PRODUCTION OF MILITARY ESTIMATES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85G00105R000100060009-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 12, 2001
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: October 7, 1970
• Content Type: MF

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DIA~ Declassification/Release Instructions on File
7 October 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for-Intelligence
SUBJECT Production of Military Estimates
REFERENCE The Director's memorandum, same
subject, dated 4 May 1970
1. We have had five months' experience in the
production of military estimates under the concept
laid out in the Director's 4 May memorandum. NIE 11-8
is before the USIB representatives, NIE 11-3-is
coming to the Board of National Estimates for its
consideration shortly, and NIE 11-.14 is in the early
drafting stage.
2. We now know enough to know that the present
arrangements are unsatisfactory. In this memorandum,
I propose to set forth the situation as I see it and
to suggest a course of action to achieve the "satis-
factory modus operandi" called for by the Director.
3. Let's begin by reviewing paragraph 4 of the
Director's memorandum:
"4. The paper I envisage represents a sharp
break from the format of the past. The basic
section would be more specific in detail, more
technical in its discussion, and more involved
in sorting and evaluating the evidence. I feel
it essential, therefore, to assign the preparation
and staffing of this part of the estimate to
those offices in the Agency which have the daily
responsibility for analyzing developments in
these fields: namely, OSR in the DDI and OSI
and FMSAC in the DDS&T. I would expect the
Board and Staff of ONE to retain its present
responsibility for the two most estimative parts
of the NIE: the drawing together of major judg-
ments and conclusions and the brief statement of
evidence and analyses. Responsibility would also
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remain with the Board, and specifically with
the Board member you designate to chair the
estimate, for producing a.'final Agency draft
and seeing it through USIB coordination."
The Present Situation
4. Given this procedure, there are three mech-
anisms now operating directly to produce military
estimates. The first is the DDI-DDS&T team, with
a team chief designated jointly by the DDI and the
DDS&T. The second is the Estimate Chairman and the
Board of National Estimates. The third is (at least
so far as the Soviet military estimates now in work
are concerned) the SMT Staff.
5. The DDI-DDS&T Team.- In each case, a senior
person has been named team chief for a particular
estimate and given full responsibility for preparation
of the basic draft. Each team chief has in-turn been
able to call upon the resources of his office and
-the other two in. the OSR-OSI-FMSAC triumvirate for
contributions and help. Working arrangements so far
have varied considerably between the three team chiefs--
25X1A9A -her-a>cze of their
different working styles, different positions, and
the different problems of the various estimates.
25X1A9A 6. When II returned from in May, 25X1A6A
he was-given one duty--to produce 11-8--and none
other. About the end of June, he was given the full-
time assistance of an experienced analyst from the
Strategic Attack Branch of OSR.
7. The situation has been somewhat different
in the preparation of 11-3, and I think our early
troubles with the Board and the Staff on 11-3 are
to some degree the result of this. 25X1A9A
25X1A6A returned from 0 to assume the team chief role
for 11-3. He was not relieved of his duties as a
division chief but instead tried both to run his
division and to prepare the estimate. There may
have been exceflent organizational reasons for this,
but the needs of 11-3 were bound to suffer. -
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25X1A9A 8. On 29 July, was freed of his
duties as chief of the Land War,are Branch in OSR to
concentrate on the preparation of 11-14. It was not
possible immediately to extricate him from his involve-
ment in NSSM-84 and this has affected work on 11-14
to a degree. (I think we are about through with
NSSM-84, at least so far as Ben is concerned.)
9. The Estimate Chairman and the Board. The
Director's memorandum notes that response ility remains
with the Board, and specifically with the Board member
designated to chair the estimate, to produce a final.
Agency draft and see it through USIB coordination.
What this means in terms of relations with the DDI-
DDS&T team chief has varied greatly from chairman to
25X1A9A chairman. has worked closely and, I think,
25X1A9Aeffectively with J, _with little Staff involve-
ment or interference. This reflects confi- 25X1A9A
I
Bence in his own knowled e of the subject and his own
25X1A9A ideas, as well as II understanding and skill
in writing estimates and dealing with chairmen.
10. I am not as familiar with relations between
25XlA9AFon 11-3 but I get the
25X1A9A impression triatl kPd to the Staff to he 25X1A9A
more of an intermediary in the than 25X1A9A
has. It is too soon to say how will
operate once 11-14 shifts into high gear.
11-. The Staff. The only mention made of the
Staff in the Director's memorandum comes in the
sentence: "I would expect the Board and the Staff
of ONE to retain its present responsibility for the
two most estimative parts of the NIE: the drawing
together of major judgments and conclusions and the
brief statement of evidence and analyses." The
position of the Staff under the new procedure clearly
is difficult and troublesome, for everyone involved.
12. There are two facts at work that have con-
spired to limit the usefulness and effectiveness of
the Staff. In -the first place, there is today
a volume of incoming material relevant to Soviet
(and Chinese) military matters that no staff of half
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a dozen can possibly stay-on top of it. With 150
or so professionals, OSR can hardly manage this--
and, for the SMT Staff, there's the military subject
matter of OSI and FMSAC to boot. As a result, the
SMT staff does almost no original or creative work
with the evidence and must depend on the work of
others. The Director took note of the effect of
this when he said: "I feel it essential to assign
the preparation and staffing of this part of the
estimate to those offices in the Agency which have
the daily responsibility for analyzing developments
in'these fields: namely, OSR in the DDI and OSI
and FMSAC in the DDS&T."
13. The second factor is less tangible but,
I think, even more relevant. It is a fact of life
that when the Nixon Administration took office,
bringing with it a different outlook, a skepticism
toward the intelligence estimates of the past, and
a new way of using intelligence in the policy-making
machinery, OSR was a year and a half old. As the
first NSSMS rolled in, calling for intelligence.
support on strategic military issues, it was this
Office L.11dL 1dlycly 1UL111511eU LOLLi1 tue lej~1F~~=l1Ldl~~-Uil
and the work. OSI and FMSAC were also drawn in,
particularly in the SALT matters. But significantly,
the SMT Staff was almost totally left out. Aside
from occasionally coordinating and commenting on
drafts prepared by OSR (or OSI or FMSAC), the SMT
Staff has not had to deal on a day-by-day basis
with the demands of the NSC staff and Dr. Kissinger.
14. As a result, the Staff (and, frankly, I
think the Board as well) lacks a feel for how this
Administration wants to have evidence presented and
judgments supported, and it lacks a sense of how
matters are perceived by the very people for whom
.the NIEs are intended.
he Memo to HoldersaofoNIEwe
went through to get
11-8-68 out testify to this problem.
15. In short, at this point I think the Staff
lacks both the competence and the awareness of what
needs to-be done to be an-effective and constructive
participant in the estimative process. The members
of the SMT Staff are very human people. The Director's
memorandum was a direct slap at them and they know it.
They have, in other words, little incentive to make a
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success of the new procedure or work out a satisfactory
modus operandi. (Let us note one other thing before
we pass on: with the new procedure for drafting
estimates and with the transfer of the NIPP to DIA,
the SMT Staff is not overly busy.)
16. As I have indicated above, the involvement
of the Staff in the new procedure has depended ar el 25X1A9A
25X1A9A on how the Estimate chairman wanted to use it. 1 :1 25X1A9A and seem to have looked to the Staff to play
a larger role than In the case of 11-8, the
Staff has done some raLti.ng in competition with the
DDI-DDS&T team and it has sometimes been necessary
to force a choice between the team's draft and the
Staff's. This has been, from our viewpoint, wasteful,
time-consuming, and unnecessary. On 11-3, the Staff
25X1A9A man 0 produced the extensive and detailed
25X1A9A comments on the team's first draft that were the
basis forl suggestion that that draft be
discarded and the DIA contribution be used in its
stead. We are not very far into 11-14 but we already
25X1A9A
have the extensive comments of the Staff man
on one Annex suggesting that the draft be.thrown out
because DIA almost certainly will not -like it.
DIA and the Military Estimates
17. I think it is appropriate at this point to
consider what is happening in DIA and how it relates
to the-production of military estimates. The new
procedure was a matter of some surprise and concern
to DIA. Whereas DIA could accept ONE drafting the
military estimates, drawing-upon--at least in theory--
the contributions of DIA as well as OSR, OSI, FMSAC,
and others, it was something else to have working
offices like OSR doing the drafting.
18. The change in procedure coincided with
's elevation to Brigadier General, his
assignmen o DIA, and General Bennett's reworking
of the DIA structure. As a result,
has recently been named the head of a new Estimates
group in DIA to take effect about 1 November.
General Bennett has said that his representative
to the Board's meetings on the initial drafts will
be And in a memorandum to the
Director on ugust 1970, General Bennett said:
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"May I suggest you consider assigning drafting respon-
sibilities to DIA for the next series of Military
estimates? It could facilitate their earlier prepara-
tion and more fully utilize the talents of our respective
staffs." (I don't know whether this memorandum has
been replied to; the best reply probably.-is no reply'.)
Discussion
19. The move to the new procedure is sound. OSR,
OSI, and FMSAC Jo have the requisite substantive ex-
pertness to produce superior estimates drafts and they
know the needs and interests of people on the NSC staff
and in the Pentagon. Furthermore, from their regular
involvement in preparing the_Director's NSC, Congressional,
and other briefings, they have an appreciation of his
views and concerns.
20. We need to do two things: one, to remove the
Staff from its present ambiguous,- essentially sterile
role in the production of military estimates; and two,
to create a military estimates staff that is organiza-
tionally as well as substantively responsive both to
L11E: LL1 0.11 LLS&T an-' to r. tho Ecar of Na iona Eci-irn 1 te
U .~ a
It's not that we don't need a Staff.y It's that we need
the right kind in the right place.
21. There is one other aspect that merits comment.
We have been extraordinarily successful so far in making
a cooperative arrangement work. As long as Carl Duckett
is DDS&T, this will probably be fine. But I suggest
that-for effective management over the longer term,
we need to give some attention to the principle of
unity of command. It is less important whether it
is the DDI or the DDS&T who is ultimately responsible
to the Director for making the new procedure work than
it is that one or the other be in charge.
22. Proposal. I suggest we do the following:
a. Reassigq the persons and the positions
of the SM'P Staff (and the individual or indivi-
duals in the FE Staff concerned with military
estimates)-to the Intelligence Directorate.
b. From these positions, create a small
Military Estimates Staff which is organizationally
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.a part of the Office of the DDI but which
administratively functions under the Director
of Strategic Research (in much the manner that
the D/OCI oversees the functioning of the
Operations Center for the DDI).
c. The persons from the SMT and VE Staffs
would be assigned to substantive analytical
positions in OSR (or in OSI or FMSAC or other
places they may prefer if opportunities exist).
d. The new Military Estimates Staff would
be headed by a senior and experienced officer
whose duties would include advising the DDI and
DDS&T on military estimative matters, meeting
the needs of the members-of the Board throughout
the year but particularly when military estimates
were in progress, overseeing the preparation of
drafts, and relating the capabilities of OSR,
OSI, and FMSAC to the military estimate's schedule.
e. The chief of the Military Estimates Staff
would be assisted during the off-season by one
or two full-time junior officers.-
f. When estimates were in progress, the
Military Estimates Staff would be augmented by
individuals drawn from OSR, OSI, and FMSAC on
a full-time basis. They would work under the
guidance of the chief of the Military Estimates
Staff for as long as required to produce the
estimates draft and see it through USIB. They
-would return to their substantive analytical
positions when no longer needed.
23. This proposal would do little to settle the
problem that the Board appears to have with the whole
concept set forth in the Director's 4 May memorandum.
Judging from the'reactions of the three Board members
who have been involved as chairmen under the new
procedure, their basic problem is that the estimate
drafts are coming to them in formats and lengths they
do not like, prepared by people who have other masters
(starting with the DDI and the DDS&T). This seems to
me to be inherent in the new procedure. With time,
the strangeness will wear off and the Board will see
that the procedure has strengths to offer a chairman.
I think this proposal would help to that end.
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24. Under this proposal, I think we could effec-
tively mobilize and organize the resources of the DDI
and the DDS&T to produce the Soviet and Chinese mili-
tary estimates. We would remove the problems caused
by the "fifth wheel" position of the present Staff.
We would take care of the work-no work cycle that has
affected the SMT staff in the pat. - __ The offices and
individuals with the daily responsibility for analyzing
developments in the military field would be preparing
the estimates drafts. And we would have an effective
operating system to fend off any further proposals by
DIA to take over drafting responsibilit.i.es.
BRUCE C. CLARKE, Jr.
Director
Strategic Research
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