SOVIET INTENTIONS AND WARNING OF SOVIET OR WARSAW PACT ATTACK ON NATO

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85G00105R000100200014-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 21, 1998
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: November 10, 1966
• Content Type: REPORT

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TALKS
Washington, D.C. - November 9-10, 1966
Copy No. 11
CONF
Doc/8(Rev. 1)
November 9, 1966
Agenda I tern:: 1. 3.
SOVIET INTENTIONS AND WARNING OF SOVIET OR
WARSAW PACT ATTACK ON NATO
General.
1. It remains a basic objective of Soviet policy to
bring about the dissolution of the North Atlantic Alliance
and thereby the exclusion of the United States military
presence from Europe, and the Soviets will exploit any oppor--
tun.-ri t.i_c s to further these ends.
Po ,sible Forms of Deliberate Attack in the NATO Area
2. An attack could take a number of forms:
a. A surprise nuclear attack on Western Europe and
North America resulting in general nuclear war.
b. A conventional attack against the Central Region
mainly with forces already in t:h forward area but with out
prior i>>obilizati.on.
c. A conventional attack against the Central Region
with mobilization to fill out reinforcements brought from
Western USSR.
nuclear we
nuclear stri
A full-scale attack including the use of tactical
ns but not necessarily preceded by a strategic
e. \A local small-scale operation mounted by the
Soviet Union, or by a Warsaw Pact country acting with the
USSR's full k-iowledge and support which could, if necessary,
be disowned.
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Other Possible Situations of Outbreak of Hostilities
3. War could grow out of miscalculation in circumstances
not foreseen or desired by either side. Berlin remains an
anomalous situation with potential for a crisis. The Soviets
have not been prepared to risk nuclear war over Berlin in the
past and it is difficult to foresee circumstances in which
they would consider the problem of West Berlin to be so important
to them that they would deliberately take such a risk in the
future. Nonetheless, we regard a confrontation over Berlin
at some time as quite possible, and as the most likely case
in which miscalculation could lead to hostilities.
Political Background
4. Although the present Soviet leaders have not renounced
the ultimate aim of the extension of communism throughout the
world, they accept that the existence of the nuclear deterrent
places strict limits on the extent and means by which they can
attempt to extend their power, and their recent actions have
been generally consistent with those aims which they publicly
declare to have first priority in their external policies ---
the prevention of world war and the creation of peaceful con-
ditions for the development of their own and of other communist
countries. They would avoid taking any action which they would
believe would put in jeopardy the internal achievements and
plans of their regime. This consideration is also of paramount
importance to the leaders of the other countries within the
Warsaw Pact.
5. In general, Soviet foreign policy over the past two
years has been cautious; this restraint has been most pro-
nounced in the actions of the Soviet Government in the European
area. Their principal efforts have been elsewhere, in the
underdeveloped world, where the limits to a more active policy
are less circumscribed and in their attempt to restore unity
within the world communist movement, for the leadership of
which they are engaged in a bitter conflict with China. The
Sino-Soviet rift is deep and unlikely to be resolved within
the foreseeable future.
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6. Meanwhile, and despite the war in Vietnam, the Soviet
Government, and also the governments of their allies in the
Warsaw Pact, have continued to maintain contacts in many fields
with the West and to maintain limited political dialogue with
NATO powers. Moreover, their economic plans involve to an
increasing extent commercial and technological exchanges with
the West. In addition, the Soviets have recently shown signs
of wishing to reach limited agreements with the West in a number
of fields. Moreover, the Soviet leaders have not responded
to the urgings of the Chinese that they take actions in Europe
which would cause the United States to be concerned for European
security and inhibit its buildup in Vietnam.
7. Although it would require considerable movement in
Soviet outlook and in the world situation to alter our present
assessment, some change is possible. A change in the Soviet
leadership, for example, followed by the emergence of a single
leader with overriding powers, might bring about less predict-
able policies comparable to those followed by Khrushchev,
possibly with less restraint. Even then, however, an actual
Soviet attack in Europe would only be conceivable in circum-
stances in which the Soviet leaders were confident that it
would not escalate and lead to the nuclear annihilation of the
Soviet Union, and we do not see that situation as one in prospect
for the Soviet leaders. On the other hand, over the long run
the Soviets might come to believe that their enhanced strategic
military posture as well as developments within the Western
Alliance would in time permit more assertive pressures, and
there is some risk of miscalculation.*
The Problem of Determining Soviet Intentions
8. In reaching a warning judgment, it is necessary to
evaluate physical preparations and other activities in the
context of the Soviet political posture. This context has
25X1 C8b
Representative would. add: "Any hardening of Soviet policy
would be apparent within a relatively short period and would
provide clear warning of a return by the Soviet Government to
high-risk policies with their consequent military implications.
There is nothing at present to suggest that any such changes in
Soviet policy are likely."
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-4-
to do with the state of affairs within the Soviet Union as
well as the way the USSR is conducting its international
affairs at the time: the vigor of its challenge to the West
over various issues, the apparent degree of commitment of
the Soviet leaders to various positions, and the political
climate in high Soviet and East European circles. While the
political context introduces vital evidence, it also adds
complications to the warning problem.. Soviet foreign policy
initiatives, actions, and positions are themselves often dif-
ficult to interpret. For example, in September 1962, an
assessment of the considerations that would deter Soviet
policymakers from deploying offensive missiles to Cuba was
both logical and erroneous. Nevertheless, evaluation of the
political posture, ambiguous though it may be,* is a vital
ingredient in the interpretation of military activities, par-
ticularly with respect to reaching judgments about the Soviet
intentions they may signify.
9. It is evident from the foregoing considerations that
warning is not likely to be either complete or unequivocal.
The more indications collected and recognized, and the more
comprehensive the picture of Soviet capabilities and behavior,
the better would be the basis for judging the Soviet course
of action. But the sum of the available indications and know-
ledge would almost certainly not be conclusive as to Soviet
intentions. Therefore, even under the most favorable circum-
stances, it is likely that we could only arrive at a judgment
that the probability of Soviet attack was high. Some indication
of the form, scale, or time of attack might be ascertained
from the character and pace of Soviet preparations, but here
too there would be uncertainty.
10. Before initiating any form of deliberate attack the
Soviet leaders would have to be convinced that the resulting
military action would not bring United States strategic nuclear
forces into play. They would have to conclude that the United
25X1 C8b
=Representative reserves on phrase, "ambiguous though it
may be."
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States no longer had the will to defend Europe, they might
attempt to establish the basis for such a conclusion by
mounting a series of pressures on Western positions, as
they attempted to do during the Berlin crisis. The changes
in the conduct of Soviet policy and in East-West relations
would in this case become apparent; irrespective of uncertainty
about ultimate Soviet intentions, there would probably be a
situation of prolonged tension, alerting the West to an in-
creased risk of war. This sort of situation would be likely
to arise if there had been fundamental changes in the relation-
ships of the Western powers such as might lead the Soviet
Government to conclude that their pressures might be effective.
11. Thus, although the Soviets could engage in military
harrassnlent without extensive preparation, it is hard to fore-
see circumstances in which they would be likely to launch an
attack against the Central Region without some indications of
political change first becoming visible."
Military Warning
12. Political indications would at best give us only
a general indication of a Soviet attack, and would be unlikely
to provide conclusive evidence that a decision to attack had
been made. It.will always be difficult to interpret Soviet
intentions purely from their military preparations, since
they could equally well be precautions in anticipation of a
Western attack, measures intended to intimidate the West
or the prelude to Soviet attack. Furthermore some preparations
might be disguised as large-scale training exercises.
25X1 C8b
representative would add: "It is impossible to be precise
about the length of warning we might get from these indications,
but it would be likely to be measured at least in weeks rather
than days." (The Mwould also add para. 11 with this footnote 25X1C8b
to the Conclusions. In that case, the US would add para. 9 to
the Conclusions.)
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13. If the Russians were prepared to forego strategic
surprise in order to increase the weight of the attack, we
would expect some warning (see FRG-UK-US footnote)* in the
event of a buildup to an 80-division force. But if they
.decided on pre-emption or surprise attack, using only such
forces as were readily available, we should be likely to
receive little or no warning.
The Political Threat
14. The Soviets are likely to expect to obtain certain
political effects from the size of their military strength.
Even if they refrain indefinitely from the more obvious
forms of military blackmail, even if they elect not to make
any shows of force in connection with Berlin, they will
nevertheless seek to exploit for political ends the very fact
that the Soviet Union is a superpower and the Western European
states are not.
25X1C8b
"Effects of NATO Force Reduction
"Reductions in NATO forces on the mainland of Europe
would have no appreciable effect on the political or military
warning of changes in Soviet intentions." (The 0 would also 25X1C8b
add this to2~heC%%iclusions.)
US and_ representatives to ti1Q' king group do not
comment on the matter raised by the =footnote because they
believe it lies outside their terms of reference.
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Conclusions
15. We conclude that under prevailing circumstances:
a. The Soviet leaders will not deliberately start
a general war, since in a strategic nuclear exchange it would
be impossible to prevent catastrophic damage to the Soviet
Union.
b. Because of their appreciation of the risks of
escalation to general war, the Soviet leaders are most un-
likely deliberately to start a limited war in the NATO area.
16. We further conclude that:
a. A war between the Soviet Union and the West
could result from miscalculation. We believe that this is
unlikely and that the risks of miscalculation in the NATO
area are low because great efforts will be exerted to avoid
such miscalculation. Nevertheless, by definition "mis-
calculation" cannot be ruled out and we therefore regard
this as the most probable cause of an outbreak of hostilities
between the Soviets or the Warsaw Pact and NATO, if it was
to occur in the foreseeable future.
b. More generally, Soviet political pressure,
with growing military power in the background, may well be
exerted against one or more members of the Alliance, par-
ticularly if the Soviets estimate that disarray and doubts
about the credibility of the US strategic deterrent in certain
circumstances had increased their capacity for political
maneuver.
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