SOVIET INTENTIONS AND WARNING OF SOVIET OR WARSAW PACT ATTACK ON NATO

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85G00105R000100190028-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 1, 2000
• Sequence Number: 28
• Publication Date: November 30, 1966
• Content Type: REPORT

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Bonn, - November 28-30, 1966
SECRET
SOVIET INTENTIONS AND WARMING OF SOVIET OR
WARSAW PACT ATTACK ON NATO
State Dept. declassification. & release instructions on file
General
1. It remains a basic objective of Soviet policy to
bring about the dissolution of the North Atlantic Alliance
and thereby the exclusion of the United States military
presence from Europe, and the Soviets will exploit any
opportunities to further these ends.
Possible Forms of Deliberate Attack in the NATO Area
2. An attack could take a number of forms:
a. A surprise nuclear attack on Western Europe and
North America resulting in general nuclear war.
b. A conventional attack against the Central Region
mainly with forces already in the forward area but without
prior mobilization.
c. A conventional attack against the Central Region
with mobilization to fill out reinforcements brought from
Western USSR.
d. A full-scale attack including the use of tactical
nuclear weapons but not necessarily preceded by a strategic
nuclear strike.
e. A local small-scale operation mounted by the
Soviet Union, or by a Warsaw Pact country acting with the
USSR's full knowledge and support which could, if necessary,
be disowned.
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Other Possible Situations of Outbreak of Hostilities
3. War could grow out'of miscalculation in circumstances
not foreseen or desired by either side. Berlin remains an
anomalous situation with potential for a crisis. The Soviets
have not been prepared to risk nuclear war over Berlin in the
past and it is difficult to foresee circumstances in which
they would consider the problem of West Berlin to be so im-
portant to them that they would deliberately take such a risk
in the future. Nonetheless, we regard a confrontation over
Berlin at some time as quite possible, and as the most likely case
in which miscalculation could lead to hostilities.
Political Background
4. Although the present Soviet leaders have not renounced the
ultimate aim of the extension of communism throughout the world,-
they accept that the existence of the nuclear deterrent places
strict limits on the extent and means by which they can attempt
to extend their power, and their recent actions have been
generally consistent with that policy. We believe that for the
foreseeable future they would avoid taking any action which
they would consider would put in jeopardy the internal achieve-
ments and plans of their regime. This consideration is of even
higher importance to the leaders of some of the other countries
within the Warsaw Pact.
5. In general, Soviet foreign policy over the past two years
has been cautious. This restraint has been most pronounced in
the actions of the Soviet Government in the European area, although
the Soviets have continued to maintain a preponderance of
their forces in Eastern Europe and the Western regions of the
Soviet Union. Their principal foreign policy initiatives have
been elsewhere, in the underdeveloped world, where the limits
to a more active policy are less circumscribed, and in their
attempt to restore unity within the world communist movement,
for the leadership of which they are engaged in a bitter conflict
with China. The Sino-Soviet rift is deep and unlikely to. be
resolved within the foreseeable future,
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6. Meanwhile, and despite the war in Vietnam, the Soviet
Government, and also the governments of their allies in the
Warsaw Pact, have continued to maintain contacts in many fields
with the West and'to maintain limited political dialogue with
NATO powers. Moreover, their economic plans involve to an
increasing extent commercial and technological exchanges with
the West. In addition, the Soviets have recently shown signs
of wishing to reach limited agreements. with the West in a number
of fields. Moreover, the Soviet leaders have not responded
to the urgings of the Chinese that they take actions. in Europe
which would cause the United States to be concerned for European
security and inhibit its buildup in Vietnam.
7. Although it would require considerable movement in
Soviet outlook and in the world situation to alter our present
.assessment, over a period of time some changes are possible. A
change in the Soviet leadership, for example, followed by the
emergence of a single leader with overriding powers, might bring
about less predictable policies comparable to those followed by
Khrushchev, possibly with less restraint. Even then, however, an
actual Soviet attack in Europe would only be conceivable in circum-
stances in which the Soviet leaders were confident that it
would not escalate and lead to the nuclear annihilation of the
Soviet Union, and we do not see that situation as one in prospect
for the Soviet leaders. On the other hand, over the long run
the Soviets might come to believe that their enhanced strategic
military posture as well as developments within the Western
Alliance would in time permit more assertive pressures, and
there is. some risk of miscalculation.
The Problem of Determining Soviet Intentions
8. In reaching a warning judgment, it is necessary to
evaluate physical preparations and other activities in the
context of the Soviet political posture. This context has
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to do with the state of affairs within the Soviet Union as well
hs the way the USSR is conducting its international affairs at
the time: its evaluation of Western military strength and.
political cohesion',i the vigor of its challenge to the West over
various issues, the apparent degree of commitment of the
Soviet leaders to various positions, and the political climate
in high Soviet and East European circles. While the political
context introduces vital evidence, it also adds complications
to the warning problem. Soviet foreign policy initiatives,
actions, and positions are themselves often difficult to interpret.
For example, in September 1962, an assessment of the considerations
that would deter Soviet policymakers from deploying offensive
missiles to Cuba was both logical and erroneous. Nevertheless,
evaluation of the political posture, ambiguous though it may be,
is a vital ingredient in the interpretation of military activities,
particularly with respect to reaching judgments about the Soviet
intentions they may signify.
9. It is evident from the foregoing considerations that
warning is not likely to be either complete or unequivocal. The
.more indications collected and recognized, and the more com-
prehensive the picture of Soviet capabilities and behaviour,
the better would be the basis for judging the Soviet course of
action. But the sum of the available indications and knowledge
would almost certainly not be conclusive as to Soviet intentions.
Therefore, even under the most favorable circumstances, it is
likely that we could only arrive at a judgment that the proba-
bility of Soviet attack was high. Some indication of the form,
scale, or time of attack might be ascertained from the character
and pace of Soviet preparations, but here too there would be un-
certainty.
lo. Before initiating any form of deliberate attack the
Soviet leaders would have to be convinced that the resulting
military action would not bring United States strategic nuclear
forces into play. They would have to conclude that the United
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States no longer had the will to defend Europe, they might attempt
to establish the basis for such a conclusion by mounting a series
of pressures on Western positions, as they attempted to do during
the Berlin crisis. The change in the conduct of the Soviet policy
and in East-West relations would in this case become apparent;
irrespcotive of uncertainty about ultimate Soviet intentions,
there would probably be a situation of prolonged tension,
alerting the West to an increased risk of war. This sort of
situation would be likely to arise if there had been fundamental
changes in the relationships of the Western powers such as might
lead the Soviet Government to conclude that their pressures might
be effective.
11. Thus, although the Soviets could engage in military
harassment without extensive preparation, it is hard to fore-
see circumstances in which they would be likely to launch an
attack against the Central Region without some indications of
political change first becoming visible. It is impossible to
be precise about the length of warning we might get from these
indications. The length of political warning we might expect
would depend in large part upon the circumstances.
Military Warning
12. Political indications would at best give us only
a general indication of a Soviet attack, and would be unlikely
to provide conclusive evidence that a decision to attack had
been made. It will always be difficult to interpret Soviet
intentions purely from their military preparations, since
these preparations could equally well be precautions undertaken
in anticipation of a feared Western attack, measures intended to
intimidate the West, or the prelude to Soviet attack. Further-
more some preparations might be disguised as large-scale training
exercises.
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b. Because of their appreciation of the risks'of
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13. If the Russians were prepared to forego strategic
surprise in order to increase the weight of the attack, we:
would expect some warning (see FRG-UK-US footnote)+ in the
event of a buildup to an 80-division force. But if they
decided on pre-emption or. surprise attack, using only such
forces as were readily available, we should be likely to
receive little or no warning.
The Political Threat
14. The Soviets are likely to expect to obtain certain
political effects from the size of their military strength.
Even if they refrain indefinitely from the more obvious forms
of military blackmail, even if they elect not to make any
shows of force in connection with Berlin, they will neverthe-
less seek to exploit for political ends the very fact that
the Soviet Union is a superpower and the Western European states
are not.
Conclusions
15. While we cannot exclude the possibility that Soviet
intentions might change in the future, we conclude that under
prevailing political and military circumstances:
a. The Soviet leaders will not deliberately start a
general war, since in a strategic nuclear exchange it would be
impossible to prevent catastrophic damage to the Soviet Union.
b. Because of their appreciation of the risks-of
escalation to general war, the Soviet leaders are unlikely
deliberately to start a limited war in the NATO area.
+ Re ara. 13: Estimates of warning time are: FRG - 6 days,
UK - ~ to g days; US - 11 to 15 days. For detailed descriptions
of national views on warning times, see the following documents.
FRG - German Memorandum On! The Warning Time Available.to.:NATO
in Each of the Following Cases US - Annex to Fina Report of
Tr atera Working Group on Warsaw Pact Capabilities.
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"; We further conclude that: '
c. A war between the Soviet Union and the West could
result from miscalculation. We believe that this is unlikely
and that the risks of miscalculation in the NATO area are low
because great efforts will be exerted to avoid'such miscalcula-
tion. Nevertheless, by definition "miscalculation" cannot be
ruled out, and we must therefore regard this as a possible
cause of an outbreak of hostilities between the Soviets or
the Warsaw Pact and NATO.
d. More generally, Soviet political pressure, with
growing military power in the background, may well be exerted
against one or more members of the Alliance, particularly
if the Soviets estimate that disarray in the Alliance had
.increaseltheir capacity for political maneuver.
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