LETTER TO ROBERT W. WELLS, GSA FROM STANSFIELD TURNER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85B00236R000200130011-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 18, 2001
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: January 10, 1980
• Content Type: LETTER

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Mr. Robert W. Wells
Acting Director, Information -')c,:urity OversicJ t Office
General Services Administration
Washington, D.C. 20405
Dear Mr. Wells:
CIA concurs in the Guidelines for Systematic Review of
Foreign Government Information Thirty Years Old or Older
forwarded under Director, Information Security Oversight Office
letter of 11 December 1979.
STANSFIELD TURNER
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 are 200 (( 4!2 t~@IA IPbB00236R008 0130011-7
Administration office ' Washington, DC 20405
,dmiral Stansfield Turner, OSfl
-irector
entral Intelligence Agency
=ashincgton, DC 20505
ear Admiral Turner:
nclosed is the final draft of the Foreign Government InforMation Guidelines
greed upon after months of consultation by a working group of senior officials
rom all affected agencies. They are being forwarded to you for your final
nd official review.
lease notify this office within 30 days of your official concurrence with the
nclosed. Many thanks for your assistance in the development of this product.
indest regards,
i ncerely,
ICHAEL T. BLOWN
rector
+wlosure
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GUIDELINES FOR SYSTEMATIC REVIEW OF
FOREIGN GOVERNMENT [NFORMMATI0N
THIRTY YEARS OLD OR OLDER
A. PURPOSE,
These Guidelines for the systematic review anti declassification of foreign
government information have been developed in accordance with the provisions of
Section 3-404 of Executive Order 12065, "National Security Information," and
Section III.C of Information Security Oversight Office Directive No. 1. All
foreign government information constituting permanently valuable records of the
United States Government, for which a prior declassification date has not been
established, shall be systematically reviewed for declassification as it becomes
thirty years old. Foreign government information found to be within one of the
specific categories of information listed in Part F below shall be reviewed
item-by-item by authorized personnel of the agency or agencies concerned to
determine whether continued protection beyond thirty years is needed. All foreign
government information not identified in these Guidelines as requiring item-by-item
review and for which a prior declassification ate has not been established shah be
declassified at the end of thirty years from the date of original classification
subject, when appropriate, to consultation with the foreign governments or inter-
national organizations of governments concerned.
B. DEFINITION.
"Foreign government information" as used in these Guidelines consists of:
1. Documents or material provided by a -oreign government or governments,
international organization of governments, c. any element thereof in the expectation,
expressed or implied, that the document, material, or the information contained
therein is to be held in confidence;
2. Documents originated by the United States that contain classified informa-
tion provided, in any manner, to the United States by foreign governments, international
organizations of governments, or elements thereof, with the expectation, express or
implied, that the information will be held .r confidence;
3. Classified information or material produced by the United States pursuant to
or as a result of a joint arrangement, evidenced by an exchange of letters, memorandum
of understanding, or other written record, with a foreign government or organization
of governments requiring that the information, the arrangement, or both be kept it
confidence,
C. SCOPE.
1. These Guidelines apply to 30-year old foreign government information which
has been received or classified by the United States Governnnent or its agents.
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2. Atomic energy information ( including that originated prior to 1947 and
not marked as such, that received from the United Kingdom or Canada marked "Atomic,"
and that received from NATO marked "Atamal") which is defined and identified as
Restricted Data or Formerly Restricted Data in Sections Ily and 142d of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954, as amended, is outside the scope of these Guidelines and is not
subject to systematic review and may not be automatically downgraded or declassified.
Any document containing information within the definition of Restricted Data or
Formerly Restricted Data that is not so marked will be referred to the Department
of Energy Office of Classification for review and appropriate marking, except for
licensing and related regulatory matters which shall be referred to the Division of
Security, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
D. AGENCY RESPONSIBILITIES.
1. Foreign government information transferred to the General Services Admini-
stration for accession into the National Archives of the United States shall be
reviewed for declassification by the Archivist of the United States in accordance
with Executive Order 12065, the directives of the Information Security Oversight
Office, these Guidelines, any applicable terms of accession, and any supplemental
guidelines provided by the agency with classification jurisdiction over the
information.
2. Foreign government information constituting permanently valuable records
of the Government (as defined in 44 U.S.C. 2103) that is 30 years old and undergoing
systematic review for declassification while in the custody of an agency shall,
except as provided in Part C, above, be reviewed for declassification and downgrading
by that agency in accordance with Executive Order 1_065, the directives of the
Information Security Oversight Office, these Guidelines, and any supplemental internal
agency guidelines.
3. Foreign government information falling within any of the categories listed
in Part F of these Guidelines shall be declassified or downgraded only upon specific
authorization of the agencies to '.hick the information was furnished by the foreign
government or international organ ration of governments concerned and/or which have
classification jurisdiction over it. When such information is in the custody of an
agency but was furnished to or classified by, or is otherwise under the classification
jurisdiction of another agency or agencies the information shall be referred thereto
for review. Information so referred shall remain classified until all reviewing
agencies have authorized its declassification. If the custodial agency cannot readily
identify the agency or agencies having classification jurisdiction, the information
shall be referred in accordance with Part (, of these +guidelines for review or further
referral.
4. Foreign government information falling within any of the categories listed
in Part F of these Guidelines appearing :n lV'hite House documents, which is either
identifiable as having been furnished or 'appears to have been furnished by a foreign
government shall be reviewed by designated white house personnel and further referred
for review to any other agencies whose ctassi is:tri.orf interest is indicated by the nature
or content of the documents.
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E. EFFECT OF PUBLICATION.
1. Foreign government information is declassified if already published in or
cleared by executive branch officials authorized to declassify the information, and/or
by the foreign government(s) involved, as appropriate, for publication in any
unclassified executive branch publication; or it officially published as unclassified
by the foreign government or international organization of governments that furnished
the information, unless the fact of the U.S. Go'vernment's possession of the informa-
tion requires continued protection.
2. The unofficial publication, in any manner, of foreign government information
contained in United States or foreign documents, or of substantially similar informa-
tion, does not in or of itself constitute or permit the declassification of such
documents. The original sources of the information, or the means whereby it was
acquired by the United States Government, may require continued protection and could
preclude declassification. Nevertheless, unofficial publication is a factor to be
considered in the systematic review of information and may affect determinations as
to requirements for its continued classification protection. However, the classifi-
cation status of information which concerns or derives from intelligence activities,
sources or methods shall not be affected by any unofficial publication of similar or
identical information. Final determination. as to the declassification of information
identical with or similar to unofficially published information shall be made by the
agency or agencies holding classification jurisdiction over the information.
F. CATEGORIES REQUIRING ITEM-BY-ITEM REVIEW.
Foreign government information failing into the specific categories listed below
shall be reviewed for declassification in acc?.o.dance with Part A above:
1. Information exempted from declas:;i ic_ation under any joint arrangement
evidenced by an exchange of letters, memor dum of understanding, or other wr,tten
record, with the foreign government or international organization of governments, or
element(s) thereof, that furnished the information. Questions concerning the
existence or applicability of such arrangements shall be referred to the agency or
agencies holding classification jurisdiction over the records under review.
2. Information related to the safeguarding of nuclear materials or facilities,
foreign and domestic, including but not ne-:e;sarily limited to vulnerabilities and
vulnerability assessments of nuclear facile-ies and Special Nuclear Material.
3. Nuclear arms control information (zee
also I"ll below).
4. Information regarding foreign nucle.!r programs (other than Restricted Data
and Formerly Restricted Data), such as:
a. Nuclear weapons testing.
b. Nuclear weapons storage and stockpile.
c. Nuclear weapons effects, hardness, and vulnerability.
d. Nuclear weapons safety.
e. Cooperation in nuclear programs including, but not limited to,
peaceful and military applications of nuclear energy.
E. Exploration, production and import of uranium and thorium from
foreign countries.
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S. Information concerning intelligence or counterintelligence sources,
methods or activities including but not limited to intelligence, counterintelligence
and covert action programs, plans, policies, operations, or assessments; or which
would reveal or identify:
a. Any present, past or prospective undercover personnel, installation,
unit, or clandestine human agent, of the United States or of a
foreign government;
b. Any present, past or prospective method, procedure, mode, technique
or requirement used or being developed by the United States or by
foreign governments, individually or in combination, to produce,
acquire, transmit, analyze, correlate, assess, evaluate or process
intelligence or counterintelligence, or to support an intelligence
or counterintelligence source, operation, or activity;
c. The present, past or proposed existence of any joint United States
and foreign government intelligence, counterintelligence, or covert
action activity or facility, or the nature thereof.
6. Information that could result in or lead to actions which would place an
individual in jeopardy directly attributable to disclosure of the information,
including but not limited to:
a. Information identifying any individual or organization as a
confidential source of intelligence or counterintelligence.
b. Information revealing the identity of an intelligence, counter-
intelligence or covert action agent or agents.
7. Information about foreign individuals, organizations or events which, if
disclosed, could be expected to:
a. Adversely affect a foreign country's or international organization's
relations with the United States.
b. Adversely affect present and/or future confidential exchanges
between the United States and any foreign government or inter-
national organization of governments.
8. Information related to plans (whether executed or not, whether presented in
whole or in part), programs, operations, negotiations, and assessments shared by one
or several foreign governments with the United States, including but not limited to
those involving the territory, political regime or government of another country, and
which if disclosed could be expected to adversely affect the conduct of U.S. foreign
policy or the conduct of another country's foreign policy With respect to a third
country or countries. This item would include contingency plans, plans for covert
political, military or paramilitary activities or operations by a foreign government
acting alone or jointly with the United States Government, and positions or actions
taken by a foreign government alone or Jointly with the United States concerning
border disputes or other territorial issues.
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Information concerning arrangements with respect to foreign basing of
cryptologicoperations and/or foreign policy considerations relating thereto.
10. Scientific information such as that concerning space, climatology, communi-
cations, maritime, undersea, and polar projects, that could be expected to adversely
affect current and/or future exchanges of such information between the United States
and any foreign governments or international organizations of governments.
11. Information on foreign policy aspects of nuclear matters, the disclosure
of which could be expected to adversely affect cooperation between one or more foreign
governments and the United States Government.
12. Nuclear propulsion information.
13. Information concerning the establishment, operation, and support of nuclear
detection systems.
14. Information concerning or revealing military or paramilitary escape, evasion,
cover or deception plans, procedures, and techniques whether executed or not.
15. Information which could adversely affect the current or future use`ulness
of military or defense policies, programs, ?.eapon systems, operations, or plans.
16. Information concerning research, deevelopment, testing and evaluation of
chemical and biological weapons and defense systems; specific identification of
chemical and biological agents and munitions; and chemical and biological warfare
plans.
17. Technical information concerning v--ipons systems and military equipment that
reveals the capabilities, limitations, or ~?.inerabilities of such systems or equipment
and that could be exploited to destroy, inter, render ineffective or neutralize such
weapons or equipment.
18. Cryptologic information, including cryptologic sources and methods, currently
in use, This includes information concerning or revealing the processes, techniques,
operations, and scope of signal intelligence comprising communications intelligence,
electronics intelligence, and telemetry intelligence, the cryptosecurity and emission
security components of communications se-:u-ity, and the communications portion of cover-
and deception plans.
19. Information concerning electronic intelligence, telemetry intelligence and
electronic warfare (electronic warfare support measures, electronic counter-countermeasux
or related activities, including but not necessarily limited to:
a. Nomenclature, functions, technical characteristics or descriptions of
communications and electronic equipment, its employment/development,
and its association with weapon systems or military operations.
The processes, techniques, operations or scope of activities involved
in the acquisition, analysis and evaluation of such information, and
the degree of success achi;ved by the above processes, techniques,
operations or activities.
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20. Present, past or proposed protective intelligence information relating to
the sources, plans, techniques, equipment and methods in carrying out assigned duties
of protecting United States Government officials or other protectees abroad and
foreign officials while in the United States or United States possessions. This
includes information concerning the identification of witnesses, informants and
persons suspected of being dangerous to persons under protection.
21. Information on deposits of foreign official institutions in United States
banks and on foreign official institutions' holdings, purchases and sales of long-
term marketable securities in the United States.
22. Information concerning economic and policy studies and sensitive assessments
or analyses of economic conditions, policies or activities of foreign countries or
international organizations of governments received through the Multilateral Develop-
ment Banks or through the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
23. Information described in subparts 2-22 of this Part contained in corres-
pondence, transcripts, memoranda of coversation, or minutes of meetings between the
President of the United States and a current or former foreign government official.
24. Information described in subpart,, 2-22 of this Part contained in documents
originated by or sent to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs,
his Deputy, members of the National Security Council staff, or any other person
performing national security functions on behalf of the White House.
25. Federal agency originated documents bearing NSC or White House comments
relating to categories of information described in subparts 2-22 of this Part.
26. Information as described in subparts 2-22 of this Part contained in
correspondence to or from the President, including background briefing memoranda and
talking points for meetings between the President and foreign government officials,
and discussions of the timing and purposes of such meetings.
27. Information as descriLed in subparts 2-22 of this Part contained in agency
message traffic originated by White [louse Staff members but sent through agency
communication networks.
1. When the identity of agencies holding classification jurisdiction over
foreign government information is not apparent upon initial inspection, or when
reviewing officials do not possess the requisite expertise, the information shall
be referred as follows to an agency competent to make the decisions required or
further to refer the information for review by the appropriate agency or agencies:
Categories 2 - 4, Department of Energy or Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (as appropriate)
S - 6, Central Intelligence Agency
7 - 11, Department of State
12 - 19, Department of Defense
20 - 22, Department of the Treasury
23 - 27, National Security Council
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2. When agencies have determined on their own authority, and/or after consul-
tation when necessary with other U.S. agencies and with foreign governments or
international organization of governments which furnished the information as
appropriate, that information under their jurisdiction no longer requires classifi-
cation protection, such information shall then be declassified. Such action may
involve the declassification of an entire document, or only portions of a document.
If it is determined that classification :nust be extended beyond 30 years, the
provisions of Section III,C,2(b) of Information Security Oversight Office Directive
No. 1 apply.
H. DOWNGRADING.
Foreign government information classified Top Secret may be downgraded to Secret
after 30 Years unless an agency with classification jurisdiction over it determines
on its own authority, or after consultation, as appropriate, with the foreign govern-
ment or international organization of governments which furnished the information,
that it requires continued protection ac the Top Secret level.
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