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NRO review(s) completed. Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP85B00803R000100130001-9 Job No. 66-R=638 (1 box) DD/R--DD/S&T Organization, Delegation of Authority (1962); Staff Mtg. Minutes, Chronos, (1962-63) 5/17/66 67-B-25 (1 box) `x 66-B-56o (1 box) 66-R-546 (2 boxes) 67-B-558 (1 box) V~ 67-R-587 ~ 1j (4 boxes) X 68-R-53o (4 boxes) ,VX 69-B-596 (1 box) 69-R-597 '(4 boxes) 69-R-598 (1 box) 69-R-599 (2 boxes) 69-R-boo STAT DD/S&T Admin. (1962) DD/S&T Admin & Ops (1963) Policy, Planning, Coordination, Direction (1963); Chronos (1963); Committees, Boards and Panels DDS&T Admin, committees, panels etc. (1964) 7/15/66 3/4/66 2/28/66 2/3/67 DDS&T Subject files (1964); Miscel. Admin. and 2/27/67 Aerial Recon Action Memos DDS&T Subject files (1965); Budget, Security, Training, Logistics, etc. DDS&T Subject files (1965-66) DDS&T Subject files (1966) (non-record copies) DDS&T Chronos (1964) DDS&T Chronos (1965) DDS&T chronos (1966) 1/29/68 2/26/69 2/26/69 2/26/69 2/26/69 2/26/69 70-R-435 DDS&T Chrono (1967) (2 boxes) 7o-R-465 1/29/70 DDS&T Subj files (1967) 2/5/70 Budget, Logs, Personnel, Security, Liaison, Travel Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP85B00803R000100130001-9 Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP85B00803R000100130001-9 70-B-501 DDS&T Policy Files (1967) (1 box) 70-B-511 DDS&T Policy Files (1958-68) (1 box) (Wheelon, 1963; History 1962-65; V X Basic Policy Agreements) 70-54+3 (2 boxes) 1. Projec 'cer 2/10/70 2/16/70 anual, 11 copies 2/2+/70 reversion" 39 copiew Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP85B00803R000100130001-9 STAT Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP85B00803R000100130001-9 Next 7 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP85B00803R000100130001-9 Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP85B00803R000100130001-9 Does Dr. Chamberlain have any recollection of how Dr. Wheelon came to be recruited as AD/SI in early summer 1962 to replace Dr. Scoville? Who recommended him? Was PFIAB (or any of its members) involved? Who approached him? Dr. Cline was then DD/I -- What part did he play in Wheelon's appointment? STAT 4e fir' Zi Lv'v~ coil 4.c` 67' / p ? lJU~jj All C A,6 Olt, CIt STAT STAT Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP85B00803FI000100130001-9 Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP85B00803R000100130001-9 CPYRGHT New York Times - Dateline Los Angeles, June 14 "McCone is Opposed to 'One-Man Rule"' A.E.C. Nominee is Expected to Keep Strauss Policy on Power and Tests -----By Gladwin Hill, Special to the New York Times Los Angeles, June 14. (McCone nominated last week to Chair AEC; Strauss retiring 30 June. Interview in L.A. brought out following views from Mr. McCo Basic research in science should proceed hand in hand with applied, or immddiately practical studies. While scientists are not infallible, their participation in policy formulation is a "healthy" and progressive application of the nation's brain power. / A well-informed public is a very important factor in the adoption of national policies. He was 4uoted, with regard to his part in the writing of the report by the Presidential Air Policy Commission, known as the Finletter Report, that he took price in the report which was as applicable in 1958 as when it was written in 1947. At a time when top scientists didn't think the Russians would have an atomic bomb, the report anticipated the early development by other nations of supersonic bombers, atomic weapons and guided missiles--possibly ahead of the United States--and urged that this country bestir itself in those fields. Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP85B00803R000100130001-9 STAT Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP85B00803R000100130001-9 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP85B00803R000100130001-9 Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP85B00803R000100130001-9 DD/P 'TSD DPD U I I i D D /R L- OSA OCS DD/I DD/S R - DD/S&T ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT Feb. 1962 -Sept. 1966 1962 1963 1964 1965 ` 1966 I DD /S&T AD PS FO-; F 11;Feh 30,July. SAS FMSAC SoP 5 Aug. 7 Nov 15 Sept SECRET Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP85B00803R000100130001-9 Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP85B00803R000100130001-9 The end design of DD/S&T's myriad of activities is to provide the Director of Central''Intelligence, and. through him the U. S. Intelligence Board, the National Security, Council and the President, with the best possible intelligence on science and technology worldwide, to aid them in the formulation of national security policy. Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP85B00803R000100130001-9 Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP85B00803R000100130001-9 Directorate of Science and Technology S cibll A~ci viftes :*66utj yl Officer ,*search and Ga d ; `Development` Servres SECRET 117 ~ ,M and Space` Analysis C&44' 6 Sc Ffi f i Intel) Bence Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP85B00803R000100130001-9 Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP85B00803R000100130001-9 NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE NRO Director: Dr. Flax Deputy Director: Mr. Reber 25X1 NRO NRO Comptroller PROGRAM A B/G Martin Satellites R/A Taylor,USN Satellite Sigint Payloads PROGRAM D B/G Geary Aircraft NRO Staff B/G Stewart CIA Recce Programs Director CIA/OSP Director Mr. Crowley Satellites CIA/OSA Director B/G Ledford Aircraft TOP SECRET 25X1 (October 1965) CIA/ELINT Director Mr. Miller /B Electronics 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP85B00803R000100130001-9 Figure 5 THE N R O 0R Drvp IMF. i t0"Wt/0E)t2V(It ? OHg3R000100130001-9 DIRECTOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE Adm. Raborn 25X1 USIB FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD Mr. Clifford, Chairman Dr. Wm. Baker Mr. Gordon Gray Dr. Land Dr. Langer Dr. Long Mr. Murphy Mr. Pace Adm. Sides Gen. Taylor Mr. Coyne,Exec Sec Adm Raborn, DCI Mr. Belmont, FBI Mr. Brown, AEC Lt.Gen.Carroll, DIA Lt.Gen.Carter, NSA Mr. Hughes, Stale Mr. Bundy, WH Adm. Raborn, DCI Mr. Johnson, State Mr. Vance, DOD NRP EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE Mr. Vance, Dep.Sec.Def. Adm. Raborn, DCI Dr. Hornig, WH PSAC (Panel on NRP Matters) Dr. Land, Chairman Dr. Baker Dr. Drell Dr. Garwin Dr. Ling Dr. Puckett Dr. Purcell SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Mr. McNamara DEP. SEC. OF DEFENSE Mr. Vance NRO Director Dr. Flax Deputy Director Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP85B00803R0001001300cM r9 Reber RESEARCH Approved For Release 200.5/04/2 CIA-RDP85B00803R000100130001-9 DD/S?YT FLNCTONS FIGURE 2 DEVELOPMENT OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS OFFICE OF SPECIAL ACTIVITIES OFFICE OF ELINT CONTRIBUTIONS TO ESTIMATES OFFICE OF SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE i OREIGN ,\IISSI1,E :', SPACE AN,1LY~IS CENTER Approved For Release 2005/04/22 CIA-RDP85BOO803R000100130001-9 SECRET March 1964 Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP85B00803R000100130001-9 Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP85B00803R000100130001-9 ILLEGIB Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP85BOO803R0001001 direct operational activities for which we have budgeted. Accord- ingly, I must recommend to you in the very strongest terms I can employ that we either budget ourselves for the direct cost of this project for Fiscal Year 1957 or set: in motion immediately the turn over of the full control of the project to the Air. Force. Only a fis- cal theorist could even seriously suggest an intermediate alternative. of materiel, existing, and newly built facilities at overseas bases and operational support which will probably cost more than the 3. The foregoing recommendation defines the practical question that must be decided at this time. Contemplation of this practical question, however, inevitably involves thought as to what is to be the ultimate fate of AQUATONE (if it turns out to be feasible to continue the operation of this project for a number of years) or of the suc- cessor activities, which surely must be contemplated if AQUATONE itself turns out to have a short life. Moreover, this question cannot, be disentangled from that of the manner in which similar activities are organized and carried out within the Air Force. In short, it is hard to chart a sensible course for AQUATONE without trying to de- cide how all activities of this sort could best be organized within the U. S. Government. 4. Without attempting to lead you through extensive argumenta- tion, I will summarize my own views on this matter as follows. I might say that these are concurred in by Colonel Ritland and I believe they are regarded as sensible by Colonel Berg. a. The present dispersion of responsibility, whereby activities of the sort here under di.scussidn are being carried on by USAFE, FEAF, SAC, and ourselves is uneconomic and involves con- siderable risk of duplication of effort and of inadequacy of central control. It would probably be desirable in the long run to create a single operating organization, controlled directly from Washington, which would carry out all overflight activities involving penetrations of more than a few miles in depth in peacetime. This organization could draw heavily on existing commands (and on the CIA) for support. b. The argument against the conduct of overflights by strictly military organizations with air crews that are members of 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP85B00803R0001001300 Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP85B00803R000100130001-9 a the Armed Services of the United States is even more powerful today than it was a year ago. Though the second Geneva Conference has demonstrated that the Russians are nearly as unyielding as ever, enough of the spirit of the first Geneva Conference is still adrift so that anything that could be identified as an overt act of military aggression would call down serious political penalties upon this country. Accordingly, if there is to be a single organization re- sponsible for overflights, its aircrews should be civilians; it should be organized to as great au extent as feasible with civilian personnel; and its activities should be regarded as clandestine intelligence gather- ing operations. c. The foregoing considerations lead me to the conclusion that the single organization here proposed should be a mixed task force, organized outside of the framework of any of the regular mili- tary services though drawing extensive support from them. On the other hand, I am inclined to believe that the Air Force should own a majority of the common stock in this organization, by contrast with the present situation in which the CIA owns the majority of the com- mon stock in AQUATONE. In any event, however, I believe that both CIA and the Air Force should contribute personnel and support and consideration might even be given to bringing the other services in as minority stockholders. d. One further argument: in favor of some such arrange- ment as that here proposed is that an organization with a permanent interest in this activity would be in a position to stimulate continuing research and development. It is worth noting that with two early and unimportant exceptions the aircraft under production for AQUATONE are the first ever designed exclusively for a reconnaissance mission and, of course, are the only ones that have ever been designed to meet the requirements of altitude, range and security imposed by the contemplated mission. 5. The views advanced in the preceding paragraphs have to do with the ultimate organization (and by inference, financing) of over- flight activities. { Meanwhile, how is AQUATONE to be carried on for another fiscal" year? The following considerations, I submit, all suggest that the present arrangement should be continued through Fiscal Year 1957 or until such time as amore permanent arrangement, can be arrived at. 25X1 T O P S E C R E T Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP85B00803R0001001 Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP85B00803R000100130001-9 a. At the present time it would be difficult if not impossible for the Air Force to take over the responsibility for AQUATONE and to carry the project on in anything approaching the present fashion. Air Force procurement procedures differ sharply from those that have been employed in this project. The Air Force is less well organized to make use of a predominantly civilian maintenance and support organization, which has been developed in this case for well considered, and solid reasons. Within the Air Force an operational activity of this sort would undoubtedly be made the responsibility of SAC or of another operational command. In this way the project would become a direct military activity and the advantages of plausible denial by the military establishment and of attributability only to the civilian intelligence arm would be lost. b. Although the present arrangement cannot be regarded as a permanent one, it will take time to evolve either the pattern pro- posed above, or any other arrangement that will perpetuate certain of the advantages of the present one. The surest way to encourage some sound and well-thought-through plan of overflight organizations is to maintain the status quo long enough (a) to prove (or disprove) the AQUATONE capability and (b) to allow the emergence of a carefully-thought-out plan for the longer run. c. Regardless of these considerations, grave practical difficulties would confront a shift of responsibility as early as the summer of 1956. The end of this fiscal year will occur only two and a half months after the target date for the initiation of operations. It is vital that command channels and organizational arrangements not be disturbed at that point. Nine or twelve months later it is to be hoped that the organization conducting the project will be seasoned, its equipment accumulated and the phasing out of civilian personnel in favor of the military will be feasible (if it is then desirable). In- deed, the risks involved in a major change some nine and a half months from now are 'so great that I believe the shift might well be undertaken at once if it is going to have to be made so soon. 6. I am not closing my eyes to the practical problem of getting money from the Bureau of the Budget and from Congress. I would emphasize three points, however, that bear directly upon this ugly task. Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP85B00803R0001001 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP85B00803R000100130001-9 First: I believe it should. be made absolutely clear to the Director of the Budget that, as stated in paragraph 2 above, the issue is not merely a financial one of which Agency shall budget for a required expenditure but is basically one of organization and ultimate responsibility. If the Bureau of the Budget recommends Air Force financing it is in fact making a recommendation about the character of and the responsibility for this project. The issue should be discussed in these terms. Second: It should be kept in mind at all times by all concerned that we are making a choice betwee Third: No matter how the accounts are set up, this project should be supported before the Bureau and before Congress by the Air Force and the CIA jointly and their joint support should be in such terms as to make it unmistakably clear that they are agreed on the urgency of the requirement, the size of the budget, and the organizational arrange- ments under which the project is being carried on. If this is done, I believe there is little bearing on purely political grounds between one choice of financing and another. 7. In the light of the above I recommend: a. That you propose to Messrs. Quarles and Gardner that they undertake an examination of the organization of overflight recon- naissance activities, the CIA to join in their discussions insofar as CIA activities and interests are concerned, and that we endeavor to arrive, after full consideration, at a rational and orderly pattern for the longer run. b. That, pending the outcome of such study, AQUATONE be continued under the present organizational arrangement in Fiscal Year 25X1 25X1 NRO 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP85B00803R00010013p001-9 Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP85B00803R000100130001-9 BOARDS, COMMITTEES, PANELS Science Advisory Committee - advisory to the President. (SAC) Established under Office of Defense Mobilization by Presidential order on 20 April 1951. Reconstituted as the President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC) 22 November 1957 and effective 1 :December 1957 was transferred to the White House. Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP85B00803R000100130001-9 25X1 ORGANIZATION Approved For Release 26 803PMd6ltb 30 1 9 : e:rao for ICI from ESC at time of his leaving the CIA Subj: Organization for ;xplo:itation of Ldvanced Technology in Support of Critical Intelligence Problems "1. !'y departure from the Agency impels me to go back and review about 15 years involvement with the problem of scientific and technical intelligence, with particular emphasis on electronics as a factor in key national security problems and to make some recommendations concerning the needs of the future in these fields. 2. In the long-term perspective of science and related scientific intelligence since the beginning of World War II, the following poi4ts should be borne in mind. The wartime developments in electronics and the application of nuclear energy were the most important scientific contributions to the winning of the war. From the end of the War until the hydrogen reaction was proven by the ~ _JC and -Luztil August 1953 when the Soviets first demonstrated their capabilities to explode a fusion device, this field merited first priority, both in rd and Intel with respect to nod. Electronics, particularly as related to long range navigation and bombing systems and to the r&d of missiles, ran a close second. 3. Once the Soviets demonstrated their capability to produce the reactions which are essential to the production of multi6megaton weapons, the key question became the development of delivery systems, first manned aircraft systems and then missile systems. electronics 1~0'l~as'?01ItAeb0>~~~e003~~-9systems. The fact tYtarto oudrF$r R IIiaCR 2104c/ .tg4#TgPRA .BRgA63~p0~1d 9c00W6ggnize the importance of electronics much better than we is indicated by a statement made by A. N. Nesneyanov, Pros. of the Academy of Sciences, USSR at the general meeting of the cademy on 26 Dec 1956. He stated, The most important of the technical sciences, and th.-.t which requires first priority development, is radio engineering and electronics." He also said .... "as a whole, in the field of radio electronics we lag considerably behind the leading capitalist countries, especially in the realm of research which opens up new possibilities for engineering." 5. During the War, there was little :meric:;.n scientific-technical intelligence activity worthy of the name carried on within the intelligence organizations of the Army and Navy. Arneric:n scientific-technical intelligence was largely initiated and guided by the organizations that were consumers of this critic-.l informa.;,ion,Le. the 'ianhattan Project, certain divisions of OSRD and the Technical Services or Bureaus of the Army and the Navy. The people in OSRD and the Services who made this effort a success during the War were almost all engineers and scientists from industry and academic life (those in the Services being F.eserve Officers) who were managing The effort programs concerned with the development and application of new weapons. was well coordinated -through the Committees of the Communications Board under the Joint Chiefs and various informal Service-CSRD Committees. With the end of the War and the return of most of these technical people to civil pursuits, the effort collapsed. Approved For Rele se 2 / 4/2 : CI 3 0 erch and 6. Out of the shambles of late an ea Development Board and in early 1947 the Scientific Advisors to the Board reviewed Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP85B00803R000100130001-9 3? the situation of scientific and technical intelligence and made it their first priority for attention. This finding was endorsed by the policy group advising the Chaim men of the Board (Gen. Norstad and Adel. Sherman). An arrangement was then made with the Director of the Central Intelligence Group, Gen. Vandenberg, under which CIG was to establish a group to provide the Board with scientific intelligence. 7. Today, there is a tren-_endous effort in scientific and technical intelligence by many of the members of the intelligence community. In the field of 7,1I NT, the Servicet and the Agency are operating an extensive intelligence collection program, a major coordinating mechanism and a sizeable processing center (to which we are all contributing; at a very large cost to the Government. The efficiency and results, in my opinion, judged against our wartime accomplishments,or the British effort and results, are pitif U-- r 8. The reason for the generally poor performance is that the SlnitQ_-;dStates lacks an effective mechanism for coordinating the conduct of scientific and technical intelli- Pence operations, both in terms of scientific intelligence collection and production an for the systematic development and application of new scientific and technical methods to general intelli.Eence collection and production problems. 9. The Agency, as p ~sen ] org y. cj, 2 u p of _ t there are several' sepa o She w ~ he app icat.ion o new methods an equipments, and the efforts of many co-equal and independent organizations must be Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP85B00803R000100130001-9 coordinated if an effective program is to be launched in any field. 10. The exception to this general situation in both the community and the Agency has been the Agency performance on a recent major project in which the best technical brains of the U.S. werelrought to bear under a single, purposeful, effectively managed organi- zation. This activity has had plenty of elbow room to exploit the most advanced technology in all relevant fields. Under this project the agency in less than 18 months developed an intelligence collection system which has been of inestimable value to the community. The secret of the success of the project is in the unity and freedom of the command and in the very close coupling between three major areas - rid, operations and the consumer requirements - with the most candid interchange between the three in order that the development of capabilities can exploit the latest in technology in direct response to stated consumer needs. Then operational capabilities and opportunities can be adjusted against requirements and new research and development on a continuing basis. 11. The potential of science and technology as an aid to intelligence operations required to meet the highest priority o: national intelligence objectives can not be overestimated, and with arms inspection or other possible major changes in the situation of Past versus West, continuing knowledge on the part of U.S. planners of the technologi- cal capabilities and plans of the Soviet orbit continues to increase in importance. Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP85B00803R000100130001-9 Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP85B00803R000100130001-9 12. The Agency can make a unique contribution to the application of advanced tech- nology to collecting the vital information needed to pisoduce this intelligence. To accomplish this, however, the Agency needs to establish some sort of continuing single organization which can bring together the three key areas of intelligence activity aforementioned; i.e., requirements, rid, and operations. This whole effort should then be supported by a continuing operations research organization (not unlike those now considered essential by the Army, Navy, Air Force and the Secretary of Defense) to apply the latest in operations analysis and research techniques to the problems that baffle us in intelligence. 13. Such an over-all organization should have wide latitude to exploit new methods such as advanced ELINT, communications intelligence, photographic, radar, infra-red, sonic or seismic and possibly other sensing systems needed to maintain surveillance of Soviet programs such as the IBM and ICBM missile systems, the air defense system,e6c. 14. An organization within the Agency to accomplish this challenging mission cannot be established as an appendage to DD1 D JI or DD S. Rather it must be an independent continuing operation similar to the ACUAATONE pro ec which his demonstrated anew prac aces proven e attan District, our major electronics projects and most of our scientific intelligence projects during World War II. Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP85B00803R000100130001-9 6. A rgvec For Release 2005104/22: C1A-RDPg5B008Q3dRQ0010%1,30001-~ l Such an organization n he :agency s zou w2 d be flect e y a e.:uty irector for possibly "New Intelligence Systems". He should be either a top scientist or engineer or someone like the present Special -`'.ssistant for Policy and Coordination who understands these matters well and can be assisted by a Deputy who has the scientific and technical qualifications and is responsible for r&d and technical planning. The organization should include those parts of the current DD/:L, PD/P and DD/_Q functions which deal with scientific-technical requirements, research and development and operations in technical intelligence collection methods. 16. The survival of the West may well rest on the Agency's ability to establish such a program and see it through to success. I Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP85B00803R000100130001-9 Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP85B00803R000100130001-9 KISTIAKOWSKY, George B. Served as Spec Asst to Pres.(DDE)for Science and Technology " Chairman of Sci. Adv. Committee (SAC) at same time 15 July 1959 - 20 January 1961 6 Jan 1961 DDE letter to GBK accept his resignation eff 20 Jan 61 Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP85B00803R000100130001-9 Approved For Release 2005/04/22: CIA-RDP85B0080@Rg001EQA1,30Qa establ 20 Apr 1951 (Truman) advisory to the Pres. & to the Off of Def. Mobil. Dr. James Rhyne Killian in matters relating to scient. R&D for defense. ? 9 Oct 1954, ODM established Technical Capabilities Panel Killian named Chairman of "Surprise Attack" Committee, by Arthur S. Fleming, 1KKXXX Director of ODM. (check NYT, 9 Oct 54, p. 10, col. 1) 13 Jan 1956, Killian nx announced by DDE as head of Pres. Bd. of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities 8 Nov 1957, appointed Spec Asst to Pres. for S&T (DDE) 16 November 1957, sworn in as SA to Pres. for S&T 21 Aug 1958, named to attend the Geneva Conference on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy. 7 Feb 1960 Appts' Spring 1960 -19erved on Commission on National Goals (DDE) 10 Jan 1961 - Resigned from Sci. Adv. Com. 2 May 1961 .- Dr. Killian named Chairman of PFIAB by JFK. Reestablishment of PFIAB by JFK viewed as attempt to restore confidence in CIA after U-2 and Bay of Pigs, and to ward off attempts to establish a Congressional watch-dog committee to oversee (CIA's activities. K 24 Apr 1963 - Resignation from PFIAB effective, Clark M. Clifford followed him as Chairman of PFIAB. Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP85B00803R000100130001-9 ?PcDetr tr er nterpssd, nstox fl ei cL Aa 1~''+ IDak, p at aK m arn "$ .t'nr s. Congre~ctn+st} :.. ':nesse trnn o the cncs h i y A ~ h '"'IJ`.P Ctrb& +srf ? tR t Ot ., ..fie wt' hr,c - ~ _fln