LETTER TO WILLIAM J. CASEY (SANITIZED)

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP85B00552R000100010015-9
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RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
9
Document Creation Date: 
December 20, 2016
Document Release Date: 
July 25, 2007
Sequence Number: 
15
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
April 22, 1982
Content Type: 
LETTER
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PDF icon CIA-RDP85B00552R000100010015-9.pdf283.19 KB
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EXDIN D/ICS DDI ow DOW C ICNICN CC IG C- D/EEO D/Pua D/DEA C/PAD/OEA SWIA AO/DCI C/IPD/OIS The Honorable William J. Casey Director of Central Intelligence Central Intelligence Agency Washington, DC 20505 1 /n1 jl i ,fl 4 Yu M -04 LS o... ~ ilk I hope you will agree with me that the time has come to revive one of the projects you and I discussed some years back, the establishment of a National Historical Intelligence Museum. Some of the changes in the intervening years are obvious, such as a change in attitude in both the Executive Branch and the Congress. Expanded educational efforts have helped -- the establishment and nationwide activities of AFIO, the projects of NISC, the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, the Welch Fund, along with expanded outreach efforts of the Agency and some, at least,of the learned and professional socities. Another, very important one is an outpouring of printed and audiovisual materials on which the exhibits of the museum can be based. We have established the National Historical Intelligence Museum as a non-profit, educational, tax-exempt organization. We are reviewing possible sites in Washington, D.C., Virginia and Pennsylvania. We have a good working board and are be- ginning to approach people about serving on a general advisory board or specialized advisory panels (ie. history and in- telligence). Our fundraising effort is beginning with app- roaches to selected foundations and individuals. Hopefully, approaches to corporations will follow before too long. We have a proposed budget and reams of raw materials from which museum content can be extracted. The museum will describe, within approporiate security considerations, significant intelligence achievements, de- velopments and personalities, using a wide variety of visual displays and audio presentations. A summary note on possible content is enclosed for your review. Such a collection would go far to increase public under- standing of the intelligence community and its efforts. The museum would parallel and complement what other museums at- tempt in related areas - air and space, (Smithsonian and Cape Kennedy) aviation development (Wright Patterson), nuclear Page Two Mr. Casey technology, the FBI, naval, army and marine history, and specialized areas of military preparation and warfare (eg. ordnance). Such existing museums, each in its own way, "beat the drums" for a particular activity. Up to now, the activity which in many ways needs it the most, U.S. intelligence, has made no such attempt to attract an expanded national con- stituency from a leadership and general public which now visits museums by the millions. John Bross has offered to get the project a hearing with you and Admiral Inman, to whom I am also sending materials on it. For now, we hope you will be willing to help us in five critical areas: (l) In advising us on people in and out of Government with whom you suggest we be in early touch. (If you are willing, I'll send you or whomever you suggest the list of people suggested thus far for the advisory board). (2) In helping us to procure a site, preferably, of course, a building, perhaps a government build- ing or a part of one - if possible in the District; if not, in Virginia near historic, tourist - at- tracting sites. (3) In helping us to approach foundations which do not accept proposals from general sources, notably the Anneberg Fund and related foundations. (4) Advising us with which Agency employees we might work in developing this project, perhaps someone on your staff, in the public affairs office, in the Center for the Study of Intelligence and in the History and Archives offices. (5) Supporting our requests to individuals and organ- izations for contributed or loaned photographic materials, artifacts and other potential museum content. Page Three Mr. Casey Our thanks for considering these proposals. I should be pleased to forward any further information on proposed content, or in response to any questions you might have. I know from your historical writing, your continuing interest in NISC and our talks of some years ago, you will give this project a very interested hearing. I hope, working together, we can develop a national intelligence museum, combining private and public efforts, more interesting than the traditional war museums and much more comprehensive than any existing museums in the U.S. with content relating to intelligence. National Historical Intelligence Museum cc: Admiral Inman DDCI John A. Bross Making the museum a heavily historical one has many advantages. It allows us: 1. To provoke thought while interesting (even enter- taining) the viewers on some very important points not well understood by many Americans. Dramatic treatments of history - historical novels, docu- dramas, historical or period films - have huge audiences, as do espionage novels; and nostalgia underlies the appeal of much in continuing education, entertainment and hobbies. All this points to a potentially very wide appeal for exhibits which make general points on intelligence collection, but focus around such dramatic subjects as espionage and colorful secret agents in the American Revo- lution, the Civil War and since; cryptographic successes, such as the Black Chamber and the Naval Treaty and ENIGMA and ULTRA, and failures (eg. Russia in World War I), aerial and satellite re- connaissance, such as in the U-2 story and the Cuba Missile Crisis; electronic listening as with the Great Seal in the Moscow Embassy, and inter- cepts, as with tapping the recently - developed telegraph in the Civil War, the Berlin Tunnel and the Zimmerman Telegram; types and variety of agents (eg. Philby, Wennerstrom, Col. Abel, Sorge, Rado, "Cicero") counterintelligence (eq. some of the FBI's more famous older cases, and more recent ones involving both military and civilian agencies and KGB activities more generally). 2. To address such important matters as war and peace, changes in non-democratic governments (succession questions), the impact of some revolutions on US interests, and thus to address general points about early warning analysis, estimates, dissemination, and briefings of top leaders, misconceptions and misjudgements, or failures to disseminate adequately and use available intelligence. Exhibits covering such subjects might center on Pearl Harbor; the beginnings of the Civil War; Arab-Israeli wars; the extravagant expectation of all initial part- icipants in World War I; the wishfulness of the Japanese in World War II; the unwillingness to listen to evidence of Stalin with regard to Hitler's preparations for a massive attack on the Soviet Union, to cite a few arbitrarily chosen examples. 3. To make some very basic points about intelligence which the knowledgeable take for granted, but are not as well understood generally as they should be. These include: -That espionage is an ancient and virtually universal activity. -That we Americans owe much to intelligence activities since the time of "George Washington, Spymaster". -That although virtually universal, intelligence is also a very "national" type of activity, dictatorships (and before that, absolutist monarchies) approaching it differently than democracies and with even differences among approaches to intelligence among the democracies (eg. the longtime acceptance of a British Official Secrets Act). 4. To address sometimes complex factors underlying the challenge posed by the need to make decisions which depend on an understanding of the probable intentions and likely actions of adversaries, potential adversaries and allies. These could include stereotypical thinking, -adoption of imiortant analogies - or failure to adopt them - or even naivite and overconfidence. 5. To make sometimes controversial matters (eg. civil liberties vs. requirements of national security; the role of the courts relative to intelligence, the limits of Congressional over- sight; media coverage of intelligence; possible "political" use of intelligence data) clear in a relatively noncontroversial way. 6. To avoid the truly sensitive (eg. in dealing with technology and weaponry in terms of intelligence, or with cryptography). Finally, in planning for relatively - recent content of the museum we will have to grapple with the fact that even highly - informed people sometimes tend to "define" in- telligence differently. The museum's content, will require further discussion and definition. It clearly would include foreign intelligence and counterintelligence and should in our view, include such historical and interesting related activities as deception and forgeries, and escape and evasion. It might or might not, however in dealing with relatively recent events, cover to any extent a number of other subjects, such as counter-insurgency and guerilla warfare, psychological warfare and propaganda and covert political action, except insofar as such activities re- quire good intelligence. Approved For Release 2007/07/25 : CIA-RDP85BOO552R000100010015-9 Admiral Bobby Inman Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Central Intelligence Agency Washington, DC 20505 pri 11 1982 Dear Admiral Inman: revived proposal Sohn Bross has suggested that I send my for a National Historical Intelligence Museum to both Mr. Casey n to the State recent presentatio l, I am especially encourag and you. Having heard en Forum P y an our Department Op pressed with your stress u" with the points ts you goverInmwennstwde matter and particularly need for sustained popular support for in- wi, More specifically, YOU made on the encies. listener through comments telligence activities and a9 urgently needs hit a very responsive cord in this that "'ntelligence has no constituency and urg one", and that we must avoid the historical pattern of build- our intelligence capabilities for actual or threatened then dismantling them when a specific combat ing hostilities and or threat of conflict ends. mer Intelligence Officers know, the Association of doreter, and the d Consortium As you an popular (AFIO), our. National intelligence Study Public for the Study of. Intelligence have sustained worked to ned understanding of intelligence and increase stained p support for it. ublic Educating and convincing opinion leaders and no a Short- made neither an easy One made skeptical in recittreequarires institutionalizatencourage- term task, however. this is through ular attempting way some of us have been more balanced scholarly and o This courses. meet of both more and overage in college course writing, and more and ecomplementary approach. establishment letter describes another, complementary Museum in a of a National Historical Intelligence visited by Americans in search of combination of recreation historical heritage. Page Two Admiral Inman We have set up a non-profit, tax-exempt organization and established a working board. We are seeking members for a blue-ribbon advisory board, a site, funds and help from within the Government. We believe the museum should take a heavily historical approach, and have enclosed some preliminary thoughts on content for your consideration. We are asking Mr. Casey for his assistance with this project and would be very pleased to have yours, as well as any preliminary comments you might have for us. Sincerely, National Historical Intelligence Museum