CIA REVIEW WORKSHEET EXECUTIVE SESSIONS OF THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE (HISTORICAL SERIES) VOLUME XIII, PART I, 1961 'THE CUBAN SITUATION'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85B00236R000400090019-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 14, 2005
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: January 11, 1961
• Content Type: MISC

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CIA REVIEW WORKSHEET
EXECUTIVE SESSIONS OF THE SENATE
FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE (Historical Series)
VOLUME XIII, PART I, 1961
"THE CUBAN SITUATION"
Partical Transcript, Pages 43-46, 11 January 1961
PAGE TEXT LINE CIA REVIEW DECISION
45 6, 7, 8 Delete: "We now ... took place"
Reason: E.O. 12356, Section 1.3a(4)
26, 27 Delete: "and we ... this conference,"
Reason: E.O. 12356, Section 1.3a(4)
CIA has completed the initial review of pages 43-46 and has
marked in brackets the passages indicated above that are
classified. The remainder of the transcript is unclassified.
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 //I ;-,rrc. 2.rv/4w
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CONFI TRIAL
REVIEW WORKSHEET
EXECUTIVE SESSIONS OF TILE SENATE
FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE (Historical Series)
VOLUME XIII, PART I, 1961
"THE CUBAN SITUATION"
Partical Transcript, Pages 43-46, 11 January 1961
PAGE TEXT LINE
CRD RECOMMENDATIONS
45 6, 7, 8 (Soviet) Delete: "We now ... took
place" 1.3a(4)
26, 27 (Soviet) Delete: "and we ... this
conference," 1.3a(4)
0 v ? V') Ll~
O9ONFID'ENTIAL
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MqN U
S-012268 OO 4(0011(29-DEC-32-09:27:02) P6601.DOC 11/08/82
CONGRESS OF COMMUNIST PARTIES
They had this congress of the Communist parties of the world
very recently in Moscow. Eighty-one Communist parties were there
including the American Communist Party was represented, Com-
munist parties from practically every country of the world, some of
t m quite large delegations.
We now have, I think, a pretty full roster of everyone that was
present at this conference. We have pretty good information as to
what took placand in addition to trying to settle the ideological
disputes between Moscow and Peiping, which they failed to settle
but merely glossed over, they also undoubtedly, and as far as we
can tell they undoubtedly were there laying their plans for the pro-
motion of Communism in each one of these various areas outside of
the bloc. Of the 81, 1 guess about 15 were bloc countries, were they
not, roughly 15?
Mr. AMORY. Yes, sir.
Mr. DULLEs. And the rest were Communist delegations from
countries that are not dominated by Communism.
Senator WILEY. How many from America?
Mr. DULLES. Do you remember?
Mr. AMORY. Yes; a very small number.
Senator WILEY. How many?
Mr. DULLES. Three, I think, three. So that it is in this kind of a
world that one approaches the Cuban situation.
KREMLIN'S PROGRAM FOR LATIN AMERICA
We go back to the 21st Party Congress that was held in February
1959. At that Congress whe a there was a large delegation from the
Latin American countriesnd we had. some people that were pres-
ent there and gave us a report on this conference then the Krem-
lin laid down the general lines of their program for Latin America,
and we see that program coming out now in the Cuban situation.
At that time, they said. "Start this thing on the nationalistic basis,
anti-Americanism, nationalism. Don't talk too much about Moscow,
we will come on later." And they laid down a general program
there for the Communist parties of Latin America which are being
carried out now, notably in Cuba.
Now, with that little introduction, I will go on to the Cuban prob-
lem in which this Committee is particularly interested.
SOVIET FUNDING OF LOCAL COMMUNIST PARTIES
The CHAIRMAN. Before you go on, does Moscow itself finance
these local Communist parties in a very substantial way? Do they
send them money?
Mr. DuLI,E,s. They do; yes. It depends a good deal on the party.
Sometimes they facilitate, they make commercial and other deals
that help them get money. They do furnish them with money, in
some cases a good deal of money.
The CIWRMAN. Have you ever tried to make an estimate of the
volume, the size of their programs of this kind? I would just like to
compare it with what we do in this field.
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CIA REVIEW WORKSHEET
EXECUTIVE SESSIONS OF THE SENATE
FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE (Historical Series)
VOLUME XIII, PART I, 1961
"THE SITUATION IN LAOS"
Partial transcript, pages 281?-308, 11 April 1961
PAGE TEXT LINE CIA REVIEW DECISION
284 40, 41, 42 Release
292 .31, 32 Release
CIA has reviewed again pages 281-308 and has found no
passages that are classifiable from the CIA point of view.
The Department of State should be consulted on passages
previously deleted from declassification at their request.
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CONF1DENTIj,L
REVIEW WORKSHEET
EXECUTIVE SESSIONS OF THE SENATE
FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE (Historical Series)
VOLUME XIII, PART I, 1961
"THE SITUATION IN LAOS"
Partial transcript, pages 281-308, 11 April 1961
PAGE TEXT LINE CRD RECOMMENDATIONS
284 40, 41, 42 Release (note 1)
292 31, 32 Release (note 1)
Note 1: This information revealed in Honorable Men,
William Colby, pages 199, 200.
DDO/EA Memo, 22 June 1982 authorizes release of Laos
information contained in Honorable Men (see
attachments).
UOI EIDENTIA?C
/0
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 'pt free of con-
in later years
exist in Laos
id leadership,
lave an impact
:mbering some
Ived in every-
ing far behind
ence oil South
'ose above two
supported, of'
retire American
integration of
ibassadors \\'il-
cover, the CIA
engage in corn-
ippineSs at not
id tribal friends
policy worked
r to only about
tr the operation
billions of (lol-
went to the val-
of ten years of
increased from
tely where they
re forced to ac-
?iitral and inde-
lit that America
the end was not
111c Coil 11-111111 ists
,s resumed mili-
agreement, CIA
der Communist
dead, or living
\Vashiiigton Assignment--and a Secret War / i99
To accolilplir~h even this much was not without its (lifI-
culties; of course. Flying hop, skip and jump through the
karst ii ountains during tropical rainstorms, skittering along
the Mekong at a ten-foot altitude render a twenty-foot ceil-
ing, searching for'an airfield on a flat stretch of the river's;
bank, and carrier-type landings in a swirl of dust on inuim-
taiiltop airstrips called for a certain equanimity of spirit from
the CIA officers who did them every day rather than on tlid
selnianmml visits I made. Flying in such conditions r{'
(tuired care as well as daring from the magnificent Air Aim r-
ica pilots and the installation of a complex of navigatimial
and meteorological aids to suppleillc'id its swashbuckliw-
image. Also, CIA's doctrines of clandcstinity had to be
stretched a good way to cover the "secret city" of zo,ooo that
grew uh of the families of the tribal forces grouped around
its headquarters Moreover, appropriate uniforms had to be
devised for the Thai, officers and men who arrived, to help
with conlmunicatiofli and, t?4ining, since they could not offi-
cially be Thai and they certainly were not Laic . And a fine
line had to be drawn between helping the triial groups in
their struggle and avoiding participation in some of the
more primitive practices of those mountain peoples so far
from civilization, including politely tasting but not ingesting
the locally fermented rice "wine," keeping clear of the rit-
ual bull-baiting that preceded feasts and tactfully turning
down the maiden offered by the local chief to ease the strain
of a mountain village visit.
One problem was fundamental to guerrilla war, only
partly brought about by the actions of the other side. Some
immutable principle provides that a barefoot guerrilla force
must inevitably grow to become a conventional army. Tito's
struggle against the Germans, Mace's against Chiang, and our
Minutemen's against the British, all exemplify this. And it
occurred in Laos as well. The si.iceessfnl teams in North
Laos against the North Vietnamese requested heavier \yeatl-
their effectiveness and then to defend
improve
ons first to cks on their villages instead of.
against North Vietnamese atta
fleeing before them and harassing them from the rear. A few
 200 / HONORABLE MIEN
captured artillery Pieces turned against the e nen-~ fro-~i
magnificent tr-otultain ring around the Plain of Jars g- ?
ated the demand I* ('I' more, and suceessfid forays h\ sqn;
grew to battalion assaults to clear the eneu-v from the trn:
tional tribal homelands.
But such escalation begat it recil.roc:-l onv fron- the ()ti
side; the energy increased its forces ;111c1 arnuunynts to
Serve its position and c0ntint-e to assert its k~ow~,?r i-- [,:ins.
1'hyry was oily dran-atic -.?zcefttio-- to the 1111c. '~h-SOVIET OOMPETITLON
Senator AIKEN. You indicated at one point, Mr. Secretary, that
Peiping was not interested in conflict there.
Secretary RUSK. No, sir. I just indicated that we have not been
able to find any
Senator AIKEN. You have not, been able to catch them at it.
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n Austrian kind of neutrality, if anyt
e could rely pretty heavily
are trying our best
tion.
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Secretary RUSK. [continuing]. Any evidence of any significant
movement of forces toward the south.
Senator AIKEN. But you do not find that Peiping is pushing for
conflict, armed conflict in this area?
Secretary RUSK. I think Peiping is probably the force that is
pushing hardest----
Senator AIKEN. Yes.
Secretary RUSK. [continuing]. For a communized Laos. I think
this is one of the reasons why there has been a certain time lag in
Moscow responses on some of these things. I am sure they are con-
sulting Peiping, and there has been some problem with it.
Senator AIKEN. Do you think Russia is monopolizing assistance
to the Laotian rebels for the purpose of keeping Red China out?
Secretary RUSK. I do not know, sir, exactly how that works out.
The Russians may be faced with a problem within the Communist
bloc itself, to be at least as Bolshevik as the Chinese, in a contest
for leadership of the Communist bloc.
I think it is also worth noting for what it might mean, and I am
not sure that I know, that North Vietnam has been closer to
Moscow than to Peiping. This may be because even in North Viet-
nam you get a share of that anti-Chinese feeling that you get
throughout Southeast Asia.
Senator AIKEN. Distrust of the Chinese?
Secretary RUSK. Yes.
Senator AIKKN. If conflict did come, would it be fought primarily
between American and Chinese, Red Chinese-
Secretary RUSK. Well, we think -
Senator AIKEN [continuing]. Forces?
Secretary RUSK [continuing]. There are a number of steps which
can be taken short of the involvement of major U.S. units, which
,, could still make considerable difference; that is,
ting 1n some mericans as In Iv1 ua. s rater, an unl , a-
things are in motion, so we feel that we can build up the
pressures in support of negotiations without precipitating at this
stage, yet, a major conflict between SEATO forces, including our
own on the one side and, say, the Red Chinese forces on the other.
DIFFICULT BA'1 MEGROUND
Senator ArKEN. Would not Laos be a more difficult battleground
for us than Korea was?
Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir; if we are talking about large forces.
Senator AIKEN. I well recall General [Matthew] Ridgway's testi-
mony before the committee at that time.
Secretary RUSK. There is no question that Laos would be. I do
not believe, if you get to the point where you had to use major
forces, that you would bring them around and put them into Laos
through Thailand.
Senator AIKEN. Yes.
I KG .. _
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Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Chairman?
Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Lausche.
are irresponsible.
h
Senator LAUSCHE. I do not want to leave this meeting with the
state of mind that we are alone to be frightened about what will
happen in Formosa and Korea and Germany because, undoubtedly,
the others are also wondering what the impact will be.
Secretary RUSK. Exactly.
Senator LAUSCHE [continued). What problems they may have in
the satellite countries and other places that are involved.
Secretary RUSK. You are quite right, Senator. In our talks with
the Russians we have gone to great lengths to make it clear to
them that they must not underestimate us in this situation. I
mean, it is rather easy for a dictatorship to underestimate a democ-
racy until it is too late.
Senator GORE. I take it when you say that this would mean a
vast, worldwide political involvement, that you were referring to
Eastern Europe and to
Secretary RUSK. You do not start serious shooting of this sort,
where the great powers are nose to nose in confrontation, without
having to face the fact that you are in confrontation with them in
other places. If you make your decision without realizing that, you
ay
Now, I think the other side, as Senator Lausche points out,
to worry about exactly the same thing, you see.
Senator GORE. Yes.
Senator LAUSCHE.IThe fact that they were so relieved when you
got Formosa to pull-those troops out of Burma indicates that they
do not want friction. 3
Secretary RUSK. I think they have some problems, and I really
think that Moscow is much more ready to get to an Austrian Laos
than is General Giap in North Vietnam or than is Peiping.
Senator GORE. May I ask a question?
Senator SPARKMAN. Yes.
S?VU;,r ASCENDANCY V. CHINAS PROXIMITY
Senator GORE. There are many puzzling factors involved here,
but the most enigmatic, to me, is why the Soviet Union would be in
the forefront here in an area that is so adjacent to Communist
China. What is the answer to that?
Secretary RUSK. North Vietnam has always been much closer to
Moscow than to Peiping. This may have something to do with it.
There is considerable trouble in South China. There are some
very large areas there that were heavily hit by the food shortages,
and we think the Chinese are pretty much involved with problems
of their own in South China.
The Soviets, following the Communist Summit of last December,
may feel they have got to play a hand here to demonstrate to the
Communist bloc that they still are the leaders of the historic and
inevitable world revolution. They may--and this is purely specula-
tive-they may prefer to be in here themselves, to try to keep the
situation under some control, than to turn it over to Peiping.
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 CONFIDENTIAL
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CIA REVIEW WORKSHEET
EXECUTIVE SESSIONS OF THE SENATE
FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE (Historical Series)
VOLUME XIII, PART I, 1961
"BRIEFING ON THE CUBAN SITUATION"
Partial Transcript, Pages 339-343; 345-387, 1 May 1961
PAGE TEXT LINE CIA REVIEW DECISION
378 46 thru 49 Delete: "And they ... abroad."
Reason: E.O. 1.2356, Section 1.3a(4)
CIA has reviewed again pages 339-343; 345-387 and has
marked in brackets the passage indicated above that is
classified. The remainder of the transcript is unclassified
from the CIA point of view. The Department of State should
be consulted on passages previously deleted from declassifi-
cation at their request.
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 Partial Transcript, Pages 339-343 345-387, 1 May 1961
REVIEW WORKS HEET
EXECUTIVE SESSIONS OF THE SENATE
FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE (Historical Series)
VOLUME XIII, PART I, 1961
"BRIEFING ON THE CUBAN SITUATION"
PAGE TEXT/LINE
378 46 thru 49
Qhlf(PE'4TIAL
CAD
CRD RECOMMENDATIONS
Delete: "And they ... abroad."
1.3a(4)
~I4FIDENTIAI
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 -12268 0197(03x06-3AN-83-11:12:49) F6601.DOC 11/08/82
378
remain secret; nothing that we do in this meeting will be a perma-
nent secret.
No. 2, the people of our country-Ohio, at least-are sick and
tired of being pushed around. I think that the people are ahead of
our leaders in wanting the honor of our country to be maintained
and to insure its security.
I agree with you, Mr. Secretary, that we cannot suffer Commu-
nist governments to become entrenched with their mighty iron
power, and then hope that you are ever going to extricate them.
I think in Cuba the and to make themselvesu impregnable against any method of revolu-
tion.
That is all I have to say.
Senator MoRSE. Senator Aiken.
STATE DEPARTMENTS INFORMATION SOURCES
Senator AIKEN. Has the State Department been aware at all
times, Mr. Secretary, of the organization and the progress made in
training the expeditionary force?
Secretary RUSK. I think officers of the State Department have
from the beginning.
Senator AIKEN. From the beginning?
Secretary RusK. Yes, sir; from more than a year ago.
Senator AIKEN. The State Department did not initiate the plan?
Secretary RUSK. No, sir.
Senator AIKEN. Who keeps you informed of what is going on?
Secretary RUSK. The machinery for this type of operation is in-
terdepartmental and relatively restricted.
One of the things that must now be carefully reviewed is, first,
under what circumstances this type of activity will be undertaken,
and, second, what machinery for complete liaison there is among
the departments.
At the present time, the interdepartmental groups working on
this are somewhat limited in number, that is, all elements of the
State Department are not drawn into this particular type of oper-
ation. The relevant bureau and the special officers who maintain
liaison with Defense and CIA, of course, are very much involved
with it. information service
Senator AIKEN. You rely upon your own
largely? _ -. - -ri('p
NeCretary n.un". in from ourselves and from other agencies, and those get put to-
gether.
Senator AIKEN. But CIA works with you?
the State Department is kept ade-
quately informed?
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some opportunity for at least a large majority of OAS to take this
question up, to consider what can now be done in the hemisphere.
This will not be unanimous because there are, perhaps, two gov-
ernments that do not feel ready to take any overt part in such ac-
tivities.
Senator HICKENLOOPER. Is Brazil even close,to thinking--
Secretary RUSK. Brazil is in a rather different position. I think
that we will find in Brazil that President Quadros will be moving
very vigorously on his home front and he will be somewhat cau-
tious on the foreign policy side, but I think on the issue of the pen-
etration of the hemisphere from the outside, he will be much more
cooperative than we would have supposed, say, a month ago that
he might have been.
Senator HICKENLOOPER. 1 am glad for your optimism about that,
which I do not share. But again I do not have all the facts at my
command. From what I have seen and whatever intuition I have on
the thing, I do not share your optimism on that.
Secre
rnin
ly this mo
Senator CKEN
HI
titude, a hostility, to
been most consistently c
strange internal
which may o
- I woul
tenti
liti
going to tale any part.n'"~
a that he thinks is on the
I would not want t
I would not r
kno
R. It is
United States personally. He has
cal arraii
'not survive.
Senator HICKENLOOPER. Let me ask you this: What do you think
about the basic prestige and the standing of the United States if
this thing just drifts in Cuba, and Castro keeps building up, and
nimity there on this thing.
Secretary RUSK. Perhaps I could come back, in connection with
the development of further approach to Latin America, with a full
report on this consultation which is now in progress. I cannot---
Senator HICKENLOOPER. I understand that you cannot answer
them now because you are talking to these people.
Secretary RUSK. I cannot answer them now because we are in
the process of talking.
PRESTIGE OF THE UNITED STATES
But just do not know where you are going to turn toward una-
? Camino Ponce Enriquez. President of Ecuador.
' Romulo Betancourt, President of Venezuela.
pathetic operation
of the United States?
er that one categorical-
out as a possibility.
wn that he has a hostile at-
pect from Colombia, with that