LETTER TO MR. BRIAN V. KINNEY FROM(Sanitized)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85B00236R000200190001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 7, 2007
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 26, 1982
• Content Type: LETTER

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
26 April 1982
Mr. Brian V. Kinney
Chief, Declassification and.
Historical Research Branch
Records Management Division
Washington Headquarters Services
Room 1DS17, Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301
Dear Mr. Kinney:
We have reviewed the documents forwarded to us under a memorandum dated
30 March 1982 from Mr. E. E. Lowry, Jr., OSD, Records Administrator. The
results of our classification review of the documents under Paragraph 3--401 of
Executive Order 12065 are as follows:
a. We have downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL the paper dated 27 August 1953,
Subject: French Action in Morocco Creates New Problems. Classification
i; retained under exemption 1-301(d) of E.O. 12065. The next review date
is 1.992.
b. We have no objection to declassification of the paper dated
3 November 1955, Subject: Item 5 (For Discussion) -- Situation in Brazil
Following the Elections.
c. We have declassified the paper dated 22 March 1954, Subject:
Major U.S. Interests in Africa.
Sincerely,
Chief, as ication Review Division
Office of Information Services
Directorate of Administration
NSC review completed - unredacted segments may be declassified
Enclosures:
1. Paper dtd 27 Aug 53
2. Paper dtd 3 Nov 55 OSD REVIEW COMPLETED Unclassified when
3. Paper dtd 22 Mar 54 Separated from
Distribution: Enclosures
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CIA No. 50313~~t[-~ c % ?.
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FRENCH ACTION IN MOROCCO CREATES NEW PROBLEMS
The French government's exchange of sultans in Morocco will
enable French authorities to revamp the protectorate's administra-
tion along the lines that they desire; however, the basic conflict
between Moroccan desires for home rule and the French wish to main-
tain absolute control remains unresolved. American unpopularity
in the area will increase, and the US treaty rights and airbases
are endangered.
On 20 August the French cabinet finally yielded to pressure
from the Residency General and French vested interests in Morocco
and approved the removal of Sidi Mohamed ben Youssef as sultan of
Morocco, replacing him with a cousin, Moulay Mohamed ben Arafa. The
latter, who had been declared the religious ruler of Morocco by
tribal chieftain El Glaoui six days earlier, precipitating the
latest crisis, was duly confirmed as sultan by religious elders
on 21 August.
French-proposed "reforms," alleged to be the point at issue
between the former sultan and French authorities, will be approved
by the now sultan, whom the French feel sure they can control.
These measures superficially modernize the local government by
imposing a front of quasi-democratic institutions. Theoretically
they provide for a separation of executive, legislative, and Judi-
cial power; but actually they legalize
i.n. the protectorate.
NSC review completed - may be declassified in full
7 0-2
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wCENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
27 August 1953
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France's gains through ousting the sultan are far outweighed
by its prospective losses. Replacement of the able and moderate
Ben Youssef by an aged, reactionary figurehead will win some tern-
porary political support from. feudal tribesmen and seekers of
political plums. On the other hand, this gain will be more than
offset by the alienation of the growing middle class, which includes
the bulk of the Western-educated and politically conscious Arabs
and Berbers.
The anti-sultan movement was spearheaded by El Glaoui, the
pasha of Marrakech. The movement was built up by Residency of-
ficials and condoned by Resident General Guillaume in contra-
vention of the French Foreign Ministry's instructions. El Glaoui
has won a personal victory to the embarrassment of Paris, but his
pliability cannot be considered permanent. His demands will
probably be excessive and his activities cause the French more
trouble. The French may therefore have to resort again to divide-
and-rule tactics in order to curb El Glaoui.
Dethronement of the popular sultan will increase the animosity
toward the French,-already widespread among both Berber and Arab
subjects. It will further embitter the approximately two million
Arabs and Berbers who sympathize with the nationalist Istiglal
party, which has about 100,000 hard-core members. It will increase
the likelihood of their becoming prey to anti-American propaganda
spread by the Communists, who number about 5,000 with a hard core
of several hundred and a European directorate.
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The Istiglal party may now abandon moderation and resort to
underground terrorism. Although it is not known to have any
military equipment and could not now stage a full-scale rebellion,
it will try to obtain foreign support, secure weapons, and sub-
vert native troops. Despite extensive security measures, isolated
incidents of violence are taking place.
Prolonged political agitation would force the French to retain
their large military establishment in Morocco. It now consists of
more than 66,000 army, navy, air and quasi-military forces.
France's policy is assured of the support of other colonial
powers, particularly the United Kingdom and the Netherlands; but
Spain, which holds a protectorate over northern Morocco, is not
likely to give more than tacit approval. so long as it continues
its policy of rapprochement with the Arab states. There has been
immediate denunciation of France by the Arab-Asian bloc. It has
demanded Security Council action and will probably be supported
in this maneuver by the anticolonial. nations. Bitter debate
within the United Nations General Assembly probably will follow.
The Soviet Union, anxious to see a rift in the Western alliance,
will benefit from any controversy which develops.
The removal of the sultan worsens the position of the United
States in Morocco. American popularity among the natives in gen-
oral and the nationalists in particular will diminish because they
hoped for support for their aspirations.
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French settlers and vested interests in Morocco are highly
suspicious of American intentions. This attitude will be sharpened
following the expression on 21 August of official US concern. More-
over, the Residency General will probably repeat previous charges
that American officials have assisted the nationalists.
The four operational American air force and naval air bases
in Morocco will be targets for sabotage if the Communists or the
nationalists resort to terrorism. Local French pressures on Paris
may also prolong the delays in building the other two bases pro-
vided for in a French-American agreement of December 1950.
The new French-dominated sultan may be asked to denounce the
US-Moroccan treaty of 1836, the basis of American treaty rights in
Morocco. France has long sought to annul the extraterritorial
privileges which only the US continues to hold and which were up-
hold by the World Court in August 1952. Abrogation of this treaty
would end the commercial open door in Morocco which has existed
since the signing of the Treaty of Algeciras in 1906.
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N x 26th meeting
3 November 1955
ITM 5 (Pbr Discussion)
SITUATION IN BRAZIL FOLLOWING THE ELECTIONS
1. At the Council meeting of 20 October, a discussion of the recent
Brazilian elections apse in connection with Allen Dulles' intelligence
br?ieefing, and the Council requested that a special presentation on this
subject be prepared by State as n4 CIA for a subsequent meeting. ''hie re-
port is responsive to that request.
2. Although the election returns indicate that Kt bitschek }
GouL ?t have ,n the presidency aai vice presidency, reepectivre ly, the.
u expected. vote polled by General Tavr!ora indicates that mode .te-conservative
forces are large and, if properly organized and led., would he sufficiently
solid to counterbalance or out-number the left 'ring. &4 votes for Tavora
not been ssiphoned off by another conservative candidate, it is probable
that Tavora would have won. Tre relatively narrow margin which the winners
held. over their opponents indicates that Communist support was the deciding
factor.
3. A question still remains as to acceptance by the military of the
election results. The basis for opposition to Kubitechek lies principally
in his alliance with Goul,art, whose pro-Co unist proclivities could facili-
tate the growth of C st inf l' uenc:e . The seeds of a coup to overthrow
Kubitsehek are present. That such a move has not taken place by this time
is probably due to the opposition of leading elements of the away and of
nearly all political groups to any extralegal move. This factor, together
with a shake-up in the armed forces hierarchy on 18 October removing certain
army leaders favoring a coup, serves to diminish, but not eliminate, the
threat of a military coup before the new regime takes office on 31 January
1956.
i.. Kubitechhk has publicly stated his intention to cooperate with the
J.S. to the fullest extent. However, his record as overnor of Minas Gerais
indicates that he is a strong advocate of some of the anti-foreign policies
of Vargas. If installed as president, Xuhitachek will probably initially
scorn any aa3sisstaance from Goulart and the Communist Party, in as attest
firmly to establish his regime sr d thereby forestall a military uprising.
Further,, it is believed that he will initially soft-pedal any anti-foreign
tendencies because of the adverse effect such action would have on Brazil's
already critical economic situation. It is estimated that Kubitechek will
probably fail to secure the respect and cooperation of the nilitaary, the
Congress, and powerful economic proosure groups necessury to establish an
effccti regime. To help bolster his position, he is anxious to visit the
U.S. before takirg office.
NSC review completed - may be declassified in full
!`r_,evmmnt No.
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*1. Resources - Urani! n, manganese, chrorse, asbestos, corund1*,
per.
co
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p
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,
diamonds, palm products, si sal# tin, rubber. co
military - Air and naval bases, manpower,. ship repair and
supply, stating areas.
U.N. actions, and tend to separate va frCm es ern
European allies.
Vesting potential cow=18t, til t.
Gradual solution to racialism, whicki handicaps free world
unity especially with color conscious East and Latin
America
NSC review completed - may be declassified in full
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V3. ral and agricultural production
spices, phosphates.
cocoa, Iron ores,
5tt port of European economies- dollar earners such as cocoa,
products supplied within own currency area.
In the distant future- eiWanded market for US investment
capital and exports; now limited due to colonial
policies, difficulties in repatriation of earnings,
small market.
Political:
*1. Seeping Africa stable and an tie free world aide for its
strength and so that it does not '.impair European
strength.
*2. Minimizing differences over colonial policies which affect
1W 4.
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NELL F _
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, HEADQUARTERS SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
March 30, 1982
NSC review completed - may be declassified in full
MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF, CLASSIFICATION REVIEW DIVISION, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SUBJECT: Request for Declassification Review
During the systematic review of all classified Office of the Secretary
of Defense (OSD) documents over 20 years old, the Declassification and
Historical Research Branch, Records Management Division, Directorate for
Correspondence and Directives, Washington Headquarters Services, turned
up the attached document(s).
The documents were either originated by your agency, contain information
for which your agency is the classification authority, or are otherwise
of interest to you.
It is therefore requested that your agency review the documents and
recommend declassification, continued classification at the present or
lesser level of classification, and/or review by other agencies. If your
agency is recommending continued classification, in accordance with Para-
graph 3-401, Executive Order 12065, it is requested that an authority for
continued classification be specified, along with a date for the next review.
The time permitted by Executive Order 12065 to reach the point where all
OSD documents over 20 years old have been reviewed, and the large volume
of over 20 year old OSD documents, make it necessary to request your res-
ponse within 60 days. In your response, you may wish to provide guidance
with regard to what categories of information you do and do not wish to
have referred to you in the future.
Your assistance in effecting this review will be most appreciated. Please
return the documents to Mr. Brian V. Kinney, Chief, Declassification and
Historical Research Branch, Records Management Division, Washington Head-
quarters Services, Room 1D517, Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301, upon
completion of your review.
Without attachments, this memorandum is UNCLASSIFIED.
E. E. Lowry,
Attachments (3)
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LIST OF ATTACHMENTS
1. Paper, 27 Aug 53, Subj: French Action in Morocco Creates New Problems,
CIA No. 50313 ('i'S)
2. Paper, 3 Nov 55, Subj: Item 5 (For Discussion) - Situation in Brazil
Following the Elections (S)
3. Paper, 22 Mar 54, Subj: Major U.S. Interests in Africa (C)
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