SATELLITE OPERATIONS CENTER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85B00803R000100060011-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 24, 2004
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: July 7, 1965
• Content Type: MF

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7JUL1965
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT Satellite Operations Center
1. This memorandum is for your information and
sets forth the reasoning which prompts us to recommend
that the Satellite Operations Center (SOC) be returned
to the Central Intelligence Agency.
2. The essential elements of our satellite
reconnaissance programs are three in number. The first
element is the development and operation of the recon-
naissance system itself. The second is the actual
launching, tracking, and recovery of the reconnaissance
payload. The third is the scheduling, orbit selection,
targeting, and orbital tasking of such missions to meet
national reconnaissance targets.
3. There is considerable and active discussion
as to which organization, or organizations, should develop
and provide the satellite payloads. There seems to be
clear acceptance that the launching, tracking, and re-
covery is the responsibility of the Department of Defense
while the scheduling, targeting, and orbital tasking of
our reconnaissance payloads are the responsibility of the
Intelligence Community (USIB) working through the
Satellite Operations Center.
4. The question before us at the moment is how
shall the Director of Central Intelligence carry out the
responsibility of tasking and, more specifically, how
does his responsibility relate to the Satellite Operations
Center?
5. The concept of a satellite operations center
responsive to the Community's requirements was first put
in practice by CIA with the :Launching of CORONA in 1960.
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It was well recognized that a mechanism was needed to
translate USIB target requirements into orbital selection
and on-orbit camera programming. At that time, CORONA
was the only operational member of the satellite family,
but following the formalization of the NRO, and the
advent of other programs, a desire to centralize all
satellite activities involved in reconnaissance operations
resulted in the transfer of the Satellite Operations
Center from the Agency to the Pentagon in April 1963.
6. We now submit that while there is some wisdom
in centralizing satellite intelligence tasking, such an
activity is more appropriately a function of the CIA
under the DCI than a responsibility of the National
Reconnaissance Office. The attached extract which out-
lines the present responsibilities of the Satellite
Operations Center clearly substantiates our position
in that the SOC is identified as a unit principally
engaged in the pursuit of the Intelligence Community's
needs and one which we suggest is of "central intelli-
gence" in nature.
7. Although we feel that the functional responsi-
bilities of the SOC themselves are cause enough to place
that organization within CIA, there is a very real and
tangible advantage in divorcing the SOC from the opera-
tional arms of the NRO. By so doing, we would preserve
for the SOC an independent outlook vis-a-vis operations,
thus ensuring that the programs remain foremost in respon-
siveness to USIB needs. With the SOC an integral part of
the NRO as it now is, there is the constant threat that it
could lose its objectivity and permit tasking or orbit
selection of reconnaissance satellites to further develop-
mental or research goals as opposed to the present day
intelligence requirements. Although such goals may be
desirable and necessary, no action to degrade our intelli-
gence take should be entertained without DCI or USIB
evaluation. By placing the SOC within the environment
of CIA, should the need arise for our reconnaissance
satellites to be tasked for ancillary or secondary reasons,
the SOC would have an independent channel for recourse
directly to the DCI for guidance.
8. We are further encouraged to recommend the
return of the SOC in view of the computer and communica-
tions support which the SOC presently receives from CIA.
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Moreover, we are confident that there is no function .
of the SOC which requires that it be located physically
within the Pentagon or organizationally placed in
proximity to the Air Force. To the contrary, the daily
activities of the SOC in mission planning, orbit selec-
tion, and targeting require a continuing relationship
with various USIB committees located within the Langley
headquarters building;.
9. In view of the basic responsibilities of the
SOC, its necessary and continuing interface with USIB,
the role and responsibilities of the DCI, and the desir-
ability of independence regarding NRO developmental
experiments, it is recomrended that the SOC be trans-
ferred to the Central Intelligence Agency.
Acting Deputy Director
for
Science and Technology
Attachment
Extract from NRO Document
Distribution:
Copy 1 - DCI
2 - D/NIPE
3 - ER
4 - DD/S&T
5&6 - DD/S&T/Reg
7,8&9 - DD/S&T/SPS
O/DDS&T/SPS:JNMcMAHON
(7 July 65)
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