THE CORONA PROGRAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85B00803R000100060014-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 10, 2004
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: March 29, 1965
• Content Type: MF

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ATTACHMENT --To:
CORONA
Dr. McMillan's willful cancellation of the CORONA
Mission 1018 launch on 23 March 1965 culminates a series
of actions dating back to the early days of the NRO to
force the Agency either out of the satellite reconnaissance
business or submit its activities to the desires and con-
trol of the Air Force.
The first NRO Agreement was signed on 6 September
1961. With Air Force personnel directing-and controlling
the NRO activities, the mechanism of that organization has
proven a most useful instrument for the Air Force to imple-
ment its desires. As far back as 22 November 1961, the
Air Force decreed its intention to eliminate CIA from the
satellite reconnaissance program, when the then Col. John
Martin, Chief of the NRO Staff, proposed to CIA the NRO
functions and responsibilities for satellite reconnaissance.
In that document, he proposed that the technical manage-
ment responsibility for all projects, black and white,
should be vested in the Air Force. He submitted that the
Air Force should generate appropriate directives to transfer
the total technical responsibility for ARGON, MURAL (CORONA)
and Navy programs to the Air Force. Since there were only
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two more launches scheduled in CORONA, and one unassigned
payload, Col. Martin conceded that no change should be
made in the present technical management structure of
that program. He later went on to reaffirm that the
CORONA program should remain the complete responsibility
of CIA, since there were only two more shots. This acknowl-
edgment by Col. Martin, although revealing the Air Force's
intention to take over all satellite programs, clearly.
established the fact that CORONA was then the responsi-
bility of CIA. By way of explanation, MURAL was the
cryptonym given to the employment of two cameras to obtain
stereo coverage as opposed to the single camera initially
used in CORONA. Since then, the stereo program has
dropped the term MURAL and continued with the original
name of CORONA.
There are other documents in that period of time
which also give testimony to the fact that CIA had a
clear responsibility for CORONA payload. In the paper
prepared by Mr. Gene Kiefer of CIA on 29 November 1961,
referring to the CORONA program, he stated that primary
cognizance for management and technical direction of the
hardware aspects will remain within*CIA for photographic
payloads and nose cones. He further observed that CIA
would continue with primary cognizance for operational
planning and control of the payload operation and target
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coverage. CIA's primacy in the CORONA payload was noted
again by Mr. Richard Bissell, Deputy Director for Plans,
in a 7 December 1961 letter to Mr. Patrick Coyne, Executive
Secretary of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory,
Board. In that letter Mr. Bissell acknowledged that the
present allocation of responsibilities with respect to
CORONA/MURAL/ARGON were as follows:
A. The Air Force had primary responsibility
(1) launch scheduling and launching,
(2) orbit and recovery operations,
(3) development and procurement of boosters,
orbiting vehicles,
B. The CIA, on the other hand, had primary
responsibility for:
(1) targeting,
(2) operational planning and control of
payload operations,
(3) development and procurement of photographic
payload and nose cones, and
(4) security.
In spite of CIA's clearly defined history for the
responsibility of CORONA payloads there have been repeated
efforts by the Air Force to divest the Agency of this role.
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Back in July 1962 Dr. Joseph Charyk, the then Director of
the NRO, advised the various program directors of the
organization and functions of the NRO. In that paper he
commissioned the Director of Program A (Air Force) as
being responsible for the National Reconnaissance Program's
satellite effort, while the Director of Program B (CIA)
was "responsible for the national reconnaissance programs
conducted by the NRO through utilization of CIA resources."
In spite of the momentum which was given to the
Air Force to usurp and control the satellite efforts, the,
Agency tenaciously held on to its CORONA position through
the control which it had over the payload contracts and
end of 1963 the outright discord between the Air Force
and the Agency in the CORONA program prompted many to
seek various solutions. Dr. McMillan, who had replaced
Dr. Charyk as Director of the NRO, offered his solution
which would place the entire CORONA program including the
CIA assets under the Air Force (General Greer). The Agency
not only found itself a victim of a frontal assault to
dispose it of its satellite interests, but also more
subtle methods, which prompted. the DCI, on 13 December
1963, to advise Dr. McMillan that he considered it
essential that no action be taken within the NRO or its
contracts structure at that time and that the status quo
be maintained until he could consider the matter further.
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He emphasized that the resources of both CIA and the
Air Force in fields related to aerial photography, both
aircraft and satellites, must be preserved. He noted,
however, that he had been informed by several sources
that major contractors no longer felt free to meet with
CIA officials and discuss problems, which through the
years had been matters of mutual interest,, without first
securing Air Force permission. The Director went on to
state that that statement extends both to problems related
to existing programs and to discussions of new concepts.
He cautioned that any such limitation, whether the result
of a directive from a procurement officer or a subtle
hint would, in his opinion, violate the basic tenet of
the NRO Agreement, which provides for the full utiliza-
tion of the resources of both the Air Force and C]A.
Up to this period of time in the CORONA program,
the Agency interacted with a small group of officers in
SSD under the title of Program 162. On several occasions,
Dr. McMillan had proposed that this office be subordinated
to General Greer and that General Greer head up the CORONA
program. Dr. Wheelon reported to the DCI and DDCI on
13 March 1964 that although two requests from Dr. McMillan
had been disapproved by the DCI regarding the transfer of
Program 162, cables from the West Coast indicated that
Program 162 office was to be dissolved, its people trans-
ferred, and its function recreated under General Greer
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as the Program 241 Office directed by Colonel Heran.
Dr. McMillan later admitted the transfer in an 18 May
1964 memorandum.
By April 1964, the responsibilities within CORONA
had become so confused by Air Force unilateral action
that the Agency's Director of Program B cabled the D/NRO
stating that "Recent events and communications force me
to request formal clarification and definition of my
responsibilities and functions concerning the
and CORONA payload management." Undaunted, the Air Force
continued to act as it wished even to direct CIA con-
tractors. By the end of 1964 Dr. McMillan chose to
ignore openly any role for CIA in satellite programs.
In his year-end report to the President's Foreign
Intelligence Board he stated that the Director, Pro-
gram A, concentrates on satellite photography and
SIGINT reconnaissance, while -the Director, Program B,
furnishes some procurement and security services-to
General Greer. At that point in time, the Agency was
not only involved in CORONA, but had satellite develop-
mental studies underway in
using NRO funds.
The year 1964 also witnessed the D/NRO's pressure
to insert Aerospace into the CORONA operational program.
This effort reached somewhat of a climax in November when
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the CIA resident manager at the
reported that
Aerospace personnel were engaged in seeking information
regarding the payload, including operational information.
The Agency's reluctance to permit Aerospace representa-
tives to acquire operational .information resulted in a
directive from the D/NRO that CIA issue instructions to
the to release the requested information to the
Aerospace personnel. CIA responded by authorizing the
to provide the payload information requested
to Aerospace in their capacity as general systems engineers.
In spite of this compliance, the D/NRO issued cabled
instructions under
to both the Air Force and
CIA, outlining new communications procedures and mission
responsibilities effective 1 December. In effect, this
from the CORONA communica-
tions network and transferred all of its responsibilities
to the Space Tracking Center (STC) under command of
General Greer. Additionally, it granted the STC not
only the technical assessment and analysis of the payload,
but also all on-orbit camera and targeting information.
This action was immediately appealed by General Carter
to Secretary Vance and Dr. McMillan and an agreement
reached with Secretary Vance that no changes would be
made to the procedures effective on 30 November 1964
until such time as a solution of the CORONA program
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organization could be achieved. Parenthetically, it
should be noted that actual implementation of
would have crippled the CORONA program since the CIA
plays such a vital role in it. Even General
Martin realized this fact and countered with
the suggestion to the NRO that the be retained
within the communications network, though under Program A.
The NRO recognized that it had to respond to the'decision
of the DCI, DDCI, and Secretary Vance and cabled instruc-
tions some ten days later reinstituting communications
procedures which were in effect prior to the infamous
The D/NRO then took measures which to some
extent circumvented the reversal of
by pe r-
sonally visiting the STC. With his presence, he registered.
the demand for operational targeting information which
heretofore had never been sent the STC. The Agency did
not object, since it recognized that the D/NRO might
personally desire that information and agreed with the
exception to the communications procedures. When
Dr. McMillan left the STC, he ordered the NRO to con-
tinue sending the information to the STC, thereby
successfully accomplishing one of the major objectives
the contrary.
in spite of the Carter/Vance agreement to
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The recitation of this determination by the NRO
calls to mind other incidents which betray a relentless
program by the NRO/Air Force to unseat and subordinate
CIA in CORONA. Such actions by the Air Force have often
placed the harmony and well-being of CORONA in jeopardy.
To enumerate, during the Spring of 1964, prompted by a
desire to meet the launch schedules established for
CORONA, the then Captain Johnson of General Greer's staff
directed the contractor to deviate from proven environ-
mental tests on the CORONA cameras M-25, M-26 and M-27.
The normal environmental testing of four days, at Capt.
Johnson's directions, was reduced to one. When the CIA
technical representative at the learned of
this deviation, he raised strong objection, supported by
the Systems Engineering Group, he asked for the complete
results of the testing accomplished. Upon examination of
the test data, he pointed out that the deviation inval-
idated the test of those instruments for susceptibility
to corona discharge markings. Unfortunately, System M-25
was already at Vandenberg and had been accepted-by CIA
before the information of the shortened test was dis-
covered. To meet the launch date, it was decided to
allow the system to fly; however, the booster failed
and hence orbit was not achieved. The CIA representative,
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however, refused to certify System M-26 for flight
until a rerun of the environmental test was conducted.
Capt. Johnson of General Greer 's staff directed the
contractor to ship Systems M-26 and M-27 to the Base
without additional testing and General Greer's office
accepted responsibility for their flight readiness.
Capt. Johnson bought off on System M-26 for the Government
and that system was flown as Mission 9062. The film
returned from that mission was largely unuseable due
to corona discharge marking. The CIA representative's
recommendations were then accepted as valid; System M-27
was returned to environmental test and the results con-
firmed a bad roller which again, in all probability,
would have caused corona discharge had that system
flown. This particular incident highlights the need
for CIA participation in the CORONA program to ensure
that that program is conducted for its intelligence
value and not necessarily for the sake of a launch
schedule. The absence of intelligence philosophy was
manifested again by Air Force personnel in Washington
on 4 February 1965 when Col. Buzzard of the NRO Staff
indicated that the CORONA launches would take place
according to the established schedule, although
Mr. Crowley of CIA contended that CORONA was an
intelligence reconnaissance program and the missions
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that the CIA analysis had been correct and that the
payload had been performing normally. In fact, it
continued to perform normally throughout the mission.
It is difficult to assess the resultant loss of intelli-
gence information by this improper. interference of Air
Force and Aerospace personnel.
On this same mission there was an important
intelligence requirement on Rev 14 which passed over
Cuba. This pass was lost due to the fact that the
Air Force had allowed a new and inexperienced man to
be on duty alone in the STC during the active operation
of the camera. Because this newly assigned officer
obviously did not understand the workings of the system,
he failed to send the requested command and, in fact,
sent one that had not been authorized. The NRO imme-
diately placed blame on the CIA representative and
directed an investigation by General Martin and
Colonel Heran into CIA communications practices.
Although CIA was never officially advised as to the
findings regarding this specific incident, we have
subsequently learned from Col. Murphy of General Greer's
staff that the error did not rest with CIA but with the
Air Force.
It is interesting to note that although the Agency
was being constantly assailed and pressured by the
Air Force, it remained cooperative and responsive to
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program needs. On Mission 1014 it was learned that the
orbital ephemeris developed by the Air Force proved
unuseable for the mission. The orbit was to have been
designed for maximum Cuban coverage, but due to the
Air Force's contractor using a wrong orbital decay
factor in their computation, the orbit developed had
serious gaps in the primary areas of interest. By the
time the error was discovered, it was too late to
correct without slipping the flight. CIA proposed a
new orbit, went to work with its computers, and on the
same day produced the desired orbit, thereby achieving
a minimum delay.
The progression of time proved an irritant to
reasonableness on the part of the Air Force and this
is best highlighted by the Webb incident. In an un-
precedented act, the D/NRO, exercising his authority
as Under Secretary of the Air-Force, directed the trans-
fer of Lt. Col. Vern Webb, who was an Air Force officer
assigned to CIA and in behalf of the Agency headed our
On 2 December 1964 Col. Webb received
military orders directing that he report on 3 December
for duty at the STC. Reassignment,on such short notice
is most extraordinary and the hypocrisy of the urgency
was revealed when Col. Webb was assigned to the routine
duty of investigating delinquent Air Force officers.
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This act by the D/NRO left ourl (critically
undermanned, and this condition was aggravated by the
requirements of an impending CORONA launch. General
Carter appealed this action to Dr. McMillan without
success,
Precipitous action by the Air Force caused yet
another perturbation in January 1965. While under-
going a routine test
forebody
(ablative shell) failed. Upon investigation the
Air Force learned that the forebody's age since manu-
facturing was 27 months. The contractor cited the
fact that his manufacturing specifications only called
for a shelf life of 12 months. Without further con-
sideration or regard for programmatical impact, the
Air Force directed that no forebodies which exceeded
a calendar life of 12 months would qualify to be flown
in the CORONA program. It should be noted that no
forebodies had ever failed in flight, although many
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much as 20 months old. CIA advised the Community
immediately of the catastrophic effect which the Air
Force direction would have on the CORONA program; in
essence, standing that program down from operation for at
least 3 to 4 months. The Agency undertook an investiga-
tion to assess the facts at hand and to ascertain the
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noted that in a study approved by both Air Force and CIA
contractor personnel the calendar life had been estab-
lished at 36 months. CIA then commenced a test program
to investigate the aging effects of forebodies. As a
result of this test, forebodies calendar life has been
established conservatively at 17 months. Again, un-
coordinated and unilateral direction by the Air Force
threatened a catastrophic impact on the CORONA program.
There are other examples which reveal that the
Air Force's reluctance and failure to coordinate with
CIA had programmatic impact. In September 1964 CIA
registered its uneasiness at an Air Force proposal which
would turn off the Stellar Index Camera pipeline in
deference to a new Index camera which had yet to be
developed. CIA's fears proved warranted and provision
was made to continue procurement of the present system
until the new one could be developed and tested.
In spite of such observations by the Agency, the
D/NRO and the Air Force have continued to provide little
in the way of information to CIA regarding requirements
for CORONA flight units or spares. Recently it was
discovered that the Air Force had issued production
instructions to the AGENA contractor without a follow-up
requirement being passed to CIA for the payload contractors.
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As a result Lockheed had produced AGENAs yet the necessary
payload components had not been ordered.
These series of incidents have provided fertile
ground for the latest and most dramatic NRO action.
On 15 March 1965 Dr. McMillan proposed to General Carter
that the Agency be directed to release all information on
the condition and operation of the payload to the Director,
Program A, or to any CORONA-cleared person as the Director,
Program A may designate. General Carter did not concur
in this proposal, but asserted that CIA is responsible
for the operation and control of the CORONA payload and
that he would not be a party to any directive which would
dilute the effectiveness of the payload control, confuse
the chain of command decisions, or permit unnecessary
distribution of payload and operational information.. Had
the Agency not held its ground regarding this point, the
major objectives of
would have been achieved;
namely, the targeting information already being supplied
to STC by the NRO could be tied together with the payload
telemetry readings and hence the Air Force would have the
means at hand to duplicate the Agency payload command
functions.
To insure that there would be no further interference
during the scheduled launch of Mission 1018 on 23 March
the Agency sent a cable reaffirming the responsibilities
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of CIA vis-a-vis the payload, yet assuring the Air Force
that information regarding the payload which could in any
way affect the health of the vehicle or bear on the de-
cision to de-orbit would be provided the Air Force. When
Dr. McMillan received this word, he cancelled the scheduled
launch of Mission 1018 on the grounds that CIA was not
providing the Air Force with information essential for
the conduct of the operation. He stated that since
August 1964 CIA had been withholding payload data from
the Air Force and that two incidents occurred during
Mission 1017 which could have had serious effects on the
health of the vehicle yet CIA continued to withhold the
data. In subsequent discussions between the DCI, DDCI,
Secretary Vance and Dr. McMillan, it was ascertained
that Dr. McMillan's statements were inaccurate and.in-
correct. It was further demonstrated that the Agency
had been supplying more information since August than
at any time prior to that date. The two incidents which
Dr. McMillan referred to caused no problem, CIA's decisions
had been proper, and that in fact appropriate Air Force
representatives had been fully informed of all details
at all times. Dr. McMillan later admitted to General
Carter that the Air Force did, in fact, have full details
concerning the incidents.
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Summary
In looking back over the history of the CORONA
Program, it becomes apparent that CIA does not claim
any more for itself than that which it originally held
and developed from the outset of the CORONA program.
Specifically, this centers about the technical responsi-
bility for the payload and the on-orbit control of the
camera program. On the other hand, the Air Force and
the NRO have worked incessantly in challenging CIA's
foothold in satellite reconnaissance. The Agency has
deferred from highlighting the failures and misdirections
perpetrated by the Air Force, though history will testify
that the failure of hardware under the Air Force's
responsibility dramatically exceeds the minor mishaps
in the camera operation. For the sake of the program,
the Agency has attempted repeatedly to seek a mutual
solution to CORONA management. Unfortunately, to date
these efforts have been thwarted, rebuffed or ignored
by the NRO/Air Force. During the latter part of 1964
and in early January 1965, members of the CIA staff in
Washington conducted informal and without portfolio
negotiations with General Stewart of the NRO Staff.
It was hoped that these negotiations could lead to a
CORONA agreement which would be acceptable to both
parties. On 12 January 1965 General Carter tabled at
the NRO Executive Committee meeting an agreement.on
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CORONA management which was taken word for word from
an agreement proposed by General Stewart. Dr. McMillan
has yet to concur with this agreement, but in its place
seeks piece-meal solutions which would strip the Agency
of its present responsibilities.
It is submitted that the Agency has done everything
to reach a satisfactory solution in CORONA yet preserve
its original responsibilities. Air Force response, however,
would suggest that unless the Agency agrees. to total-sub-
mission, an agreement is not desired.
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