PRESIDENTIAL POLICY RE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES EXPOSURE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85B00803R000200040043-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 3, 2003
• Sequence Number: 43
• Publication Date: June 3, 1960
• Content Type: BRIEF

MAY DAY & AFTER TS-155416 ~TT e 1960
Approved For Release 2004/01/29 : CIA-RDP85B00803R000200040 43-2
Memo to the DD/P Via: A/C DPD
Subject: Presidential Pol*-v re ence Activities Exposure
From: Ch/Intel Sect/DPD/OPS I STAT
"...The following suggestion is not offered as something that should or
could have been done prior to the 1 May incident. It is predicated on
the mnique circumstances which now exist as a result of all that has
happened during the past month, and in particular, on the newly acquired
sophistication of the Congress and the American people with regard to
intelligence collection activities.
"In essence, it is proposed that the President, at his next press
conference or in some other public ofrum, describe in precise terms the
future policy of the White House with regard to any exposure or public
inquiry concerning the intelligence activities of this nation.
"The substance of this policy should be that neither the President nor
members of the White House Executive Offices will publicly comment on such
activities, other than in the most general terms, nor will they confirm or
deny knowledgeability or official sanction by the Chief Executive of any
given intel. program. This policy should be adhered to consistently,
without regard for the nature and scope of the exposure and without
reference to the accuracy or inaccurac yyof the 771l" ft d For 1Rdelepse 2104/01/29: CIA-RD D P85 B00803R
The Pre ~~ cou urt er point out that this is not a reversal
nor is it incompatible with his decision after the I May incident to
 Approved For Release 2004/01/29 : CIA-RDP85B00803R000200040043-2
publicly assume responsibility for the U-2 overflights. That decision
under the circumstances was, and still is, believed to have been a
valid one. It was essential in order to refute allegations of
"irresponsibility" and "military adventuring" which, although baseless,
might have won universal acceptance had they not been answered.
"If a question should arise as to why such a policy was not established
prior to the 1 May incident, it could be argued that such a statement
of policy prior to the recent events might well have been incomprehensible
to the general public, particularly with regard to its motivation. It is
only against the background of what has occurred that such a policy can
be instituted and effectively impel-.ented with the sympathy and under-
standing of an enlightened public and Congress, and without fear that
groundless charges of the "irresponsibility" type will be given credence.
"I believe that the proposed policy, if adopted, would effectively shield
the President and the White House Staff from embarrassment resulting from
the miscarriage of any future clandestine activity. I do not believe that
it can be effective, however', unless it is stated openly and for the
record. It fully meets, at least for any future contingency, the basic
criticism of the Chairman of the SFRCommittee concerning the handling of
the U-2 incident. I further believe that it will be received favorably
by an overwhelming majority of Corri~
and rep ctE't el? s / iaCl ~9g 0mg 64:? bli c, our roa es
to a problem which could recur at any time. ?. no more reaistic approach