SSCI STATEMENT ON A/B TEAM EXERCISE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85B00134R000200080015-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 9, 2007
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: February 14, 1978
• Content Type: MEMO

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14 February 1978
MEMORANDUM FOR: Sa re Stevens
SUBJECT: Attached Draft Memo to Mr. Bowie about SSCI
Statement on A/B Team Exerc ise
Your comments on this draft are needed no later than 10 a.m.
today, Wednesday, 15 February. The Committee's suspense date for
the release of its report is noon Thursday, and Mr. Bowie and
the DCI therefore need to focus on the question this afternoon
or evening.
Howard Stoertz, Jr.
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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 26505
MEMORANDUM. FOR: Recipients of National Intell igence Estimate
? 11-3/8-76, "Sov.iet Forces for Intercontinental
? Conflict Through the Mid-1980s"
FROP?1 George Bush
1 . The attached National Intell igence Estimate is the
official appraisal of the Director of Central Intelligence. This
Estimate, including its italicized statements of differing views
by members of The National Foreign Intelligence Board, was drafted
and coordinated. by professional intelligence officers of the US
Intelligence Community and was approved by me with the advice of
the Board.
2. The judgments arrived at in this Estimate were made
after all parties to the Estimate had the benefit,of alternative
views from the various elements of the Gommunity and from panels
of experts from outside government on a few selected subjects.
The .assembling of the panels of outside experts, and the consider-
ation of their views, was agreed upon by me and the President's
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board as an experiment, the purpose
of which was to determine whether those known for their more
somber views of Soviet capabilities and objectives could present
the evidence in a sufficiently convincing way to alter the analytical
judgments that otherwise would have been presented in the attached
document. The views of these experts did have some effect. But
to the extent that this Estimate presents a starker appreciation
of Soviet strategic ca pabilities and objectives, it is but the
latest in a series of estimates that have done so as evidence
has accumulated on the continuing persistence and vigor of Soviet
programs in the strategic offensive and defensive fields.
SECRET
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3. The experiment in competitive analysis that was begun
with this Estimate has not been completed, and any final judgment
on its utility cannot be rendered. Nevertheless, there is a
,negative aspect that is already clew r and which concerns me
deeply; namely, the selective leakslregarding the details of the
process and, worse, the substantive conclusions developed by
the "Team B" panel that was concerned with Soviet strategic
objectives. Inspired by these selective 1 eaks, a151 egations have
appeared in the press that the judgments appearing in this official
Estimate were shaped by pressure from the "Team B."
4. There is no truth to such allegations. The judgments
in the attached Estimate are the best that can be made on the
basis of the analysis of the available evidence.
5. Although these leaks may appear to discredit what I
continue to regard as a worthwhile experiment, they have not
diminished the integrity of the Estimate itself, nor the integrity
of the Intelligence Community.
SEC RE