DCI BRIEFING FOR HPSCI ON SEPTEMBER 20, 1981

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85B00263R000200170006-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 8, 2007
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: August 24, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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6G 198,
24? August 1983,
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DCI Briefing for HPSCI on September 20,1983
The Soviets are increasly active throughout the world in
order to bolster their influence and to undermine that of the US:
o Moscow has become the world's leading arms exporter and
is the principal supplier of arms to 34 LDCs compared to
17 a decade ago. Military equipment sales to LDCs
totaled $68.2 billion during the last decade.
o Soviet economic assistance--though smaller than the
military program--has continued to grow. Of the $23.3
billion in credits and grants extended since 1954, 65
percent of this has been in the last decade., In
addition there were over 40,000 Soviet economic
technicians in the LDCs in 1982.
o Training programs--military and civilian--have grown
rapidly. Over 50,000 academic students were being
trained in the USSR last year, a 250 percent increase in
10 years. In addition over 10,000 military personnel
and technical trainees departed for training in the USSR
and other Warsaw Pact countries in 1982.
o The Soviets have also launched a major new propaganda
offensive aimed against the West. Radio Moscow alone
now beams programs worldwide in more than 60 languages
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and is on the air nearly 1,200 hours each week.
On the covert side, Moscow has developed a vigorous program
of "active- measures" that is carried out in large part by a
growing overseas presence that includes diplomats, Aeroflot
employees, and the representatives of Soviet trade and news
organizations. Of the 18,000 official Soviets abroad,
percent are believed to be intelligence personnel. Soviet active
measures
include:
o Financial support and direction to Communist parties,
front groups, youth and labor, and other opposition groups
o Media manipulation, disinformation, forgeries
o Support to insurgents, dissidents, and terrorists
o Agents-of-influence and other subversive activities
The Soviets have also encouraged, supported, and. sometimes
directed their allies' efforts--both overt and covert--in support
of Soviet foreign policy objectives. A pattern of cooperation
and coordination has developed between the USSR, other Warsaw
Pact members, Cuba, Libya, and a number of other states. On the
overt side, Cuban troops in Angola and Ethiopia, East German
training and support to a number of LDC intelligence and security
organizations, and the involvement of East European countries,
Cuba, Libya, and North Korea" in the provision of military
equipment to LDC governments come to mind. These countries are
also .involved in covert activities that support Soviet interests
to varying degrees.
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My remarks today will focus on the covert activities that
are used to complement the more diplomatic and military
actions. The US is the major target of Soviet Bloc covert
actions, which are generally aimed at discrediting US policies
and promoting Soviet views. The specific objectives usually vary
from region to region, although there are some themes--
particularly pushing the Soviet view on peace issues and
promoting closer relations with the Non-aligned Movement--that
encompass more than one region.
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II. Regional Sections
A. Europe
1. Soviet objective: separate Western Europe from US
by exploiting fear of nuclear war
a. Specific examples of actions supporting
objectives
(1) Covert aid to peace movements
(2) Funding of front meetings/demonstrations
(3) Propaganda promoting nuclear free zones
in Nordic countries/Mediterranean
b. East German assistance
2.
Soviet objective:
block Western efforts to aid
Polish Liberalization
(1) Disinformation/forgeries
3.
Soviet objective: restrict application by Western
powers of CSCE Final Document to human rights
issues
4.
Soviet objective: prevent Spain from entering
NATO/EC
(1) Disinformation/forgeries
(2) Promoting trade and maritime agreements
with USSR
B. Middle East/North Africa
1. Soviet objective: thwart US peace initiatives,
including Lebanon settlement
a. Supporting radical regimes
b. Disinformation/forgeries
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2. Libyan objective: combat and eventually eliminate
Israel
a. Supporting radical Palestinian movements and
b. Opposing Arafat and other moderate Palestinian
c. Supporting radical regimes e.g. Iran, Syria,
S. Yemen
d. Working against moderate regimes e.g. Egypt,
Sudan, Saudi Arabia
3. Libyan objective: support for international
terrorism
a. Financial and to radical Palestinian groups
b. Fielding assasination teams against Sadat,
Nimeri, US Ambassador Eilts
c. Fielding hits teams for assasination of
moderate Arab Ambassador
C. Sub-Saharan Africa
1. Soviet,objective: encourage/facilitate insurgency
against South Africa and isolate Pretoria regime
a. Military training for insurgents
b. Disinformation/forgeries
2. Libyan-objective: undercut Western influence
throughout continent
a. Subvert Upper Volta, Chad, Niger, Somalia
b. Supporting radical regimes in Ghana, Benin
c. Supporting spread of Islamic religion as means
of acquiring political power
3. Cuban objective: supporting radical regimes in
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Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique
a. Assist liberation movements
b. Increase military presence
D. South Asia
1. Soviet objective: counter US and Pakistani support
to Afghan insurgents
a. Supporting political opposition to Zia regime
b. Assisting anti-Zia terrorist organizations
2. Soviet objective: counter US CBW accusations
a. Disinformation/forgeries
3. Soviet objective: discredit US policies in India
a. Disinformation/forgeries
E. East Asia
1. Soviet objective: prevent strengthening of Japan-
US military cooperation
a. Agents of influence
b. Disinformation/forgeries
2. Soviet objective: penetrate labor movements in
Southeast Asia
a. Covert funding for labor conferences
3. Libyan objective: promote radical Islamic
movements
a. Assist separatist Philippine Muslims
F. Central America/Caribbean
1. Soviet objective: support radical regimes
a. Military assistance
b. Economic assistance
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2.
Cuban objective: support radical regimes
a.
b.
c.
Military training for Nicaraguans
Assisting Grenada regime
Increase presence in Suriname
3.
Cuban objective: subvert moderate regimes
a.
b.
Training for clandestine activity or
insurgency
Intelligence training for foreign agents
4.
Libyan objective: striking back at the US on
homeground
a. Paramilitary/insurgency training
b. Funding leftist opposition groups
G. Latin America
1. Soviet and Cuban objective: strengthen leftist
movements
2. Soviet and Cuban objective: capitalize. on anomisty
toward US resulting from Falklands crisis
a. Disinformation/forgeries
III. Summary/Conclusions
A. Recent trends
1. Increased activity
a. Reflect growth of program by comparing numbers
b. Key countries and regions / centers of
attention
c. Major themes of programs
2. More boldness
a. Assassination plots blamed on US Ambassadors
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b. Soviets engaging in bigger and more active
measures programs; reflected in greater
discovery rate and increased expulsions
3. Technical advances in Active Measures
a. Quality continues to vary
b. Apparent 1st use of audiotapesin active
measures
4. Target of opportunity
a. Some actions appear to be planned well in
advance
b. Others are reaction to events
IV. Outlook
A. Greatest opportunity for active measures comes from
exploiting political and economic turmoil in target
countries and internationally
B. INF will continue to be major focus
C. Active measures will continue to increase in other areas
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