(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85G00105R000100190051-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 3, 1998
• Sequence Number: 51
• Publication Date: October 27, 1966
• Content Type: REPORT

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27 October 1966
3. Conditions under which the Pact might undertake Attacks on
1. In considering the military conditions the Soviet leaders
might desire if they contemplated attacks on NATO, it is important
to recall several major findings of US national estimates on Soviet
attitudes toward war with the Western Powers. Foremost among these
is the judgment that deliberate Soviet attacks are extremely improbable.
The reasons behind this judgment include the long-standing Soviet
preference for pursuing their objectives by means short of direct
military action, and, especially, the high probability that the Soviets
are deterred from deliberate attacks by their estimate of Western,
particularly US, military power and determination.
2. The general strategic situation will, of course, have a
critical effect on this question. Considering the prospective
aeveloient of all their military forces, it is probable that the
Soviet leaders expect to achieve a substantial improvement in their
strategic position vis a vis the US during the next several years,
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but do not expect to achieve such military capabilities as would
make the deliberate initiation of general war a rational course of
action. Under such circumstances, the Soviet leaders might come to
feel that the USSR had gained greater freedom of action than it has
had in the past, and to consider that their general purpose forces
had increased relevance, particularly in non-nuclear contingencies.
However, the Soviets probably do not expect to alter the relation of
military power to a degree which would permit them to undertake sub-
stantially more aggressive courses of action. Moreover, non-military
factors will continue to weigh heavily in Soviet decisions concerning
acceptable risks and levels of tension.
3. While Soviet military theorists have now come to speak of
the possibility of conventional conflict involving their own and
Ceti: C. VA (.,
Western forces, these references are eavame& in general terms. The
most critical factors governing Soviet decisions in respect of limited
war will probably be the circumstances prevailing at the time, and
especially the USSR's estimate of the dangers of escalation. The Soviets
probably will continue to recognize that any conflict with the West,
44% particularly against NATO in Europe, would carry the grave risk of
escalation to general nuclear war. For the same general reason, it
is highly unlikely that the USSR would initiate the use of tactical
nuclear weapons in a limited conflict with Western forces.
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4. If US were to reduce its forces in Europe the Soviets would
re-evaluate prospects for political and military action there. They
would probably recognize, however, that the drawdoown of US forces
did not mean an abandonment of US combaitments in Europe and that a
renewed challenge there would still provoke a major crisis, with a
consequent reversal of European attitudes and a renewed buildup of
the American military presence.
a. A Massive Nuclear Attack
In the unlikely event that the Soviet leaders contemplated
initiating a massive nuclear strike against NATO, they would first
have to believe that they could reduce the damage which they would
receive in the ~wiuiiwiewt{strike to acceptable proportions. It is
highly unlikely that the Soviets can achieve the capability to limit
the damage from a retaliatory strike to such a. level in foreseeable
future. However, if Soviet leaders ever become convinced that a massive
nuclear attack by the West was imminent and inevitable, they might
J. I
initiate a preemptive nuclear attack,
Pot"
b. A Massive Conventional Attack
If the Soviet leaders contemplated initiating a massive
conventional attack on the NATO Central Region, they would seek to
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insure, through what they considered to be the proper combination
of surprise and ~wiiiisiwlr~+s reinforcement, that they could overrun
the opposing NATO conventional forces. More important, the Soviets%n'O VI4J
first need to be confident that the West was deterred to the extent
that it would not retaliate by going over to general nuclear war.
Indeed, they would have to have either complete confidence in their
strategic deterrent or complete confidence in their strategic defenses,
because they would be inviting a US first strike with strategic
nuclear weapons.
c. Limited Nuclear Attack
If the Soviet leaders were to contemplate initiating a
limited tactical nuclear attack on NATO, they would first have to be
convinced that the West would not respond by escalating to general
nuclear war. In addition they would have to believe that the USSR
possessed a sufficient tactical nuclear advantage so that the war
could be brought to successful conclusion without themselves being
forced to higher levels of violence.
d. A Limited Conventional Attack
If the Soviet leaders contemplated initiating a limited
conventional attack on NATO (for example) seizing Hamburg) they would
first have to be convinced that the attack could be executed so
quickly and that the objective of the attack would be so obviously
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limited that the west would accept the incursion as a fait accompli.
To be successful, such an attack would have to rely heavily on surprise
and overwhelming local tactical superiority. While such an attack is
conceivable where the Soviets have a local tactical superiority the
danger of further escalation of the conflict would probably outweigh
any prospective gains.
e. Massive mobilization
The Soviet leaders might feel that a large scale mobilization)
and possibly reinforcement of their forces in Eastern Europe1would
deter the West from carrying out some action (perhaps in some other
geographic area)Ior would underscore Soviet determination over
whatever issue was at question. In contemplating such a mobilization
the Soviets would have to balance the prospective gains against the
economic costs and the increased dangers of miscalculation leading to
war.
f. Pressure Short of Military Action
The Soviets have in the past demonstrated their willingness
to use threats and military pressures to achieve their purposes; Berlin
in 1961 and Cuba in 1962 are the classic recent examples. The post-
Khrushchev leadership has not as yet revealed an inclination to resort
to such tactics, and, indeed, we do not believe that they will do so,
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at least in Europe, in the near future. But the Soviets still view
military pressure as a suitable means for the achievement of foreign
policy goals, and they will use such means again as their judgment of
circumstances permits. The degree of risk they are likely to be
willing to run will, of course, be influenced by their calculation
of probable Western responses, and this, in turn, will be affected
by their estimate of relative military strengths. The Soviets may
someday be tempted, for example, to use their growing strategic
strength to try to deter the West from effectively responding to
military intimidation, as in Berlin. But, even in this event, we
do not believe that they would be willing consciously to run sub-
stantially greater risks of confrontation with the US.
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