BACKGROUND INFORMATION FOR FMSAC DISCUSSIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85B00803R000100180083-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 3, 2005
• Sequence Number: 83
• Publication Date: January 29, 1964
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP85B00803R000100180083-4
Carl E. Duckett, Director, FMSAC. /S&T,
29 January 1964,1 25X1
Subj: Background n rma ion for FMSAC Discussions
1. During past 2 mos discussions held w/various elements
of DOD re FMSAC and its msn. These indicate consid diff
of opin as to effectiveness of current missile and space
analysis effort. While some DOD personnel agree improvements
are needed, others feel that there are no serious problems.
Those who admit deficiencies tend to support view that a
little fixing of present resources will solve the problem;
thus they question the need for FMSAC.
2. Based on our recent review of this matter I have
attempted to re-evaluate the situation. I have talked to
a no. of OSI & FMSAC analysts, contractor personnel,
members of GMAIC, and have visited NSA. Based on these
inputs and my own background knowledge, I am convinced
that we will never sell FMSAC on the basis of fixing specific
problem areas. The two primary reasons are (1) it is
impossible to document many of the past foul-ups, and (2)
many changes have been made which DOD contends has or will
correct the recognized shortcomings. The most significant
org changes cited are formation of DIA and org of the SMAC
at NSA. Since SMAC is just a year old and the D&T element
of DIA was activated only a few months ago, it seems clear
that any reference to deficiencies which date back more
than one year will result in a counter argument that the
problem has now been solved. This argument has been used
in most of the conversations I have had with DOD repre-
sentatives. Naturally I don't buy their argument but I
don't believe it is worthwhile to engage it. For any future
debates on FMSAC, I recommend that we stick to a discussion
of the present situation and restrict our examples of problem
areas to those which have occurred in the past few months.
3. To me the most important evidence of the need for
improved analysis is a review of missile and space intelli-
gence gaps. A list of the more important of these gaps
(Here is a list of 7 probable or existin `missile-related
facilities or areas of information on which the U.S. was
lacking in data.)
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The above-listed gaps are a small sample of a very long
list. In fact, there is no Soviet missile or space
system on which we have all the answers needed. Although
some of the gaps may result from a lack of collection capa-
bility, I believe that a more effective analysis effort
can provide many of the answers. It therefore follows
that the single most important reason for organizing FMSAC
is to reduce the large number of unknowas.
4. A statement we have often made about the present
Community effort is that no one agency is doing analysis
of all available data. Despite arguments to the contrary,
this statement is still true and is the real void which
FMSAC will fill. In terms of data base, FTD is probably
the nearest thing we have to an all-s With the
exception of raw data they 25X1
are doing something wi types o a a being collected.
I know of no diplomatic way to say what is wrong with FTD's
product. The fact is, they almost always seem to get the
wrong answer. Since some DIA personnel propose FTD as the
all-source Community analysis organization, we must either
ignore the proposal or bluntly state that past performance
clearly shows a lack of competence to do the job. Config-
uration of the SS-6, propellants and guidance system of the
SS-4, size of the SS-8, are typical of the wrong answers
they have produced. It should also be noted that whereas 25X1
the in-house work at FTD is close - ,
their contractors
have been assigned rather narrow fields and are
not a owe to do all-source analysis.
25X1
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25X1
7. Many other specific background stories regarding past
mistakes have been investigat4d but it is diff, if not imposs,
to estab enough factual data to make these stories of value
in our evaluation. In most cases, several agencies were
involved and each has a separate version of what really
happened. I have, therefore, concluded that our justification
for FMSAC must be based on the big picture and not on the
numerous "who struck John" stories. There are many methods
which might be effective in solving the problems but based
on past performance a "clean up - fix up campaign" in FTD,
NSA, or other DOD agencies just won't work.
8. The reasons CIA and FMSAC appear to be the right answer
come back to the Director's basic responsibility and need
plus CIA's proven ability to attract and keep the caliber
of personnel required to do the job.
C.E.D.
Director
FMSAC
Distr:
0&1-Addr.
2 - FMSAC
FMSAC/CEDuckett:
[29 Jan 64)
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP85B00803R000100180083-4