(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85G00105R000100190046-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 3, 1998
• Sequence Number: 46
• Content Type: MISC

Approved For Release 20 0 CIA-I fl1of4Ft600'10190~6
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We agree with the data and, in general, with most of the qualitative
cor:.ents presented in the Threat Working Group draft paper, but we have
two main disagreements with the paper o. now written.
First, the paper appears to give the overall impression that Soviet
and other Pact land forces are, au they now exist, basically very sound
units which would suffer from only rather minor weakncsses in combat.
Thus Pact land forces would not, if rapidly called on to go to war,
experience very great degradation in combat effectiveness:.
Yet we observe that Pact land forces, while stated to be evc:a more
mechanized than U.S. Army forces, are less well trained, less w-11
equipped, less well provided with combat and service support, lc_
well designed for conventional conflict, and less fully manned ir.
peacetime in terms of required wartime strengths. We consider thuG
the cumulative effect of these deficiencies would be very seriously
to reduce the combat effectiveness of Pact forces in any conflict,
and particularly in nonnuclear combat, unless elaborate and time-
consuming preparations were made to reduce these weaknesses well in
advance of any deliberate large attack.
An a result, our second objection concerns the estimated tin,: for
preparing large-scale nonnuclear attacks involving, say, more trxa, 25
divisions. We consider that if the Pact planned such an attack, ~._zey
wo"d require, and would take, appreciably more time to prepare than
vested in the Threat Working Group paper. If this is in fact ;.he
cc:.;:, NATO's warning time would be correspondingly increased.
The main argument we make in support of this propostticn that
._y of the divisions which would have to be employed in a
.lion attacks and most of the non-divisional support uai"s, ~.r..
atained in peacetime at strengths 1Ktiich are too far below w x time
-.r-~ngthc; to provide reasonable combat-readiness. While the u:. er-
_:Aength units could be rapidly filled out with reservists, this by
tt.-elf would not make the units reasonably combat-ready. Some weeks
nit training would be required to ready units manned at 30-60
;cent, and months would be required for units at 0-30 percent
- cc:ngth.
It can be argued that the Soviet military are pragmatic and
ar.a thus that if necessary they would com sit units to battle
_oon az tilled out, regardless of their readiness;. We consider,
...,....ver, that quite aside from humanitarian scruples, straightforward
c ._. iderations of military effectiveness would make this an unattractive
c _..rse of action.
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Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100190046-4