LETTER TO WILLIAM J. CASEY (SANITIZED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85B00552R000100010015-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 25, 2007
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: April 22, 1982
• Content Type: LETTER

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 The Honorable William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505
1 /n1 jl i ,fl 4 Yu M
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I hope you will agree with me that the time has come to
revive one of the projects you and I discussed some years
back, the establishment of a National Historical Intelligence
Museum. Some of the changes in the intervening years are
obvious, such as a change in attitude in both the Executive
Branch and the Congress. Expanded educational efforts have
helped -- the establishment and nationwide activities of
AFIO, the projects of NISC, the Consortium for the Study of
Intelligence, the Welch Fund, along with expanded outreach
efforts of the Agency and some, at least,of the learned and
professional socities. Another, very important one is an
outpouring of printed and audiovisual materials on which the
exhibits of the museum can be based.
We have established the National Historical Intelligence
Museum as a non-profit, educational, tax-exempt organization.
We are reviewing possible sites in Washington, D.C., Virginia
and Pennsylvania. We have a good working board and are be-
ginning to approach people about serving on a general advisory
board or specialized advisory panels (ie. history and in-
telligence). Our fundraising effort is beginning with app-
roaches to selected foundations and individuals. Hopefully,
approaches to corporations will follow before too long. We
have a proposed budget and reams of raw materials from which
museum content can be extracted.
The museum will describe, within approporiate security
considerations, significant intelligence achievements, de-
velopments and personalities, using a wide variety of visual
displays and audio presentations. A summary note on possible
content is enclosed for your review.
Such a collection would go far to increase public under-
standing of the intelligence community and its efforts. The
museum would parallel and complement what other museums at-
tempt in related areas - air and space, (Smithsonian and Cape
Kennedy) aviation development (Wright Patterson), nuclear
 Page Two
Mr. Casey
technology, the FBI, naval, army and marine history, and
specialized areas of military preparation and warfare (eg.
ordnance). Such existing museums, each in its own way, "beat
the drums" for a particular activity. Up to now, the activity
which in many ways needs it the most, U.S. intelligence, has
made no such attempt to attract an expanded national con-
stituency from a leadership and general public which now
visits museums by the millions.
John Bross has offered to get the project a hearing with
you and Admiral Inman, to whom I am also sending materials
on it.
For now, we hope you will be willing to help us in five
critical areas:
(l) In advising us on people in and out of Government
with whom you suggest we be in early touch. (If
you are willing, I'll send you or whomever you
suggest the list of people suggested thus far
for the advisory board).
(2) In helping us to procure a site, preferably, of
course, a building, perhaps a government build-
ing or a part of one - if possible in the District;
if not, in Virginia near historic, tourist - at-
tracting sites.
(3) In helping us to approach foundations which do
not accept proposals from general sources, notably
the Anneberg Fund and related foundations.
(4) Advising us with which Agency employees we might
work in developing this project, perhaps someone
on your staff, in the public affairs office, in
the Center for the Study of Intelligence and in
the History and Archives offices.
(5) Supporting our requests to individuals and organ-
izations for contributed or loaned photographic
materials, artifacts and other potential museum
content.
 Page Three
Mr. Casey
Our thanks for considering these proposals. I should
be pleased to forward any further information on proposed
content, or in response to any questions you might have.
I know from your historical writing, your continuing
interest in NISC and our talks of some years ago, you will
give this project a very interested hearing. I hope, working
together, we can develop a national intelligence museum,
combining private and public efforts, more interesting than
the traditional war museums and much more comprehensive than
any existing museums in the U.S. with content relating to
intelligence.
National Historical
Intelligence Museum
cc: Admiral Inman DDCI
John A. Bross
 Making the museum a heavily historical one has many
advantages. It allows us:
1. To provoke thought while interesting (even enter-
taining) the viewers on some very important points
not well understood by many Americans. Dramatic
treatments of history - historical novels, docu-
dramas, historical or period films - have huge
audiences, as do espionage novels; and nostalgia
underlies the appeal of much in continuing education,
entertainment and hobbies. All this points to a
potentially very wide appeal for exhibits which
make general points on intelligence collection,
but focus around such dramatic subjects as espionage
and colorful secret agents in the American Revo-
lution, the Civil War and since; cryptographic
successes, such as the Black Chamber and the Naval
Treaty and ENIGMA and ULTRA, and failures (eg.
Russia in World War I), aerial and satellite re-
connaissance, such as in the U-2 story and the
Cuba Missile Crisis; electronic listening as with
the Great Seal in the Moscow Embassy, and inter-
cepts, as with tapping the recently - developed
telegraph in the Civil War, the Berlin Tunnel and
the Zimmerman Telegram; types and variety of agents
(eg. Philby, Wennerstrom, Col. Abel, Sorge, Rado,
"Cicero") counterintelligence (eq. some of the
FBI's more famous older cases, and more recent
ones involving both military and civilian agencies
and KGB activities more generally).
2. To address such important matters as war and peace,
changes in non-democratic governments (succession
questions), the impact of some revolutions on US
interests, and thus to address general points about
early warning analysis, estimates, dissemination,
and briefings of top leaders, misconceptions and
misjudgements, or failures to disseminate adequately
and use available intelligence. Exhibits covering
such subjects might center on Pearl Harbor; the
beginnings of the Civil War; Arab-Israeli wars;
the extravagant expectation of all initial part-
icipants in World War I; the wishfulness of the
Japanese in World War II; the unwillingness to
listen to evidence of Stalin with regard to Hitler's
preparations for a massive attack on the Soviet
Union, to cite a few arbitrarily chosen examples.
 3. To make some very basic points about intelligence
which the knowledgeable take for granted, but are
not as well understood generally as they should
be. These include:
-That espionage is an ancient and virtually
universal activity.
-That we Americans owe much to intelligence
activities since the time of "George
Washington, Spymaster".
-That although virtually universal, intelligence
is also a very "national" type of activity,
dictatorships (and before that, absolutist
monarchies) approaching it differently than
democracies and with even differences among
approaches to intelligence among the democracies
(eg. the longtime acceptance of a British
Official Secrets Act).
4. To address sometimes complex factors underlying
the challenge posed by the need to make decisions
which depend on an understanding of the probable
intentions and likely actions of adversaries,
potential adversaries and allies. These could
include stereotypical thinking, -adoption of
imiortant analogies - or failure to adopt them -
or even naivite and overconfidence.
5. To make sometimes controversial matters (eg.
civil liberties vs. requirements of national
security; the role of the courts relative to
intelligence, the limits of Congressional over-
sight; media coverage of intelligence; possible
"political" use of intelligence data) clear in
a relatively noncontroversial way.
6. To avoid the truly sensitive (eg. in dealing with
technology and weaponry in terms of intelligence,
or with cryptography).
Finally, in planning for relatively - recent content of
the museum we will have to grapple with the fact that even
highly - informed people sometimes tend to "define" in-
telligence differently. The museum's content, will require
further discussion and definition. It clearly would include
foreign intelligence and counterintelligence and should in our
view, include such historical and interesting related activities
as deception and forgeries, and escape and evasion. It might or
might not, however in dealing with relatively recent events, cover
to any extent a number of other subjects, such as counter-insurgency
and guerilla warfare, psychological warfare and propaganda and
covert political action, except insofar as such activities re-
quire good intelligence.
 Approved For Release 2007/07/25 : CIA-RDP85BOO552R000100010015-9
Admiral Bobby Inman
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505
pri 11 1982
Dear Admiral Inman: revived proposal
Sohn Bross has suggested that I send my
for a National Historical Intelligence Museum to both Mr. Casey
n to the State
recent presentatio
l, I am especially encourag
and you. Having heard
en Forum P y an our
Department Op
pressed with your stress u" with the points ts you
goverInmwennstwde matter and particularly
need for sustained popular support for in-
wi, More specifically, YOU
made on the encies. listener through comments
telligence activities and a9 urgently needs
hit a very responsive cord in this
that "'ntelligence has no constituency and urg
one", and that we must avoid the historical pattern of build-
our intelligence capabilities for actual or threatened
then dismantling them when a specific combat
ing
hostilities and
or threat of conflict ends. mer Intelligence Officers
know, the Association of doreter, and the d Consortium
As you an popular
(AFIO), our. National intelligence Study
Public
for the Study of. Intelligence have sustained worked to ned
understanding of intelligence and increase stained p
support for it.
ublic
Educating and convincing opinion leaders and no a Short-
made neither an easy One
made skeptical in recittreequarires institutionalizatencourage-
term task, however. this is through ular
attempting
way some of us have been
more balanced scholarly and o This
courses.
meet of both more and overage in college course
writing, and more and ecomplementary approach. establishment
letter describes another, complementary Museum in a
of a National Historical Intelligence
visited by Americans in search of combination of recreation
historical heritage.
 Page Two
Admiral Inman
We have set up a non-profit, tax-exempt organization and
established a working board. We are seeking members for a
blue-ribbon advisory board, a site, funds and help from within
the Government.
We believe the museum should take a heavily historical
approach, and have enclosed some preliminary thoughts on
content for your consideration.
We are asking Mr. Casey for his assistance with this
project and would be very pleased to have yours, as well
as any preliminary comments you might have for us.
Sincerely,
National Historical
Intelligence Museum