SOURCE MATERIAL-DDS&T FILES IN RECORDS CENTER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85B00803R000100130001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 50
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 24, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: LIST

NRO review(s) completed.
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Job No.
66-R=638
(1 box)
DD/R--DD/S&T Organization, Delegation of
Authority (1962); Staff Mtg. Minutes,
Chronos, (1962-63)
5/17/66
67-B-25
(1 box)
`x 66-B-56o
(1 box)
66-R-546
(2 boxes)
67-B-558
(1 box)
V~ 67-R-587
~ 1j (4 boxes)
X 68-R-53o
(4 boxes)
,VX 69-B-596
(1 box)
69-R-597
'(4 boxes)
69-R-598
(1 box)
69-R-599
(2 boxes)
69-R-boo
STAT
DD/S&T Admin. (1962)
DD/S&T Admin & Ops (1963)
Policy, Planning, Coordination, Direction
(1963); Chronos (1963); Committees, Boards
and Panels
DDS&T Admin, committees, panels etc. (1964)
7/15/66
3/4/66
2/28/66
2/3/67
DDS&T Subject files (1964); Miscel. Admin. and 2/27/67
Aerial Recon Action Memos
DDS&T Subject files (1965); Budget, Security,
Training, Logistics, etc.
DDS&T Subject files (1965-66)
DDS&T Subject files (1966)
(non-record copies)
DDS&T Chronos (1964)
DDS&T Chronos (1965)
DDS&T chronos (1966)
1/29/68
2/26/69
2/26/69
2/26/69
2/26/69
2/26/69
70-R-435 DDS&T Chrono (1967)
(2 boxes)
7o-R-465
1/29/70
DDS&T Subj files (1967) 2/5/70
Budget, Logs, Personnel, Security, Liaison, Travel
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70-B-501 DDS&T Policy Files (1967)
(1 box)
70-B-511 DDS&T Policy Files (1958-68)
(1 box) (Wheelon, 1963; History 1962-65;
V X
Basic Policy Agreements)
70-54+3
(2 boxes) 1. Projec 'cer
2/10/70
2/16/70
anual, 11 copies 2/2+/70
reversion" 39 copiew
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 STAT Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP85B00803R000100130001-9
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 Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP85B00803R000100130001-9
Does Dr. Chamberlain have any recollection
of how Dr. Wheelon came to be recruited as AD/SI in
early summer 1962 to replace Dr. Scoville?
Who recommended him?
Was PFIAB (or any of its members) involved?
Who approached him?
Dr. Cline was then DD/I -- What part did he play
in Wheelon's appointment?
STAT 4e
fir' Zi Lv'v~ coil 4.c` 67' /
p ? lJU~jj All
C A,6
Olt,
CIt
STAT
STAT
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CPYRGHT
New York Times - Dateline Los Angeles, June 14
"McCone is Opposed to 'One-Man Rule"'
A.E.C. Nominee is Expected to Keep Strauss Policy
on Power and Tests
-----By Gladwin Hill, Special to the New York Times
Los Angeles, June 14.
(McCone nominated last week to Chair AEC; Strauss retiring
30 June.
Interview in L.A. brought out following views from
Mr. McCo
Basic research in science should proceed hand in hand with
applied, or immddiately practical studies.
While scientists are not infallible, their participation in
policy formulation is a "healthy" and progressive application
of the nation's brain power. /
A well-informed public is a very important factor in the
adoption of national policies.
He was 4uoted, with regard to his part in the writing of
the report by the Presidential Air Policy Commission,
known as the Finletter Report, that he took price in the
report which was as applicable in 1958 as when it was
written in 1947.
At a time when top scientists didn't think the
Russians would have an atomic bomb, the report
anticipated the early development by other nations
of supersonic bombers, atomic weapons and guided
missiles--possibly ahead of the United States--and
urged that this country bestir itself in those
fields.
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DD/P 'TSD
DPD U
I I i
D D /R L- OSA
OCS
DD/I
DD/S
R - DD/S&T ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Feb. 1962 -Sept. 1966
1962 1963 1964 1965 ` 1966
I
DD /S&T
AD PS FO-; F
11;Feh 30,July.
SAS
FMSAC
SoP
5 Aug. 7 Nov 15 Sept
SECRET
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The end design of DD/S&T's myriad of activities
is to provide the Director of Central''Intelligence, and.
through him the U. S. Intelligence Board, the National
Security, Council and the President, with the best possible
intelligence on science and technology worldwide, to aid
them in the formulation of national security policy.
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Directorate of Science and Technology
S cibll
A~ci viftes
:*66utj yl
Officer
,*search and Ga d ;
`Development` Servres
SECRET
117 ~
,M
and Space`
Analysis C&44'
6
Sc Ffi f i
Intel) Bence
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NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE
NRO
Director: Dr. Flax
Deputy Director: Mr. Reber
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NRO
NRO Comptroller
PROGRAM A
B/G Martin
Satellites
R/A Taylor,USN
Satellite Sigint Payloads
PROGRAM D
B/G Geary
Aircraft
NRO Staff
B/G Stewart
CIA Recce Programs
Director
CIA/OSP
Director
Mr. Crowley
Satellites
CIA/OSA
Director
B/G Ledford
Aircraft
TOP SECRET 25X1
(October 1965)
CIA/ELINT
Director
Mr. Miller
/B Electronics
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 Figure 5
THE N R O 0R Drvp IMF. i t0"Wt/0E)t2V(It ? OHg3R000100130001-9
DIRECTOR
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Adm. Raborn
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USIB
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
ADVISORY BOARD
Mr. Clifford, Chairman
Dr. Wm. Baker
Mr. Gordon Gray
Dr. Land
Dr. Langer
Dr. Long
Mr. Murphy
Mr. Pace
Adm. Sides
Gen. Taylor
Mr. Coyne,Exec Sec
Adm Raborn, DCI
Mr. Belmont, FBI
Mr. Brown, AEC
Lt.Gen.Carroll, DIA
Lt.Gen.Carter, NSA
Mr. Hughes, Stale
Mr. Bundy, WH
Adm. Raborn, DCI
Mr. Johnson, State
Mr. Vance, DOD
NRP
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
Mr. Vance, Dep.Sec.Def.
Adm. Raborn, DCI
Dr. Hornig, WH
PSAC
(Panel on NRP Matters)
Dr. Land, Chairman
Dr. Baker
Dr. Drell
Dr. Garwin
Dr. Ling
Dr. Puckett
Dr. Purcell
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Mr. McNamara
DEP. SEC. OF DEFENSE
Mr. Vance
NRO
Director
Dr. Flax
Deputy Director
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 RESEARCH
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DD/S?YT FLNCTONS FIGURE 2
DEVELOPMENT
OFFICE OF
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
OPERATIONS
OFFICE OF
SPECIAL ACTIVITIES
OFFICE OF ELINT
CONTRIBUTIONS TO
ESTIMATES
OFFICE OF SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE
i OREIGN ,\IISSI1,E :', SPACE
AN,1LY~IS CENTER
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SECRET
March 1964
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 ILLEGIB
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direct operational activities for which we have budgeted. Accord-
ingly, I must recommend to you in the very strongest terms I can
employ that we either budget ourselves for the direct cost of this
project for Fiscal Year 1957 or set: in motion immediately the turn
over of the full control of the project to the Air. Force. Only a fis-
cal theorist could even seriously suggest an intermediate alternative.
of materiel, existing, and newly built facilities at overseas bases
and operational support which will probably cost more than the
3. The foregoing recommendation defines the practical question
that must be decided at this time. Contemplation of this practical
question, however, inevitably involves thought as to what is to be the
ultimate fate of AQUATONE (if it turns out to be feasible to continue
the operation of this project for a number of years) or of the suc-
cessor activities, which surely must be contemplated if AQUATONE
itself turns out to have a short life. Moreover, this question cannot,
be disentangled from that of the manner in which similar activities
are organized and carried out within the Air Force. In short, it is
hard to chart a sensible course for AQUATONE without trying to de-
cide how all activities of this sort could best be organized within the
U. S. Government.
4. Without attempting to lead you through extensive argumenta-
tion, I will summarize my own views on this matter as follows. I
might say that these are concurred in by Colonel Ritland and I believe
they are regarded as sensible by Colonel Berg.
a. The present dispersion of responsibility, whereby
activities of the sort here under di.scussidn are being carried on by
USAFE, FEAF, SAC, and ourselves is uneconomic and involves con-
siderable risk of duplication of effort and of inadequacy of central
control. It would probably be desirable in the long run to create a
single operating organization, controlled directly from Washington,
which would carry out all overflight activities involving penetrations
of more than a few miles in depth in peacetime. This organization
could draw heavily on existing commands (and on the CIA) for support.
b. The argument against the conduct of overflights by
strictly military organizations with air crews that are members of
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a
the Armed Services of the United States is even more powerful today
than it was a year ago. Though the second Geneva Conference has
demonstrated that the Russians are nearly as unyielding as ever,
enough of the spirit of the first Geneva Conference is still adrift so
that anything that could be identified as an overt act of military
aggression would call down serious political penalties upon this
country. Accordingly, if there is to be a single organization re-
sponsible for overflights, its aircrews should be civilians; it should
be organized to as great au extent as feasible with civilian personnel;
and its activities should be regarded as clandestine intelligence gather-
ing operations.
c. The foregoing considerations lead me to the conclusion
that the single organization here proposed should be a mixed task
force, organized outside of the framework of any of the regular mili-
tary services though drawing extensive support from them. On the
other hand, I am inclined to believe that the Air Force should own a
majority of the common stock in this organization, by contrast with
the present situation in which the CIA owns the majority of the com-
mon stock in AQUATONE. In any event, however, I believe that both
CIA and the Air Force should contribute personnel and support and
consideration might even be given to bringing the other services in as
minority stockholders.
d. One further argument: in favor of some such arrange-
ment as that here proposed is that an organization with a permanent
interest in this activity would be in a position to stimulate continuing
research and development. It is worth noting that with two early and
unimportant exceptions the aircraft under production for AQUATONE
are the first ever designed exclusively for a reconnaissance mission
and, of course, are the only ones that have ever been designed to
meet the requirements of altitude, range and security imposed by
the contemplated mission.
5. The views advanced in the preceding paragraphs have to do
with the ultimate organization (and by inference, financing) of over-
flight activities. { Meanwhile, how is AQUATONE to be carried on for
another fiscal" year? The following considerations, I submit, all
suggest that the present arrangement should be continued through
Fiscal Year 1957 or until such time as amore permanent arrangement,
can be arrived at.
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T O P S E C R E T
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a. At the present time it would be difficult if not impossible
for the Air Force to take over the responsibility for AQUATONE and
to carry the project on in anything approaching the present fashion.
Air Force procurement procedures differ sharply from those that have
been employed in this project. The Air Force is less well organized
to make use of a predominantly civilian maintenance and support
organization, which has been developed in this case for well considered,
and solid reasons. Within the Air Force an operational activity of this
sort would undoubtedly be made the responsibility of SAC or of another
operational command. In this way the project would become a direct
military activity and the advantages of plausible denial by the military
establishment and of attributability only to the civilian intelligence arm
would be lost.
b. Although the present arrangement cannot be regarded
as a permanent one, it will take time to evolve either the pattern pro-
posed above, or any other arrangement that will perpetuate certain
of the advantages of the present one. The surest way to encourage
some sound and well-thought-through plan of overflight organizations
is to maintain the status quo long enough (a) to prove (or disprove)
the AQUATONE capability and (b) to allow the emergence of a
carefully-thought-out plan for the longer run.
c. Regardless of these considerations, grave practical
difficulties would confront a shift of responsibility as early as the
summer of 1956. The end of this fiscal year will occur only two and
a half months after the target date for the initiation of operations.
It is vital that command channels and organizational arrangements
not be disturbed at that point. Nine or twelve months later it is to be
hoped that the organization conducting the project will be seasoned,
its equipment accumulated and the phasing out of civilian personnel
in favor of the military will be feasible (if it is then desirable). In-
deed, the risks involved in a major change some nine and a half
months from now are 'so great that I believe the shift might well be
undertaken at once if it is going to have to be made so soon.
6. I am not closing my eyes to the practical problem of getting
money from the Bureau of the Budget and from Congress. I would
emphasize three points, however, that bear directly upon this ugly
task.
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First: I believe it should. be made absolutely clear to the
Director of the Budget that, as stated in paragraph 2 above, the
issue is not merely a financial one of which Agency shall budget for
a required expenditure but is basically one of organization and ultimate
responsibility. If the Bureau of the Budget recommends Air Force
financing it is in fact making a recommendation about the character of
and the responsibility for this project. The issue should be discussed
in these terms.
Second: It should be kept in mind at all times by all concerned
that we are making a choice betwee
Third: No matter how the accounts are set up, this project
should be supported before the Bureau and before Congress by the Air
Force and the CIA jointly and their joint support should be in such terms
as to make it unmistakably clear that they are agreed on the urgency of
the requirement, the size of the budget, and the organizational arrange-
ments under which the project is being carried on. If this is done, I
believe there is little bearing on purely political grounds between one
choice of financing and another.
7. In the light of the above I recommend:
a. That you propose to Messrs. Quarles and Gardner that
they undertake an examination of the organization of overflight recon-
naissance activities, the CIA to join in their discussions insofar as
CIA activities and interests are concerned, and that we endeavor to
arrive, after full consideration, at a rational and orderly pattern for
the longer run.
b. That, pending the outcome of such study, AQUATONE be
continued under the present organizational arrangement in Fiscal Year
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NRO
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BOARDS, COMMITTEES, PANELS
Science Advisory Committee - advisory to the President. (SAC)
Established under Office of Defense Mobilization by Presidential
order on 20 April 1951.
Reconstituted as the President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC)
22 November 1957 and effective 1 :December 1957 was transferred to
the White House.
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 25X1
ORGANIZATION Approved For Release 26 803PMd6ltb 30 1 9
: e:rao for ICI from ESC at time of his leaving the CIA
Subj: Organization for ;xplo:itation of Ldvanced Technology in
Support of Critical Intelligence Problems
"1. !'y departure from the Agency impels me to go back and review about 15 years
involvement with the problem of scientific and technical intelligence, with particular
emphasis on electronics as a factor in key national security problems and to make some
recommendations concerning the needs of the future in these fields.
2. In the long-term perspective of science and related scientific intelligence since
the beginning of World War II, the following poi4ts should be borne in mind. The wartime
developments in electronics and the application of nuclear energy were the most important
scientific contributions to the winning of the war. From the end of the War until the
hydrogen reaction was proven by the ~ _JC and -Luztil August 1953 when the Soviets first
demonstrated their capabilities to explode a fusion device, this field merited first
priority, both in rd and Intel with respect to nod. Electronics, particularly as
related to long range navigation and bombing systems and to the r&d of missiles,
ran a close second.
3. Once the Soviets demonstrated their capability to produce the reactions which are
essential to the production of multi6megaton weapons, the key question became the
development of delivery systems, first manned aircraft systems and then missile systems.
electronics 1~0'l~as'?01ItAeb0>~~~e003~~-9systems.
 The fact tYtarto oudrF$r R IIiaCR 2104c/ .tg4#TgPRA .BRgA63~p0~1d 9c00W6ggnize the
importance of electronics much better than we is indicated by a statement made by
A. N. Nesneyanov, Pros. of the Academy of Sciences, USSR at the general meeting of the
cademy on 26 Dec 1956. He stated, The most important of the technical sciences, and
th.-.t which requires first priority development, is radio engineering and electronics."
He also said .... "as a whole, in the field of radio electronics we lag considerably
behind the leading capitalist countries, especially in the realm of research which
opens up new possibilities for engineering."
5. During the War, there was little :meric:;.n scientific-technical intelligence
activity worthy of the name carried on within the intelligence organizations of the
Army and Navy. Arneric:n scientific-technical intelligence was largely initiated
and guided by the organizations that were consumers of this critic-.l informa.;,ion,Le.
the 'ianhattan Project, certain divisions of OSRD and the Technical Services or
Bureaus of the Army and the Navy. The people in OSRD and the Services who made this
effort a success during the War were almost all engineers and scientists from industry
and academic life (those in the Services being F.eserve Officers) who were managing
The effort
programs concerned with the development and application of new weapons.
was well coordinated -through the Committees of the Communications Board under the
Joint Chiefs and various informal Service-CSRD Committees. With the end of the War
and the return of most of these technical people to civil pursuits, the effort
collapsed.
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6. Out of the shambles of late an ea
Development Board and in early 1947 the Scientific Advisors to the Board reviewed
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the situation of scientific and technical intelligence and made it their first
priority for attention. This finding was endorsed by the policy group advising the Chaim
men of the Board (Gen. Norstad and Adel. Sherman). An arrangement was then made with
the Director of the Central Intelligence Group, Gen. Vandenberg, under which CIG
was to establish a group to provide the Board with scientific intelligence.
7. Today, there is a tren-_endous effort in scientific and technical intelligence by
many of the members of the intelligence community. In the field of 7,1I NT, the Servicet
and the Agency are operating an extensive intelligence collection program, a major
coordinating mechanism and a sizeable processing center (to which we are all contributing;
at a very large cost to the Government. The efficiency and results, in my opinion,
judged against our wartime accomplishments,or the British effort and results, are
pitif U-- r
8. The reason for the generally poor performance is that the SlnitQ_-;dStates lacks an
effective mechanism for coordinating the conduct of scientific and technical intelli-
Pence operations, both in terms of scientific intelligence collection and production
an for the systematic development and application of new scientific and technical
methods to general intelli.Eence collection and production problems.
9. The Agency, as p ~sen ] org y. cj, 2 u p of _ t there are
several' sepa o She w ~ he app icat.ion o new methods
an equipments, and the efforts of many co-equal and independent organizations must be
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coordinated if an effective program is to be launched in any field.
10. The exception to this general situation in both the community and the Agency has
been the Agency performance on a recent major project in which the best technical brains
of the U.S. werelrought to bear under a single, purposeful, effectively managed organi-
zation. This activity has had plenty of elbow room to exploit the most advanced
technology in all relevant fields. Under this project the agency in less than 18 months
developed an intelligence collection system which has been of inestimable value to the
community. The secret of the success of the project is in the unity and freedom of the
command and in the very close coupling between three major areas - rid, operations and
the consumer requirements - with the most candid interchange between the three in order
that the development of capabilities can exploit the latest in technology in direct
response to stated consumer needs. Then operational capabilities and opportunities
can be adjusted against requirements and new research and development on a continuing
basis.
11. The potential of science and technology as an aid to intelligence operations
required to meet the highest priority o: national intelligence objectives can not be
overestimated, and with arms inspection or other possible major changes in the situation
of Past versus West, continuing knowledge on the part of U.S. planners of the technologi-
cal capabilities and plans of the Soviet orbit continues to increase in importance.
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12. The Agency can make a unique contribution to the application of advanced tech-
nology to collecting the vital information needed to pisoduce this intelligence. To
accomplish this, however, the Agency needs to establish some sort of continuing single
organization which can bring together the three key areas of intelligence activity
aforementioned; i.e., requirements, rid, and operations. This whole effort should
then be supported by a continuing operations research organization (not unlike those
now considered essential by the Army, Navy, Air Force and the Secretary of Defense)
to apply the latest in operations analysis and research techniques to the problems
that baffle us in intelligence.
13. Such an over-all organization should have wide latitude to exploit new methods
such as advanced ELINT, communications intelligence, photographic, radar, infra-red,
sonic or seismic and possibly other sensing systems needed to maintain surveillance
of Soviet programs such as the IBM and ICBM missile systems, the air defense system,e6c.
14. An organization within the Agency to accomplish this challenging mission cannot
be established as an appendage to DD1 D JI or DD S. Rather it must be an independent
continuing operation similar to the ACUAATONE pro ec which his demonstrated anew
prac aces proven e attan District, our major electronics projects and most of
our scientific intelligence projects during World War II.
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 6.
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l Such an organization n he :agency s zou
w2 d be flect e y a e.:uty irector for
possibly "New Intelligence Systems". He should be either a top scientist or engineer
or someone like the present Special -`'.ssistant for Policy and Coordination who understands
these matters well and can be assisted by a Deputy who has the scientific and technical
qualifications and is responsible for r&d and technical planning. The organization
should include those parts of the current DD/:L, PD/P and DD/_Q functions which deal with
scientific-technical requirements, research and development and operations in technical
intelligence collection methods.
16. The survival of the West may well rest on the Agency's ability to establish such a
program and see it through to success.
I
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KISTIAKOWSKY, George B.
Served as Spec Asst to Pres.(DDE)for Science and Technology
" Chairman of Sci. Adv. Committee (SAC) at same time
15 July 1959 - 20 January 1961
6 Jan 1961 DDE letter to GBK accept his resignation eff 20 Jan 61
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 Approved For Release 2005/04/22: CIA-RDP85B0080@Rg001EQA1,30Qa establ
20 Apr 1951 (Truman)
advisory to the Pres.
& to the Off of Def. Mobil.
Dr. James Rhyne Killian in matters relating to
scient. R&D for defense.
? 9 Oct 1954, ODM established Technical Capabilities Panel
Killian named Chairman of "Surprise Attack" Committee,
by Arthur S. Fleming, 1KKXXX Director of ODM.
(check NYT, 9 Oct 54, p. 10, col. 1)
13 Jan 1956, Killian nx announced by DDE as head of Pres. Bd.
of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
8 Nov 1957, appointed Spec Asst to Pres. for S&T (DDE)
16 November 1957, sworn in as SA to Pres. for S&T
21 Aug 1958, named to attend the Geneva Conference on
Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy.
7 Feb 1960 Appts'
Spring 1960 -19erved on Commission on National Goals (DDE)
10 Jan 1961 - Resigned from Sci. Adv. Com.
2 May 1961 .- Dr. Killian named Chairman of PFIAB by JFK.
Reestablishment of PFIAB by JFK viewed as attempt to restore
confidence in CIA after U-2 and Bay of Pigs, and to ward off
attempts to establish a Congressional watch-dog committee
to oversee (CIA's activities.
K
24 Apr 1963 - Resignation from PFIAB effective, Clark M.
Clifford followed him as Chairman of PFIAB.
Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP85B00803R000100130001-9
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