PUBLICATIONS REVIEW BOARD GUIDELINES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85B00236R000100180022-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 19, 2005
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: February 16, 1982
• Content Type: MF

Approved Fcelease 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP85B00200010018002`
DDA. 82-0336/1
16 February 1982
I'JII IORAM'DUI%I FOR: Chairman, Publications Rovi_ew Board
FRO NI: Harry E. Fitz:+.vater
Chairman, Infonnat:ion Review Colin nittee
SUBJECT: Publications Review Board Guidelines
1. These guidelines evolve j. as a resin. t of a question that I posed to
Lavon Strong at an INC meetini. I asked whether.- he felt the PRB needed
additional guidelines and his answer was yes, although most of the FRY
members believe that new or additional guidelines are not needed by them.
a
2. In responding to a request, by the DPCI to comiient on the Liechty
appeal. case, the Executive Director suggested that I, au,- Chairman, fnfoma.t .on
Review Committee, prepare guidance to the PRIIJ "oti what it should consider,
avoid and what needs tighteming,"
3. Please give me your opinion regarcli_nc the,e guide Lines and any
suggested changes that you would like to make: them.
Att
DD'A:IffFitzcvater:l`mig (16 Feb 82)
Distribution.
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1 - DflA Subj w/att
1 ?- DDA Chrono
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STAT
Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP85B00236R000100180022-1
 Approved Fd%WdTease 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP85B002' 000100180022-1
GUIDELINES FOR TILE I EVII;W OF NON-OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS
AND ORAL PRI SLNI'ATIONS BY LNIPI.OYiFS AND FOPL -R F 1I'i.W)YLLS
General Guidelines:
ffiese guidelines are for use in the review of material related. to intelli-
gence matters, produced for communication to the public .i n a written or oral
presentation, by persons who are, or have bee rz employed or a:_;soc:i..i{ted with the
Agency. Primnaari.ly, those persons w_i..ll. be current and former
errrployees, but will include persons on contract. to CIA, or persons who now have
or previously had official aa_.cess to CIA mates al. by resarson of association
through employment with pvfvato firnis or with o-,",c. r goveararrten;agencies. These
may include, for example, employees of con[paLn_ies doing consulting worlc for CIA,
employees of the Department of Justice, r mbers of a Congr:?essi.orral staff, e:tc.
All such persons have held a pos':i.on of trust With the U. S. Govve_ei-siment, and, as
determined by the U.S. Supreme Court, they must fulfill that. truss-?t and fiduciary
responsibility to protect sensitive informs tio:na learned as a r salt. of their
association with the Age-ncy.
.
The only information to be judged is that which was learned as a result
of employment or association with the CIA, the point being that these persons,
through this association, are seen by the public to be. authoritative spokesmen
regarding the Agency's activities, to one degree or another. When a person has
spent a significant period employed at CIA., it is presumed that all information
relating to intelligence matters was learned as a result of that. employment
unless it is sourced by the author otherwis(. For those associated with CIA in
other capacities or for relit i.vely short periods of time, as s.i.mrI,:L.r presumption
must be made commensurate with the _ ntima.c.y and. length of their CIA association.
Where such information can he sourced outside CIA, the author is responsible for
supplying source identifications and for the clarity anal completeness of that
sourcing.
The decision to delete information is based on a two-prart judgment that
(1) the information falls within one Of the categories for class ificd information
established by the executive order, and (2) that its release reasonably could. be
expected to cause identifiable damage to the national securi. t.y. The predominate
categories of information that apply to intelligence matters are those that relate
to intelligence activities, sources, or methods; foreign socurityi c,
. Iinfo> Lt.ion;
and U.S. foreign relations which includes Agency liaison relati conships . In judging
whether release could cause identifiable d