STAFF GUIDANCE ON DECLASSIFICATION OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ORIGINATED INFORMATION 20 YEARS OR OLDER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85B00236R000200060003-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 9, 2001
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: June 14, 1979
• Content Type: MEMO

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Approved Fd f i b ?6ft3W6? (4 l3P%8B 6R00020006
ta, SUN 14 197 National Archives and Records Service
ILV To Washington, DC 20408
:TN OF: N
Staff guidance on declassification of
Central Intelligence Agency originated
information 20 years old or older.
NC, NL, NN
1. The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) by letter of
June 5, 1979 (Stansfield Turner to James B. Rhoads) transmitted "Central
Intelligence Agency Systematic Review Guidelines." The guidelines are attached.
2. The declassification stamp marking to be applied to such informationas
nay be declassified pursuant to these guidelines should appear as follows:
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402
CIA guidelines, June 5, 1979
By__*___ NABS, Date
3. NARS general and specific restrictions will continue to he applied to the
accessioned records of the CIA and red censor agencies (Coordinator of
Information
( uy - ice of Strategic Services (OSS),
June 1942--September 1945; Strategic Services Unit (SSU), October 1945-
October 1946; and Central Intelligence Group (CIG), October 1946-47) as in
the past. The donor restrictions imposed on donated historical materials
will be applied prior to release.
4, ur er notice the following guidance remain in effect;
STATEPEC
a. NND Staff Information Memo - "Declassifica on of records o
i
i
t
d
r
g
na
e
by the -- dated March 23, 1976STA
c. NND Staff Information Supplement No. 1 to above memo, dated October 26,
1978.
t
U eclassilication stamp to read 1.0. 12065, Sec. 3-402."
and Foreign Documents Division originated
Information, 1946-50," dated October 6, 1977. Chan a the authority line of
h d
e. NND Staff Information Memo - Intelligence No. 2. "Final declassification
authority for certain high level intelligence documents, 1946-48," dated
January 16, 1976.
V.
Coordinator of Information/Office of Strategic Services," dated April 23, 1974.
d. NND Staff Information Memo - 03S #2, "Declassification review of the
serially-numbered reports issued by the Research and Analysis Branch of th
Keep Freednn- in Your Future With U.S. Savings Bonds
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f. NN's memorandum, subject "Intelligence method - secret writing,"
dated June 21, 1973.
g. N's memorandum, subject "Downgrading of World War II Top Secret
records in NARS," dated June 21, 1973.
h. NND Staff Information Memo - CIA #1. "Systematic review for declas-
sification of unevaluated SO, SODS, D6, 00 end other field intelligence
reports dated after December 31, 1945," dated December 12, 1978.
5. Any questions concerning this matter should be referred to NND (523-3165).
` JAMES E. O'NEILL
cting Archivist
of the United States
Attachment
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GUIDELINES FOR IDENTIFYING AND HANDLING CIA INFORMATION
DURINU-DE(',f,ASSI Tt';ATIQN VIEW Or, IMCORD9 MM M, EMIOD 146-54
'T'his guideline will serve as the basis for identifying and handling
information which was originated between 1.946 and 1954 by the CIA or one of
its predecessor organizations, or is information from that period which falls
under CIA jurisdiction. This guideline provides no authority to declassify
information. Its purpose is to provide background and general descriptions
intended to aid declassification review personnel to identify CIA material
that may be found in the records of other agencies. When such material is
found it must be reviewed for declassification by CIA personnel. This is
necessary because an intelligence agency has special security problems.
All components of an intelligence agency are either directly involved in
clandestine work, provide support to elements that are engaged in clandestine
work, or are involved in processing clandestinely acquired information into a
finished intelligence product. Whatever their role, there is an interrela-
tionship among these elements which makes them all sensitive to one degree
or another and an exposure in one can lead to an exposure in another. It
requires a thorough understanding of these components and their interrela-
tionships to assess the degree of sensitivity of information relating to
intelligence matters and pass credible judgment on its classification status. (U)
The inherent sensitivity of intelligence organizations is attested to by
the fact that no other nation allows, let alone requires, its intelligence
organization to make its records public except after a minimum of 30 years
and then sources and methods are still completely protected. This point is
important from another aspect: the intelligence services of nations friendly
to the U.S. are keenly aware of the situation created by the Freedom of
Information Act, the Privacy Act, mandatory review, and systematic declassifi-
cation review, and are very sensitive to the possibility that information
that they pass to the U.S. government may be exposed. For this reason, we do
not declassify or even downgrade information from other intelligence services
without their concurrence. (C)
BACKGROUND
During the years 1946 to 1954, U.S. intelligence was passing through a
transitional period. The Office of Strategic Services (OSS), which played
the major U.S. intelligence role during [WWII, was disbanded on 1 October 1945.
It was succeeded by the Strategic Services Unit (SSU) which existed for one
year. The records of the OSS and the SSU reflect a wartime context, being
staffed with military personnel and putting emphasis on "hot war" activities
related to the achievement of military objectives. On 22 January 1946 the
Central Intelligence Group (CIG) was created and began to take in more
civilians while it succeeded in absorbing the SSU by the end of October 1946.
The GIG in turn was replaced by the CIA on 18 September 1947. The CIA was
d
create
as a civilian organization and remains one today. (U)
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The world environment also was in transition: from wartime, to peacetime,
then very quickly into a "cold war," followed after a few years with hostilities
in Korea, 1950-54. Intelligence activities during the period 1946-54 were not
of wartime nature but they continued to have a strong paramilitary cast.
Considerable resources were devoted to special activities aimed at strengthen-
ing the West and weakening the East through various kinds of direct action
operations. Measures were undertaken to prepare for a "hot war" situation.
Refugee and especially defector debriefings were an important source of
intelligence information although classical intelligence collection operations
were not ignored. Throughout this period the "iron curtain" between the West
and East proved very difficult for our relatively young intelligence agencies
to penetrate, and it restricted the flow of even overt information to the
West. That forced collection efforts into many unlikely areas which normally
would be considered overt. (U)
During this period, CIA and the other U.S. national security agencies
were learning to coordinate their intelligence activities and were developing
channels among themselves and with other U.S. government agencies to get
administrative and operational support. Because intelligence agencies must
establish themselves and operate abroad under some legitimate form, i.e. cover,
they require a broad spectrum of support from agencies that function overtly.
The latter will provide transportation, housing, offices, equipment, medical
facilities, etc., the provision of which must be done covertly to provide
cover for intelligence personnel. The arrangements for and actual providing
of this support will leave a "paper trail" some of which will be classified,
and some of which will not. this "paper trail" may be found among any type
of administrative or operational records of the agencies and units which are
involved in providing the cover. Many of these records may appear routine and
normal for the unit. If all is done properly, it may be difficult from
administrative records to identify the intelligence connection. But care must
be exercised when reviewing all the unit's records that no document is
declassified which could compromise the intelligence connection, even
inferentially, and thus "blow" the cover. (See also the CIA Guideline to Aid
NABS Identify Unclassified Information Concerni Intelligence Sources and
Methods) .~~ _
The identification of intelligence related documents and information can
be very difficult, and one purpose of this guideline is to assist the records
reviewer in identifying records that relate to intelligence and, more
specifically, to CIA. When files are encountered that relate to CIA, or
relate to intelligence matters, but the specific organization cannot be
determined, they should be given to CIA for declassification review. (U)
GENERAL GUIDELINE
For the purpose of identifying information relating to CIA we may break
down its activities into four major areas: Plans and Policies; Collection;
Processing and Analysis; and Production and Dissemination. Following is a
brief general description of each of these areas intended to serve as a
framework within which to identify CIA intelligence related information. (U)
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Plans and Policies - Overall guidance to the intelligence
communit omen rom tie National Security Council (NSC). Many
intelligence activities, particularly special activities, are
initiated by the NSC or by presidential. commissions such as the
Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) or he Operations Coordinating
Board (0CB). Several agencies may be involved in discussing and
eventually adopting and formulating such guidance and the record
of such collective activities may be held by all the participating
agencies. The implementation of such plans must be coordinated at
all levels and with the many types of units. This broad involvement
will be documented and that record will be found somewhere in the
files of the participating agencies. At the NSC level planning
papers often do not indicate the source of the specific information
used. In such a document if an intelligence matter is involved and
it is not possible to identify the specific agency or department
responsible for the information, CIA would like to have the
opportunity to review that material. Classified planning and
policy records relating to intelligence activities normally will
require protection for long periods of time because (1) they
officially confirm U.S. involvement and preclude the use of plausible
denial and, (2) might provide details which could compromise
intelligence sources and methods. (C)
Collection - The acquisition of intelligence information by
all metros otr human and technical. This involves the
development, placement, and exploitation of sources that can
obtain the intelligence information that our government needs.
The protection of these intelligence sources is paramount to
preserve the flow of intelligence infornaa.tion, to prevent disruption
in our foreign relations, to protect those persons and organizations
who risk themselves on our behalf, to protect our national
investment in costly projects and technical devices, and to prevent
the targetted persons and countries from becoming aware of our
intelligence efforts and degree of success so they will not take
actions to nullify the results obtained or take aggressive
countermeasures detrimental to our national security. (U)
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25X1 C
 25X1 C
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being about the degree of success of the system and data which, if
divulged, would aid in the development of countermeasures to
negate collection. (U)
Much of the processing of technical data (such as in the
field of overhead photography) is a joint effort.by CIA and other
U.S. government agencies, particularly elements of the Department
of Defense. The research and development of advanced methods of
technical collection is often a joint effort, with CIA sharing
contracting, appropriations, testing, etc. with other agencies.
Consequently, many documents concerning such joint efforts will be
found in the files of all participating agencies. The review of
classified documents arising from such joint activities must be
coordinated with all the agencies involved. (C)
Analysis is generally known and understood as the collation
and processing of raw data from many different sources to find the
solution to some question confronting our policy makers. There are
many specific techniques that will be classified. The weighing and
establishing of priorities for collection data and its use in
estimating foreign capabilities and intentions is an intellectual
process used. by all analysts. But the fact that the Agency employs
i
i
un
que
ntelligence methodologies, for example, to estimate the
costs of foreign defense activities, is classified. So are
analytical techniques used in assessing the impact of natural
resources, science and technology development, and food and
population factors on foreign military, political, and economic
responses to the U.S. The substantive intelligence produced by
such analysis is often unavailable any other way. {-`_---
..
As in the case of processing, CIA has often shared analysis
duties with other government agencies, with many of the private
"think tanks," and with analytical institutions sponsored b
various American universities. CIA often has shared in contracts
other U.S. government agencies have had with such institutions.
Once again, this will result in documents of interest to CIA being
found in many files within and outside the intelligence community,
and review of these classified records from joint activities must
be coordinated with all the agencies involved. (C)
Production and Dissemination - The basic informational end
product o an int l'ie gene service is the finished intelligence
report. It results from the collation, analysis, and evaluation
of information available on a particular subject from all sources
both overt and covert. (Attachment B is a list of many of the
finished intelligence products that were published and disseminated
by CIA during the period 1946-54.) Most finished intelligence
reports are classified. Many of them include information from
other U.S. government agencies or from foreign governments. This
means that classification review must be coordinated with other
interested elements before the information can be downgraded or
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declassified. In some cases the titles of intelligence' reports
may be sensitive and require careful handling. Also, these
publications receive very wide distribution throughout the U.S.
government and therefore will be found in considerable numbers and
in a variety of files not only in the records of intelligence and
national security agencies but other U.S. government agencies as
well. (U)
The processing and analysis of raw intelligence information
serves to some degree to protect the source of the information.
Nevertheless, the source may be identifiable through the content,
subject matter, nature of the information, peculiar details, and
timing. In a few cases of exceptional importance to U.S.
policymakers the identify of the source may be given to aid in
assessing the value of the intelligence. Information from a.
foreign liaison service may be distinguished through its style,
content, subject matter, the conclusions drawn or comments added,
and sometimes by outright identification. Intelligence methods
might also be inferable, particularly where technical means are
used to acquire information because of the nature, content, and
quality of the data provided. Also, some sensitivity might accrue
to information which concerns the handling and distribution of
intelligence reporting, such as dissemination blocks, cover sheets,
buck slips, and even handwritten margin notes. Such informational
tidbits could indicate what information has been made available to
certain organizations, thus revealing the division of effort in
the intelligence community. It could reveal the names of covert
personnel, identify components whose existence is classified, or
reveal the existence and details of collaboration with a specific
foreign liaison service. (C)
As noted above, information that CIA is responsible for may appear in
documents which are not clearly discernible as CIA-originated, or in documents
originated by,other agencies. This makes the identification of CIA involvement
very difficult. As a bottom line, we request reviewers to coordinate with CIA
any information in any document bearing on, or suspected of bearing on, any of
the topics discussed in this paper. Queries should be directed to the
Classification Review Division, Office of Information Services, Directorate for
Administration, CIA, Washington, D.C. 20505, or telephone [phone]. (U)
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 UNCLASSIFIED ATTAef1V 'sNT B
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The following is a list of CIA finished intelligence publications that
were produced and disseminated throughout the government during the period
1946-54. Copies may be found in the records holdings of any government
agency that had need of, or use for, foreign intelligence. The titles of the
publications often changed through the years, as did the designations of many
of the CIA components which produced them. Most of these items had cover
sheets with a CIA letterhead, logo, and document number. In certain cases,
however, a plain cover containing only the document title was substituted, or
the CIA cover sheet was removed, for security or other reasons. This listing
is as complete as current institutional memory cau make it but there may be
other series found in government files. As experience reveals additional
publications that are, or could be attributable to CIA, they should be
forwarded to the Classification Review Division, Office of Information
Services, Directorate for Administration, CIA, Washington, D.C. 20505.
National Intelligence Surveys (NIS) - Encyclopedic compendium
of facts a- out a spec is country, published by section, with
contributions from all members of the intelligence community; e.g.,
USSR: Agriculture, Bolivia: Naval Forces, etc. The sections were
puulisiedas completer, and some sections were updated several
times before the program ended. The NIS's succeeded the JANIS
reports, a similar series published during World War II by a Joint
Army-Navy team.
National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) - Produced and
coordlna -ec _cu g this period by the Office of National Estimates,
CIA, on behalf of the Intelligence Advisory Committee (TAB) (later
the United States Intelligence Board (USIB)), with contributions
from all members of the intelligence community. NIE's cover long
term problems or situations, and project policy analysis into the
future.
S ecial_National Intelligence Estimates (SNIP) - originally
calle ?,ts, later called SNIE`s Originated the same way as the
NIS's, except that 'they are spot reports covering immediate
problems or crises.
Current Intelligence Bulletin (CIB) - Brief reports alerting
the intelligence comp iuni t;y-' an- senior policy officials to world
events of particular interest. Published daily by the Office of
Current Intelligence and. given wide distribution.
Current Intelligence Digest (CID) -- a briefer, less formal
version o t e CIB.
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Current Intelligence SL yiiary (CIS), and its codeword version,
the Current Intelligence Wee1 Review (CIWR) - longer, more
complete ocunients an ar icles on current problem areas - published
weekly. Often had one or more annexes which gave a fuller
treatment to one specific problem. The annexes were sometimes
published separately.
Current Support Memos and Current StTport Briefs - low level
monogramss on economic siJbj ects ofcui refit interest . Published
periodically by the Current Support Staff of the Office of Research
and Reports. Some items were codeword.
ESAU Papers, ~~CAESAR Papers, and POLO Papers - were Staff
Studies procluce b-y tTie--'*Senior ResearcTStaar on International
Communism. SRS studies were detailed, scholarly reports on various
aspects of international communism; e.g., the Sino-Soviet dispute
on Party doctrine. These studies were published in series, by
subject matter. Sometimes they were called projects.
Studies in Intelli&ence _ articles and book reviews of lasting
interest in intelligence history, published (during this period) by
the CIA, Office of Training, on a quarterly basis. Classified, but
sometimes appeared with an unclassified annex attached.
Foremen Document Division _ (FDD) - Translations of foreign
language articles'romno-ks, magazines, and periodicals of
intelligence interest. These were classified to protect the method
of acquisition and/or the intelligence interest. During most of
this period, the Foreign Document Division was part of the CIA,
Office of Operations. Hence, many FI)D translations appeared as
Office of Operations (00) reports.
Consolidated Translation Survey - Longer reports by FDD which
exploifed---nuflerous--fo'r-&lgt-i language articles of intelligence interest
for the latest information (often scientific, technical, or economic)
on a single subject, e.g., Soviet electronics, Chinese Medicine, etc.
STATSPEC These were all. classified.
UNCLASSIFIED
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TATSPEC
Biographic Inte11'iTonce Bulletin - a short biography of a
foreign personality appearing in tie news. If the person was in
the field of science, technology, or economics the bulletin would
be produced by.the Biographic Register in the CIA. At this time
biographies of political personalities were produced h the
Biographic Information Division/INR/State Departm t.
- en _~ ty~ ra an.r red to. A.-" _x.9613 " eCr political
biographies, even those with a BID/State cover sheet, must be sent
to CIA for classification review. Biographies of strictly military
personalities were produced by the individual U.S. services and are
now the responsibility of the Defense Intelligence Agency.
Biogra~hic Reference Aids - biographies of foreign personalities
grouped by a corrvnon interest, e.g. Soviet doctors attending a conference
in Italy, Chinese aircraft designers, etc. All these were classified.
OCR Reference Aids - The Graphics Register, Industrial Register,
and Special RegistE oT the Office of Central Reference also
produced reference aids in the fields of film and still photography,
plant intelligence, and, other non-biographic fields.
Intelligence Publications Index (IPI) - a bibliographic aid
whichin-Texe classified articles or intelligence interest from all
U.S. government sources (including contractors) and was disseminated
throughout the intelligence community. These were classified.
Published monthly and cumulated semi-annually.
Domestic Contact Reports - sometimes informally called- 25X1A
from tie -list three characters of their document number series.
Intelligence reports on all subjects gleaned from interviews with
Americans returned from overseas. These were classified. Published
by the Domestic Contacts Division of the Office of Operations, CIA.
Intelligence Re orts title usually preceded by the subject
matter, hence, Economic c Intelligence Reports, Scientific Intelligence
Reports, Geograp lc Intelligence Reports, Photographic Intelligence
Report, Factory Markings Intelligence Reports, etc. - monographs produced
by the Intelligence Directorate, CIA, or one of its constituent offices
periodically. Classified and disseminated according to subject matter,
but usually single subjects.
Intelligence Memoranda - also preceded by the subject in the title,
as Scientific Intelli once Memorandum_ - shorter than reports, and usually
with less research and coordination.- Classified and published as
the occasion warranted.
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