SECURITY SUITABILITY OF APPLICANTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85B01152R000901250002-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 26, 2009
• Sequence Number: 2
• Content Type: REPORT

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SECURITY SUITABILITY OF APPLICANTS
It is unstated but implicit in the tasking that current
security standards for applicants and employees should be
examined in the light of realistic criteria. The issue is valid;
there has been a profound change in national social values over
the past thirty years and it is entirely proper to determine
whether or not the Office of Security has reacted in a manner and
to the degree that is consistent both with staffing requirements
and the Office's mission to prepare and execute an effective
Agency security posture. In seeking determination, it is not
necessary to detail the dramatic change in social mores over the
past three decades. It is enough to say that the traditional
values of the 1950s were challenged in most dramatic fashion in
the 1960s and evolved in the 1970s and 1980s, with some positive
reaction to extremes, to the climate of today. The net result of
rebellion, activism, revolution within the ethical and moral
infrastructure, hedonism represented in self-gratification and
overriding self-interest and the many other expressions of
societal change have resulted in:
? Selective patriotism.
If not rejection of authority, then at least
suspicion of it.
? A search for meaning involving both a return to
some traditional values and a proliferation of
cults that exploit a need for direction.
? Weakening of the family structure.
Development of a drug culture particularly in
the young.
? Cohabitation as a generally acceptable
alternative to a "legal" union.
? A relaxed attitude toward casual sex.
? Selective observance of law.
? An attitude held by many that cheating and
some forms of theft are justified to satisfy
personal need.
? Emergence of the overt homosexual and some
acceptance of deviant lifestyles.
? Polarization on political, religious and moral
issues.
? Peer examples, attitudes and the age factor
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place most applicants in the group likely
to have accepted those societal changes that
conflict with security criteria; e.g., use of
drugs.
There are, of course, many other changes not listed above,
some bearing on security criteria and others dealing with suit-
ability factors. At this point, it is important to establish the
distinction between information relating strictly to security
(loyalty, integrity, criminal record, etc.) and other developed
information that concerns fitness and overall suitability not
necessarily related to security decisions (family background,
stability, personality quirks, etc.). The distinction figures
prominently in a discussion of counterintelligence presented
later in this paper. The separate criteria also are significant
if unstated in the review set forth immediately below.
The Office of Security does not operate in a vacuum and
would not if such an insular condition was possible. Reality
dictates flexibility in application of security standards to the
degree the mission of the Agency is not jeopardized and, within
this limitation, change has occurred. Examples:
? Cohabitation, once disqualifying under
provisions of Executive Order 10450, no longer
is a basis for security disapproval. There is
security interest in a partner with spouse-like
status in terms of identification. We require
some reasonable assurance that a cohabitant who
enjoys the same confidence given to a "legal"
partner is trustworthy. Such assurance is not
always available because partners tend to come
and go and there is no effective mechanism for
keeping current of temporary "relationships."
The Office has chosen to accept the risk
associated with the nature and pattern of
cohabitation because there is nothing to do but
to accept and live with this particular element
of an altered public attitude toward sex and
sexual unions.
? The definition of promiscuity, which under
Executive Order 10450 represented "notoriously
disgraceful conduct" has been modified to
conform to relaxed public perception of sexual
behavior. Sexual activity is not disqualifying
unless it is flagrant to a degree to embarrass
or discredit the Agency.
? Experimentation with drugs, as it figures in
the adjudicative process, essentially involves
judgment as to whether or not an applicant can
avoid use of drugs after entrance on duty.
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The Office is acutely aware that failure of individuals to
meet security standards often deprives the Agency of the services
of people well qualified in the professional sense. We also are
aware and very much concerned over a heavy incidence of security-
related terminations in the past few years. In discussion of
these matters, internally and formally and informally with the
Office of Medical Services (OMS), the following questions have
arisen:
Are our clearance standards realistic? Have we
become institutionalized to a degree where
regulations and policy dictate criteria that
are too rigid and not in keeping with the
times?
? Are our security standards valid and sound;
that is, are they based on internal perceptions
not supported by study that confirms their
viability?
? Are our adjudicators sufficiently knowledgable
of suitability factors that warrant referral to
the Applicant Review Panel?
? Do our security standards contribute negatively
to the overall quality and professionalism of
the Agency populace? In simple terms, are we
rejecting people who can do the job and
clearing less gifted and talented men and women
who require extensive development before they
can function effectively? If the latter is
true, are we conducting a social experiment to
the detriment of the Agency mission?
Must we accept as fact a premise that the best
and the brightest in today's job market are
more likely to have accepted moral and ethical
standards incompatible with current security
standards? On the other side of the coin, are
people who are governed by high standards of
personal integrity and reject the drug culture
necessarily second rate clods who have only
their virtue to recommend them?
Does the recent spate of security terminations
indicate that existing security standards for
clearance already have been weakened to the
point of intolerance?
Before addressing these questions it is necessary to
establish the points that may or may not be approached as within
the Office's authority. Two major issues, homosexuality and drug
usage, are governed by Agency rather than Office of Security
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policy. The Office of Security has the lead in recommending
policy, but it must be affirmed by the DCI. Briefly, overt or
practicing closet homosexuals are not eligible for Agency employ-
ment; those who start or continue using drugs illegally after
entrance on duty are not eligible for continued employment.
The questions raised obviously call for a good deal of soul
searching and applied analysis. This is, of course, a continuing
process that calls upon past experience, the lessons of the
present, and a constant evaluation of changing societal values
that influence applicants. Our conclusions:
? We are not insulated nor do we act in
accordance with rigid and inflexible
standards. We cannot deny an institutional
influence, but this very influence features
awareness of and reaction to societal
evolution.
? Internal perceptions are valid because they are
not locked into the past and conform to the
Office obligation to avoid unacceptable risk.
The Office has made adjustments in security
criteria and it is possible other changes may
justify themselves or be imposed upon us. We
would have no objection to a study of today's
society and its values vis-a-vis current
security standards but contend,such a study
would be no more than an extension of or
appendage to ongoing practice.
? The expertise of our adjudicators in
suitability matters should be expanded and
supplemented. This matter is dealt with at
length in a discussion of counterintelligence
presented later.
? The question of whether or not we are rejecting
well qualified people at the expense of the
Agency's ability to fulfill its mission is not
for the Office of Security to judge. We
obviously do not recruit and select new
employees other than our own and other
components must judge the quality of their
personnel. The matter should be explored
thoroughly with consideration of all factors
that contribute to the effectiveness of the
Agency work force and problems, if any, should
be discussed by heterogeneous Agency
representation, including this Office.
? Relating to the question addressed above, the
Office of Security has not found in its
recruiting efforts that all or most of our
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clearable applicants are marginal or sub-
standard. High quality personnel are harder to
find but enough can be located to maintain a
pool of high potential professionals. In our
experience, this demonstrates the variance in
contemporary society; not all of the bright and
capable young people accept the values of an
apparent majority of their peers. Accepting
this, the issue becomes a necessity to
investigate and process more people to fill a
need and not modification of existing security
standards.
The number of terminations on security grounds
in recent years is most disturbing as a
possible indicator that security criteria has
already been relaxed too much. Some employees
who experimented with drugs before entrance on
duty and were advised of Agency policy on
illegal use of drugs did not heed the
warning. In several instances, cocaine
replaced marijuana as employees became able to
afford the more expensive substance. There was
a marked increase in demonstrated dishonesty
which seems to be symptomatic of a growing
trend influenced sometimes by a tight economy
and other times by a plain lack of concern for
this element of character. Other cases involve
sexual deviation. There is no apparent pattern
to these terminations except that most surface
during probationary polygraph and reinvestiga-
tion. At this time, it cannot be stated if the
several terminations are an aberration or
related to security and/or suitability
factors. The matter should be pursued
internally in coordination with OMS.
All security criteria are geared to the counterintelligence
function of protective security. As society becomes more complex
and the influence of societal change more evident in the conduct
and attitude of the citizenry, it has become increasingly
apparent that security and suitability factors are becoming more
and more interrelated. There has never been a sharp delineation
between the two criteria and this is proper as evidenced in
inclusion of emotional and mental problems in DCID 1/14
adjudicative guidelines. Now, however, our counterintelligence
specialists who deal with espionage and other classic counter-
intelligence problems cite the direct relationship between such
problems and "suitability" issues involving personal behavior.
For example, a history of poor adjustment to employment or
educational environments, difficulties in interpersonal relation-
ships, a penchant for risk-taking, reluctance to accept
discipline, among many other forms of psychological dysfunction,
should all be regarded as indicators of possible trouble to
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come. In effect, security has become inexorably married to
psychiatry.
Within the Intelligence Community, the DCI Security
Committee has made an effort to reach accommodation between
security clearance standards and internal/external social
pressures through a series of adjudicator conferences. The
effort has suffered because of the absence of expertise and
knowledge of security personnel when dealing with psychological
dimensions of suitability problems. Adjudicators cannot be
expected to know and understand the language of psychology, much
less detect and evaluate the subtle shadings of background
meaningful to a psychologist or psychiatrist. The need for
continued dialogue in this area is apparent. It is unrealistic
to expect security personnel to qualify as experts in detection
of counterintelligence-related behavior and psychological
indicators, but we must become more familiar with significant if
basic dimensions of suitability problems. The answer lies in two
directions, increased reliance on OMS and a serious effort to
open up those avenues of education that will permit exploitation
of a related discipline.
In summary, the Office is completely aware of the dramatic
changes in societal values over the past 30 odd years and, of
necessity, has reacted to them through change in significant
areas such as cohabitation and experimentation with drugs. We do
not believe present security criteria are oppressive and
counterproductive in terms of tunnel vision, institutional
intransigence, empirical conviction or failure to implement
reasonable revision of security standards. We are concerned
about the possibility that the quality and performance of the
Agency populace may be deteriorating because of the necessity of
disqualifying many promising prospects who fail to meet security
standards; however, we are not convinced on the basis of our own
recruitment efforts that qualified applicants necessarily are
inferior to those who live in the fast lane with respect to
drugs, a self-serving concept of integrity and other behavior
found in those "with it." Admittedly, it is harder today to find
the people who meet our standards, but it can be done. Our
concern also extends to the possible implications of already
relaxed standards raised by a heavy incidence of terminations for
security reasons. Are we already too lenient and have we
sacrificed the long-term benefit of good character for short-term
expediency? This question should be studied in depth. At the
same time, the Office should initiate or be involved in a
thorough review of the feasibility of exploiting psychological
and psychiatric analysis in screening applicants in terms of
counterintelligence-related factors with which our adjudicators
cannot cope because of lack of expertise and a less than optimum
working relationship with OMS.
In conclusion, we see a fundamental conflict between today's
values and lifestyles that may be incompatible with the high
personnel security standards requisite to operation of an intel-
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ligence agency which may be irreconcilable. Within the framework
of contemporary mores, there can be only so much compromise. An
Agency employee must be trustworthy in that he or she must be
loyal, with a depth of loyalty that extends beyond payment for
services rendered; responsible to the degree it is appreciated
illegality and dishonesty cannot be tolerated; disciplined from
within to avoid excesses and thoughtless self-indulgence; and
stable enough to handle transient disappointments, frustrations
and the pressures of a unique work environment and demanding
assignments. We cannot:
? Accept the explicit lawlessness represented by
the purchase and use of drugs beyond the
experimental stage.
? Place "experimentation" with hard drugs
(including cocaine) in the same category as
former use of marijuana.
? Tolerate disregard for honesty in personal and
professional affairs.
Dismiss emotional problems or indicators of
such problems as not related to security
screening. Indicators of a potentially serious
problem developed during security screening or
reinvestigation must be made known to OMS and
referred to the Applicant Review Panel or
Personnel Evaluation Board.
? Maintain an adequate security posture through
selection and retention of trustworthy and
stable individuals.
? Exploit the assistance available from
specialists in psychology and psychiatry by
training of our adjudicators to the extent
possible in the disciplines and utilization of
the expertise to be found in OMS and the
medical community.
Continue monitoring of societal change in terms
of acceptable revision of security criteria.
? Reject a concept that security criteria must be
an absolute mirror of contemporary values and
practices. There are constants in determina-
tions of loyalty and trustworthiness and they
must not be violated to accommodate permissive-
ness incompatible with the basics of overall
suitability for Agency employment.
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Not lose sight of the importance of our role
and mission as it depends on the honesty and
reliability of our employees. This translates
to high security standards, some of which
conflict with today's ethics.
? Given the last point, accept the fact that
recruitment and the related screening process
has become more difficult. We must screen more
people to find those who meet our standards, be
they security criteria or professional
credentials.
? Direct our energies and resources to finding
and keeping the people we need. This will
involve many considerations including incentive
to sign on, the efficacy of the present
recruiting system, dedicating the resources to
gain a substantial decrease in applicant pro-
cessing time, and a comprehensive study of the
present policies on training, promotion and
other recognition as these factors bear on
retention.
To capsulize the Office of Security position, we see no need
for drastic modification of security standards and policies.
Security criteria has evolved just as societal mores have
evolved. The process will continue, but only to the limit of
tolerance that can ensure a sound security program. We cannot
condone demonstrated illegality and dishonesty and we maintain
there is little room for more concessions except at the risk of
secure operation. We regard the factors that figure in security
adjudications as essential to counterintelligence both in the
near and long-term; our immediate concern is to gain a sophisti-
cation extending beyond expertise in pure security issues to the
related psychological and psychiatric aspects of character and
behavior. The Office'submits that its own experience in
recruiting professionals negates any perception that security
criteria deny the Agency the services of the best and the
brightest. We do not live in a homogeneous society and it is
fallacious to believe that all promising young people accept the
drug culture and other unacceptable facets of today's scene.
Admittedly, it is harder to find and hire people who meet our
professional standards and security criteria, but difficulty
should not govern selection. We strongly oppose any quick fix
that would diminish the Agency's security posture and lead to a
succession of future problems. In our opinion, the nature of the
Agency's mission demands that security be optimum and precludes
lowering of personnel security standards which above all else
contribute to a secure operation or the lack of it. The answer
to immediate problems associated with staffing lies in elimina-
tion of the factors that represent negatives in the recruitment
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and retention of the type of people essential to effective and
secure discharge of the Agency's mission.
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POLYGRAPH EXPANSION
As we understand the tasking, initiatives are to be proposed
that will permit an immediate capability to reduce or eliminate
backlog of polygraphs, particularly in applicant screening,
industrial cases and reinvestigations. Before dealing with
supplements to existing corrective measures, a review of
accomplishments resulting from ongoing Office initiatives is
in order to permit evaluation of their effectiveness. Among
accomplishments:
? The CIA Polygraph School has graduated its
first class of four. These individuals are at
least three months ahead in their contribution to
the Polygraph Division's mission than they would
be if trained in a commercial school. The CIA
Polygraph School, certified by the American Poly-
graph Association, must be considered a success
beyond the most optimistic estimate of potential
during planning and development.
? The waiting period for applicant cases has
been reduced to slightly over 30 days. This
effectively eliminates the polygraph as a major
roadblock to timely processing of applicants.
? Reinvestigation polygraphs this fiscal year
are being conducted at a rate of five times our
production for last year.
? Probationary polygraphs are up 40 percent.
? Operational polygraphs are up 20 percent.
? The above gains are all the more
significant in light of the fact production in
fiscal year 1982 was one of the highest in our
history.
The impact of ongoing initiatives is obvious, encouraging
and, in our opinion, a strong support for an argument that the
solution is at hand given a reasonable time to train and activate
additional polygraphers. Application of short-term heroic
measures would gain immediate results, but at a cost we do not
feel is acceptable. To illustrate this point, specific weak-
nesses associated with alternatives are presented below.
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Utilization of a Commercial Firm. This is not considered a
desirable option in any form. Commercial polygraphers are not
trained in the CIA methodology and their use would require either
the time and expense attendant to retraining or turning them
loose to explore areas they are not equipped to handle. In
either instance, their value would be limited. We consider it
entirely inappropriate to expose our employees and contractors to
the scrutiny of commercial polygraphers in the Reinvestigation
Polygraph Program. Employees and industrial candidates are
people who have had access to very sensitive information. The
issues that examiners must probe in resolving reactions, particu-
larly when dealing with unauthorized disclosure and mishandling
of classsified information, involve highly sensitive areas; they
(the examiners) require compartmented approvals. Good security
practice demands that exposure to our most critical intelligence
data remain in-house.
Quality control, directly related to the validity of
polygraph examinations, will suffer beyond the point of
tolerance; commercial polygraphers are geared to production and
minimal operating costs. The pressures of this approach preclude
the extreme patience our examiners must display to pursue and
obtain complete and accurate information. The commercial poly-
grapher is given to quick judgments and early dismissal of
subjects based on reactions. From the professional standpoint,
this is incompatible with the validity of broad screening tests.
Representational aspects would not be served by use of
commercial polygraphers. The polygraph is highly intrusive, and
for this and other reasons inherently a controversial activity.
The Agency has respected this in years of circumspect screening
of Agency applicants and employees, and has gained a relationship
with its contractors reflective of a long-standing, carefully
nurtured and understanding position. All of this would be
jeopardized by use of polygraphers hired as transitory help and
completely disinterested in the long-term consequences of heavy-
handed questioning or other unpleasantness avoided by our staff
polygraphers.
Commercial examiners are not schooled in counterintelligence
issues. This alone is regarded as an absolute negative in
measurement of their use as an expedient.
Independent Contractors. We have explored the use of
individuals who could serve in the short-term as Independent
Contractors and the experiment produced mixed results. One
Agency annuitant agreed to participate, but only for so short a
time that his contribution had no appreciable impact on the work-
load. There are not enough Agency annuitants with state of the
art expertise and knowledge of current techniques (to say nothing
of willingness to participate) to reduce existing backlogs to any
significant degree. Essentially, use of Agency annuitants is not
a viable option.
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We are, with some misgivings, about to experiment with two
annuitants from other agencies. Our misgivings concern the need
to train the prospects in Agency methodology and the fact that
training and supervision are contrary to the concept of
"independence" as defined in the legal sense. Quality control
might present a problem, as might motivation and the afore-
mentioned representational aspects. As with Agency annuitants,
retirees of other agencies who are qualified and able to serve as
polygraphers are in short supply. The Office is open-minded at
this stage of the experiment and will pursue it if the two
prospects perform well.
Joint Efforts With Other Government A encies. The few
Federal agencies with a polygraph program have fully committed
their resources and, with the signing of the new directive
addressing containment of leaks, will almost certainly be forced
to cope with an increased workload. Even if other agencies could
divert resources, we would face the problems concerned with
incompatible training, quality and lack of control of an element
of our polygraph program. Other agencies would have the same
problems in any joint effort and, even if we could support other
agencies with already strained resources, it is probable they
would be less than enthusiastic over the prospect. Joint effort
as a concept is not practical.
Past experience has lead to rejection of other options that
have been proven impractical. They are:
? Overtime. Polygraph as a discipline
features pressure, stress, and mental and physical
fatigue. Any use of overtime on other than a very
limited basis is a negative in terms of test
validity.
? TDY assignment of former polygraphers.
Polygraph examiners are volunteers who serve at
least a four-year tour. Without constant practice
of polygraphy, former examiners do not maintain
the level of required expertise. Temporary
reassignment of Polygraph Division alumni would be
contrary to the understanding between office and
employee governing assignment as a polygraph
examiner and, in the first instance, would be
unproductive. Beyond the fact it would take time
to bring former examiners up to speed, they cannot
be removed from primary duties to the detriment of
core functions.
? Creation of a reserve polygraph corps.
Years ago (circa 1960), the Office trained
professionals to serve as a backup to dedicated
polygraph examiners. They received initial
training and periodic refresher training, and
supplemented the full-time polygraphers on
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occasion, usually by running apparently "routine"
cases. The idea was dropped when it became
apparent part-time polygraphers had to be prepared
to cope with difficult/involved cases (there is no
guarantee any examination will be "routine"). The
required level of expertise could not be reached
with a part-time commitment. In the future, the
capability offered by in-house training may permit
consideration of some modified version of the old
program, but now is not the time. We cannot tie
up resources of the Polygraph Division on a
questionable experiment when faced with the
present workload.
In summary and conclusion, the Office believes that
production in this fiscal year has diminished backlog con-
siderably and justifies optimism of continued progress. Ongoing
initiatives which figured directly in growth of production are
believed to have been proven as a long-term solution. None of
the options mentioned as candidates for short-term relief hold
the prospect of success and some, particularly contracting out to
commercial firms, are unacceptable in terms of utility or
feasibility. It is our conclusion that the answer is in hand.
Allow a reasonable time for the development of additional poly-
graphers trained in our methodology and motivated to meet our
standards, and we are confident that the challenge will be met
and quality will remain high. It is our conclusion that expedi-
ency must not dictate acceptance of dangerous or unrealistic
emergency measures. It is our recommendation that we be per-
mitted to stay on the course of internal improvement represented
by the success of the current program, i.e., graduated additives
to Polygraph Division's resources. The key to expansion that
will permit full and timely service is the rate of expansion
permitted by the budget process.
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REVITALIZE AND EXPAND THE EMPLOYEE SECURITY AWARENESS PROGRAM
The tasking acknowledges that a security program exists but
does not note that the program represents comparatively recent
formalization and significant enhancement of activity in the
security awareness field. In effect, we have been asked to
comment on an ongoing program in terms of additional emphasis
and improvement. Revitalization is not appropriate to the paper;
the current program is vigorous, effective and a successful
initiative within the limits of staff, plans and equipment.
The Security Education Group (SEG) is charged with the
operation of the Agency's security awareness program for
employees. The staff includes five professional security
officers, three of whom (non-supervisory personnel) bring a level
of limited experience to the job consistent with the youth of a
preponderance of Office professionals; i.e., they are conversant
with the full-range of Office of Security functions but generally
lack the hands-on experience in the several security disciplines.
The existing program could be improved by extensive
refurbishment of the facilities now used for briefings and by
acquisition of additional training facilities. The storage
facility in Room GA-13 should be vaulted to permit less time
devoted to security housekeeping and for solid security reasons
involving the safeguarding of classified media used in
briefings. Both rooms need attention to heating and air
conditioning equipment and extensive internal improvement in
equipment and decor to facilitate media assisted briefings and
generally provide an atmosphere conducive to learning and
representational of the seriousness of subject matter. The
Office has reprogrammed $40,000 to refurbish GA-13 in FY 1983;
this will satisfy the most immediate and pressing need.
The present security awareness program features two primary
elements, the 1 1/2 day EOD briefing and the "reawareness" sessions
of one to two hours tailored to the needs of the various Agency
components. The last mentioned sessions represent an innovation
that reflects commitment to periodic reminders of security
responsibility. They have proved valuable in that employees who
have been on board for some time are given the opportunity to
raise questions on security standards and practices of particular
interest to them as individuals or as members of a group with
unique problems. There is a good deal of give and take in these
sessions because they deal with people who have been on the job
and have their own ideas on the merit and efficacy of security
procedures. This is in contrast to EOD briefings where attendees
generally are new to the Agency and to Government and are not in
a position to do more than sit and listen. Obviously, both the
EOD and "reawareness" briefings are valuable and, in fact,
indispensible to understanding of what is expected of the
employee in order to comply with security regulations. Any
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expansion or improvement of the security awareness program would
focus on improving the quality of both types of briefings.
Any serious effort to improve the security awareness program
would involve:
? Development of a reindoctrination format to
permit more frequent briefings on security
obligations and responsibilities.
? Funding to create new audiovisual programs.
? The aforementioned refurbishment of existing
plans, plus the acquisition of another briefing
room properly equipped and furnished.
The above listing represents resource enhancement which
would permit a quantitative but not necessarily a qualitative
gain in the program. The briefings would benefit from inclusion
of actual case examples of recent and significant physical
security violations, careless or negligent handling of classified
information, leaks and their consequences, and hostile penetra-
tion attempts. These case studies could be prepared by the
Office of Security component(s) involved in a given case and
sanitized and depersonalized in the manner appropriate. There
are many dramatic lessons to be learned from our experience in
dealing with and measuring the consequences of breaches of
security and hostile operations; these lessons are more
meaningful when presented as immediate examples of the impact of
poor security practices.
Another approach of potential value, particularly in EOD
briefings, is the filming of especially well-done presenta-
tions. The advantage of this technique lies in assurance that
a comprehensive and smooth informational talk is available to
supplement in-person briefings. Films cannot replace live
briefers; they cannot answer questions or address any concern of
the viewer that strays from a script. Films are, however, a
change of pace that breaks whatever monotony is associated with a
steady stream of speakers.
Films also are used as a briefing device in the form of
dramatization of security hazards associated with loose talk,
cultivation and exploitation by the opposition, the damage caused
by leaks, etc. The problem with this approach is audience
reaction if a production is poorly directed, played by obvious
amateurs, and simplistic in presentation of complex issues. The
medium generally is not effective in providing specific guidance
that reflects regulatory obligations and responsibilities; it is
most effective in presenting a broad picture of generalized
security concerns and, in this regard, is as much entertainment
as indoctrination. There is some benefit if the film is well
written, directed and acted and does not insult one's intelli-
gence in making a point. It must also be current; viewers do not
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relate to object lessons obviously prepared for an earlier time
and audience. At present, the Office of Security has no up-to-
date dramatization available that was sponsored in-house. We do
not contemplate preparing a film in the near future because of
budgetary considerations. This, however, does not preclude
planning for .a. quality production if and when funds are avail-
able.
SEG plans to expand the use of audiovisual aids other than
films to supplement briefings by staff members. Slides and
graphic illustrations are proven educational tools and figure as
a major item in raising the level of attention to and retention
of subject matter presented in live briefings.
There is no guarantee that well equipped SEG staff can
insure responsible adherence to security regulations. To the
contrary, raising security education to a group speciality and
introducing a matrix of penalties set forth in HR 10-11*,
Compliance with Security Regulations, has not been completely
effective in eliminating a frustrating and nagging problem
bearing on improper handling and storage of classified
information. Despite these measures and unannounced briefcase/
package inspections, Agency employees persist in taking classi-
fied information out of the building and working on it at home.
The violators are not malicious people who wish harm to the
Agency and their transgressions in one sense are indicative of
dedication. Their enthusiasm is misplaced, however, when weighed
against flagrant disregard of security regulations and the risk
of compromise.
Another approach to security awareness illustrates the line
responsibility inherent in achieving compliance with all security
regulations by the Agency populace. The Office of Development
and Engineering (OD&E) recently published a comprehensive
security indoctrination manual which covers both Agency and SCI
policies. The manual will be used by OD&E security officers to
conduct an annual security indoctrination of all OD&E
employees. This initiative could serve as a model for all Agency
components and as a most valuable adjunct to SEG activities.
OD&E has a large complement of security officers to assist in
security control of national programs and this undoubtedly
contributed to the initiative. We do not advocate an increased
Office of Security presence in all components but note in-place
security officers have a direct bearing on good security
management practices. For our part, we welcome security-oriented
innovation as appropriate to a high level of security
consciousness. Security is a command function that looks toward
observance of security policy and practice established by the
Office. The concept of component participation is entirely in
line with an effort to upgrade security awareness.
The tasking specifies that publicizing security violations
should be examined as a device to enhance security awareness.
The Office of Security recognizes possible benefit from an
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approach that might bring and keep security awareness to the
forefront of employees' consciousness. We are reluctant,
however, to endorse the concept without full understanding of
scope and intent. This concern involves protection of polygraph-
derived information, the feasability of publishing a completely
depersonalized report, and misgivings regarding the integrity of
security information which by regulation receives extraordinary
protection and extremely limited dissemination. We would prefer
and recommend a method other than a "newsletter" approach to
bring the message home before a serious effort to implement the
concept.
In summary, the Office believes that the SEG function can be
enhanced by providing additional material resources, upgrading
audiovisual presentations, and in general improving the SEG
product in terms of currency and relevance. As an adjunct to SEG
activities, we recommend the approach reflected in the cited OD&E
publication. At this time, the Office does not favor publicizing
security violations as a phase of the overall security awareness
program.
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In today's climate, the terrorist threat as it applies to
Headquarters and other open Agency facilities should have
diminished upon the demise or limited activity of the weathermen
and other underground groups. The threat, in fact, remains as a
serious potential hazard. The organized terrorists have been
supplemented by deranged or disturbed people who have embraced a
variety of causes and are willing to take extreme risks for the
sake of publicity, an unreasonable commitment to a movement, or
the several other motivating factors that figure in irrational
acts. In addition, organized terrorism is still a threat; while
attacks against the establishment by radical activists and
attempts to disrupt Government by extremists and their supporters
are less frequent, there has been no decrease in the number of
political fanatics concerned with foreign issues who are capable
of seeking redress or publicity through violence. The following
represent obvious threats:
? A demonstration organized without intent
of violence that, through the efforts of
provocateurs, degenerates into a riot and/or
attack on Agency facilities. Unless infiltration
by a hostile element is sufficient to displace the
organizers, this type of occurrence should be
contained by local or Federal police quickly and
without extensive harm to person or property.
? A bombing attack. Such an attack is
possible with only a moderate degree of technical
expertise and preparation. At Headquarters, with
the protection of badge machines, it is probable
that a bomb would be placed somewhere in the
compound, set to give the perpetrators time to get
away, and exploded in an area where casualties and
damage would be minimal. This type of attack is
the most likely because it involves little
immediate danger to those involved, and still
would serve to gain a great deal of publicity.
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- A bombing attack on an outlying building
could have more serious consequences. Without
the protection of badge machines, entry with a
forged badge would not be difficult and a
sizable bomb could be placed for delayed
detonation. A bomb could also be introduced
into an outlying facility for use in hostage
and/or takeover situations.
? Assassination. An assassination attempt
can involve either a target of opportunity or a
determined and planned effort to kill one or more
well-known figures either held personally
responsible for perceived wrongs or selected as
symbols of an objectionable system or practice.
An assassination can be attempted anywhere and,
therefore, protective measures cannot be confined
to Agency facilities. They may be the result of
impulse usually involving the deranged, or could
be carefully planned and organized, calculated
attacks. In either instance, warning is unlikely
and prearranged countermeasures an absolute
essential.
? Armed attack. Attack by a group of trained
terrorists could be mounted for a number of
reasons, including the theft of classified
information, the taking of hostages, a staged
takeover that would be assured of immediate and
extensive media coverage, or a suicide mission by
fanatics determined to publicize a cause. What-
ever the motive, the present system of guards,
entrance control and backup capability is not
geared to stop a well organized terrorist attack
either in the training given or physical security
safeguards.
? Surreptitious forced entry. It would
not be difficult for one or more professional
terrorists to gain entry into Headquarters
buildings. Entry into the outlying buildings
would be even less difficult. Once inside a
facility vaults and safes would slow but not stop
forced entry; safekeeping devices cannot be made
invulnerable and can only delay knowledgeable
efforts to defeat them.
Our protective security no longer is consistent with the
environment in which we live and work. It is conditioned by a
complacency deemed inappropriate to the mission of an intelli-
gence agency and a perception that the impact of tight physical
security would be negative and self-defeating in terms of produc-
tion, extensive liaison, required maintenance and the purpose of
visits. We aim for adequate and not absolute security. It is
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possible to secure our facilities and grounds by duplicating
prison-like security arrangements featuring such safeguards as
unscalable walls, barred windows, heavily armed guards, impas-
sable internal gates and doors, sealed areas and all of the other
devices appropriate to containment of a criminal population.
Such extreme measures are not, of course, either feasible or
necessary, any more than overseas embassies built like castle
keeps are acceptable. Another negative factor is prohibitive
cost in dollars; in this area monetary cost must be balanced
against the loss that would be experienced as the result of a
serious incident.
The Office of Security has established procedures to follow
when a terrorist threat or attack is reported. These procedures,
attached, illustrate the limited resources and protective
measures available even in a "red alert" when the reserve of
available manpower is tapped. Essentially, the Agency must
depend on the FBI and local police to protect against a terrorist
attack. Existing safeguards can be enhanced with moderate
expense. Such enhancement would not gain self-sufficiency, but
would go a long way toward adequacy. Areas that must be improved
include:
Better screening of visitors through a
Headquarters Visitor Control Center. This is a
key need.
Improvement of building security through
placement of badge machines in outlying buildings.
? Enhance Headquarters security at the
perimeter through improved fencing, gates, and
lighting.
Development of a more secure badge.
With or without enhancement, there are built in weaknesses
and some significant strengths in existing physical security
countermeasures. On the positive side:
Officers assigned to protective security of
high Agency officials are armed, qualified in the
use of weapons, and trained in techniques utilized
by the Secret Service.
? It is probable that screening of visitors
would detect an unstable individual. The chance
of detection would be greatly enhanced by
screening at the perimeter.
? The presence of Federal Protective Officers
affords the power to arrest.
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? With warning of trouble, we may call local
police for assistance on short notice.
The Federal Protective Service can provide
an impressive display of manpower and adequate
protection in the event of demonstrations, unless
they are spontaneous or unannounced.
? The Office of Security can arm and deploy
personnel to supplement the Federal Protective
Officer complement.
Existing safeguards discourage trespass.
They look more effective than they are.
On the negative side:
? The absence of badge machines in outlying
buildings increases the risk of unauthorized
entry.
Access to the compound, with or without a
badge, cannot be controlled in a manner consistent
with optimum security. This problem, created by a
need to handle a large traffic flow at peak hours,
will be more pronounced after completion of the
new building.
? Existing security precautions are most
effective with warning. All such precautions are,
to some degree, dependent on a lack of surprise.
? We have neither the people nor the
firepower to repel a well organized and planned
terrorist attack, undertaken with modern weaponry.
? Excluding those certified for protective
assignments, our Headquarters personnel are not
trained to prevent or protect against planned
attack.
? As already stated, physical security
safeguards were not established to properly deter
an armed attack. It is not believed possible to
set up an adequate defense without adopting a
fortress mentality inconsistent with the manner in
which the Agency now does business.
The existing physical security safeguards accomplish what
they were intended to do; ensure that routine entrance and egress
concern or are related to official business. They were, quite
frankly, conceived in a benevolent environment with provision for
emergencies that could be handled with our own resources or, in
exigent circumstances, by law enforcement agencies. The approach
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was dictated by the decision to go public with the location of
Headquarters and outlying buildings and the resultant need to
accommodate operation in a fishbowl. These measures have worked,
but only to the degree they have not been tested. Gaining
absolute security is impossible as a concept and, more to the
point in this exercise, would be both cost prohibitive and an
unacceptable bottleneck to the pursuit of the Agency's
business. Some improvements are needed and they have been
identified. Measurement of whether or not cited improvements
will suffice in the face of a threat requires analysis of the
threat. These factors apply:
The Agency has survived to date without
suffering a serious domestic attack by terrorists,
excluding the bombing of the Office of Security's
New York Field Office. The latter incident may
not have been aimed at the Agency; instead the
target might have been the Department of
Defense. In any case, the bombing illustrates
vulnerability when well organized terrorists
choose a target.
? The security of Headquarters and outlying
buildings in the Washington, D. C., area include
protective measures that cannot be used in a cover
situation such as existed in New York. Fences,
perimeter guards, and controlled entrance into the
buildings or that portion of them occupied by
Agency personnel represent a level of security
well above that afforded other Government facili-
ties, the National Security Agency and military
establishments excepted. Improvements or expan-
sion of fencing, visitor control, and use of badge
machines will raise the level of physical security
without significant impact on the Agency's day-to-
day operations.
Our liaison with the FBI and Secret Service
has been effective in alerting us to danger
represented by group or individual activity. With
warning, security protection can be enhanced to a
level of counterforce adequate to deal with
unfriendly demonstrations and/or armed attack.
? So long as we have outlying buildings,
defense of the people and material therein will be
difficult. Perimeter security at these buildings
necessarily cannot be as visible and effective as
at Headquarters. The visibility of control
measures in itself is a deterrent.
A factor in planning an attack is the
probability of getting out as well as getting
in. Entrance to any of our open facilities would
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be comparatively easy and, as stated, we could not
stop a surprise armed attack if outmanned and
outgunned. However, once the element of surprise
is gone, attackers would have difficulty in
escaping and could not hope to resist a siege.
This narrows the type of armed attack that might
be attempted. Only groups or individuals who are
willing to accept the consequences of their
actions would accept the risk.
? We do enjoy a home country advantage in
that we do not have to depend on politically
oriented response or the lack of it from the
security forces of host nations.
? Risk must be accepted when Headquarters
building is an area tourist attraction, so long as
our outlying buildings must limit protective
security measures, and when most of our employees
are open and, therefore, a potential target for
any person or organization bound to register a
protest against the Agency and its activities.
? The record so far is encouraging in any
estimate of the probability of terrorist attack.
The fact that local buildings have not been hit is
not, of course, a guarantee they are immune from
attack. Whether our good fortune is related to
the Agency mystique or if terrorists have decided
other targets suit their purpose, the fact remains
that the Agency has been spared. Even without a
guarantee history cannot provide, this is a factor
in an estimate of adequate enhancement. In our
judgment, identified improvements and additions
represent a reasonable approach that recognizes we
cannot button up to a point approaching
invulnerability.
In summary, the threat of terrorist attack to Headquarters
and outlying buildings exists as a distinct possibility. The
most likely danger involves demented or disturbed individuals;
present security measures should negate this threat. We are
vulnerable to an organized terrorist attack, but the cost of
installing elaborate barriers would be prohibitive and inappro-
priate to the manner in which the Agency has chosen to operate.
Organizing and equipping a "SWAT" team to defend or reclaim a
building would not be productive. Such a team could not respond
in time to defeat a well organized attack mounted with split-
second timing. After forced entry, local police would be at the
scene and would operate with a professionalism expected of
specialists. On an historical basis, existing safeguards have
served and, with identified improvements, should provide a
realistic and affordable level of protection. Outlying buildings
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represent a particular weakness and should be phased out as
quickly as possible after the new building is habitable. After
completion of the new building, the matter of protection against
terrorist attack should be revisited. Protection of one compound
permits concentration on enhanced security procedures that is not
possible with a system of diverse and decentralized quarters.
In conclusion, the threat is recognized as is the reality
that the good fortune generally enjoyed by domestic Agency
facilities does not preclude future violence. Plans are in
existence to deal with terrorist attacks which in the main
reflect dependence on Federal and local law enforcement agencies
to respond and act. Our current physical security precautions
leave room for improvement and those considered feasible and
appropriate have been cited. We take comfort without smug
satisfaction that in-place safeguards are considerably more
stringent than those found in almost all of Government, and that
these safeguards have done the job given a benign environment.
We eschew the fortress mentality and appreciate a degree of risk
must be accepted in an open society. To reduce the risk, we
recommend suggested enhancement be implemented and that other
reasonable safeguards be examined in future when a centralized
operation will permit greater control of the Headquarters
compound. Immediate action should be directed toward a visitor
control center, by far the paramount need. In the meantime, we
plan to maintain productive liaison with Federal and local police
agencies that must supplement our own limited resources and
authority.
Based on trends established in the late 1960's and continued
throughout the 1970's, terrorism can be expected to continue at
least at the same levels and perhaps even to increase throughout
the 1980's. Of more specific concern is the fact that terrorism
continues to target Americans and American installations as
symbols of U.S. "Imperialism." Until the mid 1970's, more than
half of all Americans killed by terrorists were killed only
because they were coincidentally at the location of an attack.
Since 1978, however, terrorists have tended specifically to
target Americans. This trend continued during the period 1980 -
1982 with 21 U.S. citizens dying as a result of international
terrorist incidents with 15 of these individuals being specifi-
cally targetted. A total of 385 terrorist incidents were
recorded as directed against American citizens or property in
1982 alone. 30 of these resulted in casualties. U.S. diplomats
were primary victims of terrorist incidents, accounting for
approximately 38 percent of the total, while U.S. military
personnel were the victims of approximately 18 percent of the
terrorist incidents aimed at Americans in 1982, Since almost All
tney obviously must be considered prime targets tor terrorism
even without taking into account the added dangers associated
with their Agency duties.
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Since the mid 1970's, the Office of Security has been
responsible for a comprehensive personnel protection program.
This program is designed to reduce the liklihood that a security
conscious individual will be the target of a terrorist incident
in the first place and to reduce his vulnerability in the event
he is targetted despite his security consciousness. The
objective of the program is to reduce the risks of attack by
providing individuals and command elements with knowledge of
countermeasures which can be used to detect, neutralize, or evade
terrorist/criminal attacks. The Office of Security's personnel
protection program consists of the following:
? Briefing and training programs for
employees and dependents who are about to be
transferred overseas.
? Surveys by personnel protection
specialists at overseas locations.
Up until FY 1983 funding for personnel protection equipment
and installations was obtained from area divisions. In FY 1983
over two million dollars was allocated in the OS budget for the
enhancement of our overseas personnel protection program. This
money is being used to upgrade emergency communications equip-
ment; to install alarm systems, locking devices, security
grillwork, etc., in residences; and for vehicle and body armor.
Approximately $500,000 of these funds is being used for safety
equipment both in residences and offices. In following years, it
is anticipated that at least $100,000 will be funded to enable us
to maintain our basic personnel protection capability. This
continued funding is required since facilities and residences are
constantly changing and security equipment requirements arise
after each change. In cases such as vehicle armoring, the
equipment is perishable and must be replaced periodically.
Funding must continue at a level adequate to enable us to
keep our personnel protection profile up-to-date. This funding
must include both office equipment and residential equipment.
Typical items funded under this program would be emergency
destruction equipment, vault doors and escape hatches, emergency
power upgrades, grilles and locking equipment for residences,
residential alarms, and vehicle and body armor. (Emergency
communications equipment must also be continually upgraded but
responsibility for this requirement should most logically be
handled by the Office of Communications). The training of our
personnel in personnel protection, residential security,
defensive driving and emergency destruction needs to be
continued. Staffing of OSSB must take into account the need to
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meet these trainin requirements. As an alternative, the
security staff could be expanded to include an officer who 25X1
would be responsible for handling these requirements.
In addition to the aforementioned equipment and training
needs, there is a further need for the Office of Security to be
in a position to provide timely responses to emergency
situations. Our current staffing is geared to maintenance of a
once every two years survey schedule. Personnel protection is
one of the elements covered during these surveys. However, each
emergency or priority personnel protection requirement impacts
negatively on the maintenance of even this minimum schedule. The
most effective way to provide an adequate response capability
would be through the positioning of additional Agency security
professionals at various locations overseas. For example, the
Regional Staffs in Europe, East Asia and Africa should be
expanded by at least one individual and Regional Staffs should
be established for Latin America and the Middle East.
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