 40 percent. Moreover, amortization charges
(not included in these figures) were to become especially heavy
in the early 1980s.
The combination of political and economic risks entailed in
lending to sovereign nations makes the meaning of prudence in
bank policies difficult to define. The borrowing governments in
the 1970s were thought to be somewhat more politically insecure
than the industrial democracies, but the larger LDC borrowers
were on the whole viewed as politically stable: Taiwan, Korea,
Mexico, Brazil, and those countries in Eastern Europe. In the
early 1980s, however, political disturbances in Korea, Taiwan,
Poland, and Iran brought into doubt assumptions about political
stability in all LDCs.
In addition, high debt service ratios are properly viewed in
the context of the rate of growth of the borrower's ? production
and foreign exchange receipts. The main error of borrowers and
lenders alike in 1979 and 1980 was their failure to foresee the
deflationary impact of the second oil price rise on world trade
and production and thus on the ability of the borrowers to earn
the foreign exchange necessary to meet their rising debt service
charges.
This failure was in fact largely a failure to forecast a
different policy reaction in the United States to the second oil
shock. In contrast to 1973-1974, when the United States chose to
fight unemployment rather than inflation, the United States --
confronting inflation of 13 percent in 1979 (and nearly 20
percent in the first quarter of 1980) -- pursued an anti-
inflationary policy that was accompanied by rising unemployment
and declining income and production. The other industrial
countries -- more or less willingly -- followed the same course.
The result was world recession, contracting demand and world
trade, and a collapse of raw material prices. (Commodity export
prices are now -- in late 1982 -- one third lower than at the end
of 1980.).B/ The foreign exchange receipts of the LDCs, further
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more, dropped far more sharply than the costs of their imports.
The high pace of bank lending to the rapidly growing LDCs
continued after 1979 until the third quarter of 1982, when it
fell to less than half its previous levels. In the aggregate it
now amounts to about half a trillion dollars.9/ Mexico surpassed
Brazil in 1981 as the top borrower ($57 billion for Mexico vs.
$53 billion for Brazil at the end of 1981) with Venezuela tied
with Argentina for third place ($26 and $25 billion) and South
Korea not far behind ($20 billion). The Soviet Union and Poland
ranked next in line with indebtedness of $16 and $15 billion.
(These data exclude short-term -- less than one year -- credits.)
The Polish de facto default in 1981 sobered the bankers who
had not already become more cautious. Argentina's Falkland
adventure added a further chastening effect, but still, for the
most part, Mexico's financial embarrassment took them by
surprise. The August 1982 issue of Euromonev,. which appeared
during the unfolding of the Mexican crisis and featured an
article on debt rescheduling, did not even mention Mexico.
As the recession in the industrial world deepened during
1982, the persistence of an oil glut and weak oil prices
diminished the flow. of petrodollars to the international banks.
In fact, OPEC. as a whole shifted from a net lending position to
that of a net borrower. The.virtual disappearance of the OPEC
surplus coupled with the continued scrambling for international
credits even at astronomical interest rates provided clear
evidence that-the world was attempting to consume more than it
was producing.
As of mid-1982 there were nine LDCs whose estimated interest
and principal payments as a percentage of expected 1982 foreign
exchange receipts amounted to 90 percent or more. For Argentina,
Mexico, Ecuador, Brazil, and Chile, the ratios were all above 100
percent (with a horrendous 179 percent for Argentina).LQ/ There
were, moreover, an additional five countries whose debt service
ratios amounted to more than 45 percent. Because all of those
countries were heavily dependent on imports of materials,
supplies, and machinery, they were forced to borrow just to
maintain production at existing levels. They were no longer
using their loans in a way that would provide the means of
repayment. Starting in 1981 their reduced import levels forced
growth rates everywhere to fall; they actually became negative in
Argentina, Brazil, and Chile.
Tie kind,na-down Process
The lending banks' problems, of course, have been compounded
by recession, high interest rates, and mounting business failures
at home. With perceptions of heightened risks both at home and
abroad mounting abruptly, banks have taken steps to protect the.
adequacy of their capital in relation to assets by curtailing the
growth of the latter. In particular -- in a development poten-
tially hazardous to the health of the world system -- not only
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credits but also interbank deposits are being curtailed. domesti-
cally and internationally. The nervousness of the credit market
is underlined by the fact that several of the largest U.S. banks
have lost their triple-A credit rating, a development that Lord
Lever, former financial advisor to Prime Ministers Harold Wilson
and James Callaghan, termed "sensational."fl/ A contraction of
the interbank market will make it difficult for some banks to
fund domestic as well as Euromarket loans, thus making a further
slowdown in international lending likely. As a consequence, the
list of countries being forced to renegotiate their debts .is.
bound to lengthen, 'and "underborrowed" countries such as many in
Africa are effectively being shut out of credit markets.
Sovereign debts rescheduled in 1979 amounted to $4.9
billion, in 1980 to $4.5 billion, in 1981 to $10.8 billion, and
in the first half of 1982 to $27.9 billion.12/ How much more can
the banking system take?
CONTINGENCIES
A Financial Emig
The worst-case possibility, which worries bankers and
statesmen alike, centers around a collapse of one or two perhaps,
widely separated financial institutions that would trigger a
chain reaction of failing banks. The interdependence of the
world economy reaches its apogee in the interdependence of
financial institutions. The interconnection of banks, brokerage
and investment houses, and insurance companies around the world
is intricate and vast; the specifics are unknown. In an
environment of extreme nervousness about world financial
stability, panic and consequent runs on banks could spread like
wildfire. Even healthy banks could be forced to close their
doors. Commodity, security, and foreign exchanges would be
forced to shut down. Money and trade (domestic and foreign)
march hand-in-hand; with money unavailable (that 'is,* interest
rates at infinity) trade and production would halt.
Such a collapse is unthinkable. Clearly governments would
have to act individually or jointly. Within each country the
central bank is the institution of last resort with the authority
to provide liquidity to the domestic system, but there is no
comparable institution to act on a world scale. The existing
resources of the IMF are not nearly adequate to cope with world
collapse. The recent failure of the Luxembourg subsidiary of an
Italian bank (Banco Ambrosiano) demonstrated that holes exist in
the effectiveness of the central banks' Basle agreement
concerning responsibilities for external operations. Even with
the best will in the world, central bank cooperation in an
atmosphere of panic and emergency is unlikely to be optimal.
In such circumstances the immediate pumping of liquidity
into the system would get top priority, with worries over its
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inflationary impact postponed until later. The challenge facing
central bankers would be the timing of efforts to mop up excess
liquidity after panic has subsided and before the inflationary
consequences have taken root. If the central banks initiate
tighter credit. conditions too soon, the pause in economic
activity could be turned into a severe depression. If they wait
too long, rising prices would be difficult to curtail. Many, if
not most, developing countries, whose expertise' in monetary
policy is in most cases superficial, could be deluged by
hyperinflation after not too many months. Governments are not
likely to survive such chaos; political turmoil would be its
handmaiden.
No one knows the probability of such an Armeggedon, a fact
that accounts for much of the world's current nervousness. it
may not have been happenstance that the abrupt recovery of the
U.S. stock market after the second week of August, with volume at
an all-time high, occurred at the height of the Mexican crisis.
Volume probably was substantially buoyed by orders from abroad,
the United States being viewed as the safest haven in a financial
storm. Similarly, the sustained strength of the dollar in
foreign exchange markets since then reflects widespread attempts
to minimize perceived risks.
A Debtors' Cartel
Another danger is a debt renunciation announcement by one or
several of, the larger debtors. . Collusive action by LDC debtors
in renouncing their indebtedness is being urged by leftwing and
nationalistic groups throughout much of Latin America. Belief in
the efficacy of a "Debtors' OPEC" is founded in the conviction
that LDCs will always be exploited by the imperialist North, that
the North's prosperity depends =captive LDC markets, and that,
consequently, the North will have to continue to provide the
South with the means for buying its exports. The consequences of
such a_ debt renunciation would also be worldwide panic and either
acute and prolonged depression or high inflation through most of
the world.
Economic Recovery
A third contingency, recovery of economic activity in the
United States and other parts of the industrial West would be a
mixed blessing for the LDC borrowers and the CMEA countries
alike. Increased demand for their raw material and manufactured
exports would mean rising foreign exchange incomes. The danger
that rising business activity in the United States will be accom-
panied by rising interest rates is real, however. It has been
estimated that every 1 percent increase in interest rates adds
nearly $2 billion to the interest payments required of the LDC
borrowers.13/ Recovery, moreover, also carries the risk of a
tighter oil market and a rise in oil prices, which would add a
further burden to the non-oil producing LDCs' balance of payments
problems. For OPEC and the USSR a firmer oil market would, of
course, be.a..plus.
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19 49
Even if the world survives 1982 with no major default or
financial crisis, the danger will by no means have passed. The
same worries and tension over world financial stability will
continue in 1983 -- and beyond. The existence of this
nervousness not only makes banks less willing to lend, it also
makes borrowers in the industrial countries less willing to
borrow. The low level of investment activity in the OECD
countries is likely to be prolonged by the perceived risks of
financial insecurity; the consequent continued recession in the
industrial world will perpetuate the problems of both the LDCs
and the banking community.
It is in the national self-interest of all countries of the
trading world to remove this depressing overhang of risk and
doubt. No one country, not even the United States, can do it
alone. No single country is capable of insuring world financial
stability unilaterally, because today no one economy is suffi-
ciently large in relation to the world total to do more than
influence the rate of change. No single economy can determine the
rate or the absolute level of world economic activity.
International cooperation among the major participants is
therefore necessary.
The United States, however, should immediately initiate two
international efforts aimed at removing first, the short-term
threat to international stability and second, the underlying
long-run threat. The forum is not too important -- it could be
the Bank for International Settlements, the IMF, or some spot of
scenic beauty. like Bretton Woods.. The essential part of the
agenda for the first-effort is to come to agreement on ensuring
sufficient liquidity in the immediate, short-run future in order
to prevent panic and collapse. If the major central banks of the
financial world announced the existence of a multibillion dollar
safety net. capable of providing the international liquidity'
necessary in an international financial crisis, the likelihood of
such a crisis would be greatly diminished.
At the same time, however, it is necessary to initiate an
international effort aimed at solving the long-term, on-going
problem -- how to manage the existing world structure of debt
("the largest and most remarkable financial house of cards ever
created" -- again, Lord Lever) to ensure that sovereign debtors
can continue to meet service charges without a sudden precipi-
tous, politically explosive collapse of their economies. What'
is . necessary is a massive renegotiation of outstanding
indebtedness that spreads existing debt out farther into the
future, reduces the annual debt service burden, and evens out the
bunching of maturities so that borrowers can continue to meet
interest payments. Lending banks require that their assets be
"performing" -- that is, earn regular interest at commercial
rates --not that they be repaid. Banks exist to earn money --
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that is, interest -- not to keep cash in their till.
.Such a massive rescheduling of existing sovereign indebted-
ness should require a quid pro quo from the borrowers in the form
of domestic economic policies to be pursued by them that will
avoid the wasteful, noneconomic expenditures of the past and
instead encourage an increase in their productive and export
potential founded on increasing competitiveness in world
markets -- without subsidies.
Clearly this is not an agenda for the weak-hearted. The
.problem is of worldscope, and all parts of the world would
benefit from its resolution. Similarly, all parts must
participate in bearing its costs. It would, however, not be a
zero-sum solution -- the potential benefits to the world outweigh
the costs.
An obvious part of such an international program. would
include a continued willingness of OECD countries to import from
the LDCs. Borrowers cannot service their debts if lenders do not
permit them to earn the export receipts necessary to do so.
Another part of such an agenda would involve an attempt to
improve the quality and quantity of available data on outstanding
international loans. Our knowledge of the volume of
international indebtedness of any one country is woefully
incomplete and often of dubious reliability. A related problem
is the. adequacy of central banks' supervision of commercial
banks' lending, especially through offshore subsidiaries.
Such a program is likely to require participation by the
governments of the creditor banks, to ensure that these banks can
continue. domestic and foreign lending while rolling over interest
and principal payments due from the sovereign borrowers. Such
participation could take the form of a government guarantee of
selected liabilities, or a special discount facility for the
paper of sovereign states, or other instruments to support the
liquidity of the commercial banks. This type of government
.support should bear a high price; it is not the function of the
government.to make good the past errors of bank managers.
On the other hand, some part of today's financial mess can
be ascribed to the failure of governments to act. If in the
1970s, Europe, Japan, and the United States, the main oil
importers, had been able to agree on collusive action to form a
buyer's club (monopsony) to bargain with OPEC and to ration
available energy effectively among themselves, they might well
have forestalled the second oil price shock. They might even
have succeeded in bargaining down the original price increase.
In any event, it was the failure of governments to devise any
concerted program that left to the private banks the full burden
of financing the oil price rise.
-The Inadequacy of Today's Financial Institutions
The private commercial banks,,-of the. world are not in a
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position to enforce those adjustments of internal economic policy
in the borrowing LDCs that will increase the latter's ability to
service their foreign debt -- nor should they be. The number of
banks involved as creditors of a single country may be in the
thousands; they are not organized except on an -c-W or basis in
the Paris Club; most do not have the required expertise. Clearly
the fashioning and enforcement of a feasible economic policy for
each LDC debtor is the kind of task for which the IMF is well
equipped.
The function of the IMF, however, has never been one of
aiding in the solution of long-run developmental problems. The
IMF was conceived and set up to ameliorate short-run cyclical
problems -- to aid countries beset by short-run temporary balance
of payments exigencies until the time when cyclical recovery
would remove the cause of the payments deficit. The problems
confronting today's world debtors are in many cases more than
cyclical. They are, in addition, long-term problems involving
the economic structure being set in place by the development
process. These structural problems were created by or aggravated
by the sharp 600 percent increase in real oil prices during the
decade 1972-1982, which shifted certain industries in certain.
location from a profitable category to a marginal one or from a
marginal to a noneconomic position. Such structural problems are
not confined to the LDCs but affect all economies. They have,
been made more pressing in the LDCs by the huge overhang of debt.
service requirements.
The Bretton Woods agreement assigned to the World Bank.
(IBRD) responsibility for aiding in long-term development
problems, while the IMF was to cope with short-term cyclical
deficits created by.the perceived necessity for 'supporting a
fixed exchange rate. The Bretton Woods agreements never foresaw
that the world's economic structure might be subjected to the
kind of abrupt and severe wrenching as that caused by the
gargantuan distortion of energy prices. Nor did the agreements
foresee a necessity for abandoning a system of fixed exchange
rates. The World Bank and the IMF served the requirements of the
world reasonably well for the best part of a quarter-century.
Today's requirements., however, are quite different. It is time
for reconsideration.
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ENDNOTES
1. world Business Weekly, August 11, 1980.
2. IMF Survey, March 3, 1980. See also, QEA Annu3.1.
Report, Jauary 1980.
3. E_coomisjt, March 8, 1980.
4. A- ouzegar, J. "Petrodollars Again," Wash ngtoyn, Quart r=
iy, 4, no. 1, (Autumn 1982) : 132; George Eklund, World Q.1,
January 1980.
5. International Monetary Fund, Woor conom?jg outlook,
6. Eco omist, November 3, 1979.
7. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of East
West Trade Finance, August 1982.
8. Financial Times (London) October 18, 1982.
9. Morgan Guarantee Trust Company, World Financja1
Market-*, October 1982.
10. Tb' .
11. kje_w X r Time-g, September 24, 1982.
12. uro.ney, August 1982.
13. Financial Ti_mgs (London) October 15, 1982.
10
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