PERSONNEL SECURITY POLICY FOR SCI ACCESS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85B01152R000200130016-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 19, 2007
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: July 27, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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Approved pproved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP85B01152R000200130016-7
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A #24
LAUIR, V.
NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENUt I,vUNCIL
WASMNCTON, DC. 20505
NFIC-9.1/52
27 July 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL
Acting Executive Secretary
SUBJECT: Personnel Security Policy for SCI Access
The attached package is forwarded for your review and comment as
indicated in paragraph 6. of the attached memorandum from the Director of
Central Intelligence. Please forward your comments to the
NFIC Secretariat Staff by close of business, 8 August 1983.
Attachment
As Stated
DD /A
 NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D C 20505
Attachment to
NFIC-9.1/52
SUBJECT: Personnel Security Policy for SCI Access
1. The DCfi 3ecur.ity i ommittee ?SECOM) has "completed a review of the SCI
personnel security investigative and adjudicative requirements as promulgated
in DCID 1/14. A difference of opinion remains whether the scope of investi-
gative coverage should be reduced from 15 years to 10 years.
2. Since the mid-1960's, DCID 1/14, with full Community concurrence, has
:required investigations. to cover-the last 15 years of?candidates' lives, or to
their 18th birthdays, whichever is less, but in any event not less than the
most recent two- years. In .1980 the SECOM completed a study of 5,204 DCID 1/14
investigations adjudicated for SCI access by 10 Community agencies. The study
Evaluated the productivity of various investigative sources and periods of
investigative coverage. It concluded that a 15-year period of coverage would
capture all adverse data determined by adjudicators to warrant denial of SCI
access but that a 10-year period would risk losing 9% of significant adverse
data which was the basis for 3% of the access denials.
3. The study was the basis for a thorough review of DCID 1/14. In
December 1981, recommendations for its revision were approved by a majority
(10 to 3) of the SECOM members. The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
(Policy) asked that the proposed revision be held in abeyance until a newly
appointed Defense Department senior-level panel could complete a review of the
DoD personnel security program. That review recommended substantial upgrading
of DoD personnel security practices to include raising investigative criteria
for Top Secret clearances to the DCID 1/14 level and considering the use of
the polygraph to screen persons for SCI access. Concurrently, the Defense
Investigative Service received a substantial increase in resources to improve
the quality of investigations and reduce its backlog.
4. With the new Defense findings, the SECOM resumed work on the
DCID 1/14 revision. The OSD member proposed that the scope of all investi-
gations for SCI be reduced to 10 years. The Personnel Security Subcommittee
voted 8 to 5 in favor of retaining the 15-year scope. The Committee voted
7 to 6 in favor of retaining the 15-year scope, with all votes to reduce the
scope coming from DoD agencies. Unanimous agreement was reached on several
changes to DCID 1/14. These included introduction of an explicit reference
to the polygraph in paragraph llm as a supplement to personal interviews in
departments or agencies with policies sanctioning its use for personnel
security purposes; and a new paragraph 21 and an addition to the last paragraph
of Annex A, both emphasizing that unauthorized disclosure of classified
 Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP85BOl152R000200130016-7
information is a cause for denying or revoking SCI access approval. The
revision also makes minor changes to investigative. standards, adds language to
strengthen the government's position in denying access for cause, and updates
definitions and references.
5. The OSD dissent focuses on the allocation of resources and promises to
trade off more stringent investigations for non-SCI cle
reduction in SCI scope. :All non-Defense SECOM members,
prefer continuation of the 15-year investigative scope. Energy wants it
because of concerns about the sensitivity of nuclear weapons data and FBI wants
it because they feel it has proved its worth in the past. The CIA Office of...
General Counsel urges retention of the 15-year scope for SCI access as a means
of- maintaining- a distinction between SCI access criteria and Top Secret clear-
ance standards in litigation involving access denials. In addition, there
are doubts that the DCI should engage in trade-offs involving resources of
individual agencies.
6. I am enclosing as attachments copies of the majority approved version
of.the DCID 1/14 revision, a summary of changes from the previous edition, and
the OSD minority position. Please review the draft art advise me on resolution
of the Community difference on whether investi)" for SCI accesshould
Attachments
 OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, DCI SECURITY COMMITTEE
SUBJECT: Minority Position on Draft Revision of DCID 1/14
on 23 February 1983, the DCI Security Committee approved the draft DCID 1/14
by a vote of 7 to 6 with all Department of Defense (DoD) members supporting
the position of the Office of the Secretary of'D'efense (OSD) that a 10 year
period of coverage be substituted for the requirement that an investigation
for access to Sensitive Compartmented
life. W thin the, experiencecandrstudies,
most recent 15 years of a which have been made available to you, have disclosed that little, if any,
significant information impacting on a person's eligibility for SCI access is
developed beyond ten years of investigative coverage.
Consequently, the DoD has approved a program which will begin on 1 April 1983,
with implementation of a periodic reinvestigation which significantly exceeds
the current DCID 1/14 in scope. Previously, a program of security supervision
within each Defense Component was mandated and implementation has begun. Begin-
ning on 1 January 1984, it is planned that the DoD will implement a single scope
background investigation in accordance with DCID 1/14 standards for all persons
with ongsafor Top the ecret Furthert,aithas
been long advocated
should be noted that while reducing the scope of coverage from 15 to 10 years,
the DoD will add a Subject interview to the coverage in every investigation.
The Subject interview has been established as a technique of much greater
value than merely five more years of background coverage. Another consideration sult of is that resources saved by the Defense
-
theeexpandedecoverage of theeperiodic re-
reduction in will be applied to
investigation and the Subject interview. The DIS conducts SO,000s~how;niteregisions
each year so the savings will be significant. In addition, as
in the thD and
pending a revision to policy concerning the use of the polygraph
if the pending revisions receive approval, the personnel security program will be
supplemented by polygraph use to. some extent.
While the OSD supports the implementation of the revised DCID 1/14, it is requested
that our recommendation concerning the scope modification be forwarded rofurther
consideration on the basis that the DoD has developed a much improved peo
security program which exceeds the minimum requirements of both the current and
the revised DCID 1/14._ In the absence of further favorable consideration of the
OSD recommendation, it is requested that consideration be given to adding the
following footnote to DCID 1/14:
"The appropriate authority in Departments and Agencies subject
to this directive may substitute investigative procedures of equal or greater value
to those prescribed in exceptional circumstancies for a limed period of time."
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