INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Release Decision: RIPPUB
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• Document Page Count: 413
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 2, 2003
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 1, 1954
• Content Type: IS

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INTELLIGENCE FOR
NAVAL OFFICERS
Prepared by
U. S. NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SCHOOL
For
BUREAU OF NAVAL PERSONNEL
NAVY Declassification/Release Instructions on File
NAVPERS 10889
Approved For IlafAigekibg93/
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INTELLIGENCE FOR
NAVAL OFFICERS
Prepared by
U. S. NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SCHOOL
For
BUREAU OF NAVAL PERSONNEL
1954
0002-9
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The following material is reproduced by permission of the copyright owners:
Chapter
Page
Author(s)
Publication
Publishers
1
2
J. F. C. Fuller
"The Pattern of Future War,"
Brassey's Annual, The Armed
The Macmillan Co., New York,
N.Y.
Forces Yearbook, 1951.
1
2
"The Living Thoughts of Clause-
wits," Infantry Journal.
David McKay Co., Inc., New
York, N. Y.
1
4
Editor, Thomas R. Phillips
Roots of Strategy
Military Service Publishing Co.,
Harrisburg, Pa.
1
11
Omar N. Bradley
A Soldier's Story
Henry Holt & Co., New York,
N.Y.
1
12
Sherman Kent
Strategic Intelligence
Princeton University Press, Prince-
ton, N. J.
1
16
"The Living Thoughts of Clause-
wits," Infantry Journal.
David McKay Co., Inc., New York,
N.Y.
2
19
Editor, Thomas R. Phillips_ _
Roots of Strategy
Military Service Publishing Co.,
Harrisburg, Pa.
2
23
Flavius Vegetius Renatres__ _
The Military Institutions of the
Do.
Romans.
2
36
Corey Ford and Alastair Mac-
Cloak and Dagger
Random House, New York, N. Y.
Bain.
2
44
Ian Colvin
Master Spy
McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., New
York, N. Y.
2
46
Ralph Ingersoll
Top Secret
Harcourt, Brace & Co., New York,
N.Y.
2
49
Corey Ford and Alastair Mac-
Cloak and Dagger
Random House, New York, N. Y.
Bain.
2
58
Donald Robinson
"They Fight the Cold War Under
Cover," Saturday Evening Post.
Curtis Publishing Co., Philadelphia,
Pa.
4
99
George F. Kennan
American Diplomacy, 1900-1950_
The University of Chicago Press,
Chicago, Ill.
4
100
B. H. Liddell-Hart
"Strategy", 14th edition, vol. 21__
Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., Chi-
cago, Ill.
4
103
Hugh Gibson
The Road to Foreign Policy
Doubleday, Doran & Co., Inc.,
Garden City, N. Y.
4
105
Hugo Fernandez Artucio__ _ _
The Nazi Underground in South
America.
Farrar & Rinehart, Inc., New York,
N.Y.
4
112
John R. Deane
The Strange Alliance
The Viking Press, New York, N. Y.
4
114
Walter Lippmann
In his column, of the New York New York Herald Tribune, Inc.,
Herald Tribune of Mar. 29,1947. New York, N. Y.
4
121
Roger Hilsman, Jr
"Intelligence and Policy-Making
in Foreign Affairs," World Poli-
tics, vol. 5, No. 1, October 1952.
Princeton University Press, Prince-
ton, N. J.
5
126
Dwight D. Eisenhower
Crusade in Europe
Doubleday, Doran & Co., Inc.,
Garden City, N. Y.
5
145
B. H. Liddell-Hart
The Revolution in Warfare
Yale University Press, New Haven,
Conn.
5
156
H. G. Thursfield
"Brassey's Annual: The Armed The Macmillan Co., New York,
Forces Yearbook, 1951." N.Y.
10
260
John McDonald
"The War of Wits," Fortune,
March 1951.
Time, Inc., New York, N. Y.
10
260
do
"A Theory of Strategy," Fortune,
June 1949.
Do.
10
260
do
"The War of Wits," Fortune,
March 1951.
Do.
111
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Chapter Page
Author)
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Publication
Publishers
13
323
Dispatch datelined Dayton, Ohio,
Nov. 3, 1951.
Associated Press, New York, N. Y.
14
350
Hans Speier
"Psychological Warfare Reconsid-
ered," in the book "Propaganda
in War and Crisis," edited by
George W. Stewart Publishers,
New York, N. Y.
Daniel Lerner.
14
351
Harold D. Lasswell
"Political and Psychological War-
fare," in the book Propaganda
in War and Crisis, edited by
Do.
Daniel Lerner.
14
354
Daniel Lerner
Sykewar
Do.
14
356
Article, "Daily Crop of Annoy-
ances," New York Times, Nov.
New York Times, New York, N. Y.
17, 1952.
14
358
Ellsworth Huntington
Mainsprings of Civilization
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New
York, N. Y.
14
359
Alex Inkeles
Public Opinion in Soviet Russia__
Harvard University Press, Cam-
bridge, Mass.
14
360
Daniel Lerner
"Effective Propaganda Conditions
and Evaluation," in the book
George W. Stewart Publishers,
New York, N. Y.
Propaganda in War and Crisis,
edited by Daniel Lerner.
14
361
do
Sy kewar
Do.
15
374
Nathaniel Weyl
The Battle Against Disloyalty _ _ _
Thomas Y. Crowell Co., New York,
N.Y.
15
374
Philip Selznick
The Organizational Weapon: A
McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., New
Study of Bolshevik Strategy and
York ,N. Y.
Tactics.
15
376,
do
The Organizational Weapon: A McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., New
377
Study of Bolshevik Strategy and York, N. Y.
Tactics.
15
379
Louis Francis Budenz
Men Without Faces_
Harper & Bros., New York, N. Y.
15
379
Eugene Lyons
The Red Decade
The Bobbs-Merrill Co., New York,
N.Y.
15
380
Philip Selznick
The Organizational Weapon: A
McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., New
Study of Bolshevik Strategy and
York, N. Y.
Tactics.
15
388
J. Edgar Hoover
"How to Fight Communism," Newsweek, New York, N. Y.
Newsweek, June 9, 1947.
15
389
"Don't Be Duped by the Commu-
nists," Redbook Magazine, June
Redbook Magazine, New York,
N.Y.
1948.
15
393
Harry Soderman and John J.
O'Connell.
Modern Criminal Investigation__ _
Funk & Wagnalls Co., New York,
N.Y.
15
393
Jacob Fisher
The Art of Detection
Sterling Publishing Co., Inc., New
York, N. Y.
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PREFACE
Intelligence is an indispensable element in the successful operation of any
modern navy.
World War II and the subsequent hostilities in Korea have more than
demonstrated the value to planning and executing naval operations of sound,
properly interpreted information about the character of the enemy?the product
of naval intelligence. This value is even greater in periods of peace or in the
twilight zone between war and peace such as we have experienced since the end
of World War II. The extent, direction, and timing of our naval preparedness
in these years depend directly on the depth and accuracy of our understanding
of the hostile or potentially hostile forces that confront us.
Accordingly the training of capable intelligence officers is one of the Navy's
primary tasks. A good intelligence officer must first be a good naval officer;
but, in addition, he must have spent long hours learning and perfecting the
specialized skills that make it possible for him to penetrate the curtain of
secrecy that enshrouds an enemy. Naturally these skills cannot be acquired
simply by reading this or any other single book. At the postgraduate level the
Navy trains its intelligence officers at the Naval Intelligence School.
This text, which covers in a general way the major aspects of naval intelli-
gence and their relationships to the other functions of our naval establishment,
meets two significant needs. First, for those officers assigned to intelligence
duties for the first time, or with prior experience in one or another of the various
components of naval intelligence, it provides a greater understanding of intelli-
gence as a whole. Second, to the general line officer preparing himself for more
responsible operational commands, it gives an intimate acquaintance with the
capabilities and limitations of one of the most important supporting elements
in successful operational command, with the result that he will find himself
better equipped to make use of the services which intelligence is qualified to
perform for him.
This text makes no claim to being an exhaustive treatise. Neither is it
a book of rules and regulations, since that particular need is covered by the
Naval Intelligence Manual and the Naval Intelligence Directives issued by the
Office of Naval Intelligence. This is a textbook issued by the Standards and
Curriculum Branch of the Training Division of the Bureau of Naval Personnel
to bring to the officers and men of the Navy and the Naval Reserve such infor-
mation about the functions of Naval Intelligence as can appropriately be
disseminated through the medium of a training text.
This is the second revision of the original text, NavPers 16047, published
in February 1946 and reissued in 1948. It was prepared by the staff of the
United States Naval School (Naval Intelligence), Washington, D. C., and
reviewed by the Office of Naval Intelligence.
Suggestions, comments and criticisms are invited.
CARL F. ESPE,
Rear Admiral, USN,
Director of Naval Intelligence.
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CONTENTS
Chapter
Page
1. Intelligence: A General Orientation
1
2. The Development of Intelligence
19
3. U. S. Organizations for National Security.
63
4. An Intelligence Perspective in a Changing World_
97
5. Components of Intelligence Knowledge
123
6. Elements of World Power_.
163
7. The United States and the World
179
8. World Communism and the U. S. S. R
197
9. The Intelligence Cycle: Collection
215
10. The Intelligence Cycle: Processing
247
11. The Intelligence Cycle: Dissemination
263
12. Intelligence Staff Procedures
273
13. Intelligence in Support of Operational Command
301
14. Intelligence in Support of Special Activities
335
15. Counterintelligence
363
Summary and Conclusions
404
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CHAPTER 1
INTELLIGENCE: A GENERAL ORIENTATION
INTRODUCTION
The word "intelligence" has a long history in
the English language. In the sixteenth century,
in addition to its primary meanings denoting the
power, capacity, and product of the intellect, it
began to signify "information, news, or advice,"
and this secondary meaning implied that such in-
formation was secret, obtained through the clan-
destine efforts of spies employed by rulers or gov-
ernments. These agents were called intelligen-
cers, a word now obsolete, and the organization
in which they operated came to be known as the
Intelligence of the directing authority. In mod-
ern professional usage the word in its secondary
sense has come to have three connotations: first,
a body of knowledge; second, the formal organi-
zations engaged in producing this knowledge; and
third, the activity or processes by which the knowl-
edge is produced by the organizations. When re-
ferring to a formal organization the word is
usually capitalized.
The popular concept of intelligence as a mys-
terious, glamorous, and hazardous activity has in
part been derived from fictional accounts of in-
ternational intrigue on the Riviera, as described
in the novels of E. Phillips Oppenheim, or from
the published "cloak and dagger" exploits of two
World Wars, both truth and fiction. Indeed, in-
telligence cannot be denuded of all mystery,
glamor, and hazard for they are inherent to some
degree in the work of all intelligence organiza-
tions. However, the aura of mystery is caused
in greater part by the fact that the nature and
purpose of intelligence activity are always
guarded from public scrutiny by stringent se-
curity measures. In general, Intelligence is sim-
ilar to any other military staff section or govern-
mental agency performing tasks in the national
interest.
Because of the essential security of its opera-
tions, and the somewhat sinister quality attributed
to it by popular literature, intelligence has long
26910e-54 2
1
been considered an activity foreign to American
custom and procedure. Not until World War II
was there a real national interest in intelligence
and a universal appreciation of its functions in
military command and civil leadership. Even in
the postwar period there has not always been com-
plete general agreement as to what intelligence
means and what it can or should do. When prop-
erly forged, intelligence is a potent weapon, and
its efficient use is based on certain indispensable
principles and procedures. It is an exciting ad-
venture in forecasting what men and nations might
do; in both offensive and defensive actions it is a
sword and a shield.
Under the stimulus of world events, America
has become "intelligence-conscious," for experi-
ences of the past two decades have demonstrated
that intelligence is essential, not only to military
command, but also to the government of any na-
tion with worldwide interests and responsibilities.
The phenomenal success of Nazi and Fascist dic-
tators in the years preceding World War II, the
disaster at Pearl Harbor, and the forward march
of Soviet communism in the postwar period have
indicated the need for coordinated intelligence
upon which to base policy and decision to insure
the national welfare. There has been a growing
realization that America cannot afford to be
caught off guard or be forced into an unfavorable
defensive position in the world scene.
This new appreciation and support of its en-
deavors has given the intelligence profession more
stature, and increasing use has been found for its
products in solving a greater variety of problems.
Intelligence has also acquired a technical vocabu-
lary to explain its processes and concepts, and
for the first time in American history qualified
persons, civilian and military, are being encour-
aged to make it a lifetime career.
This study will describe the milieu in which
intelligence operates, the concepts and principles
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CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS
that govern its employment, and the professional
tools which modern science and technology have
made available to its personnel. To the profes-
sional intelligence officer, it can be no more than
a review of what he has learned through training
and experience; to the uninitiated it can serve only
as an introduction. But to all concerned it will
show the inseparable intermeshing of the activities
of Naval Intelligence with those of other military
and national intelligence organizations, and the
corresponding interaction and cooperation that
continually links intelligence with planning,
policymaking, and operations at every level?
from the White House to the foxhole. Naval
Intelligence represents only one part of the na-
tional intelligence effort. To see the activity of
his own service in proper perspective the naval
officer must understand and appreciate the vast
body of intelligence knowledge, the agencies which
produce it, and the methods by which it is made
usable.
Our first consideration is the significance of
intelligence today, its total meaning, and the scope
of its interests, activities, and responsibilities.
THE CHANGING NATURE OF WAR
The changing nature of war itself has created
an increased need for intelligence. Men and
weapons within the area of conflict have always
been primary considerations, but by the 20th cen-
tury nations began to give attention to achieving
their aims through influencing the minds of other
men. By the written and spoken word nations now
strive to affect the opinions, emotions, attitudes,
and behaviors of the peoples of other nations, both
friendly and hostile. During World War I, three
theories of warfare were developed, all of which
emphasized the psychological rather than the
physical objective, and which were made practical
by the development of the aircraft and the radio.
The first theory shifted the purpose of the attack
from physical destruction to demoralization of
the opposing force by paralyzing its command.
The second, "strategic bombing," not only was
directed against the enemy's economic capabilities,
but also aimed to overthrow the political govern-
ment by destroying the morale of the civilian
population behind the battle lines. The third was
based on a delay in physical attack until the moral
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disintegration and internal decay of the enemy
had been accomplished by propaganda and other
means of psychological operations.
In World War II these theories were put to use
and greatly refined. The mobility of tanks and
aircraft was utilized to overwhelm enemy com-
mand. Aircraft and aircraft carriers turned
space into speedways of conquest. Guerrilla war-
fare and the submarine were utilized to exploit
enemy weakness. Amphibious warfare developed
a new means of invasion. Radio propaganda was
employed to confuse and to demoralize. The new
strategy, or large-scale planning and directing of
operations, used political, economic, and psycho-
logical as well as military warfare against entire
enemy populations to accomplish ultimate
objectives.
In the modern era, as trade in finished indus-
trial products and raw materials was extended to
all parts of the world, so likewise military con-
flict assumed world dimensions. War became
total, directed against total populations and all
human activities. Both Nazis and Communists
have demonstrated consummate skill in using eco-
nomic, psychological, and subversive, rather than
military weapons, to accomplish their basic objec-
tives. War by conventional military weapons has
become only one aspect of total war; while so-
called "peace" has become a period when the other
weapons have been used with devastating results.
Though the war of shot and shell was over,
the war of words and ideas was rigorously
continued by Russia and directed against all
noncommunist countries, and in particular
(those of) her wartime allies. Within 5
years this bloodless war enabled the Soviet
Union to establish an ideological empire cov-
ering nearly a third of the land surface of the
globe and including 40 percent of its inhabit-
ants, a conquest unequalled in history (J.
F. C. Fuller, Brassey's 1951 Annual, p. 138) .
By the middle of the 20th century, the well-
known Clausewitz definition that "war is the con-
tinuation of state policy by other means" had been
reversed by the Soviet Communist Party. Soviet
state policy had become the continuation of war
by other means. A more appropriate definition at
the current stage of history might be: "War is
the imposition of one State's policy on another in
such a manner that freedom of group will is lost."
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INTELLIGENCE: A GENERAL ORIENTATION
The key to the definition of any period as war or
peace may well be found in the means employed
and the effect of those means.
In considering the changing nature of war it is
significant to note that the strategy of total war
differs completely in its fundamental premise
from the old strategy of limited or battlefield war-
fare. As Fletcher Pratt points out in his book
America and Total War, the old strategy was to
attack the enemy where his strength lay. When
his strongest force was defeated, the remainder
fell with it. The new concept is to concentrate on
weakness and not to encounter the enemy's
strength, if at all possible. The point of view of
the Soviet Union is indicated by Lenin's statement
that "the soundest strategy of war is to postpone
operations until the moral disintegration of the
enemy renders the delivery of the mortal blow
both possible and easy." As a result, the Soviets
have employed political, psychological, economic,
and technical means to achieve warlike objectives,
wholly or in part, without the more expensive re-
sort to military force. By utilizing these means
as part of a total subversive effort, the interna-
tional communists have fatally weakened certain
of their target states, notably Czechoslovakia.
Subversion, therefore, has been demonstrated as
a new instrumentality for making war. The
strategy of total war makes it increasingly diffi-
cult for any state to remain neutral in the struggle
for power between dominant groups of nations.
In the post-World War II period, world com-
munism has continued to emphasize the weapon of
ideas in preference to, although supported by, the
traditional weapon of physical force. Just when
or if there may be a shift in emphasis, and how
the United States should conduct its national poli-
cies to meet and thwart any means employed by its
adversaries, are vital questions we face today.
A survey of current international conditions, to-
gether with a clear understanding of the pattern
and methods of total war, gives unmistakable
meaning to the popular term, "cold war." In this
situation at least two factors, other than the nature
of total war, have given emphasis to the funda-
mental importance of intelligence and the need for
its use: the increased scope and speed of war and
the world commitments of the United States.
3
Increased Scope and Speed of War
No longer is space itself a conclusive element
for defense, nor are geographic features of the
earth's surface impassable barriers to enemy at-
tack. The awesome technical improvements with
which scientists are transforming the aircraft and
the radio of World War II have given the speed
of sound to the initiation of military attack. In
World War II the German Blitzkrieg combined
the use of planes and tanks to conquer France in
35 days, while in the Pacific, the aircraft carrier
brought naval forces separated by hundreds of sea
miles into decisive conflict. At the same time de-
velopments in submarine and amphibious war-
fare withered the extended sea power of Japan and
brought men, guns, and supplies over thousands
of miles of ocean to overwhelm her vital defenses
within a relatively short period.
Strategic bombing, guerrilla, submarine, and
psychological warfare carried the war far behind
the battlefronts to entire civilian populations,
vital industries, sources of the raw materials of
war, and communications systems. The master
plan of the two major Axis partners, Germany
and Japan, encompassed the globe. To meet this
threat, the United States fought in the far reaches
of the Atlantic and the Pacific and sent forces to
distant continents. All parts of the world felt
the direct or indirect impact of a world at war.
World Commitments of the United States
In the interests of its own security and national
welfare, the United States has assumed world-
wide commitments, both military and economic.
The decisions which must be made are funda-
mental, far-reaching, and exceedingly complex.
The problems involve such intricately related
questions as economics, finance, national politics,
raw materials, industrial capacities, communica-
tions, manpower, weapons, and scientific and tech-
nological developments. The growing interrela-
tion of political and military decisions has made
it impossible for the responsible leaders in either
field to take action without the closest coordina-
tion of effort, based on a full and mutual under-
standing. The decisions of the military com-
mander are no longer so directly circumscribed by
the elements involved in a tactical field of action.
The factors of total war, the increased scope and
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INTELLIGENCE FOR
speed of war, and interlocking world commitments
have added to the complexity of both staff and
field decisions. Obviously, the effect of these fac-
tors on the commander varies in degree with the
echelon of his command. But at any echelon in-
telligence has become a necessity.
Intelligence?An Essential Function
More than 2,400 years ago a Chinese general
named Sun Tzu is reported to have said: "Hostile
armies may face each other for years striving for
victory which is decided in a single day. This
being so, to remain in ignorance of the enemy's
condition . . . is the height of inhumanity. One
who acts thus is no leader of men, no present help
to his sovereign, no master of victory. Thus, what
enables the wise sovereign and the good general
to strike and to conquer, and achieve things be-
yond the reach of ordinary men, is foreknowl-
edge."
Intelligence, properly performed, can provide
foreknowledge both for government and for mili-
tary commanders. It can reduce the possibilities
of surprise, give estimates regarding both the po-
tential enemy and the area in which he might op-
erate, and so aid in reaching sound decisions which
are vital not only to the security and welfare of
the nation but also to success in combat. Intelli-
gence, properly used, has its place not only in war
or preparation for war, but also in peace and keep-
ing the peace.
INTELLIGENCE AS KNOWLEDGE
"Intelligence regarding the loyalty of the aver-
age indigenous peasant to the present hostile gov-
ernment of . . . is important (1) to an evalua-
tion of the stability of that government and its
capacity to extend its influence and (2) to the
selection of an area along its coast for the landing
of amphibious forces."
By this hypothetical statement, the following
charactertistics of intelligence are illustrated: (1)
it is a body of knowledge; (2) it deals with a pos-
sible enemy state; (3) it affects a possible area of
operations; (4) it can be used by top-level plan-
ners in government and on military staffs; and
(5) it can aid the military commander in the
planning of a specific operation.
Knowledge regarding the "average indigenous
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4
NAVAL OFFICERS
peasant" is much more than the sum of bits of
information regarding few or many peasants,
gathered from every conceivable source. Some of
these bits of information may be true or false;
some may be detailed or fragmentary; some may
be general or factual in nature; some may come
from sources which are accurate and reliable, some
from sources which are inaccurate and unreliable.
At any rate, many bits of information regarding
the "indigenous peasant" must be gathered to-
gether and evaluated; they must be carefully
analyzed and compared to see that they are plaus-
ible; and, after having been boiled down to an
essence most closely approximating probable truth,
they will provide a conclusion which is meaning-
ful. From the facts or information comes some-
thing new, called knowledge or intelligence.
Information, then, includes such things as facts,
documents, and observations, but is not intelli-
gence until it has been carefully screened and
digested to provide accurate meaning.
Intelligence, however, does not include the total
substance of human knowledge, but only that
which military and civilian leaders must have to
make the vital decisions for today and tomorrow.
It is the basis for a country's foreign relations, and,
as a function of command, it is also essential for
the planning and execution of military operations.
In either case, it is knowledge upon which a suc-
cessful course of action can be based. It has been
aptly stated that intelligence ideally is that knowl-
edge which a potential enemy has about himself.
The scope of American national intelligence is
exceedingly broad because the United States in
the interests of its own welfare must know a
great deal concerning the attitudes, activities, in-
terests, and long-range plans of all other states in
the world. The concentration of interest, of
course, will depend upon the conditions of inter-
national relations at any given time. Since it is
impossible for any nation to attain the ideal of
having all pertinent knowledge about potential
enemies, certain gaps always exist. Intelligence,
therefore, resembles a vast collection of jigsaw
puzzle pieces. Some pieces belong to different
puzzles, some will not fit any apparent gap in the
picture, and some obviously belong but must be
patiently fitted into the picture in order to solve
the puzzle.
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INTELLIGENCE : A GENERAL ORIENTATION CONFIDENTIAL
Component Parts
In assembling this comprehensive knowledge it
is essential to break it down into component parts
for better understanding and ease in handling. A
systematic classification is achieved by a detailed
compilation of, first, all the factors of physical
environment and, second, of the characteristics
that govern human behavior in a given country.
Eight major divisions are generally used: military
geography, transportation and telecommunica-
tions, sociological, political, economic, armed
forces, technical and scientific, and biographical.
Each of these components, discussed in detail in
chapter 5, are indicative of the tremendous range
of intelligence subject matter. All components
are closely interrelated; no one can be considered
separately. A valid estimate can be reached only
by considering each in relation to the others.
For the intelligence officer a similar comprehen-
sive knowledge about his own country is a neces-
sary tool, since only with this accurate and more
familiar yardstick can he make valid comparisons
and relative estimates.
The Factor of Time
The components listed above represent a divi-
sion of the subject matter of intelligence into broad
fields of knowledge. A consideration of the fac-
tor of time produces a further breakdown into
relative elements, labelled as follows: Basic, which
is descriptive of the more permanent and signifi-
cant past; Current, which deals with the present;
and Estimative, which concerns future develop-
ments. The truly significant element of intelli-
gence is, of course, the Estimative which projects
situations and trends into the future. This fore-
casting, however, must be built up accu-
rately and painstakingly from both past and cur-
rent knowledge.
The basic element is encyclopedic in nature and
includes geographical and historical data. It
provides the broad background against which to
interpret the present and predict the future. It
is a part of all the components already mentioned,
but especially of those which cover the area of
operations and the sociological, political, and eco-
nomic background of a people. As in the pre-
vious example of the "average indigenous
peasant," in order to predict his reactions at some
future time, the analyst must have a comprehen-
sive knowledge of the peasant's past attitudes,
group habits, environment, and responses. Also,
in deciding on possible landing beaches on the
coast of the country in question, the intelligence
officer must present to his commander a complete
description of the beaches along the entire coast.
The geographic knowledge must include soil; exits
from beaches, topography behind the beaches; ac-
cessibility to roads, rail-lines, towns, water, build-
ing materials; recognizable features of the coast-
line; the slope of the beach, the sea bottom off
the beaches, the surf, currents, tide, underwater ob-
stacles, sea approaches, and so forth. When it
is realized that there may be a number of possible
beaches along the coastline of a given country,
the quantity of knowledge required becomes
apparent.
During World War II, the monographs and area
studies prepared by Naval Intelligence provided
detailed background knowledge of an encyclopedic
nature which was indispensable to the planning
of operations all over the world. The Joint
Army-Navy Intelligence Studies (JANIS) were
also developed to provide background knowledge
of areas about which little was previously known.
The extensive encyclopedic documentation on
heavy industry within Germany, for example, en-
abled intelligence personnel to note change or ex-
pansion, and to estimate the effectiveness of
strategic bombing. The experience gained and
lessons learned from these wartime studies have
emphasized the need for continued coordinated
efforts on the part of all intelligence activities
in developing and maintaining a fund of basic
knowledge in order that the day-to-day situation
can be better interpreted. The National Intelli-
gence Survey program is a more recent step to-
ward meeting that need.
The current element records the changes con-
tinually occurring among all groups of peoples,
as well as those which may occur in the physical
geography of the world. Knowledge about the
past must be brought up to date. The significance
of change lies in the possibilities not only of
progress but also of decay. For example, in con-
sidering any other state, friendly or unfriendly,
our military and civilian leaders are vitally in-
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terested in knowing whether its steel production
has increased or decreased to a significant degree;
what changes have occurred in population, espe-
cially in the distribution of age groups;
or whether there is a decided swing in popular
support from one political doctrine to another.
In considering financial aid to the Nationalist
Chinese Government after World War II, United
States leaders needed to know details about such
matters as current economic conditions in China,
and how they were affected by government poli-
cies; the needs of the people for food, clothing
and shelter; the morale and status of equipment
of the military forces; and the effectiveness of
military and political opposition forces. From
an infinitely complex situation an accurate esti-
mate was required in order to determine if finan-
cial aid would be of assistance and, if so, in what
manner it should be given.
Even the most limited description of the basic
and current elements of intelligence indicates the
enormous quantity and variety of details involved.
It becomes readily apparent that there is a physi-
cal limit to the production of such a volume of
knowledge. The question quickly arises: Since it
is impossible to achieve the ideal, how should the
effort be distributed? The only possible answer
is to concentrate on those areas which are most
directly related to the present and future deci-
sions of military commanders and civilian leaders.
In any event, the basic and current elements of
intelligence must be formulated so as to provide
an accurate basis for the estimative.
The estimative element deals with the future.
It is knowledge of what a state or a military force
of that state can or might do. In respect to in-
ternational politics, it includes the influence which
any state can exert in the world and what forms
that influence may take. In respect to a military
force, it considers the effectiveness of that force
at a given place and time and the objectives that
force is capable of gaining, or might try to gain.
In effect, this element of intelligence represents
inferences from past and current knowledge
which may or may not be complete.
Involved in the estimative element are four pri-
mary factors: situations which exist or may
eventually exist; vulnerabilities or specific weak-
nesses which may be exploited; capabilities; and
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probable courses of action. An intelligence esti-
mate, to have real meaning, must relate to a situa-
tion, that is, to a possible enemy, to a possible
place, to a possible time, and to the probable
means which may be employed. No estimative
knowledge can have meaning in a vacuum.
Given the concept of total war, the vulnerabili-
ties of another state are particularly significant.
Weaknesses may exist in any aspect of its national
life?political, sociological, or economic. They
may be found in its military forces or in its geo-
graphic position. The skillful exploitation of
weaknesses may produce results out of all propor-
tion to the means employed. Conversely, failure
to exploit them because of lack of knowledge can
be costly to a disastrous degree. In both World
Wars, Great Britain's insularity was a vulnera-
bility upon which Germany concentrated by
means of its submarine force. Extremely serious
situations resulted from this underwater warfare
directed against the shipping which carried food
to Britain's population and raw materials to her
industries. In World War II, one of Hitler's
blunders was his failure to invade England after
the withdrawal from Dunkerque, an admirable
illustration of failure to take advantage of a mili-
tary vulnerability because of lack of knowledge
and planning. In the case of France, on the other
hand, the moral weakening of her political struc-
ture, and internal dissension and corruption
helped to create a vulnerability which the Ger-
mans exploited to the full.
The capabilities of a state relate to its qualities
of strength. The fundamental?and ultimate?
capability is that of military power, expressed in
time and force, which includes not only men and
guns, but also economic and industrial strength.
Other strength factors include: geographical po-
sition; population, especially of military age; raw
materials and industrial plants; transportation
facilities; the stability of political structure; and
the moral fibre of the people. During World
War II, the German and Japanese Governments
underestimated both the industrial capability of
the United States and the strength and determi-
nation of the American people.
In planning military operations, the following
additional factors of strength or weakness are con-
sidered: numerical military strength, effect of
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time and distance, efficiency of personnel, quality
of equipment, special weapons, and logistic sup-
port and reinforcement.
Given the situation, together with the enemy's
vulnerabilities and capabilities, the estimative ele-
ment of intelligence takes the form of probable
courses of action. It may be deduced, therefore,
that this element of intelligence represents guesses
or opinions rather than verifiable facts and hence
is of doubtful value. It is true that estimative
knowledge is not absolute nor as exact as basic and
current. However, if based on accurate informa-
tion carefully analyzed, it constitutes an educated
guess and a carefully considered opinion of a much
more valid nature than that derived from an in-
dividual "hunch" or snap judgment.
Intelligence, then, is a body of knowledge which
encompasses in greater or less degree, all world
states, and all possible areas of operation. Its ele-
ments and component parts are interrelated and
intermeshed. Its infinite volume of detail re-
quires emphasis only on those portions of knowl-
edge which are or will be needed by military com-
manders and civilian leaders. It is knowledge
for a purpose. The only justification for its col-
lection and interpretation is to assist those who
will use it in reaching vital decisions. Those who
produce intelligence must keep this purpose fore-
most in mind.
Use for Strategic Purposes
Military commanders at all echelons of com-
mand draw upon the body of intelligence knowl-
edge in solving particular problems and in reach-
ing command decisions. Those in top echelons
of command, and top-level leaders in government,
use areas of this knowledge in formulating plans
and policies and reaching decisions affecting the
security and welfare of the entire nation. In time
of peace, top-level commanders determine how best
to dispose and utilize available military forces for
the national security and assist the top-level ci-
vilian leaders who formulate the national policy
toward other nations of the world. In addition,
in time of war, these military commanders are re-
sponsible for the conduct of total military opera-
tions. This employment of intelligence is called
Strategic Use. Strategic Use furthers the master
plan of the nation's world relationships in both
7
war and peace?its grand strategy, which encom-
passes both military planning and foreign policy,
and has an inevitable impact on domestic policy
as well.
From the military point of view, strategy does
two things: it determines and assigns objectives
which, if achieved, will aid in winning a war and
strengthening the peace; and it allocates and gets
to the right place at the right time an adequate
and suitable force to accomplish each objective
against enemy resistance. In respect to national
policy, strategy is positive when it aims to im-
prove a current situation in world affairs; it is
defensive when it strives to prevent a situation
from becoming more unfavorable. When the na-
tion has a choice of several favorable policies, it
then has the strategic initiative.
In the restricted military sense, strategy con-
notes the application of armed force or the threat
of that force; in a broader military-political
sense, it includes the use of economic-political-
psychological activities to gain diplomatic or
trade advantages or to influence the group think-
ing of another nation in a manner which will
promote the welfare of our own Nation. The
strategic role of intelligence when there is no
armed conflict is to aid the chiefs of state in
formulating grand strategy and to enable military
leaders to plan in such a way as to support the
decisions of the chiefs of state.
An example of the use of intelligence for the
purposes of grand strategy is afforded by Hitler's
early development of a world-wide system for
gathering information which was scientifically
analyzed and evaluated. With this weapon he
was able to implement his revolutionary methods
of warfare, which took economic, political, and
psychological forms during the years from 1938
to 1940. It made possible his "fifth-column" ac-
tivities, his "war of nerves," and the corruption
of high public officials. It was the basis for a
succession of historic events: the annexation of
Austria, the occupation of Czechoslovakia, Nor-
way, the Netherlands, and Belgium, the diplo-
matic isolation of the Balkan countries, and the
fall of France.
Through intelligence activities the Nazis probed
the defenses of the Maginot Line, and through a
skillful "war of nerves," followed by the ultimate
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"blitzkrieg," 200,000 men were enabled to defeat
a nation with 5,000,000 men under arms.
In modern war, strategic bombing has increased
the requirements for intelligence knowledge upon
which military planners are dependent for target
selection. In World War II the bombing of Ger-
man industrial targets required information
about basic war industries and the thousands of
industrial plants involved. For example, a great
deal of study preceded the Allied decision. to
bomb plants producing aircraft and their compo-
nent parts, ball bearings, synthetic rubber and
oil, and thus to cripple a most important segment
of German war production.
The term, "Strategic Intelligence," then, is de-
scriptive of one use of intelligence knowledge.
Other terms, commonly employed, relate not only
to a use of this knowledge but also to the user.
"National Intelligence" describes the knowledge
used as a basis for reaching comprehe:asive deci-
sions regarding national policy, welfare, and se-
curity. It also identifies the users as top-level
governmental groups whose interests are broader
than those of any one department or agency.
"Departmental Intelligence" identifies the user as
a department of the federal government and re-
fers to the knowledge used in the carrying out of
its mission and assigned responsibilities. "Naval
Intelligence," for example, is one kind of
"departmental intelligence." "Interdepartmental
Intelligence," which lacks the scope of "National
Intelligence," describes knowledge of. common
concern to more than one department. Finally,
other terms are employed to describe many of the
component parts of intelligence knowledge ac-
cording to their content: such as "political intelli-
gence," "economic intelligence," and "technical
intelligence."
A. problem in the use of terms such as these has
been the resulting erroneous impression that each
represents a kind of intelligence that is different
from all others. While these various terms are
quite acceptable for convenient reference, the point
to remember is that they do not describe separate,
distinct or compartmented kinds of intelligence.
All kinds are irrevocably interrelated; the mean-
ing of each, as well as the meaning of the total, is
complete only when all are considered together.
Regardless of terminology, intelligence can be only
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one body of knowledge with component parts and
elements which are drawn upon according to the
needs of the user.
Use for Operational Purposes
While toplevel military commanders use intelli-
gence for broad planning purposes, they can never
lose sight of the fact that their policies and deci-
sions must be translated into action by the lower
echelons of command. Hence the knowledge used
by all echelons is both broad and specific. The
only difference is one of emphasis, which stems
from the problem to be solved by the user. For
example, the knowledge used becomes less broad
and more specific as the toplevel decision is trans-
ferred for action to the theater commander, down
to the task force commander, and so on to the com-
manders of the operatng fleet units. Thus intel-
ligence is used specifically for operational pur-
poses when it is a basis for decisions involving the
physical employment of particular men and mate-
riel against a particular adversary. Here the
current element of intelligence plays a most im-
portant part.
As one illustration, in the latter days of World
War II, the decision to drop an atomic bomb on
Hiroshima was made at the highest policy and
command levels on the basis of the most compre-
hensive available intelligence in view of the stra-
tegic implications for the entire Pacific war. At
the same time, potential Japanese air opposition
required the use of intelligence for specific opera-
tional considerations in determining whether or
not such a mission could be successfuly carried out.
It has often been said that intelligence is used
for strategic purposes in time of peace and for
operational purposes in time of war. Such a
statement might have been approximately correct
prior to World War I, when periods of war and
of peace could be more accurately labeled. How-
ever, just as the pattern of total war has materially
reduced the distinction between strategy and
tactics so likewise has it resulted in a merging of
the uses of intelligence for strategic and opera-
tional purposes.
In time of peace, or when widespread military
conflict is not involved, intelligence may be
used for operational purposes, as well as stra-
tegic. The ideological war waged by the Soviet
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Union against many nonCommunist countries, in-
cluding the United States since 1945, is illustra-
tive. The weapon of ideas has been employed in
an effort to incite unrest among labor and racial
groups, and to capture the minds of men with false
words. To take action against this weapon, radio
programs, such as those produced by the Voice of
America, have been instituted as a means of pre-
senting a true picture of American life and aims.
Intelligence has an operational use when it serves
as a basis for decisions regarding such matters as
audience targets.
In times of armed conflict, intelligence has many
varied and vital operational uses. In planning
and executing a large amphibious operation, such
as that at Okinawa, the responsible commanders
required the most detailed and comprehensive
knowledge concerning the Japanese forces and de-
fenses on those islands, the physical area of opera-
tions, and enemy forces in adjacent areas which
would be capable of interference. In a smaller
specific combat situation, such as a submarine mis-
sion in the Formosa straits, the submarine com-
mander required specific knowledge as to when
and where Japanese naval and merchant ships
could be expected and which were the best targets.
If a merchant ship carrying rice from Saigon to
Tokyo was given first priority, that selection
might well have represented a strategic as well as
an operational use of intelligence. The knowl-
edge required as a basis for operations involving
aircraft carriers separated by hundreds of miles
may be both operational and strategic.
For operational purposes, then, there is a need
for the most detailed and specific knowledge about
the enemy and the anticipated area of conflict.
This is true for all types of military operations,
amphibious, submarine, antisubmarine, mining,
air, fleet, and reconnaissance patrols, to mention
only a few. Similar knowledge is also required
for the action phase of other types of modern war-
fare such as economic, political, and psychological.
For convenience of reference in operational ac-
tivities, the knowledge involved has been labelled
according to its use and its user. For example, the
following terms are common: operational intelli-
gence, amphibious intelligence, air intelligence,
and fleet intelligence. During World War II the
term "operational intelligence" was defined as "in-
9
telligence needed by naval commanders in plan-
ning and executing operations, including battle,"
and referred to operations of an extensive and
time-consuming nature. A second term, "combat
intelligence" was used to describe that part of
naval operational intelligence required by naval
commanders actually engaging enemy forces dur-
ing the comparatively short time of a naval battle.
As in the case of the various terms applied to the
strategic use of intelligence, it must be pointed out
again that no separate or distinctive kinds of in-
telligence are involved. The parts or elements of
the total body of knowledge are simply being used
for a particular purpose which, in this instance, is
operational.
In connection with military operations, it must
be emphasized that intelligence has one primary
function: to aid the commander in resolving his
mission and supervising the planned action
against the enemy. This function, together with
the role of the intelligence officer on an operational
staff, will be discussed in chapter 12.
Use for Countering Purposes
A third major use of intelligence arises from the
need for countering the positive efforts of poten-
tial enemies to carry out against a nation certain
inimical activities known as espionage, sabotage,
and subversion. In general, these activities have
the common objectives of weakening or destroying
any or all elements of a nation's total power and
warmaking potential, thereby increasing the
power advantage of the nation initiating them.
Simply stated, espionage is the clandestine collec-
tion of information about a foreign country. To
a degree, it is the art of spying. However, it may
also be any unobserved or unapproved collection
of information which, when gained, is used to the
disadvantage of the subject nation. The target of
espionage is particular information which will aid
in determining a nation's capabilities and inten-
tions, its strengths and weaknesses.
Sabotage is activity directed toward the damage
or destruction of physical facilities vital to a na-
tion's total power, such as its industrial system and
military establishment. Sabotage, however, is
not only physical. It may be nonphysical, though
just as effective, if its objective is the weakening
or destruction of a program or a policy, domestic
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or foreign, related to a nation's strength, security,
and general welfare. This type of sabotage in-
cludes enemy activities which have as their result
the creating of terror, panic, and civil disorders.
Subversion may be described as activity aimed
at attacking men's minds for such purposes as
destroying primary loyalties and faith in consti-
tuted authority, encouraging continued dissension
between social and racial groups, or causing in-
dividuals and groups to act consistently contrary
to the best interests of a nation's government. As
an ultimate objective, subversive activities are di-
rected toward transforming social institutions and
eventually altering a form of government through
unconstitutional means. While it is often difficult
to differentiate between the activities of nonphysi-
cal sabotage and subversion, one point of distinc-
tion is the fact that subversion involves a com-
plete change in attitudes and points of view, a
permanent transfer of loyalties and faith. A dif-
ference, then, is to be found in the degree of
finality of the results achieved. Because of the
common objective and related methods of espio-
nage, sabotage, and subversion, the term "subver-
sion" is sometimes used to include all of these
detrimental activities.
Quite naturally, every nation actively endeavors
to prevent any other from carrying out success-
fully such activities. These opposing efforts are
called counterespionage, camtersabotage, and
countersubversion.
Since it is apparent that some nations of the
world have organizations trained to carry out
espionage, sabotage, and subversion, the United
States Government and its military services must
be prepared to counter them in at least two ways.
First, adequate security control measures must be
established and maintained to safeguard informa-
tion, personnel, equipment, and installations
against these inimical activities of foreign nations
and of disaffected or dissident groups or individ-
uals which constitute a threat to the national se-
curity; and second, both the foreign organizations
and the groups or individuals involved must be
actively opposed and prevented from accomplish-
ing their objectives. In order to achieve maxi-
mum success, our responsible departments and
agencies require both comprehensive and detailed
knowledge regarding the objectives, plans, and
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10
NAVAL OFFICERS
methods of the enemy, and particularly the or-
ganizations, groups, and individuals trained in
and assigned to the specialized activities described
above. The knowledge used to counter these ac-
tivities may be called counterintelligence. How-
ever, it must be noted immediately that the term
"counterintelligence" means much more than
"knowledge"; it encompasses both organization
and activity. In its comprehensive sense, there-
fore, counterintelligence is a specialized phase of
intelligence related specifically to security control
measures applied against the enemy's activities of
espionage, sabotage, and subversion. A more com-
plete discussion of this subject will be given in
chapter 15.
The use of counterintelligence knowledge is
closely and continuously related to the uses of in-
telligence for strategic and operational purposes.
Regardless of the purpose, information concern-
ing it must be denied to the enemy, and his efforts
to interfere by means of espionage, sabotage, or
subversion must be opposed. This is essential in
both peace and war. In time of peace for example,
information regarding the grand strategy of the
United States must be most carefully guarded.
In time of war, the military commander usually
includes a counterintelligence plan with his opera-
tions plan or order. Hence, while intelligence is
being used for other purposes, it is being used
concurrently to protect those purposes. The na-
ture and form of security control measures depend
upon knowledge of the enemy and of the particu-
lar activities to be countered.
The vital part which counterintelligence must
play in time of peace is well illustrated by the
Gouzenko incident in Canada in 1945. Through
the voluntary confession of a cipher clerk in the
Soviet Embassy at Ottawa, evidence was revealed
that a Soviet spy ring had obtained much vital
technical information regarding the atomic bomb.
Subsequent additional evidence pointed to the
probability that the Soviet Union, profiting from
extensive espionage activities, was much further
advanced in its atomic research program than had
been considered possible. An immediate result of
this information was a reduction in the world
power advantage of the United States and her
allies, maintained as long as she was in exclusive
possession of the secrets of the atomic bomb. In
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view of this newly determined Soviet capability,
both our national and military planning and poli-
cies became subject to revision. The deficiencies
of counterintelligence in this instance had ob-
viously significant effects on a worldwide scale.
Preparatory to the Allied invasion of Nor-
mandy counterintelligence was needed by appro-
priate authority to formulate protective, decep-
tive, and aggressive measures in the United States,
the United Kingdom, and in enemy-occupied'
France in order to thwart Nazi efforts to gain vital
information regarding invasion plans. It may be
assumed that the enemy concentrated his espio-
nage activities on finding out the time and place of
the Allied landings, and the numbers and disposi-
tions of ground, air, and naval units involved; fur-
ther, that every effort was made by means of
sabotage and subversion to disrupt the imple-
mentation of Allied plans. The responsibilities
of counterintelligence were tremendous and its
contributions substantially effective.
These illustrations indicate that knowledge
prior to enemy action is of inestimable value.
Even more, they imply that positive action in ad-
vance which will deny to an enemy the opportunity
to commit the act is of even greater value. This
action feature of counterintelligence sets it some-
what apart from the uses of knowledge already
mentioned.
As was true of the other two major uses of in-
telligence knowledge, various descriptive terms
have been applied to counterintelligence in order
to define it. For example, it has been labelled as
"domestic intelligence," "negative intelligence,"
"security intelligence," or "passive intelligence."
Since these terms are not entirely accurate or com-
plete they should be noted only for reference pur-
poses. To be remembered is the fact that knowl-
edge used for countering purposes is still a part
of the total body of knowledge, deriving its full
meaning only when considered in the light of the
whole.
Other Uses
There is frequent need for specific items of
knowledge; in some cases, merely factual data or
information .from which is derived the encyclo-
pedic or basic element of knowledge. For ex-
ample, in the formulation of a new policy or in the
solution of a military problem, an agency or a
commander may need to know the cargo unloading
capacity of a certain port, the depth of water
alongside a particular pier, the source of water
for a town, or the lowest recorded temperature at
the South Pole. Various departments or agen-
cies concentrate on specific areas of knowledge and
must be prepared to provide reference service to
organizations working on related problems. When
knowledge or information is used for this purpose
it is known as Spot Intelligence or Spot Informa-
tion. It is usually obtained by intelligence agen-
cies or collection units in response to a specific re-
quest. Important as this use is, care must be taken
to ensure that concentration on the requirements
of Spot Intelligence does not result in a neglect
of the overall requirements of the intelligence
mission.
Other uses of intelligence may well arise in
years to come. Since 1945 a concept of world
state communities has been growing out of the
activities of the United Nations and its associated
regional pacts. As the United States increases its
participation in these activities it is quite possible
that there will be new uses for intelligence in such
joint enterprises. But regardless of any new uses,
or special terms to describe them, the knowledge
involved will still remain a part of the total body
of intelligence as far as the United States is
concerned.
In discussing various uses of intelligence, the
users have been described in general terms. They
include not only civilian leaders within the federal
government and military leaders in all echelons
of command, but also individual military person-
nel with specialized jobs?such as pilots, boat-
swain's mates, and tank drivers. Even those who
produce intelligence must use it in order to con-
tinue the orderly expansion of the total body of
knowledge. It is the organization of these pro-
ducers that gives a second connotation to the word
intelligence.
INTELLIGENCE AS ORGANIZATION
In his book, A Soldier's Story, General of the
Army Omar N. Bradley makes the following com-
ment: "Later in the War, I often explained to
my Staff that 0-2 (Intelligence) existed to tell
me what should be done on the basis of his in-
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INTELLIGENCE FOR
formation concerning the enemy." In this
statement, General Bradley is referring to the or-
ganiZation which produces the knowledge he, as a
commander, must have for his use. When spelled
with a capital "I," Intelligence means organi-
zation.
The historical development of intelligence or-
ganizations, and characteristics of the United
States intelligence system are more fully discussed
in chapters 2 and 3, but it is pertinent here to
stress the impact of the pattern of total war on
all intelligence organizations. Not only has to-
tal war caused a tremendous expansion of the total
body of knowledge needed by civil government
and military command, but it has also forced an
intensive development of organizations specializ-
ing in many fields to gather and to produce that
knowledge. Some nations, having maintained
intelligence organizations for hundreds of years,
have a substantial background upon which to
draw. The United States, however, has a much
more limited background; and only in recent
years has it endeavored to stabilize the structure
of its national intelligence system. The poten-
tialities of this system, in peace and in war, are
great indeed; its youth is a limiting factor which
will be overcome only by inspired leadership,
hard work, and continuous years of experience.
Prior to, during, and even after World War I,
intelligence production was handled on an indi-
vidual basis, with little coordination of effort.
Total war, however, has brought about require-
ments for knowledge based on information of such
complexity and pervasiveness throughout the
total of man's activities that it cannot be encom-
passed by individuals working singly. Meaning-
ful intelligence requires the group effort of many
individuals whose activities must be carefully
directed and coordinated. Therefore, efficient
organization and skillful production have as-
sumed great importance.
Sherman Kent has aptly stated that good in-
telligence organizations must possess certain char-
acteristics of a large university faculty, a great
metropolitan newspaper, and a good commercial
business organization. First, management must
appreciate and tolerate broad individual freedom
in the search for truth by personnel selected for
their abilities in research and analysis. Second,
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NAVAL OFFICERS
organizational doctrine must emphasize rigid ad-
herence to the time requirements for completion
of assignments, an observance of editorial policy,
and an individual responsibility for accuracy,
completeness, and clarity of meaning And third,
the producers must be sure that the product is
prepared and packaged in accordance with the
needs and wishes of the consumer. They must
also consider its value in relation to its cost. Like
'a good business, Intelligence must stress plan-
ning; it must study the market, consumer reaction
to its product, and new consumer problems which
will require the development of new products.
Intelligence must be a carefully defined, smoothly
operating organization which remains sufficiently
flexible to permit adjustment to emergencies.
Continued application of the principles of mod-
ern management will aid in streamlining intelli-
gence organizations to reduce duplication of
effort, without sacrificing complete coverage.
Special efforts of management must be directed
toward the development of a sense of purpose for
each organization, an understanding of the over-
all intelligence production problems, and an ap-
preciation of the interdependence of the various
producing organizations. Close coordination of
the intelligence production of the various serv-
ices, departments and agencies, together with the
greatest care in selection and training of person-
nel, can do much to develop smoothly operating
organizations.
Many problems of United States intelligence
organizations stem from inexperience and from
the inevitable fact that much information collected
is incomplete and imperfect. Still others arise
from the techniques employed to refine the infor-
mation. It should be clearly understood that,
since this information relates substantially to the
variables of human behavior, its processing into
intelligence cannot apply fully the techniques of
scientific research and laboratory method used by
the exact sciences. An appreciation of various
basic reasons for some of the problems of intelli-
gence organization can, in itself, benefit both the
producers and the consumers of intelligence.
Of necessity, intelligence work has become a
profession, deriving its substance from other pro-
fessional fields, especially from the exact sciences
and the social studies, but also requiring the con-
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tributions of the historian, economist, lawyer, and
linguist. No longer is it desirable for individuals
to be impressed into Intelligence service with the
hope that they can "pick it up." The require-
ments for each worker include an accurate fund
of knowledge which is not only broad, but also
specific (in at least one field) . In addition, cer-
tain basic personal qualities are indispensable.
Basic Attributes of Personnel
Intelligence is an organization made up of peo-
ple; its effectiveness and success rest upon them.
What then should be some. of their personal qual-
ities? First of all is flexibility of mind, which
may be defined as the ability to meet new situa-
tions effectively as they arise. One who possesses
this quality is capable of bold and original
thought, and he does not hesitate when the need
arises to depart from traditional procedure.
A second quality is the ability to assimilate
quickly a large and perhaps diverse number of
facts into a comprehensive whole, from which sig-
nificant meanings may be drawn. This quality
obviously implies others, such as a faculty for ab-
sorption and retention of background information,
a natural curiosity, well-ordered mental processes,
and imagination tempered by common sense.
The ability to speak and write clearly, concisely,
and accurately is essential if the information or
intelligence is to be successfully transmitted to
those who need to know.
Personal enthusiasm, a strong sense of balance
and proportion, and a wholehearted spirit of co-
operation rank high on the list. Because intelli-
gence work represents group effort, no one person
should depreciate the work of others and magnify
his own; he must recognize that there is much he
can give and much he can receive in the total pro-
duction effort. He should never lose sight of the
fact that he is contributing to overall objectives
and meanings which may be vital for his country-
men's survival. Loyalty, then, is also basic.
Intellectual honesty is that quality which will
compel the intelligence work& to transmit the true
meaning of his knowledge as he sees it, and not as
the potential user would like to hear it. Emo-
tional stability is essential to continued good judg-
ment as well as to the indispensable quality of re-
liability. The significance of these qualities is
well illustrated by the case of Col. Alfred Redl,
head of all Austrian espionage during the days
of the Old Austro-Hungarian Empire prior to
World War I. Because of his homosexuality, he
was successfully blackmailed by a Russian agent
who obtained Austrian secret war plans, military
codes, and a list of Austrian agents in Russia. The
appalling defeats suffered by the Austrians in
Galicia early in World War I were partly attrib-
utable to Redl's vulnerability.
Other qualities and abilities are required in in-
telligence work, varying in degree according to
the particular duties assigned. They will be dis-
cussed as appropriate in later sections of this text.
The intelligence officer must possess qualities of
leadership commensurate with the responsibilities
of his billet. In general, he must have a minimum
amount of knowledge in all fields relating to his
work so that he may recognize the existence and
general nature of any problem. For example, he
must know enough about an area of operations to
appreciate any conditions which might give rise
to problems of health for a landing force. He
must be able to coordinate the precise technical
knowledge of the staff expert with his own general
knowledge about the enemy in order to evaluate
the full implications correctly. Finally, he must
be able to integrate subsidiary conclusions in order
to reach the essential overall estimate.
It becomes apparent that the requirements for
the intelligence officer are highly exacting. The
body of knowledge with which he must concern
himself is both comprehensive and widely varied.
The question immediately arises as to where such
personnel may be found and how they should be
selected.
Selection of Personnel
In the case of officers for Naval Intelligence bil-
lets, a basic knowledge regarding the United
States Navy is a first requirement. This knowl-
edge can best be obtained from active naval serv-
ice, although good training at naval schools can be
an emergency substitute. The importance of this
requirement has been indicated previously, when
it was noted that the production of knowledge
about the enemy and the area of operations is often
facilitated by knowledge of our own forces and
our methods in comparable operations. In addi-
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tion to naval knowledge and training, officers must
be carefully selected on the basis of the personal
attributes described above and the particular re-
quirements of the billet for which they are being
considered. Specialized intelligence training is
also essential.
In general, intelligence personnel should be se-
lected from those who have specialized in fields of
knowledge to which intelligence is related, such as
architecture, archeology, engineering, geology,
cartology, hydrography, photogrammetry, law,
transportation and shipping, languages, the nat-
ural and physical sciencies, and the social studies.
Valuable experience includes extensive foreign
travel, investigative work with federal and state
agencies, research and analysis, executive and ad-
ministrative. While it is true that the selected
specialists are well versed in their own fields, they
are entering a new field, and must learn to perform
their assigned duties in Intelligence in accordance
with new techniques. Training of all personnel is
imperative.
The Value of Training
At least two facts emphasize the necessity for
the most exacting training: First, the production
of intelligence involves an intricate developmental
process for which all pertinent material is seldom
available; and second, the finished product may be
vital to the welfare and security of the Nation
and to the very lives of fellow countrymen.
In order to contribute effectively to this produc-
tion, intelligence personnel must fully explore all
possible sources for information; they must know
when and how to explore; they must thoroughly
understand the process for refining this informa-
tion: the adding, subtracting, tempering, and test-
ing which go into the forging of intelligence. In
this refining process, they need experience to ap-
preciate the degree of improvising possible when
essential items are missing, and the logical se-
quence to be followed in interpretation of informa-
tion. Above all, they must never forget that the
product has no value unless it can be used. The
critical factors of time and space in modern war-
fare subject them to a great amount of production
under pressure.
To say that intelligence workers are made, not
born, implies that there are no substitutes for
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14
training, continuous study, conscientious effort,
and years of experience. As in other fields, the
mechanics of training are not enough; the motiva-
tion must come from the worker himself. No out-
side assistance can be of real value without a
determination on the part of the individual to
become not just another intelligence worker but
the very best.
Although he may be a specialist in a particular
field, the intelligence officer must develop an ap-
preciation of the other fields which comprise the
sum total of intelligence knowledge. With this
appreciation, he can more effectively direct his
own efforts. Training must encourage that har-
mony of effort so important for the success of
any organization.
Learning through doing is another important
training requirement. Painstaking, detailed work
is part of the routine, a necessary preliminary to
exciting accomplishment. A continuous training
program can help to define the goals and objec-
tives. Such a program must also include Reserve
personnel.
Indoctrination in security measures for han-
dling classified material is an essential part of
training. The intelligence officer must not only
be thoroughly familiar with the regulations as set
forth in the Navy's Security Manual for Classified
Matter, but he must also have a real appreciation
of their guiding principle, that classified material
is made available only on a "need to know" basis.
Intelligence personnel can provide accurate knowl-
edge regarding a problem only if they have access
to all data bearing on that problem. If the clas-
sification of certain data restricts availability,
knowledge will be incomplete and false conclu-
sions may be drawn. Intelligence officers, there-
fore, rank high on the list of those who need to
know.
There seems to be no question but that training,
and continued training, is of inestimable value for
developing the highest caliber of personnel to
produce the highest caliber of intelligence. A
program of training for reserve military person-
nel in peacetime has assumed more importance
because of the rapidity with which the military
services must expand in the event of total war.
If military intelligence organizations are to be
sufficiently flexible to continue adequate and effi-
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cient production of intelligence under wartime con-
ditions, there must be a substantial reserve force,
well trained, which can be activated in a minimum
time interval. Since World War II, the develop-
ment of a permanent intelligence corps in each
branch of the Armed Forces represents a step
toward improving this situation. While the ac-
complishments of reserve personnel in World War
II were phenomenal, considering the fact that
their training was carried out "on the job," mis-
takes were made. Modern warfare has reduced
materially the available time to recover from mis-
takes. Only training can maintain reserve mili-
tary personnel at a degree of efficiency which will
permit them when called upon to contribute ef-
fectively to the production of intelligence.
Undoubtedly, one of the most difficult aspects of
training is that of method in intelligence produc-
tion. This term, production, brings our discus-
sion to the third connotation of the word
"intelligence."
INTELLIGENCE AS PRODUCTION
"Intelligence involves the collecting of infor-
mation, its processing, and the disseminating of
the resultant knowledge to those who need it."
In this illustrative statement, intelligence means
production. The production effort, known as the
intelligence cycle, includes collection, processing,
and dissemination. Since the cycle is the subject
of later chapters, only certain general comments
need to be made here. A technical intelligence
vocabulary has been developed to apply to the
various phases of production. Different terms
are sometimes used by different organizations to
describe the same working tools, working proce-
dures, and mental processes, but if the basic proc-
esses involved are kept clearly in mind, confusion
over definitions can easily be avoided.
If the intelligence cycle is to be effective, there
must be careful planning and firm direction to the
production effort. Priorities in collection must
be established, and a continuing program of
guidance instituted for economic and efficient op-
eration throughout all phases of the cycle. Intel-
ligence organizations must be kept informed of
overall plans and policies so that everything they
do will have meaning and value.
15
Emphasis on the collection phase of intelligence
production has resulted in the use of special terms
to describe sources of information. For example,
covert intelligence refers to information obtained
by secret means, through spies or undercover
agents, without the consent of the country in-
volved. While it is this type of collection which
has given intelligence activity the flavor of ad-
venture and mystery, by far the greater amount
of information is derived from sources available
to anyone who knows how and where to look.
Such sources include the newspapers, periodicals,
governmental and business reports, radio broad-
casts, and diplomatic representatives. Informa-
tion gained from such sources is often called overt
intelligence.
Intelligence Collection in Time of Peace
It is readily apparent that the collection of in-
formation and the production of intelligence in
peacetime is facilitated because information is
customarily more easily available than in war-
time. With the exception of some areas con-
trolled by totalitarian states, data can be collected
the world over to provide the encyclopedic knowl-
edge which forms the broad base of intelligence.
It is in such periods that Intelligence can make
its greatest contribution to the nation by pro-
ducing knowledge which can be used to thwart
the nonmilitary aggression of other states, to pre-
vent surprise, and to avoid devastating military
conflict.
In preparing for total war and avoiding sur-
prise, collecting information, and developing
knowledge regarding the scientific and technical
advances of other nations assume particular sig-
nificance. Science has always been applied to the
perfecting of weapons of war. The improvement
of old weapons and the invention of new ones
have progressed rapidly since World War II.
Never before has the fate of nations been sus-
pended so precariously in the balance or depended
so completely on the efforts of scientists racing
against time. The increasing range of weapons
and new tactics in their employment have brought
home to the United States the awesome prospect
of being caught by surprise. Ignorance might be
a deciding factor in total war; intelligence is the
weapon which must combat it.
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The importance of intelligence in peacetime is
well known to the French. The Prussian collec-
tion effort, prior to the Franco-Prussian War of
1870, was so thorough that Bismarck's armies
practically walked into Paris. The Nazi suc-
cesses prior to World War II provide more recent
and equally appropriate examples.
Intelligence Collection in Time of War
The collection of information in time of war is
accomplished by methods which are usually more
costly in terms of men, money, and materiel. The
enemy, once identified, expends even greater efforts
to deny information regarding himself or to con-
trovert this information for the purposes of
deception.
Clausewitz pointed out the difficulties of war-
time collection when he said: "A great part of
the information obtained in war is contradictory,
a still greater part is false, and by far the greatest
part is somewhat doubtful. What is required of
an officer in this case is a certain power of dis-
crimination, which only knowledge of men and
things and good judgment can give. The law of
probability must be his guide."
In time of war, collection is aided by such opera-
tional means as aircraft, submarines, reconnais-
sance patrols, ships, and by the interrogation of
prisoners. Photography then becomes an indis-
pensable means of collection, and a source of
knowledge for both strategic and operational pur-
poses. The accurate interpretation of photo-
graphs reveals both the activities of the enemy and
the terrain characteristics of the area of opera-
tions. Because the factor of time has assumed
such importance, continuing efforts are being made
to develop techniques which will speed the trans-
mission of photographic information from its
source to those who can interpret and dissem-
inate it.
The numerical requirements for trained intelli-
gence personnel rise sharply in wartime. In the
case of the Navy alone, hundreds of additional
officers and enlisted men must be assigned to the
expanded fleet organization, flag staffs, motor tor-
pedo boat, and air squadrons; to intelligence cen-
ters and advanced base units; to sea frontiers and
naval districts; to naval attache posts; and to
joint or combined military staffs. Rapid expan-
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16
sion can be accomplished only if there are sub-
stantial well trained reserve groups which can be
quickly activated. To insure the continuous flow
of intelligence production, however, adequate
numbers must be employed at all times, in peace
as well as war. The curtailment of this produc-
tion can be as disastrous to the nation as the
failure to keep pace with the development of
physical weapons.
Processing Information
The collection of information is a time-consum-
ing and expensive operation. It can be an almost
futile effort unless its results can be converted into
usable knowledge. This conversion phase is much
more than the physical handling or rearrangement
of information received; it involves original think-
ing as well as logical thought processes. Ob-
viously, many difficulties arise in large organi-
zations where volumes of factual material must
be so catalogued and disposed that interrelation-
ships can be studied and new meanings derived.
Processing data may be compared to refining
crude oil. The oil is subjected to many stages of
cracking; at each stage a different substance is
developed; until, at the final stage, a new product
is created. So it is with the processing of in-
formation. When received, the original informa-
tion is studied. From this study, first conclusions
are drawn. These conclusions are then studied in
connection with those supplied by other basic data.
At each stage of study, the subject material is
transformed into a new conclusion. As in the oil
cracking process, each stage must follow a logi-
cal sequence. For ready reference at each stage
of production, a complete and systematic filing
system is essential. At no point, however, can
any study or solution be considered as irrevocably
definitive, in view of the fact that it concerns the
activities of men in which there is constant
change. Therefore, no conclusion may be said to
be final; each is subject to possible change. Of
course, material dealing with certain physical con-
ditions, such as terrain, are the least subject to
change.
A basic problem of production is that the in-
formation received may be incomplete and con-
tradictory, requiring the application of the most
searching standards of proof for all conclusions.
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The processing phase itself is a delicate operation
and subject to errors resulting from the omission
of necessary comparisons, the inclusion of false
data, or failure to follow a logical sequence. The
problems of processing and the application of
scientific methods in intelligence production will
be discussed at more length in a later chapter.
Intelligence Action
In the military services, intelligence is a staff
function operating as an adjunct of the com-
mander. Intelligence takes a vigorous part in
helping to formulate the action which will be
taken by or in the name of the commander. In-
telligence, therefore, is not an action agency, if
by the term is meant chain of command authority.
However, action, and plenty of it, is involved
constantly in the collection of information and in
the prompt dissemination of intelligence to those
who need it. Skillful action also is required in
countering the intelligence efforts of potential ene-
mies, as exemplified by the activities of the Army's
Counter Intelligence Corps.
To be stressed is the fact that Intelligence must
maintain a positive and aggressive point of view,
together with a keen sense of responsibility for its
part in any action which will be taken. Intel-
ligence personnel can never retire from the scene
of decision after presenting their recommenda-
tions; they continue to function after decisions are
made and often become a part of action taken.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this chapter has been to acquaint
the naval officer with the meaning and significance
of intelligence. It has been emphasized that in-
telligence is one great body of knowledge, used
for a variety of vital purposes. It is the result
of skillful production by organizations composed
of carefully trained personnel, and in the right
hands at the right time, it provides a sound basis
for diplomatic and military decisions affecting the
welfare and security of the nation. Such intel-
ligence, coordinated at the highest governmental
level, is of common concern to more than one or-
ganization and transcends the exclusive com-
petence of any one part of the total system.
It must not be assumed, however, that Intel-
ligence is infallible or that it can provide all neces-
sary knowledge. The most desirable situation
would be the presentation of the precise intentions
of potential enemies: when and where and with
what means they plan to strike. Because such
precise knowledge is seldom obtainable, Intelli-
gence strives to provide the closest approximation.
Limitations of Intelligence
Intelligence is not without its limitations, the
first being that information regarding potential
enemies is often incomplete and inaccurate. While
a vast amount of information is available for col-
lection, the most vital is obviously concealed to
the greatest degree possible. Often, incorrect in-
formation is made available for purposes of de-
ception, and its true identification requires both
skill and experience. Since he seldom knows the
enemy's specific objectives, the collector of infor-
mation does not always grasp the significance of
what he gathers, and his reports become meaning-
ful only when collated with other data by the
intelligence producing unit.
A second limitation arises from incomplete un-
derstanding of our own plans and objectives. In
the field of national affairs, this limitation is
caused by the fact that the United States is still
trying to interpret its own position of world lead-
ership and to formulate specific objectives which
can aid the world today in the struggle against
the threat of global conflict. In the field of mili-
tary command, Intelligence will be limited by the
extent of its knowledge of the commanders' plans
and problems.
A third limitation is that of personnel with suffi-
cient skills and experience. Only in recent years
has Intelligence been considered as a professional
field, and its personnel in general require more
training and more practical experience. Its doc-
trines of method and procedure are still in the de-
velopmental stage. In the military services, there
has been additional limitation of numbers, for in
the past, Intelligence has been manned almost ex-
clusively by reservists called to duty in time of
actual conflict. In time of so-called peace, it has
been skeletonized to the degree that production has
been critically limited.
A fourth limitation of intelligence lies in the
research process itself. An error in basic data, if
not recognized, can become magnified progres-
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sively to produce entirely false conclusions. In
intelligence work the cost of such errors may be
measured in human life. Recognizing this limi-
tation, intelligence workers must exercise every
effort to avoid the use of incorrect data and to re-
view most carefully the conclusions reached at
each stage of the production effort.
Other more specific limitations, such as those
of the physical equipment sometimes used in the
collection of information, will be noted in other
sections of this text. In connection with the gen-
eral limitations indicated above, it is apparent that
several can be reduced to a minimum and perhaps
eliminated. The controlling factors include time,
with its accumulation of experience, and an in-
creased understanding of the problems involved
in intelligence production.
The Place of Naval Intelligence
The comprehensive body of intelligence knowl-
edge may be compared to a large pyramid, at the
top of which are placed the most highly refined
estimates needed for national policy decisions.
Each contributing organization is represented by
a cross section of the pyramid. Into these sec-
tions is channeled the raw data acquired from
thousands of sources at home and abroad. There
is a descending as well as an ascending flow of
knowledge within this pyramid, as specific re-
quests for estimates are passed from the top down.
The same holds true even within the organiza-
tional levels. There is also movement horizon-
tally between organizations on the same level.
The speed with which the knowledge flows within
and to the top of the pyramid depends upon the
efficiency of the various organizations which make
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18
up the pyramid. Because of the changing nature
of war itself there can no longer be watertight
compartments of knowledge nor can any one of
these organizations be considered self-sufficient.
Each contributes to and receives from the total
body of knowledge.
Naval Intelligence is an integral part of this
pyramid. It produces what is known as depart-
mental intelligence. It contributes to the total
body of knowledge through the use of the pro-
fessional naval training and experience of its per-
sonnel in interpreting and evaluating data con-
cerning an enemy. It provides specialized naval
agencies particularly adaptable for the collection
of certain types of information. It gives guid-
ance to the collection effort to assure that the in-
formation procured is relevant to the needs of
naval planners and policy makers. It produces
intelligence which will directly serve naval com-
manders in the solutions of their problems and
the reaching of decisions both for overall plan-
ning and specific operations.
While Naval Intelligence must therefore con-
tribute to the total body of knowledge, it must
also utilize those parts of the total body of
knowledge which directly or indirectly affect the
successful accomplishment of its assigned respon-
sibilities. The same applies to all other organi-
zations of our national intelligence system. The
only difference is one of emphasis.
For these reasons, the scope of this text is neces-
sarily large, in order that it may serve at least
two purposes: to indicate to the naval officer the
broad body of knowledge with which he must be
familiar, and to point out the specific naval uses
of this knowledge.
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CHAPTER 2
THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTELLIGENCE
INTRODUCTION
Intelligence is neither new nor peculiar to mod-
ern times, whether it be interpreted as knowledge,
as organization, or as production. While the em-
phasis on its many aspects has varied from time
to time, intelligence has always existed in one form
or another. Ever since men organized themselves
into community groups they have sought for var-
ious reasons to dominate other groups, by means
of military force or by political or economic
measures backed by military force. Whatever the
means employed, advance information about the
enemy, when collected and processed, has been used
to advantage from time to time throughout re-
corded history.
The story of armed combat is fundamentally a
record of the historical evolution of military or-
ganization: from primitive men who fought as
independent individuals with stones and clubs to
modern men who fight as part of an intricate mass
machine. As the organizations grew in size, so
did the battles fought, requiring more and more
the use of military staffs to assist the commanders
in planning and carrying out their decisions. The
history of this military growth has been divided
into three periods: the first, from the beginning
of written records to the fall of the Roman Em-
pire, a period when military methods evolved from
mob action into a recognized art, including prac-
tically all of the modern principles of war; the
second, the Middle Ages, when there was almost
no progressive military thought; and the third,
from about 1632, the time of Gustavus Adolphus,
to the 20th century, when modern military ma-
chines emerged. As military organization has de-
veloped, so has Intelligence.
Thus Intelligence has a military origin. Full
knowledge has always been essential for the suc-
cessful general. The French Marshal Maurice de
Saxe, in recording his experiences, commented:
"You cannot give too much attention to spies and
guides . . . They are as useful as the eyes in your
head and, to a general, are quite as indispensable."
To be found in one form or another in the ancient
writings about war is the maxim: "Other things
being equal, victory goes to the commander with
the latest and the best information." Political
leaders and the governments of nations have also
made use of intelligence since the beginning of
recorded history.
While both military and political leaders have
long recognized the importance of gaining ad-
vance information, there have been times when
they either failed to obtain it or neglected to make
use of it. A study of military history reveals that
many defeats in battle have resulted from failures
to use intelligence. Indeed, there are indications
that intelligence has had a marked effect on the
shaping of world events.
Illustrative of a failure to use intelligence, and
the effect on later events, is the case of the British
Admiral De Robeck whose Anglo-French fleet won
a complete victory in the Dardenelles during
World War I. As a result the Turkish Govern-
ment began the evacuation of Constantinople, and
the Allies might have taken the city, had De Ro-
beck made any effort to obtain information about
the enemy. In ignorance he withdrew, and con-
sequently the ill-fated and disastrous Gallipoli
campaign was undertaken.
A striking feature of the historical development
of intelligence is its slow progress, shown by the
similarity of ancient and modern methods. There
is little difference between the instructions of
Moses to his 12 spies who were to go into the land
of Canaan and those of Stieber, Bismarck's In-
telligence Chief, to his agents who were to infil-
trate France. The difference is merely in the
numbers involved. In fact, modern intelligence
seems to have little that is really new, although
the character of intelligence has changed from
time to time. Before the rise of nationalism, the
collecting of information was a trade carried on
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by those whose services were at the disposal of the
highest bidder. With the upsurge of the modern
states, patriotism gave new motivation to the ac-
tivities of the collector. In recent times, some of
those engaged in intelligence activities are moti-
vated solely by an ideological fanaticism which
recognizes no national boundaries.
It is obviously quite difficult to trace the his-
torical development of intelligence. It is seldom
exposed to the public eye, and for reasons of se-
curity, those making use of intelligence cannot
disclose methods, sources of information, and ex-
tent of knowledge. Available records, therefore,
are relatively few and incomplete.
It is clear, however, that intelligence has not
only been the first line of any nation's defense, but
also the springboard of offensive action aimed at
surprise and deception. At times it has taken the
form of a shadowy undercover war of world-wide
proportions. As a result, the outcome of great
battles involving armies, navies, and air forces,
has depended upon the result of conflicts between
intelligence organizations. These have often
taken place long before a declaration of war, and
have continued after the signing of an armistice.
The intensity of the total intelligence effort be-
fore and after World War II indicates that intelli-
gence activity is of a long range and continuing
nature.
Intelligence has served many purposes. From
earliest times tyrants have subverted intelligence
organizations into repressive systems of political
police, thus placing exaggerated emphasis upon
domestic espionage and counterespionage. Free
people, too, have used intelligence to advantage
in promoting and maintaining their national inter-
ests. Historically speaking, Intelligence has not
been the exclusive tool of armies and governments,
for it has also been used by revolutionaries, church-
men, bankers, trade unions, and criminals.
In this historical review, the intelligence activi-
ties of armies and governments are of primary
interest. Much can be learned from past experi-
ences for contemporary application.
EARLY HISTORY
The desire for advance information about a
prospective adversary is an instinctive character-
istic of man. Even primitive tribes, with only
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the crudest weapons and no appreciable sense of
group discipline, carried out reconnaissance of
their enemies. For example, before a band of
forest Indians set forth on the warpath, their
chiefs sent the most able warriors to learn about
the trails and streams in the area of attack and
to discover the numbers, disposition, and state of
preparedness of the enemy. The early successes
of the American Indians against numerically su-
perior and better armed white men were often the
result of the Indians' superior, though primitive,
system of intelligence.
20
Intelligence in Antiquity
Intelligence activity is as old as war. One of
the earliest and best known records may be found
in the Bible. Moses selected men from each of the
twelve tribes and sent them into Canaan with these
instructions: "See the land, what it is; and the
people that dwelleth therein, whether they be
strong or weak, few or many; And what the land
is that they dwell in, whether it be good or bad;
and what cities they be that they dwell in, whether
in tents, or in strongholds; And what the land is,
whether it be fat or lean, whether there be
wood therein or not." It is to be noted that he
chose leading men to do the job, and that their
instructions included both the characteristics of
the enemy and the area of potential operations.
But long before Moses, the Pharaohs of Egypt
were receiving regular intelligence reports from
their agents scattered beyond the valley of the
Nile. The Egyptian army had a rudimentary
staff organization which included an intelligence
function, that of receiving reports from recon-
naissance units. With the Assyrian armies as
models, the Persians under Darius made further
advances in military organization and planning.
Herodotus' account of their invasion of Greece
describes the extensive preparation that preceded
their military campaigns. A system of staff or-
ganization was developed, and there is evidence
of the functional existence, at least, of intelligence
officers. The soldier kings, apparently, did not
delegate any operational functions, but kept them
inherent in command and so they have remained
ever since. It is also most likely that the so-called
"intelligence officers" were primarily collectors,
and that the early military commanders who led
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their followers into battle solved their own intelli-
gence problems and did not rely on intermediaries
to digest information reports. However, they did
develop extensive courier services for the rapid
transmittal of intelligence and administrative
reports.
Alexander the Great inherited an efficient mili-
tary machine from his father and for thirteen
years carried on continuous campaigns throughout
the then-known world. While the basis for a
military staff existed in the form of several officers
under his personal direction, Alexander appears
to have been his own intelligence and operations
officer. He relied heavily on reconnaissance,
which was essentially on operational function.
Military postal censorship is reported to have orig-
inated with this Greek conqueror. During one of
his expeditions into Asia he heard rumors of dis-
affection among his allies and mercenaries. In
order to determine the true situation, he announced
that he was writing home and encouraged his
officers to do likewise. When all the messages had
been collected, he examined them and proceeded to
correct such conditions as appeared to have been
justly criticized.
Intelligence in Ancient India
At about the same time that Alexander was ex-
tending his conquests, the famous Brahman,
Kautilya, is reputed to have overthrown the
Nanda dynasty and established the first Mauryan
king on the throne of India. Kautilya is known
not only as a kingmaker but also as the greatest
Indian exponent of the art of government, the
duties of kings, ministers, and officials, and the
methods of diplomacy. A Sanskrit book of ad-
vice to rulers, attributed to him, reads in part
almost as a modern manual on military and polit-
ical intelligence. It emphasizes the fact that a
highly organized intelligence service is essential
to the state and of first consideration in both peace
and war. In discussing the expansion and se-
curity of the state Kautilya says, " . . . he who
has the eye of knowledge . . . can, with little ef-
fort, make use of his skill for intrigue, and can
succeed by means of conciliation and other strate-
gic means and by spies . . . in overreaching even
those kings who are possessed of enthusiasm and
power."
OF INTELLIGENCE
21
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Kautilya recommends that his ruler should first
strike the enemy at his weak points by means of
spies. In describing the means to conquer an en-
emy's stronghold, he lists first "intrigue, spies,"
and "winning over the enemy's people." "Siege
and assault" are last on the list. Although his
terminology is a bit obscure, he accurately de-
scribes the modern fifth column and Soviet sub-
versive activities when he says: "The arrow shot
by the archer may or may not kill a single man;
but skillful intrigue devised by wise men can kill
even those as yet unborn." Distrust and suspi-
cion are powerful weapons when forged within
an enemy country.
Before beginning a military operation, Kautilya
advises: "The conqueror should know the compar-
ative strength and weakness of himself and his
enemy" and no war should be undertaken without
a careful examination of all the factors as reported
by the king's spies. These factors could well serve
as an outline for an estimate of the situation pre-
pared by a modern military staff. "Having ascer-
tained the power, place, time, the time of march-
ing and of recruiting the army, the consequences,
the loss of men and money, and profits and dan-
ger," the conqueror "should march with his full
force." Kautilya divides the king's army into
five parts: elephants, chariots, horsemen, archers,
and spies and of these he considers the spies the
most important.
The spy system of the Mauryans apparently
rivaled that of the modern Soviets. It included
many classes, both military and political, operat-
ing within India and in adjoining countries. One
class shadowed the king's ministers and officials
and attempted to determine their very thoughts.
Another, drawn from the merchants and farmers,
reported on the wrongdoings of the people. A
third, whose sons and wives were kept at home
as hostages, operated secretly in foreign countries,
spreading unrest, committing acts of sabotage, and
even assassinating political and military leaders.
Official envoys to foreign kings were instructed
to make friends with officials of the enemy, to con-
trast military stations, war material and enemy
strongholds with those of their master, to deter-
mine the size and location of forts, to identify local
intrigues, to sow dissension, and to determine en-
emy intentions.
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Counterspies and watchmen were employed;
there were border guards to check on all who
attempted to enter or to leave; and travelers had
to have passes. In order to dispose of seditious
persons who opposed the king, these persons were
secretly incited to reckless action and then con-
demned. Kautilya reminded his king that he
would be able to know all things through his spy
system, and that his information should be con-
sidered reliable if received from three different
sources in exactly the same version. He also em-
phasized the importance of the speedy transmis-
sion of information. The Mauryan Empire of
India appears to have been a police state in the
most modern sense.
Kautilya's book seems to have been a standard
manual for the Mauryan rulers, and to have been
based on experience. A study of the methods of
this ancient dynasty, which was able to conquer
and hold a greater part of India, sheds consider-
able light on the intelligence operations of any
despotic state.
Intelligence and War in Ancient China
It is indicative of the early development of
civilization in Asia that outstanding military and
political leaders were recording their experiences
and knowledge long before the same was done in
Europe. About Kautilya's time in India, a
Chinese General named Sun Tzu wrote a treatise
on the Art of War which was so sound that its
principles may be easily adapted to modern war-
fare. Sun Tzu discussed the fundamentals of
war and the influence of politics and human na-
ture on military operations. His writings indi-
cate, in a striking manner, how unchanging these
fundamentals are.
Writing as a field commander on the subject of
strategy and tactics, Sun Tzu emphasized the im-
portance of terrain study and accurate informa-
tion about enemy strength and intentions. He
stressed maneuver and deception and the attain-
ment of victory by indirect methods. Like
Kautilya, he recommended battle only as a final
resort and placed primary importance on a good
intelligence service: "A hundred ounces of silver
spent for information may save ten thousand
spent on war." His formula for victory aptly
states the basic reason for maintaining an intelli-
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22
gence service: "If you know the enemy and know
yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred
battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy,
for every victory gained you will also suffer a
defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor your-
self, you will succumb in every battle."
Sun Tzu warns against information derived
from appearances alone, and accepts only that
which is obtained from intelligence agents. Most
effective are those who have penetrated the high
councils of the enemy and the operators whom
we now term "double-agents." In addition, it is
profitable to employ inhabitants of an enemy
country to act as local spies, and to have other
agents spreading false rumors for purposes of de-
ception. Finally, there must be spies in the
enemy forces to be firsthand sources of informa-
tion. In selecting intelligence personnel Sun
Tzu would employ only those with natural abil-
ity and of high mental caliber. He continues
with the observation that if military warfare be-
comes necessary, "spies are a most important ele-
ment, because on them depends an army's ability
to move." Another Sun Tzu maxim has been
heeded by both Nazi and Soviet leaders of recent
years: "To fight and conquer in all your battles
is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence
consists in breaking the enemy's resistance with-
out fighting."
Developments by the Romans
Quite independent of the Oriental generals, but
about the same time, the Romans were developing
their own military organization and doctrine in
Europe. By the time of Julius Caesar the staff
of each legion included ten "speculatores" who
served as an information collecting agency.
Caesar's successful campaign against the Helve-
tians was aided materially by advance information
he acquired about their strength, movements, and
plans. The "speculatores" are the first intel-
ligence personnel to appear definitely in a military
staff organization, and there is evidence that the
Romans differentiated between the staff functions
of intelligence and operations. This early dis-
tinction was not "re-discovered" by military com-
manders until relatively modern times.
The military success of the Romans was also
aided by their communications system. Frontinus
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and Lipsius, in their writings, describe the train-
ing of swallows as long distance messengers and
the use of carrier pigeons, which explains the
amazing speed with which the intelligence of Im-
perial Rome was transmitted. An efficient intel-
ligence organization was thus able to give warning
of an impending surprise offensive by Hannibal
and Antiochus in Asia Minor in time to enable
Lucius Scipio to regroup his forces and administer
a crushing defeat at Lydia. The Romans also em-
ployed ciphers to ensure the secrecy of communica-
tions.
Skillful covert operations were of positive mili-
tary value. Scipio Africanus used his officers dis-
guised as menials and servants to secure reliable
data on the strength of the opposing Numidian
army. His methods have a peculiarly modern
flavor since, in order to gain time for accurate ob-
servations, he entered into negotiations with the
Numidians, presumably to arrange a treaty.
In the following centuries of Roman imperial-
ism, intelligence continued to be fostered by the
emperors, and covert activities were practised to
an unscrupulous and vicious degree in palace cir-
cles. Vegetius, in his advice to the Emperor Vu-
lentinian, states that a general may avoid defeat
if he employs spies on whose intelligence he can
depend. Like the military writers of Asia, he em-
phasized the importance of trying to sow dis-
sension among enemy peoples, and comments that
no enemy nation, regardless of how weak, can
be completely ruined "unless its fall be facilitated
by its own distraction."
The professional army of the Byzantine Empire
also had a well organized intelligence service.
Much more colorful, however, was the elaborate
spy system of the Empress Theodora which per-
meated the entire governmental structure of the
Empire. It should be noted that the oriental mind
has always appeared to stress political over mili-
tary intelligence.
The Middle Ages
Military intelligence in this period of chivalry
was of little consequence to warriors for whom
fighting was an individual sport. On the other
hand, the Mongol conquerors who swept into east-
ern Europe from Asia during the 13th century
made use of not only an efficient intelligence sys-
tem but also of an effective propaganda machine.
Agents of the Mongol commanders ranged far in
front of the invading hordes spreading rumors
of Mongol terrors and collecting information on
the weaknesses and rivalries of Europe. Local
citizens were used to advantage. The Venetians,
for example, striving to gain superiority over their
rivals, supplied information to the Mongols in
return for help in ousting Genoese traders from
the Crimea.
In addition to agents disguised as merchants,
the Mongol commanders maintained a screen of
scouts in front of each column of soldiers. They
appreciated the need for the rapid transmission of
information, and established a pony post system
across the whole of eastern Europe. The code of
laws set up by Genghis Khan instructed his gen-
erals to send out spies and to bring in prisoners
who would be forced to give information which
could be checked against the reports of the spies.
The Mongols provided for Western Europe an un-
heeded example of an effective military intelli-
gence and staff communication system. They
greatly influenced the Mogul Emperors of India
who perfected an amazing political intelligence
service. Among the personnel of this service were
spies who visited houses twice daily for the osten-
sible purpose of removing refuse and trash.
Although the knights of medieval Europe
scorned the advance collection of information
about their enemies, the churchmen had no such
scruples. They not only utilized already known
intelligence collection methods but contributed
variations of their own. De Torquemada, head
of the Spanish Inquisition, developed a political
intelligence system which has scarcely been
equalled. Thousands of intimidated men, women,
and children were encouraged to give information
which would incriminate their own relatives and
acquaintances. Large groups of spies were care-
fully trained, and a manual of instructions was
prepared for their guidance.
The Renaissance of Intelligence
With the rise of nationalism and the develop-
ment of modern armies the need for intelligence
became apparent to the larger states. Following
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an Italian lead, the principal courts of Europe be-
gan to exchange resident ambassadors, one of
whose functions was to collect information on the
political and diplomatic activities, the plans, and
the military strength of potential enemies. As
time progressed an increasing volume of political
and military intelligence, collected by covert as
well as overt means, flowed into the various capi-
tals of Europe to be processed and filed for use
in making important strategic decisions.
As early as the 15th century French and German
military organizations known as "Landsknechts,"
meaning "men of the country" as opposed to for-
eign mercenary troops, were developed. The
staffs of these armies embodied the principal char-
acteristics of the modern regimental staff. Be-
cause the quartermaster general had to precede
the troops on the march in order to arrange for
quartering and feeding, he also became responsible
for reconnaissance. This functional development
exerted considerable influence on the German and
English staff systems. Gustavus Adolphus of
Sweden created a "Chief of Scouts" on his Su-
preme Staff, indicating both his awareness of the
importance of intelligence and his realization that
intelligence as a staff function should be separate
from operations and logistics. It is generally
agreed that the military organization developed
by Gustavus served as a pattern in Europe until
the 20th century. With him, therefore, modern
military history began.
While there are records of intelligence activities
throughout English history and especially from
the time of Cromwell and Henry VII, it was Sir
Francis Walsingham, under Elizabeth, who gave
England its first national intelligence service.
His crowning achievement was the employment of
a spy on the staff of the Admiral in command of
the Spanish Armada. Thus he was able to ob-
tain the most detailed information regarding the
state of readiness of the Armada, its ships, equip-
ment, forces, and stores. In addition, under Wal-
singham's guidance, the English Government per-
suaded the bankers of Genoa to withhold certain
loans to Philip of Spain which delayed his naval
offensive against the English.
In France, the crafty Cardinal Richelieu de-
veloped an effective intelligence organization. It
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04
included a network of covert collectors who trans-
mitted prompt and accurate information to Paris
regarding the activities of the many rebellious
and dissident elements of the kingdom. An ex-
pert in political intrigue and diplomatic maneuver,
Richelieu used his intelligence forces to strengthen
the central government of France. After him,
Louis XIV consolidated his personal power by
means of a systematized political police, continu-
ous surveillance, postal censorship, and a peace-
time military intelligence organization. The
famous French general, Maurice de Saxe, organ-
ized an intelligence service which represented a
considerable improvement over others of his time.
Unlike the Germans, the French based their mili-
tary staff organization on Roman theories. As
a result, the French staff included officers charged
with the separate functions of supply, administra-
tion, operations, and intelligence. By 1700 the
pattern was set for the French staff system of
World War I, and consequently for the system
used by the United States Army. The French
military writers of this early period appreciated
the value of reconnaissance in major military plan-
ning and stressed professional knowledge as in-
dispensable to national military power.
Intelligence activity appeared in other coun-
tries during the 18th century. In Russia it took
the form of a political police system under the
personal supervision of the Tzar. The forerunner
of the dreaded Ochrana was the "Special Office,"
later called the "Secret Office," which was used
extensively by Peter the Great. In colonial Amer-
ica, Baron von Steuben served as an intelligence
and operations officer on Washington's staff. His
recorded intelligence activities include an analysis
of British and American capabilities and limita-
tions and a personal reconnaissance of General
Clinton's forces before the battle of Monmouth.
All of the great European military leaders, in-
cluding Marlborough, Prince Eugene, Maurice de
Saxe, and Frederick the Great, appear to have
recognized the importance of intelligence and used
it. Each, in his own way, contributed to its de-
velopment. Frederick the Great, for example,
established four classes of agents for the collec-
tion of information and set up careful rules for
selecting and training them.
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Expansion of Intelligence Activities Under
Napoleon
Napoleon once said: "One spy in the right place
is worth 20,000 men in the field." The truth of
his remark was amply substantiated by one of his
own agents, a man named Schulmeister, who man-
aged to become the Chief of Intelligence for the
Austrian general in command of armies opposing
the French. Every Austrian plan and move was
carefully reported to Napoleon, while false infor-
mation was supplied to the Austrians. Undoubt-
edly the clever machinations of Schulmeister
contributed materially to the brilliant French vic-
tories at Ulm and Austerlitz, which led to the sur-
render of Austria. It is of interest to speculate
on what might have been the historical results had
Napoleon's agent failed in his efforts.
Napoleon's personal staff included two bureaus
of interest. The first, and most important, was
the Bureau of Intelligence, staffed by two officers
and an unknown number of agents. Its function
was to consolidate all incoming information re-
garding the enemy for presentation to the Em-
peror, and to obtain such special information as
he desired. The second, closely related to the first,
was called the Topographic Bureau. Here was
maintained a large situation map covering the
latest information regarding both enemy and
friendly forces. In the field the French Head-
quarters Staff was divided into four sections, one
of which was responsible for reconnaissance, op-
erational planning, communications, postal serv-
ice, and the employment of guide companies.
It was at the beginning of the 19th century that
large conscript armies came into general use, and
with them large scale military maneuvers.
Napoleon's genius for efficient military organiza-
tion brought him resounding successes and tre-
mendously influenced modern military theory and
tactics. His military staff system was much more
effective than that of the Prussians, and Intelli-
gence served him well during a part of his spec-
tacular career. It should be noted that during
the wars between the French and the Germans, in
1806 and again in 1870, victory came to the side
which had the superior staff system. It may also
be said that victory at Waterloo came to the gen-
eral who had advance information concerning the
enemy and the area of operations.
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25
In addition to his military intelligence organi-
zation, Napoleon maintained an effective secret
political police service over all of Europe. Under
the shrewd and remorseless direction of Joseph
Fouche, and later of Savary, this service was held
in fear and terror. It was during this period that
the system of spying upon spies reached such pro-
portions that the term "counterespionage" came
into popular usage.
Like England, France has had a governmental
intelligence system almost continuously since the
15th century. But only during the time of Napo-
leon, and during and after the First World War,
did the French system achieve the international
scope of the English.
The Status of Intelligence in the United States
As already mentioned there is evidence that
General Washington made some use of intelli-
gence methods; however, there was no organiza-
tional development in the United States until the
late 19th century. At the beginning of the Civil
War the Federal forces had no intelligence organi-
zation, and Gen. George B. McClellan relied al-
most entirely on the Pinkerton Detective Agency
to collect and evaluate information for him.
Pinkerton himself served as a staff Intelligence
Officer to McClellan, although he proved to be a
poor substitute for a trained military observer.
For example, in July 1862, McClellan based his
military plans on Pinkerton's inaccurate estimate
of Lee's strength at more than 200,000, while the
actual opposing strength was less than 90,000.
During the Civil War both the North and the
South made use of spies. The tapping of tele-
graphic wires was employed for the first time.
One writer of this period, while acknowledging
the importance of intelligence and listing a num-
ber of recognized collection methods, felt it neces-
sary to justify them as "honorable means of secur-
ing victory over the foe." It was during the Civil
War that the United States Secret Service was or-
ganized, first as a military activity, and later as a
Federal Government function.
Wilhelm Stieber and Modern Intelligence Systems
Together with the Frenchman Schulmeister,
Stieber, who served as Prussian Minister of Police
under Bismarck, developed the pattern for mod-
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ern intelligence systems. His claim to fame in
this field is based both on the quality and the ex-
tensiveness of his organization. His influence
throughout Europe was tremendous, especially in
France and Russia. With Stieber's assistance
Bismarck was able with lightning speed to over-
whelm Denmark in 1861, Austria in 1866, and
France in 1870. Even the great German General
Moltke was amazed at the vast amount of perti-
nent military information supplied by Stieber for
facilitating the rapid advance of the German
armies, to the extent of making possible an accu-
rate timetable for the victorious march into
Austria.
Stieber's activities in Austria for the 2 years
prior to the invasion are an early modern example
of the German fifth column technique. Methodi-
cally he gathered information on fortifications,
troop concentrations, and supply capacities, and
recruited agents and saboteurs. By the time of
the Franco-Prussian War he had an estimated
12,000 spies scattered throughout Europe, and
boasted that some 85 writers on French news-
papers were under his control, not to mention paid
sympathizers among Italian, Austrian, and Eng-
lish journalists. He set up a system of military
censorship and organized a Central Information
Bureau for propaganda purposes. He concen-
trated on developing statistical and biographical
knowledge, including the industrial potentials of
possible enemy states and detailed data regarding
their politicians, diplomats, and higher civil em-
ployees. In addition to gathering information
about roads, bridges, arsenals, fortifications, and
lines of communication, he was interested in data
on population, commerce and agriculture, local
politics, and patriotism. Imitating Napoleon, he
established the first formal system of German
counterespionage.
As one of Bismarck's most trusted advisers,
Stieber organized an effective secret police system.
He was also adept in the field of political intelli-
gence. His work in alienating Russia and France
prior to the war with France in 1870 was highly
effective. In 1867 he arranged for an attempt to
be made on the life of Alexander of Russia who
was on a diplomatic mission to Paris, but he also
arranged to frustrate and capture the assassin.
To cap it all, at the trial he bribed the French
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NAVAL OFFICERS
jury and obtained an acquittal. The ultimate ef-
fect was that the Russians were antagonized and
canceled further efforts to form an alliance with
France.
Stieber created for Germany a superior intelli-
gence system which was feared and respected
throughout the continent of Europe. Because of
his influence, however, the German intelligence
system always retained some of the characteristics
of a police organization.
Beginnings of Japanese Intelligence
The Japanese early applied their imitative tal-
ents to the organization of up-to-date intelligence
systems for both their Army and Navy. As a re-
sult, they were able to use Intelligence as an effec-
tive offensive instrument in the Russo-Japanese
War of 1904-5 and to overwhelm its Russian coun-
terpart. The Japanese victory in this war has
been attributed in large measure to the effective-
ness of their intelligence activities. For example,
at Port Arthur advance information was obtained
regarding the Russian minefields and the power
station, transmission lines, and powerful search-
lights designed to blind the attackers. With this
knowledge, the Japanese fleet captured the port
with minimum losses in a remarkably short time.
The Japanese were particularly successful in the
speed with which they collected and transmitted
information.
During the 18th and 19th centuries, intelligence
was centralized and systematized primarily at the
highest governmental levels. It therefore had a
political emphasis and often a secret police bias.
In the military field, each general often served as
his own intelligence officer and directed his own
intelligence system. With the increasing com-
plexity of modern warfare, together with the
added burdens imposed by larger, more diverse
armies, greater logistical support and expanding
areas of operations, commanders came to require
better staff organizations, including adequate in-
telligence sections. The impact of the striking
Prussian victories of 1867 and 1870 had a tremen-
dous effect on European military thinking and
gave credence to the writings of such theorists as
Berthier and Clausewitz. By 1900 the major
European powers had developed modern staff sys-
tems and had placed intelligence on the same level
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with personnel, operations, and logistics, designed
to function in times of peace and war.
The Development of the United States Intelligence
Organization?Navy
The improvements and expansion of the world's
navies during the latter years of the 19th century
caused the Navy Department to realize its need
for information from abroad. The building of
new ships of steel instead of wood had begun, and
the best available technical data were required in
order that these ships might incorporate the latest
methods of construction and the most up-to-date
equipment. Accordingly, in March 1882 the Sec-
retary of the Navy established by General Order
an Office of Intelligence under the Bureau of Navi-
gation for the purpose of "systematizing the collec-
tion and classification of information for the use of
the department, in relation to the strength and
resources of foreign navies." The following year
the Secretary emphasized two functions for the
Office of Intelligence: the collection of informa-
tion regarding the progress of naval science and
the dissemination of that information. Not only
commanders, but all other officers, were directed
to collect and submit appropriate professional ma-
terial to Intelligence. From the beginning, there-
fore, Intelligence was given the primary mission
of collecting, interpreting, and disseminating in-
formation of value to the Navy. Commanders in
chief were also directed to appoint an officer, pref-
erably of their personal staffs, to perform the
duties of fleet intelligence officer; and com-
manders of ships were to appoint an officer of their
command for similar duties. The emphasis was
on positive foreign intelligence and on technical
information such as ship construction and ord-
nance. There was some initial opposition to the
new intelligence office from some of the Bureaus,
but the office was soon accepted.
Lt. T. B. B. Mason was selected to head the
new office and was designated as the "Chief In-
telligence Officer." To him is due much credit for
the early organization of the Office of Naval In-
telligence. He was assisted by two other officers
in Washington, with one naval attache in London.
In view of the fact that the office was not estab-
lished by congressional action, there were no ap-
propriations for maintenance; accordingly, clerks
27
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and equipment were borrowed from other offices
and bureaus. This situation existed until after
the Spanish-American War.
The activities of Naval Intelligence during the
Spanish-American War are of particular interest.
There was a broadening of responsibilities, with
a shift in emphasis to intelligence for strategic
and operational use. The Office of Intelligence
prepared data on the strength of the Spanish Navy
and the condition of Spanish home and colonial
ports. At the same time, the attaches were au-
thorized to negotiate abroad for the purchase of
ships and munitions of war, and six cruisers were
purchased in this manner. In order to strengthen
the position of attaches in collecting information
abroad, requests for information by official for-
eign representatives in Washington were chan-
neled through the office.
After 17 years of operation, the Office of Intelli-
gence was established on a permanent basis by
Congress in 1899, with regular appropriations for
carrying on its work. It was charged with ob-
taining information concerning the latest con-
struction and equipment of warships during
peacetime, and producing knowledge of the
strength and disposition of enemy forces in time
of war. It was to assist in maintaining the Navy
in a proper state of readiness for naval operations
and in providing knowledge to aid in the conduct
of hostilities.
The administrative responsibility for the Of-
fice of Intelligence was shifted a number of times
during the first 30 years of its existence: from the
Bureau of Navigation, to the Office of the Secre-
tary, to the Office of the Assistant Secretary, back
to the Bureau of Navigation, and to the Office of
the Aide for Operations. Finally, in 1915, when
a Chief of Naval Operations was created by law,
the Office of Naval Intelligence was established
permanently as one of the divisions under Naval
Operations.
During its formative years the Office of Naval
Intelligence was organized on the basis of the sub-
ject matter with which it was concerned: there
were desks devoted to ships, ordnance, personnel,
communications, and steam engineering and elec-
tricity. At this time technical information took
precedence. One early Intelligence publication
was entitled "Coal, Docking and Repair Facilities
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of the Ports of the World: With Analysis of Dif-
ferent Kinds of Coal."
At various times prior to 1900 the Chief Intel-
ligence Officer had additional responsibilities, such
as: translation of foreign documents, preparation
of the War Plans of the Navy and the Auxiliary
Naval Force. Intelligence also prepared various
kinds of information reports for the Naval Bu-
reaus and for the Naval committees of Congress.
In 1889 the regular report of the Secretary of the
Navy included the following comment regarding
Intelligence: "Its value to naval legislation and
to naval administration is now fully recognized."
Prior to World War I the development of a com-
prehensive intelligence organization was slow, and
serious problems arose in connection with the
availability of trained officer personnel. As a re-
sult civilian employees were used as much as pos-
sible to permit continuity of effort.
Since collection was a basic responsibility of
Naval Intelligence, the collectors assumed an early
importance. The United States Navy sent its first
attache to London in 1882, the year the Office of
Intelligence was established. One additional at-
tache was later accredited to France, Russia, and
Germany. As late as World War I, the Director
of Naval Intelligence expressed the opinion that
his office existed largely for the support of the at-
tache system. As official agents for collection
purposes, the naval attaches were cautioned to use
reputable business methods. Adequate financial
support was a major problem, and officers volun-
teered for attache duty with full knowledge that
their expenses would exceed their pay and allow-
ances. This situation soon created a prejudice
against these posts and rendered difficult the as-
signment of qualified officers.
The Development of the United States Intelligence
Organization?Army
The Army's Attache System dates from 1889.
However, prior to World War I, the military at-
taches received little guidance or support; nor is
it certain that the information they collected was
properly disseminated. As in the case of the
Navy, financial support was a serious problem and
the selection of officers as attaches was often a
haphazard matter governed either by personal ac-
quaintance or by the availability of an officer with
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28
a personal income which would enable him to
meet the expenses of diplomatic life in a foreign
capital.
The importance of intelligence to the Army was
emphasized by Mr. Elihu Root when in 1902, as
Secretary of War, he argued for the creation of an
Army General Staff. In this connection he said:
The Commanding Officer "must determine at what
points and by what routes the place shall be ap-
proached, and at what points his troops shall
land . . . ; and for this purpose he must be in-
formed about the various harbors of the island
and the depth of their channels; what classes of
vessels can enter them; what the facilities for
landing are; how they are to be attacked; the
character of the intervening country; how far it
is healthful or unhealthful; what the climate is
likely to be at the season of the proposed move-
ment; the temper and sympathies of the inhabit-
ants . . ."
Primarily as a result of Mr. Root's efforts, the
Congress created in 1903 an Army General Staff
with three major divisions: Administration, Mili-
tary Information, and War College and Military
Studies. In subsequent years new divisions were
established and Intelligence was placed under the
War College. The few officers assigned to Intel-
ligence before World War I had a constant strug-
gle against prejudice, a half-hostile tradition, and
inadequacies of operating facilities. Such intel-
ligence effort as was possible was confined to col-
lection, with little processing or dissemination.
As late as April 1917 the Army's Intelligence Sec-
tion consisted of only 2 officers and 2 clerks.
Such was the status of military intelligence in
the United States just prior to the First World
War. By contrast, the major European powers
at the same time had military intelligence organi-
zations operating as general staff divisions.
WORLD WAR I
The many tensions which had been building up
for 50 years finally exploded in World War I.
Perhaps some of them were observed by various
intelligence groups, especially during the fateful
year of 1913. Some writers have suggested that
certain situations, such as the Austro-Balkan con-
flicts, might have been averted had intelligence
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knowledge and organization been properly ex-
ploited.
In any event, the various military intelligence
services of Europe all believed themselves to be
prepared to handle any situation, but they were
not prepared for a long general war. Suddenly
they found themselves short of trained personnel,
and without sufficient funds. Their peace-time
efforts had not been adequate. The German sys-
tem was coasting on its past reputation, while the
Russians had never developed a modern or ef-
ficient system. Although British Intelligence was
small, it had a nucleus of organization and a back-
ground of experience capable of rapid expansion.
French Intelligence, in the first critical days of the
war, failed in its estimate of enemy strength. It
did not anticipate the possibility of early German
use of reserves, which put twice as many troops
against the French armies as had been estimated.
General Joffre's battle plan was based on this
erroneous estimate and had to be completely re-
vised, practically at the time of actual conflict.
Belgian Intelligence, activated as late as 1912,
collected vital information on the new German
siege guns, the capabilities of which indicated
serious weaknesses in the Belgian defenses at Ant-
werp, Liege, and Namur. However, the General
Staff considered the reconstruction of these de-
fenses too expensive and too time-consuming to
be worth the effort. In addition, it was believed
inadvisable to disturb their popular King with
such bad news. The high command was also in-
formed by Intelligence of the presence near the
Belgian border of a German force of six brigades
with a mass of artillery. The German tactical
surprise at Liege, therefore, cannot be credited as
much as a German success as an Allied failure to
take proper countermeasures. Failures attributed
to Intelligence have often been failures of a high
command to utilize the intelligence available to it.
As an additional example, at the Battle of St.
Quentin the British Army suffered its most shat-
tering defeat of World War I. At the same time,
it had available the most elaborate collection sys-
tem to be found in an area of combat.
The nature of this war, of course, determined
the pattern of intelligence activities. Develop-
ments in transportation?the railroad and the
motor truck?made possible the use of large ar-
29
mies and permitted the movement of sufficient
ammunition and supplies to support the great ar-
tillery battles and the masses of men engaged in
trench warfare. This tactical situation, in which
the defensive position was stronger than the of-
fensive, resulted in the static kind of warfare
characteristic of World War I. Discipline, train-
ing, and tactics were important factors in deter-
mining victory. Intelligence, therefore, concen-
trated on information about the armed forces of
the enemy and their capabilities.
The introduction of aircraft as implements of
war added a new method of collection: aerial
reconnaissance. Both the area of operations and
the activities of the enemy behind the battlelines
were brought into focus for observation, report-
ing, and use.
A Cryptographers' War
The employment of great armies over broad
areas increased the requirements of communica-
tions. These were met by the perfection of wire-
less telegraphy. Codes and ciphers assumed a
new significance and intelligence found an ex-
panded field of operations. In fact, from the
intelligence standpoint, World War I has been
described as a cryptographers' war. At times the
outcome of land and sea battles was determined
in advance of actual conflict by those who inter-
cepted and broke the enciphered operational mes-
sages of the enemy.
Several examples will be given in a later dis-
cussion of communications intelligence, but two
can be mentioned here because of their particular
impact on the course of the war. At an early
stage of hostilities two Russian armies, the First
and the Second, were advancing separately against
East Prussia, with the objective of joining forces
for an attack against Hindenburg's army which
was numerically superior to each, but inferior to
their combined strength. The First Army failed
to receive the field communications code which
both were to use and was forced to send in plain
language a message advising that it would be
delayed three days in joining the Second. On the
basis of this intercepted information, Hinden-
burg attacked and massacred the Second Army in
the famous Battle of Tannenberg; then crushed
the First Army 3 weeks later. Russia never re-
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INTELLIGENCE FOR
covered from this action and gradually slid into
ruin and revolution.
Early in 1917 the German ambassador to Mexico
was given secret instructions to negotiate an al-
liance with Japan in order to promote an attack
by that country on the United States, with the aid
of Mexico. As her reward Mexico was to receive
three of the American States. This secret mess-
age known as the Zimmerman note, was intercepted
and broken by the British who gave it to the Amer-
icans. This incident had much to do with bring-
ing the United States into the war.
A War of Spies and Agents
Many tales have been told of the colorful per-
sonalities in World War I who worked secretly to
obtain information or to protect it. The story
of Mata Hari, the exotic dancer and condemned
spy, has come to epitomize the romantic and ad-
venturous secret operative and to give the general
public its strongest impression of those associated
with intelligence activity. In spite of this fact,
her actual effectiveness as an agent is considered
questionable. There were agents, however, whose
work was of considerable importance.
One of the better known was Capt. Franz von
Rintelen, a German agent who contributed in no
small measure to impeding the flow of American
supplies to the British prior to the entry of the
United States into the war. With a talent for or-
ganization, he promoted pro-German and anti-
British sentiment in this country. His efforts on
the New York waterfront were particularly suc-
cessful. There his ingenious sabotage caused
ships bound for England to blow up or catch fire.
Labor unions were goaded into crippling strikes
against production and war shipping. A phoney
supply firm was organized which took several
million dollars of Russian money for war material
which was subsequently destroyed at sea.
The Middle East was the scene of widespread
and significant underground activity, German ver-
sus British. In Persia a German agent named
Wassmuss was so effective that four B ritish war-
ships and several thousand troops were eventually
dispatched to curtail his efforts. On the other
hand, Lawrence of Arabia organized and con-
trolled local tribes so effectively that he had more
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A?r-yrifilekr 79/1
30
I?? ro*: is I rill is III _?
NAVAL OFFICERS
value to the British than many thousands of
soldiers.
According to Gen. Maximilian Ronge, director
of the Austrian Intelligence Service, secret agents
were able to advise the enemy well in advance
of every major attack that was projected in World
War I. However, military high commands re-
peatedly failed to take advantage of this vital in-
formation. One interesting example is the Battle
of Caporetto which the Austrians mounted against
the Itrilians in October 1917. From the Austrian
point of view, this battle was their most successful
surprise attack of the entire war. It combined
sound military judgment and thorough prepara-
tions with a skillful offensive use of intelligence.
Weeks in advance of the battle information was
gathered regarding critical adverse political con-
ditions existing within the civilian population in
northern Italy. This information was dissemi-
nated to the Italian front line troops just before
the battle by means of carefully initiated Italian
newspapers. Espionage, counterespionage, cen-
sorship, and propaganda were all employed in this
operation. The effect was devastating and the
Italians lost 600,000 men as casualties and pris-
oners. The success of this engagement, however
was not the result of surprise. The Italian gen-
eral had been fully warned of the intentions of the
Austrians from several sources, including Ameri-
can Military Intelligence. It was successful be-
cause the Italians failed to act.
The Myth of German Intelligence
In 1914 German Intelligence still enjoyed a high
reputation for offensive effectiveness throughout
Europe. However, in the absence of strong lead-
ership supported by the government in power, the
formidable organization created by Steiber under
Bismarck had deteriorated badly. In addition,
the German Imperial Staff was so confident of a
quick victory that it could see no need for
Intelligence.
Actually, at the outset of the war the German
military intelligence system broke down. From
1906 it had concentrated its collection efforts in
Russia and France. Its work was seriously handi-
capped by inadequate financial support, lack of
trained personnel, and active opposition from the
diplomatic corps and other groups within the gov-
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTELLIGENCE
ernment. When Col. Walther Nicolai was ap-
pointed Chief of the Intelligence Service for the
High Command in 1913, he found that there was
no top level guidance for military intelligence.
As a result, his organization did not understand
the political and economic factors involved in its
work. Apparently Naval Intelligence was more
effective, but liaison was poor and there was no
coordination.
When war began, unlimited funds were allo-
cated to Intelligence; but, Nicolai commented
afterward, "money alone will not build up an In-
telligence Service." The German collection effort
in the British Isles had been neglected because the
High Command did not believe Britain would
enter the war. In addition, British counterintel-
ligence was quickly able to apprehend the few
German agents who were operating in the home
islands. German Intelligence immediately suf-
fered a black-out of information and had no ad-
vance knowledge of the arrival in France of the
British Expeditionary Force which joined with
the French Army to defeat the Germans at the
First Battle of the Marne.
Nicolai found it necessary to reorganize military
intelligence under the most adverse conditions.
When appointed to his post he held the rank of
major, and he soon found that his junior status
was a real handicap. When war started his best
officers were transferred to staff duty with the vari-
ous armies. The commanding general of the army
marching through Belgium considered his intel-
ligence officers so unnecessary that he left them
behind at Liege.
Reasons for the initial failures of German Intel-
ligence included lack of preparedness, general
neglect of overall responsibilities, and lack of
foresight. Military and political leaders failed
to recognize the importance of developing a good
intelligence service at the right time and over-
looked the vital necessity for coordination of ef-
fort. Counterintelligence was also understaffed
and handicapped at the start of the war, with no
central direction, especially within Germany
itself.
In spite of its weaknesses and initial failures,
German Intelligence improved materially as the
war progressed. It achieved considerable success
in its espionage and sabotage activities in the
31
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United States under the direction of von Rintelen,
and completely disrupted the French Intelligence
Service prior to the Battle of Verdun. It aided
the Russian revolutionary movement by transport-
ing Lenin across Germany into Russia.
After the war was over, Nicolai wrote a de-
tailed account of the wartime problems of German
Intelligence and the conditions under which it
operated, stating: "Its character and methods
. . . should be generally known if it is ever to
succeed both in carrying out its own tasks and in
thwarting the activities of the opposing Intelli-
gence Services. This applies also to States which
possess no Intelligence Service, have no adequate
idea of its importance, and do not realize how their
people and their political freedom are threatened
. . ." On the basis of subsequent developments,
there is reason to believe that Adolf Hitler read
Nicolai's book most carefully.
French Intelligence
The influence of Stieber in France was tremen-
dous. By 1900 the Deuxieme Bureau had been
established as part of the General Staff System
and made responsible for all enemy information
and the topographical service of the command.
The staff was composed of the following divisions:
administration, intelligence, operations, and sup-
ply. This French system was to exert a strong
influence on the development of the United States
Army Staff during World War I. French naval
attaches, unlike the British, were given direct con-
trol of the Naval Secret Service operating in their
areas.
A Civil Intelligence Service operated under the
chiefs of police of the various larger cities, with
headquarters at Paris. This service was based on
the organization established under Napoleon III.
Nicolai considered France as the "perfect master"
in the field of political and military intelligence,
"directed by a strong and deliberate power
policy."
Russian Intelligence
Under the Tzars, Russian military intelligence
had no centralized administration and suffered be-
cause of an inadequate number of personnel and
no system for training. Full use was made of
military attaches in the collection of information,
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although some were compromised by disclosure of
their undercover activities. The incompetence of
the General Staff had a direct effect on the work
of Intelligence which was far from consistent in
performance. It failed in Germany, while it suc-
ceeded in Austro-Hungary. By means of black-
mail, the Russians obtained from the Chief of
Austrian Intelligence, prior to the war, a list of
Austrian agents operating in Russia and, more im-
portant, the complete Austrian battle plans.
However, the Russian High Command, relying on
this accurate information, failed to anticipate the
probability of any changes in plans by the Aus-
trians when they learned of the treachery of their
Chief of Intelligence. As a result the Russians al-
most lost the Battle of Lemberg in Galicia.
Spying has always been a specialty of the Rus-
sians and they have been adept in the arts of
counterintelligence. Using the informer system
established in France under Napoleon as a model,
the Ochrana perfected the employment of the
"agent provocateur" for purposes of internal se-
curity and political repression. Some of the most
active Russian revolutionaries were trained by the
Ochrana. In addition, the so-called Black Cab-
inet served as a private censorship office of the
Tzar and for a time brought under its cognizance
even officials of the Ochrana.
British Intelligence
The statement has been made that the British
entered World War I with the worst intelligence
system in Europe and ended with the best.
Whether the first part of the statement is true or
not, it is apparent that the initial organization was
small, with limited funds available. At the be-
ginning of 1914 there was a total staff of 14 to
handle the counterintelligence section of military
intelligence. Only 2 years earlier military staff
doctrine had been formalized to include operations
and intelligence functions within the same branch.
Still earlier, the modern British Secret Service
Department had been founded in more or less its
present form. At the outset, however, the British
were able to capitalize on the weaknesses of their
opponents and to counter successfully the intelli-
gence activities of the Germans. In an amazingly
short time sources of vital information were being
exploited with significant results. It is quite pos-
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32
sible that the economic and financial organizations
of the far-flung British Empire were helpful in
developing many of these sources.
Naval Intelligence expanded rapidly along with
the total British Intelligence Service, achieving
its greatest successes by means of censorship and
its code room, the celebrated Room 40 0. B. With
these means were combined a skillful use of covert
agents. For example, an agent was placed in the
German Admiralty where he had access to secret
codes. On this agent's initiative, Admiral von
Spec was ordered to attack the Falkland Islands.
When the German squadron arrived it was met and
destroyed by the waiting British. Illustrative of
the work of the code room was an intercepted
message which warned the British of an impend-
ing German naval attack on the eastern coast of
England. The result was the Battle of Jutland
which forestalled the coastal attack and crippled
the German Grand Fleet to the extent that it re-
mained in its home ports for the balance of the
war. The unfailing ability of Room 40 0. B. to
break the enemy's codes aided immeasurably in
the war against German submarines.
By early 1918 the British Intelligence Service
had reached a new peak of efficiency in the col-
lection of information and the production of in-
telligence. Nicolai, commenting later on British
Intelligence, expressed the opinion that its work
was unique and unsurpassed. The American
Forces in Europe, which depended greatly on
British Intelligence, regarded it as the best service
in the world. The amazing accuracy of British
information may be attributed in part to the ex-
treme care with which all reports were checked.
The reporting records of all agents were kept in
great detail in order to determine their degree
of accuracy and reliability over long periods of
time. Some agents, known to be employed by the
enemy, were left at large in order that the British
might know what the enemy wanted them to
believe. Another basis for the strength of the
British Service may have been its reported corps
of covert agents scattered throughout Europe,
quite independent of its recognized attache system.
The British record in World War I was not
without blemish. One failure occurred at the
Battle of Jutland when vital information failed to
reach the commanding officer in time to be of use.
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As a result the German fleet managed to escape
destruction. In retrospect, the British com-
mander commented that the shore intelligence or-
ganization and the command afloat must be more
closely linked "to insure mutual confidence and
service." The problem, in this case, appeared to
be one of coordination and communications.
United States Naval Intelligence
When war broke out in Europe the Office of
Naval Intelligence was an organization inadequate
for war purposes. Its personnel included 8 offi-
cers, 10 civilians, and 6 attache's. In an effort to
keep abreast of rapidly changing conditions, Naval
Intelligence, in 1915, established a War Informa-
tion Service to obtain military, political, and eco-
nomic information regarding potential enemies.
At the same time, the office was reorganized on a
functional rather than a subject matter basis.
Four major sections were created. Section A was
given administrative responsibilities and the con-
trol of the collection of confidential information
at home and abroad. Section B included crypto-
graphic activities and a clipping service. Section
C acted as a processing agency, while section D
handled dissemination, archives, and a reference
center. There were other sections concerned with
translation, disbursing, filming, printing, and
mail. For the first time, funds to carry on confi-
dential work were provided by the Congress.
Immediately upon the entry of the United
States into the war there was a great expansion
in the organization and activity of Naval Intel-
ligence. The number of officers on duty jumped
from 8 to 300, and the number of attaches was
doubled. Since it was apparent that the intel-
ligence services of the Allies could supply full
information regarding the enemy in the European
theater, domestic counterintelligence became a
principal activity.
This work was delegated to Aides for Infor-
mation, now known as District Intelligence Of-
ficers, who were assigned to each of the Naval
Districts. Their responsibilities included investi-
gations, plant protection, ship inspection, and
naval personnel, both military and civilian.
Branch Intelligence Offices were established as
undercover agencies in large seaports and manu-
facturing centers. These offices grew to consider-
269196 54- 4
33
able size and accomplished much useful work. As
an indication of the extent of naval counterintel-
ligence in the United States, over 3,000 individuals
were actively engaged in its various activities at
the peak of the war. Although cable and radio
censorship was under the cognizance of Naval
Communications, Intelligence provided consider-
able assistance. In the domestic field there was
some conflict of interests between Naval Intel-
ligence and such other Government agencies as
Military Intelligence, the Departments of Justice
and Treasury, the Emergency Fleet Corporation,
and the War Industries Board.
Abroad, the naval attaches continued to have as
their primary responsibility the collection of in-
formation. The quality of their work during the
war was subject to considerable criticism, espe-
cially by staff officers assigned to United States
Naval Forces, Europe, with headquarters in Lon-
don. Adm. W. S. Sims, in command of this force,
was also critical of the evaluation of initial reports
by Intelligence headquarters in Washington. At
the same time, he fully recognized the importance
of intelligence and stated that the "efficient and
intelligent exercise of command is entirely de-
pendent upon information." It was his expressed
point of view that there should be an entirely sepa-
rate Intelligence Section on a naval staff which
would work in the closest cooperation with the
other staff sections. He stressed the opinion that
Intelligence should be prepared to be the first in the
field in the event of war. Some of the criticism
of the work of the naval attaches can undoubtedly
be attributed to the fact that the number of per-
sonnel was inadequate to permit the satisfactory
performance of their assigned responsibilities. It
was also found that the personalities of officers per-
forming attache duties and their ability to work
easily with representatives of foreign intelligence
services were of great importance.
United States Military Intelligence
Col. Ralph H. van Deman, called the "father of
American Military Intelligence," played an im-
portant role in the postwar recognition of Intel-
ligence as a separate function of the Army's Gen-
eral Staff. He was materially aided by the Sec-
retary of War, the Army's Chief of Staff, and Gen-
eral Pershing himself. The latter made Intel-
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ligence a coordinate section of his staff even before
his forces landed in England in June 1917. The
British, and especially the French staff systems
influenced the staff organization of the American
Expeditionary Forces in Europe, with the result
that Intelligence sections were created at both
higher and intermediate echelons. When America
entered the war, Army Intelligence was rapidly
expanded.
The central office in Washington was organized
into three branches. The positive branch was as-
signed the functions of collection, evaluation, and
dissemination. Its responsibilities included prep-
aration of situation estimates and translation of
documents. The negative branch carried out
counterintelligence functions, including investi-
gations regarding disloyalty and sedition, enemy
activities, and graft and fraud in organizations
under the control of the War Department.
Thousands of officers and men were engaged in
this field. The Geographic Branch was concerned
with the production of maps, photographs, and
terrain studies. In addition there were sections
for administration, collection of information by
attaches and troops, and codes and ciphers.
In connection with MIS, the code and cipher
section, it should be noted that this type of work
was almost unknown to the War Department
prior to World War I. Its activities were many
and varied and have been recorded in some detail
by II. 0. Yardley in his book, The American Black
Chamber. However, this section was regarded
only as a wartime agency by the Director of Mili-
tary Intelligence and high Government officials,
and was discontinued shortly after the war was
over. During its relatively short existence, it
demonstrated the importance of cryptography as
an intelligence procedure essential to the success-
ful prosecution of war.
In the European Theater there are interesting
examples of the effectiveness of Army Intelli-
gence. One concerns the discovery of vital in-
formation on German submarine operations in the
North Sea and around the British Isles. In Oc-
tober 1917, after a successful raid over England,
the German zeppelin L-49 was forced down in
France. Scraps of an operational map were ob-
tained through the persistent efforts of an Ameri-
can colonel who waded through a swamp over
CONFIDENTIAL
34
which the zeppelin had traveled. The map con-
tained a code covering the North Sea and British
Isles area. It meant little, however, until a code
book was recovered from two American souvenir
hunters who had rifled the cabin of the L-49 prior
to the arrival of Intelligence representatives.
With the map and the code book, the Allies gained
complete data on German submarine operations
and were able to surprise and destroy a large num-
ber of U-boats at their designated rendezvous.
The activities of the military attaches in Eu-
rope and the military observers attached to the
European armies during the first part of the war
appear to have been handicapped by organiza-
tional deficiencies. In the War Department's
Annual Report for the year 1919, the Chief of
Staff commented that the valuable information
gathered by these military observers was never
properly used. During this period, the attaches
were involved in counterintelligence work which
proved both difficult and delicate.
It was not until August 1918 that the Military
Intelligence Division was established officially as
coequal with the other Divisions of the Army
General Staff. In commenting upon this devel-
opment, the Director of Military Intelligence
stated that correct military information can be
obtained only as the result of correct staff organi-
zation. He added: "Our Army now has its eyes
open. It is the duty of every officer to study and
support our intelligence organization in order
that our Army eyes may never again be closed."
At the height of its activity, near the close of the
war, the Division in Washington was staffed by
more than 1,200 highly specialized persons, of
whom the majority were civilian employees. The
field force was enlarged and improved, with rep-
resentatives in all important foreign countries,
in the major cities of the United States, and in
each military unit at home and overseas. Army
Intelligence personnel were utilized by the Ameri-
can Commission during the peace negotiations in
Paris.
By the end of this war, there was apparent rec-
ognition of the close relationships which should
exist between intelligence and national strategy
and between intelligence and war planning. Brig.
Gen. Marlborough Churchill, Director of Military
Intelligence, wrote that national policy is based
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on accurate predictions regarding the interna-
tional future and that war plans must be grounded
on correct detailed information. "There is hardly
an officer who does not realize that at a G. H. Q.
and at the headquarters of every army, corps, di-
vision, and similar unit, G-3 cannot make good
plans unless G-2 furnishes good information." A
strikingly similar statement was to be made more
than 30 years later by the Army's Chief of Staff,
Gen. Omar Bradley, in relating his personal ex-
periences in World War II.
Perhaps the most important single contribution
made by the United States to the development of
offensive intelligence method was the employment
of aircraft to transport covert agents over the
battlelines to and from areas under enemy control.
In this connection, however, it should be noted
that the head of Army Intelligence, at the end of
the war, believed that covert agents could not be
justified by the military in time of peace. In this
belief he appears to have reflected the thinking then
current among Washington officials.
THE INTERWAR PERIOD
In the period between World Wars I and II,
political developments in each of the major na-
tions distinctively shaped the emphasis on and
therefore the results of intelligence. Having
fought a war to end all wars, the United States
sharply curtailed its military expenditures and em-
barked upon a program of world peace. Public
opinion was such that there was a necessary and
rapid demobilization of both civilian and tempo-
rarily commissioned personnel. A similar situa-
tion existed in Great Britain, where a conservative
government sought a return to the status quo.
In France, Intelligence suffered increasingly from
growing political corruption. On the other hand,
restrictive political police systems became the
foundation and support of autocratic govern-
ments in Germany, Italy, and Soviet Russia, not
to mention other smaller countries in central and
eastern Europe.
The Neglect of Intelligence in the United States
The intelligence organization which had begun
to assume some form by the close of World War I
deteriorated rapidly. Military Intelligence, such
as it was, suffered from insufficient funds, lack of
35
CONFIDENTIAL
appreciation or sense of responsibility on the part
of the State, War, and Navy Departments, and,
most of all, from a feeling by most officers that
an Intelligence assignment was undesirable. For
the most part, Intelligence billets were filled by
officers awaiting retirement. Such capable officers
as were assigned found little opportunity or en-
couragement to improve the situation. There was
no successful effort to recruit or train new
personnel.
The organization of Naval Intelligence prac-
tically fell to pieces. Contributing factors were
the general desire to return to "normalcy," and
a feeling of antagonism toward any organization
involving classified activities. In 1920 the Secre-
tary of the Navy assured the Congress that the
activities of Naval Intelligence in the collection
of information at home had been restricted and
the office reduced to its prewar status. At the
same time, the Director of Naval Intelligence was
constrained to state that the activities of his of-
fice were now the same as they had been in 1882.
The number of attaches abroad was cut dras-
tically.
By 1938 world political conditions had stimu-
lated an increase in the number of naval attaches.
However, the collection of information was in-
adequate and there were too few trained persons
to process what was collected. By late 1941 the
organization of Naval Intelligence had been ex-
panded in Washington, in the naval districts, and
overseas. The volume of incoming information
increased correspondingly, but the years of neg-
lect and inactivity could not be overcome so
quickly.
The Condition of British Intelligence
The published records of expenditures ap-
proved by Parliament for governmental intelli-
gence organizations indicate roughly their status
during the period from 1919 to 1939. More than
$5,000,000 were appropriated in 1919. The fol-
lowing year operating funds were cut to about
one fifth of that amount, and during succeeding
years there were still further reductions. Al-
though the British had developed the best intelli-
gence organization in Europe during World
War I, they soon found themselves with little
more than a skeleton force, incapable of much
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productive action. Fortunately, however, the
vital nucleus was retained upon which to build
again.
By 1935 there were indications that British Na-
val Intelligence was active once more in the
Mediterranean area. One of its self-revealed
agents, Dod Orsborne, has given an interesting ac-
count of his own assignment. His purpose was
to obtain and to transmit information about Mus-
solini's activities in Ethiopia and about the prog-
ress of events in Spain. He was disguised as the
skipper of a boat whose appearance could be
radically altered from sailing vessel to steam
trawler to diesel-driven fishing boat. He landed
agents in Spain, the Balearic Islands, Morocco,
Algeria, and Libya and brought back vital infor-
mation to his contact at Gibraltar. His story is
not only colorful, but also indicative of one type
of intelligence operations in the Mediterranean
during the period of increasing tension some years
before the outbreak of war.
By 1939 the funds reported as available to Brit-
ish Intelligence had been increased to more than
$2,000,000. Once again the British were to de-
velop the most efficient intelligence organization in
the world. Two of their initial and basic problems
were those of personnel and training. For the im-
pending war, therefore, their early intelligence
efforts were necessarily defensive. Their success
has been attributed, in part at least, to qualities of
discipline, imagination, and improvisation.
The Decline of French Intelligence
At the close of World War I, France had one
of the most efficient and extensive intelligence sys-
tems in Europe. The head of Military Intelli-
gence, through his membership on one of the
important Allied commissions, was able to expand
his organization of covert agents throughout Eu-
rope during the early postwar period. As the
newly created national states of central and east-
ern Europe developed their own governmental
structures, their intelligence systems were closely
coordinated with that of France. By this in-
genious method France was able to advance and to
protect its national interests and to maintain an
intricate network of agents and informers. The
resulting organization was superior to that of
Stieber and the equal, at least, of that of Napoleon.
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36
In the decade before the Second World War,
this organization was fatally weakened by the
germs of internal corruption which spread
throughout the nation, and which eventually aided
the Germans in infiltrating both the political and
military structure of France, thus further weak-
ening the French intelligence system.
The Expansion of German Intelligence
As early as 1924 the Chief of German Military
Intelligence, Nicolai, declared: "Now that inten-
sive military, political, and economic espionage,
after its successes in the World War, has become
an official organ of the state, it is time that the
public should recognize the fact." While the
United States and Great Britain sought peace
through the reduction Of their wartime organiza-
tions, the Germans strove to profit by their mis-
takes and to forge invincible weapons for military
victory. The growth of a dictatorship under
Adolph Hitler and the National Socialist Party
encouraged, promoted, and soon absorbed this ef-
fort of the German militarists.
The militarists, including Ludendorff, were con-
vinced that World War I had been lost because
of a failure to organize the country for total war,
behind the battlelines as well as at the front.
Acutely aware that this war had shifted the em-
phasis of attack to the minds and emotions of
both soldiers and civilians, they recognized the
great importance of propaganda. Lenin had
enunciated the idea of an initial moral disintegra-
tion of the enemy before attempting physical at-
tack; and Hitler was in complete agreement. In
Nein Kampf, he wrote, "In the future, the place
of the artillery barrage as preparation for an in-
fantry attack will be taken by revolutionary propa-
ganda, designed to break down the enemy psy-
chologically before the armies begin to function
at all."
To carry out this new type of warfare a new
armament of knowledge was required. As soon
as Hitler assumed power he gave high priority to
the organization necessary to produce that knowl-
edge. By 1937 the new German intelligence sys-
tem was operating at peak efficiency with all of
its many branches carefully coordinated by a Liai-
son Staff, of which Rudolph Hess was the chair-
man and Nicolai a permanent member. Included
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in this system were: the Intelligence Service of
the War ministry, under the direction of Nicolai ;
the Abwehr, or Military Intelligence, under Ad-
miral Canaris ; the Auslands Organization (AO),
or Organization of Germans Living Abroad,
headed by Ernst Bohle ; the Special Service of
the Foreign Office, headed by von Ribbentrop;
the Foreign Department of the Propaganda Min-
istry, under Goebbels; Rosenberg's Foreign Polit-
ical Office; the Foreign Department of the Min-
istry of Economics and Finance; the Reich
Colonial Office; and the Foreign Department of
the Gestapo, under Himmler and Heydrich.
Hitler's personal plan for world conquest was
based upon means which were not only military,
but also economic, political, and psychological.
To make it effective, full information and accurate
estimates were required concerning the entire re-
sistance capability, both actual and potential, of
prospective enemies. Knowledge of actual re-
armament was not as important as rearmament
potential; the capacity of an enemy's war industry
was not as significant as the total industrial po-
tential which could be geared to war purposes.
Prof. Karl Haushofer's Geopolitical Institute at
the University of Munich thus became an ad-
ditional important branch of the German system
devoted to the collection of information and the
production of intelligence. With unlimited funds
available, Haushofer employed more than a thou-
sand research workers at home and abroad, in-
cluding historians and economic statisticians. De-
tailed analyses of the more important countries of
the world were prepared from the point of view of
their political, economic, and sociological struc-
tures. Both geographic vulnerabilities and mi-
nority group problems were included in these
studies.
Such was the comprehensive and complex Ger-
man intelligence system. It was a worldwide or-
ganization for the gathering of vast quantities of
information, with elaborate facilities for classify-
ing, evaluating, and converting that information
into intelligence. Under the Nazis, intelligence
as an activity was a huge enterprise, operating
with the precision of a modern machine. No
longer was intelligence a matter of individual ac-
complishment but rather the combined achieve-
ment of many groups. The dimensions of the new
organization were drawn to accommodate the re-
quirements of global war, fought by many means.
It was a system new to the modern world.
In developing this organization the Nazis were
influenced considerably by Soviet methods. For
example, the machinery of diplomacy was care-
fully geared to intelligence operations. Special
agents were attached to embassies, legations, and
consulates throughout the world under the guise
of military, naval, air, commercial, and press at-
taches. Networks of covert agents were tied in
with these special groups. The worldwide or-
ganization of German-born men and women was
exploited wherever possible. Its potentialities
were great, as indicated by the size of its mem-
bership which was officially reported in 1937 to be
3 million, and an additional 100,000 sailors serving
on German ships. Special organizations in Ger-
many were utilized, such as the Students' Bureau,
the Bureau for Educators and Teachers, and var-
ious labor and cultural groups. Even the Ger-
man youth were carefully organized and trained
to believe that sabotage, murder, and spying were
natural expressions of loyalty to the State and
Per Filehrer.
Every conceivable method was employed to gain
information. One of the more technical was the
breaking of diplomatic codes. A clever device of
the German Foreign Ministry was the delivery of
an important note to foreign embassies on a quiet
weekend which would require the embassy to re-
quest instructions from its government. When
such enciphered messages were presented to the
Reichspost for transmittal, German cryptanalysts
would attempt to break the codes used, capitaliz-
ing on the possibility that the message had not
been paraphrased and would contain the German
note verbatim. Whether or not this particular
device was used against the Belgians, it is true
that their diplomatic code was known to German
Intelligence before the outbreak of World War II.
Initially at least, within the War Ministry,
Nicolai was able to coordinate all Military Intel-
ligence activities?army, navy and air?and to
achieve an overall political guidance through liai-
son with the Foreign Office. Under Hitler, there-
fore, Nicolai's theories became practice for a lim-
ited period of time. In addition, he was able to
expand the field of military intelligence interest
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to include not only fortifications, military person-
nel, and materiel, but also such behind-the-line
matters as communications systems, public utili-
ties, and scientific and technical developments.
Careful and early planning was a key feature
of the German system. For example, the Abwehr,
under Admiral Canaris, had selected its foreign
listening posts and personnel with the greatest of
care years before war came. There are indications
that even the isolation of Germany by its enemies
was given consideration, and well-laid plans were
prepared by the Abwehr to permit the continued
flow of information into Berlin from various areas
outside of Europe.
Intensive advance planning, in which Intelli-
gence played a vital part, found its most startling
expression in Hitler's development of the modern
offensive weapon which came to be known, after the
Spanish Civil War, as the fifth column. Highly
effective in a number of foreign countries, this
weapon consisted of corrupt, politically dissatis-
fied, self-interested people who were won to the
Nazi cause by means of propaganda and master-
race doctrines. Many of these people remained in-
active and unknown, to be used for special pur-
poses when military conflict began. Then bridges
were seized and road blocks formed by men in
civilian clothes or local uniforms; and planned
sabotage threw into confusion local defenses, sup-
ply systems, and transportation and telecommuni-
cations.
German Intelligence operations abroad were
many and met with varying degrees of success.
In France the political and moral disintegration
provided the Nazis with a most rewarding oppor-
tunity for fifth-column activities. A number of
Frenchmen whose loyalties were bought by Ger-
man gold and promises held important positions in
government and came from some of the first fami-
lies of the land. The frequency of trials for trea-
son in the prewar period revealed the gravity of
the situation. Involved in some of these trials
was betrayal to the Germans of secrets of the
Maginot Line, the Belfort fortifications, and plans
of the Metz fortress and the Toulon Naval Base.
In other countries of Europe the appearance of
the quislings after war began revealed the success
of earlier German operations.
Fully aware of the failure of German Intelli-
CONFIDENTIAL 38
gence in Great Britain in 1914, the Nazis were
determined that it should not fail again. Accord-
ingly, large numbers of agents were sent into Eng-
land years before Poland was invaded. The
extensiveness of their activities is indicated by the
number of espionage cases which were uncovered
during the years from 1935 to 1939. Not all were
caught, however. One successful agent who went
by the name of Van Schullermann first arrived in
England in 1927. By 1932 he had become a natu-
ralized citizen, well established in a modest busi-
ness near the naval base at Scapa Flow. Over a
considerable period of time he seems to have gath-
ered accurate information about the antisubmarine
defenses for this base. At any rate, to his efforts
is attributed the German success in penetrating
Scapa Flow and sinking H. M. S. Royal Oak early
in the war. At the outset of their intelligence
efforts in Britain the Germans were able to take
advantage of the fact that the British were in no
way prepared for hostilities, either in fact or in.
spirit. But again, in 1939 as in 1914, the Germans
were unable to cope successfully with British
counterintelligence. Emphasis on quantity rather
than quality of effort, and stereotyped methods,
again were important factors in the German
failure.
Nazi intelligence activities in the United States
began in 1933, soon after Hitler came to power.
German shipping was utilized to introduce covert
agents into the country and to transmit informa-
tion back to Berlin. By 1938 vital defense secrets
were reaching German Intelligence files. Among
them were blueprints for new bombers and
fighters, stolen from aircraft plants in New York
and Pennsylvania; key designs of naval ships, re-
vealing possible weaknesses; and certain codes of
the Army Air Force. On the west coast German
agents were relaying information to the Japanese;
and members of the German-American Bund were
striving to obtain classified maps of fortifications
in the Panama Canal Zone.
Within Germany itself, Hitler's intelligence sys-
tem was equally comprehensive. The Nazi leaders
fully realized that they must- establish absolute
control over the German people if they were to
control the world. Accordingly, even before
Hitler came to power his henchmen had laid plans
for a secret police system. In 1932 there were
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138,000 German police; a year and a half later
there were 437,000, of whom almost half were
members of the Nazi Elite Guard, called the
Schutz-Staffel, or SS. By 1940 the SS alone
totaled 432,000 men, organized into 36 divisions of
12,000 men each. During war this army was des-
ignated to hold the inner front. A significant
part of the SS was the secret police force called
the Gestapo, a name which came to strike fear and
terror into the minds of men. The Gestapo was
not only inquisitive in nature; it was an inquisi-
tion. Its purpose was to hunt out, repress, and
destroy all enemies of the Nazi State. Its meth-
ods were characterized by brutality, if not bestial-
ity. Its eyes and ears gradually penetrated all
phases of German life.
It must have seemed to the Nazis that they had
indeed forged an invincible weapon for their com-
plete success. It was well made; and Hitler soon
put it to triumphant use in Austria, Czechoslo-
vakia, and other areas of Europe. However, the
Nazis failed to control the inevitable human factor
which eventually led to the serious weakening of
their entire Intelligence apparatus. Distrust arose
and increased between the leaders of the Gestapo
and those of the Abwehr of the Army General
Staff. There were conflicts between the secret
police and military intelligence, especially as to
spheres of authority and responsibility. Rivalries
became intense, with much personal jealousy and
animosity. By 1938 Hitler found it expedient to
form a high command of the armed forces and to
relieve the general staff of any responsibility for
the interpretation of intelligence. The political
direction, urged by Nicolai, became political
domination.
Italian Intelligence
Mussolini's major military intelligence effort
was demonstrated briefly during his campaign
into Ethiopia in 1935. It took the form of sub-
version of the Coptic priests in order to render
even easier the overthrow of their government.
The principal Italian Intelligence organization
was the Fascist Secret Police, known as the OVRA,
established officially in 1926 as a direct result of
the insecurity of the Fascist government and a
succession of attempts to assassinate Mussolini
himself. Its weapons, applied with liberality
against the Italian people, were fear, terror, and
absolute power over life and death. The OVRA,
as part of the state militia, devoted itself to ob-
taining information about all enemies of the state,
both within Italy and abroad. Agents provoca-
teurs were active in Europe and in North and
South America, where they attempted to hunt
down and destroy Italian antifascists. One of
their effective weapons against those who managed
to escape from the country was holding as hostages
families who had been left behind.
In 1938, when Mussolini entrusted his political
fortunes to Hitler, the German Gestapo entered
Italy in force and rapidly replaced OVRA with
its own organization.
The Rapid Growth of Japanese Intelligence
Even before Hitler began to implement his con-
cept of total war in Europe, the Japanese were
putting many of the same theories to use in Asia.
For example, the political and moral disintegra-
tion within Manchuria?an early objective for ag-
gression?provided an excellent opportunity for
the use of the fifth column technique.
For many years the head of the Army's Bureau
of Military Information, Colonel Doihara, had
been active in China. Using many disguises,
from peddlar to priest, he had traveled about the
country, gathering information and enlisting the
services of dissident elements and criminal groups.
He was particularly successful in utilizing agents
provocateurs to create incidents which would jus-
tify interference in China by Japanese military
forces. In the summer of 1931, for example, he
arranged for the kidnapping of the commander of
the Manchurian Infantry. Several days later, a
group of men dressed in uniforms of the Man-
churian Infantry provoked an argument with a
Japanese officer on the streets of Mukden and bru-
tally killed him before a crowd of onlookers.
Taken into custody, these men stated that they
had acted under the direct orders of their com-
mander. When an explanation was demanded by
the Japanese Government, the commander, of
course, could not be found. Immediately the
Manchurian Government was accused of protect-
ing this officer and encouraging atrocities against
the Japanese. After diplomatic denials were pre-
sented, the officer in question reappeared. Hay-
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ing been well treated, he was unable to support
his story of kidnapping and was completely
discredited.
In addition to this type of direct pressure, the
Japanese employed more subtle, though equally
effective, methods. The Chinese opium industry
was exploited and the sale of its product promoted
among the people, with the double-edged result
of further destroying their moral fiber and at the
same time providing financial support for the
whole operation.
As Japanese plans for expansion in Asia devel-
oped, so did her requirements for information to
be used to support conquest by military, economic,
political, and psychological means. The alloca-
tion of more than $3,000,000 to official Japanese in-
telligence services for the fiscal year 1934-35 is
indicative of the attention given to their develop-
ment. Listening posts and personnel were gradu-
ally established in Malaya, Singapore, Burma,
Java, the Philippines, Morotai, French In do-
China, and India. After the "China Incident" of
1937 the activities of military intelligence mate-
rially increased. With Manchuria and Korea as
bases for operation, the collection effort against
Soviet Siberia was intensified. Long before their
attack against Pearl Harbor, the Japanese had ex-
tended their intelligence network throughout the
world, utilizing agents of many types.
Trained agents were provided in part by the
Army General Staff. As the demand for personnel
increased, it became necessary to establish secretly
in 1938 a Rear Area Service Personnel Training
Center, which was soon expanded into an Army
Intelligence School. Officers trained at this school
were sent abroad as military attach4s, diplomats,
newspaper reporters, businessmen, or special
agents. Their activities included: the collection
of information and liaison work; the organiza-
tion of small guerrilla groups, especially in China,
for scouting and undercover operations; and sab-
otage and subversion, which was concentrated in
southeast Asia and the islands of the Pacific.
These officers were the vanguard for Japanese mil-
itary action, paving the way for the occupation
of various areas by Japanese troops.
Naval officers also acted as special intelligence
agents and were distributed throughout the mer-
chant marine and fishing fleets disguised as wire-
CONFIDENTIAL
40
less operators, crew members, and ships' officers,
especially in the Pacific. Thus training maneu-
vers of the United States Fleet, for example, were
watched by expert eyes from nearby Japanese
cargo ships or fishing craft. There were, of
course, many situations in which Japanese person-
nel could not be used because of their oriental
appearance. As a result, Caucasians were often
employed, particularly Germans, in such areas as
Hawaii, the United States, and South America.
In addition to their trained personnel, the In-
telligence services had available literally thousands
of amateur collectors of information, for one char-
acteristic of the Japanese is careful and conscien-
tious observation. More important, they feel
impelled to report their observations to proper
authorities. As a result, great quantities of in-
formation were channeled into Tokyo from trav-
elers, tourists, Japanese living abroad, and
business firms operating in foreign countries.
These amateurs usually had cameras and made the
most of their opportunities to photograph war-
ships, naval bases, and other subjects of possible
military interest. Reports and photographs were
turned over to military authorities, either directly
or through consulates, special messengers, or rep-
resentatives of the merchant marine. While
much of this information was inaccurate or with-
out value, it was all carefully classified and proc-
essed by the Intelligence agencies of the Army
and Navy and the Information Bureau of the For-
eign Office. This technique of capitalizing on the
mass collection of information is a Japanese con-
tribution to the modern development of intelli-
gence activity.
The collection procedures of the Japanese in
the prewar period also indicate their appreciation
of the importance of peacetime planning and
preparation, years in advance of actual conflict.
An excellent illustration is provided by one of
their agents, a Dr. Kuehn and his family, who
came to Oahu, T. H., from Germany in 1935. Dr.
Kuehn posed as a scientist interested in the an-
cient history of the islands. About 1939 his
daughter, Ruth, opened a beauty shop, which
served as an excellent source of information gath-
ered from its patrons who were the wives of United
States Navy personnel. As Japanese require-
ments for information became more definite, Dr.
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Kuehn began to forward through the Japanese
and German consulates specific information re-
garding naval ships at Pearl Harbor. On De-
cember 2, 1941, a complete report on the number,
types, and exact locations of United States naval
ships in the Hawaiian area was prepared for the
Japanese consul who transmitted it by short-wave
radio to Japanese Naval Intelligence Headquar-
ters. At the appropriate time, the Kuehns were
to be evacuated to Tokyo by submarine; but this
plan failed to materialize because they were appre-
hended and taken into custody as the result of
action by the United States Naval Intelligence.
The Trend of Soviet Intelligence
During the early years between the two World
Wars, the development and consolidation of power
within Russia consumed much of the attention and
energies of the revolutionists who had seized con-
trol of the government in 1917. For this reason
Soviet Intelligence was, first of all, a security po-
lice system, with military intelligence occupying
a position of secondary importance. Conditioned
to an atmosphere of distrust and suspicion while
they were revolutionary conspirators, the Soviet
leaders fully appreciated the need for a highly
organized and pervasive Intelligence system to
maintain rigid controls over the actions and even
the thoughts of the Russian people. Within 3
weeks after the revolution had become an accom-
plished fact, they established the Cheka which con-
tinued not only the tradition but also the methods
of the Tzarist Oehrana.
The Ch,eka was given great independence of ac-
tion, with the power to carry out searches, arrests,
and executions. Its ruthless and brutal methods
inspired such fear and terror that it became the
object of widespread opposition within a few
short years. As a result, in 1922, when the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics was established, the
Ch,eka was abolished. It was quickly replaced,
however, by the 0. G. P. U., which had its head-
quarters in Moscow, with branches known as
G. P. U. in each of the member republics. The
purposes, powers, and methods of this new or-
ganization were substantially the same as those of
the Ckeka, but its jurisdiction was expanded.
The border and internal security troops were
placed under its control, and a military section
was created to insure the political allegiance of
the Army and the Navy. In 1934, the 0. G. P. U.
was replaced by the N. K. V. D. At this time
there was further centralization of authority and
a reorganization to include all police and firemen
engaged in overt security duties. New sections
were added to direct the surveillance of the civil-
ian population and of foreign espionage agents.
Soviet Intelligence had now become a full-scale
commissariat of the government, far more com-
prehensive and powerful than anything ever en-
visioned by the Tzars. Its stability and deadly
influence were fully demonstrated by its bloody
purge of Red Army personnel in 1937.
The record of Soviet Intelligence within Russia
during the period from 1917 to 1939 is one of
steady expansion and increasing influence in every
aspect of Russian society. Abroad it became
more and more active, developing networks of
agents and informers by many means. The inter-
national organization of Communists, the Comin-
tern, provided excellent opportunities for
intelligence activities in many countries. Diplo-
matic and trade channels were exploited for the
collection of information by carefully placed in-
telligence agents. For example, more extensive
Soviet intelligence activities in the United States
are believed to date from 1933 when diplomatic
relations were reestablished between the two coun-
tries. In fact, every conceivable situation was
skillfully turned to the advantage of intelligence
operations. In 1929 when Stalin expelled Trot-
sky from the Soviet Union, the N. K. V. D. made
use of this situation to send abroad a number of
covert agents posing as escaped sympathizers.
Some legitimate sympathizers were permitted to
leave the U. S. S. R. only after they had agreed to
serve the N. K. V. D. The double result of this
procedure was to provide a good cover for intelli-
gence personnel and to confuse and discredit anti-
Soviet groups outside the country.
The Spanish Civil War was also used to good
advantage for intelligence purposes. Not only
did Soviet personnel receive excellent practical
training, but also valuable information was
gained regarding the capabilities of other coun-
tries involved. One seemingly insignificant, but
important, procedure initiated by the Soviets in
this war was the careful collection of the pass-
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ports of volunteers who came from many coun-
tries to fight in Spain. The passports of those
killed were saved for later use by Soviet agents
in other parts of the world. This procedure pro-
vides a good illustration of long-range planning.
There are indications that Soviet Intelligence,
or the use of intelligence, was not always success-
ful in the pre-World War II period. At the out-
set of the Russo-Finnish War of 1939, Soviet
forces suffered some amazing defeats at the hands
of inferior Finnish armies. There was subse-
quent speculation that the Kremlin may well have
been led by Finnish Communists to believe that
their country's armies would not materially resist
Soviet military maneuvers. If this was true, then
Soviet Intelligence may have suffered from a
tendency to place too much reliance upon infor-
mation derived from affiliated foreign Communist
organizations.
During the early part of World War II, a fur-
ther reorganization of the Soviet Intelligence
System resulted in the establishment of the Peo-
ple's Commissariat of State Security, called the
N. K. G. B. This new agency relieved the
N. K. V. D. of its functions in internal surveil-
lance and the collection of information abroad.
WORLD WAR II
The Second World War has been described as
one of unparalleled mobility, tremendous destruc-
tiveness, and intense savagery. The technologi-
cal improvements in tanks and aircraft, when used
in combination, made possible the lightning war,
or "Blitzkrieg," so successfully employed by Hit-
ler. Poland was conquered in 18 days and France
fell in 35. The French General Staff, complacent
and unprepared, was paralyzed by this new war-
fare of fluid movement. The techniques de-
veloped by the Germans were later used with equal
success by General Patton in his drive on Paris.
Other methods of warfare were developed with
notable effectiveness. Strategic bombing brought
destruction behind the battlelines to all parts of
enemy countries, while transport aircraft carried
conquering airborne forces across geographical
barriers. Amphibious craft made possible the
launching of land attacks from the sea which had
been considered too difficult in previous wars. In-
ventions in the field of electronics produced such
CONFIDENTIAL
42
weapons as radar and guided missiles for long-
range battle use. The aircraft carrier replaced
the battleship as the capital ship and made pos-
sible the waging of sea battles across hundreds of
miles. Guerrilla warfare sprang out of internal
resistance movements and was exploited on a wide
scale. The submarine harassed lines of communi-
cations and committed sizable organized forces
to its pursuit. The radio permitted an intensifi-
cation of propaganda and the waging of psycho-
logical warfare in all parts of the world, a type
of "strategic bombing" of equal effectiveness in
peace or war.
World War II was much more than a series of
battles between armies and navies; it was a gi-
gantic struggle between peoples for survival and
for the perpetuation of their economies and ways
of life. Hitler's intelligence weapon had to be
improved upon and surpassed by the opposing
nations. The variety of the modern methods of
warfare imposed even greater demands upon In-
telligence, for it had to cover not only the armed
forces of the enemy, their discipline, training, and
tactics; in addition, it had to be conversant with
industrial capacity, technological abili ties, trans-
portation and communication facilities, internal
political situations, and the will of the people to
resist. The speed of this war placed a premium
on the time factor in the collection of information
and the dissemination of intelligence. The com-
plexity and scope of military action increased the
problems of preparing accurate intelligence esti-
mates which in turn led to the demand for more
highly trained personnel. The sheer volume of
advance knowledge required for success in battle
forced the expansion of organizations to a size
adequate for its production. The resistance move-
ments in occupied and enemy countries aided ma-
terially in the collection of information. The un-
precedented number of covert agents stepped up
the work of both intelligence and counterintel-
ligence. Radio and aircraft facilitated the trans-
mission of information. The total impact of all
of this intelligence activity rendered doubly im-
portant the most stringent security measures.
At the beginning of World War II, the pre-
ponderance of land and air military strength was
in the hands of Germany, Japan, and the Soviet
Union. Likewise, the offensive intelligence
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strength of Germany and Japan was superior. On
the other hand, for over 2 years the Western Al-
lies were harassed, driven back, and on the de-
fensive, while they took time to prepare a counter-
offensive.
The Effectiveness of German Intelligence
The Nazis began the war with the world's best
organized intelligence service. Without detract-
ing from the effectiveness of the German military
forces, it is generally agreed that their early rapid
progress was greatly facilitated by the advance
preparations of Intelligence, which preceded and
accompanied troop movements. Polish resistance
was paralyzed by the Nazi fifth column which
spread false rumors, issued conflicting orders, and
transmitted vital operational information to the
German General Staff. France, from the military
point of view, was potentially much more power-
ful than Poland, yet fifth column activities had
fatally weakened her ability to fight and, even
worse, her will to resist.
Greece and Yugoslavia were able to prolong
their resistance to German covert penetration.
Time and the examples of Poland and France were
of some assistance to them. In addition, the
Italian OVRA, which had assumed some responsi-
bilities to prepare these countries for invasion,
failed miserably. In Greece, for example, Ger-
man forces were required to save Mussolini from
being thrown back into the Adriatic.
The German intelligence service had available
unlimited funds, an army of agents, and a net-
work of collection centers. At the beginning of
the war $200,000,000 were reportedly being
spent annually on intelligence organization and
propaganda. In 1943 the Abwehr was allocated
$11,700,000 and had a personnel strength of 30,000
including 7,000 officers. In Denmark alone there
were 750 Nazi agents. The four major Intelli-
gence centers established by the Abwehr for the
collection of world information were located at
Konigsberg, Munich, Cologne, and Hamburg.
Madrid, Lisbon, Berne, Ankara, Stockholm, Buda-
pest, and the Vatican were centers for the collec-
tion of information on a long-range basis.
Brussels, Warsaw, Sofia, Bucharest, The Hague,
and Paris were considered short-term centers.
One network of agents was distributed among the
43
various diplomatic, consular, and commercial posts
in these capitals. A second network worked inde-
pendently in the collecting and transmitting of in-
formation for strategic and tactical use. One of
the specialized types of collectors was a group of
deaf-mutes who were skilled in the reading of lips
and the recording of conversations seen but not
heard.
In Great Britain, during the early months of the
war, the Germans achieved some successes. The
transmittal of vital information regarding war
factories in Birmingham and Coventry aided in
the bombing of those areas. The German lega-
tion at Dublin served as one collection center;
while Lisbon and Oslo were relay points between
England and Berlin. However, British counter-
intelligence soon proved more than a match for
German Intelligence, whose effectiveness rapidly
dwindled in the British Isles. In fact the British
success in forwarding inaccurate information,
ostensibly from German agents who had actually
been taken into custody, confused and bewildered
headquarters in Berlin.
The entire Middle East was the scene of inten-
sive intelligence activities by German agents lo-
cated in Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and
Afghanistan. The total organization extended
from the Mediterranean coast of North Africa to
the Indian Ocean. The objectives were to under-
mine British influence among the Arab peoples
and to prepare them for German domination by
means of corruption and subversion. In these ef-
forts the Germans had the active assistance of the
Grand Mufti of Jerusalem. The German com-
mercial attache at Ankara was instrumental in
fomenting an unsuccessful rebellion against the
pro-British government of Iraq. The German
ambassador at Ankara, Franz von Papen, was pro-
vided with more than $4,000,000 in gold to finance
his work in the Middle East. But in spite of this
well-organized and numerically superior machine,
German Intelligence failed in its efforts. It also
failed to forecast the Allied invasion of North
Africa.
Of particular interest is the "Cicero" affair
which took place in Turkey during late 1943 and
early 1944. "Cicero" was the code name of an
employee in the British Embassy at Ankara. He
became a German spy, motivated by a desire for
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money and possibly an old hatred of the British.
As a result of his efforts the Germans were pro-
vided with highly classified material of incredible
value: a record of official messages passing be-
tween the British Ambassador and the Foreign
Office in London. In this manner it is believed
that the German Government was fully informed
of the latest figures of American lend-lease
deliveries and anticipated shipments; the minutes
of the Allied Casablanca Conference; a resume of
Allied conversations at Moscow between Stalin,
Anthony Eden, and Cordell Hull, including a re-
port of the Russian demand for a second front in.
Europe; decisions reached between Roosevelt,
Churchill, and Chiang Kai-shek at Cairo; and,
finally, the conclusions of the Teheran Conference,
including decisions of the military staffs of the
Big Three. But even more incredible than the
nature of the information itself is the apparent
fact that the German military and political lead-
ers failed to make use of it. Von Ribbentrop
seems to have questioned the accuracy of the in-
formation and the source remained suspect. The
only real value to the Germans of "Cicero's" work
was the breaking of the British diplomatic code.
In South American countries, German Intelli-
gence exploited important sources of information.
The German Ambassador to Argentina, Baron
von Thermann, coordinated the collection effort
in this part of the world. For transmittal pur-
poses he had available 12 powerful secret radio
stations, operating with the knowledge of Argen-
tine authorities. As of 1942, over $2,000,000 were
being spent annually in Argentina to subsidize
German cultural organizations. There can be little
doubt that information derived from Buenos Aires
and various other ports in South America aided the
operations of German submarine warfare in the
Atlantic.
Weaknesses in the German intelligence service
rapidly diminished its overall effectiveness. Its
elaborate mass training of agents resulted in a
standardized type of operation and response which
facilitated detection, and overcentralization of or-
ganization tended to reduce individual initiative.
Political considerations were an increasingly lim-
iting factor. Tension and distrust grew between
political and military leaders on the one hand and
Army General Staff Intelligence personnel on the
CONFIDENTIAL
44
other. As the war progressed actual leadership
was concentrated in the hands of political leaders
and military men chosen and influenced by them.
Vital decisions were reached more and more by
Hitler himself on the basis of intuition, rather
than intelligence. This was particularly true in
the campaign against the Soviet Union. Hitler
and his henchmen often refused to accept unfavor-
able reports, even though well documented. As a
result, intelligence personnel on all echelons came
to color their reports, emphasizing the favorable
factors and withholding or mitigating the
unfavorable.
There is some evidence to support the conten-
tion that Admiral Canaris, Chief of the Army
Intelligence Section, was in active sympathy with
those German military leaders whose opposition
to the Hitler regime resulted in an abortive at-
tempt to assassinate Der Fuehrer in 1944. At the
Nurnberg trials following the war, Ernst Kalten-
brunner, the head of the German Security Police,
stated: "I had to accept this post (the Reich Se-
curity Office) at a time when suspicion fell on
Admiral Canaris of having collaborated with the
enemy for years . . . In a short time I ascer-
tained the treason of Canaris to a most frightful
extent." Whether or not the individual involved
was Canaris himself will probably never be de-
termined. It is known, however, that the British
gained possession of information which could
have come from very few other sources. For ex-
ample, all German plans for aggressive action
prior to the invasion of France were reported to
the British. They were warned of the impending
attack on Norway in 1940. Winston Churchill
had some knowledge of the plans for the invasion
of England at a time when only a few highly
placed officers of the German General Staff had
similar information. It is of interest to note
that much of this information gained by the Brit-
ish was disregarded, perhaps for lack of con-
firmation.
Suspicion against Canaris reached such propor-
tions that he was relieved of command of the
Abwehr in 1941 when Hitler established a unified
secret intelligence service more directly under his
personal control.
German military intelligence was weakened by
the attitude of the officer group toward it. In the
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German staff organization, Intelligence was sub-
ordinated to Operations. While intelligence of-
ficers were expected to have a clear understanding
of tactical situations, no particular specialization
of knowledge or training was considered essen-
tial. German officers did not regard an intelli-
gence assignment worthy of a soldier and, conse-
quently, endeavored to avoid it whenever possible.
However, the performance of military intelli-
gence must not be underrated. It remained a
formidable weapon during World War II. The
relationship of Intelligence to Operations kept
the study of the enemy situation on an immedi-
ately applicable basis. All officers had been care-
fully trained to develop qualities of thoroughness,
sense of duty, logical approach to problems, and
accuracy. In spite of no special training, they
became competent in these assignments as a re-
sult of hard work and careful study. Their abil-
ity to gather facts and piece together an accurate
picture of the enemy situation was often amaz-
ing. They were most successful in the interroga-
tion of captured enemy personnel. Their radio
intercept work was of a high order and a profit-
able source of information, especially after the
Germans lost their air superiority. It was un-
fortunate for military intelligence that those
officers who had trained themselves in intelligence
were transferred in due time to other assignments
more to their liking and ambition. But, as far
as results were concerned, German military in-
telligence, which had been only mediocre in
World War I, performed rather successfully in
World War II, especially when permitted to func-
tion without the blight of political interference.
The Errors of Japanese Intelligence
The remarkable mass collection system of the
Japanese provided Tokyo with a wealth of vital
information prior to the outbreak of war. For
example, when it was ready to move troops into
Southeast Asia, the Imperial High Command had
complete and accurate models of the defenses of
Hong Kong down to the last gun position. Its
detailed information regarding ship positions and
movements in and around Pearl Harbor was used
with devastating effect. However, the Japanese
intelligence organization was not provided with
a sufficient number of trained personnel at the
higher echelons to assemble and evaluate the mass
of material which had been collected.
At the time of Pearl Harbor the Intelligence
Section of the Army General Staff included only
17 officers. Its growth was negligible until early
in 1945 when 40 additional officers were assigned
to be trained for duty with the armies organized
for the defense of the Japanese islands. The de-
velopment of Naval Intelligence was equally slow.
Beginning with 29 officers attached to the Naval
General Staff, the total number was increased to
97 by early 1945. The Kempeitai, or secret police,
was primarily responsible for counterintelligence
and was well organized, with trained personnel
to carry out this function. It achieved a reputa-
tion similar to that of the German Gestapo, and
many of its methods were comparable.
The slow and limited development of Japanese
Intelligence appears to have resulted from the
high command's concept of a short war, defensive
in nature, following the initial conquests. Based
on the possibilities of an early German victory in
Europe and the rapid consolidation of her own
newly won territories, Japan believed that the
United States would settle for an advantageous
compromise peace. As a result, neither the Army
nor the Navy expanded their intelligence organi-
zations to make possible the production of intel-
ligence for dissemination throughout all levels of
command. At the headquarters level, intelligence
for both the Army and the Navy was subordinated
to the war plans sections and responsible prima-
rily for the production of background intelligence.
There was apparently little coordination between
the intelligence effort at headquarters and at the
operational levels.
In the field, intelligence units were utilized by
military commanders for such purposes as the
collection of tactical information, penetration and
subversion of native peoples, and the exploitation
of economic sabotage. These units often worked
with the military governments established for con-
quered territories. The unit attached to the Nan-
king Government Military Affairs Committee, for
example, was particularly active in the prepara-
tion of surveys and statistics and in attempting
to influence and control the activities of the local
Chinese. In general, however, these units were
not effective, for a variety of reasons. In the first
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place they were not organized in sufficient time
to permit the accomplishment of their responsibil-
ities. One unit, created for the battle of the
Pacific islands, became operational just 2 months
before hostilities began. Another reason was the
Japanese failure to appreciate the customs and
habits of other peoples and an attempt to impose
their own, without change. They alienated those
whom they sought to control, and operated by
means of intimidation and threats. There was
continuous conflict over responsibility and author-
ity between military commanders, intelligence
units, and representatives of the secret police.
Finally, many operational commanders had no
appreciation of the potential value or use of the
intelligence units assigned to them, particularly
from a long-range point of view.
When Japan's diplomatic relations with many
countries were broken, her primary sources of in-
formation were reduced to Allied communications
transmissions, short wave and medium wave radio
broadcasts, and newspapers and magazines pro-
cured through neutral sources.
Special agents planted in the Western Hemi-
sphere continued to supply some information, with
diminishing degrees of success as the war pro-
gressed. The case of one American citizen who
served as an agent is illustrative of the use made
of the nationals of various countries for espio-
nage purposes and, incidentally, of the devious
means employed for the transmittal of informa-
tion. Mrs. Velvalee Dickinson, owner of an ex-
clusive doll shop in New York City, made use
of her occupation and clientele to transmit infor-
mation regarding the movement of United States
Navy ships. Various kinds of dolls provided an
ingenious code. Her messages were transmitted
via a contact in Buenos Aires. The suspicion
which led to her discovery was aroused when one
of her letters to Argentina was returned to the
United States, addressee unknown. The Japanese
had failed to notify her that her contact had
moved. This incident has been popularized as
"The Case of the Talking Dolls."
These, then, were some of the errors of Japanese
Intelligence, which were in turn errors of the
Japanese High Command. They contributed to
heavy losses in Japanese manpower and materiel
and were factors in Japan's eventual defeat.
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46
The Resiliency of British Intelligence
Although decidedly inferior to that of the Ger-
mans in numbers and resources at the beginning
of the war, British Intelligence made maximum
use of its available strength and centuries of ex-
perience. Much of the German Intelligence ac-
tivity in Britain had been carefully followed and
its organization penetrated. When the Germans
marched into Poland, therefore, it was compara-
tively easy, by means of extensive raids and ar-
rests, to destroy the overall effectiveness of Ger-
man Intelligence in Britain in much the same way
as it had been accomplished early in World
War I.
After Dunkirk, when the British faced one of
the most precarious and dangerous situations of
their history, Intelligence proved to be a bul-
wark of defense. Appalling weaknesses were suc-
cessfully concealed from the Germans and accu-
rate information made possible the skillful use of
inferior military forces. In his book, Top Secret,
Robert Ingersoll has aptly commented: "Intelli-
gence was always the Empire's ace in the hole.
When British fortunes were at the lowest ebb, it
was their Intelligence organization which saved
them."
Once the country was on a war basis, ample
funds and personnel became available, but the
training of personnel required considerable time.
It was not until several years had passed that Brit-
ish Intelligence was able to develop its outstand-
ing organization, again conceded to be the "world's
best." By that time many covert agents of Brit-
ish, French, and German nationality were active
within Germany itself. Innumerable bits of in-
formation, often irrelevant in themselves, flowed
regularly into London for analysis by various in-
telligence agencies. Through the European gov-
ernments-in-exile, in London, encouragement was
given to the underground resistance movements
which sprang up against the Germans all over
Europe. The time came when British Intelli-
gence was able to operate fifth columns in many
countries of Europe as effective as those of Hitler.
The British had many assets upon which their
intelligence organization could draw. In addi-
tion to comprehensive experience, internationally
educated, politically informed soldiers and civil-
ians were available who were adept in dealing
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with foreign peoples. Their basic research and
available source material were tangible assets.
Their military and political leaders had a real
and full appreciation not only of the value of
intelligence, but also of long-range planning.
Typical of British Intelligence personnel was
a young man named Rankin who had lived all of
his life in the inaccessible Chin hills of Burma.
He knew the Burmese, Chin, and Manipur lan-
guages, dressed and lived like the natives, and had
a sincere affection for them. Even though the na-
tives in these hills were anti-British, Rankin was
able to influence them to support the Allied cause.
A more intangible asset was the ability of the
British to improvise. When their armies were
driven off the continent and their channels of in-
formation blocked, they devised a means of ex-
tracting military information from photographs
taken over enemy-held territory. In a relatively
short time the results obtained were successful to
a spectacular degree. The development of photo-
graphic interpretation as a technique for the col-
lection of information was a significant British
contribution to intelligence in World War II.
A further asset was the control of the informa-
tion upon which military decisions were made.
This control, as well as effectiveness of presenta-
tion, was well demonstrated at the major political
and military conferences held by the Allies during
the war. In the European theater, for example,
their intelligence organization was so complete
that they were given primary responsibility for
enemy intelligence in that theater. In the Middle
East, British agents, experienced in local customs
and traditions, surpassed the Germans in winning
the support of those peoples. As is often true in
the Orient, the bribe was the key to support, and
it was often a case of outbidding the Germans.
One of the real achievements of Intelligence was
a delay in the German use of V-bombs against
Britain. Preliminary reports about German de-
velopment of V-weapons were received as early as
1942, and a female special agent was able to trans-
mit vital information concerning the activities and
installations of the main research station at Peene-
muende. As a result of her work, one of the most
effective Allied air raids of the war was carried
out against this area at a time when some of Ger-
many's key scientists were there. Over 200 per-
47
sons were killed during this raid, including the
director of the station and the Chief of Staff of
the Luftwaffe. The raid substantially retarded
the production of these new weapons.
British Intelligence, however, was not always
successful. One of its failures contributed to the
defeat of General Montgomery's forces at Am-
helm. Just prior to this engagement Intelligence
lost track of one German Panzer corps and was
unable to determine its location, which unfortu-
nately was Arnheim. The well-guarded move-
ment of this corps is reported to have resulted
from a betrayal of Montgomery's plans by a
Dutch traitor. In any event, British losses were
heavy. Some of the troops who managed to es-
cape were aided by British agents in that area.
Throughout the war, Intelligence continued to
underestimate German production capabilities, re-
cuperative powers, and capacity to wage war.
Basing its decisions on such estimates, the British
General Staff discouraged an invasion of the con-
tinent from the west, believing that Germany's
surrender could be brought about by aerial bomb-
ing. Opposition to invasion plans was further
strengthened as a result of overestimating the
strength of German fortifications along the chan-
nel coast. Captured German generals later
pointed out that this overestimate had been caused
by effective propaganda. A much earlier failure
of Intelligence was its incorrect appraisal of Ger-
man intentions in Norway, just prior to the occu-
pation of that country.
For a short period during the war there was
intense rivalry between the Intelligence and Oper-
ations staffs, which temporarily blocked the inter-
change of important information. As a result,
on one occasion, both groups put agents ashore at
the same place on the coast of Norway within an
interval of 3 days. The agents from Operations
destroyed vital targets in the area and withdrew.
When the Intelligence agents arrived they re-
ceived a warm welcome from the German field
police.
In the field of counterintelligence the British
were of considerable assistance to the Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation in both North and South
America, and this mutual cooperation was of real
value in smashing the Nazi espionage activities
there.
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The Rapid Growth of a United States Intelligence
Organization
Surprised and dismayed by the progress of
world events leading up to World War II, the
United States gradually became aware of the in-
adequacy of its intelligence agencies which it had
so pointedly neglected. The success of the Jap-
anese attack at Pearl Harbor disclosed the tragic
results of this neglect. Even more, it revealed a
lack of coordination of effort in the collection of
information, interdepartmental jealousies which
stymied effective exchange of information, and in-
correct estimates of the war capabilities of the
enemy.
As a result, the older intelligence agencies were
expanded and strengthened, and new agencies
were created to develop sources of information and
new techniques. Among these agencies were: a
foreign propaganda agency, an economic warfare
agency, a war production agency, the Office of
Strategic Services, a branch of the foreign eco-
nomic administration, and special units in the De-
partments of Justice, Interior, and Agriculture.
Founded in 1908 and reorganized in 1924, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation was officially
given responsibilities for counterintelligence in
1939. After the war began its personnel expanded
to more than 15,000. It had a tremendous task
in weeding out potentially dangerous aliens, as
is indicated by the fact that over 7,000 Germans
and 5,000 Japanese were detained or imprisoned
after war was declared. The size of the job can
be estimated somewhat from a partial list of ma-
terial collected from the hiding places of enemy
agents: 4,626 firearms, including modern auto-
matics and submachine guns; 307,506 rounds of
ammunition, 2,340 sticks of dynamite, 2,800 dyna-
mite caps, 3,787 feet of fuse, 1,700 items such as
time bombs, teller mines and boohytraps ; over
3,000 illegal radio receivers and shortwave trans-
mitters; 4,000 cameras, navigational instruments,
naval charts, aeronautical maps, tens of thousands
of detailed photographs of coastlines, ports, in-
dustrial plants; and thousands of feet of micro-
film containing vital records prepared by covert
agents. Aided by Naval and Army Intelligence,
the Federal Bureau of Investigation was emi-
nently successful in thwarting sabotage efforts.
Although the sabotage of American factories was
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a part of the Nazi plan, there is no definite evi-
dence that organized German sabotage achieved
any major destruction.
One of the most clever counterintelligence feats
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation was made
possible by a German-born American citizen
named Wilhelm Sebold, who was employed as an
engineer by the Consolidated Aircraft Co. In
1939 Sebold made a trip to Germany to visit his
parents and relatives. While there he was de-
tained by the Gestapo and "persuaded" to become
an undercover agent in the United States, with his
family held as hostages in Germany. After train-
ing in espionage and radio transmission at a Nazi
spy school, he was permitted to return to America
with instructions to gather detailed statistics on
aircraft and poison-gas production. He had been
able to advise the FBI of his predicament through
the American consul in Germany. Upon his re-
turn, Sebold was established by the FBI at Center-
port, Long Island, where the most modern short-
wave transmitter equipment was made available
for his use. For a period of 16 months both fake
and genuine information was transmitted to the
unsuspecting Germans. By means of Sebold and
his shortwave transmitters, the Nazis were thor-
oughly deceived as to the number of aircraft avail-
able to the British for the Battle of Britain and
the FBI was able to round up over 30 Nazi agents
in the United States and to gain information about
others located in Cuba, Brazil, Argentina, and
Chile.
48
The Office of Strategic Services
The establishment of the Office of Strategic
Services in 1941 under Maj. Gen. William J. Dono-
van was an unprecedented act on the part of the
United States Government. Its early functions
included research and analysis of military, politi-
cal, and economic information us it affected the
security of the country. After Pearl Harbor it
was placed under the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Its
mission was twofold: to act in support of the Army
and Navy in the collection and analysis of strategic
information; and to be responsible for the plan-
ning and operating of special services. These
special services involved covert operations which
would not normally be carried on by the armed
forces. Personnel were selected for this work only
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after the most intensive screening and psychologi-
cal testing for mental aptitude and emotional sta-
bility. Their training in subversive warfare was
rigorous, extensive, and carried on under condi-
tions of the greatest secrecy. Altogether, during
the war, thousands of OSS operators made their
way into enemy countries to engage in black war
fare, a term applied to the often unrecorded yet
decisive struggle between spies and counterspies.
Their weapons were bribery, treachery, and sub-
version. Although inexperience resulted in some
mistakes, the agents of the OSS were able to
achieve considerable success and to measure up
favorably to the professional agents of the
European powers.
Early success marked the efforts of the OSS
agents who helped to pave the way for the invasion
of North Africa. A total of 15 men were in North
Africa for almost a year before the actual invasion,
operating 5 secret radio stations, transmitting vital
information which facilitated the movement of
troops ashore, and arranging the contacts between
representatives of the Allies and friendly elements
in that area. The Jedburgh Mission, developed
in 1943 by the OSS and its British opposite num-
ber, proved most successful in integrating the ac-
tivities of friendly European underground resist-
ance groups with the overall plans of the Allied
Command. The program of this mission was to
parachute scores of three-men teams into France,
Belgium, and Holland on D-day ahead of ad-
vancing Allied armies, to provide resistance
groups with military supplies, and to lead them
in coordinated guerrilla activities designed to
create confusion and havoc behind the German
lines. In commenting on the success of the Jed-
burgh Mission, General Eisenhower said: "In no
previous war, and in no other theater of this war,
have resistance forces been so closely harnessed to
the main military effort."
OSS agents encouraged the labor resistance
movement in the occupied countries of Europe,
while in Germany itself 80 separate contacts were
established and workers were organized even in
the factories of the Ruhr. When Allied troops
reached the Rhine German bargemen were avail-
able to help them cross the river. In the Balkan
countries the OSS helped to set up successful
escape and evasion operations. Shortly after the
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OF INTELLIGENCE CONFIDENTIAL
surrender of Rumania a total of 1,050 airmen were
rescued from prison camps around Bucharest.
The extraordinary heroism and bravery of one
OSS agent, Corp. Frederic A. Mayer, resulted in
the declaration of Innsbruk, Austria, as an open
city and its capture by American troops without a
fight. In Burma, OSS personnel helped to organ-
ize a guerrilla warfare campaign against the Japa-
nese. The intelligence they gathered provided
the basis for almost all of the combat missions
flown in that area by the 19th Air Force. In 2i/2
years of operations, the Kachin guerrilla forces in
Burma killed over 5,000 Japanese troops, dis-
rupted their lines of communications, and spear-
headed the advances of the Allies under the com-
mand of Gen. Stillwell.
Further American Expansion
In addition to the establishment of new intelli-
gence agencies, there was a tremendous expansion
of the older military intelligence organizations.
For example, at the peak of its wartime effort the
Office of Naval Intelligence had a sizable number
of officers, enlisted men, and civilian personnel in
the United States and scattered throughout the
world. After the Battle of Midway, naval com-
manders came to appreciate more fully the value
of Intelligence officers attached to their staffs for
operational purposes. Accordingly, the demand
quickly exceeded the supply available. A more
detailed discussion of the development of naval
operational intelligence will be found in chapter
13. However, it should be noted here that intelli-
gence was recognized as an essential function of
the staffs of the operating forces afloat.
The surface naval forces themselves were often
valuable sources of information. For example,
in June 1944 the aircraft carrier, Guadcalanal,
captured a German submarine undamaged off
Cape Blanco, French West Africa, and obtained
five German acoustic torpedoes, submarine code
books and the key to their changes, and every
chart, publication, and general order that an oper-
ating German submarine carried. These items
were, of course, of great value to Intelligence.
One of the greatest contributions of the United
States to the general development of intelligence
was in the field of amphibious warfare, where the
closest coordination of many types of intelligence
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activities was required to provide adequate knowl-
edge upon which to base the successful operation
of a complex military force transported over water
with the objective of establishing itself on an
enemy-held shore against opposition. The mere
fact that such an operation involved Army, Navy,
and Air Forces required the greatest ingenuity
and diligence on the part of Intelligence to coordi-
nate and to consolidate all the diversified knowl-
edge into a package which was comprehensible,
usable, and effective.
The successes of United States Intelligence in
World War II were particularly notable because
they were achieved primarily by personnel drawn
from the civilian population: business and profes-
sional men and women with an infinite variety of
vocations. At the outset urgent personnel re-
quirements permitted only cursory initial train-
ing; it had to be done on the job. Therefore mis-
takes were made, not through lack of industry and
devotion, but because of inexperience. In the
winter of 1944, for example, Intelligence failed to
interpret correctly the movements of von Rund-
stedt's troops on the western front, and the Ger-
mans broke through the Allied defenses in the
Battle of the Bulge to inflict heavy losses of men
and materiel.
Despite its failures and frustrations, Intelli-
gence gained recognition from military and politi-
cal leaders in the United States to a degree never
before attained.
The Contribution of Chinese Intelligence
At the beginning of war in the Pacific, United
States Navy planners recognized the importance
of cooperation from the Nationalist Government
of China for ultimate victory over Japan. In
March 1942 Comdr. Milton E. Miles, now Rear
Admiral, left for Chungking to solicit the assist-
ance of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek in obtain-
ing information regarding weather and other
matters of vital intelligence value to the United
States Pacific Fleet. The result of Miles' mis-
sion was the formation of the Sino-American
Cooperative Organization (SACO) , of which he
was Deputy Director.
The Director of SACO was Lt. Gen. Tai Li,
Chief of the Bureau of Investigation and Statis-
tics (BIS) of the National Military Council of
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50
China, an intimate friend and adviser of the Gen-
eralissimo. Tai Li, known for many years as a
mystery man of Asia, had tremendous power and
a reputation which inspired more fear and hatred
than admiration. As early as 1926 he had asso-
ciated himself with Chiang when the latter took
command of the Nationalist Armies at Canton.
During the march into North China Tai Li acted
as an advance agent, collecting information about
popular sentiment, military and political devel-
opments, and advantageous routes of approach.
The intelligence he produced was an important
factor in the successive victories which led to the
unification of China under the Nationalist Gov-
ernment. When Chiang was captured by the
Communists, Tai Li aided in his rescue. In 1937,
as commander of the loyal patriotic army, Tai Li
held Shanghai for 3 months in the face of over-
whelmingly superior Japanese forces. He had
almost unlimited energy and stamina and acted
with a directness that was more western than
Oriental. Because he had escaped death so often
he was considered invulnerable, and his avoidance
of all personal publicity added to the aura of
mystery which surrounded him.
Tai Li organized China's secret police, the BIS,
in 1932, and directed its activities until his death
in 1946. During this period he established a
complex network of covert agents not only
throughout China but also in Indo-China, Burma,
India, Bali, Borneo, Formosa, and the Philip-
pines. He controlled the uniformed police in
Free and Occupied China, as well as the Chinese
puppets of the Japanese. Smuggling and anti-
smuggling activities came under his jurisdiction.
He was Director of the Bureau of Communica-
tions and Transportation and Head of the Office
of Freight Transportation Control. Thus he
wore many different hats which gave him a power
not only far-reaching but even paradoxical.
A major function of the BIS was espionage and
counterespionage directed against Japanese spies
and Chinese Communists. Some of its agents
were high ranking officers, well educated and well
trained. Others were peasants, recruited from
Chinese families which had suffered from Japa-
nese mistreatment. Representatives were located
in the smallest villages and largest cities of China.
The BIS formed the nucleus of an effective guer-
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rilla army aimed at driving the Japanese out of
China and combatting subversive elements.
As the Director of SACO, Tai Li contributed to
it the full support of the Chinese Intelligence Or-
ganization, which made possible the activities of
almost 3,000 Americans (Navy, Army, Marine
Corps, and Coast Guard) assigned to SACO,
known as Naval Group, China. Their responsi-
bilities included weather reporting, coastwatch-
ing, guerrilla training, and combat operations.
Their activities were made effective by the estab-
lishment of a radio communications network.
Weather data supplied by SACO was of signif-
icant value to the first air attacks on the Japanese
home islands and to the attacks on Iwo Jima and
Okinawa. Information provided by SACO
coastwatchers on Japanese naval and merchant
shipping was the basis for the successful sweep of
the South China Sea and its ports in January
1945 by the United States Fleet. SACO also
made possible the sensational destruction of Japa-
nese ships by the United States submarine Barb,
as well as the sinking of thousands of tons of
Japanese shipping by other American submarines.
Tai Li and his organization made a significant
contribution to the successful prosecution of the
Pacific war. His untimely death shortly after
the war was a serious blow not only to Chinese
Intelligence but to the Nationalist Government
itself.
The Expansion of Soviet Intelligence
Occupied as they were with military and politi-
cal developments in western Europe prior to the
outbreak of the war, the leaders of Soviet In-
telligence in no way neglected the situation in
the Far East. The clever and adroit activities
of their spy ring in China and Japan during the
period from 1937 to 1941 give some indication of
Soviet operating techniques. The principal figure
was Dr. Richard Sorge, a German national who
was sent as a covert agent by German Intelligence
to the Far East in 1933 posing as a foreign news-
paper correspondent. Among his close friends
and associates were the German Ambassador to
Tokyo and Ozaki Hozumi, a Japanese newspaper
man prominent in government circles and a friend
of various members of the Imperial Cabinet.
Together, Sorge and Hozumi cultivated a num-
51
ber of important sources of information, includ-
ing the German, British, American, and French
Embassies, the Dutch Legation, the Japanese War
Ministry, and the Japanese cabinet itself. From
them they gathered invaluable data including esti-
mates and opinions at the highest official levels,
which they evaluated and forwarded not to Berlin
but to Moscow by means of radio, by courier
through Shanghai, or through the Soviet Em-
bassy in Tokyo. The significance of their efforts
is revealed by some of the reports transmitted to
the Kremlin. In 1937, when the Japanese attacked
China, Sorge reported that there would be no
attack against the U. S. S. R. in Siberia. In May
1941, Moscow was warned that the Germans would
attack the U. S. S. R. along the entire western
frontier on 20 June with a force of from 170 to
190 divisions, the major objective being Moscow.
The actual attack came on 22 June. In October
1941, Sorge forwarded his well-documented con-
clusion that the Japanese would attack to the south
in Asia and that there was no serious danger of
any attack along the Siberian frontier. On the
basis of this information the Soviets were able to
transfer large units of their forces in eastern Si-
beria to the western front to strengthen their de-
fenses against the Nazi invasion. It is somewhat
ironic that Sorge's activities were revealed by a
Japanese Communist.
A tendency of the Soviet leaders to permit the
reports of their Communist friends in foreign
countries to override the reports of other units in
their intelligence system is shown by their initial
reaction to indications of Hitler's decision to attack
the U. S. S. R. The Communists inside Germany
are believed to have reported that the Germans
would refuse to march into the Soviet Union.
When the attack actually came, the Soviets were
taken by surprise.
As the war progressed, the Soviets were able
to take full advantage of association with their
wartime partners in the expansion and extension
of their intelligence activities. In the United
States since 1924 there had been an organization
known as Amtorg, created for the purpose of pur-
chasing all kinds of material for the Soviet Union.
During the war the activities of this organization
were intensified, together with those of the Soviet
Purchasing Commission which worked closely with
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Amtorg. In addition to the procurement of mate-
rial, the collection of detailed information con-
cerning American industry was stepped up.
Factory techniques, production statistics and labor
relations were all matters of great interest, in
addition to any fact which might have future in-
telligence value. As one example, all of the Amer-
ican patents concerned with carbon compounds
were purchased?a total of about 30,000 in this
field alone. By 1946 a comprehensive catalogue
had been compiled of every mill, factory, refinery,
and engineering plant in the United States. The
Four Continent Book Corporation in New York
City was developed as an agency for the purchase
and transmittal of American technical publica-
tions, trade papers, and patents. In addition, it
handled Communist propaganda literature in
English and Spanish, forwarding the latter to
various Latin American countries.
By 1944 Soviet intelligence and propaganda ac-
tivities were expanded in Latin American coun-
tries through Soviet diplomatic representatives.
In Mexico an extensive organization was devel-
oped for the purpose of destroying American in-
fluence first in Mexico and later in other countries
of South America. As a part of this process, the
Soviets aimed at the elimination of American busi-
ness interests and the eventual domination of the
economies of these countries. Various cultural
organizations were fostered, such as the Russian-
Mexican Clubs, to serve as propaganda media and
sources of information.
In Europe, during the war, a new counterintelli-
gence agency was created. It was known as
"Smersh"?from the Russian words: "death to
spies." It seems to have been organized originally
in connection with the administration of the Soviet
occupied areas of Europe, and was concerned with
disaffection among Soviet troops and anticommu-
nism in any form. By painstaking processes it
attempted to liquidate all individuals who were
not proCommunist, including those active in any
democratic-type parties, throughout Poland,
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, and the
Carpatho-Ukraine. Its carefully selected person-
nel, intensely loyal to the Soviet State, showed no
mercy or compassion in their work.
While positive information is not available,
"Smersh" appears to have been organized into five
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52
major departments: administration, operations,
investigations, prosecution, and personnel. With
central headquarters in Moscow, there were sub-
divisions established for each military district in
Russia, as well as in Europe. Agents were at-
tached to all units of the Soviet Army, and net-
works of spies and informers were set up in the
occupied countries, to make particular note of
trends in political thought. The investigations
department developed the science of interrogation
to a high degree of perfection, while the prosecu-
tion department utilized three men courts to dis-
pose of those found guilty.
Prior to World War II many improvements had
been made in the functional organization of the
Soviet military staff. One of these was an in-
creased emphasis on intelligence, notable because
this function was weak in the staff organizations
of both the Tzarist and early Soviet armies. Re-
vised military doctrine now included a reconnais-
sance, or intelligence, section at the division level,
headed by a chief of section. He was responsible
for the preparation of the reconnaissance plan,
including air reconnaissance; the assignment of
missions to subordinate agencies; the maintenance
of the enemy situation map; the collection and
analysis of information; keeping the commander
and chief of staff informed of all intelligence in-
formation; and the dissemination of information
to higher, coordinate, and subordinate units. Dur-
ing the war the intelligence organizations of the
Army and the Navy apparently functioned sep-
arately; however, by 1946, there was some evidence
that they had been combined.
The pattern of Soviet Intelligence operations
which seemed to emerge during the war period
was that of comprehensive, overlapping informer
networks within all countries under Soviet rule
and of burrowing, multiplying systems of sym-
pathizers and agents within foreign countries of
exploitable interest. The extensiveness of its op-
erations abroad was to be clearly demonstrated in
the postwar period.
THE POSTWAR PERIOD
Great enthusiasm throughout most of the world
greeted the unconditional surrender of Germany
and Japan, the inauguration of the United Na-
tions Organization, and prospects for world peace.
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Amidst the glow of military victories the wartime
Allies frequently met to chart a new world of
freedom and prosperity. But many boldly pro-
jected plans failed to materialize, diametrically
opposed points of view were bared, and even peace
treaties were delayed interminably by disagree-
ments or failed completely of final approval by
all concerned, as in the cases of Germany, Austria,
and Japan. Two contrary concepts of world re-
lationships became more clearly defined in the
opposing policies of the United States and the
U. S. S. R. Gradually the peoples of the western
world, especially in the United States, became
aware of a new threat to their political and social
institutions and their way of life.
The aggressive ideology and world power ob-
jectives of the Soviet Government found expres-
sion in the absorption of the countries of Eastern
Europe, a closely knit alliance with Communist
China, and the encouragement of Communist or-
ganizations throughout the rest of the world. In
an effort to counter these activities, the United
States assumed world leadership to aid in reestab-
lishing the economic stability of those countries
ravaged by the war but as yet free of Communist
domination. Economic stability was considered
to be fundamental to political and military sta-
bility, and through the improvement of standards
of living the United States sought to destroy the
conditions of poverty upon which Soviet propa-
ganda most effectively feeds. The Truman Doc-
trine of 1947 brought economic and military
assistance to Greece and Turkey threatened by
Soviet penetration. The European Recovery
Program of 1948, popularly known as the Mar-
shall Plan, had as its objective the restoration of
the economic productivity of Europe and the
healthy employment of all its peoples. This am-
bitious program was gradually extended in a les-
ser degree to other parts of the world. In 1951
the United States frankly embarked on a Mutual
Security Program which tied together economic
assistance and military cooperation.
The outbreak of the war in Korea in June 1950
brought into clearer focus the grim realities of
the so-called "cold war," a term descriptive of
various forms of the conflict between Communist
and non-Communist countries which had been un-
derway for a number of years but which became
58
more apparent after World War II. In the light
of postwar experience, some earlier events as-
sumed even greater significance than they did at
the time. In 1943, for example, a group of young
physicists working in the radiation laboratory of
the University of California turned over to a
Communist agent technical data for transmittal to
a Soviet Vice-Consul. In 1944 Soviet representa-
tives in South and Central America were ordered
back to Moscow for retraining. By that time the
military defeat of Germany was assured, so that
Soviet emphasis could again be directed toward
bringing about the political and economic collapse
of the non-Communist countries of the west.
To achieve this ultimate objective, the Soviet
Government has employed, initially at least,
methods other than the force of arms. Penetra-
tion and subversion, propaganda and detailed
organization have proved to be highly effective in
various countries. The use of nationals as agents
within their own countries has presented a most
difficult problem for the counterintelligence agen-
cies of those countries. The Soviets have imple-
mented a plan to collect great quantities of
information about non-Communist countries, ob-
viously in order to determine strengths and weak-
nesses. During this "cold war" Intelligence has
assumed even greater importance than during
World War II. The scope and methods of Soviet
Intelligence in the postwar period have been indi-
cated by the disclosure of some of its activities in
various parts of the world.
Soviet Intelligence in Canada
In September 1945 Igor Gouzenko, a cipher
clerk in the Soviet Embassy at Ottawa, deter-
mined to expose the activities of Soviet agents
and sympathizers in Canada. The documented
information which he was able to furnish to the
Royal Commission finally appointed to conduct a
full investigation was a startling revelation of the
extensiveness of the Soviet intelligence system in
Canada, the type of individuals who were in-
volved, and the nature of the information which
was being transmitted to Moscow. The impor-
tance attached by the Soviet Embassy to Gou-
zenko's testimony and substantiating documents
was indicated by the strenuous efforts made to re-
gain custody of both.
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INTELLIGENCE FOR
The evidence uncovered by the Royal Commis-
sion definitely revealed the existence in Canada of
a fifth column, organized and directed by Soviet
agents. Within this fifth column were a number
of spy rings, possibly as many as five, of which de-
tailed information was available only on the one
headed by Col. Nicolai Zabotin, Soviet Military
Attache in Ottawa. Additional rings appeared to
be operated by the MVD, the Naval Attache, the
commercial and political representatives, and the
Embassy itself. Each of these rings was com-
pletely independent of the others, using separate
codes and agents, and was apparently organized
rather simply into various cells composed of
agents working on similar tasks. Only one agent
in each cell had contact with a Soviet representa-
tive and each made use of a "cover" name. The
Royal Commission concluded that the Soviet or-
ganization in Canada was the product of careful
and detailed preparation by trained men. Of sig-
nificance were the indications that the Canadian
organizations were associated with similar ones
in other countries, notably Great Britain and the
United States.
In Zabotin's ring only two individuals were Rus-
sian-born, and these had become naturalized Ca-
nadian citizens: Sam Carr, the Organizing Sec-
retary of the Canadian Communist Party, and
Fred Rose, a member of Parliament. The re-
mainder were Canadian or British by birth and
were motivated by Communist sympathies. Money
was apparently of only incidental concern.
Scientists and civil servants were especially cul-
tivated by Zabotin who approached them through
local Communists, fellow travellers, and sym-
pathizers attending study-groups and special lec-
tures. The care with which prospective agents
were selected is indicated by the positions held by
those found guilty of turning over classified in-
formation to Soviet representatives: a senior
worker with the National Research Council; two
additional members of this Council who supplied
information regarding explosives, atomic energy,
and aircraft development; an employee in the Of-
fice of the High Commissioner of the United King-
dom; an employee in the Department of Muni-
tions and Supply; and a staff member of the cipher
division of the Canadian Department of External
Affairs. The most prominent individual involved
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54
NAVAL OFFICERS
was Dr. Allan Nunn May, a nuclear scientist em-
ployed in research for the Canadian Atomic En-
ergy project at Montreal. The investigation dis-
closed that he had been a Communist before coming
to Canada. The Royal Commission was particu-
larly astounded by the success of the Soviets in
enlisting Canadians in positions of responsibility
and trust who were willing to betray their country.
Since the activities of Soviet Intelligence had
been going on for some years, it was difficult to
determine the amount of information which the
Soviets had managed to accumulate. The evi-
dence indicated, however, that a considerable
quantity of classified information had been trans-
mitted with regularity from various Government
departments and agencies. Specific information
included samples of uranium ore; data about
atomic plants and processes; 'details of Asdic, a
submarine detection device; formula of new ex-
plosives and blueprints of fuzes, such as the V. T.
fuze; economic reports; and political reports, in-
cluding diplomatic messages exchanged with Great
Britain and the United States. Of particular
significance was the fact that much of the infor-
mation sought was technical and concerned the
postwar defenses of Canada, Great Britain, and
the United States.
Two interesting Soviet Intelligence procedures
were revealed by Gouzenko. The first was Zabo-
tin's plan to arrange for the entry into Canada of
additional agents under the guise of personnel
attached to a proposed Soviet Trade Mission. The
second was the use of forged passports to permit
the entry of agents into other countries from
Canada.
Soviet Intelligence in the United States
The Report of the Canadian Royal Commission,
published in June 1946, excited worldwide atten-
tion and particularly, attention was given to it in
the United States where the evidence indicated
that similar Soviet organizations were operating.
Several Congressional committees found new
sources of information regarding un-American
activities and accumulated volumes of data.
These committees were aided materially by a few
repentant American Communists who, like Gou-
zenko, found themselves completely disillusioned
by the wide gulf between Communist promises and
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practices. Louis F. Budenz, editor of the official
newspaper of the American Communist Party,
the Daily Worker, was one such person. His testi-
mony, given in November 1946, disclosed the close
relationship between American and Soviet Com-
munists. Further, it gave clues to the activities
of Soviet agents operating in the United States.
Gerhart Eisler, for example, was pointed out
as the representative of International Communism
in the United States and, as such, the boss of all
American Communists. His true position could
not be determined, but his status as a representa-
tive was substantiated. Eisler, a professional
revolutionist, was active in the United States dur-
ing the 1930's, speaking before many groups, help-
ing to organize Communists and Communist sym-
pathizers, and identifying those who might be en-
couraged to aid the Communist cause. During
the war years he may well have headed a Soviet
spy network. In the late 1940's he evidently con-
centrated on artists, writers, and intellectuals. He
was reported to have said that New York City
would become the center of International Com-
munism outside of Russia. Because of the dis-
closures before the House Un-American Activities
Committee in early 1947, Eisler was no longer use-
ful to the Soviet effort in this country. He es-
caped to Europe and later turned up as an official
for the East German Government, operating under
direct Soviet control.
In July 1948 Elizabeth Bentley testified on her
activities as a courier for a Soviet espionage system
in the United States during the war. She col-
lected information from various Government em-
ployees in Washington, and turned it over to
Soviet representatives in New York for transmit-
tal to Moscow. Her contacts in Washington were
individuals employed by such Federal Depart-
ments as State, Treasury, Army, the War Produc-
tion Board, and the Office of Strategic Services.
Among those she incriminated was William W.
Remington who was first employed by the War
Production Board and later by the Department of
Commerce. In both these positions he had access
to secret information, and in Commerce he headed
a committee responsible for the clearance of mate-
rials for export to the Soviet Union. Unlike
Gouzenko in Canada, Bentley was unable to docu-
ment her testimony.
55
CONFIDENTIAL
During the summer of 1948 Whittaker Cham-
bers, reformed American Communist and a senior
editor of Time magazine, appeared before the
House Un-American Activities Committee in
Washington. He described in detail his activities
as a Communist from 1924 until 1938, when, dis-
illusioned and embittered, he renounced com-
munism and determined to expose the Soviet ac-
tivities of which he had been a part. Of primary
interest was his work as an underground courier
for a Communist cell, from 1934 to 1938, collecting
classified information in Washington and carrying
it to a Soviet agent named Colonel Bykoff in New
York City. The purpose of this cell was the col-
lection of military and political information from
the State Department. The sensational aspect of
Chambers' testimony was his ability to produce
documentary evidence which included copies and
photographs of highly important British naval
papers and extremely confidential reports from
China, Yugoslavia, and Poland. The keys to cer-
tain secret American diplomatic codes were also
involved. These substantiating documents proved
beyond question that in 1938 some individual in
the State Department had made important classi-
fied information available to him. That individ-
ual, according to Chambers, was Alger Hiss, a
brilliant young man in the State Department, a
prominent figure in the creation of the United
Nations, and president of the Carnegie Endow-
ment for International Peace. Volumes of evi-
dence were accumulated in the succeeding sensa-
tional Hiss-Chambers legal actions which finally
resulted in the conviction of Alger Hiss for per-
jury and a sentence of 5 years imprisonment.
Additional cases involving suspected Soviet es-
pionage and Communist activities continued to be
brought to light in the United States. In the
spring of 1949 the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation released evidence against Judith Coplon,
first employed by the Justice Department in its
economic warfare section and later assigned to its
internal security section as a political analyst.
She was accused on two counts: taking unlawful
possession of Government documents and spying
for a foreign power. Her contact was a Soviet
engineer employed by the United Nations secre-
tariat in New York. Her sensationalized trial on
the first count in Washington resulted in convic-
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tion, although subsequent trials on the second
count in New York City failed of conviction be-
cause of certain legal technicalities.
During 1949 and 1950, while the Justice De-
partment was prosecuting the leaders of the
American Communist Party for conspiracy
against the United States Government, the FBI
was accumulating evidence against other individ-
uals suspected of treason in connection with the
atomic bomb and military uses of atomic energy.
In May 1950 Harry Gold confessed that, in 1944
and 1945, he had acted as a courier in relaying
atomic information to a Soviet agent for transmis-
sion to the U. S. S. R. His motives appeared to be
basically ideological. His confession involved Al-
fred Dean Slack, a chemist, and David Greenglass,
a New York machinist. The former was charged
with revealing details of the manufacture of
RDX, a secret high explosive developed during
the war, and supplying a sample. The latter con-
fessed to turning over sketches and descriptions
of the atomic bomb while he was employed at Los
Alamos, N. Mex., working on the top secret Man-
hattan project. These men in turn incriminated
other individuals including Ethel and Julius
Rosenberg and Martin Sobell. These were accused
of complicity in espionage work for Soviet Intel-
ligence, transmitting information concerning the
atomic bomb.
The evidence presented during these trials was
startling. It became apparent that the Soviet
Union had gained considerable information about
the Manhattan project and the work of some of
its scientists during the latter months of 1941; fur-
ther, that the schedule for the explosion of the
first atomic bomb at Alamagordo was known at
least a month in advance. Months before the first
bomb was dropped on Hiroshima the Soviets had
learned the principles of its construction. Rosen-
berg stated that he had procured information per-
taining to the use of atomic energy for aircraft.
The series of shocking disclosures in the postwar
period clearly indicated that Soviet Intelligence
had developed intricate systems of covert agents
in the United States for the purpose of channeling
vital information of a political, military and scien-
tific nature to Moscow through both official and
unofficial representatives.
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56
NAVAL OFFICERS
Soviet Intelligence in Great Britain
The Canadian Spy Case and the disclosures in
the United States had eventual repercussions in
Great Britain. Tipped off by the FBI, Scotland
Yard initiated investigations which resulted in
1950 in the apprehension of Dr. Emil Julius Klaus
Fuchs, head of the Ministry of Supply's Theo-
retical Physics Division and the deputy chief
scientific officer at Harwell, England's principal
atomic installation. Fuchs was accused of releas-
ing American atomic secrets to Soviet representa-
tives in 1945 and British secrets in 1947. His con-
fession left no doubt as to his guilt. While the
amount of information he had given was not pub-
licly announced for security reasons, it was appar-
ent that Fuchs had detailed knowledge of the con-
struction of atomic bombs and, further, that he
was conversant with the initial studies for the hy-
drogen bomb. The tremendous advantages accru-
ing to the Soviets from this information are diffi-
cult to estimate, although it is obvious that their
atomic program was greatly advanced. At the
same time irreparable harm was done to the na-
tional security of both Great Britain and the
United States.
The investigations of Fuchs revealed that he
had been a Communist for many years and that
his motivation, like so many others already men-
tioned, was ideological. He was the scientist from
whom Harry Gold had received his information,
and his confession was of material assistance in
the prosecution of Gold, Greenglass, and others.
Soviet Intelligence in Sweden
In September 1951 the long suspected activities
of Soviet espionage in Sweden were dramatically
exposed. A 42-year-old petty officer in the Royal
Swedish Navy, Ernst Hilding Andersson, was
accused of betraying military secrets to a foreign
power, found guilty of treason, and sentenced to
life imprisonment. From 1949 to 1951 he had pre-
pared and transmitted reports and maps of the
defenses of naval bases at Stockholm and Karls-
krona, and of an air base, naval station, and the
Boden fortress in northern Sweden. His three
contact men were: a former Soviet Embassy sec-
retary, a former Tass news-agency correspondent,
and an assistant to the Soviet Naval Attach6.
While small money payments were made for in-
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formation delivered, Andersson's motivation was
to aid communism. Investigation showed that
he had become a Communist in 1928, but that his
first assignment in espionage was not made until
1949.
According to the Swedish Chief of Staff, incal-
culable damage to Sweden's security had been
caused by Andersson's activities. Even more
harmful, perhaps, were the similar efforts of
Fritiof Enborn, a Swedish journalist, discovered.
in February 1952. Sweden faced a new threat to
her security and national defense system.
Soviet Activities in South America
In Mexico the Communist group appeared to
fall into three categories: the professional agents,
carefully trained in the art of collecting informa-
tion and spreading Soviet propaganda; the ideal-
ists, motivated by the propaganda; and the
fellow travelers, inspired by their own liberalism.
The Soviet Embassy in Mexico City made use of
each category to promote its primary objectives
of propaganda, penetration, and the destruction
of the economic position of the United States and
its favorable pan-American relationships.
The Mexican pattern was apparent in other
countries. In Guatemala in 1951 there were
charges that the Communists were infiltrating both
the government and labor. A primary target was
the United Fruit Co. which was harassed by
strikes and one-sided labor laws. In Chile the
large and active Communist Party encouraged a
series of strikes in the copper mines which helped
precipitate a copper shortage crisis in the rearma-
ment program of the United States. In Panama
the Communists attempted to capitalize on the po-
litical unrest in the country.
In the postwar period, there were other positive
indications and significant disclosures of Soviet
Intelligence activities in various trouble spots of
the world. The United States and her Allies
found themselves faced with the necessity of com-
batting diverse problems of major proportions.
The Readjustment of the United States Intelligence
Effort
At the end of World War II the demobilization
of the Armed Forces was accelerated almost to a
point of disintegration, at least from the point of
269190-54----5
view of ready effectiveness. The drastic reduction
in personnel seriously affected all military activi-
ties and especially those of Intelligence. For ex-
ample, by 1946 the strength of Naval Intelligence
had dropped sharply from its wartime peak. Pre-
war problems of Intelligence, such as personnel
and production, once again developed, though to a
lesser degree because of what appeared to be a
positive if gradual change in both the popular and
official point of view towards Intelligence.
Even before the end of the war, top level plan-
ners had become convinced of the need for a perma-
nent well coordinated national Intelligence system.
The result was the passage of the National Se-
curity Act of 1947 which for the first time in
the history of the Nation, outlined the structure
of such a system to operate in times of war and
peace.
The deterioration of the international political
situation created urgent demands upon all intelli-
gence agencies. Moving into Greece to aid in the
defense of that country, the United States Army
was immediately involved in problems arising
from guerrilla warfare and the infiltration
of communist groups from the Sovietized Balkan
countries. In Western Europe, advance informa-
tion concerning the trends of Soviet activities was
essential to the formulation of any military or
foreign policies which would effectively protect
the interests of the United States in that area.
Months in advance information was obtained
regarding Soviet plans to blockade Berlin. The
communist coup in Czechoslovakia was anticipated
by 3 months. Evidence was accumulated to show
that the Soviet Union was supplying arms and am-
munition to Communist groups in France and
Italy. In the spring of 1948 events in Europe gave
rise to serious misgivings that the Soviet Union
might be contemplating offensive military action.
Under terrific pressure, the Central Intelligence
Agency produced an estimate that such action
would not take place within the next 2 months
and, in all probability, not within a year.
With the outbreak of war in Korea the Navy,
Army, and Air Force were faced with many se-
rious problems, including an acute shortage of
Intelligence personnel and data. Drawing sub-
stantially upon their reserve organizations, the
military services overcame these shortages and
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rapidly increased the production of intelligence
for operational purposes. Once again the need
for intelligence was clearly demonstrated.
POSTWAR INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS
The impact of the cold war in the postwar
period is shown by the emphasis given to intelli-
gence organizations and activities by both larger
and smaller nations of the world.
The United States intelligence system is dis-
cussed in detail in chapter 3 of this text, but
certain general developments in military intelli-
gence should be mentioned here. Intelligence ac-
tivities have been expanded in order to provide
the intelligence required for strategic planning.
Broad programs involving research and special
studies of foreign powers have been undertaken.
Increasing importance has been placed on person-
nel training through the encouragement of reserve
intelligence units and an emphasis on training
schools for both regular and reserve officers. There
has been some indication of a trend in the Army
and the Navy to encourage officer personnel to spe-
cialize in intelligence work. Gen. Omar N. Brad-
ley, Army Chief of Staff, has been quoted as say-
ing: "I am recommending to the General Staff
that the Army establish an Intelligence Corps in
which personnel can specialize in Intelligence just
as artillery men concentrate on guns, and armored
corps men on tanks." The training of personnel
assigned to attache posts has been improved. The
work of counterintelligence has received more and
more attention.
As a newcomer to the field of intelligence, the
United States has learned much in a relatively
short period of time. Intelligence organizations
have improved the quality of their product, and
despite "growing-pains" have accomplished a
great deal.
The British Intelligence Service
The British intelligence service is composed of
several intelligence agencies. Of special impor-
tance is the British secret service whose operations
and organization are closely guarded secrets. For
budgetary purposes it is sponsored in Parliament
by the British foreign office. Appropriations for
the secret service are usually passed without com-
ment, and if a question is ever raised, the foreign
CONFIDENTIAL
58
secretary replies that the matter is a secret of state
which, if revealed, would no longer be secret. The
British secret service corresponds, in many of its
functions, to the United States Central Intelligence
Agency.
The war office, the admiralty and the air minis-
tries have separate intelligence agencies which co-
operate closely with the British secret service and
other agencies. The military intelligence division
(MID) is divided into some 20 different depart-
ments. In addition to purely military matters,
sections of MID deal with the problems of spies
at home, in the dominions and British possessions,
and in foreign countries. The naval intelligence
division is also divided into several departments
for specialized work, as is the air intelligence
division.
Another organization of the British intelligence
service is generally referred to as MI 5. This
organization is devoted to counterespionage and
security. It has jurisdiction in the British Isles
and in the British possessions overseas. Many of
its functions are similar to those of the United
States Federal Bureau of Investigation. MI 5
cooperates closely with the special branch of Scot-
land Yard as well as with the British secret service
and the military intelligence agencies.
The special branch of Scotland Yard, which
may be included as a part of the British intelli-
gence service, is charged with guarding the Royal
Family and important British officials and visiting
foreign dignitaries. It is also concerned with
counterespionage and problems of national secu-
rity. Some of its functions are similar to those
of the United States Secret Service and the United
States Federal Bureau of Investigation.
There are several British joint intelligence com-
mittees and boards which include representatives
from the major British intelligence agencies, mil-
itary and civilian. These joint committees and
boards are subordinate to the British military
chiefs of staff, though they contain civilian repre-
sentation. These committees and boards prepare
estimates of all kinds and serve all interested min-
istries of the British Government.
The French Intelligence System
The principal French intelligence organization
is the Service de Documentation Exterieure et de
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Contre Espionenage (SDECE.). It was established
under this name in December 1945 and is a devel-
opment of intelligence organizations which oper-
ated under General de Gaulle from 1940 to 1945.
General de Gaulle set up the Bureau Central de
1?enseignements et d'Action (BCRA) in London
in 1940. This was an expansion of the Service de
Renseignements (SR) , a part of the old Deuxieme
Bureau of the French General Staff. After Gen-
eral de Gaulle left London and went to Algiers, he
combined the BCRA with an intelligence organi-
zation of General Giraud and created a new intel-
ligence organization called the Direction Generale
des Services Speciaux (DGSS) . The DGSS was
replaced shortly after the liberation of most of
France by an intelligence organization called the
Direction Generale des Etudes et de Recherches
(DGER), out of which SDECE directly evolved.
Historically, the Deuxieme Bureau of the
French general staff has been the most important
French intelligence organization. In the post
World War II organization of French Intelli-
gence, the SDECE appears to have taken over
most of the functions of the traditional general
staff Deuxieme Bureau, leaving to the Deuxiemes
Bureaux of the armed services responsibility
mainly for operational military intelligence. The
SDECE is subordinate to the French national de-
fense ministry and is divided into two main sec-
tions (called by the French, Offensive and Defen-
sive) which are concerned respectively with stra-
tegic intelligence and counterintelligence. The
Surete Nationale, under the French interior min-
istry, is also a part of the French Intelligence
system. The Surete is similar in some respects to
the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation
and the British Scotland Yard.
The Soviet Intelligence System
Often described as omnipotent and omnipresent,
the Soviet intelligence system is in many respects
unique in the postwar world. It is a vast, intri-
cate organization with an incredible amount of
duplication and involving literally millions of
people. With its two-pronged objective of inter-
nal security and external espionage, it maintains
agents in every village of the U. S. S. R. and
agents or potential agents in all countries of the
59
world where there are Soviet diplomats, trade rep-
resentatives or Communist Party groups.
Within the U. S. S. R., the intelligence-security
system is the cornerstone of the police state, re-
sponsible for insuring rigid political and eco-
nomic controls and rooting out all dissident ele-
ments. It can be assumed that the average So-
viet citizen is aware of the secret police to the ex-
tent that he knows he must remain where he is
registered, perform his work satisfactorily, and
refrain from any criticism of the government.
He must also hope that his relatives and friends
will do likewise. Should there be any deviation
from the established pattern, he can anticipate
severe punishment including death or hard labor
in a penal camp. Within the borders of the coun-
try, the closest observation is maintained not only
over all citizens but also over all visitors.
Abroad, the strength of Soviet Intelligence lies
basically in the worldwide organization of the
Communist Party. As already indicated, the So-
viets have emphasized the use of agents who are
citizens of the country in which they are to oper-
ate. These prospective collectors of information,
recruited by the regular Communist Party organ-
ization, are fellow travellers and sympathizers not
known as Communists. Either they are already
in an exploitable position or possess the necessary
qualifications. Sold on the basic doctrines of com-
munism, these individuals transfer their loyalties
from their own country to the U. S. S. R. They
are given small sums of money for "expenses" and
so become subject to blackmail. Each new recruit
becomes the member of an independent cell, but
only the leader of the cell has a direct Soviet con-
tact. Thus this system is capable of almost in-
definite expansion and, of even greater impor-
tance, is subject to a minimum risk of exposure.
In connection with this recruitment program, So-
viet Intelligence has an amazingly complete dos-
sier coverage of individuals all over the world:
their appearance, interests, weaknesses, and politi-
cal inclinations.
The counterintelligence activity of the Soviets
is particularly noteworthy. Its defensive effec-
tiveness makes the term "Iron Curtain" most ap-
propriate. No one may cross the borders of the
U. S. S. R. without great hazards of detection.
All means of communications are rigidly con-
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trolled, and the gathering of any information in-
side the country by foreign agents is notoriously
difficult. The offensive aspects of Soviet counter-
intelligence are even more unique and constitute
a Russian contribution to modern intelligence.
The objective is the dissemination of false infor-
mation designed to mislead and confuse opponents
and prospective victims. Seemingly "anti-Com-
munist" propaganda and individuals are skillfully
utilized in a cleverly organized program.
The controls of this tremendous organization
were further overhauled and centralized at the top
level in 1946. As a result, the major agencies pri-
marily concerned with intelligence activities from
1946 to 1953 were: Military Intelligence, and the
Ministry of State Security, or MG-B, formerly
known as NKGB. During this period the MVD,
Ministry of Internal Affairs (the former NKVD),
appeared to have lost most of its police and intel-
ligence functions.
Currently, the Military Intelligence organiza-
tion, known as GRU, is a part of the Soviet gen-
eral staff. From the military point of view, it
is interested in political events and economic con-
ditions abroad and so collects information for in-
telligence purposes all over the world, It also di-
rects foreign sabotage. It maintains networks of
agents, directed both by military attaches and by
special agents assigned cover positions in Soviet
diplomatic and consular posts.
From 1946 to 1953 MGB had broad responsi-
bilities for political espionage and propaganda
abroad and for the control of espionage activities
of foreign Communist Parties. Its foreign de-
partment, known as INO, maintained an agent in
every Soviet diplomatic, consular, and trading
mission abroad. KRU, another department, had
the objective of countering foreign political es-
pionage in the Soviet Union and the activities of
anti-Soviet groups abroad. EKU, the economic
department, was organized originally to control
foreign economic activity within the U. S. S. R.
Later it was composed of two sections: the first
exercised political control over the domestic econ-
omy by means of secret police; the second directed
external economic espionage and encouraged class
warfare, industrial crises, and strikes. Two other
departments, SPU and DTU, had responsibilities
within the U. S. S. R. and were charged, respec-
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60
tively, with purging counterrevolutionary activi-
ties and suppressing espionage or sabotage activi-
ties directed against transportation. The careful
correlation of all foreign intelligence at the top
level was accomplished to formulate or to revise
Soviet foreign policies.
The personnel of MGB included: border guards
and internal troops; specially trained spies and
covert agents; highly placed Soviet citizens, who
were not only specialists in such fields as econom-
ics, foreign trade, education and cultural activi-
ties, but also were well-trained in the work of in-
telligence; unofficial Soviet citizens who were na-
tionals of various satellite governments; and for-
eign Communist Party members. The Soviet
Union has maintained the largest diplomatic corps
of any country in the world, and the size of indi-
vidual missions has been far in excess of normal
requirements. For example, in Ottawa the
U. S. S. R. has maintained a diplomatic staff of
70, as compared with maximums of 12 to 24 main-
tained by other countries. In Cairo the Soviet
Ambassador has had a staff of more than 300;
while the Egyptian Ambassador in Moscow has
had fewer than 12. In London the U. S. S. R. has
had more than 250 persons representing various
agencies; while in Washington it has had approxi-
mately 1,100 official representatives. At the same
time, in Moscow Great Britain was limited to 32
representatives and the United States to about 175.
The MVD cooperated with the MGB and con-
trolled the administration of the slave labor
camps. It had its own troops, politically reliable
and ready to crush any armed revolt within the
country. Its activities were primarily internal.
However, shortly after the dramatic announce-
ments of Stalin's serious illness and death in
March 1953, news releases from Moscow revealed
an important administrative reorganization of the
Soviet Intelligence System. The MGB and the
MVD were combined as the Ministry of Internal
Affairs.
There are several possible weaknesses of Soviet
Intelligence. The most vital may be that of inter-
nal suspicion. In striving for the greatest possi-
ble efficiency, Soviet leaders place little trust in
their operatives, whom they keep under careful
surveillance, including even their diplomatic rep-
resentatives. Complete thoroughness may, in it-
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self, become a weakness. A second possible weak-
ness, similar to that of the Nazi Germans, is an
emphasis on intensive training for their agents
which has led to standardized methods and reac-
tions. While there is no way to determine the
degree of success of Soviet agents, the fact that
some of them have been discovered, especially in
the United States, indicates that they are not com-
pletely successful.
Since it must answer to only a small group of
Communist leaders, Soviet Intelligence has almost
absolute power. It acts as the eyes, ears, and
punishing arm of the government in authority.
Fear is one of its most effective weapons. There
are, however, indications of an underground op-
position movement, especially in satellite areas, en-
gaged in sabotage and propaganda warfare on a
considerable scale.
The organization of Soviet Intelligence is fur-
ther strengthened by the intelligence agencies of
the various satellite countries, including Poland,
Hungary, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia. Each
of these countries is engaged in intelligence activi-
ties which seem to be geared to those of the Soviet
Union. The extent of these activities is illus-
trated by Hungary, for example, which has an or-
ganization out of all proportion to its size, inter-
est, and national income.
The Rebirth of German Intelligence
The political and economic conditions in post-
war Germany, divided as it has been into eastern
and western zones, have led to underground re-
sistance movements with several intelligence or-
ganizations, each active in espionage, sabotage,
and propaganda. The "Fighters Against Inhu-
manity" and the "Investigating Committee of
Free Jurists in the Soviet Zone" are two such
groups directing their activities against the Soviet
occupation forces and the Soviet-sponsored Com-
munist Government in East Germany. The "Red
Gestapo" is a security service organized by the
East German Government to combat the covert
activities of the West German groups.
CONCLUSIONS
A review of the development of the intelligence
activities and organizations of various countries
of the world throughout recorded history points
CONFIDENTIAL
up certain general principles and significant les-
sons. First of all, intelligence as activity is a
product of war and the fear of war. In one form
or another, it has always been an inevitable ad-
junct of military activity and command. Its de-
velopment, therefore, has been associated with that
of military forces. History has shown that no
major military endeavor has been better than the
staff responsible for its direction. At the same
time, the degree of the success of any major staff
effort has often been proportionate to the knowl-
edge, or intelligence, upon which that effort was
based.
Intelligence has been used for other purposes as
well. Wisely employed, it has given direction and
meaning to the foreign policies of nations.
Basely subverted, it has supported and maintained
the autocratic power and authority of police
states.
There are many lessons of importance to be
learned from the history of intelligence. Of these
there are six which seem to have particular sig-
nificance. The first is the demonstrated need for
continuity of performance. No successful organi-
zation can be improvised overnight: years of ad-
vance planning and preparation are required.
Collection and production are effective only on a
longterm basis. This means that intelligence ac-
tivity must be continuous in times of peace and
times of war. The closest possible relationship
exists between intelligence operations in peace-
time and their effectiveness in wartime. History
has demonstrated time and again that adequate
peacetime preparations have given a significant
offensive advantage when military operations be-
gan. Associated with this lesson of history are
two others: trained personnel are essential to in-
telligence organization; and adequate funds must
be made available to maintain the personnel and
the organization. The lavish outlay of funds for
intelligence in times of crisis is not sufficient.
Only longterm support, regardless of the apparent
requirements of the moment, can assure continued
success.
A fourth lesson is the importance of unified di-
rection to coordinate and to concentrate the total
intelligence effort of a nation. The failures of
German Intelligence in World Wars I and II give
particular emphasis to this point.
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Fifth, the effectiveness of intelligence rests upon
the speed of its dissemination and the adequacy of
the communications systems upon which it must
rely.
Finally, intelligence must be used. Its func-
tions must be understood and its value appreciated
by potential consumers. Time and again in mili-
tary and political history failures of intelligence
have actually been failures to make use of it.
The development of intelligence has been grad-
ual, almost imperceptible at times, and paced by
the historical trends of nations and peoples. It
would be difficult to determine with any finality
the extent of its influence on historical events.
There seems to be evidence, however, that intelli-
gence activity has had a marked effect upon the
outcome of specific situations which have influ-
enced significant world events. In the broadest
CONFIDENTIAL
sense, therefore, the lessons to be learned from a
study of the history of intelligence merit the most
attentive consideration of those military and po-
litical leaders of any nation who bear in large
measure responsibility for its security, its well-
being, and its destiny.
Since this chapter has dealt with development,
there has been an emphasis on intelligence in re-
lation to both military and political history. The
illustrations of covert operations may have excited
the particular interest of the reader, but the pur-
pose of this chapter has not been to give an exag-
gerated build-up for intelligence, nor to suggest
that it is the answer to all military and political
problems. In considering its importance the
reader must see it in proper perspective. He must
also recognize clearly that covert operations are
but one aspect of its total activity.
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CHAPTER 3
UNITED STATES ORGANIZATIONS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
INTRODUCTION
A study of its historical development has re-
vealed how and why, by the middle of the 20th
century, intelligence has become exceedingly im-
portant to government and its supporting armed
forces in their mutual objective of promoting and
maintaining the security and welfare of any na-
tion in its relations with other nations. Foreign
policies, to be sound and constructive, must be
based on realism and fact. Military policies, as
part of foreign policies, are subject to the same
requirements. Since foreign and military policies
are a product of the world environment interact-
ing with national aspirations and objectives, they
are affected necessarily by the increasing complex-
ities of international relations.
In recent years as a part of its foreign policy,
the United States has assumed additional respon-
sibilities under various treaty and pact arrange-
ments with other nations on a world, regional, or
bilateral basis. Thus special organizations have
been required to carry out these new international
tasks and new missions and responsibilities have
been created for the armed forces. For these rea-
sons, the United States has found it imperative
to reorganize and expand the agencies responsible
for the formulation and direction of plans and
policies relating to the national security. The
organizations which produce the intelligence re-
quired by these agencies have likewise been sub-
jected to frequent change in order to carry out the
tasks of new responsibilities.
This chapter will review the organization of the
various United States agencies which have respon-
sibilities in connection with foreign policy and
will show how Intelligence is related to them.
Two concepts must be kept in mind: first, that
Intelligence is a service organization, not an end
in itself; and second, that Intelligence is a unity
and is not the exclusive province of any one agen-
cy. By tracing the interrelationships of these
agencies and their Intelligence subdivisions, these
63
concepts should become clear and the intelligence
officer should better understand his own position
and functions. By reason of the frequency of
joint operations, he must also be informed of the
detailed organization of the army and air force.
NATIONAL SECURITY ORGANIZATION
The National Security Act of 1947, and the leg-
islation supplementing or amending it in 1949,
produced fundamental and far-reaching changes
in the organization and relationships of the armed
forces of the United States.
The pumpose of the Act was stated as being:
To promote the national security by pro-
viding for a Secretary of Defense; for a -De-
partment of Defense, for a Department of the
Army, a Department of the Navy, and a De-
partment of the Air Force; and for the co-
ordination of the activities of the Department
of Defense with other departments and agen-
cies of the Government concerned with the
national security.
The policy expressed in the Act and its subse-
quent amendments was stated by the Congress as
follows:
In enacting this legislation, it is the intent
of Congress to provide a comprehensive pro-
gram for the future security of the United
States:
to provide for the establishment on integrated
policies and procedures for the departments,
agencies, and functions of the government re-
lating to the national security;
to provide three military departments, sep-
arately administered, for the operation and
administration of the Army, the Navy (in-
cluding naval aviation and the United States
Marine Corps), and the Air Force, with their
assigned combat and service components;
to provide for their authoritative coordina-
tion and unified direction under civilian con- ..
trol of the Secretary of Defense, but not to
merge them;
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to provide for the effective strategic direc-
tion of the armed forces and for their opera-
tion under unified control and for their
integration into an efficient team of land, naval
and air forces;
but not to establish a single Chief of Staff
over the Armed Forces nor an Armed Forces
general staff (but this is not to be interpreted
as applying to the Joint Chiefs of Staff or
Joint Staff) .
Major Features of the National Security Legislation
The major features of the Act were the establish-
ment of: (a) the National Security Council, the
National Security Resources Board, and the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency; (b) a Department and
a Secretary of Defense to provide unified control
over the Armed Forces; (c) the Department of
the Air Force as a separate command under the
Department of Defense; ( d) the following agen-
cies under the Department of Defense (in addi-
tion to the three military departments) : the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, the Munitions
Board, the Research and Development Board, and
the Armed Forces Policy Council.
The 1949 Amendments to the Act increased the
authority previously granted to the Secretary of
Defense to exercise further centralized control of
the military departments, and created the posi-
tions of Deputy and Assistant Secretaries of De-
fense, and the position of Chairman, Joint Chiefs
of Staff.
The Air Force Organization Act of 1951 further
clarified the organization and command structure
of the Department of the Air Force, the Chief of
Staff and the Air Staff, and the United States Air
Force.
By mid-1953, various Presidential Reorganiza-
tion plans had resulted in a number of changes in
some of the agencies and offices created by the
National Security Act of 1947. It also resulted in
the redistribution of some functions originally as-
signed them. For example; Reorganization Plan
No. 3 of 1953 abolished the National Security Re-
sources Board and transferred its responsibilities
to the Office of Defense Mobilization. Within the
Department of Defense there was a reorganization
of some of its subordinate agencies and offices as the
? result of Presidential Reorganization Plan No. 6
of 1953.
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64
Continuing efforts are made within the executive
branch of the Government to increase efficiency of
operations and to insure the greatest coordination
of its widely varied activities, particularly as re-
lated to problems of national security.
The National Security Council (NSC)
The NSC is composed of officials specifically
designated by statute. Among these are: the
President of the United States; the Vice Presi-
dent; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of De-
fense; the Director of Defense Mobilization; and
the Secretary of the Treasury. The President acts
as chairman.
In addition to the foregoing officials, the Presi-
dent is given authority to appoint (subject to the
advice and consent of the Senate) as additional
members of the Council other administrative gov-
ernment officials, including the Secretaries and
Under Secretaries of other Executive Departments
and of the Military Departments.
The law provides that it shall have a staff headed
by a civilian executive secretary.
The function of the NSC is stated as follows:
to advise the President with respect to the
integration of domestic, foreign and military
policies relating to the national security so as
to enable the military services and the other
departments and agencies of the Government
to cooperate more effectively in matters in-
volving the national security.
In addition to performing such other func-
tions as the President may direct, for the pur-
pose of more effectively coordinating the poli-
cies and functions of the departments and
agencies of the Government relating to the
national security, it shall, subject to the direc-
tion of the President, be the duty of the
Council?
(1) to assess and appraise the objectives,
commitments, and risks of the United States
in relation to our actual and potential military
power, in the interest of national security,
for the purpose of making recommendations
to the President in connection therewith; and
(2) to consider policies on matters of com-
mon interest to the departments and agencies
of the Government concerned with the na-
tional security, and to make recommendations
to the President in connection therewith.
The NSC is concerned with the ultimate correla-
tion of the Government's best military and diplo-
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matic thought on problems relating to the position
of the United States in the world society of na-
tions, and has the additional responsibility of
making sure that our commitments do not exceed
our abilities to carry theM out. The Secretary of
State and his Department continue to exercise
leadership in charting our foreign policy, but other
branches of Government, including the military,
have a chance to state their views before decisions
are made.
The NSC does not seek publicity but works
quietly and secretly. When the President or one
of the members of the NSC asks for advice on a
particular situation, the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency has a summary of the situation
prepared, which includes an appraisal of world
reactions to it. A working group made up of
representatives from each department recommends
a course of action which may be acted upon with
dispatch by the NSC itself. Disagreements not
resolved are settled by Presidential decision. The
long range purpose of the NSC is to provide a
thoughtfully developed and clearly stated foreign
policy in balance with military strength so as to
give continuity to policies even as administrations
change. The NS C also specifically guides the ac-
tivities of the Central Intelligence Agency.
THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
The National Security Act of 1947 created the
"National Military Establishment" under the Sec-
retary of Defense; the 1949 amendments changed
the organizational title to the "Department of De-
fense." The latter statute also made the Depart-
ment of Defense one of the "executive" depart-
ments of the Government equal to the other
departments headed by cabinet officers; the De-
partments of the Army, the Navy, and the Air
Force became "military" rather than "executive"
departments, the Secretaries no longer being cabi-
net members.
The current organization of the Department of
Defense is indicated in figure 1.
Office of the Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of Defense is the principal as-
sistant to the President in all matters relating to
the Department of Defense. He is normally a
269196-54 6
65
civilian and cannot have been a regular commis-
sioned officer within 10 years of appointment to
the Secretary's post. A special congressional act
waived this restriction in the case of General of
the Army George C. Marshall.
Congress has restricted the Secretary's powers
to change through administrative acts the func-
tions of any of the military services that have
been fixed by legislation. Further, each of the
three military departments is separately admin-
istered, and their respective Secretaries as well
as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have the
right, after informing the Secretary of Defense,
to express freely their recommendations on defense
needs to the Congress.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the Joint Staff
Although a body bearing the title Joint Chiefs
of Staff has operated since 1942, the official per-
manent organization was not established until
1917. At that time the position of Chief of Staff
to the President was replaced by that of the Chair-
man, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the other members
being the Chief of Staff of the United States
Army, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief
of Staff of the United States Air Force, and the
Commandant of the United States Marine Corps.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff, frequently termed
the JCS, are the "principal military advisers" of
the President, the NSC, and the Secretary of De-
fense. Their duties specifically include:
(1) preparation of strategic plans and provision
for the strategic direction of the military
forces;
preparation of joint plans and assignment
to the military services of logistic respon-
sibilities in accordance with such plans;
establishment of unified commands in stra-
tegic areas;
review of major material and personnel re-
quirements of the military forces in accord-
ance with strategic and logistic plans;
formulation of policies for joint training of
the military forces;
formulation of policies for coordinating the
military education of members of the mili-
tary forces; and
providing United States representation on
the Military Staff Committee of the United
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
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I
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66
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RTMENT OF THE N
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
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Nations in accordance with the provisions
of the Charter of the United Nations.
The chairman, selected from among regular of-
ficers by the President, has no vote and exercises
no command over the JCS or any service. He
serves as presiding officer, provides the agenda for
meetings, and informs the Secretary of Defense
or President when the JCS has been unable to
reach agreement on issues. He is appointed for
a 2-year term renewable only once, unless a state
of war would make change unwise.
The Joint Chiefs have a Joint Staff not to ex-
ceed 210 officers drawn from the three services and
headed by a Director appointed by the JCS. This
relatively small, compact body in no way usurps
the direct operational functioning of the individ-
ual armed services, but plans and coordinates. If
the JCS must undertake operational functions, the
service Chief most directly concerned acts as "Ex-
ecutive Agent" to control field and other agencies.
The JCS exercise command authority as a body;
they do not decide questions by majority rule.
Most questions are satisfactorily resolved, but re-
maining differences of opinion are decided by
higher authority.
The Joint Staff is divided into three groups: the
Joint Strategic Plans Group, the Joint Logistics
Plans Group and the Joint Intelligence Group.
Of necessity most studies involve intergroup col-
laboration. The Staff works full time for the JCS,
and its members are not responsible to their own
services. Since considerable amounts of JCS work
involve detail that must be provided by the in-
dividual services, a number of Joint Committees
have been established to work with the Joint Staff.
The principal ones are the Joint Strategic Survey
Committee, Joint Strategic Plans Committee,
Joint Intelligence Committee, and Joint Logistics
Plans Committee.
The first of these committees is the senior policy
planning and advisory group for the JCS, dealing
with broad political-military problems from a mil-
itary viewpoint. The other three committees are
part-time, staffed by officers with regular duties in
their own departments closely related to their com-
mittee assignments. Plans prepared by any of
the groups are reviewed by the appropriate com-
mittee before submission to the JCS and com-
mittee members are able to call upon their respec-
67
tive services for advice. Thus the particular
requirements and problems of the various services
are coordinated in the planning of the Joint Staff.
There are of course, still other specialized com-
mittees as depicted in figure 2. And ad hoc com-
mittees are also created to meet specific additional
needs.
The responsibilities of the JCS have been de-
lineated in the excerpt from the law given earlier
in this section. The JCS contribute to the estab-
lishment of priorities to insure the meeting of
military needs. Increasingly, too, they are work-
ing on budget allocations of the three services to
be sure they match the strategic and logistics plans
agreed upon. Specific questions come to them
from the Services, cabinet secretaries, other Gov-
ernment departments, or from one of their own
joint staff groups.
The complexity of the problems of the JCS can
be quite readily illustrated. For example, they
have to consider the problem of stockpiling: How
much will we require of certain specific materials?
Other typical problems might be: How great is
the threat of submarine warfare? How much oil
and gas will be required in war and how long will
the war last? Are reserves adequate? Is ration-
ing feasible? What is the availability of men and
weapons? In planning the need for bases they
must evaluate requirements in relation to avail-
ability, defense, and cost of acquisition. Of great
importance are intelligence estimates regarding
both enemies and allies, what they may or can do.
Since planning can never be on the basis of un-
limited strength, the JCS must decide what risks
can be accepted, what ones are unavoidable, and
how these policies or positions interact upon each
other. Future weapons planning is also an un-
certain and complex problem with tremendous
consequences at stake. Many of these weighty
problems hinge upon estimates of future interna-
tional developments, a matter of good intelligence
assessment. All of the planning must be done
within the limits of available money appropria-
tions.
When the JCS finally prepare a strategic plan,
it consists of four essentials: (1) a statement of
national war objectives; (2) a statement of enemy
capabilities; (3) a broad general concept of op-
erations; and (4) a statement of a number of time-
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71111113010103
NOTE:
BOXES INCLOSED BY BROKEN UNE
INDICATE THE JOINT STAFF
JOINT STRATEGIC
SURVEY COMMITTEE
CHAIRMAN'S
STAFF GROUP
REPRESENTATIVE OF J.C.S.
ON SENIOR STAFF OF N.S.C.
SECRETARIAT
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN
UNITED STATES DELEGATION
UNITED NATIONS MILITARY
STAFF COMMITTEE
1........
UNITED STATES DELEGATION
INTER-AMERICAN DEFENSE BD.
HISTORICAL
SECTION
}--
JOINT MIUTARY TRANS-
PORTATION COMMITTEE
HUNITED STATES MIUTARY
COOPERATION COMMITTEE
JOINT METEOROLOGICAL
COMMITTEE
JOINT MUNITIONS
ALLOCATIONS COMMITTEE
JOINT COMMUNICATIONS-
ELECTRONICS COMMITTEE
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF
COMMUNICATIONS ELECTRONICS
JOINT INTELLIGENCE
OBJECTIVES AGENCY
JOINT MATERIEL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
JOINT
STAFF
????1
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
JOINT STAFF
JOINT STRATEGIC
PLANS COMMITTEE
JOINT STRATEGIC
PLANS GROUP
JOINT INTELLIGENCE
COMMITTEE
JOINT INTELLIGENCE
GROUP
JOINT LOGISTICS
PLANS COMMITTEE
JOINT ADVANCED
STUDY COMMITTEE
JOINT LOGISTICS
PLANS GROUP
L
- J
Figure 2.?Organization Chart?Joint Chiefs of Staff.
September 1952
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phased military tasks to be undertaken by the
military forces, including the major tactical units
to perform the tasks. The importance of the
intelligence function in such planning is evident.
THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY.
An understanding of the organization of the
Navy Department is important to the intelligence
officer for at least two reasons. In the first place,
since Intelligence must supply many kinds of in-
formation required by the planners and command-
ers, its ability to supply meaningful information
in no small measure depends upon its understand-
ing of the organization it serves. Secondly, In-
telligence is dependent upon its whole parent
organization for most of the raw material which
it is to process into finished intelligence. Like-
wise, since the same information may be of use to
all three services, and any part of another service
may be a source of intelligence useful to the Navy,
an understanding of the other national security
agencies is also important.
The National Security Act of 1947 describes the
functional organization of the Department of the
Navy as follows:
The term "Department of the Navy" as
used in this Act shall be construed to mean
the Department of the Navy at the seat of
government; the headquarters, United States
Marine Corps; the entire operating forces of
the United States Navy, including naval avia-
tion, and of the United States Marine Corps,
including the reserve components of such
forces; all field activities, headquarters, forces,
bases, installations, activities, and functions
under the control or supervision of the De-
partment of the Navy; and the United States
Coast Guard when operating as a part of the
Navy pursuant to law.
In general the United States Navy, within
the Department of the Navy, shall include
naval combat and service forces and such avia-
tion as may be organic therein. It shall be
organized, trained, and equipped primarily
for prompt and sustained combat incident to
operations at sea. It shall be responsible for
the preparation of naval forces necessary for
the effective prosecution of war except as
otherwise assigned, and, in accordance with
integrated joint mobilization plans, for the
expansion of the peacetime components of the
Navy to meet the needs of war.
All naval aviation shall be integrated with
the naval service as part thereof within the
Department of the Navy. Naval aviation
shall consist of combat and service and train-
ing forces, and shall include land-based naval
aviation, air transport essential for naval
operations, all air weapons and air techniques
involved ,in the operations and activities of
the United States Navy, and the entire re-
mainder of the aeronautical organization of
the United States Navy, together with the
personnel necessary therefore.
The Navy shall be generally responsible for
naval reconnaissance, anti-submarine warfare,
and protection of shipping.
The Navy shall develop aircraft, weapons,
tactics, technique, organization and equipment
of naval combat and service elements; matters
of joint concern as to these functions shall be
coordinated between the Army, the Air Force,
and the Navy.
It also describes the organization and functions of
the Marine Corps:
The United States Marine Corps, within the
Department of the Navy, shall include land
combat and service forces and such aviation as
may be organic therein. The Marine Corps
shall be organized, trained and equipped to
provide fleet marine forces of combined arms,
together with supporting air components, for
service with the fleet in the seizure or defense
of advanced naval bases and for the conduct
of such land operations as may be essential to
the prosecution of a naval campaign. It shall
be the duty of the Marine Corps to develop,
in coordination with the Army and the Air
Force, those phases of amphibious operations
which pertain to the tactics, technique, and
equipment employed by landing forces. In
addition, the Marine Corps shall provide de-
tachments and organizations for service on
armed vessels of the Navy, shall provide
security detachments for the protection of
naval property at naval stations and bases,
and shall perform such other duties as the
President may direct: Provided, That such
additional duties shall not detract from or
interfere with the operations for which the
Marine Corps is primarily organized. The
Marine Corps shall be responsible, in accord-
ance with integrated joint mobilization plans,
for the expansion of peacetime components of
the Marine Corps to meet the needs of war.
Historical Development
On April 30, 1798, Congress established the De-
partment of the Navy and the Office of the Score-
69 CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
INTELLIGENCE FOR
tary. Before that time the Secretary of War was
responsible for naval affairs. After 1815 the or-
ganization was modified to include a board of
three naval officers to serve as professional assist-
ants to the Secretary. Then in 1842 this board of
Navy commissioners was abolished, and the system
of technical bureaus was established. By the time
of World War I, the post of Chief of Naval Opera-
tions was established, and between the two world
wars an Assistant Secretary for Air was also ap-
pointed. The immense new responsibilities de-
veloped during World War II were formalized in
the legislation now governing Navy organization.
Present-Day Navy Organization and Functions
Although the National Security Act of 1947 set
forth basic Navy responsibilities, later amplifica-
tions have been promulgated. The President and
the JCS issued a paper on April 21, 1948, entitled
"Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff." It specifies four purposes com-
mon to all three services for military operations:
(1) to support and defend the Constitution of the
United States against all enemies, foreign or
domestic; (2) to maintain, by timely and effective
military action, the security of the United States,
its possessions, and areas vital to its interest; (3)
to uphold and advance the national policies and
interests of the United States; and (4) to safe-
guard the internal security of the United States.
Among the more specific functions this document
describes is that of providing adequate, timely,
and reliable intelligence for use within the Na-
tional military establishment.
Using this 1948 document as an authority, the
Department of the Navy, in General Order No. 5,
established three principal organizational com-
ponents and enumerated four principal tasks.
The principal components are:
1. The Operating Forces: the several fleets,
seagoing forces, sea frontier forces, district
forces, and such of the shore establishments of
the Navy and other forces and activities as may
be assigned to the operating forces by the Presi-
dent or Secretary of the Navy.
2. The Navy Department: the executive part
of the naval establishment located at the seat
of the government, which comprises the bureaus,
boards and offices of the Navy Department; the
Headquarters of the Marine Corps; and the
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70
NAVAL OFFICERS
Headquarters of the Coast Guard (when as-
signed to the Navy).
3. The Shore Establishment: all other activi-
ties of the naval establishment including all
shore activities not assigned to the operating
forces.
It is fundamental naval policy to "maintain the
Navy as a thoroughly integrated entity in suffi-
cient strength on the sea and in the air to uphold,
in conjunction with our other Armed Forces, our
national policies and interests, to support our com-
merce and our international obligations, and to
guard the United States including its overseas
possessions and dependencies." The implementa-
tion of this policy imposes upon the administra-
tion of the naval establishment four principal
tasks:
1. First, to interpret, apply and uphold the
national policies and interests in the develop-
ment and use of the naval establishment. This
task may be described as the "policy control" of
the naval establishment.
2. Second, to command the operating forces,
and to maintain them in a state of readiness to
conduct war; and to promulgate to the naval
establishment directives embracing matters of
operations, security, intelligence, discipline,
naval communications, and similar matters of
naval administration. This task may be de-
scribed as the "naval command" of the naval
establishment.
3. Third, to coordinate and direct the effort
of the Navy Department and the shore establish-
ment in order to assure the development, pro-
curement, production and distribution of mate-
rial, facilities and personnel to the operating
forces. This task may be described as the "logis-
tics administration and control" of the naval
establishment.
4. Fourth, to develop and maintain efficiency
and economy in the operation of the naval estab-
lishment with particular regard to matters of
organization, staffing, administrative proce-
dures, the utilization of personnel, materials and
facilities, and the budgeting and expenditure
of funds. This task may be described as the
"business administration" of the naval establish-
ment.
The first and third tasks require additional com-
ment. Policy control includes guidance of the
Navy as a whole, appraisal of its overall perform-
ance, and public relations in the broadest sense.
Logistics is further described in General Order
No. 5 as having two phases: consumer logistics,
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UNITED STATES ORGANIZATIONS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY CONFIDENTIAL
and producer logistics. The former involves the
planning and forecasting of requirements on the
basis of operational plans, a responsibility of the
Chief of Naval Operations. The latter involves
the developing and procuring of these require-
ments. Consumer logistics is intimately asso-
ciated with naval command while producer
logistics is a matter of business adminstration,
although, of course, the two are intimately related.
Distribution of Executive Responsibilities
Figure 3 outlines the principal subdivisions of
the Department of the Navy. It will be noted
that the secretary has 4 civilian executive assist-
ants and a larger number of naval professional
assistants, including the naval command assistant
(Chief of Naval Operations) and up to 12 naval
technical assistants (counting the Chief of Naval
Reserve, Chief of Naval Material, and, when so as-
signed, the commandant of the Coast Guard).
The Secretary directs and controls the entire
naval establishment and retains immediate respon-
sibility for policy control, public relations, morale,
and budget. The civilian executive assistants
handle business administration and producer
logistics, exercising top management coordination
of the work of the many bureaus and offices in
the Navy Department. Bureau heads, however,
have direct liaison with the Secretary, although
routinely most of their business is transacted
either through the Chief of Naval Operations or
one of the civilian executive assistants. The bal-
ancing of military with civilian authority and
responsibility within the Navy is shown by the
division between the naval command assistant with
his subordinates and the civilian executive assist-
ants with their staffs.
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO)
The Chief of Naval Operations is the highest
ranking officer in the Department of the Navy.
As such he is a member of the JCS and is the prin-
cipal naval adviser to the President, Secretary of
Defense, and Secretary of the Navy. He is in
command of the operating forces and includes
among his responsibilities their training, readi-
ness, and war planning. He is required to deter-
mine the personnel and material requirements of
the operating forces and to this end coordinates
71
and directs the efforts of the various bureaus and
offices of the Navy Department.
His Vice Chief of Naval Operations (VCNO)
supervises the General Planning Group and the
work of the five Deputy Chiefs of Naval Opera-
tions (DCNO) : Personnel, Administration, Op-
erations, Logistics, and Air. There is also an
Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Naval Re-
serve) advanced from his former position under
the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Person-
nel). The General Planning Group prepares
broad strategic plans and aids in developing logis-
tics requirements in support of such plans. These
naval plans are based on overall plans received
from the JCS. Another more recent change is the
Progress Analysis Group to report on Navywide
progress and readiness for war. Both the Com-
mandant of the Marine Corps and the Comman-
dant of the Coast Guard (in wartime) deal di-
rectly with the Chief of Naval Operations on
matters of common interest.
The office of the Chief of Naval Operations is or-
ganized along the same lines as the general staff
of the Army, although different titles are used
and there are some variations. For example, per-
sonnel and administration are separate sections.
The latter directs United States naval missions,
Navy participation in pan-American affairs, naval
records and history, the Naval Observatory, the
Naval Hydrographic Office, and the Naval Com-
munications Service. Air also has its separate
organization to develop aircraft and guided mis-
siles, to organize aviation logistics, and to develop
air warfare operating plans. The DCNO (Opera-
tions) Division includes intelligence and plans, so
that the Director of Naval Intelligence is subordi-
nate to the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations.
This same subordination exists in the Air Force.
Training responsibilities are allocated as fol-
lows: individual training to the Chief of Naval
Personnel, group training to the Deputy Chief of
Naval Operations (operations) , and aviation to the
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air). By
general policy either the Chief or the Vice Chief of
Naval Operations must be a naval aviator to insure
full representation of aviation needs. The Vice
and Deputy Chiefs derive their authority solely
from the Chief of Naval Operations, in the same
manner as with staffs afloat. Although not in-
CONFIDENTIAL
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1VIIN3011N00
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
I TIE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
SUM= OF AIL NAVAL MORS
NAVAL COMMAND ASSISTANT
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CIVRIAN EXECUTIVE ASSISTANTS
OWN SECRETARY OF 1111 NAVY
MIAMI SE011TARY
ASSISUMT SECRETARY FOR MN
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Figure 3.?Organization Chart?Department of the Navy.
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INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS
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UNITED STATES ORGANIZATIONS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
flexible or fixed by formal regulations, the most
frequent relationships between CNO and the Bu-
reaus are found as follows: DCNO (Logistics)
with Yards and Docks, Ordnance, Supplies and
Accounts, Ships, Medicine and Surgery; DCNO
(Personnel) with Personnel; and DCNO (Air)
with Aeronautics.
The Naval Inspector General reports both to
the Chief of Naval Operations and to the Secre-
tary of the Navy. He investigates and reports on
all matters affecting the discipline and military
efficiency of the Navy, making such recommenda-
tions as are required. In his work he has great
latitude, and every part of the service is open to
his scrutiny. His investigations are not to be
confused with those made by the Office of Naval
Intelligence which relate to security and are made
only on request of competent authority.
The Operating Forces
Since World War II, all United States forces
outside the continental limits have been organized
under unified area commands. Each is under a
commander-in-chief who has control over all
United States forces?Army, Navy, and Air Force
in his area?as assigned by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. Under the Executive Agent concept men-
tioned earlier, the Chief of Naval Operations holds
that JCS position for the Pacific, Atlantic, and
Eastern Atlantic-Mediterranean commands. The
Chief of Staff, United States Army, is the Execu-
tive Agent for the Far East (FEC) , Caribbean,
and European (EuCom) commands as well as
United States Forces in Austria. The Chief of
Staff, United States Air Force, is the Executive
Agent for the Alaskan and Northeast commands,
the United States Air Force Europe, and the Stra-
tegic Air Command (SAC).
The Chief of Naval Operations has under his
direct control the Pacific Fleet, Atlantic Fleet,
and Naval Forces Eastern Atlantic and Mediter-
ranean. Each fleet has type components: Am-
phibious, Fleet Marine, Air, Battleships and
Cruisers, Destroyers and Destroyer Escorts, Mine,
Submarine, Service Force, and Training Com-
mands.
Under Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet (Cin-
CPac) is the First Fleet, operating in the Eastern
Pacific, and the Seventh Fleet, in the Western
73
CONFIDENTIAL
Pacific. However, during the Korean fighting
operational control of the latter fleet has been held
by the Commander-in-Chief, Far East (Army)
exercised through Commander Naval Forces, Far
East (ComNavFE). The Commander-in-Chief,
Atlantic Fleet ( CinCLant) , has the Second Fleet,
and the Operational Development Force for evalu-
ation tests. Commander-in-Chief Eastern At-
lantic and Mediterranean (CinCNELM) has the
Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, receiving logis-
tic support from CinCLantFlt. Each of these
fleets is composed of appropriate ships tempo-
rarily assigned from type commands, and each is
a purely operational command, the administration
remaining under the type commander.
Naval Forces, Germany (NavForGer) is under
Commander-in-Chief, Europe (Army) . The Mili-
tary Sea Transportation Service (MSTS) is under
the Chief of Naval Operations. In addition there
are Pacific and Atlantic Reserve Fleets made up
of the "moth-ball" ships. The Commanders of
the Western and Eastern Sea Frontiers respec-
tively command these fleets as additional duty.
Sea Frontiers
Sea Frontier forces are part of the Operating
Forces of the Navy. Geographically there are five
such forces. The Eastern Sea Frontier (East-
SeaFron) includes waters off the Atlantic and
Gulf Coasts and the 1st, 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th, 8th,
and 9th Naval Districts, plus Naval Commands
of the Potomac and Severn Rivers. This sea
frontier command is under CinCLant. The
Caribbean Sea Frontier, under the Commander-
in-Chief, Caribbean (Army), includes the 10th
and 15th Naval Districts, plus adjacent waters in
the Caribbean and nearby Pacific. The Western
Sea Frontier (WesSeaFron) under CinCPac in-
cludes the 11th, 12th, and 13th Naval Districts, as
well as eastern Pacific waters. The Hawaiian Sea
Frontier also under CinCPac includes the 14th
Naval District and central Pacific waters. The
Alaskan Sea Frontier is under Commander-in-
Chief Alaska (Air Force) and includes the 17th
Naval District and north Pacific waters.
These command relationships are in the field of
military operations. Sea Frontier commanders
are responsible for maintaining adequate plans for
the defense of their respective areas, both of a
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CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS
naval and a joint nature. They also must be
ready to expedite and protect merchant shipping
in their areas. Naval participation in search and
rescue operations is under their control.
In addition to operational duties, Sea Frontier
commanders are administratively in the chain of
command between the Chief of Naval Operations
and the District Commandants. This is military
command and coordination control in the interests
of uniformity of action and avoidance of duplica-
tion among the districts. District Commandants
still can deal directly with the Navy Department
on matters not involving coordination or the mili-
tary readiness of their forces.
The Shore Establishment
The shore establishment includes the field ac-
tivities of the bureaus and offices of the Navy De-
partment and all shore activities not assigned to
the operating forces. These activities are largely
involved in producer logistics for the support of
the operating forces. Although located princi-
pally in coastal areas, they may be scattered any-
where throughout the United States and its terri-
tories.
It is appropriate at this point to provide an ex-
planation of the formal command relationships
which apply specifically to the Shore Establish-
ment, based on General Order No. 19 which gives
the official definitions.
Command is the authoritative direction exer-
cised over a unit or individual of the Naval Estab-
lishment in all matters pertaining to the conduct
of naval affairs not specifically expected by higher
authority and is commensurate with the responsi-
bility imposed. Inherent in command are prec-
edence over all personnel serving with the com-
mand, the responsibility for coordinating the ef-
forts of the units or individuals commanded, the
power to enforce the official will of the commander
through the exercise of the necessary military di-
rections, the authority to make inspections to in-
sure compliance with such directions, and the
initiation or application of authorized discipli-
nary measures incident thereto. A commander,
within his discretion, may delegate the execution
of the details to be performed by his authority to
appropriate subordinates, but such delegation does
not relieve him of the overall responsibility for
CONFIDENTIAL
74
the performance of the personnel or units under
his command.
In General Order No. 19 "command" is subdi-
vided into four components which are defined as
follows:
Military Command is the authoritative di-
rection exercised over activities of the Naval
Establishment in military matters together
with the power to exercise authoritative direc-
tion in all matters when circumstances
dictate.
Military command stems from the Chief of Naval
Operations, and is exercised over activities of the
shore establishment through the Sea Frontier Com-
manders and the District Commandants, the
Chief of Naval Air Training, and the Comman-
dant of the Marine Corps. It includes matters
characteristic of a military organization, as con-
trasted to matters of the type provided for under
Management Control in industry or business.
Coordination Control is that necessary di-
rection of separate units of the naval estab-
lishment to insure adequately integrated
relationships between all of these units.
Coordination Control is a responsibility of the
Chief of Naval Operations, exercised through the
Sea Frontier Commanders and the District Com-
mandants, over shore activities located within the
several districts. It fulfills the twofold purpose
of providing for orderly and complete service in
support of the operating forces and coordination
between shore activities under different commands.
Management Control is the direction exer-
cised, in other than military matters, by an
authority of the Naval Establishment over a
unit of the naval shore establishment in the
administration of its local operating func-
tions.
Management Control is exercised by the desig-
nated bureau or office of the Navy Department
over a field activity in the non-military adminis-
tration of its functions. Bureau management re-
flects the policies and procedures of the Civilian
Executive Assistants in the fields of Business Ad-
ministration and Producer Logistics, and includes
overall responsibility for the work performed.
It is to be noted that in the operating forces Man-
agement Control is included in "Command" and
is always the responsibility of the Chief of Naval
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UNITED STATES ORGANIZATIONS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
Operations. Command in the operating forces is
not divided into the four components specified in
General Order No. 19; however, commands of the
operating forces which control activities of the
Shore Establishment exercise that control in ac-
cordance with these four components.
Technical Control is the specialized or pro-
fessional guidance or direction exercised by
an authority of the naval establishment in
technical matters.
Technical Control is exercised by the bureaus and
offices of the Navy Department according to their
specialized technical responsibilities. This con-
trol extends throughout the naval establishment.
The shore establishment consists of district ac-
tivities, fleet activities based ashore, Marine Corps
supporting activities, and the Naval Air Training
Command. Their relationships with the districts,
sea frontiers, fleet commands, and bureaus, are
governed by the regulations indicated above.
A District Commandant is an officer of the line
qualified for command at sea. In his naval dis-
trict he acts as the representative of the Secretary
of the Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, Sea
Frontier Commander, and the various bureaus of
the Navy Department. His responsibilities in-
clude support of the operating forces, defense of
the district, control of public relations, mainte-
nance of industrial mobilization plans, control of
naval reserve matters, and maintenance of an ef-
ficient intelligence service both for security and
operational purposes. Additional duties include
operation of naval communications, collaboration
with other Government authorities, supervision of
legal matters, public works, and transportation.
Each major harbor or operating area within a
district has a Naval Base Commander, with pri-
mary responsibility to support the operating
forces. A Naval Shipyard is but one component
of a Naval Base. There are also Naval Air Base
Commands with appropriate subordinate oom-
mands, including all aviation activities within a
district with the exception of training commands,
Marine Air commands, and weather centrals.
The United States Marine Corps
The Marine Corps, whose mission has been stated
earlier, is divided like the Navy into three com-
ponents: the headquarters, the operating forces,
CONFIDENTIAL
and the supporting establishment. Headquarters
include the Offices of the Commandant, the Supply
Department, and the Personnel Department. In
the Offices of the Commandant, the Division of
Plans and Policies formulates intelligence plans.
The major commands of the operating forces
are Fleet Marine Forces, Atlantic, and Fleet Ma-
rine Forces, Pacific, each under a Commanding
General, located respectively at Norfolk, Va., and
at Honolulu. These forces contain balanced land,
air, and service elements. The Marine Corps Se-
curity Forces guard naval shore activities, with
a Marine Barracks established at each. Ship de-
tachments, actually a part of the security force,
serve as gun crews and small-sized landing parties.
The supporting establishment includes the quar-
termaster depots and other facilities required to
service the Operating Forces.
OTHER DEFENSE DEPARTMENTS
The Department of the Army and Department
of the Air Force resemble the Department of the
Navy in structure, but different histories and mis-
sions have brought about somewhat different solu-
tions to their organizational problems.
The Department of the Army
This title refers both to the whole Army estab-
lishment and to the executive offices in Washington.
The Department of War, created in 1789, became
the Department of the Army in 1947 at which time
the Department of the Air Force was established.
The Secretary of the Army has responsibilities
and an organization similar to those of the Secre-
tary of the Navy. His department includes a
Chief of Staff, a General Staff, a Special Staff,
various administrative and technical staffs and
services, the Office of the Chief of Army Field
Forces, the continental armies, and the overseas
commands.
The mission of the Army places its primary
interest in all operations on land, but its forces
include also such aviation and water transporta-
tion as may be organic to its land combat and
service forces.
Figure 4 shows the Washington offices of the
Department of the Army. Most of the titles are
self-explanatory. The chiefs of the technical serv-
ices, however, have a dual role. They not only
75 CONFIDENTIAL
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ADMINISTRATIVE
ASSISTANT
1
DEPARTMENT
COUNSELOR
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF THE ARMY
(General Management)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF THE ARMY
(Manpower & Res Forces)
UNDER SECRETARY
OF THE ARMY
CHIEF OF STAFF
VICE CHIEF OF STAFF
SECRETARY OF THE GENERAL STAFF
COMPTROLLER OF THE ARMY
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR OPERATIONS & ADMINISTRATION
GENERAL STAFF COMMITTEE ON
NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVE POLICY
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR PLANS
ACCOUNTING 8, FINANCIAL
POLICY DIVISION
AUDIT
DIVISION
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF
G-1, PERSONNEL
BUDGET
DIVISION
MANAGEMENT
DIVISION
PROGRAM REVIEW &
ANALYSIS DIVISION
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF
G-2, INTELLIGENCE
GENERAL
SPECIAL
CHIEF OF INFORMATION
STAFF
STAFF
CHIEF OF LEGISLATIVE LIAISON
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF
G.3, OPERATIONS
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF
G.4, LOGISTICS
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE
CHIEF OF FINANCE
INSPECTOR GENERAL
CHIEF OF AtILJTARY HISTORY
ADMINISTRATIVE STAFFS AND SERVICES
THE ADJUTANT
GENERAL
PROVOST MARSHAL
GENERAL
CHIEF OF CHAPLAINS
THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL
CHIEF NATIONAL
GUARD BUREAU
TECHNICAL STAFFS AND SERVICES
OFFICE OF THE EXEC
FOR RES & ROTC
AFFAIRS
1
SURGEON
GENERAL
CHIEF OF
ORDNANCE
CHIEF OF
ENGINEERS
QUARTERMASTER
GENERAL
Figure 4.?Organization Chart?Department of the Army
CHIEF OF
TRANSPORTATION
CHIEF SIGNAL I
OFFICER
CHIEF CHEMICAL
OFFICER
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serve in the manner of the chiefs of technical bu-
reaus in the Navy in determination of require-
ments, procurement, and storage of supplies, under
the direction of the Assistant Chief of Staff 0-1
Logistics, but they also command their technical
branches and certain installations. For example,
the Chief of Transportation commands Ports of
Embarkation, Railway Repair Depots, and other
Transportation Corps facilities.
The Army organization provides for each mili-
tary commander a staff to aid him in his work.
Divisions and larger units have a Chief of Staff
to direct and coordinate a General Staff which in
its four divisions, G-1 Personnel, G-2 Intelligence,
G-3 Operations, and 0-4 Logistics, includes all
functions of command. Under the coordinating
General Staff is such Special Staff organization as
may be required, including all other staff officers in
a headquarters not specifically part of the General
Staff. In brigades or smaller units the director
and coordinator for the commander is called the.
Executive, and there is no special staff, but there
is an equivalent of the General Staff, known as S-1
Adjutant, S-2 Intelligence, S-3 Operations and
Training, S-4 Supply, and such other staff officers
as may be required.
Since the same pattern of organization appears
at every level of the Army, there is no loss of
efficiency when officers are transferred from one
unit to another or between levels, for their respon-
sibilities are clearly defined and understood. The
American General Staff system has one interesting
variation from that of other countries, such as
Germany. The United States Army rotates offi-
cers between staff and command assignments; the
Germans built a preferential elite corps ear-
marked almost solely for staff assignment.
The Office, Chief of Army Field Forces, is the
field operating agency of the Department of the
Army for the continental United States and is
located at Fort Monroe, Va. The Army Field
Forces are responsible for training, development
of doctrine, and equipment. Its responsibility
for overseas forces is limited to setting training
standards and doctrine, and determining opera-
tional readiness. Orders to overseas commands
are issued through the Department of the Army.
The United States is divided geographically
into six Army Areas and a Military District of
Washington. The Commanding General of each
area, or district, commands all units and activities
within his area except those specifically com-
manded by one of the Technical Services or other
agencies of the Department of the Army.
Army Territorial and Troop Organization
The Army refers to any land, sea, and air masses
involved in the conduct of war as theaters of war.
A theater of operations refers to an area where
actual tactical operations are or can be conducted,"
and it may be subdivided into a combat zone and
a communications zone. The combat zone may
include division areas at the front, behind them
corps service areas, and behind those in turn army
service areas. The communications zone relieves
combat commanders of responsibility for logistics
and security operations not concerned with their
primary combat missions. It is divided into an
advance section, an intermediate section, and a
base section.
That part of the theater of war not included in
the theater of operations is called the zone of the
interior?a term usually applied to the United
States, but on occasion also to foreign territory
whether allied, neutral, or hostile.
Army troop organizations range from the army
group down to the rifle squad. An army group
is primarily a tactical command made up of sev-
eral field armies. A field army includes a head-
quarters, certain organic troops, and a variable
number of corps and divisions. The army is both
administrative and tactical. A corps also includes
a headquarters and certain organic troops plus a
variable number of divisions. It is primarily a
tactical unit but can be administrative. A divi-
sion is the basic unit of combined arms, includ-
ing headquarters, infantry, armored or airborne
units, artillery, and other units as required. It
is both administrative and tactical.
There are smaller units such as the brigade, a
tactical unit of two or more regiments, headquar-
ters and other small units; a group, a flexible
organization with various attached units to ac-
complish a particular mission; a regiment, with
headquarters, service company, and two or more
battalions, or other smaller units; a battalion, the
basic tactical unit; a company or battery, the basic
administrative unit; a rifle platoon; a weapons
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section; and a squad. An army rifle squad has 9
men; in contrast, the Marines divide their 13-man
squads into three 4-man fire teams. The rifle pla-
toon is the smallest infantry unit commanded by
a commissioned officer. Such personnel and equip-
ment as are not required consistently by a particu-
lar unit are pooled and assigned to a higher unit.
When particular tactical groupings are re-
quired, special task forces are created, preserv-
ing as much as possible the integrity of compo-
nent units. Armored divisions sometimes have
combat commands with their own headquarters
companies to direct temporary tactical groupings.
The infantry division frequently uses a combat
team consisting of an infantry regiment, support-
ing artillery, and engineers, or possibly also a
signal detachment, medical battalion, and so forth.
This is called a regimental combat team (RCT) .
The Army classifies as "arms": the Infantry,
Armored Cavalry, Field Artillery, Coast Artil-
lery, Corps of Engineers, and Signal Corps. It
classes as "administrative services": the Adjutant
General's Department, the Chaplains, the Corps
of Military Police, the Inspector General's De-
partment, the Judge Advocate General's Depart-
ment, and the Finance Department. It classes as
"technical services": the Chemical Corps, the
Corps of Engineers, the Quartermaster Corps,
the Transportation Corps, the Ordnance Depart-
ment, the Signal Corps, and the Medical Depart-
ment.
Department of the Air Force
From a modest beginning in 1907 as the aero-
nautical division in the Office of the Chief Signal
Officer, the United States air arm has developed
tremendously under the impetus of two world
wars. In World War I the Army Air Corps was
used in combat operations, and during World
War II the Army Air Forces expanded to nearly
21/2 million men operating 80,000 aircraft. After
the war there was a reduction in size, but by 1950
the objective was a total of 143 wings as a result
of the Korean War and the world situation.
The National Security Act of 1947 and its sub-
sequent amendments created an Air Force Estab-
lishment, a Department of the Air Force, and the
United States Air Force. The civilian Secretary
and his assistants have functions comparable to
CONFIDENTIAL
78
their counterparts in the Department of the Navy
and Army. The Chief of Staff, United States Air
Force, is the principal military adviser to the Sec-
retary and exercises command over the Air Force.
His Air Staff includes a Vice Chief and Deputy
Chiefs as shown in figure 5. The five deputies
are for Comptrolling, Personnel, Development,
Operations, and Materiel. As was pointed out
earlier, Intelligence is under Operations, together
with Plans, Communications, Manpower, and
Organization.
The Air Force is charged with the responsi-
bility of being "organized, trained, and equipped
primarily for prompt and sustained offensive and
defensive air operations." Its missions as for-
mally defined include (1) defense of the United
States against air attack; (2) the defeat of enemy
air forces and the control of vital air areas; (3) the
interdiction of enemy land power and communi-
cations; (4) the furnishing of combat and logisti-
cal air support to the Army, including air lift and
resupply of airborne operations, close combat air
support, aerial photography, tactical reconnais-
sance, etc.; (5) the carrying out of a campaign
of progressive planned destruction of the enemy's
war-making capacity; and (6) the providing of
air transport for the Armed Forces. There are
also the collateral duties of interdiction of enemy
sea power, antisubmarine warfare, protection of
shipping, and aerial minelaying. The latter are
closely coordinated with naval efforts.
Major Air Commands
There are 13 major commands in the United
States and 5 overseas, all under the Chief of Staff,
United States Air Force. Those in the United
States are grouped functionally as follows: (a)
operational: Strategic Air Command, Tactical
Air Command, Air Defense Command; (b) sup-
portive operational: Military Air Transport Serv-
ice, USAF Security Service, Headquarters Com-
mand; (c) training: Air University, Air Training
Command, Continental Air Command; (d) de-
velopmental and logistic: Research and Develop-
ment Command, Air Materiel Command, Air
Proving Ground Command, Special Weapons
Command.
The Strategic Air Command (SAC) includes
heavy and medium bombers, long and medium
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SURGEON GENERAL
THE
INSPECTOR GENERAL
THE
JUDGE ADVOCATE
GENERAL
CHIEF OF STAFF
VICE CHIEF OF STAFF
ASS'T VICE CHIEF OF STAFF
AIR
ADJUTANT GENERAL
SCIENTIFIC
ADVISORY BOARD
SECRETARY OF
THE AIR STAFF
SPECIAL ASST
FOR RESERVE FORCES
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF
COMPTROLLER
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF
PERSONNEL
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF
DEVELOPMENT
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF
OPERATIONS
DEPUTY CHIEF Or 5TAFF
MATERIEL
ASSISTANT FOR PLANS
AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
ASSISTANT FOR
GROUND SAFETY
SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR
AIR FORCE ACADEMY MATTERS
ASSISTANT FOR
DEVELOPMENT PLANNING
ASSISTANT FOR
ATOMIC ENERGY
ASSISTANT FOR
PROGRAMMING
ASSISTANT FOR
MATERIEL PROGRAM CONTROL
ASSISTANT FOR
LOGISTICS PLANS
AUDITOR GENERAL
DIRECTOR, WAN
CHIEF OF
AF CHAPLAINS
ASSISTANT FOR
- DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMING
ASSISTANT FOR
MUTUAL SECURITY
DIRECTOR
OF
ACCOUNTING
DIRECTOR
OF
PERSONNEL
PLANNING
DIRECTOR
OF
REQUIREMENTS
DIRECTOR
OF
INSTALLATIONS
DIRECTOR
OF
MAINTENANCE
ENGINEERING
DIRECTOR
OF
STATISTICAL
SERVICES
DIRECTOR
OF
RESEARCH &
DEVELOPMENT
DIRECTOR
OF
INTELLIGENCE
DIRECTOR
OF
SUPPLY &
SERVICES
DIRECTOR
OF
MILITARY
PERSONNEL
DIRECTOR
OF
PLANS
DIRECTOR
OF
BUDGET
DIRECTOR
OF
INDUSTRIAL
RESOURCES
DIRECTOR
OF
COMMUNICATIONS
DIRECTOR
OF
MANAGEMENT
ANALYSIS
SERVICE
DIRECTOR
OF
CIVILIAN
PERSONNEL
DIRECTOR
OF
TRANSPORTATION
DIRECTOR
OF
MAVOWER
AND
ORGANIZATION
'1
DIRECTOR
OF
'PROCUREMENT
AND
PRODUCTION
ENGINEERING
DIRECTOR
OF
FINANCE
DIRECTOR
OF
TRAINING
DIRECTOR
OF
OPERATIONS
Figure 5.?Organization Chart?Department of the Air Force.
Approvefh,h90,91?(*gg gpfaigtgpokcikgzig,gglip 002100Q2a-
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range reconnaissance aircraft, transports, and jet
fighters. Organizationally it includes the 2d, 8th,
and 15th Air Forces, each with several air divi-
sions; overseas it maintains the 5th and 7th Air
Divisions. Its missions may carry it to any part
of the globe.
The Tactical Air Command includes fighter-
bombers, light bombers, reconnaissance aircraft,
and troop carriers. Organizationally it includes
the 9th and 18th Air Forces. It works closely
with the Army Field Forces in developing tactical
air support doctrines.
The Air Defense Command (ADC) controls
fighter-interceptor units, air bases, and radar sta-
tions along the possible air attack routes in this
country. It consists of three regional forces, the
Eastern, Central, and Western, each made up of
several air divisions, supplemented by Air Na-
tional Guard wings. Their operations are closely
integrated with the Navy Sea Frontier system and
the respective Army Anti-Aircraft Artillery com-
mands. Elements of ADC may be assigned to
commands outside the United States by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff.
The Military Air Transport Service (MATS)
combines the former Air Transport Command and
Naval Air Transport Service. Its routes extend
around the world, and it can provide military air
lift as required. It provides supplementary serv-
ices such as airways communications, weather
reporting, air and sea rescue. It includes person-
nel of the Navy as well as of the Air -.Force. A
special operation of MATS is the Air Resupply
and Communication Service (ARCS) which trains
Air Force units in the preparations and dropping
of psychological warfare pamphlets.
The USAF Security Service produces and dis-
seminates communications intelligence and main-
tains communications security within the Air
Force. The Headquarters Command is primarily
an administrative adjunct of the Headquarters,
United States Air Force, and operates the base for
the heavy traffic in and out of Washington. The
Air University includes a variety of schools and
institutes ranging from the Air War College to
the Extension Course Institute. The Air Train-
ing Command is responsible for all training below
the Air University level from recruit to flying offi-
cer, and for this purpose uses the Flying Training
CONFIDENTIAL
80
Air Force and the Technical Training Air Force.
The Continental Air Command constructs and
maintains air bases and other facilities within the
United States, using as subcommands the 1st, 4th,
10th, and 14th Air Forces.
The six research centers of the Research and
Development Command work on aircraft, mis-
siles, and armament. The Air Materiel Command
buys, supplies, and maintains Air Force equip-
ment throughout the world. The Air Proving
Ground Command develops operational tech-
niques and makes recommendations on require-
ments for equipment. The Special Weapons Com-
mand is part of the joint Army-Navy-Air Force
atomic weapons organization.
Overseas there are five air commands. The gen-
erals of the Alaskan and Northeast Commands are
also theater commanders over all three services in
their areas. The Caribbean Air Command and
Far Eastern Air Force (FEAF) are under Army
theater commanders and the United States Air
Force in Europe (USAFE) operates under the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
Although the preceding discussion of organi-
zations for United States security is relatively
brief, it provides a necessary background in
nomenclature and functions. The balance of this
chapter will deal with supporting intelligence
subdivisions, emphasizing those within the De-
partment of Defense, but including others which
are of interest.
NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
Naval Intelligence includes all the organizations
that carry out the intelligence and counterintelli-
gence missions of the naval establishment. The
responsibilities of the Director of Naval Intelli-
gence are: (1) to provide the naval elements re-
quired in the production of national intelligence;
(2) to produce for naval commanders adequate
and timely intelligence needed both for planning
and conducting operations, and for estimating the
capabilities, vulnerabilities, and proper courses of
action of foreign nations; (3) to warn naval com-
manders of threats to the security of their
commands.
The components of Naval Intelligence are: (a)
the Office of Naval Intelligence; (b) Intelligence
foreign posts (Attaches, Observers, and Liaison
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UNITED STATES ORGANIZATIONS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY CONFIDENTIAL
Officers) ; (c) Naval District and River Command
Intelligence organizations; (d) Intelligence sec-
tions and units of the operating forces including
outlying bases; and (e) joint and combined In-
telligence and liaison activities. Each of these
components will be discussed in turn.
It will clarify our point of view to think of all
naval intelligence officers as serving on the intelli-
gence section of some commander's staff, the size
and organization of the section depending on the
needs of the command. On lower echelons, the
intelligence section may consist of a single officer
who also performs other duties, such as that of
assistant operations officer; and the commander?
for example, the captain of a ship or an air squad-
ron?may not be normally thought of as having
an organized staff at all. On higher echelons, in-
telligence duties may require the full time services
of many officers. The higher the echelon of com-
mand, the more extensive the staff organization,
and the larger and more complex the intelligence
section.
The highest echelon of the United States Naval
Command is that of the Chief of Naval Operations
(CNO) . CNO's Intelligence Officer is the Direc-
tor of Naval Intelligence (DNI) , and his intelli-
gence section is the Office of Naval Intelligence
(ONI) .
Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI)
Under the Director and Assistant Director of
Naval Intelligence, ONI (0P-32) is divided into
three branches which carry out the various objec-
tives necessary for the accomplishment of the gen-
eral mission of Naval Intelligence. Each branch
of ONI is subdivided into sections, which are fur-
ther divided into units and desks. Figure 6 indi-
cates the current ONI organization.
As the counterintelligence arm of the Navy, the
Security Branch (OP 321) is charged with the
safeguarding and security of naval information,
personnel, equipment, and naval installations. Its
five sections are: Investigations; Sabotage, Es-
pionage and Counter-Subversion (SEC) ; Secu-
rity Control; Commerce and Travel; and
Censorship.
Of particular interest are the Investigations
Section and the SEC Section. The Investigations
Section conducts investigations as required to pro-
81
tect the Naval Establishment against espionage,
sabotage, subversion and unauthorized disclosure
of classified information. It also conducts other
types of investigations upon request by competent
authority?for example, investigations of appli-
cants for naval employment. The SEC Section
functions as a research and evaluation unit, co-
ordinating and disseminating intelligence relating
to sabotage, espionage, and counter-subversion.
These two sections work as a team. The SEC Sec-
tion keeps track of the danger spots; its work is
primarily a desk job. The Investigations Section
acts as the hands and feet of the SEC Section.
The Intelligence Branch (OP 322) is responsible
for strategic and operational intelligence, specifi-
cally including air intelligence, and for the coordi-
nation of naval intelligence activities on foreign
posts. It is required to collect and process infor-
mation, and to disseminate intelligence produced
or received; to maintain liaison with other Federal
intelligence agencies; and to direct and coordinate
the preparation of intelligence directives, plans,
and manuals.
Its five sections are Estimates, Collection and
Dissemination, Foreign, Operational, and Air.
The Collection and Dissemination Section main-
tains official intelligence liaison with the Army,
Air Force, State Department, and the Central In-
telligence Agency. This Section also discharges
the responsibility of the Intelligence Branch for
the collection of information by Naval Intelli-
gence foreign posts. One of its subsections main-
tains the CNO Chart Room; another provides
maps, charts, photographs, and related material
for intelligence purposes. The Foreign Section
is responsible for supplying intelligence on foreign
powers to the policy, planning, operational, and
logistics agencies of the Navy. The Operational
Section insures that timely intelligence, both basic
and current, is disseminated within ONI and to
the operating forces. The Air Section provides
intelligence on foreign air power and coordinates
the naval aspects of the joint air production intel-
ligence activities of ONI and the Air Force.
The Administrative Branch (OP 323) super-
vises all management activities within and for
ONI. Its five sections are: Field Activities, Gen-
eral Services, Personnel, Fiscal, and Training.
General services include such matters as: publica-
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Co
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
DIRECTOR OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
ASSISTANT
DIRECTOR OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
POLICY AND PLANS I
COORoINATION
FOREIGN LIAISON
HEAD OF SECURITY BRANCH
ADMINISTRATIVE
ASSISTANT
HEAD OF INTELLIGENCE BRANCH
ASSISTANT TO
BRANCH HEAD
SECURITY POLICY
HEAD OF ADMINISTRATIVE BRANCH
1
ASSISTANT TO
BRANCH HEAD
FOREIGN
SECT! ON
COLLECTION &
DISSEMINATION
SECTI ON
CENSORSHI P
SECTI ON
INVESTI GATI OHS
SECTI ON
SEC
SECTION
____L____
(OMIERCE &
TRAVEL
SECT! ON
ESTIMATES
SECTI ON
AIR
SECTION
OPERATIONAL
iNTELLIGENCE
" SECTION
SECUR I TY
CONTROL
SECTION
ASSISTANT TO
BRANCH HEAD
FIELD
ACTIVITIES
SECTION
GENERAL
SERVICES
SECTION
Figure 6.?Organization chart?Office of Naval Intelligence,
PERSONNEL
SECTION
FISCAL
SECTION
TRAINING
SECTION
INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS
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tions, editorial review, reproduction, mail, files,
and translation. The Personnel Section is re-
sponsible for the Naval Intelligence Reserve
Program.
Included within ONI are also offices responsible
for Plans and Policies, Foreign Liaison, and Sec-
retariat. The Plans and Policies office prepares
and coordinates Naval Intelligence plans. The
Foreign Liaison office maintains official liaison be-
tween? ONI and foreign attaches, missions, and
distinguished visitors. It also advises United
States Naval officers in matters of protocol. The
Secretariat reviews correspondence, reports and
messages and otherwise relieves DNI of admin-
istrative details.
Intelligence Foreign Posts (Attaches, Observers and
Liaison Officers)
Naval Attaches and their staffs who reside
abroad are officially a part of ONI and thus under
the cognizance of DNI. At the same time, at-
taches and assistant attaches have diplomatic
status and report for duty to the ambassador or
minister who is the chief of the diplomatic mis-
sion to which they are assigned.
Naval Attaches are in command of naval attache
offices whose size is determined by ONI in accord-
ance with the importance of the area controlled
by the governments to which the attaches are
accredited. The primary function of Naval In-
telligence officers stationed abroad is to collect
information in accordance with the official delimi-
tation of topical material between the Navy, Army,
Air Force, and State Department, and to forward
it, after preliminary evaluation, to the Collection
and Dissemination Section of ONI. Foreign
Posts are supported by the Intelligence Branch.
Naval District and River Command Intelligence
Organizations
General Order No. 19 states in part: ". . . The
Commandant shall maintain within the district
an efficient intelligence service, including such in-
telligence matters as affect the security of naval
activities within the district, and such operational
intelligence matters as are required by the com-
mander of the sea frontier in which the district is
located . . ."
Accordingly, in each District and River com-
mand, a District Intelligence Officer (DIO) serves
on the staff of the Commandant, just as DNI serves
on the staff of CNO. In certain designated dis-
tricts, the DIO has additional duty on the staff
of the Sea Frontier Commander. The District
Intelligence Office under the DIO is thus the
Intelligence Section of the commandant's staff.
While each District Intelligence Office is under
the military command of the Commandant, its
activities are coordinated by ONI which provides
administrative support. Each District Intelli-
gence Office is organized in a manner similar to
ONI although its primary mission is in the field
of counterintelligence. Just as the Intelligence
Branch of ONI supports naval attaches and other
naval intelligence officers on foreign duty, the
Security Branch supports the DIOs and their or-
ganizations. The relationships and responsibili-
ties of the DIO to DNI and to the Commandant
are comparable to those of the naval attache to
DNI and to the Chief of Mission.
The District Intelligence organization consists
of a headquarters office, zone and subordinate of-
fices as required, and intelligence units at naval
stations and other naval activities as designated
by the Commandant. The personnel of zone and
subordinate offices are directly under the DIO.
Intelligence officers assigned to naval stations and
other naval activities are members of the staffs of
those commands.
Under the technical guidance of the DI0s, the
various naval districts and river commands con-
duct specialized intelligence training programs
for officers of the Naval Intelligence Reserve.
Intelligence Sections and Units of the Operating
Forces, Including Outlying Bases
In the fleet, as in the district and river com-
mands, the basic pattern of the intelligence or-
ganization is that of the staff section. On the staff
of each area, fleet, type, and task force commander,
and on the staffs of all flag officers exercising com-
mand, there is an intelligence section headed by a
flag Intelligence Officer.
Sections 0504 (4) and 0506 (1), Navy Regula-
tions, 1948, provide, respectively, that a com-
mander in Chief, or commander of any other or-
ganization or unit of the Operating Forces shall
"maintain an effective intelligence organization
and keep himself informed of the political and
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INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS
military aspects of the national and international
situation" and shall "keep his immediate superior
appropriately informed of . . . intelligence infor-
mation which may be of value."
These two articles make each commander re-
sponsible for the collection, processing, and dis-
semination of intelligence within his own com-
mand, and the dissemination of intelligence to
higher echelons. Because of the complexity of
present-day naval operations, and the consequent
need for a steady and voluminous flow of intelli-
gence, a commander must rely on his staff to carry
out most of his intelligence responsibilities.
Wartime intelligence organization in the oper-
ating forces was by no means uniform. This di-
versity was due in part to the relative independ-
ence of the various commands, and in part to their
widely differing needs. Late in World War II,
considerable progress was made toward uniform-
ity. Nevertheless, the exigencies of any future
war are likely to result in intelligence organiza-
tions quite different from those of peacetime, since
each commander must bear the responsibility for
organizing his intelligence section to meet his par-
ticular needs. But no future development will
alter the responsibility incumbent upon intelli-
gence officers with the operating forces--as upon
all members of Naval Intelligence?to see that all
intelligence received or produced flows upward to
the higher echelons where it can be properly evalu-
ated and disseminated and so, ultimately, reaches
the Office of Naval Intelligence.
For background purposes, the organization of
fleet intelligence during World War II need be
only summarized. In general, the area command-
ers were served by large intelligence centers, which
later set up offices in forward sectors for more
rapid collection and dissemination. These intelli-
gence centers proved their usefulness, and counter-
parts of them are likely to be established in any
future war. They were intelligence agencies, usu-
ally large, which served the commander and all
subordinate units of his command, but were sep-
arate from the relatively small intelligence section
of the staff itself. So far as practicable, they were
joint activities of the Navy and the other armed
forces. Their normal work included photog-
raphy, photo-interpretation, hydrography, car-
tography, target and flak analysis, interrogation
CONFIDENTIAL
84
and translation. On the lower echelons of the
area command, an intelligence officer?sometimes
with one or more assistants?was assigned to each
flag afloat, including fleet air wings. Intelligence
officers were also assigned to battleships, cruisers,
destroyer and motor torpedo boat squadrons, all
major amphibious units and all carriers, air
groups and air squadrons.
Since World War II, ONI and the Bureau of
Naval Personnel have had the objective of plac-
ing trained intelligence officers in all echelons of
command. In practice, however, on many staffs,
no trained intelligence officer is available, and a
staff officer is given additional duty in intelligence.
Shipboard intelligence organizations also have
suffered from a lack of personnel. Article 0916,
Navy Regulations, 1948, provides that the opera-
tions officer of a ship, under the commanding offi-
cer, shall be responsible for the collection and
analysis of intelligence information. Accord-
ingly an intelligence officer, when available, is as-
signed to the operations department of every
capital ship and of other ships as conditions
warrant.
The primary responsibility of intelligence offi-
cers assigned to the operating forces is to meet
the intelligence requirements of their immediate
commander. However, they have an added re-
sponsibility, through their commander to ONI,
in collecting information for not only their im-
mediate command but also the Naval Establish-
ment as a whole. Intelligence Sections and units
of the operating forces are supported by the In-
telligence Branch of ONI.
Joint and Combined Intelligence and Liaison
Activities
During World War II the scope and diversity
of the fighting required an unprecedented degree
of joint and combined activity and hence joint
and combined intelligence. United States naval
intelligence officers served as observers with the
British Fleet. British personnel were attached
to American armed forces. Amphibious opera-
tions in both the Pacific and the European theaters
were planned and supervised jointly by sea,
ground, and air specialists.
Naval Intelligence participated in joint intelli-
gence activities on all echelons during World War
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II, from the Joint Intelligence Committee, the in-
telligence agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
down to small field units engaged in such tasks as
the exploitation of captured documents and the
interrogation of prisoners of war. Less than a
dozen of these joint intelligence activities sur-
vived the peace.
Several trends initiated in wartime have con-
tinued in the postwar period?namely, the trends
toward joint and combined scientific research and
development, joint and combined intelligence pro-
duction, and joint and combined staff training.
All commanders of naval operating forces are
authorized and directed, subject to the prior ap-
proval of DNI, to conduct or participate in joint
intelligence activities which they believe are re-
quired for successful execution of their missions.
Among the assignments open to naval intelligence
officers are participation in the work of the Joint
Staff, under the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and duty in
the Central Intelligence Agency.
MARINE CORPS INTELLIGENCE
While the United States Marine Corps draws its
intelligence information from the Navy, it pat-
terns its Intelligence organization after the Army.
The Commandant of the Marine Corps has a staff
Intelligence Officer (G-2) and a headquarters in-
telligence section which produces intelligence of
interest to the Corps on such subjects as foreign
coasts, landing beaches, and associated subjects.
Most strategic intelligence is obtained directly
from ONI. During joint operations the Marine
Corps also obtains intelligence from the Army.
Intelligence Officers are assigned to all Marine
operating units of battalion level and higher. The
size of the intelligence section varies with the size
and needs of the unit. For example, a battalion
has but one intelligence officer, while a division
may have five officers in its intelligence section.
Marine intelligence officers are also assigned to
duty in ONI, in Naval Attache billets, on naval
operating staffs and with the Central Intelligence
Agency.
ARMY INTELLIGENCE
The Army intelligence organization is officially
called the "Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff,
85
0-2, Intelligence, General Staff, United States
Army." The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, is a
member of the General Staff, United States Army,
and is coequal with the heads of the other General
Staff divisions. He is thus an echelon higher than
his naval counterpart, the Director of Naval In-
telligence, but his responsibilities are substantially
the same.
As shown in figure 7, there are five operating di-
visions in the Army's 0-2 organization: Adminis-
trative, Collection and Dissemination, Production,
Security, and Training. Each consists of several
branches. The Administrative Division contains
the following Branches: Attache, Fiscal, Message
Center (communications), Personnel, and Service
(including records and translation). The Collec-
tion and Dissemination Division operates the War
Room, is responsible for intelligence requirements
and publications, and maintains the 0-2 Docu-
ment Library. The Production Division is com-
posed of the Estimates Branch, three geographic
branches?Eastern, Western, and Eurasian?the
Technical and Special Research Branches, Area
Resources Branch, and the Air Intelligence Com-
ponent which works with the Air Force. In the
Security Division are the three branches respon-
sible for censorship, personnel security, and the
security of military information. The Training
Division is concerned with regular and reserve in-
telligence training, and also operates the Map and
Photo Branch.
The Army Security Agency (ASA) and the
Counter-Intelligence Corps (CIC) are specialized
organizations of importance. ASA is responsible
for communications intelligence and security.
CIC is the counterintelligence agency of the
Army; it makes all investigations for which the
Army is responsible under the Delimitation Agree-
ment, and also investigates compromises of mili-
tary information and cases involving foreign na-
tionals both in the United States and abroad.
Each of these agencies takes care of its own ad-
ministration, including the procurement, training
and assignment of personnel, and the development
of equipment and doctrine. Their work, however,
comes within the purview of G-2, and close liaison
and coordination is maintained.
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STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE
SCHOOL
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2
DEPUTY for Intelligence
DEPUTY for Operations
EXECUTIVE
SPECIAL
ASSISTANT
LIAISON OFFICERS
(Army Security Agency)
(Counter Intel. Corps)
MANAGEMENT
OFFICE
FOREIGN LIAISON
OFFICE
POLICY AND
COORDINATING
OFFICE
PRODUCTION
DIVISION
Branches:
Eastern
Estimates
Eurasian
Western
Technical
Special Research
Area Resources
AFOIN component
ADMINISTRATIVE
DIVISION
Branches:
Attache
Fiscal
Message Center
Personnel
Service
COLLECTION &
DISSEMINATION
Branches:
Requirements
Operations
Plans & Research
Document Library
Publications
SECURITY
DIVISION
Branches:
Censorship
Personnel
Security
S. M. I.
TRAINING
DIVISION
Branches:
Organisation &
Training'
Reserve
Components
Map & Photo
Figure 7.?Organization Chart?Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Intelligence, General Staff, U. S. Army.
APPr?v&M21; M??ReoiRAN
0 30200N il[A) oslocnosroyo 1 00210002-9
CONFIDENTIAL
AIR FORCE INTELLIGENCE
The Directorate of Intelligence under the Dep-
uty Chief of Staff for Operations, Headquarters,
USAF, is usually abbreviated "D/I" and desig-
nated AFOIN?literally Air Force Operations
/Ntelligence?a term corresponding to "Op 32"
in the Navy. In command structure, the Air
Force follows the Navy, rather than the Army, in
making Intelligence subordinate to Operations.
This Air Force organization deserves special com-
ment for several reasons. It differs from ONI and
0-2 in that it has no responsibility for counter-
intelligence; it formulates no policy for safeguard-
ing military information; and it specifically pro-
duces intelligence for the other military services.
The Navy and the Army provide approximately
one-third of the personnel in the intelligence pro-
ducing divisions of the Directorate in return for
processed air intelligence for the Army, Navy, and
Marine air arms.
Figure 8 indicates that Air Force Intelligence
is headed by a Director of Intelligence assisted
by three Deputy Directors: for Collection and
Dissemination, Estimates, and Targets. The Di-
rector also administers the Air Technical Intelli-
gence Center.
The Director's responsibilities include collect-
ing information on the air potential and air forces
of foreign countries; producing intelligence from
this information; and disseminating this material
not only within the Air Force, but also to the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Central Intelligence
Agency, and other departments and agencies as
appropriate. He directs and controls all USAF
intelligence activities, including the Air Attache
system. He sets up the air intelligence require-
ments for USAF photo reconnaissance, mapping
and charting and geodetic surveying programs.
He is further responsible for meeting the intelli-
gence requirements of the continental and over-
seas air commands, and the air administrative
and technical services. The Director also repre-
sents the Air Force on intelligence matters with
other departments and agencies of the United
States Government and with foreign governments.
The Office of the Director of Special Investiga-
tions, an agency under the USAF Inspector Gen-
eral, is the counterintelligence agency of the Air
Force. It is responsible for safeguarding military
87
information, and for investigating all cases of
espionage, sabotage, treason, subversion, etc.,
within the Air Force.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (FBI)
The FBI is the chief internal security agency
of the Federal Government. It is now responsible
for investigating violations of more than 100 Fed-
eral laws. Under some of these laws, such as
the Atomic Energy Act and the Federal Em-
ployees Loyalty Program, specific responsibility
has been given to the FBI by the law itself or
by Presidential Directive. Under others, the FBI
exercises its general investigative functions in all
cases where the United States is or may become a
party in interest. The FBI also promotes scien-
tific crime detection by means of its laboratory,
its fingerprint files, and the FBI National Acad-
emy for law-enforcement officers.
The FBI is organized in seven Divisions: (1)
Identification; (2) Training and Inspection; (3)
Administration; (4) Records and Communica-
tions; (5) General Investigations; (6) Labora-
tory; and (7) Security. The latter division is
of primary interest to Naval Intelligence because
of mutual counterintelligence responsibilities.
THE DELIMITATION AGREEMENT
The Delimitation Agreement originated in a
Presidential directive of 26 June 1939, which pro-
vided that investigations of all matters concerning
espionage, counterespionage, subversion, and sab-
otage (the "four categories") should be conducted
and controlled emclusively by Naval Intelligence,
Military Intelligence, and the FBI. The heads
of these three agencies were directed to form a
committee to pool information and coordinate ac-
tivities. This became the Interdepartmental In-
telligence Conference (IIC), which worked out
the Delimitation Agreement, prescribing the juris-
diction and investigative duties of each of the
three agencies. Under the original Agreement,
the Navy assumed responsibility for the investi-
gation and disposal of cases in the "four cate-
gories" involving (a) personnel of the Naval
Establishment, including civilians employed by
the Navy, and (b) personnel in areas under its
administrative control: Guam, Samoa, Palmyra,
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1V11N3OHNO0
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE
AIR TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE CENTER
(Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio)
Policy & Management Group
jDEPUTY DIRECTOR for
COLLECTION & DISSEMINATION
Policy & Mgmt Group
COLLECTION OPERATIONS
DIVISION
Branches:
Collection Control
Reconnaissance
Supplemental Research
Air Attache
DISSEMINATION CONTROL
DIVISION
Branches:
Processing
Dissemination
Documents
Foreign Liaison
DEPUTY DIRECTOR for
ESTIMATES
Policy & Mgmt Group
TOPICAL INTELLIGENCE
DIVISION
Branches:
Indications
Current Intelligence
Intel. Exploitation
Air Intel. Digest
INTEL INTEGRATION
DIVISION
Branches:
Analysis & Review
Military Services
National Estimates
Survey
Planning Estimates
MILITARY CAPABILITIES
DIVISION, WEST
Branches:
Analysis & Review
Western Establishments
Western Air Facilities
Western Support
MILITARY CAPABILITIES
DIVISION, EAST
Branches:
Analysis & Review
Eastern Establishments
Eastern Air Facilities
Eastern Support
Weapons Analysis
(World Wide)
DEPUTY DIRECTOR for
TARGETS
Policy & Mgmt Group
Special Studies Group
TARGET ANALYSIS DIV.
Branches:
Military Vulnerability
Industrial Vulnerability
General Vulnerability
PHYSICAL VULNERABILITY
DIVISION
Branches:
Weapons Application
Weapons Effects
Mathematical Analysis
TARGET MATERIALS DIV.
Branches:
Production
Target Integration
Radar Target Intel.
Figure 8.?Organization Chart?Directorate of Intelligence, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Headquarters, USAF
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UNITED STATES ORGANIZATIONS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY CONFIDENTIAL
Johnson, Wake, and Midway. In Japan, the
Navy and FBI had joint responsibility.
After the War, changes in the Delimitation
Agreement were necessitated by the Atomic En-
ergy Act of 1946, which provided that everyone
authorized to have access to "restricted" atomic
data should have been investigated by the FBI.
Some of the people for whom such authorization
was desired wore Army or Navy uniforms. Ac-
cordingly, the FBI was required to conduct in-
vestigations of all Armed Forces personnel for
"Q clearances" for access to "restricted" atomic
data. However, as a result of the Agreement of
February 1951, Armed Forces personnel are now
given access to "restricted" atomic data on the
strength of their military security clearances, ex-
cept in cases involving contractors with the Atomic
Energy Commission or their employees.
The Delimitation Agreement was also affected
by the Federal Employees Loyalty Program (Ex-
ecutive Order 9835 of March 21,1947). Although
this applied mainly to civilian employees in the
Executive Branch of the Government, it directed
the Armed Forces to take such steps as necessary
to ensure the loyalty of their own personnel. It
also directed the FBI to make all investigations.
Accordingly, the Navy is no longer responsible for
investigations in the "four categories" of civilians
whom it employs or over whom it has administra-
tive control. Nevertheless, in areas under Naval
Administrative control, the Navy in practice still
does the job for the FBI, and also investigates
all cases involving personnel of the Military Sea
Transportation Service. For purposes of the De-
limitation Agreement, Reserve personnel on in-
active duty are civilians.
To sum up, in the "four categories", the Navy
now restricted to investigations involving ac-
duty and retired naval and marine personnel,
the exceptions stated above. However, its
Iction to make general security investigations
the "four categories" is not restricted either
3 Delimitation Agreement or any other regu-
17 document; and it still makes many investi-
ions involving civilians, for example, in cases
Involving its own employees, applicants for naval
employment, and employees of naval contractors.
By provision of the National Security Act of
1947, the Director of Special Investigations,
269196-54----7
USAF, joined the Director, FBI, the Assistant
Chief of Staff, G-2, and the Director of Naval
Intelligence on the Interdepartmental Intelligence
Conference. Thus the Air Force is governed by
and participates in the provisions of the Delimita-
tion Agreement.
STATE DEPARTMENT INTELLIGENCE
The Special Assistant to the Secretary of State,
Intelligence, has the rank of Assistant Secretary
of State. His office provides the departmental
intelligence of the State Department. In the field
of national intelligence, it is primarily, though
not exclusively, responsible for political, cultural,
and sociological matters, by NSC directive. In
practice, it has also produced most economic in-
telligence and considerable scientific intelligence.
It has a special responsibility for coordinating
overt intelligence activities abroad, since, by NSC
directive, the Chiefs of Mission are the coordina-
tors of such activities.
As shown in figure 9, the State Department
Office of Intelligence has two major suboffices, each
of which has a number of divisions. The Office
of Intelligence Research (OIR) plans and de-
velops an intelligence research program along
regional and functional lines, and coordinates it
with that of other Federal agencies. In this
manner the Department is provided with the in-
telligence necessary for the formulation and exe-
cution of foreign policy. On the other hand,
information pertinent to national security is fur-
nished to the Security Council, the Central Intel-
ligence Agency, and the Department of Defense.
In addition to carrying on intelligence research,
OIR prepares or participates in the preparation
of studies and spot intelligence for authorized
recipients in the Department and other Federal
agencies. It continuously scrutinizes world situa-
tions and deals with intelligence problems sub-
mitted to it by the Secretary, Under Secretary,
Planning Adviser, and other State Department
officials, as well as the Central Intelligence Agency
and the Department of Defense. It directs De-
partment of State participation in the National
Intelligence Survey basic research program and
works in close cooperation with the Central In-
telligence Agency and other governmental agen-
89 CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS
OFFICE OF
SPECIAL ASSISTANT ? INTELLIGENCE
r--
ISPECIAL PROJECTS STAFF
EXECUTIVE STAFF
OFFICE OF
LIBRARIES & INTELLIGENCE
ACQUISITION (OLI)
DIRECTOR
ACQUISITION & DISTRIBUTION
BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION
LIBRARY &
REFERENCE SERVICES
OFFICE OF
INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH (01R)
DIRECTOR
FAR EAST
HWESTERN EUROPE
HNEAR EAST, SOUTH
ASIA & AFRICA
USSR 8, EASTERN EUROPE
AMERICAN REPUBLICS
FUNCTIONAL INTELLIGENCE
Figure 9,?Organization Chart?Office of Intelligence, Department of State.
cies engaged in the production of National
Intelligence Survey materials.
The Office of Libraries and Intelligence Ac-
quisition (OLI) has a collection responsibility and
also maintains a library program for the Depart-
ment, which includes policy guidance and assist-
ance to the libraries of the Foreign Service
establishments overseas. It collects and evaluates
biographic information on foreign individuals,
involving the preparation of analytical biographic
studies as well as the maintenance of the Depart-
ment's central collection of biographic and sem-
rity information of foreign persons, It collects,
processes, and evaluates security intelligence per-
taining to foreigners and organizations abroad.
The security program of the State Department
and the Foreign Service is supervised by the Office
of Security and Consular Affairs, in large part
through the Division of Security. The functions
of this Division include development of security
policy for the Department and the Foreign Service
CONFIDENTIAL
90
and provision for their personnel and physical
security by: (1) conducting investigations of ap-
plicants for employment in the Department and
Foreign Service; (2) directing those investiga-
tions requiring coverage overseas in connection
with the President's Loyalty Program; (3) evalu-
ating investigative reports and making recom-
mendations to the Loyalty and Security Board in
appropriate cases; (4) establishing and supervi'
ing control measures for documentary, commr
cations, and building security for the Depart,
in Washington; (5) directing, through appi
ate channels, the security program in
Service establishments.
Further, it furnishes additional investigt.
services for the Department with respect to:
passport, visa, munitions control, and other cases,
(2) individuals, organizations, situations, trends,
and developments constituting a threat to the
security of the United States; (3) other matters,
as requested.
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UNITED STATES ORGANIZATIONS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
The Security Division also provides security
protection for official guests of the United States
Government and other distinguished visitors, and
for international conferences in the United States.
It maintains official liaison with the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, the Treasury Depart-
ment, the Post Office Department, and other do-
mestic security and law enforcement agencies. It
cooperates with Department of Justice on ques-
tions of policy in connection with the Foreign
Agents Registration Act. No foreigner can get
a visa for entry into the United States unless he
has been cleared through the Visa Division. Such
clearance is effected or denied on the basis of
information gathered by the Department and
other governmental intelligence agencies with
which it maintains close liaison.
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION INTELLIGENCE
Because of the importance of intelligence con-
cerning the military applications of nuclear
power, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)
has an Office of Intelligence and a Division of
Security.
The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 first provided
four divisions, Research, Production, Engineer-
ing, and Military Applications, to aid the General
Manager in carrying out his duties. Other divi-
sions were needed, and in 1948 a Division of
Security and Intelligence was created. Shortly
thereafter, this division became the Division of
Security when a separate Office of Intelligence was
formed with a Director.
The Office of Intelligence has no collection
function, but it may request information from
other agencies. When information of atomic and
thermonuclear interest is received by any govern-
ment agency (including the non-intelligence agen-
cies such as Commerce), it is forwarded to the
AEC where a group of highly trained scientists
in the Office of Intelligence evaluates the incoming
information. The Director of Intelligence may
also call upon the leading scientists in the country
for consultation on the proper evaluation of in-
formation received. The resultant intelligence is
disseminated to the President, the National Se-
curity Council, the Department of Defense, CIA,
and others as appropriate. This evaluation is
AEC's important contribution to intelligence.
91
CONFIDENTIAL
A great and continuing concern of the Atomic
Energy Commission is the safeguarding of our
atomic program from espionage, sabotage, theft,
and destruction. This counterintelligence func-
tion is taken care of by the Division of Security.
In Washington, on the General Manager's staff,
the Division of Security has four sections: Physi-
cal Security, Personnel Security, Document Con-
trol, Violations and Visitor Control. The
functions of each section are essentially what the
names imply. The Division also supervises field
security offices at nine installations in the United
States. Internal security investigations are ini-
tiated by these offices, but if it appears that a
regulation of the Atomic Energy Act has been
violated, it becomes a case for the FBI.
INTERDEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES
There are many areas of activity and interest
where the intelligence requirements of two or
more government agencies or departments coin-
cide; therefore, in the interests of efficiency and
the coordination of effort interdepartmental in-
telligence agencies are established. If all the par-
ticipating departments are military, the agency is
called "joint."
Intelligence Organization for the Joint Chiefs of
Staff
The Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) , to-
gether with its full-time staff, the Joint Intelli-
gence Group (JIG) , is the intelligence agency of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As such, it is the high-
est-level intelligence agency within the Depart-
ment of Defense. Its members are: the Assistant
Chief of Staff, G-2, General Staff, U. S. Army;
the Director of Naval Intelligence; the Director
of Intelligence, USAF; and the Deputy Director
of the Joint Staff for Intelligence. In short, the
Joint Intelligence Committee is composed of the
intelligence chiefs of all the armed forces, plus a
fourth member who directs the Joint Intelligence
Group.
The JIC is charged with: (a) the preparation
of joint intelligence estimates for the Joint Chiefs
of Staff and their subordinate committees; (b)
the coordination of photographic, mapping, and
charting activities of the Department of Defense;
and (c) security matters within JCS jurisdiction.
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Since the three departmental committee mem-
bers devote only a part of their time to JIC mat-
ters, a full-time working staff is required to
prepare joint estimates, reports, plans and policies
for Committee approval. This staff is the Joint
Intelligence Group of the Joint Staff.
The JIC/JIG differs from other intelligence
organizations relating to the national security in
that it is neither a collecting nor a disseminating
agency. It does not duplicate the work of the
departmental agencies or the CIA, but merely uses
the intelligence material of those agencies to meet
the intelligence requirements of the JCS and their
supporting committees and groups.
Interdepartmental Coordinating Committees
Where the intelligence requirements of two or
more departments coincide, the necessary collec-
tion and production operations are brought into
common action by special-purpose committees.
There are a number of such coordinating commit-
tees, the most important being the Interdepart-
mental Intelligence Conference (TIC), discussed
in connection with the FBI, the Intelligence Ad-
visory Committee (IAC), which serves to coordi-
nate the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) with
the other Federal intelligence agencies concerned
with the national security, and the National In-
telligence Survey (NIS) Committee. The IAC
is composed of the intelligence directors of the
Justice Department (FBI) ,the State Department,
the Atomic Energy Commission, the Army, the
Navy, the Air Force and the Joint Staff, in addi-
tion to the Director of Central Intelligence, who
acts as chairman.
During World War II, the main source of basic
intelligence for the armed forces was a series of
handbooks known as Joint Army-Navy Intelli-
gence Studies (JANIS). The deficiencies of the
JANIS series emphasized the fact that basic in-
telligence must be produced on a much broader
scale, over a longer period, and, as far as possible,
in time of peace. Therefore, on 13 January 1948,
the NIS program was initiated.
The NIS Program represents the combined in-
telligence efforts of the CIA, the Army, the Navy,
the Air Force, and the State Department. It is
supervised by the NIS Committee, which consists
of representatives of all the contributing agencies,
CONFIDENTIAL
92
and is coordinated by the CIA. Its purpose is to
produce a concise digest of basic intelligence, such
as, encyclopedic knowledge of the geographic, eco-
nomic, socio-political and military characteristics
of every foreign country.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
During World War II, intelligence-coordinat-
ing agencies including the Office of -War Infor-
mation (0W1) and the Office of Strategic Serv-
ices (OSS) were created by Presidential directive
and a Joint Intelligence C ommittee (JIC) was es-
tablished under the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The
JIC soon recognized the need for, and proposed,
a national agency to coordinate intelligence
produced by the various Departments. Its pro-
posal resulted in the Presidential letter of 22 Jan-
uary 1946, which created the National Intelligence
Authority, and the Central Intelligence Group as
its operating agency. The Authority was di-
rected to plan, develop, and coordinate all Federal
intelligence activities "so as to assure the most
effective accomplishment of the intelligence mis-
sion related to the national security."
The National Security Act of 1947 established
the National Security Council (NSC) which took
the place of the National Intelligence Authority,
specifically abolished by the act. The Central In-
telligence Agency (CIA) was established under
the Council as the statutory successor of the Cen-
tral Intelligence Group.
The Director of CIA
The Act specifically provides for a Director of
Central Intelligence, appointed by the President
with the advice and consent of the Senate. The
Director may be either a civilian or an officer of
one of the armed forces. In the latter event, the
Act provides the safeguard that, during his tenure,
the Director shall be subject to no greater military
control than would any civilian; nor shall he have
or exercise any control, other than as Director,
over any component of the armed forces. Service
as Director is to have no effect, except as described
above, on the status, office or rank in the Armed
Forces of any military man so appointed.
One of the most important provisions of the Act
gives the Director the right in his discretion to
"terminate the employment of any officer or em-
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ployee of the Agency whenever he shall deem such
termination necessary or advisable in the interests
of the United States." This provision frees the
director from civil service restrictions. In an in-
telligence agency, where security is paramount,
freedom in dismissing employees is an obvious
necessity.
The duties of the CIA are set forth in section
102 of the Act, as follows:
(1) to advise the National Security Coun-
cil in matters concerning such intelligence
activities of the Government departments and
agencies as relate to the national security;
(2) to make recommendations to the Na-
tional Security Council for the coordination
of such intelligence activities of the depart-
ments and agencies of the Government as re-
late to the national security;
(3) to correlate and evaluate intelligence
relating to the national security, and provide
for the appropriate dissemination of such in-
formation within the Government using
where appropriate existing agencies and fa-
cilities: Provided, That the _Agency shall have
no police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers,
or internal security functions: Provided fur-
ther, That the departments and other agencies
of the Government shall continue to collect,
evaluate, correlate, and disseminate depart-
mental intelligence: And provided further,
That the Director of Central Intelligence
shall be responsible for protecting intelligence
sources and methods from unauthorized- dis-
closure;
(4) to perform, for the benefit of the exist-
ing intelligence agencies, such additional
services of common concern as the National
Security Council determines can be more effi-
ciently accomplished centrally;
(5) to perform such other functions and
duties related to intelligence affecting the na-
tional security as the National Security Coun-
cil may from time to time direct.
The first paragraph of Section 102 directs and
authorizes the CIA to serve as intelligence ad-
viser to the NSC on all matters relating to the
national security.
The second paragraph requires the CIA to make
recommendations to the NSC for coordinating
such intelligence activities of the Government as
relate to the national security. In performing its
duties under this paragraph the CIA has the coun-
sel of the Intelligence Advisory Committee de-
scribed in the preceding section. Through the
IAC, the CIA is able to maintain close contact
with all the departmental intelligence agencies
concerned with the national security; it can bene-
fit from their knowledge, experience and judg-
ment, and keep itself informed of their intelli-
gence requirements. Their views can serve as the
basis for recommendations made by the CIA to
the NSC. In particular, the IAC can help the
CIA determine the primary fields of intelligence
responsibility of the various departments and
agencies. Thus it can help in promoting efficiency
by the elimination of duplicate missions, func-
tions, and services.
The third paragraph of Section 102 provides for
the correlation and evaluation of intelligence re-
lating to the national security. This task involves
the production of national intelligence. Just as
the NSC integrates national policies that could
not be integrated by either the State or the De-
fense Department alone, so the CIA draws upon
the intelligence produced by the various depart-
ments, supplements it, and integrates it into a
product which is suitable in content and form for
national planning. However, the CIA does not
interfere with the production of departmental in-
telligence. Each department must still evaluate,
correlate, and interpret that intelligence which is
within its own exclusive competence and is needed
for its own use.
The CIA is further charged with the dissemi-
nation of national intelligence within the Gov-
ernment. Because of this responsibility, CIA
must at all times know the intelligence require-
ments of the various Government departments
and agencies. This function of disseminating na-
tional intelligence to the departments that need it
is clearly essential. Owing to the volume and
complexity of intelligence information available,
it should be a centralized function; and the proper
place for centralizing it is the focal point where
all the streams of incoming intelligence converge.
Thus the Act gives the CIA two major functions
of intelligence?production and dissemination. It
makes no explicit provision for the third major
function?collection. Nevertheless, the duties of
the CIA under the second paragraph of Section
102, with respect to the coordination of depart-
mental intelligence activities, entail the coordina-
tion of foreign intelligence collection. As to col-
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lection, then, the role of the CIA is at least to pre-
vent gaps, cross-purposes, and wasteful duplica-
tion among the various departments and agencies.
On the one hand, to give a fictitious example, some
department or agency should collect economic in-
telligence information. On the other hand, the
Air Force should not concern itself with the col-
lection of detailed sociological information about
Java.
The fourth paragraph of this Section gives the
CIA a further warrant for foreign intelligence
collection by authorizing it to perform "such addi-
tional services of common concern as the National
Security Council determines can be more efficiently
accomplished centrally." In eliminating waste-
ful duplication of collection functions, therefore,
the CIA can use either of two methods. It can
discontinue the overlapping collection efforts of
all but one of the departments, and arrange for
that one to serve all the others. In doing so, it
would merely be coordinating. Or, instead, it may
supplant the collection efforts of all the depart-
ments with its own collection effort, and perform
the collection function itself as a service of com-
mon concern to the existing intelligence agencies.
Which, if either, method is used in any given case
is of course determined by the NSO.
To sum up, then, the National Security Act rec-
ognized the need for departmental intelligence,
and in fact specifically provided for its continu-
ance; at the same time, the Act recognized the need
for the coordination of departmental intelligence,
and for the production and dissemination of na-
tional intelligence, and created the CIA to per-
form these functions; and, finally, the Act pro-
vided that certain unspecified intelligence func-
tions should be centralized in the interests of
efficiency.
OTHER UNITED STATES AGENCIES PRODUCING
INTELLIGENCE
Although it is not possible to trace in detail the
organizations of all agencies of government that
collect information and process it into intelli-
gence, it is most important for the naval officer
engaged in intelligence work to realize that his
sources are not limited to the national security
agencies alone. With proper liaison he will dis-
cover that there are available vast analytical and
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94
cataloguing resources in the federal government,
and also many operating agencies with functions
closely allied to security.
Department of the Treasury
A number of offices and bureaus within the
Treasury have intelligence functions. The Office
of International Finance studies foreign econ-
omies, international capital movements, gold
movements, and exchange controls. It can block
the movement of foreign assets under United
States jurisdiction. The Bureau of Customs not
only collects duties on imports but is concerned
with preventing smuggling, registering vessels,
and stopping the export of controlled materials.
The Bureau of Narcotics controls trade in nar-
cotic drugs and of necessity works closely with
some foreign governments. The Alcohol Tax
Unit may become involved in blocking illegal al-
cohol operations if of an international scope. The
United States Secret Service tries to prevent
counterfeiting, and provides various protective
services including guarding the President and his
family.
The United States Coast Guard, though a part
of the Department of the Navy in wartime, is nor-
mally under the Treasury. It not only saves lives
at sea, provides navigation aids, and sets safety
standards for merchant ships, but also has major
responsibility for port security and checking on
the loyalty of seamen.
Department of Commerce
This is another department of interest to In-
telligence. It contains the Bureau of Foreign and
Domestic Commerce with a subordinate Office of
International Trade, a major collector and proces-
sor of economic and commercial intelligence from
the whole world. The Federal Maritime Board
has to study foreign costs of ship construction and
operation, and approve any international rate
agreements that involve United States steamship
companies. The Civil Aeronautics Board makes
many studies of world aviation developments, and
works closely with the International Civil Avia-
tion Organization of the United Nations. The
Patent Office collects and analyzes the official jour-
nals of all foreign patent offices. The Weather
Bureau collects weather reports from all over the
world to add to its domestic analyses. The Coast
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and Geodetic Survey collects data on United States
territorial waters and on a number of overseas
areas that are important to naval operations. The
Bureau of the Census as a service agency manipu-
lates data fed to it by government offices, and these
include foreign trade statistics and international
statistics in general.
Other Agencies
There are additional agencies. Some of the
more obvious include: (1) the Office of Interna-
tional Labor Affairs in the Department of Labor,
which watches developments abroad in use and
behavior of labor and labor organizations; (2)
the Office of Alien Property in the Department
of Justice, which keeps track of foreign assets
under our jurisdiction and possible trading with
the enemy; (3) the Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service, also in the Department of Justice,
which watches for violations of immigration laws
and maintains border patrols; (4) the Depart-
ment of Agriculture's Office of Foreign Agricul-
tural Relations which has attaches abroad to
collect data and makes analyses of world-wide de-
velopments in agriculture; (5) the same De-
partment's Bureau of Entomology and Plant
Quarantine, which like the United States Public
Health Service may be in the forefront of detect-
ing biological warfare attacks upon the United
States; (6) the Post Office Department's Bureau
of the Chief Post Office Inspector, whose studies of
postal law violations may turn up much informa-
tion of intelligence interest; (7) the Department
of Interior's Office of Territories and many special
commissions and corporations which serve as
sources of intelligence on our own territories; (8)
the Federal Communications Commission, which
tracks down clandestine radio stations and keeps
95
track of use of frequencies by transmitters both
at home and abroad; (9) the Federal Reserve
Board, which makes studies of international fi-
nance; (10) the Tariff Commission, which studies
foreign costs, protective measures, and other re-
trictions ; (11) the Smithsonian Institution,
which collects and studies scientific data the world
over, and its subsidiary International Exchange
Service which trades scientific publications with
foreign countries; (12) the Library of Congress,
which also has exchange and collection functions;
(13) the Office of Civil Defense with its physical
security functions; and (14) such quasi-official or
private groups as the National Geographic Society,
which can send expeditions to remote places, and
prepare finished maps based upon data collected,
and the Bureau of Railway Economics, which also
has very wide collection and processing facilities.
The above list, by no means exhaustive, indicates
the variety of agencies that are in some way useful
to Intelligence, although they are not intelligence
agencies in the strict sense of the term.
In any review of United States Organizations
for National Security it must be kept in mind that,
in actuality, they are not inanimate spaces on a
formal chart but rather living vital composites of
many individuals each of whom is daily contribut-
ing his talents and energies toward the production
of a total coordinated product. The best finished
product is possible only when each individual con-
tributor has a clear perspective of the total field
of which he is a part so that his own efforts will
blend effectively and harmoniously. Therefore,
in order to aid the naval intelligence officer to
carry out his assigned duties and responsibilities
most effectively, the following chapter will be de-
voted to a consideration of the proper intelligence
perspective he must have.
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CHAPTER 4
AN INTELLIGENCE PERSPECTIVE IN A CHANGING WORLD
The iob of Intelligence is "to winnow the extraneous data from the vital facts and to set these facts
In proper perspective . . ."
This statement was made following World War
II by Rear Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter in
describing the function of intelligence to produce
usable knowledge. Its key words, "proper per-
spective" aptly describe the central theme of this
chapter.
Cause and effect, action and counter-action are
woven into an unending pattern of conditions and
situations which must be followed with infinite
care the world over. The relentless continuity
of events makes it impossible to consider them
singly or outside their frame of reference. Mili-
tary policies and international politics are inter-
dependent and neither can be effective without the
other. Similarly, the strategies of nations may
begin and end within a period of war, or they may
be conducted, with or without change, continuously
between wars. The intelligence officer must be
schooled in the field of international relations in
order that he may develop a broad sense of world
affairs and recognize the trends which will give the
fullest meaning to emerging situations. In de-
veloping this sensitivity he must keep in mind the
functions of intelligence, its past influence on
world events, and the purposes of the various agen-
cies which it supports.
In chapter lit was stated that Intelligence has
three primary functions: first, to give warning
of any hostile plans directed against a nation or
a military force; second, to provide the knowl-
edge upon which policies and plans can be based;
and third, to counter the intelligence efforts of
opposing nations. The very nature of military
warfare maximizes the opportunity of Intelligence
to predict the time and place of attack. The
greater variables in time of peace, however, re-
quire Intelligence to evaluate with care the par-
ticular factors which may produce specific
developments within certain periods of time. The
importance of such evaluations was stressed by
Maj. Gen. William J. Donovan when he said:
269196-54-8
97
"Government policy must be based upon a tested
knowledge of the facts. What facts? The capa-
bilities, the intentions, and the policies of other
nations . . (Intelligence is) just the careful
gathering and analysis and interpretation of many
bits of evidence."
The need for intelligence in time of war has
been generally recognized; its importance in time
of peace is still a topic of considerable argument
among some political leaders and students of
government. A British writer recently com-
mented that, prior to World War II, intelligence
seemed to have little purpose as long as the vital
interests of the nation did not appear to be threat-
ened. As late as August 1952, a well-known
American, in describing United States intelligence
organizations, remarked that they would be un-
necessary if American relations with the Soviet
Union were normal. This failure to understand
the need for continuity in intelligence activity
arises from a misconception of the terms "war"
and "peace." Certainly they are not exclusive
concepts. For example, it is almost impossible to
pin-point the causes of wars and the exact times
when each really began. Since basic national in-
terests remain relatively the same, the transition
from war to peace is merely a shift in emphasis
on the means employed to promote those interests.
Instead of military force, the means may be poli-
tical, economic, psychological, or a combination
of all three.
Likewise for intelligence the end of a war means
only a shift in major interests. Instead of the
numbers and movements of troops and ships, in-
terest centers on the capabilities of new weapons,
the acquisition of new strategic bases, and the
development of new areas of political influence.
Political machinations in the world's trouble spots,
exploitation of markets for manufactured goods,
and the control of strategic materials become sub-
jects of concern. Knowledge of these matters may
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INTELLIGENCE FOR
alter relationships and determine the attitudes of
one nation toward another at international confer-
ences or at meetings of the United Nations. In-
telligence has the responsibility not only to acquire
such positive information regarding other nations
of the world, but also to perform its equally im-
portant function of preventing the disclosures of
vital information and countering foreign es-
pionage.
Consideration of the historical development in
chapter 2 led to the conclusion that Intelligence
has often influenced the outcome of military and
political events which had world-wide repercus-
sions. The intelligence officer, therefore, must be
fully aware of the scope of his interests and the
implications of his activities. The guerrilla war-
fare carried on by Lawrence of Arabia in World
War I had a strategic significance out of all pro-
portion to the size, area of combat, and equipment
of his modest forces. The German agent, Wass-
muss, held southern Persia under his personal
influence and did much to prolong the British mili-
tary campaign in that area. Early in World War
II, a cipher clerk in the American Embassy at
London provided Germany with vital diplomatic
information passing between Washington and
London. When his treachery was finally discov-
ered, during the dark days of Dunkirk and the
fall of France, all classified communications of
the American State Department had to be sus-
pended until new codes were prepared and.
distributed. The impact of this failure of
counterintelligence was brought out at the Nurem-
berg trials when various Nazi leaders stated that
the information derived through the American
cipher clerk influenced their decision to curtail
military activity during the winter of 1939-40
while they prepared for the spring offensive
against France. The use of the Italian Embassy
in London for the transmittal of this information
may well have influenced Italy's decision to post-
pone her entry into the war for about ten months.
In the preceding chapter, the purpose of the
discussion was to review the various government
agencies responsible for planning and formulating
the foreign policies of the United States and to
describe their supporting Intelligence subdivi-
sions. The Office of Naval Intelligence, as one
of these subdivisions, contributes significantly to
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98
NAVAL OFFICERS
the production of the total knowledge used as the
basis for national policy decisions which guide
relationships with other nations in times of war
and peace. This knowledge is also a fundamental
source of support to the military commander in
the area of operations and to both military and
political agencies at all levels in their efforts to
oppose the intelligence activities of other nations.
When used at the national planning level, this
knowledge is called Strategic Intelligence; at the
naval planning level, it is called Naval Strategic
Intelligence, the importance of which to any na-
tion depends upon the extent of that nation's sea
power. At the operational level, this knowledge
is termed Operational Intelligence.
To be emphasized is the fact that, regardless
of the level or echelon by which intelligence is
used, those engaged in its activities, whether mili-
tary or civilian, cannot properly perform their
duties without a comprehensive understanding of
the world scene, from which is derived a clearer
view of relationships between events wherever and
whenever they occur.
As early as World. War I, Brigadier General
Marlborough Churchill, then Director of Military
Intelligence, made this pertinent comment
The reason why we have decided to study
the whole world is that we believe it to be
impossible correctly to predict the points
which are going to be sensitive in the future,
unless we take the trouble to find out the sit-
uation in all countries, and all the factors
which go to make up an international situa-
tion. . . . If it is remembered that the assas-
sination of an Austrian Prince in 1914 started
a conflagration which our Army was called
upon to play a major part in extinguishing,
it will be seen that MID is not doing its full
duty if it does not attempt correctly to re-
cord and promptly to bring to the attention
of the proper authority everything that is
going on in the world.
He also made the observation that, prior to World
War I, Regular Army officers tended to limit their
interest and training to matters of specific military
content.
We failed to realize that it is the duty of
every Army officer to follow the example set
so many years ago by the Navy, and make
himself not only a fighting man, but also a
well-informed man of the world.
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Important contributory elements which are the
basis for a clear and proper perspective for in-
telligence personnel include an understanding of
basic national interests and objectives, a knowl-
edge of the place and meaning of strategy and the
resulting foreign policy, and an appreciation of
the ultimate purposes of operational activities to
implement both strategy and policy. The intelli-
gence perspective cannot be static: it must be ca-
pable of rapid adjustment to changing conditions
and altered circumstances. It must always be
positive, with a clear and unbiased view of its own
purposes and responsibilities. The following dis-
cussion of these elements, although by no means
exhaustive, should serve to portray the perspective
which all intelligence personnel must acquire if
they are to perform their duties successfully. It
should also serve to indicate the necessity for
further reading and continuous study.
NATIONAL INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES
In view of the vast amount of knowledge about
the world and its peoples, guidance is essential if
intelligence activities are to be economically con-
centrated. Normally, specific guidance emanates
from higher authority, but it is important to rec-
ognize that ultimate guidance is provided by the
fundamental national interests and objectives
which must form the basis for national strategy
and policy.
Our own national interests have never been more
succinctly expressed than in the words of the Dec-
laration of Independence: "Life, Liberty, and the
Pursuit of Happiness"; other expressions repre-
sent only the means toward these ends. Over the
years these fundamental interests have gradually
been broadened to include the preservation of na-
tional independence, freedom from war and the
threat of war, improvement in standards of living
so that everyone may have the opportunity to earn
an even better and more secure livelihood, and the
maintenance of friendly relations with all peoples
of the world.
From such interests come national objectives
which include the protection of the American form
of government and way of life at any cost from
every challenge, the support of endeavors aimed at
the peaceful resolution of all international prob-
lems, the encouragement of a healthy world econ-
omy, and the championship of nations threatened
by any ruthless imperialistic aggressor. Em-
bodied in these objectives are certain definite social
values, such as those enunciated as the Four Free-
doms by Roosevelt and Churchill. Of particular
importance is the value of popular power which
emphasizes the orderly process of making decisions
through democratic participation.
Few can find fault with these interests and ob-
jectives; the problems lie in their interpretation
and implementation. For many complex reasons
interpretations vary between various social groups
within the nation and the power of one group may
permit it to dominate the expression of national
objectives at a given time. Historically, the popu-
lar power value when applied to foreign relations
has resulted in the implementation of the objective
of national security through international law and
organization, a sincere effort to deter aggressive
nations from their intentions by bargaining and
persuasion. In his book, American Diplomacy,
1900-1950, George F. Kennan has pointed out what
appear to be not only certain theoretical deficien-
cies in this approach, but also the serious implica-
tions of its resultant theory of "unconditional
surrender":
It is a curious thing . . . that the legalistic
approach to world affairs, rooted as it unques-
tionably is in a desire to do away with war
and violence, makes violence more enduring,
more terrible, and more destructive to politi-
cal stability than did the older motives of
national interest. A war fought in the name
of high moral principle finds no early end
short of some form of total domination.
If our national objectives as they relate to the
rest of the world imply a defense of free countries
of the world so that they may remain free, there
is the added implication of an ability to wage war
when necessary. However, atomic warfare of the
present and the future could well bring ruin to a
degree never before experienced and with it the
destruction of what the war was fought to pro-
tect. For this reason alone, national objectives
must transcend the mere winning of wars; they
must include the realization of the purposes for
which war is waged. These purposes, when de-
fined and understood, might well control the tac-
tics, targets, and even the weapons used; even
more, they might alter the concept of total victory.
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In the past, American objectives, expressed as
abstract moral principles, have led to some mis-
understanding and disappointment. In. the pres-
ent world crisis, there have been suggestions that
they be more concretely defined: what are our spe-
cific objectives, our capabilities for reaching them,
our plans for carrying them out? Various stu-
dents of government have raised the problem of
what they describe as an American tendency to-
ward a negative approach to objectives; that is,
expressing them in terms of opposition to those of
another nation. They recommend a positive ap-
proach to objectives which might provide greater
illumination and stimulation, not only to the
American people, but also to the rest of the world.
To point out the problems in connection with
the interpretation and implementation of national
objectives is easy; to solve them is a matter in-
finitely more difficult. Dr. William L. Langer,
long associated with government agencies con-
cerned with national planning, has suggested the
possibilities of a special staff, under the National
Security Council, specifically charged with the
long-range study of national objectives, together
with provisions for the close exchange of ideas and
coordination of action between the executive and
legislative branches of the government. It is his
belief that, by such means, greater unity of pur-
pose and action might be achieved. Without ques-
tion, clearly defined and well understood national
objectives are fundamental to a national grand
strategy aimed at encouraging our allies and dis-
couraging our adversaries.
GRAND STRATEGY
As a term, strategy has long been associated with
war as an art of military command, but as a result
of the modern complexities of war and of the-so-
ciety from which it stems, the strategy of today
has come to embrace many factors other than mili-
tary: political, economic, technological, moral,
and psychological. It has come to embrace activi-
ties of government and diplomacy aimed at the
control and utilization of a nation's total resources,
of which military forces is only one, for the pur-
pose of promoting and protecting national inter-
ests against actual or potential enemies. The di-
mensions of modern strategy become even more
profoundly impressive when groups of nations
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band together for the promotion and protection
of common interests. Simply defined, strategy is
the basic pattern for employing instruments of
power. In its broadest sense, therefore, it is
known as grand strategy.
In chapter 1 grand strategy was defined as the
master plan of a nation in both war and peace, in-
cluding not only military planning but domestic
and foreign policy as well. A more complete
definition by B. H. Liddell-Hart is given in the
Encyclopedia Britannica (14th edition) :
Grand Strategy should both calculate and
develop the economic resources and manpower
of the nation in order to sustain the fighting
services. So also with the moral resources?
for to foster and fortify the will to win, and to
endure, is as important as to possess the more
concrete forms of power. And it should reg-
ulate the distribution of power between the
several services, and between the services and
industry. Nor is that all, for fighting power
is but one of the instruments of grand strat-
egy. It should take account of and and apply
the power of financial pressure, diplomatic
pressure, commercial pressure, and, not least,
ethical pressure to weaken the opponent's will.
A good cause is a sword and a buckler. Fur-
thermore, while the horizon of strategy is
bounded by the war, grand strategy looks be-
yond the war to the subsequent peace. It
should not only combine the various instru-
ments, but so regulate their use as to avoid
damage to the future state of peacefulness, se-
cure and prosperous.
There are other terms with which the intelli-
gence officer should be familiar in order to under-
stand this element of the intelligence perspective
more thoroughly. Combined Strategy refers to
the common strategy of coalitions of nations. Na-
tional Strategy is used interchangeably with strat-
egy and grand strategy, while Military Strategy
is a more restrictive term, denoting the art and
science of employing the armed forces of a nation
to secure the objectives of national policy by the
application of force, or the threat of force. Naval
Strategy is the result of planning for the effective
employment of naval power in support of national
objectives. Other military terms have been found
useful in describing the activities of nations.
Strategic offensive, strategic defensive, and stra-
tegic initiative?all defined in chapter 1?apply
to nations as well as to combat units.
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Interrelationships of Military and Political Factors
The interchange of vocabulary is but one indi-
cation of how closely interwoven the military and
political factors of our Nation's strategy have be-
come. Another indication is the reliance placed
on the opinions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the
Chief Executive and by the National Security
Council, and the fact that the nation's military
leaders are included in consultations involving top-
level planning in many areas which are not di-
rectly of a military nature. As shown in the pre-
ceding chapter, Congress has officially recognized
the role of the military forces in connection with
national strategy.
World conditions, of course, have exerted a tre-
mendous influence in bringing about this situa-
uation in the United States. Specifically, the
emphasis on force and the threat of force in the
foreign policies of the Soviet Union has strongly
affected the international relationships of nations.
The problem of Korea provides a good illustration
of the interplay of military and political factors.
As early as 1947, $510,000,000 in military aid for
South Korea was proposed. When the Soviet
Union suggested a conference on Korean unity,
the United States State Department dropped the
military aid program. Later, when the U. S. S. R.
took the strategic offensive and formally withdrew
from Korea, leaving behind a trained North Ko-
rean Army, the United States had no alternative
but to withdraw also, leaving no comparable army
behind. When South Korea was invaded in the
summer of 1950, it was the State Department, not
the Department of Defense, which encouraged
military support of the South Koreans. Having
committed military units to Korea, the military
leaders found their planning sharply circum-
scribed by strategic political considerations.
Admiral Mahan set forth the proposition that
"The strategist is he who always keeps the ob-
jective of the war in sight and the objective of
the war is never military and is always political."
In the past, the leaders of American military forces
have tended to overlook this dictum, undoubtedly
because of the meritorious, long-established, and
deeply-rooted American conviction that overall
civilian control of the Nation's military forces
must be maintained at all costs.
The Military Point of View
The American military mind in the past has con-
centrated on the military factors involved in
achieving victory and avoiding defeat; it has not
associated itself officially with a consideration of
the political implications of victory or the political
situations which might lead to further conflict.
As a result, when called upon, it has tended to
concentrate on the use of direct, overpowering
force to accomplish its objectives, leaving to other
agencies the considerations of other means to carry
out strategic plans.
The developments following World War II,
however, have had a profound effect on the think-
ing of both military and political leaders in the
United States. It has become apparent that
throughout that war the Soviets were guided in
their strategic military planning by their postwar
political objectives. For example, it has been sug-
gested that Soviet insistence on committing Allied
forces in Italy to an invasion of southern France
was based primarily on an effort to keep them out
of the Balkan countries. As a result, there were
no substantial British or American military units
in Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary to retard the
extension of Soviet control over those countries in
the postwar period. The military objectives of
the Korean war from 1950 to 1952 were obviously
limited by broad political considerations.
The American system of government and way
of life will always assure civilian control of its
military forces. The military themselves will be
the first to reject any suggestion that they assume
leadership in formulating national strategy and
directing foreign policy. Since, however, our mil-
itary leaders are involved in national strategy, they
must be thoroughly conversant with all the politi-
cal factors in order to contribute effectively to
overall planning for the welfare and security of
our Nation.
Basic Considerations in the Formulation of Strategy
Four concepts should be basic in the thinking of
all those responsible for planning national strat-
egy. The first is that modern strategy is global.
The interdependence of all parts of the world has
increased to the extent that a changed condition
in one area is quickly felt in many others. The
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Soviet "war by satellite" strategy has made clear
the fact that many widely separated parts of the
world are vital to our national security; while
Stalin's comment that victory in Europe may first
be won in Asia gives added significance to the
drain on the military strength of France caused
by the situation in Indo-China. An appreciation
of this concept can serve as a constant warning
not to concentrate on the security of one area
without a full awareness of the possibilities of
weakening the security of another.
The second concept is that international rela-
tions are unstable; hence the strategic planner
must be prepared to adjust rapidly to the prob-
abilities of change, perhaps even radical change.
American relations with the Soviet Union, chang-
ing from allies in World War II to adversaries
in the postwar period, illustrate the validity of
this concept. It should be remembered also that
the United States and Great Britain have not
always been allies. The situation in postwar Eu-
rope demonstrates all too well the instability and
delicate balance of relations between countries: an
unfavorable resolution of internal conflicts within
Germany, France, and Italy might sharply alter
our relationships with those countries; and cer-
tainly the position of Yugoslavia has changed
radically in a few short years. The Communist
purges in the Soviet satellite countries during 1951
and 1952 might indicate that the Soviet Union has
not yet achieved complete stability in its relations
with its involuntary associates. The significance
of this concept is two-fold: fixation on a particu-
lar situation which exists at any given time can
distort the evaluation of developing events and
throw long-term planning off balance; strategic
planning must be dynamic, sensitive to indications
of change, and prepared to take the initiative as
changes occur.
The third concept is that of consistency to prin-
ciple. American goals and ideals have long been
a source of inspiration to all people of the world
who see in the United States a land of opportunity
and a haven from tyranny where freedom has real
meaning for the individual. Consistency in the
championship of human liberty, wherever it is
sought, is essential to any long-term success in
strategic planning; inconsistency contains the
seeds of self-destruction. In itself, this concept
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poses some exceedingly difficult problems in a
world where force is a constant threat. However,
simply stated, it means that those responsible for
national strategy must never lose sight of basic
national objectives.
The fourth concept is that the various means
available to strategy are employed in varying de-
grees at all times to strengthen the master plan of
one nation while restricting the plans of another.
The availability of military force is a factor which
constantly affects the formulation of strategies,
as is illustrated by the effect of the postwar ac-
tivities of the Soviet Union in Europe and in Asia.
Diplomacy, which pursues a more peaceful ap-
proach to the solution of world problems, endeav-
ors at all times to win friends and to create condi-
tions favorable to its own objectives. Economic
power is exerted to strengthen and to destroy. In
postwar Europe, the United States has used its
economic resources to restore war-ravaged coun-
tries; while at the same time, in China, it has em-
ployed this power to weaken the Communist con-
trolled government. Similarly, the sociological
instruments of emotion and culture are being ex-
ploited by opposing forces all over the world, on
the one hand to build and on the other to tear
down. In more recent years, science and tech-
nology have become powerful weapons; the atom
bomb alone has played a significant part in the
planning of world strategies.
The essential point of this concept is that war
and peace are relative terms and that no wise
strategist can consider them to be mutually exclu-
sive with particular instruments appropriate only
to one or the other. Such a point of view might
lead to the sacrifice of long-term objectives for
short-term advantages. A keen appreciation of
this concept can immeasurably strengthen a na-
tion's grand strategy by permitting the skillful
employment of all available instruments in the
right degree at the proper place and time.
All of these concepts can be reduced to the sim-
ple fact that strategy must be based on realities,
and hence requires the availability of all perti-
nent knowledge. The approach to this require-
ment involves: first, a continuous awareness of
the unknown. factors and an effort to uncover
them; second, a full appreciation of the known
factors and their realistic application to the solu-
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tion of the many problems of planning; and third,
the conscientious use of logical reasoning.
Success in the formulation of strategy is
achieved when the resultant policies are so inte-
grated with available instruments that war be-
comes either unnecessary or is undertaken with the
optimum assurance of victory.
POLICY IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS
The net product of grand strategy, which is
based on national interests and objectives, is called
"policy"; when that policy concerns relationships
with foreign countries it is called "foreign policy."
Obviously policy cannot be established in the best
interests of a nation without a great deal of care-
ful advance study and planning; thus it represents
the last step in a nation's strategic planning proc-
ess and gives expression to its master plan. For-
eign policy is that element of the total plan, devel-
oped from experience and knowledge, which aids
in the conduct of government business with other
governments.
In the postwar period there has been a notable
growth of popular interest in American foreign
policy, and much has been written on the subject.
There has been criticism of certain aspects, such
as the lack of realism, the absence of continuity,
and excessive improvisation. In his book, The
Road to Foreign Policy, Hugh Gibson, a long-
time career diplomat, refers to the "Open Door"
policy in China, "Dollar Diplomacy," and the
"Monroe Doctrine," among others, as "fragments
of foreign policy" and suggests that some Ameri-
can foreign policies "can be described not too un-
kindly as hobbies of successive secretaries of
state."
From such discussions and criticisms it may be
concluded that a real need exists for a better un-
derstanding of what foreign policies are, the proc-
esses from which they are derived, and an expres-
sion of the policies themselves in language
unmistakably clear, with no possibility for mis-
interpretation. Such an understanding is aided
by a recognition of the fundamental character-
istics and qualities which all policies should have.
Foreign policies are rooted in the historical
background of nations; they develop gradually,
are the result of objective thinking, and have qual-
ities of stability and permanence. They never
103
spring suddenly into being and can seldom arise
out of the emotional excitement of the moment.
George Washington, in his Farewell Address, was
encouraging the idea of objectivity when he
warned against "passionate attachments." In dis-
cussing basic policy in his book, Mr. Gibson com-
ments that, in the light of subsequent events the
post-World War II policy of the Allies to destroy
the power of Germany was not a true policy be-
cause it was emotionally conceived and lacked the
quality of Objectivity. The term "policy" should
be applied only to something that is fundamental
and of a long-range nature; it should not be con-
fused with tactical devices used to implement the
basic plan. The Marshall Plan, for example, has
been merely a device for implementing a basic
policy of denying the control of Europe to one
aggressor nation. However, it gives continuity to
that policy and should not be misunderstood as
an improvisation.
Obviously, a policy is never one-sided; it always
involves other nations and other peoples who have
much to do with its effectiveness or ineffectiveness.
The success of the balance of power policy in
Europe depends upon the whole-hearted response
and cooperation of various countries participating
in the Marshall Plan, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, and the European Defense Com-
munity. The success of any policy depends also
on the high caliber of those responsible for its ad-
ministration, their training, experience, and sen-
sitive perception of its many aspects and impli-
cations. The measure of success should never be
gauged by spectacular immediate results, because
the results achieved over a period of years are
often much more significant. Since a policy must
be judged on a long-term basis as it grows and
develops, it cannot always be evaluated at a given
time; rather, the degree of its effectiveness will be
demonstrated by the manner in which it influences
subsequent events.
Since a true basic policy grows out of national
objectives which are the common interest of all
groups within a nation, it does not represent a
partisan point of view. On the other hand, the
implementing tactics or devices may well origi-
nate from the elected representatives of the people
in control of the government at a given time.
Finally, all policies are not of equal importance.
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The defense of American policy in China, for ex-
ample, would not elicit the same immediate re-
sponse as the defense of our policy to protect the
Western Hemisphere from aggression.
A review of common characteristics should lead
to the conclusion that foreign policies are the re-
sult of long-range planning and that shifting re-
lationships between nations will affect their execu-
tion, so that adaptability is essential to successful
operation. An understanding of these character-
istics should do much to sharpen the intelligence
perspective in identifying the broad patterns of
policy, often obscured by tactical devices which
are no more than implementations. Even more,
it becomes apparent that the successful execution
of policy requires at every step a great amount of
knowledge and a full appreciation of cause and
effect relationships.
While the instruments of policy and strategy are
the same, it must be reemphasized that they are
the machinery through which policies operate and
that their effective use is necessary if any policy
is to have real meaning or ultimate value. Diplo-
macy and military forces are two basic instruments
whose significance merits further consideration.
Diplomacy is not a function limited to the diplo-
matic service. It is carried on through any official
or unofficial activities which affect foreign rela-
tionships such as: a restrictive tariff act or a gen-
erous foreign aid measure passed by Congress; the
movements of the 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean;
the behavior of American citizens, military or ci-
vilian, in a foreign capital; formal addresses or
off-the-cuff remarks by high Government officials.
It is true that the diplomatic service itself must be
a highly trained body of devoted men and women
capable of administering policy wisely in a con-
fused and troubled world. At the same time, pub-
lic opinion has much to do with diplomacy as an
instrument of policy; the more enlightened it is,
the more advantageously effective it can be. The
importance of this instrument is self-evident; its
failure results inevitably in war.
Military forces are not only an exceedingly im-
portant instrument of policy, but also affect policy
directly or indirectly. United States Army oc-
cupation and control in Germany, for example,
will have an effect on American policies in Europe
for many years, and likewise our occupation and
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NAVAL OFFICERS
subsequent retention of military bases in Japan
have given a definite pattern to American policies
in the Far East. Close coordination of military
and political policies, therefore, becomes essential
to the national interest. To be remembered also
is the fact that military power as an instrument of
policy must be adequate to support that policy;
further, that the knowledge required to determine
what constitutes adequacy must be supplied by
an effective intelligence service.
THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE
Since modern nations can scarcely afford to
maintain military forces sufficient to meet all even-
tualities, the production of knowledge from which
to determine adequacy becomes a contribution of
major consequence. Intelligence can also have
great value in helping to compensate for certain
deficiencies in military instruments available to
carry out strategy and policy. Prior to World
War II, one of the German military theorists,
Captain von Gadow, recognized this value in an
article prepared for Militaerevessenschaftliche
Rundschau
We must be far-sighted in our policies. The
next war will depend on the success or failure
of the great sea powers. Germany is not and
cannot become a great sea power. But we
can protect certain interests by erecting effi-
ciently working outposts which would have to
fulfill highly important tasks in the sphere of
naval strategy and may also often play a de-
cisive part in our foreign policy . . .
In evaluating the military factor, Intelligence
must inevitably assess the relevant political, eco-
nomic, psychological, moral, and technological
factors. In so doing, it produces knowledge which
can be used as the basis for the successful employ-
ment of these additional factors in total war.
The preceding discussion of the planning of
strategy and the formulation and execution of
policy has indicated the quantity and scope of
knowledge required. It has also suggested in
general terms the necessary breadth of the intelli-
gence perspective. A review of some of the strat-
egies, policies, and tactical operations of Germany,
Japan, and the Allied Nations before and during
World War II and of the Soviet Union after-
wards will more specifically illustrate the vital
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role played by Intelligence and the perspective its
personnel must have in support of that role. Dur-
ing this review it will be well to keep in mind the
intelligence organizations developed by these na-
tions as described in the latter sections of chap-
ter 2.
GERMAN STRATEGY BEFORE AND DURING
WORLD WAR II
The grand strategies of the Axis powers were
formulated separately in the 1920's and were im-
plemented and combined in the 1930's. Their
tenuous roots may be traced to Mussolini's march
on Rome and his establishment of the first dic-
tatorship; the Japanese fortification of their
newly acquired Mandated Islands in the Pacific;
and Hitler's dramatic presentation of himself and
his scheme for world conquest in Mein Kampf.
When Hitler became Chancellor of Germany in
1933, Nazism was established as a political and
military force and secret preparation for war was
begun. Germany, however, did not take the stra-
tegic offensive in the international arena until 7
March 1936, when she reoccupied the Rhineland.
A year earlier Italy had taken the strategic of-
fensive when she moved against helpless Ethiopia.
By 1936 Hitler had created the "Rome-Berlin
Axis" and, with Mussolini, had intervened in the
Spanish Civil War for the purpose of testing new
weapons and tactics, to say nothing of further
undermining the stability of that country. By
1936 he also had evolved and put into action the
new Nazi strategy, which utilized not only mili-
tary but also economic-political-psychological
means. Because he held the strategic initiative,
Hitler was able to a large extent to predict and
determine the course of events.
In the period from 1936 to 1940 it became in-
creasingly clear that the grand strategy of the
Nazi regime was territorial aggrandizement by
means short of war, and the forging of armed
might against the day when conflict with major
powers could no longer be avoided. During this
period Mussolini played second fiddle to Hitler;
his ambition was perhaps not so grandiose, and
certainly his resources were not comparable. He
basked, however, in the reflected glory of the Nazi
state as it gradually assumed hegemony over one
European country after another from 1938 to 1940.
105
Hitler's spectacular successes were in large meas-
ure due to his "combined strategy" which adapted
grand strategy to the purposes of a ruthless dic-
tatorship in which total mobilization could be en-
forced immediately for the waging of total war.
That the Nazi grand strategy was truly global
in scale, and was directed, among other objectives,
at gaining a foothold in Latin America, was rec-
ognized in 1942 by Hugo Fernandez Artucio, who
wrote in his "The Nazi Underground in South
America":
An undeclared war is being waged in Latin
America today against the democratic insti-
tutions and the independence of the New
World Republics. The war is being con-
ducted with fearful efficiency by the soldiers
of the Third German Empire, who have been
distributed by the thousands throughout the
political underground of this continent.
They are the agents of Adolph Hitler, whose
mission it is to put into practice here, as in
Holland and Belgium, Czechoslovakia and
Norway, Austria and France, the principles
of totalitarian warfare. In this concept of
war, actual armed invasion becomes merely a
link in a long chain of underground prepa-
ration . . .
A political scheme of international implica-
tions has been set afoot on the American con-
tinent . . . Its object is to set up a govern-
ment as nearly like the totalitarian regime
as possible, and the method employed is "the
war of nerves." Its creators know, with
Machiavellian cunning, the political function
of fear.
Nazi strategy was ably supported by the world-
wide German Intelligence Service, the concepts of
which were broadened in order to implement new
and revolutionary methods of warfare, such as
the "blitzkrieg," the "war of nerves," and the
"fifth column." The effectiveness of German In-
telligence in contributing to Nazi strategic pur-
poses in Spain is described by Hansjurgen Koehler
in his book Inside the Gestapo. The particular
device used was the Hagenbeck Circus which was
sent to Spain to roam the countryside for months.
Gestapo agents were included among the large
numbers of circus employees. With this excellent
"cover," these agents had little difficulty in obtain-
ing a great variety of important information.
This circus also provided a means whereby Nazi
propaganda could be distributed with little or no
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difficulty. As a result of the Nazi intelligence ef-
fort in Spain, anti-German elements were almost
completely eliminated, Germans residing in the
country were enlisted as collaborators, and vital
strategic data on Spain was collected.
Tremendous sums of money, estimated at $200,-
000,000 annually, were allocated for intelligence
purposes, including the creation of fifth columns
and the conduct of propaganda activities. Such
expenditures were possible because of the Nazi
planned economy in Germany, and, from their
point of view, it was money well spent--except in
England and the United States.
Although the ruthless aggressions of the Axis
powers were in open defiance of existing treaties
and international law, the western democracies
were impotent, and could only helplessly observe
the progress of events. For some time Hitler was
not taken seriously, certainly not by Ramsay Mac-
Donald and Stanley Baldwin, although as early
as 1934, Winston Churchill had begun to issue
solemn warnings of the new peril which was
taking shape beyond the Rhine. Thus England
remained on the strategic defensive, and Neville
Chamberlain's policy of appeasement did not im-
prove the situation. England was not alone, how-
ever, for the other democracies shared this
unfavorable position.
One problem was that England and France were
getting very little intelligence out of Germany,
because it was a part of the Nazi strategy to infest
the homeland with armies of counterspies, to pun-
ish betrayal of military or industrial secrets by
well-publicized beheading, and to employ torture
and execution to stamp out disaffection whenever
and wherever detected. But a greater problem
was lethargy in the British Government and cor-
ruption in the Government of France which pre-
vented the right kind of action from being taken
in response to such intelligence as was received
regarding the German rearmament.
As can be seen, the advantage of strategic ini-
tiative, and hence the advantage of surprise, lay
with the totalitarian states dedicated to world
conquest. Innumerable acts of aggression, almost
imperceptible at their inception and fully identi-
fied only after they were accomplished facts, were
carried out in times of ostensible peace by scores of
fanatical and capable agents. Powerful nations
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NAVAL OFFICERS
were lulled by skillful propaganda into a false
sense of security; while others, less powerful, were
threatened, coerced, and attacked. The Axis
powers sought to change the existing world situa-
tion to one more favorable to themselves and, up
to a certain point, each succeeded remarkably well.
Failures in German Strategy
The period up to and including the fall of
France was characterized by brilliant Nazi suc-
cesses; thereafter, when Hitler was forced into
war with both England and the United States
while still embroiled on the continent of Europe,
Nazi blunders were the order of the day. Of par-
ticular interest are the failures in strategy which
led to failures on the field of battle and on the
diplomatic front. The publication of war his-
tories, memoirs of key political and military fig-
ures, the texts of hitherto top secret international
agreements, and "post-mortems" obtained through
the interrogation of high-ranking prisoners of
war, all shed light on different facets of German
planning and strategy. The "post-mortems" are
very illuminating although compensation must be
made for personal bias.
There is evidence that no war with England or
the United States was contemplated by the Ger-
man High Command during the period of initial
Nazi successes. An essay by Admirals Schniewind
and Schuster includes this statement:
A war on such a tremendous scale?or even
with England?was in 1939 quite beyond the
range of the preparations and intentions of
the Government. But the policy of the Gov-
ernment and its political negotiations did not
make any provision for this idea, as subse-
quent developments showed. They completely
failed to realize the determination on the part
of those who were later to become her enemies
to declare war in the event that Germany car-
ried out any further activities similar to the
occupation of Austria, Sudetenland, or Czech-
oslovakia. Germany, her armed forces and
especially her navy, were thereafter taken un-
aware and had to enter the war inadequately
equipped.
Additional evidence is found in an article by Vice
Admiral Hellmuth Heye, entitled, "From Panzer-
schiffe to E-Boats :"
Foreign politics were of particular impor-
tance from the naval point of view. The re-
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lease of Germany from the Versailles Treaty
. . . was . . . a hopeful development. Ad-
miral Raeder, in common with all the best
naval opinion, held the view that the war of
1914-18 was lost as a result of Anglo-Ameri-
can sea power. The land decision was only a
result of Anglo-American superiority at sea.
The Navy therefore held the view that the
waging of modern warfare is only possible,
especially in the air age, when there is no de-
termining enemy superiority at sea. Natu-
rally all the necessary conditions appertaining
to the use of the sea in an essentially conti-
nental country like Germany were difficult
to achieve. From the to downward all im-
portant offices in the Ministry of War and in
the air arm were occupied by persons who
were essentially land-trained. The Navy
found it impossible to introduce qualified of-
ficers into either the Air Ministry or the War
Ministry.
Naturally this state of affairs could not but
have an influence on the decision taken on all
questions connected with the sea and sea war-
fare. Nevertheless, every effort was made on
the highest level to avoid under all circum-
stances hostilities with England. This hope,
as I see it, remained up to the very day of the
declaration of war by England. There is no
better evidence on this than the fact that until
close up to the outbreak of war, I believe 1938,
the Navy was expressly forbidden to study or
consider the problems presented by a war with
England.
This almost incredible failure in German basic
planning was to have costly results in 1940 when
the opportunity arose to invade the long-invulner-
able British Isles. Detailed plans for Operation
Sealion had been prepared and were ready to be
put into effect, but Nazi strategy had failed to
foresee and prepare for this opportunity, and Ger-
many lacked the necessary landing craft and other
naval units to carry out an invasion. Air power
and land armies had been highly developed while
sea power had been neglected. This crucial error
in strategy seems to have resulted in part from a
failure of German Intelligence to predict in ad-
vance the psychological factors which would make
England a belligerent. Even this error might
have been counterbalanced by a skillful diplomatic
effort directed toward gaining and preserving an
attitude of neutrality in England, but the Nazis
lacked this capability and Hitler's personal short-
comings were reflected in the conduct of his
foreign policy.
The first major error in strategy involved Hitler
in a land war and a sea war simultaneously and
prevented him from mounting an invasion of Eng-
land in her weakest hour. A second, equally se-
rious, resulted in an all-out offensive against the
U. S. S. R. in the winter of 1941-42. The land
war now had to be fought on two widely separated
fronts, a situation particularly dreaded by the
members of the German General Staff. From the
very first, Hitler underestimated Soviet strength
and miscalculated Soviet intentions. Interesting
comments on these failures in strategy were made
by Colonel Gottschling, Chief of Staff of the Ger-
man Air Staff in Italy, during interrogation:
Hitler's "idee fixe" was to wage war against
Russia. The failure to invade Great Britain,
the ever-increasing amount of aircraft Britain
was receiving from the United States and
Germany's ever-increasing number of aircraft
losses served to spur Hitler on and in his ob-
session drove him to attack Russia.
Luftwaffe fighter and bomber units needed
in western Europe were dispatched to Bul-
garia, Rumania, etc. FIitler overruled every
objection of the General Staff with his gift
of persuasion. . . .
I would summarize Germany's war mistakes
as follows:
a. Overestimation of England's ability to
resist invasion.
b. Underestimation of Russia.
c. Overestimation of Germany' s allies,
such as Italy.
d. Our failure to treat France as an equal
and obtain full use of the wealth and
resources of the French colonial em-
pire. This could have been a stepping
stone for the invasion of Great Britain.
e. Declaring war on America. The High
Command should and must have
known that America's entry into the
war meant Germany's defeat.
?Defeat, Headquarters Army Air Forces,
January 1946.
A theme which reappears time and again in the
various "post-mortems" is the disastrous result of
Hitler's personal and complete control over Ger-
man grand strategy, particularly after the war
began. Colonel Gottschling stated:
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I have seen the most brilliant and deter-
mined men of my acquaintance go before Hit-
ler, determined not to acquiesce to his whims.
These brainy and critical men returned fasci-
nated and for weeks remained under the spell
of Hitler's charms or hypnosis. Thus, Hit-
ler exercised his influence on his General Staff.
Vice Admiral Heye is quoted again in this
connection:
During the preparations for the operations
in Norway I was only once present at a con-
ference with Adolf Hitler. In the course of
this he emphasized the importance of the oc-
cupation of Norway for the whole conduct of
the war and said he was the only man who
could assume responsibility for such an opera-
tion. In the course of the war, as is well-
known, he on many occasions acted against the
advice of his military chiefs and sometimes
he met with successes. This fact may have
caused him and many officers to regard him
not only as a statesman but also as a superior
general in the field. His intervention in mil-
itary operations grew at all events noticeably
more pronounced.
The German High Command progressively lost its
freedom to reach military decisions of a strategic
nature; more and more these were made by Hit-
ler himself on the basis of "intuition." It would
appear that the major errors already listed, and
some of their far-reaching consequences, might
have been avoided if Hitler had been persuaded
from exercising complete control over German
grand strategy, and if more comprehensive and
more accurate intelligence had been available to
the High Command. Fortunately for the Allies,
much of the information collected by the Nazis
was unreliable and inadequately processed; even
more, either the resulting intelligence was not
disseminated to those who needed to know, or, if
disseminated, was not used. Strategy, when for-
mulated by one individual on the basis of intui-
tion rather than fact, cannot fail to reflect not
only the brilliance but also the faults of that in-
dividual. Further, when faulty intelligence is in-
volved, the errors are compounded and magnified.
Other errors in German strategy included the
failure to bring Spain into the Axis camp, a lack
of appreciation for the advantages of joint opera-
tions in battle, and miscalculation of the enemy's
total industrial capacity. Regarding the latter
two, General von Senger was most outspoken i
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NAVAL OFFICERS
The General Staff failed to understand the
modern idea of warfare. It still thought in
terms of Nineteenth century land battles,
whereas we should have had a combined staff
like Italy. Our General Staff was primarily
occupied with army strategy rather than co-
ordination with the navy and air force. . . .
The tragedy of the General Staff is historical
rather than military. It saw its enemy in the
Allied field soldier?whereas the real enemy
was Allied industrial capacity far beyond the
front, out of reach of bombs or the range of
artillery.
?Defeat, Headquarters Army Air Forces,
July 1945.
The turning of the tide against the Germans is
generally agreed to have occurred in the fall of
1942 when the Allies landed in North Africa and
went on to defeat Rommel and to invade Italy.
The Allied advantage lay in the important ele-
ment of surprise, not only in tactics, but also in
the employment of many new types of landing
craft and weapons. Initial military success led
to a major political triumph, the fall of Mussolini.
The way lay open to the "soft underbelly of Eu-
rope," but the Allied strategic initiative in the
Mediterranean theater, except for long-range
bombing of the Rumanian oil fields, dwindled in
the face of stubborn German resistance and diffi-
cult terrain. Elsewhere in Europe, however, the
success of air operations from bases in England,
and the advance of Soviet armies following the
defense of Stalingrad, gave the Allies the strate-
gic initiative on both western and eastern fronts.
Meanwhile, in the Atlantic, the strategic offen-
sive maintained by Nazi submarine warfare was
reduced to the defensive, and as the situation
became more desperate it should have been ap-
parent to Hitler that victory was beyond his grasp.
The landing in Normandy, the devastating sweep
through France, and the junction with Soviet
forces in Berlin were but the final stages of suc-
cessful Allied grand strategy in Europe.
Japanese Strategy Before and During World War II
Japan took the strategic initiative on the main-
land of Asia on 18 September 1931 when she ar-
ranged the Mukden Incident as a pretext for the
invasion of Manchuria. Thereafter, she became
deeply involved in a land war in China. How-
ever, unlike Hitler, who initially at least had a
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healthy respect for the military and industrial
potential of the United States, the Japanese com-
pletely underestimated America's war-making
capability and deliberately provoked a conflict.
The attack on Pearl Harbor exploited surprise,
the range of carrier task forces, and the power of
aircraft to sink surface vessels. Not only did it
surprise the United States but also Nazi Germany,
for it now appeared that Japan was determined to
fight her own war independently, without more
than a perfunctory liaison with the Third Reich.
Thus an early failure of the combined strategy
of the Axis powers was the lack of effective coor-
dination?a problem which continuously plagued
the German High Command.
The final decision of Japan to make war,
reached with the full concurrence and active con-
sent of Japanese military and civilian leaders, was
based upon the following evaluation which is very
well presented in the Summary Report (Pacific
War), published by the United States Strategic
Bombing Survey:
a. The threat of Russia on the Manchurian
flank had been neutralized by the decisive
victories of Germany in Europe which might
eventually lead to the complete collapse of the
Soviet Union.
b. Great Britain was in such an irretriev-
ably defensive position that, even if she sur-
vived, her entire war-making potential would
be spent in a desperate attempt to protect her
home islands.
c. The forces which the United States and
her Allies could immediately deploy in the
Pacific, particularly in the air, were insuffi-
cient to prevent the fully trained and mobil-
ized forces of Japan from occupying within
3 or 4 months the entire area enclosed within
a perimeter consisting of Burma, Sumatra,
Java northern New Guinea, the Bismarck
Archipelago, the Gilbert and Marshall
Islands, Wake, and from there north to the
Kuriles.
d. China, with the Burma Road severed,
would be isolated and forced to negotiate.
e. The United States_, committed to aiding
Great Britain, and weakened by the attack on
Pearl Harbor, would be unable to mobilize
sufficient strength to go on the offensive for
18 months to 2 years. During this time, the
perimeter could be fortified and the required
forward air fields and bases established.. So
strengthened, this perimeter would be backed
by a mobile carrier striking force based on
Truk.
f. While the stubborn defense of the cap-
tured perimeter was undermining American
determination to support the war, the Jap-
anese would speedily extract bauxite, oil, rub-
ber, and metals from Malaya, Burma, the
Philippines and the Dutch East Indies, and
ship these materials to Japan for processing,
to. sustain and strengthen her industrial and
military machine.
g. The weakness of the United States as a
democracy would make it impossible for her
to continue all-out offensive action in the face
of the losses which would be imposed by fa-
natically resisting Japanese soldiers, sailors,
and airmen, and the elimination of its Allies.
The United States in consequence would com-
promise and allow Japan to retain a substan-
tial portion of her initial territorial gains.
Most of this evaluation was incorrect, because it
was based on faulty intelligence.
At the very outset of the Pacific War, therefore,
the seeds for Japan's eventual defeat were sown.
She was unable to comprehend or to predict those
psychological and moral factors which bolstered
the Allied cause in a time of severe trial and mis-
fortune. Since the Japanese concept of the state
involved ruthless tyranny and the complete sub-
jugation of the individual, she was also unable to
appreciate the power potential of the Allies in
obtaining a supreme voluntary effort from the in-
dividual, whether on the field of battle or on the
production front. Individual response to a noble
cause is one of the great strengths of a democ-
racy. Before a democracy fights, however, the
enemy has usually gained the strategic offensive.
The magnitude of their early successes at Pearl
Harbor, in Malaya, in the Philippines, and at
Wake, Guam, and Rabaul, encouraged the Japa-
nese to commit an outstanding error in grand
strategy?expansion beyond the perimeter origi-
nally planned. The nature of this new plan and
its inherent weaknesses are also described in the
Summary Report (Pacific War) :
Accordingly, a new plan was approved, pro-
viding for (a) an advance into the Solomons
and Port Moresby., to be followed, if success-
ful, by a further advance into New Caledonia,
Samoa, and the Fiji Islands; (b) the capture
of Midway; and (c) the temporary occupa-
tion of the Aleutians. Accomplishment of
such a program would cut the line of com-
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INTELLIGENCE FOR
munication between Australia and the United
States, reduce the threat from Alaska, and
deny the United States all major staging areas
more advanced than Pearl Harbor.
By stretching and overextending her line of
advance, Japan was committed to an expen-
sive and exacting supply problem. She de-
layed the fortification of the perimeter origi-
nally decided upon, jeopardized her economic
program for exploiting the resources of the
area already captured, and laid herself open
to early counterattack in far advanced and,
as yet, weak positions.
It should be pointed out, however, that this new
plan was partially successful; for example, sig-
nificant strategic gains were achieved by the tem-
porary occupation of Kiska in the Aleutians. The
United States was immediately placed on the de-
fensive in an area from which it had planned to
take the offensive. The Japanese action denied to
the United States Fleet advance bases for opera-
tions in the northwest Pacific and the Bering Sea,
from which aerial reconnaissance could be main-
tained over the northernmost Japanese Islands.
Furthermore, it was a threat to the shipping routes
between the west coast of the United States and
the east coast of Siberia; it endangered sealing
and fishing in the Bering Sea, and imperilled the
northwestern area of Alaska. The influence of
Japanese technical intelligence on this decision to
move into the Aleutians is indicated by the fol-
lowing quotation from the United States Strategic
Bombing Survey (Pacific) :
In Commander Hashimoto's opinion the
Japanese move into the Aleutians was con-
ceived as a flanking operation to the occupa-
tion of Midway. Once Kiska and Attu were
occupied it was decided to hold them for the
purpose of blocking a United States amphibi-
ous advance toward the Empire via the Aleu-
tian Chain, and also to deny the use of the
western Aleutians as bases from which long-
range bombers might operate. He said that
the Japanese were aware in the latter part of
1942 that the United States had plans for a
high altitude, long-range bomber, and, in
about February 1943, had information con-
cerning the B-29. This information was later
confirmed in a radio broadcast by an Ameri-
can general. He went on to say that the
B-29 appeared in operation 8 months later
than the Japanese had estimated it might ap-
pear. When Attu was re-taken by the United
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NAVAL OFFICERS
States, the Japanese expected long-range
bomber operations from Massacre Bay.
?Interrogations of J a p anese Officials
(Vol. I)
The operation launched against Midway, also
a part of this new plan, was far from successful.
In fact, in the words of Captain Tsuda :
The Battle of Midway was the beginning of
the Japanese failure in the war, I do not mean
that this was the decisive battle of the war,
but the loss of our carriers and some of our
best pilots and officers affected us throughout
the war. It called for the reorganization of
the carrier divisions and the Naval Air Force
in general. Due to the loss of ships we were
unable to meet the Americans in force in the
Solomons.
?Interrogation of Jap an e se Officials
(Vol. I)
United. States Strategic Bombing Survey
(Pacific)
The explanation for this fatal error to expand
the original perimeter may be found in the com-
ments of Admiral Toyada, one of her top naval
leaders:
I think the decision to expand the area of
operations so widely might be attributed to a
feeling on the part of the Japanese authorities
at the time that the state of mind under which
you fought the war and the state of mind
under which we fought the war were very
different, in that to us this was the war for our
very national existence, whereas in your case
it was merely a case of national honor or per-
haps protection of your economic interests in
the Far East; and, because to you the war
under such conditions would be of relatively
slight significance compared with ours, there
might have been a feeling on the part of our
leaders that, should the war continue a little
longer, you would lose your will to fight, and
with that idea we might have continued
spreading the battleline.
?Interrogations of Jap an es e Officials
(vol. II)
United States Strategic Bombing Survey
(Pacific)
If this explanation can be accepted as authorita-
tive, the cause for such a fundamental error in
strategy was an incorrect understanding of the
psychology of the American people. Here again
inaccurate intelligence had repercussions of the
first magnitude.
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Although the United States had early been
placed on the strategic defensive, by the end of
1942 precarious footholds had been consolidated
and reinforced in the southwest Pacific, thus up-
setting the enemy's strategic plan. The Battle of
Midway dealt a heavy blow to the Imperial Fleet,
and the strategic initiative passed to the American
forces. Thereafter, having ousted the Japanese
from Attu and Kiska, the north Pacific units were
employed as a holding and diversionary force,
while the major Allied attacks were carried out
by carrier task force raids, amphibious operations,
and strategic long-range bombing always aimed
at the final target, the Japanese home islands.
ALLIED STRATEGY BEFORE AND DURING WORLD
WAR II
Allied strategy in its entirety during this par-
ticular period serves to illustrate two points: the
tremendous ultimate value in coordinating the
strategies of allied nations; and the long term
effectiveness of strategy formulated in times of
peace as well as war.
As has been mentioned, the grand strategy of
the Axis was sharply divided, so that effective
concentration of power against major objectives
was never possible. On the other hand, the war
effort of Great Britain and the United States was
most closely coordinated. Varying degrees of co-
ordination were achieved from time to time with
the U. S. S. R., and with other Allied nations.
Perhaps the outstanding feature of Allied grand
strategy was the early implementation of the prin-
ciple of combined British and American conduct
of the war. Gen. George C. Marshall has com-
mented on this feature as follows:
On December 23, 1941, Winston Churchill,
Prime Minister of Great Britain, accompanied
by the British Chiefs of Staff, arrived in
Washington to confer with the President and
the American Chiefs of Staff. Out of the
series of discussions which then followed re-
sulted an agreement, not only regarding the
immediate strategy of our combined conduct
of the war, but also for the organization of a
method for the strategical command and con-
trol of British and American military re-
sources. Probably no other Allied action, in
the field or otherwise, has exerted as power-
ful an effect on the conduct of the war as the
prompt establishment of a prescribed pro-
cedure for achieving unit of effort through
the medium of the Combined Chiefs of Staff
acting under the direction of the leaders of
their respective Governments.
?Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the
United States Army, July 1, 1939 to June
30, 1941.
The pooling of resources and ideas generated a
total power which swept the Axis countries into
defeat. This concentration of power also included
the use of Army, Navy, and Marine Corps in
joint operations, especially in the Pacific. Joint
and combined intelligence activities contributed
substantially to strategic planning. For example,
the results of British experiments in photographic
interpretation were made available to the United
States, while air intelligence methods, and operat-
ing procedures aboard United States carriers were
provided the British Fleet through special train-
ing and liaison arrangements. This mutual ex-
change at many echelons was invaluable to the
combined allied strategy.
It has already been suggested that grana strat-
egy is conducted in time of ostensible peace as well
as in wartime. This is well illustrated by the fact
that the United States began to cooperate with
Great Britain in her war effort more than 3 years
before Pearl Harbor, and was actually at war with
Germany long before formal declarations were
made. Arrangements for the exchange of de-
stroyers for bases under 99-year lease agreements,
the convoying of merchant shipping, and the
American Lend-Lease program were all early in-
dications of combined strategy and military
planning.
NATIONAL STRATEGIES IN THE POSTWAR
PERIOD
The events of the postwar period, which have
their roots in past decades, will continue to influ-
ence the events of the future. The fate of the
world, or of civilization as it is now known, con-
tinues to hang in the balance, years after the termi-
nation of World War II. Former enemies and
former allies have united into new combinations
in peacetime, striving to achieve their objectives.
New strategies are being implemented and new
pressures applied in support of them.
The confusion and turbulence in relationships
between nations, both large and small, all over
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the world, and the crises caused by many diver-
gent often delicate situations, tend to obscure a
clear view of national strategies. However, it is
apparent that a dominant influence upon them has
been the fact that only two nations emerged from
the war with the full stature of major powers--
the United States and the U. S. S. R. It is neither
possible nor practicable to consider current events
in detail, or to speculate on developments in the
immediate future, but there are indications now
which shed light on the postwar strategies of
these major powers.
United States Strategy
In his book, The Price of Power, Hanson W.
Baldwin presents an interesting discussion of
United States strategy. His thesis is that in con-
tinuing to strive for the fulfillment of her objec-
tives in support of democracy and a just and last-
ing peace for the world, the United States aims to
preserve the political integrity of the "fringe-
lands" of Europe and Asia in order to prevent
the extension of Communist influence either to the
Atlantic in Europe or to the East and South China
Seas in Asia. This implies the restoration of a
balance of power. There are, of course, many
subsidiary aspects to this strategic purpose. Bald-
win goes on to describe the United States as "home
base" for operations with additional advanced and
intermediate bases, both fixed and mobile, required
because of the limitations of even the latest weap-
ons of warfare. Okinawa is illustrative of a fixed
base, while the United States Navy provides stra-
tegic mobile bases. Such a system of widely dis-
persed military bases becomes fundamental to
strategic planning. Of equal importance is the
development of "positions-in-readiness," that is,
friendly and allied countries who can contribute
to strategic purposes, both military and political.
The necessity for advance military bases was dis-
cussed by Colonel Clifford J. Heflin in the Air
University Quarterly, Fall 1947:
The idea of operating from home bases,
without the burden of establishing and main-
taining advanced and intermediate bases,
would be welcomed by every Air Force officer,
if it could be realized without paying too pro-
hibitive a price. From the inherent character-
istics of the airplane as developed during the
last 40 years, however, it appears probable
CONFIDENTIAL
112
that the price of such a method of operating
will continue to be extremely high in the meas-
urable future. Even if aircraft had attained
the range necessary to launch bombing at-
tacks from a distance of 6,000 to 8,000 miles,
it would be likely to remain much more eco-
nomical in materiel, and therefore more effi-
cient, to operate from nearer bases, wherever
they could be obtained . . .
If the coastal areas of Europe and Asia are of
most importance in United States strategic plan-
ning, then the significance of both sea and air
power, becomes readily apparent. The Atlantic
and Pacific Oceans are American sea frontiers
which must be protected, for only across them can
the United States exert its strength, whether it be
military, economic, or cultural. Strategic air
power is expressed by planes, both land and car-
rier based, capable of transporting atomic weap-
ons. Logistic superiority involves not only the
American industrial system, but also the capacity
of the United States and her allies to move their
products throughout the world by means of su-
perior sea power and merchant marine. Other
aspects of United States strategic planning may
well include an ideological offensive and a highly
mobile military force capable of almost immediate
retaliation against any aggressive action.
The Strategy of the Soviet Union
In his book, The Strange Alliance, John R.
Deane, formerly a Brigadier General in charge of
the United States Military Mission to the
U. S. S. R., says:
In my opinion there can no longer be any
doubt that the Soviet leadership has always
been motivated by the belief that communism
and capitalism cannot coexist. Nor is there
any doubt in my mind that present-day Soviet
leaders have determined upon a program
pointed toward imposing communism on those
countries under their control, and, elsewhere,
creating conditions favorable to the triumph
of communism in the war against capitalism
which they consider to be inevitable . . .
The program of the Soviet leaders is being
carried out with equal aggressiveness in two
ways: First, by the introduction and compul-
sory acceptance of communism in those coun-
tries which the Soviet Union controls either
by force or by the threat of force; and second,
by the infiltration of Communist ideology into
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those countries which, for the moment, are
beyond the orbit of Soviet control. In be-
tween are some nations that are subject both
to Soviet threat of force and ideological in-
filtration. Among these are Greece, Turkey,
Iraq, and to some extent China. It is safe to
predict that these countries will be subjected
to a war of nerves which they will be able to
resist only by the firm support of the western
democracies . . . The program of infiltration
is world-wide. It is evident throughout Latin
America, Canada, the British Empire, Asia,
and not least?the United States.
In attempting to achieve world domination the
Soviet Union aims to exert pressures in many areas
by many means in order to extend her political
influence and to weaken her adversaries by causing
them to overextend and to dissipate their strength
and power. Subsidiary elements of her strategic
planning include substantial military forces in
being, the threat of attack with atomic weapons,
propaganda and subversion.
In propaganda and subversion the Soviets have
been highly successful. Their strategic purposes
have been well served by the widespread employ-
ment of radio broadcasts to disseminate the com-
munist point of view and to vilify the western
democracies. The Nazi techniques of the "war of
nerves" and the "fifth column" have been most
effectively employed. Intensive effort has been
directed toward the development of new weapons
and electronic equipment, the large scale produc-
tion of interceptor and long-range aircraft, and
the expansion of a submarine fleet.
In attempting to combat the logistic superiority
of the democracies, the Soviets have concentrated
the production of their heavy industry on arma-
ments. In addition, it is of vital interest to the
U. S. S. R. to prevent the translation of Ameri-
ca's tremendous war potential into actual strength.
The tortuous course of the Soviet "peace" offen-
sive seems to be directed toward this end. A po-
tentially much more dangerous approach has been
the suggestion of the availability of the Russian
market for the sale of the products of foreign
industry: a proposition particularly attractive to
the business interests of the western democracies
beset by economic problems and the urgent need
for expanding foreign trade.
CTIVE IN A CHANGING WORLD CONFIDENTIAL
The Atomic Bomb
The successful adaptation of the principle of
nuclear fission to war purposes has had a marked
effect on national strategies in the postwar period.
Just how marked the effect has been is a matter
of personal opinion. Some writers have felt that
the initial possession of the atomic bomb gave to
the United States a dominant world power posi-
tion. Winston Churchill, speaking before a Tory
party conference in Wales in 1948, solemnly
observed:
It is my belief?and I say it with deep sor-
row?that . . . the only sure foundation of
peace and of the prevention of actual war rests
upon strength. If it were not for the stocks
of atomic bombs now in the trusteeship of the
United States, there would be no means of
stopping the subjugation of Western Europe
. . . If the United States were to consent, in
reliance upon any paper agreement, to destroy
the stocks of atomic bombs . . . they would
be guilty of murdering human freedom . . .
In connection with the development of an atomic
bomb, the strategic initiative was first held by
Germany. It was the knowledge that the Nazis
were engaged in intensive atomic research that
prompted the United States to undertake its own
program and to expend nearly $2,000,000,000 in
order to gain the strategic initiative in atomic
power. Secretary of War Stimson considered the
success of this program to be a great historical
achievement attained through the integrated ef-
forts of scientists, industrialists, labor, and mili-
tary personnel. The fact that the United States
alone possessed the atomic bomb was a great, if
temporary, advantage and undoubtedly influenced
strategic planning.
The announcement in September 1949 that there
was evidence of a recent atomic explosion within
the U. S. S. R. and subsequent similar announce-
ments in 1951 have had a profound effect on na-
tional strategies and no longer does the United
States have its unique power advantage. The part
played by Soviet Intelligence in bringing about
this change has been described in chapter 2.
However, the development of tactical atomic
weapons for offensive use in war makes the concen-
tration of military forces or supplies extremely
hazardous, and what was once a capability be-
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comes a vulnerability. Thus, the Soviet capabil-
ity to mass large military forces is not now as
significant strategically as it was prior to 1952.
On the other hand, Soviet progress in the harness-
ing of atomic energy has been much more rapid
than was expected and, even if the United States
maintains its production lead, the time might
come when the Soviet Union would have enough
atomic weapons for an attempted knock-out blow
against American industry.
Progress in the development of the hydrogen
bomb represents a new factor in strategic plan-
ning, as do other scientific projects in related fields.
As a result, the most detailed knowledge possible
regarding scientific activities in the atomic age
becomes a matter of great importance to grand
strategy and represents a grave responsibility for
intelligence.
Indications of Strategies in the Postwar Period
After 1945, disturbing reports from Soviet zones
.of occupation revealed that these areas were being
drawn into the Soviet orbit along the typical lines
of Communist-operated countries. The guaran-
tees of free elections in the Balkan countries and
the promise of the ultimate unification of Korea
were brushed aside. Red Army garrisons were re-
duced or withdrawn only after communist dom-
ination and control of the various coalition
governments were assured.
The drive for extension of Soviet influence into
the eastern Mediterranean, a centuries-old Russian
objective, was renewed in several indirect ways.
Occupation forces in Iran were withdrawn only
in the face of stern threats of action by the United
Nations. The Soviet Foreign Minister advanced
the proposal of Soviet trusteeship of the former
Italian colony of Libya. Pressure was exerted on
Turkey to agree to joint control of the Turkish
Straits, and Communist guerrilla activities were
intensified in Greece, weakened by the Nazi occu-
pation, internal dissension, and admitted British
inability to provide a stabilizing influence. Amer-
ican planes, lost over Yugoslavia, were shot down.
It was apparent that Soviet strategy aimed at the
exploitation of political and military weaknesses
whenever and wherever they could be found.
In the light of Soviet intransigence and double-
dealing on many major issues throughout the
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114
world, the United States evaluation of this situa-
tion was that Soviet domination in the eastern
Mediterranean would threaten the independence
of other states in the Middle East, vital supply
routes through the Suez Canal, and important
sources of oil upon which the United States Navy
depends for a sizable proportion of its fuel sup-
ply. Accordingly, as a counterstrategic move, the
Truman Plan was promulgated to provide mili-
tary and economic aid to Turkey and Greece. The
strategic aspects of this plan were summarized
by Walter Lippmann in March 1947:
The reason for intervening in Greece and
Turkey is that of all places in the world they
are the best suited strategically for the em-
ployment of American military power to
check the expansion of Soviet military power.
The power of the Soviet Union is in its inex-
haustible reserves of infantry capable of
pressing upon its wide land frontiers in Eu-
rope and Asia. There is no other power or
group of powers capable of mobilizing the
troops to hold, much less push back, the
masses of the Red Army on land. The power
of the United States is on the sea and in the
air. This kind of power can be exerted to
check the Red Army only if it can be brought
within striking distance of the vital centers of
the Soviet Union.
The obvious and unique strategic approach,
as all history proves and the Russians are
most keenly aware, is across the Black Sea
to the Ukraine and the Caucasus. The en-
trance to the Black Sea is in the eastern Med-
iterranean through the Aegean Sea and the
Dardanelles, that is to say between Greece and
Turkey . . .
Insofar as we are able to exert American
sea and air power in the Black Sea, we have
the means of checking the advance of the Red
Army westward into Europe. We are on its
flank and in its rear, and we are able to main-
tain a balance of power, without which serious
diplomatic negotiation is impossible.
Since the sea and air power of the United States
Navy is intimately associated with the strategic
situation in the Mediterranean, it follows that
Naval Intelligence can and must make a signifi-
cant contribution to strategic planning.
American success in Greece, strengthened rela-
tionships with Turkey, and the deviation of Tito
from the Moscow orbit have all combined to serve
the strategic purposes of the United States. How-
ever, it should be pointed out that there is still
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little room for complacency or undue optimism.
The oil supply was cut off from Iran in 1951 and
the unstable government of that country is seri-
ously threatened by Soviet subversive efforts;
while, at the same time, the nationalistic aspira-
tions and racial prejudices of the Arab peoples
throughout the Mediterranean basin are being ex-
ploited as a means of weakening the position of
the United States, Great Britain, and France in
that area. This development has been particu-
larly serious in that it poses a threat to the chain
of United States strategic air bases located along
the North African coast. In the fall of 1952, the
purging of presumably dissident elements in
Czechoslovakia appeared to be serving the double
purpose of stabilizing Communist control in that
country and appealing to the anti-semitic preju-
dices of the Arab world. In view of the general
unrest, the United States Gth Fleet has played a
major strategic role in the Mediterranean, show-
ing its flag in ports from Trieste to Istanbul, thus
bolstering local confidence and deterring overt
Soviet action.
The Soviet land blockade of Berlin in 1948-49
represented a major test of strength. Although
the airlift was very costly to the western democ-
racies, its strategic significance was tremendous.
In the first place, it showed that the United States
was not ready to be driven out of Germany; and,
even more important, it strengthened the will of
the Germans and other peoples of western Europe
to resist Soviet aggression. Economic support to
the anti-Communist nations of western Europe
further aided United States interests, while influ-
ence was effectively applied in support of anti-
Communist political parties in a series of crucial
national elections in France and Italy.
In Asia, Communist control was gradually ex-
tended over all of China, with the exception of a
few offshore islands and Formosa. Even inacces-
sible Tibet fell under the domination of the Com-
munist government in Peking, thus posing a po-
tential threat to India. The control of China,
plus that of Sakhalin and the Kuriles, gave the
Soviet Union the strategic initiative in Asia. Not
only did it make possible the application of strong
pressures on the large resident Chinese popula-
tion in many areas of the Far East, but it also pro-
vided a strategic support base for guerrilla war-
115
fare and Communist encouraged nationalist re-
volts in Indo-China, Malaya, Burma, and Indo-
nesia. The strategic position of the United States
in the Philippines, Okinawa, and Japan was im-
mediately threatened. If Soviet influence were
extended to Southeast Asia and the Persian Gulf
area, India and Pakistan would be in a very pre-
carious position.
Faced with mounting commitments all over the
world and with Soviet pressures exerted at many
points from one extreme of the Eurasian continent
to the other, the United States did not have ade-
quate military or political strength to support its
commitments fully or summarily resist all pres-
sures. In Japan, for example, in June 1950, there
were only four inexperienced American divisions,
all understrength, engaged primarily in routine
occupation duties. When the military blow was
finally struck in Korea, the United States was un-
prepared to support the political integrity of that
country. However, its strategic significance re-
sulted in action by the United Nations.
The Korean war, from the strategic point of
view, has indicated on the one hand that World
Communism will resort to military force to
achieve its objectives when other means prove un-
successful. On the other hand, it has shown that
the United States will employ the most vigorous
defensive measures to halt Soviet penetration and
control of the coastal littorals of Asia. An exten-
sive rearmament program has been initiated in an
effort to attain military strength consonant with
world commitments and adequate to deter the mil-
itary power which the Soviets have maintained
and increased since World War II. In this re-
spect, the war in Korea may eventually prove to
be an event of tremendous consequence to the na-
tional welfare and security of the United States.
This brief review of postwar strategies shows
that planning and intelligence are closely linked,
for Intelligence must provide the knowledge for
the planners. It must aid in the assessment of
Soviet actions wherever they take place and pre-
pare realistic estimates. Timing and method are
of tremendous importance. Are the Soviets pre-
pared to exert military force in several areas, and,
if so, where and when? Will they continue to
hope for military, political, and economic decay
in the western democracies, or will they strike
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while their military strength is relatively sups.
nor? Do they feel that the extension of their
influence by nonmilitary means is fast enough, or
will they decide in favor of open war even at the
risk of the atomic destruction of their population
centers? A great number of diverse elements are
involved in finding answers to any of these ques-
tions: the progress of Soviet technology, the tem-
perament of individuals in the Kremlin, increased
exploitation of natural resources, the morale of the
peoples of western Europe, and economic problems
in all parts of the world. To find the right an-
swers, the resources and skills of the personnel of
all United States Intelligence agencies will be
taxed to the utmost.
IMPLEMENTATION OF STRATEGY
In an effort to prepare neat definitions, much
has been said and written on the subjects of strat-
egy and tactics, although the nature of modern
warfare has led to the inevitable conclusion that
the differences between the two cannot be drawn
as clearly today as they were formerly?just as
the distinctions between war and peace are no
longer clear-cut. Tactics, as a military term, re-
fers to the employment of units in combat and to
their ordered arrangement and maneuver in rela-
tion to each other or to the enemy. In connection
with the employment of the nonmilitary factors
of strategy, tactics is simply descriptive of the
various implementations of a nation's master plan.
Strategy and tactics are directly related to strate-
gic intelligence and operational intelligence,
the meanings of which have been discussed in
chapter 1.
In brief the intelligence officer, in his perspec-
tive of the world scene, must recognize that strat-
egy is the forest, tactics are the trees, and neither
has meaning without the other. He must not only
understand the relationships between world events
as they occur, but also be able to predict how an
enemy may react in a given situation. In con-
sidering the matter of tactics, he must realize that
although operations may vary in size and intensity,
they are always designed to further the strategic
plan and national objectives.
Thus far it has been emphasized that intelli-
gence materially serves strategy, and that it has
an important responsibility in assisting the im-
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plementation of strategy by non-military means.
In a tactical or operational military situation in-
telligence plays an equally significant part. Here,
the intelligence officer must have a professional
competence in matters relating to military opera-
tions and their component elements. This involves
knowledge of the characteristics, capabilities, and
new developments of ships, aircraft, weapons,
technical equipment, personnel, and materiel, to-
gether with procedures, methods of employment,
and techniques. His professional competence will
be further increased by study of the art, theories,
and history of warfare.
Principles of Warfare
The Principles of War, or general truths
adopted as guides for action, are based upon the
writings of theorists and the experiences of suc-
cessful military men from ancient to modern
times. The many books on this subject merit the
attention of intelligence officers, because they are
basic guides to the organization, maintenance, and
application of all types of military forces. These
principles influence tactics, and an understanding
of their application gives greater meaning to the
procedures involved in developing operational sit-
uations. They can serve as a check-list for analyti-
cal purposes, but it must be remembered that they
cannot be considered individually since they are
all closely interrelated.
The Principle of Objective emphasizes the need
for relating all tactical objectives to national ob-
jectives and has been mentioned in the preceding
discussion. The Principle of Offensive means
concentration of all possible effort toward obtain-
ing the objective by successful offensive action; it
is based on the truism that military victory can
only result from offensive action. An offensive
has the advantages of initiative and freedom of
action, and compels the enemy to disperse his
strength, thereby limiting concentration of forces
for effective action. Finally, an offensive raises
the morale and determination of both the fighting
force and the supporting civilian force; while, at
the same time, it may effectively lower the morale
of opposing forces. Defensive action is not con-
sidered a principle of war, because it is tolerated
only for purposes of security or for gaining ad-
vantages leading to ultimate offensive action.
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The Principle of Mass includes a concentration
of combat power, proper timing and placement, a
sufficient number of personnel who are carefully
trained and thoroughly indoctrinated for preci-
sion work, the availability of weapons and mate-
riel for fire power in adequate quantity and of
proper quality, and the facility to move both men
and materiel as required. Accumulative mass is
based on a systematic plan and timetable to re-
duce the enemy's power of resistance effectively.
To the physical shock effect of mass attack must
be added the psychological effect in creating anx-
iety and fear in the minds of both troops and
civilians. Related to this principle is that of the
Economy of Force which directs the distribution
and alignment of forces for combat to achieve de-
cisive results. This principle does not mean the
saving or non-commitment of military force.
Marshal Foch once made some pertinent com-
ments on this subject:
There is a proverb which says you cannot
hunt two hares at the same time. You would
catch neither of them. Efforts must be con-
centrated. Those who would say economy
means sparing one's own forces being careful
not to disperse one's own efforts would only
state part of the truth. Those would come
closer to the truth who could assimilate the
other art of knowing how to expend usefully
and profitably to make the best possible use
of all available resources.
The appropriate distribution of force reduces the
element of risk; forces are not committed to battle
before sufficient strength has been gained to in-
sure success. This principle acts as a check and
a balance on the others.
The Principle of Movement concerns the mobile
qualities of combat units and their proper and
prompt logistic support; it conditions and limits
the principles of offensive, mass, and economy of
force. Mobility involves not only the speed, range,
and maneuverability of equipment, but also the
ability to transport combat units as entities with
a minimum loss of time. The security of lines of
movement becomes a vital factor in a successful
operation. For example, in the North African
campaign of World War II, logistic support was
denied the Nazis by Allied naval and air forces
which sank German ships and shot down German
transports which were attempting to bring in addi-
tional troops and materiel. This principle largely
determines the possibility of Surprise which is an-
other principle of war. The employment of sur-
prise permits the more effective use of combat
forces when the enemy is unaware of the time and
place of their impending effort. Surprise is often
possible as a result of security, rapidity of move-
ment, deception, and the audacity of the com-
mander in striking under conditions which appear
unusually difficult and therefore unlikely. New
weapons and new or different methods of making
use of current weapons may also make surprise
possible. Obviously, surprise can magnify the
effects of an offensive or a mass attack. However,
advantageous as surprise may be, it must be kept
in mind that the enemy may employ it too, so that
all preparations must be taken to guard against
surprise.
The Principle of Security is applicable in times
of peace as well as war and is closely associated
with the warning function of intelligence and the
activities of counterintelligence. In an opera-
tional situation close attention must be given to
such matters as camouflage, dispersion, antiair-
craft weapons, radio and radar countermeasures,
early warning networks, and defensive armament.
The Principle of Simplicity recognizes the great
importance of clear-cut military organization and
easily understood administrative procedures in
order to obtain the greatest degree of cooperation
and coordination. Simplicity reduces to a min-
imum the possibilities of faulty execution through
misunderstanding and makes easier the handling
of an unexpected situation. Clarity in command
responsibilities and relationships and the publica-
tion of Standard Operating Procedures contribute
to the required simplicity of military operations.
Confidence, a minimum of confusion, and a max-
imum of efficiency are qualities which can be de-
rived from careful attention to this principle. The
Principle of Cooperation provides for unified ef-
fort toward a common goal; unified command,
joint training, economy of joint effort, and self-
lessness of interests are all contributory factors.
117
World War II Battles in the Pacific
The use of intelligence for operational purposes
is discussed in detail in later chapters, but in order
to assess the part played by intelligence in the im-
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plementation of strategy, a consideration of spe-
cific operations which took place in the Pacific
during World War II is most helpful. The suc-
cesses and the failures of the opposing forces were
directly related to the effectiveness of their re-
spective intelligence efforts.
For the attack on Pearl Harbor the Japanese
commanders were provided with intelligence
which was amazingly complete, accurate, and
usable. The contribution of intelligence to their
success is well summarized in the United States
Strategic Bombing Survey, Japanese Military and
Naval Intelligence Division:
The shocking success of the Japanese attack
on Pearl Harbor was due to careful planning
based upon nearly complete intelligence as to
the position, movements, and strength of
United States forces in the area . . .
The Japanese had a large amount of de-
tailed information concerning United States
fleet units, air strength, and other military in-
stallations at Pearl Harbor which was put to
effective use in the surprise attack. After the
raid, crashed Japanese planes and a beach
midget submarine yielded annotated charts
and other documents which set forth the
United States situation in fairly accurate
The midget submarine had on board a
United States Navy hydrographic chart
which had been used as a track chart for the
sub's intended transit of the harbor. It was
annotated with detailed navigational data,
with the names and positions of major units
expected to be in the harbor, and with the
berthing areas of minor units and auxiliaries.
Similar intelligence concerning ship anchor-
ages? charts for aircraft torpedo runs against
specified targets, and data on Honolulu radio
frequencies were found in crashed planes.
The leader of the first attacking flight, Cap-
tain Fuchida, has reported the careful prep-
arations which accounted for the effectiveness
of the attack. The attacking pilots were
briefed on 23 November, 3 December, 7 De-
cember, and at a final session two hours before
the attack on 8 December (Tokyo time). At
the briefing the day prior to the attack, the re-
vised estimate of the major units at Pearl was
announced as no carriers, 7 battleships and 7
cruisers. Actually there were 8 battleships
and 8 cruisers. At the final briefing, the pilots
were given mimeographed sheets indicating?
with names in most cases and with substan-
tial accuracy?the probable positions of the
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118
warships berthed around Ford Island and at
the Navy Yard.
Conditions affecting the United States Forces
during the period immediately following the at-
tack are discussed in the Report of the Joint Com,-
mittee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor
Attack :
While it appears that some planes under
Navy direction were assigned to search the
sector to the north of Oahu, generally re-
garded as the dangerous sector from the
standpoint of an air attack, they were diverted
to the southwest by reason of a false report
that the Japanese carriers were in that
direction.
Admiral Smith, Chief of Staff to Admiral
Kimmel, said he did not get the information
as to the probable location from which the
Japanese carriers launched the attack for
some 2 days. There is a great deal of con-
fusion including false civilian reports of troop
parachute landings and a false report from
one of our own planes concerning an enemy
carrier to the south. A chart showing the
position of the Japanese carriers was taken
from a Japanese plane by the Army on De-
cember 7 but was not shown the Navy until
the afternoon.
The deplorable feature of the action follow-
ing the attack was the failure of the Navy and
Army to coordinate their efforts through in-
telligence at hand. The same Army radar
unit that had tracked the Japanese force in,
plotted it back out to the north. Yet this
vital information, which would have made
possible an effective search, was employed by
neither service.
The situation in connection with the Japanese
occupation of the Philippine Islands was some-
what similar. Here again, accurate intelligence
regarding American forces on Luzon made pos-
sible effective operational planning, which was
coupled with the element of surprise. The Jap-
anese estimate of the situation in the Philippines
proved to be substantially correct and their forces
enjoyed early and economical success in spite of
the fact that the United States ground forces main-
tained organized resistance longer than had been
anticipated.
The basis of Japanese success in this operation
was the destruction within a week of American
air strength by the Japanese 11th Air Fleet based
in Formosa. According to information brought
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out by the interrogation of Vice Admiral Shirai-
chi, then Chief of Staff of the 2d Fleet, and of
Captain Takahashi, then on the 11th Air Fleet
Staff, the Japanese began their attacks on 8 De-
cember with almost exact information regarding
the strength and disposition of the American air
forces. Making use of surprise, the invaders were
able to destroy most of the American planes on the
ground. This vital information was obtained by
reconnaissance aircraft on 24-25 November which
reported 300 planes in the Luzon area?there were
actually 317.
Prior to the Battle of Midway in mid-1942 there
was a tremendous decline in the efficiency of Jap-
anese Intelligence, with the result that the Jap-
anese commanders entered into this battle with
an abysmal lack of anything approaching accurate
knowledge. The Japanese Estimate of the Situa-
tion, discussed in the ONI Review for May 1947,
included the following specific points: (1) Al-
though the U. S. Navy "lacks the will to fight,"
it will counterattack if Midway is occupied; (2)
"The enemy is not aware of our plans ;" (3) the
United States has no carrier force in the vicinity;
and (4) after attacking Midway by air and de-
stroying American shore-based strength, the Jap-
anese Striking Force will still have enough planes
"to destroy any enemy task force which may
choose to attack."
On the other hand, the United States forces had
available a rather accurate estimate of Japanese
plans and preparations drawn up by Intelligence
from various items of information derived from
many sources. One of the vital decisions of the
Pacific War was made by Admiral Nimitz when
he accepted the estimate of his intelligence section
that Midway and the Aleutians were primary ob-
jectives of the enemy. By 23 May, Rear Admiral
Bellinger, Naval Air Commander at Pearl, was
able to predict the Japanese plan of attack, the
composition, approximate routes, and timetable of
the forces which were threatening Midway. This
battle was a major success for U. S. Intelligence;
the "United States Strategic Bombing Survey"
comments:
The battle of Midway was a notable early
occasion where United States intelligence con-
cerning the enemy was superior to the enemy's
intelligence concerning the United States,
thus affording an opportunity to organize and
employ our forces effectively and achieve a
victory of decisive importance.
Just as the Battle of Midway is generally con-
sidered to have been a turning point in the war,
so it was also a turning point in the intelligence
effort. As the war progressed, American intelli-
gence increased in quality and quantity while that
of the Japanese decreased. The Imperial Staff
continued to underestimate United States strength
and capabilities and concluded that no major op-
erations could be attempted before the end of 1912
because of American naval losses at Pearl Harbor
and heavy shipping losses in the Atlantic.
These faulty estimates were partially responsi-
ble for the success of the Allied counterattack
through the Solomons area which marked a change
in pace from the defensive to the offensive. The
American landings in the Guadalcanal area in
August 1942 caught the Japanese completely by
surprise at the particular time when they were
not prepared to defend the area or to mount an
effective counteroffensive. Their difficulties were
compounded by two disastrous errors: the first
was an initial intelligence report that less than
1,000 American troops were involved in the land-
ings, while actually there were more than 19,000,
including the 1st Marine Division and two Army
battalions; the second was an underestimate of
troops required to recapture Guadalcanal, based
upon experience in China and in Malaya.
Using this inaccurate and incomplete informa-
tion, the Japanese made a number of attempts to
regain the island with insufficient forces which
were destroyed one after the other. In August, 1
battalion was committed and destroyed; in Sep-
tember, 3 battalions mounted an unsuccessful as-
sault; in October, after the extent of United States
strength was realized, a joint Army-Navy opera-
tion involving two divisions of 29,000 troops was
carried out which also failed. Further attempts
were equally ineffective and Guadalcanal was
finally abandoned in January 1943. By continu-
ing to underestimate the strength of the American
forces, the Japanese gave them the invaluable op-
portunity to strengthen their position gradually
so that each attack was successfully repulsed.
The glaring error of the Japanese during the
Solomons campaign in underestimating United
States strength resulted in a serious weakening of
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their air and naval power by piecemeal commit-
ment in a series of ineffective counterattacks.
Their best carrier air groups were decimated, and
their warship strength in all categories was ma-
terially reduced in the long series of naval actions.
At the same time, heavy transport shipping losses
progressively curtailed their offensive operations,
not only in the Solomons-New Guinea area, but
later in other areas as well. The effects of this
poorly conceived plan of operations in the Solo-
mons were far-reaching. Since the carrier air
groups had been drawn from the Combined Fleet
based at Truk, their destruction made it impossible
for the fleet to support Japanese positions in the
Gilbert and Marshall Islands either by surface or
air action. Before replacements were possible,
American forces were able to over-run those is-
lands. These persisting losses had a deteriorating
effect on Japan's total military strength from
which she was never able to recover.
At the battle for Leyte Gulf the Japanese naval
operation, carried out by means of a three-pronged
attack, was planned and executed with almost no
intelligence available. In numerous instances in-
dividual commanders could not employ their units
effectively because of the lack of knowledge re-
garding their opposition. The effect on the out-
come of the battle is summarized in the United
States Strategic Bombing Survey:
Investigation shows that a continuing basic
weakness in the Japanese position throughout
this action was the lack of adequate opera-
tional intelligence. This is seen to have con-
tributed to their other difficulties and to have
compounded them. They were unable to get
adequate timely information as to the
strength, location, and movements of the
United States forces, and as a consequence
were operating a large part of the time by
guess and chance. The chief cause of the lack
of adequate intelligence in this situation was
the recurring failure to maintain air recon-
naissance, which was admittedly a cardinal
weakness. There is no indication that there
was any effective Japanese submarine scout-
ing in these actions.
In this battle, as was later the case at Iwo Jima
and Okinawa, United States naval commanders
were able to base their operations on much better
intelligence regarding the strength, disposition,
and composition of opposing forces.
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It is true that in the latter stages of the Pacific
war the Japanese were able frequently to prepare
fairly accurate estimates of impending Allied op-
erations; but it is equally true that the number
of possible objectives was rapidly reduced as the
Allied forces approached their ultimate objective.
The campaigns at Midway, in the Solomons, and
in the Gilbert and Marshall Islands each reflected
progressively sharper drops in the quantity and
quality of intelligence available to the Japanese
operational commanders. As a result, they were
forced more and more to rely on professional spec-
ulation which contributed to defeat rather than
to victory. From a review of the various Pacific
campaigns, it is concluded that intelligence con-
tributed materially to successful military opera-
tions, while a severe and sometimes insurmount-
able handicap was imposed upon the commander
who did not have it, or who failed to use it.
DYNAMICS OF STRATEGY, TACTICS AND
INTELLIGENCE
Just as strategy and tactics are formulated in
part from the knowledge provided by Intelligence,
intelligence activities are likewise affected by de-
velopments arising from strategies and tactics.
The intelligence perspective, therefore, must have
flexibility and the capacity to adapt itself to
changing conditions and circumstances. Events
can and do take place in the world scene and in
operational situations which have a direct and
immediate impact on planning, so that Intelli-
gence must be prepared to react promptly if it is
to make its full contribution.
During the course of their long history, British
planners have shown a remarkable capacity to
make use of changing events, extracting the ad-
vantages presented and adapting their plans and
policies accordingly. Such a procedure at the
higher planning levels might be critically de-
scribed as improvisation and opportunism; how-
ever, since the British have not deviated from their
basic national objectives, its merit has been his-
torically demonstrated. In this connection,
Churchill has commented: "We assign a large
importance to opportunism and improvisation,
seeking rather to live and conquer in accordance
with the unfolding event than to aspire to domi-
nate it often by fundamental decisions."
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World War II is replete with examples of the
ability of American commanders in the field to
adapt themselves readily to changing circum-
stances; the ingenuity of the individual American
soldier, sailor, and airman has reflected a common
national characteristic. American top-level plan-
ning in the past has tended to differ from that of
the British. In noting this difference, Churchill
again has said that "in the military as in the com-
mercial or production spheres, the American mind
runs naturally to broad, sweeping logical conclu-
sions on the largest scale. . . . They feel that once
the foundation has been planned on true and com-
prehensive lines, all other stages will follow natu-
rally and almost inevitably." The approach of
American planners has been to prepare several
carefully analyzed plans each of which, if selected,
will lead to inevitable conclusions. The success of
this approach has also been amply demonstrated.
In view of the trends of modern warfare, however,
it is entirely possible that American planners may
now find it advantageous, if not necessary, to make
full use of developing situations. Whenever this
is true, Intelligence can make a substantial
contribution.
For the greatest success of their mutual effort,
the relationships between policy-makers and In-
telligence should be closely scrutinized at frequent
intervals. In his provocative article, Intelligence
and Policy-Making in Foreign Affairs, Roger
Hilsman, Jr., serving with the Joint Military Ad-
visory Group in Europe in 1952, has analyzed these
relationships and found a division of labor which,
in his opinion, may not be the best.
Intelligence on the one hand and policy-
making and action on the other are separated
physically, organizationally, chronologically,
functionally, and by skills?separated in every
possible way.
His suggestion, in part, is a reconsideration of or-
ganizational structure. Regardless of what sug-
gestions may be offered, it is true that the dy-
namics of strategy, tactics, and intelligence can
best operate under the most carefully coordinated
conditions in an atmosphere of mutual
understanding.
Attitudes for Intelligence
In assuming its share of responsibility, Intelli-
gence must maintain a perspective that is positive,
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clear, and keenly alert; it must never lose sight
of its own purposes and objectives as determined
by the requirements of those responsible for na-
tional strategy and its implementation. In Mr.
Hilsman's opinion,
. . . the important step for intelligence is
an intellectual reorientation designed to create
a new set of attitudes?a frame of mind which
is manipulative, instrumental, action-con-
scious, policy oriented. The major task
before the researchers is one of recasting their
thought to the context of action, and adapting
their tools to the needs of policy.
Ultimately, both operators and researchers
must move from hunch and intuition to an im-
proved capacity for explicit and disciplined
policy analysis. If at the same time the re-
searchers become policy-oriented, there may
develop a more effective integration of knowl-
edge and action . . ? The first problem is one
of attitudes and skills.
?World Politics, 0 ctober 1952.
Although critical, this statement serves a good
purpose in that it stimulates a thoughtful con.
sideration of appropriate attitudes.
Two things merit special attention. The first is
that planners must recognize that intelligence is a
continuous activity and that planning must be
grounded on fact rather than on conjecture. The
second, is that Intelligence personnel must con-
sider their work in time of peace as important as
in time of war, if not more so. General Donovan
has appropriately said:
It is much more difficult to prevent war than
to wage it. It is even more important in
peacetime, in a sense, to know what people are
up to, and what's going on, so that the peace
can be preserved. If you want to have peace
in the world, you've got to know the truth of
what is happening and not be forced to rely
on rumor. Rumor might make us act in one
way, and knowledge would compel us to act in
another.
Shortly after World War I, Colonel Nicolai, well-
known German intelligence officer, urged that the
peacetime functions of Intelligence be maintained
and said, "But if even today certain circles believe
that nations can cooperate, they ought to make
sure the way of cooperation is illuminated by a
good Intelligence Service . . ."
Nicolai also summarized the role of intelligence
in the world scene when he said: "The Intelligence
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Service moves ahead of developments into the dark
future, in order to discover what it will be and to
influence it."
This discussion has stressed the importance of
accurate, pertinent knowledge as it relates to the
fields of strategy and tactics. The tremendous
volume and scope of such knowledge require that
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it be reduced, for the sake of manageability, to
its logical component parts in order that it may
be efficiently collected, carefully evaluated, and
made available in usable form. The following
chapter will outline by component parts the con-
tent of intelligence used by strategic and opera-
tional planners.
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CHAPTER 5
COMPONENTS OF INTELLIGENCE KNOWLEDGE
Intelligence knowledge is generally divided into
eight component parts: geographic, transporta-
tion and telecommunications, sociological, politi-
cal, economic, technical and scientific, armed
forces, and biographical. Each part is then often
identified as a type of intelligence. While this
division is not completely standardized and varia-
tions can be debated, it is agreed that no one com-
ponent can stand alone. Each is interdependent
and interrelated with one or more of the others.
In order to gain a proper perspective when using
this knowledge, all parts must be integrated into
a well-balanced whole.
In connection with use, two points must be em-
phasized: first, for purposes of planning and
reaching decisions at almost any command level,
the user can seldom confine himself to only one
component; and second, depending upon the par-
ticular problem at hand, he will usually select
various items from different components in deter-
mining the best answer. In other words, point of
view and particular needs govern the use of in-
telligence knowledge and the parts thereof. In
estimating the capabilities of an opposing military
force, for example, the commander must know
more than its size and fire-power, as gained from
enemy order of battle reports. He must also be
informed of the enemy's economic and technical
resources and the personal characteristics of op-
posing commanders and personnel. Under some
circumstances, political and social forces govern-
ing enemy behavior may be important. Thus
knowledge not encompassed by the category of
Armed Forces Intelligence may be of inestimable
value to a subordinate command in carrying out
its assigned task and represent a vital saving in
time and lives. An Underwater Demolition Team
is greatly aided by advance geographic knowledge
regarding such matters as beach gradient; avia-
tors need meteorological data as well as target
information; and those responsible for logistics
require a wide range of intelligence knowledge in
128
order to perform their responsibilities efficiently
and economically.
Since these various components are mutually
supporting, the intelligence officer cannot wisely
confine his energies to the mastery of only one, as
will be pointed out in the ensuing discussion.
GEOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE
Geographic intelligence is the military evalua-
tion of all the geographic factors which may in
any way influence a military operation. Military
geography embraces all aspects of the physical en-
vironment of man, both natural and artificial: the
position, size, shape, boundaries, weather, climate,
water characteristics, land forms, drainage, vege-
tation, and surface materials of all parts of the
earth; also the cultural or man-made features such
as cities, transportation routes, industries, mines,
and farms.
Frontiers
The problems of location, size, shape, and fron-
tiers for a territory are largely strategic. Loca-
tion basically affects the economic, political, and
social nature of a country because of its relation
to markets, to agricultural and mineral resources,
to terrain and climate, and to transport. Military
problems grow out of the economic, political, and
social. Size and shape and frontiers have mili-
tary significance, for great size may afford an
opportunity to trade space for time. Air power
may shrink distances but size will still give min-
utes or hours of warning of conventional air at-
tack to centrally located industrial sites. On the
other hand, size is a weakness when there is waste
or undeveloped land that requires expensive long
hauls for industry and long military movements
of materiel and personnel from one frontier region
to another. The shape of a country, of course,
determines the relative amount of frontier to be
defended. Frontiers have multiple significance.
Strong natural frontiers as opposed to artificial
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ones may tend to isolate countries from other peo-
ples and ideas and hamper trade. Purely politi-
cal frontiers that shift with the fortunes of war
will affect the military and political views and
behaviors of nations. Sea frontiers will influence
the growth of seapower. The military study of
frontiers must consider man-made features such
as fortifications and bridges. In a time of cold
war, the fact that satellite frontiers have been de-
nuded of farms and villages, stripped bare of
vegetation at the boundary itself, and protected
by electrified wire, mine fields, and patrols with
dogs is no small intelligence consideration. In
the planning of conventional military campaigns,
frontiers may be studied for their tank traps,
dragons' teeth, bunkers, and access roads, as well
as for their natural physical elements.
Topography
Land forms, drainage, surface materials, and
vegetation, all elements related to topography, are
of more than army interest. The general char-
acter of continents and islands, even of plains,
mountains, and plateaus, are of strategic interest.
For example, the broad sweep of the North Ger-
man plain across Germany, Poland, and into
Russia, as well as the Pyrenees barrier, are of
importance in assessing the potentialities of Soviet
military advance in Europe. But whether col-
lected in strategic encyclopedias or observed in
field operations, military concern extends to in-
dividual valleys, basins, ridges, cliffs, hills, and
other features. In this age of joint operations,
all three services are concerned with these elements
of topography. Of special importance to the Navy
are the detailed characteristics of coasts and land-
ing beaches. All these topographic features affect
the movement and supply of forces, the types of
equipment that can be used, the methods of attack
and defense, the possibilities of concealment and
surprise, and many other operational matters.
Land forms and drainage conditions are so
closely related that it is almost impossible to con-
sider one to the exclusion of the other. Whether
an area is fully or partially drained, the number,
width, depth, and direction of rivers and streams,
and the condition of their banks and crossing-
places, are determining factors in the movements
of troops and the tactics employed in any given
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NAVAL OFFICERS
area. The number, size, and distribution of lakes,
ponds, lagoons, swamps, and marshes are elements
that may play an important part in military oper-
ations. Subsurface water is a principal source of
water supply, and in many areas constiutes a ma-
jor drainage problem in excavation and construc-
tion. In recent years rivers and swamps have
many times shaped military actions. Examples
are the causeway from Johore to Singapore's back
door, the Remagen bridge across the Rhine, the
Yalu river, which freezes over to allow troops to
cross without bridges, and the Rapido in Italy
which was a barrier for so long.
Military interest extends to soils analysis as well
as to land form. The materials of the surface of
the earth determine, among other things, what
kind of vehicles can move over it, whether it is
suitable for entrenchments, how quickly it will
drain, and the effect of frost. Surface materials
have a definite significance concerning the con-
struction and maintenance of roads, airdromes,
and other engineering problems. In addition, in
the broader picture, soils affect agriculture, min-
ing, and basic transportation routes. There are
many regions where seasonal weather changes re-
lated to local soils bar virtually all movement ex-
cept along established railways and better roads.
Japanese ability to honeycomb some of their war-
time positions proved to be a major factor in slow-
ing the reduction of their military power. This
was noted in such places as Iwo Jima and Okinawa
where soft rock allowed relatively rapid digging.
The coral of some south Pacific atolls proved to be
a superb construction material for airstrip run-
ways. The muck of Attu rendered inefficient much
of our artillery fire in the landing at Massacre
Bay.
Coasts and landing beach intelligence, of special
naval interest, is now becoming so specialized and
requires such development that its detailed discus-
sion is reserved for the amphibious section of
chapter 13. It involves a study of the sea ap-
proaches, the coastal terrain, the beaches them-
selves, the beach exits, and adjacent terrain.
The presence or absence of forests, brush, grass-
land, cultivated crops, and other forms of vegeta-
tion has a vital effect on military operations.
Vegetation may be in either the primeval state or
the result of cultivation. In any case, its charac-
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ter, distribution, and seasonal variation have im-
portant bearings on cross-country movements,
deployment, concealment, and visibility. Local
supplies of food, forage, and timber are also re-
lated to the nature of existing vegetation. Exten-
sive areas of dense vegetation, such as woods and
jungles, or the relative absence of vegetation, as
in the desert areas, may be a major consideration
in strategic and logistics planning. They may
result in a need for special types of organization,
equipment, and methods of supply. When these
areas are not too extensive, they are considered
primarily from the tactical point of view. How
different were the wars of the Burma jungle with
small units filing through the brush and the great
armored sweeps of the Afrika Korps and the
opposing "Desert Rats" between El Alamein and
Bizerte
Hydrography
Hydrography, and especially its subdivision,
oceanography, is of particular naval concern when
detailed information is required. Amphibious
operations are especially affected by hydrographic
considerations. Hydrography, of course, refers
to the measurement and charting of all bodies of
water; oceanography is concerned more specifi-
cally with phenomena of the oceans and seas, in-
cluding gulfs, bays, and estuaries. Naval con-
cern includes tides and currents, sea and swell, sea
water characteristics of salinity and temperature,
bottom topography, sediments, and marine life.
Knowledge of ocean currents, tides, sea, and swell
is important to all ships at sea, but particularly
to craft engaged in amphibious operations. The
significant and costly effect of a lack of such
knowledge is illustrated by the unhappy position
of landing craft stranded off Tarawa in the Pacific
during World War II when a change in the wind
varied the depth of water over offshore reefs and
the Marines had to wade ashore in the face of
withering enemy fire. The needs for detailed hy-
drographic data were again sharply demonstrated
prior to the Inchon landing in Korea in 1951,
when landing craft had to thread their way
through restricted waters to land in a harbor
where tides were all-important and the existence
of extensive mud flats directly affected the types
of landing equipment which could be used.
125
Studies of temperature, salinity, and density of
sea water are especially important to the use of
sonar in submarine and anti-submarine warfare.
Again, in the broader sphere, warm and cold cur-
rents strongly affect the habitability of many re-
gions of the world. The Gulf Stream makes
northwestern Europe important in one sense,
while the Labrador current has quite different ef-
fects across the Atlantic.
The configuration of the ocean bottom, depth
of water, type and distribution of bottom sedi-
ments are important elements in navigation in-
structions and in the location of anchorages.
These conditions together with information on
reefs, shoals, and other obstructions, help to deter-
mine the location of naval bases, and the planning
of naval and amphibious operations. Someday
when the means are found to exploit the seas for
more than fisheries and offshore oil wells, control
of marine resources may become a compelling stra-
tegic issue.
Even marine biology is of naval concern in a
variety of ways. Whales or other sea creatures
may be mistaken for submarines. Some forms of
marine life create enough noise to obscure more
significant sounds on the sensitive hydrophones
used in submarine and antisubmarine warfare. In
a number of parts of the world a ship or snorkel-
ing submarine may leave a tell-tale fiery wake be-
cause of the bioluminescence from the plankton
growing in the water. All military personnel,
whether sailing or flying over the seas, or wading
ashore in a landing, need some knowledge of the
habitat and habits of poisonous or savage marine
life. This applies to TJDT's who work in the
water and to those involuntarily brought into the
water due to aircraft failure or ship sinking.
There are stinging jellyfish and some nonedible
fish that may poison the unwary, as well as the
well-publicised sharks that infest many regions.
Aerology
Aerology or meteorology refers to the study of
the atmosphere, especially its variations of heat
and moisture, its winds, and so forth. Weather
refers to the meteorological conditions such as
wind, temperature, rain, snow, and cloud, that
affect an area at a given time or for a short period
of time. Climate, on the other hand, refers to the
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average and range of meteorological conditions
affecting an area over a long period of time. In
a sense climate is strategic in nature since it af-
fects the basic planning of military operations
and of course affects the economic and social life
of an area through the crops that can be raised
and the density of the population. Operations of
a military nature frequently must be planned in
the light of known seasonal changes of weather
based on climate studies. It is impossible to read
military history without an awareness of the im-
portance of weather to operations planning. The
Japanese carriers that hit Pearl Harbor came in
behind a cold front with heavy clouds and rain
that shielded their approach. General Eisen-
hower's Crusade in Europe makes constant ref-
erence to aerology and hydrography :
There was unusual operational hazard con-
nected with the Casablanca project. During
the late fall and winter the northwest African
coast is a forbidding one from the standpoint
of small boat landings. The long Atlantic
swells break up on the beaches in terrifying
fashion and even in relatively good autumn
weather this condition exists, on the average,
four days out of five. . . .
After the abandonment of the May target
date, the next combination of moon, tide, and
time of sunrise that we considered practicable
for the attack (on Normandie) occurred
June 5, 6, and 7. We wanted to cross the
channel with our convoys at night so that
darkness would conceal the strength and di-
rection of our several attacks. We wanted a
moon for our airborne assaults. We needed
approximately forty minutes of daylight pre-
ceding the ground assault to complete our
bombing and preparatory bombardment. We
had to attack on a relatively low tide because
of beach obstacles which had to be removed
while uncovered. These principal factors
dictated the general period; but the selection
of the actual day would depend upon weather
forecasts.
If none of the three days should prove sat-
isfactory from the standpoint of weather, con-
sequences would ensue that were almost terri-
fying to contemplate . . .
When the commanders assembled on the
morning of June 4 the report we received was
discouraging. Low clouds, high winds, and
formidable wave action were predicted to
make landing a most hazardous affair. The
meteorologists said that air support would
be impossible, naval gunfire would be ineffi-
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NAVAL OFFICERS
cient, and even the handling of small boats
would be rendered difficult . . .
When the conference started the first re-
ort given us by group Captain Staff and the
Meteorological Staff was that the bad condi-
tions predicted the day before for the coast
of France were actually prevailing then and
that if we had persisted in the attempt to
land on June 5 a major disaster would almost
certainly have resulted.
Aerology as a science is becoming much more
complex because of the heavier demands upon it.
Although a physical science, it has so many var-
iables that predictions on weather have some of
the indeterminate character of the social sciences.
We no longer are interested in the "weather" alone.
We need to know what conditions are at many
different altitudes. Close to the ground much
more detail is needed in order to prepare defenses
against use of toxic warfare. Aloft flying
weather, headwinds, and tailwinds are quite dif-
ferent at various altitudes and such reports are
routinely required for all flying operations. Now
research into weather is extending into the upper
atmosphere never before explored, in order to pre-
pare the way for turbojet and rocket flight of
aircraft and missiles.
Collection of weather data in war is so impor-
tant that very considerable efforts are made to
obtain it. German weather stations were set up
in Greenland to give advance warning of condi-
tions in the Atlantic and Europe, since weather
moves generally eastward. To support our own
carrier operations in the Pacific we had to estab-
lish stations in Siberia and also in China. Naval
Group, China, operated literally hundreds of se-
cret weather stations deep behind the Japanese
lines to report the weather that later would gov-
ern our carrier strikes in the Pacific. Today we
would face some difficulties in weather data col-
lection from the vast Soviet territories if war were
to come. One solution made public is a robot
weather station that can be dropped from an air-
craft. On parachuting down, it would automati-
cally rise on extensible legs, push out an antenna,
and broadcast coded radio signals on the weather
in the same way as telemetering missiles.
Weather reporting is now so technical that
trained meteorologists must make detailed fore-
casts. But the intelligence officer, being responsi-
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ble for reporting on the area of operations, must
have some familiarity with the subject. He must
at least be able to read weather maps, station
models, sequence reports, and to interpret their
meaning.
Urban Geography
A subdivision of military geography is con-
cerned with cities and other cultural factors. The
applications of this information are numerous.
Strategic targets of factories, transport, and hous-
ing need study. Tactics frequently involve seiz-
ure of a town, and require detailed information
on construction of buildings, possible strong-
points, main thoroughfares, power, water, and
communications facilities. Later there may be
questions of billeting space in what is left. Cer-
tainly vulnerabilq. to fire, high xplosive, or
atomic attack 9kiley consideration
Descriptive Analysis of Military Regions
In practically all nations except the very small-
est, sufficient variation in geographical character
exists to make it impractical to confine a study
to the geography of a nation as a whole. Conse-
quently, studies are often broken down into re-
gions having geographical characteristics which
would exert a definite influence on military oper-
ations. By definition, a military region is a re-
gion of any size in which the combination of
geographic conditions is relatively uniform, and,
as a result, permits the use of the same types of
equipment, organization, and mode of operations
throughout the region. These may be areas where
mountains, plains, river systems, deserts, indus-
trialized areas, or other factors are predominant
and thereby establish the nature of the region.
Local minor variations in geographical conditions
are treated as subregions. In preparing the de-
scriptive analysis of a military region, the area
is first considered from the over-all viewpoint and
then is broken down into appropriate subregions
for detailed consideration. This type of encyclo-
pedic information used for general military plan-
ning usually needs additional detailed analysis
and current reporting to meet tactical needs.
Preparing Geographic Intelligence
The importance of peacetime efforts in acquir-
ing the data needed for strategic studies has been
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emphasized, and this is certainly true of geo-
graphic intelligence. Compilation of good charts
and maps, painstaking analysis of soil surveys and
other data from a variety of sources, and the
matching of aerial photographs with existing
charts is time consuming work that should go on
continuously. Inevitably in war there are new
demands and many of these processes must be
speeded up. As potential areas of operations be-
come actual areas, the emphasis shifts from stra-
tegic to operational intelligence.
The strategic area studies and surveys prepared
by United States Armed Forces in World War II
merit special mention here. In ONI, in the Naval
Districts and River Commands, and at intelligence
centers and joint intelligence collection agencies
in operational areas, whole sections of specialists
devoted their entire time to the evaluation, com-
pilation, and distribution of reports. Often, like
the Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Studies
(JANIS) , these reports were the result of joint
effort.
The surveys drew upon many divergent sources
for their material. They contained data collected
by aerial photographs over enemy territory, often
supplemented by information gained from inter-
viewing engineers who had built or managed the
installations photographed. Beach gradients
were calculated from photographs taken from
warplanes and even from snapshots taken by tour-
ists and missionaries; these pictures were supple-
mented by the notes of American geologists, nat-
uralists, and conchologists who had worked in the
area, and by the reports of friendly natives or
guerrillas.
New Horizons of Geographic Intelligence
The horizons of geographic intelligence have
been pushed farther in several directions as a re-
sult of technological progress and political change.
This of course, as is amply demonstrated else-
where in this book, applies to all intelligence.
These geographic changes are easily illustrated by
reference both to the World Wars and to more re-
cent events. World War I was largely fought in
traditionally strategic areas, but included opera-
tions in places as remote as the Falkland Islands,
Tanganyika, the Hejaz, and Cocos Islands. Much
more striking were the changes of World War II
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that took hundreds of thousands of Americans to
such unlikely spots as Ulithi Atoll, that make
commonplace in American thought the Hump,
Kasserine Pass, Eniwetok, and Coral Sea. Cur-
rently we have become vitally concerned with new
names: Abadan's refineries, Shinkolobwe's pitch-
blende, and the oil of Leduc. The turn of events
has given America and consequently her Armed
Forces heavier responsibilities than ever before.
The new technology demands much greater geo-
graphical detail and accuracy. The long range
guided missile, when it acquires range, command,
speed, destructive power and accuracy, must still
find the right targets. Since existing charts and
maps have errors of many miles in some parts of
the world, finding the target becomes a major
problem, and constitutes a challenge to the geo-
graphic intelligence of the future.
Polar Intelligence
One of the expanded horizons of geographic in-
telligence is in the north polar regions. The old
Mercator view of the world of sailing ships has
been amplified by polar projections and the realis-
tic views of Richard Edes Harrison, well-known
cartographer. The fact that the United States
and Canada are really polar neighbors of the So-
viet Union is a familiar theme both of the Sunday
supplements and military strategic estimates. The
implementing of plans to meet this new challenge
of the air age is a greater task than the mere recog-
nition of new problems. An immediate require-
ment since World War II has been to collect new
geographic intelligence and operational experi-
ence on cold weather operations to overcome the
admitted Soviet lead in this field. Such opera-
tions as Muskox, Frostbite, Icebox, Frigid, and
Williwaw in the Arctic, and Higkjump in the
Antarctic, have been directed to that end, as have
also the daily weather flights from Ladd Field to
the North Pole. Our general strategy has been
revised to strengthen Alaska, string radar barriers
and weather stations in belts across Canada, and
to rebuild base facilities in Greenland and Iceland.
We have mapped the Arctic, learned to sail in the
northern seas, to cross tundra and ice, and devel-
oped clothing, fuels, lubricants, housing, and elec-
tronic gear suitable to the extreme temperatures
and raging storms that are common to the north.
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We have also found out with guidance from vet-
eran Arctic explorers that operations in extreme
latitudes are entirely possible with proper prepa-
ration. Though the likelihood of large land cam-
paigns in the polar area is not great, the extension
of aircraft range and the advent of guided missiles
make it imperative that intelligence officers have
an awareness of the new problems of Arctic war-
fare and their influence on strategy and tactics.
The Arctic cannot be defined by merely drawing
the Arctic circle around the globe at latitude
66?30'. A more descriptive line is the northern
limit of trees, above which there is only tundra
or ice. Below this the subarctic begins, and in-
cludes the northern limit of cereals, the continental
taiga of all but southern Canada, much of northern
Russia, and certainly the eastern half of Siberia.
The low latitude Tibetan plateau is Arctic-type
tundra, and winter operations even in the conti-
nental forest areas such as the Great Lakes, St.
Lawrence Valley, Hokkaido, the Baltic, and Cen-
tral Russia, involve "Arctic" problems for mili-
tary purposes.
The topography of the Arctic varies from the
broad plains in Russia, parts of Siberia, and
around Hudson Bay to the high plateaus of Green-
land and Tibet, and towering mountain ranges.
often poorly mapped, in the Yukon, Alaska,
northeastern Siberia, Kamchatka, the Himalayas,
Pamirs, Altai, and Hindu Kush. The Antarctic,
largely ice covered like Greenland, includes high
plateaus and towering mountain ranges in some
areas.
Drainage is a major geographical factor in the
Arctic. Many of the greatest rivers of the world,
such as the Mackenzie, Yukon, Ob, Yenesei, and
Lena, are not only Arctic but flow in a generally
northerly direction. Many major rivers of China,
Southeast Asia, and India-Pakistan have their
sources in Tibet. Overland travel in the Arctic
is generally easier in winter than in summer, for
tractor trains can travel on the frozen rivers.
With the coming of summer the river mouths to
the north are still frozen while the southerly
reaches thaw and overrun the banks to form vast
lakes in the valleys. Canoes with portage from
one body of water to the next are a principal
means of transport. The frozen surface of winter
turns into an impassable bog for tracked vehicles
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in the summer because the frozen subsoil prevents
adequate drainage. Roads or railways built across
such terrain need new ballast season after season
and even so trains frequently are derailed. The
epic struggle of the Canadian Government in
building the Hudson Bay Railway to Port
Churchill is an example of transport difficulties.
Coasts and landing beaches in the Arctic vary
from those which are eminently suitable in all re-
spects for amphibious landings to those which are
impossible because of forbidding overhanging
cliffs. Most are open and exposed, although
Greenland, Iceland, and Norway have deep fjords.
By our definition the true Arctic areas are de-
void of forest cover. Some are glacial like the
interior of Greenland, northern Baffinland, North-
ern Novaya Zemlya, Ellesmere Land, and Ant-
arctica; more are tundra that offers no real cover,
but in the summer may include edible berries and
a profusion of wild flowers. The subarctic's
forests are scrub growth and often extremely diffi-
cult of passage either for vehicles or men on foot.
The hydrographic conditions of the Arctic are
of special naval concern. In contrast to the con-
tinental land mass at the South Pole surrounded
by shelf ice and stormy seas, the Arctic is a shal-
low sea basin surrounded by land with entrances
at Bering Straits, through the northern Canadian
archipelago or from the Atlantic approaches near
Greenland, Spitzbergen, and Novaya Zemlya.
The great ice pack is virtually impassable to ships.
Those caught in it, if they escape destruction, over
a period of many months may move hundreds
of miles with the clockwise drift of the ice and
emerge at another point. Due to the pressures of
current and wind the ice piles in ridges and irregu-
lar masses. A few parts of the pack are flat and
thick and the possibility of using them as floating
air bases has been exploited by both the Russians
and ourselves. Winter shore ice builds out from
bays in virtually all of the Arctic Ocean to meet
the permanent ice pack and also closes much of
Bering Sea, the Sea of Okhotsk, Hudson Bay, the
Baltic and even parts of the Caspian and Sea of
Azov. Icebergs from Greenland's fjords move far
south and constitute a hazard in the North At-
lantic shipping lanes. The classic example was
the Titanic disaster.
In the short summer season cracks open in the
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129
ice pack near shore, and ships may be able to
make their way through the northwest passage
around North America and the northeast passage
around Eurasia. Usually, such ships are specially
strengthened, are of shallow draft to allow them
to use the primitive ports, and are preceded by
powerful icebreakers to clear the way. Aerial
reconnaissance minimizes the chances of being
caught and crushed, but a change in the wind may
often bring that threat. Amphibious landings
can be quite difficult if ice close to shore will not
support heavy equipment, or if storms have blown
up a great barrier of tumbled ice on the beach.
A sudden storm may trap both big ships and
landing craft by driving the ice pack toward shore
and thus removing the frequently limited open
water.
The life forms found in the Arctic are of special
interest to men awaiting rescue. In the extreme
north there may be polar bears, walrus, and seals,
but the interior of Antarctica offers little. Es-
kimos manage to live in good health on meat and
blubber, and so can military personnel if it is
necessary. Farther south there are many small
animals, fish, and in summer birds that can be
trapped or shot by the trained men.
It is the weather of course, that offers the great-
est challenge to military operations and survival.
The temperature range is from over 90? F. in the
summer in the Yukon Valley to a winter ? 90? F.
in northeastern Siberia. In the subarctic, summer
is a time of torment because of flies and mosquitoes.
Snow and fog may cut visibility for many days
or weeks on end, affording cover but also limiting
travel or navigation. The aurora borealis (or
australis at the south pole) restricts radio recep-
tion. Compasses are unreliable and it is to be
remembered that the magnetic poles neither coin-
cide with the geographic nor are they entirely
fixed. Daylight and darkness conditions, reach-
ing the extreme of 6 months of day and 6 of dark
have important implications both for observation
and for morale. In winter cold, all human move-
ments are slowed by the protective clothing worn.
Logistics needs are increased by the kind of hous-
ing required and the greater quantities of fuel and
food consumed.
Urban geography of the Arctic is largely Soviet,
for the only cities of importance in the area are
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Russian and Siberian. They have tried to develop
mining, lumbering, and commerce along the north-
east passage as well as building military bases.
Aside from some Alaskan and Canadian mining
and trapping, and the new military bases, perhaps
the most important economic development in the
free world Arctic has been the uranium discoveries
near Great Bear Lake. In the approaches of the
Antarctic it is the international rivalries of the
whaling industry that are of particular interest.
In summary, the great circle routes across the
Arctic represent the most direct flight lines for
strategic bombers and guided missiles to reach the
key populated and industrial regions on earth.
The Arctic then is of great concern for aviators
who must navigate across it and who may be forced
down in it. It is of further concern as an area for
detection and interception of such air strikes. It
is also an area rich in mineral resources awaiting
exploitation. Finally, it requires continued study
as a route of travel and invasion by military forces.
Its problems are being solved with growing skill,
ingenuity, and confidence. The requirements of
its climate have produced new developments in
housing and weapons.
TRANSPORTATION AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS
INTELLIGENCE
A second major component of intelligence
knowledge is that of transportation and telecom-
munications. Information about these facilities
in all parts of the world is needed for planning
both our strategy at the highest echelons and tac-
tics at lower command levels. All forms of such
intelligence are used on occasion by the Navy, even
though other agencies collect and process much of
the information.
Ports and Harbors
Port and harbor intelligence includes every con-
ceivable type of information on these facilities.
Harbors refer to natural locations that may be used
as anchorages by ships or as protection and setting
for man-made port facilities. Harbors may be
bays, rivers, or combinations of both. When a
port completely lacks protection and shoreside
berthing facilities, it is called a roadstead. Some
ports have been created by means of artificial har-
bors. In the broad sense, a port includes not only
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the piers and wharves used by shipping, but also
all the transfer, storage, and land transportation
facilities used in connection with shipping. In
fact a port area includes frequently a considerable
tributary area with manufacturing, fuel and water
facilities, banking and customs houses; that is, the
whole range of the appurtenances of modern
commerce.
Sources of information on ports are numerous.
Naval observers, as described in chapter 9, can col-
lect some port information. Commercial steam-
ship companies collect much information, too, for
their own operations. Individual masters and
sometimes crew members make reports to their
governments as needed to supplement collection.
There are various chamber of commerce and port
commission studies available for the asking, as well
as tourist guides, foreign government maps, com-
mercial photographs, and data from business
houses supplying foreign orders. All are useful
sources of information.
Port data are so complex and detailed that most
naval powers prepare specific port studies on in-
dividual foreign ports. This is a Navy responsi-
bility in our country, but the Navy is not the sole
user. The Army needs such data for establishing
ports of embarkation. The Navy needs to know
what servicing facilities would be available to the
fleet. Some foreign ports are studied for their
military or commercial importance and vulnerabil-
ity to attack. During wartime the individual uses
of ports may give many clues to the enemy's
activities.
Shipping
Ocean shipping is the principal means for the
bulk movement of freight internationally. It is
characterized by the large tonnage carried by in-
dividual ships at very low ton-mile costs, fre-
quently over very great distances. The routes
most vital to this commerce of the world are: (1)
the North Atlantic from Canada and the United
States to the English Channel, North Sea or Medi-
terranean areas; (2) the Suez route through the
Mediterranean to India, Australia or the Far
East; (3) the South Atlantic route from Europe
and North America to Argentina; (4) the South
Africa run from Europe or North America to
South and East Africa with extensions to Aus-
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tralia and Indian Ocean points; (5) the trans-
pacific routes from North America to Asia; (6)
the Panama routes linking many continents and
several coasts.
A handful of countries build most ships and
these same countries are the principal operators of
substantial numbers of ships. The United States,
Britain, and Norway are the three big operators,
though in time Japan and Germany may regain
their former positions.
The Navy is concerned not only with the areas
where ships operate and with the total carrying
capacity of various merchant fleets, but also with
the building capacity of various shipyards and the
repair facilities. Because of its operational and
strategic needs, it must also know the speed, age,
tonnage, dimensions, appearance, fuel, draft,
ownership, location, and use of every individual
merchant ship in the world.
Collection of most shipping information is
largely a matter of organization and thoroughness,
and most of it can be derived from regular com-
mercial information services. Lloyd's Register
provides ship particulars and Lloyd's List gives
vessel movements. A series of trade journals in
Britain, the United States, France, Japan, and
other countries report building, give vessel plans
and pictures, discuss trends in chartering, marine
insurance, rates, conference agreements, and so
forth. It is only the Iron Curtain countries which
hide or disguise their shipping information thus
requiring other nations to take special measures
in order to develop comprehensive worldwide re-
ports on merchant vessels.
Shipping intelligence has many forms. It may
be absorbed into other intelligence as a part of a
larger subject. Summary statistics of all sorts are
prepared, and card indexes of vessel activity and
large wall plots showing estimated location of all
vessels are used for operational purposes.
The uses of shipping intelligence are many.
Any blockade operations require detailed ship
movement information together with manifest
data. Protection of shipping against submarines
and aircraft requires location data. When an H-
bomb hidden in a nondescript neutral freighter
becomes a possibility, shipping intelligence needs
will be further increased.
Railways
Since railways represent the principal arteries
of land transport and have the greatest tonnage
capacity for movement overland from place to
place, they are of considerable military interest.
The Transportation Corps of the Army is chiefly
responsible for collection and processing of land
transportation data. Essential informational
needs include detailed maps of the lines, descrip-
tions of bridges and tunnels, a working timetable,
a gradient profile chart, and lists of motive power
and rolling stock. Even though a railway may
seem relatively static, its capacity is affected by
many factors: the maintenance and improvement
of the right of way (including ballast, ties, rails),
the addition of automatic block signals or train
control, the realinement of track to ease ruling
grades and reduce curvature, the strengthening of
bridges, the switch to new motive power such as
dieselization or electrification, and the traffic load
with its seasonal and directional differences.
Data may come from newspaper stories, the
order books of equipment manufacturers, trade
statistics, and trade journals such as the Railway
Gazette published in London, which is the best for
world coverage. Information from behind the
Iron Curtain is harder to obtain, but there are
publicly announced 5-year plans, radio broadcasts
of new construction and attainment of traffic goals,
and the reports of refugees.
The use to which such information is put varies.
It may contribute to a strategic estimate involving
a country's capability to meet overall war require-
ments or provide specific data concerning the coun-
try's ability to move forces to a particular front.
The Navy is interested in many details on rail-
ways, arising out of such matters as the movement
of landing craft or submarine subassemblies over
particular lines that may or may not have limited
clearances. Preliminary to an amphibious land-
ing the Navy may have air support missions which
will include selecting railway targets such as tun-
nels, bridges, and yards. For both amphibious
and land operations, similar targets are sometimes
involved in connection with naval gunfire support.
The success of naval ships in providing gunfire
support to land operations during the Korean War
illustrates naval use of intelligence regarding both
railway systems and roads.
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Roads
Roads generally serve as feeders to railway
lines, although in a few parts of the world they
constitute an independent, fairly usable network.
They have the military advantages of reaching
more places than railways and being more flexible
in alternate routes. If trees block a road, vehicles
occasionally can drive through fields around the
obstacle. Most military transport organic to land
units is intended for road use. In most foreign
countries roads are typically poor by American
standards, having a low tonnage capacity and a
rapid deterioration rate. Maintenance thus be-
comes a problem when they are used for heavy
military traffic.
Road maps are available in most foreign coun-
tries, but they are frequently inaccurate, and their
condition is subject to change with the seasons.
Road reports should not only describe the seasonal
condition of roads, bridges, and shoulders, but
should also note the availability of surfacing mate-
rials, local labor, and repair machinery. Bridges,
steep grades, and narrow single lanes are typical
limiting factors to the usefulness of a road.
Pipelines
The bulk movement of petroleum, gas, and water
is increasingly being accomplished by pipeline.
Modern technology permits the dispatching of
several different products in succession through a
line with metering, sampling, and water plugs to
keep each one separate. A recent development is
the use of radioactive isotopes to identify particu-
lar shipments by Geiger counter.
Pipelines represent a mass means of delivery
relatively free from interference by weather.
Underground lines are reasonably safe from at-
tack, but the pumping stations, storage tank farms,
and other surface installations remain vulnerable
points.
Pipelines may have more than economic signifi-
cance. Some United States lines, for example,
represented a countermove against German sub-
marine attacks. Others in Burma, France, and
Alaska provided direct tactical support. Aerial
reconnaissance will usually reveal the construction
of new lines, but lacking that opportunity, infor-
mation on the manufacture and delivery of the
necessary pipes and pumps will give many clues.
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132
Inland Waterways
Inland waterways in many foreign countries are
a major element in the transportation system.
Their usefulness depends upon their general loca-
tion and direction of flow. The current, control-
ling depth, turns, constancy of channel, subjec-
tivity to freezing, bridge clearances, and cargo
transfer facilities are important details. Reports
on foreign waterways are processed primarily by
the Army Transportation Corps, and the sources
of information are official documents of foreign
governments and direct observation. From them
are obtained answers to logistics questions. Aerial
mining of waterways, and destruction of locks or
dams by bombing can be made possible through
adequate intelligence.
Aviation
Civil aviation rightly comes under the general
cognizance of air intelligence. Although avia-
tion competes with railways only in countries
where railways are lacking, it is important to know
the role it plays in the rapid movement of critical
freight and personnel. Today, airlines under
many flags not only blanket their home countries,
but extend internationally into far reaches of the
earth. Thus they also provide a unique instrument
for observation and collection of information.
Our own widespread aviation interests are in a
position to report on foreign aviation progress
everywhere this side of the Iron Curtain. Trade
journals in many languages are likewise extremely
helpful. We are interested in new transport air-
craft performance and production, the frequency,
reliability, and control of air lines, the provision
of navigation aids and. airfields, and the training
of personnel. In time of war or other emergencies,
commercial aircraft and aviation facilities play
important auxiliary roles. The degree of subsi-
dization of aviation may give clues to intended
use. Deutsche Lufthansa went so far as to con-
vert "commercial" Ju-52's into bombers and para-
troop transports when war came. Italy's commer-
cial air service to Rio de Janeiro reported ship
movements off Brazil to German raiders in the
early days of the war.
Considerable aviation intelligence is assembled
in convenient form by such unofficial yearbooks as
Jane's All The World's Aircraft. The Navy's
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own large interests in aviation make all such in-
telligence of considerable interest.
Telecommunications
Telecommunications include telegraph, tele-
phone, radio, television, cable, and all related serv-
ices and equipment. Each type of signal has its
own advantages and disadvantages of cost, avail-
ability, secrecy, range, number of channels, and
so forth. While the National Security Agency
is the agency with direct cognizance over intelli-
gence in this field, earlier references to the collec-
tion of intelligence from communication sources
indicate the importance of such information to all
branches of the military service.
The interruption of communications in any mod-
ern state, especially a highly centralized one, can
bring its national life to a standstill. Such sys-
tems thus become prime targets in war. Further,
an understanding of the various channels of sig-
nal traffic is basic to maintaining the security of
classified information. Therefore, knowledge of
a nation's telecommunications is helpful for a
variety of purposes.
Information on world systems comes from such
sources as trade journals, records of purchases of
new equipment from leading manufacturers, and,
of course, observation and the piecing together of
many bits of information.
SOCIOLOGICAL INTELLIGENCE
Sociology is the study of man and his human
environment. It deals with all the phenomena
arising out of the group relations of human beings.
There is still some disagreement whether sociology
has reached a stage of development which would
entitle it to rank as a science, but it is uniformly
recognized that the methods used in sociological
research and the conclusions reached may be
strictly scientific when based on extensive observa-
tion and careful analysis.
In the introduction to this chapter it was stated
that no one of the eight components of strategic
intelligence can be considered alone; they are all
interdependent and closely interwoven. This is
particularly true of the sociological component
which is closely allied to the geographical, politi-
cal, and economic, and which strongly affects
armed forces, particularly with relation to man-
1,33
power. The cultural traditions of a people and
their intellectual achievements based on a sound
educational program, have tremendous effect on
their scientific capabilities. Sociological assess-
ment of a nation also embraces anthropological
and psychological factors.
The aspects of sociological intelligence which
are important to military planners are those which
determine the military potential of a nation, but
the analyst will soon find that his task is in no way
restricted. True interpretation must weigh all
facets of sociological significance, and it is im-
possible to ignore any of them.
The importance of sociological intelligence has
never been more clearly evident to Americans than
in recent years, for the understanding of foreign
peoples has become essential to the successful ad-
ministration of American aid programs all over
the world, both civil and military. Throughout
their service careers naval personnel visit many
foreign ports, and those on special naval missions,
stationed at bases abroad, and on attache duty are
intimately associated in their daily life, profes-
sionally and socially, with people whose culture,
customs, and traditions are different from their
own. An appreciation of the forces and factors
which govern the behavior of foreign peoples is
therefore a prime objective of sociological intelli-
gence. All naval officers, and particularly those in
intelligence activities, can with profit be avid stu-
dents of sociology as it applies to the assessment of
the capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable
courses of action of a foreign country.
The sociological component comprises the fol-
lowing major considerations: Population; charac-
teristics of the people; religion, education, and
public information; morale and public opinion;
health and public welfare. A brief examination
will be made of the significance of these elements
in sociological intelligence.
Population
Intelligence on the population of a country is
much more than a mere numerical count. To be
valuable it must provide data on density and
geographical distribution; classification by age
groups and sex; growth or decline; immigration
and emigration; future trends and government
policies which affect population problems. Sta-
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tistics are given meaning through interpretation
by averages and percentages, and by comparison
with familiar standards. Populations in many
countries of the world since World War II show
marked departure from the patterns of past dec-
ades, and it has become increasingly important to
obtain up-to-date information before coming to
any conclusions.
Lt. Col. Robert C. White makes some pertinent
observations on population change in an article
entitled "Sociological Factors in Strategic Intel-
ligence" published in the Military Review, No-
vember 1949:
From an intelligence standpoint, it is the
increase, stability, or decline in the size of a
population upon which we first focus our in-
terest. The future size of the population of a
foreign nation may be of more importance
to us than its present size. Knowledge of
future size will help us keep our estimate of
a foreign power's war potential correct.
Consider what has been happening to the
world's population in the past 150 years. We
are living in a period of unparalleled (but
uneven) growth in the world's population.
Since 1800, the population of the world as
a whole has more than doubled. This rapid,
almost explosive, growth first started in
Europe, where the population since 1800 has
trebled. The number of Chinese and Jap-
anese has increased greatly, also, but their
increase did not commence until well after the
middle of the nineteenth century. In other
regions, the timing of rapid population
growth has varied.
The clue to rapid population growth is to
be found in the changing relationship be-
tween birth rates and death rates. Before
the Industrial Revolution, high birth rates al-
most negated high death rates, and there was
little natural growth in population. The ef-
fects of the Industrial Revolution?in raising
standards of living, sanitation, and health,
and therefore in reducing infant mortality
and in increasing life expectancy?were felt
first in Western Europe, the United States,
and Canada. Therefore, the populations of
these areas increased rapidly during the nine-
teenth century. However, in more recent
decades, because of cultural changes, such as
the decline of the large family ideal, for ex-
ample, there has been a drop in the birth rate.
Thus, the margin between birth and death
rates has been narrowing. The tendencies in
these areas, therefore, is for population to
level off, even to decline. With the extension
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134
NAVAL OFFICERS
of modern industrialization, sanitation, and.
medical care to other parts of the world, this
same pattern of changing death and birth rate
has appeared. Thus, China, India, the Soviet
Union, and other areas more recently affected
by industrialization are now in the stage of
population growth that was characteristic of
Western Europe several generations ago. It
is likely that they, too, will in time pass into
the stage of stable or even declining popu-
lation.
The intelligence analyst is also concerned with
a nation's labor force and available military man-
power. He must know the age-sex distribution of
the population, the number of males and females
of a given age or within a certain age group. The
labor force is found between the ages of 15 and
65, while military manpower can be derived from
the number of males between the ages of 15 and
45, with particular emphasis on the 18 to 35 group.
There can be considerable margin of error in these
statistics if account is not taken of those who may
be disqualified for either labor or military service
by reason of physical disability.
The geographical distribution and density of
population are further vital considerations in so-
ciological intelligence. The density of population
per square mile of arable land has much more in-
telligence significance than the density per square
mile of total land. The concentration of popula-
tion in certain areas of a country is likewise valu-
able knowledge. Since, for example, a sixth of
the population of Argentina is located in Buenos
Aires, destruction of her capital city would be a
crippling blow to that country.
Population analysis (demography) requires ex-
pert understanding of statistical terms and the
methods employed in the compilation of data.
Progressive countries of the world have govern-
ment sponsored census bureaus and keep popula-
tion registers, but less than a third of the world's
population has ever been officially counted or reg-
istered. Some peoples of the world are just not
age conscious. An American or European child
when questioned will readily report his age to
the fine degree of 61/4 or 13 years 5 months. In
the villages of the Orient the same question will
be greeted with either a blank stare or a smiling:
"I don't know."
Experiences of World War II in the enlistment
of women both in the Armed Forces and on the
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home front have placed new emphasis upon their
contribution to the usable portion or manpower
factor of a nation's total population. This brings
us to a consideration of the entire situation with
respect to labor in the country: wages, working
conditions, organization, legislation, and control.
The government policies on population control
often are responsible in many countries for con-
siderable shifts in population. The development
of new industries or the exploitation of newly
discovered resources can also cause internal move-
ments of large numbers of people, and will require
reassessment of population distribution.
Characteristics of the People
In studying a nation's people, the intelligence
officer must identify and evaluate those racial,
ethnic, and cultural characteristics which are
sources of national strength or weakness. He must
determine the sociological forces which cause dis-
sension among them, resentment against the gov-
ernment, or susceptibility to psychological in-
fluence from abroad. The latter will be discussed
fully in the section of this text entitled Psycho-
logical Operations.
Race and nationality are not synonymous terms.
There is no German race or French race or Chinese
race. The anthropological classification of race
is in three main divisions: Caucasian, Mongolian,
and Negro. These are further divided into sub-
races characterized by such physical characteristics
as shape of skull, color of hair or complexion, stat-
ure, facial structure, and physical vigor. Few
nations of the world have a population of only one
race. Most are a mixture; for example, the white
population of the United States and European
nations comprises a mixture of three of the Cau-
casian subraces, and there are many Mongolian
subraces in the Chinese nation. If a country's
population is composed of more than one main
race, there is always a possibility of internal strife
and racial discrimination. Hitler, for example,
effectively used the idea of an "Aryan" super-race
to develop a feeling of racial superiority among
the Germans. The tragic consequences of this
doctrine are a blot on the history of Europe.
Ethnic groups, another important consideration
in sociological intelligence, are people bound to-
gether by ties and traits of both race and
nationality. In the United States, for example,
there are large communities in various sections of
the country composed of such ethnic groups as
Czechs, Poles, Irish, Swedes, and Finns. Ethnic
groups often maintain, at least for two or three
generations even in America, the customs, tradi-
tions, religion, and language of their forefathers,
and assimilation into the nation to which they have
migrated is completed only after several centuries.
The countries of Europe provide similar examples:
the Germans of Alsace-Lorraine, the Swedish eth-
nic group in Finland, and the Serbs of the old
Austro-Hungarian Empire. In Asia the Parsees
of India are a striking example of how a people,
originally Persian, have become a force in the com-
mercial and industrial development of the country
of their chosen residence.
The presence of such groups in a nation may
weaken national solidarity, or make a nation vul-
nerable to psychological warfare. It may also re-
sult in violent hatred and prejudice. During
World War I, for example, German-Americans in
many communities were the innocent victims of
slander and even mob violence.
The cultural characteristics of a people are those
derived from language, social structure, social
values and patterns of living, artistic and intel-
lectual expression. Differences in thinking and
acting occur to the extent to which such forces
control or influence collective behavior. The
presence in appreciable numbers of aristocrat and
peasant, clergy of strongly opposed religious sects,
intellectuals, artists, and illiterates in a nation's
population are significant subjects for sociological
intelligence. Careful examination of these ele-
ments yields greater understanding of a people's
history, customs, and traditions and is essential to
evaluation of public opinion, attitudes toward
foreigners, and national morale.
Religion
Religion has always been a potent force in the
history of the world, and religious differences have
caused much war and strife. "There is no God
but Allah, and Mohammed is his prophet" became
the war-cry of Moslem hosts, the bloody Thirty
Years War between Catholic and Protestant arm-
ies in 17th century Europe, and in our own time
the Moslem-Jewish struggle for the control of
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Palestine, as well as the Moslem-Hindu riots in
India and the formation of Pakistan attest to the
influence religion has upon the actions of men.
In many countries the constitution establishes a
state religion, and religious sects are powerful
political parties.
The intelligence researcher often finds the an-
swer to problems of national attitudes by analyz-
ing the tenets of the religion of dominant or
minority groups. Religion can determine the
moral fiber of a nation or it can produce social
handicaps which become strategic vulnerabilities.
Often a well organized church or religious group
supports numerous schools at all educational levels,
and makes a valuable contribution to the improve-
ment of social conditions and the rehabilitation of
social unfortunates.
Education
Education has always been a measure of prog-
ress. The strategic significance of education has
become even more pronounced in this modern age
of scientific and technical achievement. A na-
tion's technical capabilities will be governed by
the extent to which it can produce men and women
with technical skill, and the cultural level of its
people will be determined by the extent to which
a spirit of scientific inquiry and academic freedom
are fostered by its government and society.
Intelligence on education must be specific in
order to be usable: the number of schools at all
levels of education; the number enrolled and the
number graduated; the curricula and teaching
methods; the qualifications of faculties; the con-
trolling and accrediting agencies; and in the field
of higher education, the distribution of graduates
by subject of specialization. It is important to
know, for example, that a given country is produc-
ing engineers and physicists at an accelerated rate,
or that there is a shortage of trained teachers in
the secondary schools. Adult education by exten-
sion courses and evening trade schools must also
be evaluated.
The number of students engaged in graduate
study at institutions in other countries and the
use which is made of them upon their return may
be of great significance in a sociological estimate
of a nation. This is of special interest to America,
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136
since we have increasing numbers of foreign stu-
dents attending our colleges and universities. The
question is: What happens to them when they go
home? Will their experience influence the thought
of their fellow countrymen?
Public Information and Opinion
Intelligence interest here centers in the methods
of disseminating news and the influence upon na-
tional attitudes exercised by newspapers, maga-
zines, radio programs, and motion pictures. Are
the people left free to form their opinions on what
they see, hear, and read or are true facts withheld
through rigid government control of the press and
other avenues of public information? Do foreign
publications have a wide circulation and what is
the extent of any foreign propaganda in the
country?
The answers to all these and similar questions
are invaluable to the sociological analyst. Cer-
tainly in this field he must be constantly aware
of current trends and possess sufficient background
to assess them in the light of the people's history
and traditions.
Health
Information for intelligence on health condi-
tions in a foreign country is concerned not only
with the health of the indigenous population but
also with the effect of health and sanitation con-
ditions upon foreign troops which may operate
in the area. Environmental factors such as to-
pography and climate, nutrition and dietary hab-
its, plant and animal life, and the food supply
situation all pose problems for the military
analyst. Can an invading force live off the land?
Is there an abundance of potable water? Will
special installations be necessary for garbage and
waste disposal or are existing utilities adaptable?
Medical intelligence has an important role to
play in determining the prevalence of disease, par-
ticularly those to which an invading army would
be exposed. Will extensive malarial control be
necessary? Are there certain health regulations,
quarantine measures, or sanitary precautions to
consider? The country's medical resources must
be also evaluated in terms of the number of doc-
tors and nurses, the quantity of medical supplies,
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hospitals, and medical training, research, and
development.
Public Welfare
The status of public welfare in a country is an
important element in sociological intelligence be-
cause it so directly affects the happiness and mental
attitudes of the people. The standard of living,
housing, and opportunities for gainful employ-
ment are factors which must be considered.
Sweden, for example, has no slum areas in her
large cities, and her government's achievement in
providing clean and comfortable housing for the
worker is notable. It has been attained, however/
only through high taxation, and many a Swede is
unhappy because of the tax drain on his pocket-
book. As a result, it may be easy for him to forget
the great benefits to himself and to the nation
which accrue from high standards of public
health and sanitation.
The evaluation of a standard of living is no easy
task for the analyst, for the peoples of different
countries do not place the same value upon certain
human comforts and possession of certain advan-
tages. The average American family needs an
automobile; many Europeans consider the posses-
sion of one not only unnecessary, but even a great
nuisance. We put ice in our drinking water and
keep our beer in the refrigerator. The average
Britisher does not like either water or beer that
cold. Comparison of wages in different countries
has meaning only when such wages are expressed
in terms of their buying power within each coun-
try. A dozen eggs in one country may represent
5 hours of work by a machinist, while in another
country a machinist would have to work only 1
hour to earn enough to buy 3 dozen eggs. Other
commodities, however, may be so much more expen-
sive in the latter country that the machinist may
not enjoy as high a standard of living as he would
in the country where eggs are dear. Assessment
of living standards, therefore, cannot be based on
limited observations, but must be made from aver-
ages over periods of years, and evaluated in rela-
tion to the entire socio-economic situation of the
nation.
Unemployment will always create problems for
a nation. Crime has a higher incidence, and dis-
satisfaction with the existing government grows
with the misery of the unemployed. Communism
feeds upon such conditions. Employment, of
course, brings prosperity and its attendant com-
fort and happiness.
The manner in which a foreign country has met
its public welfare problems is an indication to
the analyst of strength, vulnerability, and morale.
A people who enjoy social security and a happy
daily life are not good subjects for propaganda
influence from without, and they will combat any
effort to change their satisfactory status, even to
the point of armed resistance.
Sociological intelligence is a fascinating field,
and deserves more than the summary treatment it
has received above. The intelligence officer should
consider the aspects so briefly discussed as an
introduction and inspiration for more intensive
reading and study. The philosopher's observation
that "the most interesting thing to man is man"
has real significance in intelligence, and the study
of foreign peoples in relation to one's own socio-
logical heritage has its reward in furthering the
cause of international understanding and peace.
137
POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE
Political intelligence on a foreign country is an
evaluation of the effectiveness of its government
in achieving the national objectives of its people,
both domestically and in foreign relations. It is
an assessment of the political strength and inter-
national influence of the nation in respect to unity,
stability, and efficiency, as well as the determina-
tion of the degree to which its government repre-
sents the will of the people. The political com-
ponent of strategic intelligence is closely associ-
ated with the sociological and economic, for
government exercises a profound influence on the
economic and social life of a people, and con-
versely its nature is to a large extent established
by economic and social forces.
The purpose of this section is to delineate the
elements essential to a political estimate of any
foreign country: the constitutional system, gov-
ernmental structure, political dynamics, national
policies, and the way in which its government pro-
vides for public order, safety, and security, con-
trols subversive activity, obtains intelligence, and
disseminates information.
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The Constitutional System
Governments derive their powers from consti-
tutions or codes of laws which set up the basic
framework and describe the rights and privileges
of the individual citizen. A constitution is not
necessarily a single written document. The Brit-
ish "constitution," for example, is largely an un-
written code built upon custom and usage. A
consideration of the constitutional system of a
country begins with a study of its origin and devel-
opment. What political, economic, or social
groups dominated political thought at the time
of its adoption? To what extent does it reflect
the public opinion of that time? Oftentimes the
circumstances under which a constitution was for-
mulated endow it with lasting respect and author-
ity. The principles of a constitution in theory
are often quite different from its principles in
practice. Attention must be given to its flexibility
and the ease with which it can be amended. Have
there been disagreements as to its interpretation?
What economic and social provisions does it con-
tain? Are there any unusual provisions? The
American Constitution, which establishes execu-
tive, legislative, and judicial branches of govern-
ment, has served as a model for constitutional
systems of later origin in all parts of the world,
but in various countries, the powers granted to the
different branches and the rights of citizens will
vary widely. In some republics the chief executive
may be a mere figurehead; in others he may have
dictatorial power. Prime ministers often exercise
much more leadership and have greater responsi-
bilities than kings. The office of prime minister
can be most precarious for it is usually dependent
upon the support of a majority in the legislature
and failure is followed by the resignation of the
prime minister and his cabinet.
Legislatures will vary in composition and effec-
tiveness. When two houses are provided for by
the constitution, one may be more advisory than
legislative in function, and it may have a history
of gradual weakness, such as the House of Lords
in Great Britain. The Senate of the United States,
on the other hand, has always had more power
and prestige than the House of Representatives,
but the Speaker of the House can succeed to the
Presidency.
A strong judicial branch of an established gov-
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138
ernment will exercise tremendous influence in
maintaining the spirit of the constitution, even
though its interpretations will reflect the coun-
try's economic and social changes. The strength
of the judiciary will usually be determined by its
independence of thought and action insofar as it
can resist political pressure and the lobbying of
special interest groups. The confidence of the
people in government is largely controlled by the
judgments of the courts when their powers are
exercised in a way that is an effective check on
both executive and legislative branches.
The civil and religious rights of citizens guaran-
teed by the constitution are important considera-
tions in a political estimate, not only in theory but
in practice. Freedom of speech, press, religion,
and the rights of assembly and trial by jury so dear
to the American citizen do not find exact counter-
parts in the constitutions of all other countries.
Important also are the rights and privileges ex-
tended to foreigners in the country. Can they
move about freely, and engage in business enter-
prises with the same protection accorded to
nationals? The Americans are very jealous of
their "constitutional rights" and justly proud of
their political heritage. The analyst must make an
assessment of the presence or absence of similar
feelings among foreign peoples and the extent to
which they would tolerate any abrogation of par-
ticular political rights.
Structure of the Government
The consideration here is of organization and
procedure in central, regional, and local govern-
ment. It is an evaluation of the government in
operation. Are there any conditions or situations
which have required special organizations or oper-
ations by the government and are practices at vari-
ance with the provisions of the constitution?
What are the major agencies of each branch of the
government and how do they operate? What are
the significant features of regional and local gov-
ernment organization? Often an understanding
of the political forces of local government is essen-
tial to the evaluation of the government as a whole.
Many countries have colonies or dependencies
which must also be examined in their relations to
the mother country, including their own govern-
mental structure. International relationships
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such as participation and membership in the
United Nations Organization or any regional pacts
may have important influences on a political sys-
tem through the creation of special commissions.
The operations of such agencies can have a decided
impact upon internal affairs as well as formulate
national attitudes toward other countries and in-
crease support for cooperative endeavors.
Political Dynamics
The extent to which the people participate in
political activity, their fitness for political respon-
sibility, the sources of political power, the electoral
and political party systems are some of the main
factors to assess in a political estimate of a foreign
country. The major political parties must be eval-
uated, taking into consideration their membership,
program or special interests, organization, and
methods of propaganda.
Throughout his study of these aspects of politi-
cal life, the analyst will find that comparisons
with American counterparts will give meaning
and perspective. He cannot merely ascertain the
constitutional framework which sets up the party
system, but must note actual practices, both his-
torical and current. Pressure groups within par-
ties, lobbying tactics, the amount of money avail-
able and expended for promotional purposes, and
the manner in which the objectives of such pres-
sure groups affect American interests are essential
considerations.
The biographic component of strategic intelli-
gence is here effectively applied. The personali-
ties, qualities of leadership, and motivations of
prominent politicians will provide the answer to
many problems of changing political influence.
National Policies
The intelligence significance of knowledge of
a country's domestic and foreign policies will be
made apparent in succeeding chapters in their dis-
cussion of the economic, sociological, and political
factors which determine a country's position in
the community of nations. The interplay of these
factors will be shown in the examination of United
States foreign policy and the relationship of party
and government in the U. S. S. R. Detailed treat-
ment of important elements of national policy is
therefore superfluous here.
139
Suffice to say, military intelligence is particu-
larly concerned with those policies pertaining to
national defense and their influence on domestic
and foreign policies. Are the military establish-
ment and civilian lawmaking bodies in agreement
on what defense policies should be? To what ex-
tent do the various branches of government in-
fluence or decide defense policies? What is the
popular reaction to defense policies? Do the
people accept rearmament programs, conscription,
food rationing, and production controls with forti-
tude or do such defense measures result in much
grumbling, support of black markets, or actual
rebellion?
Again the influence of individual leaders, both
within their own party and on the populace as
a whole, can be studied with profit.
Public Order and Safety
Within the scope of political intelligence are
those organizations which maintain public order
and safety, that is, the police and penal systems.
Is the police system adequate in size, well-organ-
ized at all levels of government, and effective in
protecting citizens against lawless elements of so..
ciety ? The strategic analyst would also be con-
cerned with the morale of the police force, the in-
tegrity of law-enforcement officers, and the extent
to which the system is susceptible to political in-
fluence. If the police of a large city, for example,
are controlled by a certain politician and used
for furthering his political ambitions, the fact
should be carefully noted. The attitude of the
average citizen towards law enforcement is also
significant.
Consideration of the penal system would in-
clude not only its organization and operation, but
also criminal codes, trial procedures, incidence of
crime, conditions in prisons and reformatories, and
the effort made by social forces in the country to
rehabilitate felons and juvenile delinquents. In
this respect there is considerable overlapping of
the political and sociological components.
Subversive Activity
Active or latent subversive groups in a country
are exceedingly important factors in the assess-
ment of weaknesses in its political system. The
presence of subversive activity in political parties,
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labor organizations, or government agencies can
profoundly affect the operation of the political,
economic, and social forces of the nation. In recent
years we have seen the results achieved by Com-
munist subversive activity in Poland, Czechoslo-
vakia, Hungary, and Rumania. We have also seen
in the case of Italy, how a people aroused to its
menace can keep Communists from obtaining con-
trol by defeating them at the polls. The extent to
which subversive elements have penetrated or in-
filtrated a country is thus the analyst's concern.
He must identify the subversive groups and show
how they operate. An innocuous appearing
society for the improvement of cultural relations
with the U. S. S. R., with a membership of several
thousand students, may well be the front organi-
zation of a growing Communist Party, the ulti-
mate objective of which is the overthrow of the
existing political system.
The peoples' attitude, their traditions, and the
economic and social conditions which foster sub-
versive groups must be taken into account. If,
like the Gallic tribes of Julius Caesar's time, they
are "conspiring among themselves and eager for
revolution," intelligence upon the nature, poten-
tial strength, and leadership of such groups is es-
sential. Finally, an estimate must be made of how
subversive activity of any kind may affect the
policies of the United States and other world
powers towards that country.
Intelligence System
The United States intelligence system and the
development of intelligence activity in other coun-
tries of the world have been fully treated in pre-
ceding chapters of this text, and are indicative of
the scope of the information required. What is
the mission of each intelligence agency? Are
funds available for effective operations? What is
the public attitude towards intelligence activities?
What is the relationship of the various agencies,
their methods of operation, and who are the key
figures in their personnel?
Propaganda
Political propaganda may be defined as the dis-
semination of information or ideas designed to in-
fluence the political behavior of the people of a
country by affecting their beliefs or attitudes con-
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140
cerning facts or values. It may be either direct or
indirect in approach. The source of control may
be located in the country itself, such as at the
permanent headquarters of a political party, or
it may be directed from outside the country, as for
example, in the case of Kremlin control of propa-
ganda in a satellite country.
For strategic intelligence purposes the assess-
ment of political propaganda emphasizes an evalu-
ation of its effectiveness. How much distortion
of fact will the people accept? It will depend,
of course, on the degree to which they have op-
portunity for becoming aware of the true facts.
In a country where the party in power maintains
rigid control of press and radio the people may
be kept completely in the dark. If freedom of
speech is a jealously guarded national heritage,
the people will be more enlightened and better
educated politically. Propaganda may then be
recognized for what it is and may have to be
disseminated through more subtle media and by
more indirect means.
Political propaganda is never more clearly evi-
dent than in an election campaign. The analyst
can learn much from a careful study of the cam-
paign speeches of leading candidates of opposing
parties. Often a clever slogan or sobriquet has
a tremendous psychological effect.
The effectiveness of the propaganda factor in
political intelligence can only be evaluated by
consideration of certain sociological aspects of the
nation, particularly those discussed in the preced-
ing section entitled "Characteristics of the People."
Good propaganda will always exploit the racial,
ethnic, and cultural elements of which national
character is composed.
The principles and techniques of propaganda
will be treated more fully in a later section dealing
with psychological warfare.
Political Factors in Strategy
The ultimate purpose of strategy is to make it
possible for a nation to approximate its basic
goals. Its intentions, which are derived from
these goals, are influenced by a variety of political
factors. Inevitably, therefore, strategy is affected
by the same political considerations. Initially,
of course, those responsible for formulating na-
tional strategy must choose objectives which are
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in accord with the basic goals of their own nation
and with those of its allies. Thereafter, political
factors must be considered in such matters as esti-
mating the dimensions and timing of war prepara-
tions by a nation and its allies, considering the
extent of possible losses by the military forces
which might be acceptable at any given time, and
selecting instruments of war and the use to be
made of them. Conversely, in connection with the
capabilities of the enemy, consideration must be
given to the effect of political factors on his own
strategic planning and how these factors may
cause him to react to a state of war or measures
short of war.
Mr. Chester Wilmot, eminent Australian jour-
nalist, has advanced the thesis that much of the
tension following World War II might be at-
tributed to a failure to take political factors into
account in strategic planning. He has suggested
that military strategy is affected both by political
factors as they develop and by long term political
objectives. By way of illustrating the influence
of political factors he has cited the Mediterranean
campaign of 1943 and the strategic decision of the
allies to invade Italy. A decision to land troops
on the Italian coast appeared advantageous be-
cause of the enemy's inferior military strength.
In addition, however, such a decision was made
more attractive because Mussolini's political
strength had become seriously impaired by 1943
and represented a real weakness in the Axis
partnership. Thus developing political factors,
when combined with the military situation, mate-
rially supported the decision made.
In illustrating the importance of considering
long term political objectives in the planning of
strategy, Mr. Wilmot has suggested that a great
political advantage could have accrued to the
western allies in the post-World War II period
had they, rather than the Soviets, liberated Ber-
lin, Prague, and Vienna. A significant power ad-
vantage might have been retained in Germany,
even if Berlin had been given up later as a result
of zonal agreements. The effect in Czechoslovakia
might have been even greater. The mere presence
of the Red Army in Prague became a source of
material strength to the Czech Communists and
undoubtedly affected the negotiations conducted
between the Benes government and the Soviet
141
leaders in Moscow in June 1945. Mr. Wilmot's
point is that the decisions which resulted in the
halting of the allied advance into Germany and
Central Europe might well have taken into greater
consideration the possible progress of events after
the war was over.
These illustrations suggest the importance of
political intelligence and the variety of tasks
which must be performed in connection with it.
Since military strategy and politics are insepara-
ble, the naval intelligence officer must understand
the significance of politics in military decision.
ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE
Economics, simply defined, is the study of how
people make their living and satisfy their mate-
rial wants. Economics thus represents a very
sizable part of total activity, for most people are
destined to spend the majority of their waking
hours either earning their living or spending what
they have received. Economics in practice is much
broader in application than the definition first
suggests because we live in organized societies, and
therefore as a social science, economics is con-
cerned with group behavior. As a discipline, eco-
nomics attempts to explain and interpret this
behavior and predict its consequences. Economic
laws, like other social laws, are tendencies and
trends, and thus the precise answers and controlled
experiments common to the physical sciences are
lacking in economics because of the difficulty in
measuring all significant variables. The result is
that the applications of economics in the field of
intelligence may be ineffective or even dangerous
in the hands of one who is not well grounded in
its principles and who is unaware of the pitfalls
in the use of data and concepts.
Economic intelligence is concerned with the col-
lection and processing of information relating to
the extent and utilization of natural and human
resources and the industrial potential of nations.
Economic military intelligence is not a delimited
part of the larger field; rather it is a viewpoint
that gives full regard to the military implications
of economic events. Specifically, this means that
we want to know how strong other countries are?
the limits to their economic capabilities for mak-
ing war; also whether they are preparing for war
and the extent of such preparation; and, finally,
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their economic vulnerabilities. When the need
arises, such weaknesses may be attacked by mili-
tary means or by the techniques of economic
warfare.
Sources of Economic Intelligence
The Department of Commerce, Office of Inter-
national Trade, receives reports from commercial
attaches and consular agents all over the world.
Its commodity and area specialists review large
numbers of foreign periodicals and other reports
in order that both private individuals or concerns
and government agencies may have the best pos-
sible information on conditions abroad for con-
ducting business affairs. The State Department
also has extensive interests in economic intelli-
gence since its consuls do so much of the collecting,
but some of its direct collection responsibilities
have been reassigned to other agencies, particu-
larly special types. The Tariff Commission is in-
terested in foreign costs of production, foreign
tariffs, and trade restrictions. The Treasury and
the Federal Reserve Board are concerned with
monetary and fiscal developments. The Depart-
ments of Agriculture and Labor are active in their
respective fields and have some representatives in
our diplomatic missions overseas. Private agen-
cies also have specialized interests in particular
fields of economic intelligence and prepare reports
used by business men. For example, some are con-
cerned with petroleum, mining, construction, elec-
tric power, foreign trade, manufacturing and, of
course, transportation and communications which
have been treated separately. Some of these
private concerns do a very thorough job within
their own fields. Even such popular magazines
as Fortune and the London Economist make nota,-
ble contributions in the reporting of foreign de-
velopments.
The military services have the responsibility for
filling any gaps in the economic intelligence they
need for their own planning, and the task of tap-
ping what is already available in order to apply
it to their own ends.
Primary Military Interests in Economic Intelligence
Military intelligence has the responsibility of
keeping track of any change in economic factors
that affect a country's ability to wage war. These
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142
include new discoveries of mineral deposits, new
crops and changing methods in agriculture, new
industrial processes that affect the demands for
labor and material and affect output and costs,
changes in business, labor, and government that
react on efficiency and allocation of resources,
trends in capital investment, new depreciation
and tax policies, trends in the price level, bank
reserves, and inventory levels.
Preparations for war become important to
watch in an age when a sudden attack can be so
crippling. Economic intelligence may well give
warning of such action, for industry must also be
mobilized for war. Clues may be provided by
the stockpiling of critical materials, the develop-
ment of higher cost substitutes and synthetics for
what normally is imported, and conversion of
civilian industry to the production of war goods.
Such clues need coordination with political in-
telligence to determine motivation. Since some
economies are at all times regulated by the gov-
ernment and "mobilized," the detailed study of all
changes in their regulations, priorities, and al-
locations may produce important leads in judging
modifications of plans or timetables for military
actions.
Study of economic vulnerabilities is continuous
also, for a dynamic economy is faced with chang-
ing pressures and shortages. Especially when a
war becomes hot, and military action and economic
warfare are modifying the enemy's economy, a
close watch is essential so that counteractions will
have maximum effect. Considering the wartime
hazards to collection, such an assessment will be
possible only if a prior basic analysis was prepared
when there was time to gather and assess the origi-
nal set of facts.
Analytical Criteria
Assessment of economic data must include the
application of many different criteria, all of which
are important, such as the study of particular in-
dustries with their problems of production and
pricing; the whole fiscal and monetary system with
questions of the price level, savings, investment,
and employment; the problems of ownership and
income distribution; the problems of consumption
and of institutions. Micro-economics with its
attention to supply and demand of particular
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commodities and its concern with competition,
monopoly, and monopolistic or monoposonistic
competition is best known to the beginning student.
Macro-economics is more recent, but offers some
singularly effective analytical tools for intelli-
gence purposes. The approach is in terms of the
interactions of particular events on the economy as
a whole. Some of the most useful results are ap-
parent in the national income accounting analysis
done by the Department of Commerce. In effect
it is the old "Tableau Economique" of Quesnay
brought up to date to combine modern accounting
procedures with present economic thinking into a
large number of mutually supporting tables. The
intelligence significance is that even if a foreign
country tries to hide its activities almost anything
that it does in the economic sphere will have reper-
cussions that will leave telltale signs. If it tries
to hide much basic information, such data may be
derived anyway by analytical techniques that have
been developed so fully in the last decade or so in
the United States. Some of them are highly com-
plex and lie beyond the scope of this study, but
their importance is not to be minimized. This sug-
gests that the requests for certain types of eco-
nomic data which may mean little to the layman
frequently include keys to very big secrets. There-
fore, the economic data collected by naval attach&
or observers abroad may be ultimately as impor-
tant as information on strictly naval subjects.
European Illustrations
Hitler's Mein Kampf made clear his political
views and intentions long before he came to power,
although its significance was not seen by the public
at large. Once the Nazis came to power, however,
economic intelligence disclosed German prepara-
tions for war. Economic regimentation began as
early as 1933, with many telltale signs. State-
directed planning was the rule, and heavy arms
orders were fed to industry. Labor was mobilized
through the Deutsche Arbeitsfront and the pro-
duction of civilian goods was progessively reduced.
The conquest of Czechoslovakia was an important
addition to German economic potential because of
the acquisition of the Skoda works and an addi-
tional labor supply. German ingenuity went to
work on developing substitute materials for those
that would be cut off by war. All of these de-
143
velopments pointed to a growing capability of
carrying on a major war effort. The success of
German preparations was indicated by the length
of time they were able to fight against a coalition
of nations numerically and industrially stronger.
One of the most interesting exploits of economic
intelligence involved the German oil industry.
Especially after the dissolution of her friendship
pact with the Soviet Union, Germany had only the
Rumanian Ploesti fields and minor wells in Hun-
gary and Poland as sources of petroleum. To take
the place of natural petroleum, German chemists
had developed new processes for extracting oil and
gasoline from coal, which brought costs down to
a fairly reasonable level. It was natural that the
strategic nature of these German automotive fuels
prompted special attention by allied intelligence
and target specialists and it became most impor-
tant that attacks be centered on all facilities of
the industry to paralyze German transport and
aviation. Planners remembered well that in
World War I German transport came to a halt be-
cause of a shortage of lubricants. Some excellent
intelligence on German oil facilities came from
secret sources, but the most accurate and com-
plete was obtained from the Germans themselves.
German rail tariffs, like our own, include not only
class rates but specific commodity rates on a place
to place basis. In order to subsidize the vitally
needed synthetic oil industry, special commodity
rates were set up for each oil refinery. Just as in
America, German law required that these rates
had to be published, and the Germans methodically
printed such information in rate bulletins and in
an obscure technical traffic magazine. Allied in-
telligence subscribed to this magazine through a
Swiss address, and regularly found each new secret
oil refinery listed with information as to the open-
ing date for the new rates,. It was then a simple
matter to pinpoint the facility on the map and de-
stroy it by bombing. Before the war was over,
German aircraft were grounded in considerable de-
gree by the shortage of fuel.
Less successful were Allied attempts to cripple
Germany's ball-bearing industry which was being
augmented by supplies from neutral Sweden.
The British, too, were getting considerable quan-
tities of Swedish ball bearings, but attempts to buy
up the entire production were unsuccessful. The
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Swedish SKF concern had expanded facilities, and
deliveries were being made to Germany in return
for safe conduct to Swedish ships bringing in es-
sential imports to the homeland. Some of the
most spectacular and costly Allied air attacks deep
in Germany were aimed at destroying ball-bearing
plants, notably at Schweinfurt, but the chief ob-
jective was not gained. Germany restored pro-
duction much more rapidly than anticipated and
redesigned her war equipment to require fewer
bearings. The war was almost over before the
Swedes were persuaded to cut off further ship-
ments, and by that time ball bearings were no
longer a determining factor in the German war
effort. The whole experience illustrated the im-
portance of correct assessment of economic intelli-
gence as well as its collection.
German economic intelligence about the Allies
was fairly good, notably in the data collected on
Allied ocean convoys. Due to censorship leaks,
secret radio broadcasts, and marine insurance re-
insured in neutral countries, German U-boats were
frequently able to pick off the most critical ships in
our convoys with disastrous results. It took con-
siderable effort to minimize these leaks.
Pacific Illustrations
Japan's military ambitions were made clear not
only through the controversial "Tanaka Memo-
rial," the activities of the Black Dragon Society,
and the attacks on China, but also from economic
intelligence. Some fundamental changes in the
Japanese economy were noted and set forth in a
Harvard University study by Mrs. E. B. Schum-
peter (et al.), The Inclust2-ialization of Japan and
Maneh,ukuo, that appeared just before the war.
Although this was a study based on overt sources
for public purposes, it revealed for the first time
considerable detail on changes in the Japanese
economy. In 1937, as a war measure, the Japa-
nese had banned the publication of all economic
data; they were aware of its great significance.
A great void developed in year books, trade re-
turns, periodicals, and industry publications. In
fact, they were so successful in hiding informa-
tion that their own planning was hampered, and
postwar search of Japanese government records
indicates that many vital economic records were
not even maintained, and thus represent gaps that
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interfere with analyses of Japan's position. The
Schumpeter study did reveal, despite the incom-
pleteness of data, that the Japanese economy was
switching from primary dependence on export
production of such items as textiles and ceramics to
heavy industry, chemicals, and instruments, all
needed for war purposes. Further, the study re-
vealed that Japan had been converted during the
late 1930's from an island kingdom to a conti-
nental power, for much of the new industry was
located in Korea and Manchuria.
In passing, the pitfalls of jumping at too easy
conclusions are evident in connection with postwar
Japan. That defeated nation, hard hit by war
and with shrunken boundaries, has faced major
dilemmas. Some people have advocated concen-
tration on light industries that use labor rather
than imported raw materials, and thus minimize
balance of payment difficulties. Unfortunately,
however, from the Japanese point of view, these
are the very industries being developed by the
nations which are the chief potential markets for
Japanese goods, so a weakened Japan, unlikely
to be a military threat, is developing heavy indus-
tries whose production will outstrip that achieved
during the peak of her militaristic period. This
has American encouragement. The military in-
telligence assessment cannot be based upon eco-
nomic data alone, as these economic facts of the
new Japan must be linked to political and geo-
graphic changes both in Japan and in the world
as a whole before they attain real meaning.
Current Problems
Some details of the Soviet economy will be pre-
sented later. Economic intelligence today from
that area must be based on careful analysis of open
Soviet broadcasts of information, statements in the
Soviet press, study of Soviet foreign purchases,
"Wringer" reports from all kinds of persons who
have been behind the Iron Curtain, and such lim-
ited observations as diplomatic personnel are al-
lowed to make. What of Soviet activities here?
We know that for a long time Soviet purchasing
agents were able to tour our factories and buy our
patents. The volume of economic data published
by both government and private concerns is so
tremendous that little is hidden, and that fact
itself may give us partial protection because it
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places a heavy burden of analysis on the Russians.
Could we hide information from them? Un-
doubtedly, there are many particulars easy for
them to collect, but it should be emphasized that
analytical techniques today are such that the hid-
ing of the broad facts of our economy from the
enemy would require repressive measures incom-
patible with the efficient operation of a private
enterprise economy. Hiding facts from ourselves
could seriously cripple the planning and pricing
activities of American businessmen. A competi-
tive system is presupposed in economic analysis to
be one with freedom of information. In conclu-
sion, then, short of radical security measures, the
United States must be reconciled to losing more
information to totalitarian enemies than it gains,
but much can be gained through intensive exploi-
tation of available sources and careful analysis.
TECHNICAL AND SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE
The developments in military science which have
been produced in recent years by science and tech-
nology constitute but one aspect of the profound
change which the industrial revolution has caused
in the environment of modern man. B. H. Lid-
dell-Hart, the British military expert, analyzes
the subject in his book, The Revolution in
Warfare:
Science and technology have produced a
greater transformation of the physical condi-
tions and apparatus of life in the past two
hundred years than had taken place in the
previous two thousand years. Yet when men
turn these tremendous new powers to a war
purpose, they employ them as recklessly as
their ancestors employed the primitive means
of the past, and they pursue the same tradi-
tional ends without regard to the difference of
effect. Indeed, the governments of modern
nations at war have largely ceased to think of
the postwar effects which earlier statesmen
were wise enough to bear in mind?a consid-
eration which led in the eighteenth century to
a self-imposed limitation of methods. Mod-
ern nations have reverted to a more primitive
extreme?akin to the practices of warfare be-
tween barbaric hordes that were armed with
spear and sword?at the same time as they
have become possessed of science-given in-
struments for multiple destruction at long
range.
The revolution in warfare has thus been
two-sided?on the one side, in the instruments,
145
the technique of warfare; on the other side, in
the character of warfare.
Technical and scientific intelligence are directly
concerned with the "instruments and techniques"
in which so profound a change has taken place.
Consideration of a new instrument, or weapon, is
meaningless without taking into account the con-
ditions under which it is to be used and the method
of its employment.
To match the increased speed and scope of war,
scientific research and development were, during
World War II, expedited as never before, and in
this postwar period of world tension they con-
tinue to be pressed with the greatest possible ur-
gency, particularly in the fields of atomic energy,
jet propulsion, and guided missiles. Technical
and scientific progress continue to force the revi-
sion of ancient and time-tested military concepts,
and to dictate even more revolutionary changes in
the design of ships, planes, and tanks which for-
merly embodied those concepts. Intelligence of a
new weapon originated by an enemy perforce leads
to feverish efforts to develop a counterweapon,
in which the enemy in turn is vitally inter-
ested. Tactical surprise, which in earlier wars
had been achieved by novel dispositions of armies
and fleets, was in World War II gained also by the
unleashing of new weapons such as the atomic
bomb, and by improvisation, such as skip bomb-
ing, in the employment of weapons already de-
veloped. Never before have the twin qualities
of flexibility of mind and the ability to gaze in-
telligently into the crystal ball of the future been
so vital to military men and to the political leaders
to whom the security of the nation is jointly
entrusted.
Science and technology were placed at the dis-
posal of the ground, sea, and air forces of the
United States during World War II, and in many
cases new weapons and items of equipment de-
signed for one specific branch of the armed forces
were adopted by the others as well, or were fitted
to the needs of more than one service. For ex-
ample, new aircraft went to both Army and Navy
to be used for different tactical purposes, and the
principle of rocket power was used by the infan-
try in the form of the bazooka, and by the Navy
for antisubmarine warfare and for strafing enemy
positions by LC (R) s; both Army and Navy em-
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ployed rocket-equipped aircraft. The VT fuze
was utilized as an antipersonnel weapon by the
Army and as an antiaircraft weapon by the Navy.
Therefore, it is advisable not to consider the tech-
nical and scientific category of strategic intelli-
gence from the specialized viewpoint of but one
branch of the armed forces. Although we are
concerned primarily with naval strategic intelli-
gence, the technical and scientific component em-
braces the contributions of research and develop-
ment to land, sea, and air power.
Definitions
The official Navy definition of the technical and
scientific category of strategic intelligence is suffi-
ciently broad to permit a general discussion. In
terms of Naval Intelligence, technical and scien-
tific intelligence is defined as:
"Disclosing the development of new materials,
techniques, and munitions of war."
The words "technology," "science," "research,"
and "development" are too well known to require
definition, as are the adjectives derived therefrom.
However, it is advisable at this point to break
down the term "scientific research" into three
parts, and to define each of them. 'These three
parts are:
1. Pure research.
2. Background research.
3. Applied research and development.
For definition of these phrases we turn to appen-
dix 3 of Science: The Endless Frontier, a report
to the President, dated July 1945, by Vannevar
Bush, wartime Director of the Office of Scientific
Research and Development:
1. Pure research,.?Pure research is re-
search without specific practical ends. It
results in general knowledge and understand-
ing of nature and its laws. This general
knowledge provides the means of answering
a large number of important practical prob-
lems, though it may not give a specific solu-
tion to any one of them. * * * The unpre-
dictable nature of pure science makes
desirable the provision of rather special cir-
cumstances for its pursuit. Pure research de-
mands from its followers the freedom of mind
to look at familiar facts from unfamiliar
points of view. It does not always lend itself
to organized efforts and is refractory to direc-
tion from above, in fact, nowhere else is the
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principle of freedom more important for sig-
nificant achievement. . . .
2. Background research,.?The preparation
of accurate topographic and geologic maps,
the collection of meteorological data, the de-
termination of physical and chemical con-
stants, the description of species of animals,
plants, and minerals, the establishment of
standards for hormones, drugs, and X-ray
therapy; these and similar types of scientific
work are here grouped together under the
term background. research. Such background
knowledge provides essential data for ad-
vances in both pure and applied science. It
is also widely used by the engineer, the physi-
cian, and the public at large. In contrast to
pure science, the objectives of this type of re-
search and the methods to be used are reason-
ably clear before an investigation is under-
taken. Thus, comprehensive programs may
be mapped out and the work carried on by
relatively large numbers of trained personnel
as a coordinated effort. . . .
3. Applied research, and development.?
Applied research and development differs in
several important respects from pure science.
Since the objective can often be definitely
mapped out beforehand, the work lends itself
to organized effort. If successful, the results
of applied research are of a definitely practi-
cal or commercial value. The very heavy ex-
penses of such work are, therefore, undertaken
by private organizations only in the hope of
ultimately recovering the funds invested. . . .
The distinction between applied and pure re-
search is not a hard and fast one, and indus-
trial scientists may tackle specific problems
from broad fundamental viewpoints. But it
is important to emphasize that there is a per-
verse law governing research: Under the
pressure for immediate results, and unless de-
liberate policies are set up to guard against
this, applied research invariably drives out
pure. The moral is clear: It is pure research
which deserves and requires special protec-
tion and specially assured support.
The Time Element in Research and Development
The importance of scientific progress, which de-
pends on basic scientific research, to our Nation in
time of peace and war is summed up by Dr. Bush
in his report as follows:
Progress in the war against disease depends
upon a flow of new scientific knowledge. New
products, new industries, and more jobs re-
quire continuous additions to knowledge of
the laws of nature, and the application of that
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knowledge to practical purposes. Similarly,
our defense against aggression demands new
knowledge so that we can, develop new and
improved weapons. This essential new
knowledge can be obtained only through basic
scientific research.
Science can be effective in the national wel-
fare only as a member of a team, whether the
condition be peace or war. But without sci-
entific progress no amount of achievement in
other directions can insure our health, pros-
perity, and security as a nation in the modern
world.
Dr. Bush, in the above quotation, states that a
form of warfare, war against disease, continues,
in peacetime, and that our security against aggres-
sion by other powers is intimately bound up with
our prosperity and our national health. Research
specialists in the medical field may be said to be
intelligence officers of a certain kind, to whom the
qualities of alertness, thoroughness, patience, and
imagination are as essential as they are to mili-
tary intelligence specialists. Now more than ever
must scientific research specialists coordinate their
effort with military intelligence specialists, in
view, of the susceptibility of all nations to sudden
attack directed against centers of population and
industry. Developments in aircraft and guided
missiles have increased the range and speed of de-
livery of atomic bombs and toxic warfare agents.
Thus scientists as well as specialists in strategic
intelligence may be said to be today in our first
line of defense.
Not only must the state of our own scientific
research and development be of interest to us, but
we must also disclose, as promptly and completely
as possible, the trends and achievements of sci-
entific research and development in potential
enemy nations. In his report, Dr. Bush empha-
sizes the time element in modern war, and the
necessity for peacetime scientific preparedness:
The bitter and dangerous battle against the
U-boat was a battle of scientific techniques?
and our margin of success was dangerously
small. The new eyes which radar has sup-
plied can sometimes be blinded by new sci-
entific developments. V-2 was countered only
by capture of the launching sites.
We cannot again rely on our Allies to hold
off the enemy while we struggle to catch up.
There must be more?and more adequate?
military research in peacetime. It is essen-
147
tial that the civilian scientists continue in
peacetime some portion of those contributions
to national security which they have made so
effectively during the war. This can best be
done through a civilian controlled organiza-
tion with close liaison with the Army and
Navy, but with funds direct from Congress,
and the clear power to initiate military re-
search which will supplement and strengthen
that carried on directly under the control of
the Army and Navy.
During peace, the time element in our own sci-
entific research and development is closely related
to the time element in obtaining strategic intelli-
gence of scientific progress in other countries, in
precisely the same way that the two were related
during the war recently concluded. Furthermore,
internal security and counterintelligence, as ap-
plied to technology and science, are of continued
importance.
In World War II the deliberate and planned
violation of security which took place in connec-
tion with the atomic bomb was the disclosure to
the world of the fact that it existed and that it
worked. Security was also relaxed in connection
with the VT fuze, one of the important new weap-
ons produced by the Office of Scientific Research
and Development. As in the case of the atomic
bomb, a significant factor was the time element.
Originally, the VT fuze had been allocated only
to the Navy because of the possibility that the
enemy might learn the secret if VT fuzed shells
were fired over land. However, in the autumn of
1943, it became necessary to use VT fuzed shells
for the protection of London and port areas in
southern England which were eventually to serve
as major staging areas for the Normandy invasion.
The details of this situation are described by
Dr. James P. Baxter III in his book, Scientists
Against Time. Highly secret information re-
ceived by the Allies indicated that the Germans
intended to employ robot bombs against England.
Some months before any were used, however, a
detailed description of the new buzz bomb became
available to OSRD. With this information, it
was possible to construct a duplicate of the new
German bomb and to conduct intensive tests.
These tests revealed that the buzz bombs would
activate the VT fuzes and that certain models of
these fuzes could be effectively employed against
the bombs. As a result of this new information
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developed by careful research, a high level deci-
sion was made to utilize VT fuzes as a means of
aiding in the protection of the threatened areas of
England. This emergency decision made available
a helpful countermeasure which was ready for use
in ample time. The urgency of the situation and
the time element dictated the decision.
The importance of the time element in the grand
strategy of the Allied Nations in 1942, and the
reasons for selecting Germany as the main target
for attack instead of Japan, were explained by
Secretary of War Patterson in an address before
the American Chemical Society, 8 April 1946. In
his speech the Secretary gave the following rea-
sons for assigning priority to the European War:
One was to take advantage of the concen-
tration of forces. Russia was fighting Ger-
many, but not Japan. Another was the
shorter distance to Germany; the shorter dis-
tance meant shorter time in getting into ac-
tion. But the reason that seemed to me as
compelling as any was the danger of the Ger-
man scientists, the risk that they would come
up with new weapons of devastating de-
structiveness. There was no time to lose in
eliminating German science from the war.
There was no comparable peril from Japanese
science.
The wisdom of this decision is seen now in
retrospect when we ponder the remarkable ad-
vances made by German research and development
in the latter half of World War II, particularly
with respect to rockets, jet propulsion, and guided
missiles. The race for new weapons and counter-
weapons was ultimately won by the Allies, largely
because of better mobilization and organization of
scientific brainpower and because of greater armed
might and industrial capacity, but the margin was
close.
The secret of our success in developing many
new and improved types of weapons and equip-
ment during World War II, and producing them
in quantity and delivering them in time to be
effectively employed against the enemy, lies in the
coordination of our scientific and industrial po-
tential, in close cooperation with the armed serv-
ices. Our top strategic planners allocated mate-
rials, scientific brainpower, and industrial compe-
tence in accordance with priorities dictated by the
overall grand strategy, and, by means of technical
and scientific intelligence, kept abreast of scientific
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research and development in enemy countries, and
assessed the performance of our new weapons in
action as they were developed.
The Technical Intelligence Center and Missions
The vital interest of the Office of Naval Intelli-
gence in technological and scientific fields led to
the establishment of the Technical Intelligence
Center to deal with foreign technical subjects, in-
cluding ordnance in all its phases, electronics,
naval vessels and merchant ships and their char-
acteristics and equipment, chemicals, synthetics,
medicines, and aircraft (in collaboration with the
Technical Air Intelligence Center).
During World War II the Technical Intelli-
gence Center had a dual purpose:
1. To keep the strategic and operations planners
and the Navy at sea and in forward areas
informed at all times of such technical de-
velopments on the part of the enemy as might
affect operations, tactics, or planning in any
phase of the war.
2. To make available to bureaus of the Navy
and other interested technical and scientific
activities any information on foreign tech-
nology which might lead to development of
effective countermeasures on our part, the
perfection of Allied weapons, or the evolu-
tion of new materials and techniques.
The Technical Intelligence Center profited by
constant use of all the normal sources of intelli-
gence within and outside the country. Of unusual
significance was the detailed interrogation of cap-
tured personnel, particularly those with scientific
or technical background, with the Center itself
conducting an examination of some of the most
important prisoners.
In maintaining liaison with other technical ac-
tivities, the Technical Intelligence Center was
responsible for directing the collection of specific
items in fields of intelligence of extraordinary
importance to American scientific research and
development. To this end, the center coordinated
the activities of our naval representatives abroad,
particularly those of naval technical missions
eventually established first in Europe and later
in Japan.
With the successful invasion of the European
continent on 6 June 1944, and the advance of
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Allied forces into the German homeland, the ex-
ploitation of German technical developments for
possible use against Japan became a project of
urgent importance in the final phase of the Euro-
pean conflict. The determination of the nature
and extent of German technical aid to Japan was
in itself a project of vast significance. Strategic
planners recognized that the rapid exploitation
of this project, with correspondingly efficient
development of countermeasures, might affect to
a marked degree the duration of the war. There,
the naval technical mission in Europe, working
from lists of intelligence targets of prime impor-
tance, was assigned the job of investigating and
reporting on German technology; the Technical
Intelligence Center in Washington coordinated
the activities of the mission and assured proper
distribution of its discoveries and reports. The
detailed operation of NavTecMisEu teams in the
European theater was an interesting and exciting
chapter in the history of Naval Intelligence. The
successful examination of German industrial
plants, the painstaking and difficult search for
records and files which were often partially de-
stroyed or buried in cellars, and the continual and
often dangerous hunt for key personnel by teams
which travelled by air, train, jeep, and even on
foot, resulted in an exceedingly valuable and com-
prehensive record of German technological efforts.
While the Japanese war ended too quickly
thereafter for the United States to put into effect
the countermeasures which resulted from this
thoroughgoing investigation, the advantages ac-
cruing to the American military and to private
enterprise from a careful digest of German re-
search, developments, and techniques can hardly
be overestimated. An organization similar to
NavTeeMisEu was created under the title, Naval
Technical Mission Japan, with much the same
ends in view. A brief account of the establish-
ment, purpose and accomplishments of this group
is contained in the following quotations from
Summary Report, United States Naval Technical
Mission to Japan:
In the summer of 1945 . . . the United
States Navy established a mission to deter-
mine the position of the Japanese in the field
of naval technology.
How did the design and construction of
their warships compare with ours ? What
149
range and power had their guns? How heavy
was their armor and what was its metallurgy ?
Were they ahead of us in electronics develop-
ment ? The Navy wanted the answers to these
and a thousand other technical questions.
To obtain the desired information, investi-
gators had to enter Japan with the occupation
forces, before manufacturing plants, equip-
ment, materials, and records could be de-
stroyed and experienced personnel dispersed.
NavTechJap, which became the abbreviated
designation for the United States Naval Tech-
nical Mission to Japan, was established on 14
August 1945 by directive of Commander in
Chief and the Chief of Naval Operations . . .
The purpose of the Mission was to survey
all Japanese scientific and technological de-
velopments of interest to the Navy and
Marine Corps in the Japanese islands of
Kyushu, Shikoku, Honshu, Hokkaido; in
China; and in Korea south of latitude 38? N.
This involved the seizure of intelligence mate-
rial, its examination and study, the interroga-
tion of personnel, and, finally, the preparation
of reports which would appraise the techno-
logical status of the Japanese Navy and Japa-
nese industry.
The mission remained in existence from 1 Sep-
tember 1945 until 1 November 1946; its accom-
plishments were stated to be as follows:
A total of 185 separate reports comprising ap-
proximately 10,000 printed pages were prepared
and 500 copies of each were printed.
Approximately 3,500 documents were seized and
shipped to the Washington Document Center and
the technical bureaus of the Navy Department.
Approximately 15,000 pieces of equipment were
seized and shipped to the United States for labora-
tory investigation. The largest items were two
18.1-inch guns shipped from Kure, each 75 feet
long and weighing 180 tons.
The shipment to the United States of the 15,000
pieces of enemy equipment by the mission was but
a continuation on a far larger scale of a pro-
cedure established during the war, under which
items of equipment captured in the field were for-
warded to designated laboratories or test centers
in the United States for detailed analysis and
testing. In this phase of technical intelligence,
the center served as a clearing house for items sent
in, and for requests from Washington to forward
areas for specific 'articles. By this means, the
connection between reports of new weapons and
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the pieces themselves was maintained, and ade-
quate exploitation of the information assured.
Another responsibility assigned to the Techni-
cal Intelligence Center was that of evaluating and
processing information on naval and merchant
ships and their characteristics. All possible
sources of information were continually scanned
for data, comprehensive or fragmentary, on the
existence or characteristics of new ships, or for
alterations in existing vessels. The collation of
this kind of intelligence with a detailed analysis
of all types of photographs, including aerial and
surface shots, during the war resulted in far
greater knowledge of enemy ships than had ever
been available before. The size, probable per-
formance, equipment, and appearance of the bat-
tleships Tomato and Musash,i, secrets so closely
guarded in Japan that even men who had worked
aboard the vessels knew little about them, were
revealed with amazing accuracy by this method.
Another instance of the detailed processing of
ship data occurred in connection with the conver-
sion of the Japanese battleships Ise and Hyuga to
carry aircraft on a "flight deck" abaft the main-
mast. Prisoner-of-war reports were carefully
checked with the Preliminary Design Section of
the Bureau of Ships, and, without benefit of photo-
graphs or sketches, a drawing was prepared of
the possible appearance of the two vessels. The
close similarity of the drawing to the ships them-
selves, as revealed in the second battle of the
Philippine Sea, is testimony to both the possibili-
ties and value of expert processing of ship in-
formation.
Throughout the war the Technical Intelligence
Center made available to strategic planners and
to the fleet the latest information on the enemy's
naval vessels, including such important factors as
the speed, armament, armor, and specialized equip-
ment of each enemy unit.
As a means of assuring the distribution of in-
formation on naval and merchant vessels, the Tech-
nical Intelligence Center took over the basic work
accomplished by the Identification and Charac-
teristics Section in the publication field, and pre-
pared standard reference manuals on the fleets of
the world, together with a comprehensive volume
on merchant vessels. The ONI 22 series on the
naval vessels of Japan, Russia, Britain, and the
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United States and other countries contains all
available information on dimensions, armament,
protection, and propulsion of each ship, as well
as carefully prepared plan and profile drawings
and detailed photographs. These publications
serve innumerable uses as basic reference manuals
and provide source material for recognition train-
ing, naval staff work, and study at the Naval War
College. ONI 209, A Manual of Merchant Ships,
includes statistical information on over 13,000
vessels now afloat, in a convenient, readily avail-
able index, and profiles of approximately 8,000 of
these ships. Included also is a section originally
designed to assist in the recognition of German
raiders and blockade runners in the Atlantic,
South Pacific, and Indian Oceans. In addition
to these standard works, the center distributed
other information on weapons and equipment
through the medium of special publications, and
also in articles in The ONI -Weekly and its suc-
cessor, The ONI Review.
As a result of the flood of information from the
European theater subsequent to the Allied pene-
tration of Germany, an expeditious method had
to be promulgated to assure adequate distribution
of vital intelligence data to those technical activi-
ties best qualified to analyze the information and
develop any latent value it might contain. At the
same time it was apparent that much of the tech-
nical data from abroad was of interest and im-
portance concurrently to a number of widely
scattered organizations, and, as mentioned above,
to private industry.
A technical library of all reports and related
data was therefore established in the Technical In-
telligence Center which permitted immediate ref-
erence by subjects to all available information. A
staff of experts was assigned the task of analyzing
and briefing each incoming item of information.
Members of the staff were required to know the
needs of various technical organizations and to be
familiar with projects being carried on by them,
in order to make immediate distribution of needed
data. At the same time accession lists were dis-
seminated, containing brief abstracts of the con-
tents of incoming documents, by means of which
interested activities were apprised of the existence
of these reports. Processing this type of informa-
tion, translating, duplicating, and disseminating
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was a tremendous task, and one in which the entire
Office of Naval Intelligence participated, and of
which it can be justifiably proud.
ARMED FORCES INTELLIGENCE
Even though nonmilitary methods of warfare?
political, economic, and psychological ? have
grown in use and importance, their ultimate suc-
cess will be largely conditioned by physical force
or the threat of fts use. Military strength has his-
torically been the basis of national power, the hard
core of all the elements through which a nation
realizes its strategic objectives in peace and war.
Armed forces intelligence is therefore derived
from timely and accurate information of military
strength, both in being and potential. It is an
evaluation of the aggregate power of all the armed
services, as well as a detailed analysis of each serv-
ice. As a component of intelligence knowledge
it has a particularly strong relationship to the
other components, for armed forces are definitely
influenced by a nation's geographic position, the
adequacy of its transport and communications
systems, its sociological, political, and economic
structure, its scientific capabilities, and the per-
sonalities of leaders in each arm of the military
establishment. Because of these relationships;
armed forces intelligence is most complex, and in
order to make valid deductions the intelligence
officer or strategic analyst must have not only pro-
fessional competence in military matters, but also
a wealth of background knowledge in those aspects
of national life which govern military affairs.
In an age of amphibious landings, combined
operations, and "tri-elemental" warfare, Naval In-
telligence is concerned with all the elements of land
and air as well as sea power. Coastal zones may
be dominated by either ground or naval forces, or
by carrier-based or land-based air forces. Ex-
tensive sea areas may also be controlled from the
adjacent land. World War II provided striking
examples of the effectiveness of close coordination
of armies, fleets, and aircraft in achieving victory.
The naval intelligence officer will often be as-
signed to a joint or combined staff where he will
be closely associated with his opposite numbers
in the Army and Air Force. It is incumbent upon
him, therefore, to become familiar with the mis-
sion, organization, and professional nomenclature
151
of the other services. He should be a keen ob-
server of their operations, learn the capabilities
of their weapons, and appreciate their problems.
The ensuing discussion of the armed forces will
point out the various elements which must be con-
sidered in the development of this component of
intelligence knowledge.
THE ARMED FORCES IN GENERAL
Control
Political, administrative, and command control
must be clearly distinguished. They may be
vested in the same officials or be separated by an
elaborate system of checks and balances. In most
countries a semblance of civilian control of the
armed forces is preserved, but actual control is not
always the same as that prescribed by the consti-
tution. Usually in democracies a single cabinet
member of the executive branch, a civilian, is in
charge of all military affairs. In Latin American
democracies, however, it is often true that civilian
control over the army exists only in theory, for
the military may have acquired control over the
executive branch by force of arms.
Civilian control of the military sometimes takes
fantastic forms. During the past several years
the Soviet Government has been trying to intro-
duce a certain amount of "culture" into the officer
corps of its armed services. It appears that "cul-
ture" does not require an officer to become a con-
noisseur of the arts but relates to neatness in dress
and better table manners. The official officers'
guide contains the following directives:
Don't comb your hair during meals; don't
stretch your legs out; and don't open your col-
lar . . . The fork is held in the left hand,
the knife in the right hand, and not vertically
but horizontally . . . To eat with the knife
alone is quite indecent. . . . Don't exhale into
the faces of others.
Any important change in the top control struc-
ture effected in time of war must be carefully
noted. If such a change involves the formulation
of a joint general staff or other unified control, its
composition and the methods whereby coordina-
tion is achieved and differences resolved become
significant.
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Composition and Size
The armed forces of a nation may include in
addition to army, navy, and air, certain compo-
nents with police and border security functions,
which are integrated into the armed forces in time
of war or emergency. The United States Coast
Guard, for example, under the Treasury Depart-
ment in peacetime becomes a part of the Navy in
time of war. In East Germany the B ereit-
sehaf ten or "Alert Police" constitutes the nucleus
for an army, and the "Sea Police" can become a
navy. An estimate of the armed forces of the
U. S. S. R. will include consideration of the se-
curity forces of the M. V. D.
Data on the size of the armed forces consists of
more than figures on the total personnel strength
of each service. The relationship of the strength
of the armed forces to total population must be
shown, and significant trends in size and propor-
tion indicated. Comparative figures over a pe-
riod of years are essential.
Position in the Nation
The chief factors to consider in determining the
position of the armed forces in the nation are the
legal or constitutional basis for their existence and
organization, the traditions responsible for popu-
lar attitudes toward them, their role in political
life, and the fiscal support they receive. When-
ever the prestige and power of the armed forces
appears to be due in part to foreign influences,
the development of such influences should be care-
fully traced. Knowledge of these matters will
provide the researcher with the proper perspective
for detailed study of individual arms and services.
In many countries the size of the armed forces
and the proportion of the total military budget
allotted to each arm are specifically restricted by
law. An examination of such laws will help to
ascertain whether the present government pre-
serves their letter and spirit or whether the armed
forces have come to their present status without
regard for legal basis. Public law may also pro-
vide for organizational structure; for example, in
the United States, the National Security Act of
1947 represented a fundamental change toward
unification of the American military establish-
ment. An understanding of our present military
structure can only be gained through familiarity
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152
with the provisions of this law and its amend-
ments.
The attitude of the people toward the armed
forces is important in determining the position of
the military as a whole or the prestige of an in-
dividual arm. In Great Britain, for example, the
Royal Navy is the senior service, the result, of
course, of the place of sea power in British history
and traditions. In America, the Army has been
the senior service since the time oithe Revolution-
ary War when national objectiv"& were achieved
through effective use of ground forces. Reverence
for military leaders and popular approval of stern
military discipline have been important elements
in the willingness of the German people to go to
war. The victories or defeats of past wars may
have contributed to the present attitude of the
people of a nation toward war and military or
naval affairs. National emergencies can likewise
change the people's attitudes. In the United
States, for example, popular enthusiasm for mili-
tary matters and the prestige of military men
have always been greater in wartime than in pe-
riods between wars. In countries where conscrip-
tion is resented the armed forces will not enjoy
popular esteem, civilian control is apt to be more
firmly established, and the efficiency of national
defense may even be impaired. The morale and
accomplishments of the military establishment or
of an individual service may instill admiration
and respect in the popular mind, and become an
incentive for the most capable citizens to seek
military service. In countries where citizen
soldiers far outnumber professionals, the public
attitude will be conditioned by the treatment ac-
corded reservists while on active duty.
The political influence of military men must also
be assessed. Does the party in power take particu-
lar steps to keep popular military figures removed
from the political scene? Do political leaders re-
quire military support to further their objectives?
Associated with such considerations are the ex-
istence of political factions within the services
and the extent of political intrigue. Measures
taken to insure the loyalty of members of the mili-
tary establishment and the manner of dealing with
subversive elements are important in respect to
some countries. For example, in the U. S. S. R.,
political reliability is a requirement for promotion
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in the officers corps, and a special organization
within the military services is charged with the
political indoctrination of enlisted personnel.
In determining the national position of the
armed forces the manner of allocation and control
of appropriated funds are just as important as
the amount of the appropriations themselves.
What proportion of the total national budget is
allotted to the armed services? Are any items for
military purposes concealed in the budget figures
as published? Often the executive branch of the
government will have considerable funds available
for expenditure without public accounting. The
Manhattan project, for example, which developed
the A-bomb during World War II, cost over two
billion dollars, but the expenditures were never
published as items in a military budget for secu-
rity reasons.
The national objectives of a country will be re-
flected in its military budget. A striking example
can be found in the present tremendous rise of
United States military expenditures to meet the
threat of aggression in Korea. It also reflects the
growing realization that America can no longer
rely on her ocean barriers. New problems of na-
tional security require extensive funds for research
to improve existing weapons and equipment.
Manpower
Analysis of a nation's manpower was initially
treated in the preceding discussion of the sociologi-
cal component. The same principles apply here,
but more attention is given to manpower from
the military point of view, differentiating between
manpower as a whole and that section of it which
is drawn upon for the armed forces. Statistics
must be presented showing availability and quality
of men fit for military service. How many young
men annually reach military age, and what is the
average number inducted? The basic military
service laws and the general conscription system
should be studied. What are the actual practices
in granting deferments, and what proportion of
the number available is affected by such reg-
ulations?
In estimating the quality of military manpower,
attention must be given to physique, intelligence,
education, amenability to hardship, aptitude for
handling and maintaining technical or complex
269196-54--11
153
equipment, and general attitudes, such as accept-
ance of discipline, esprit de corps, and loyalty.
The discussion to this point has concerned armed
forces as a whole. The balance of this section will
deal with ground, naval, and air forces separately,
and the detailed information regarding each which
is needed in the production of accurate armed
forces intelligence.
GROUND FORCES
Administration of the Army
The best way to present overall organization is
by a chart showing the main subdivisions of the
War Ministry, or the Department of the Army,
and the chain of command to territorial headquar-
ters and field forces. The structure of the High
Command should be included and comments made
on the functions of main bureaus and staff divi-
sions. Maps showing the boundaries of military
districts and the location of headquarters are
essential.
The various arms and services of the Army must
be accurately described, using nomenclature in the
language of the country. Any distinctive insig-
nia worn by certain troop units should be described
or illustrated.
Tactical Organization
The overall organization of the Army into tacti-
cal commands can also be presented in chart form,
supplemented by a description of basic tactical
units and field staffs. If there are any differences
between the tactical organization in time of war
and that of the peacetime Army, note should be
made of them. Additional charts can be prepared
to show the detailed organization of divisions and
smaller independent combat units, including
strengths and allotment of weapons and vehicles.
Comparison with similar organizations in the
United States Army is always helpful. Descrip-
tions should be carried down to the smallest ele-
ments, such as rifle squad or tank platoon.
The organization of service units, engineers,
signal, transportation, etc., should be given in the
same detail as that of combat units. Nomencla-
ture should be carefully recorded, for it varies
considerably in armies of the world. American
equivalents again serve as good standards of corn-
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parison. Therefore, for background purposes, the
following brief discussion of United States Army
divisions is appropriate.
The Infantry Division
An infantry division is typically composed of
three regiments of infantry, a medium tank bat-
talion, a combat engineer battalion, an antiaircraft
artillery automatic weapons battalion, and four
field artillery battalions. It is designed to hit
hard, maneuver over any terrain, absorb reinforc-
ing units easily, and show considerable staying
power. In specific situations it may require addi-
tional artillery, armor, engineers, or service units.
It gives close support to armored units, seizes,
holds, or envelops objectives, and engages in neces-
sary close combat. The ratio of combat to service
troops is 1 to 1. In its present composition it is
a more powerful striking force than its World
War II counterpart, for each regiment also has a
medium tank company. The combat engineers can
build roads, bridges, ferries; lay mine fields and
obstacles; build shelters, landing strips, water-
works; and in emergency fight as infantry.
Infantry weapons include rifles, bayonets, auto-
matic rifles, machine guns, mortars, carbines, pis-
tols, grenades, light antitank weapons, recoilless
rifles, flamethrowers, and tanks. Infantry has the
advantage of being able to move inconspicuously
in small groups, taking full advantage of terrain.
Battle effectiveness over a period of time requires
rotation of units, proper supply, and medical
service.
When Army infantry is used in amphibious
operations, the battalion landing team is the basic
organization. Necessary boats and amphibious
vehicles take the place of much of the motor
equipment.
The Armored Division
The armored division is the basic large armored
unit, a balanced force of ground arms designed
to be tactically and administratively self-sufficient
for missions requiring great mobility and. fire-
power.
Typically, it is composed of 15 battalions: 4
tank, 4 armored infantry, 4 armored field artillery,
1 antiaircraft automatic weapon, 1 reconnais-
sance, and 1 armored engineer. In addition, there
are the necessary headquarters and service troops,
including combat commands as required. It is
very flexible in organization and employment.
An armored division is especially suited for
deep penetration and seizure operations, mobile
defense, and destruction of hostile armor. If
it cannot lead an assault, it can attack through an
infantry division after obstacles have been
breached or bridged. Maintaining its momentum
is important to full effectiveness.
CONFIDENTIAL 154
The Airborne Division
Just as amphibious operations require special
techniques and equipment, so too do airborne as-
saults. All equipment must be transportable by
air. The ground units depend upon the Air Force
for airlift just as amphibious units depend on
the Navy. Airborne divisions frequently are or-
ganized in three combat teams, each with an in-
fantry regiment, an artillery battalion, an engineer
company, and a medical detachment. Other per-
sonnel include a parachute maintenance company,
antitank and pathfinder platoons.
The airborne division enters combat in three
echelons: an assault group, either parachuted or
landed from assault transports; a followup group,
landed in the air head either by assault or regular
transports; and a rear echelon of maintenance
and administrative personnel.
The division is no more mobile than any other
without its airlift. Its radius of action is deter-
mined by the aircraft it uses. Typically, it re-
quires 751 Fairchild Packets (C-119), 161 Chase
Avitrucks (C--123) , and 16 Douglas Globemasters
(0-421).
Because of dependence on airlift, which in turn
depends on good weather, airborne operations are
usually limited to short duration strikes against
key targets in the enemy rear where opposing
forces will be weak or scattered. Operations are
usually intended for early joining with other
ground forces, raid and withdrawal, or special aid
to guerrillas. An independent operation, such as
the seizure and expansion of an air head, is possi-
ble, but requires a major effort since medium tanks
and heavy artillery are not available to an airborne
unit. Sufficient air superiority must be main-
tained to prevent the enemy from taking effective
counteraction over a period of time.
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The strategic mobility of airborne forces, sub-
ject to the command of the theater headquarters,
is a threat to the enemy by its very presence in
the theater of operations. At present the radius
of action for large-scale airborne operations is
about 730 miles; it could be extended to 1,000 miles
with the aid of carrier-based aircraft.
Order of Battle
In time of war, a large part of the total military
intelligence effort is devoted to enemy order of
battle: specific information on the strength and
disposition of opposing forces. Strength is meas-
ured in terms of personnel, units, and armament.
Disposition refers to the locations of identified
units, their headquarters, and movements. For
the operational commander such information on
the enemy is imperative, and he must also try to
keep from the enemy corresponding information
on his own forces. This denial to the enemy of
order of battle intelligence was well illustrated
early in the Korean War when General Douglas
MacArthur's headquarters asked correspondents
to refrain from identifying military units in the
Korean operations and reporting the whereabouts
of headquarters or troop movements.
Order of battle intelligence is expanded to in-
clude tactical doctrines and methods, combat value
of troops, records of performance of identified
units, and personal data on unit commanders. If
the information gathered by the intelligence re-
searcher in peacetime is painstaking in attention
to details, the task of the combat intelligence offi-
cer in the field will be made easier.
The need for including data on weapons and
equipment in order of battle information is well
illustrated by an experience of the United States
Marines in Korea. The First Marine Division
had made contact with an enemy unit. By inter-
rogating a prisoner, the Marine Intelligence officer
learned that this unit was a full North Korean di-
vision. Consulting his order of battle file, he
further learned that an artillery battalion is at-
tached to each North Korean division and that its
armament consists of 18 76-mm. guns and 18
122-mm. howitzers. Thus he was able to supply
his commander with valuable combat intelligence
on the firepower of the enemy.
Order of battle data can be effectively recorded
155
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on a situation plot for a given area of operations
by pins and symbols as far as identifications and
locations are concerned. A card file giving de-
tails on individual units is an indispensable
reference.
Strategy and Tactics
Since the strategic military problems of a nation
are influenced by such factors as geographical
position, nature of terrain, economic capabilities,
and political system, the analyst's task is to study
the land fortifications and costal defenses in the
light of the nation's strategic concepts. Detailed
information must be gathered on the location, pur-
pose, characteristics, and manning of defense in-
stallations. Presentation on a map will give a
good graphic picture. Whenever possible, sketches
or ground plans of individual fortifications should
be included.
The basic tactical doctrines of the Army offen-
sively and defensively must be carefully studied
in comparison with those of the United States
Army. How is artillery used in support of ground
forces? Cavalry? Tanks? Are there any pre-
ferred types of field fortifications or ground ob-
stacles? What use is made of reconnaissance?
What tactics are employed in close combat? The
doctrines established in special operations must
also be included, such as amphibious landings, air-
borne operations, and guerrilla warfare. Opera-
tions in desert, jungle, or mountain terrain require
special tactics. Similarities and differences with
respect to United States doctrine should be pointed
out.
Personnel and Training
The rank structure and system of pay and al-
lowances of a foreign army can be presented in
tabular form, with the United States equivalent
providing a basis for comparison. Any particu-
lar differences may require a descriptive explana-
tion. When pay is given in the terms of the
country's monetary system, the equivalent in dol-
lars at a stated rate of exchange is necessary.
Military pay should also be evaluated according to
the standard of living in the country.
Additional considerations with respect to per-
sonnel are the methods of procurement, terms of
service, and any quality factors not covered under
manpower. An assessment of military leadership
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against a background of the military history and
traditions of the nation is valuable in a strategic
estimate.
Details on the ground forces training program
should include training of the individual soldier
as well as that of all types of units. The army
school system for officers and enlisted men, regular
and reserve, the character of training maneuvers,
and the overall effectiveness of instruction are
pertinent considerations.
Closely allied to training are the reserve and
mobilization systems. The total number of
trained reserves should be presented by age groups.
In regard to mobilization plans an estimate should
be made of the actual numbers which could be
called up and ready for field service on M-day, M
plus 30, M plus 60, etc.
Logistics
Logistics enters into every phase of military
activity: production, procurement, storage and
issue, transport of supplies, maintenance and re-
pair on the field, and evacuation of both equipment
and personnel. Many a battle or war has been lost
through logistics failures and contrariwise superb
logistics support made victory possible for Ameri-
can armies in the farflung campaigns of World
War II. More recently the failure of Chinese
Communist Forces in Korea to sustain offensives
for long periods of time has been due to their in-
ability to maintain the nesessary amount of ma-
teriel at the front to support their operations.
The better logistics of the United Nations, on the
other hand, has enabled a numerically smaller
force to contain the enemy attacks.
The analyst or researcher thus considers all
the factors of logistics in preparing an estimate
of a foreign army. He very quickly finds that he
needs accurate knowledge of industrial production
and economic affairs in order to make his analysis
complete.
Army logistics are of particular concern to the
Navy because the transport of men and supplies
for any overseas operation is a naval responsi-
bility. Logistic planning in the United States
Army is based on the "division slice," that is, the
total number of men in both combat and com-
munications zones. For example, a theater di-
vision slice totals 40,000 men: 30,000 in the combat
CONFIDENTIAL
156
zone (20,000 in the division area, 10,000 in corps
and army service areas) and 10,000 in the com-
munications zone.
H. G. Martin in Brassey's Annual for 1951
makes some interesting comparisons between the
division slice of American and Soviet Armies:
Within two months of the outbreak of war
the Soviet Army could probably mobilize
about 300 divisions; at the peak of its effort
in the late war its total of divisions amounted
to about 600. The Soviet Army achieves
this multiplicity of divisions by a process of
streamlining vigorously applied. Marshal
Vasilevski believes that it is the men in the
firing line who win battles. He sees to it,
therefore, that in the Soviet Army there shall
be as many men as possible in the firing line?
at the expense of the rearward services?and
that the ratio of weapons to men shall be
higher than in Western armies. He has be-
gun right down at rifle company level.
Whereas in a rifle company in the United
States Army there are thirty-seven men whose
primary jobs are cooking, signalling, M. T.
driving, or clerking, in a Soviet rifle company
all but two are there for one purpose only?
to shoot at the enemy . . .
Clearly the West has something here to
learn from Marshal Vasilevski's methods.
Russia, with a plethora of cheap manpower,
has given us, with our manpower shortage,
a striking lesson in economy of administra-
tive overheads. Clerical staffs, cooks, or-
derlies, M. T. drivers, signals, engineering
and medical services?Marshal Vasilevski
prunes the lot ruthlessly.
Of course, his is a comparatively simple
problem. He can afford to cut overheads
because he is dealing with men accustomed
to conditions that more civilized Westerners
would find intolerable. For instance, in the
Soviet Army there is no personal documen-
tation of soldiers below the rank of major;
the medical battalion of a division is only
eighty strong.
Moreover, Vasirevski is faced by the fact
that in Russia there is no educated class of
minor technicians. Thus with the best will
in the world he could not have provided the
Soviet artillery with the men to do the sur-
vey, work out the computations, and man the
? observation posts on a western scale. Per-
force, he must there cut overheads at the
sacrifice of some flexibility of fire of his ar-
tillery.
Finally, he has a comparatively small zone
of communications to deal with. If war
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should come, the Soviet Army would advance
from its bases in Occupied Eastern Europe
in an attempt to overrun the western fringe.
Throughout, Vasilevski would be fighting al-
most on his own doorstep; but not so the
United States or even the British armies?
theirs would be an overseas campaign, fought
through a zone of communications that must
add greatly to the magnitude of the divisional
slice. Nonetheless, when we have made all
these allowances we still are left with our
lesson to learn. The West cannot afford to
put so few of its soldiers into battle.?Bras-
my's Annual, The Armed Forces Yearbook,
1951, pp. 261-2.
Materiel
Intelligence on ground forces materiel is gained
through detailed information on ordnance, signal,
and engineer equipment, quartermaster, chemical,
and medical supplies. Tables of characteristics
must be prepared for specific items in each cate-
gory of ordnance and quality as well as quantity
described. Quartermaster supplies include uni-
form, insignia, decorations, individual and unit
equipment. Any experimentation with new items
of materiel should be noted. Often the Quarter-
master Corps is currently engaged in a number of
research projects to determine the adaptability
of such things as clothing for certain weather con-
ditions, and the Engineers may be testing a new
type of portable bridge. Information on medical
supplies, facilities, and equipment are important
in evaluating the combat effectiveness of the army
in the field. The existence, for example, of a
national blood bank for military use should not
escape the analyst's notice.
Obviously every nut and bolt cannot be de-
scribed, and so the problem becomes one of se-
lection of significant items representative of type
and class. Photographs or sketches are always
helpful. It is in this subdivision of armed forces
intelligence that technical intelligence makes its
greatest contribution. Conclusions reached by
the technical evaluator often have far wider im-
plications than those apparent from the examina-
tion of an individual piece of equipment.
NAVAL FORCES
To make an appraisal of the naval forces of a
foreign country the factors considered are in prin-
ciple much the same as those for the ground forces.
Organization, strength and disposition, strategic
and tactical doctrine, personnel, training, logistics,
and materiel have a similar bearing on the deter-
mination of strengths and weaknesses. Com-
parisons with the U. S. Navy and American
equivalents of nomenclature will give proper per-
spective to the study of foreign navies.
Organization
In addition to diagrams showing the overall
command and administration of the navy, maps
outlining the naval districts, and discussion of the
functions of the more important department and
staff components of the naval establishment, spe-
cial attention should be given to naval communi-
cations. The organization of naval communica-
tions networks, and the various existing naval
communications facilities can also be graphically
presented on charts and maps.
Tactical and administrative organization of the
forces afloat should include shipboard organiza-
tion of typical units. Shore support activities,
and their relation to the fleet should be described.
If quasi-naval organizations, such as Coast
Guard, Coast Artillery, Coast Watchers, and Ma-
rine Corps are not adequately covered in the pre-
ceding sections on the armed forces as a whole,
these should be properly included here.
Strength and Disposition
The disposition of ships into fleets and forces,
names, types, and status of individual units can
be presented in tabular form. Such information
is never static, so the analyst should keep a card
file on each naval vessel on which entries can be
made to keep location and status up-to-date. The
number of vessels in "mothballs," those used for
reserve training, and those undergoing extensive
repairs or alterations in shipyards should be clearly
indicated.
The total number of naval personnel should be
broken down according to rank and rate, regular
and reserve. The proportion serving in ships and
at the shore activities of the naval establishment
should be shown.
Policy and Doctrine
The capabilities of the navy in fulfilling its mis-
sion with the forces available are fundamental con-
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siderations in a strategic estimate. What factors
influence naval thinking and strategic concepts?
Are naval problems of real national concern, or
must the navy wage annual battles with the legis-
lature to obtain an adequate operating budget?
How is naval doctrine formulated? Is it in-
fluenced particularly by war experiences? Has
the navy developed independent of foreign influ-
ences? What are the naval traditions of the
country?
Every country which has a navy will also have
a naval construction and development program.
The political and economic factors bearing upon
such plans must be noted. The Scandinavian
countries, for example, are developing navies suit-
able for coast defense and operation in restricted
waters. The U. S. S. R. has been concentrating
on submarines, destroyers, and light cruisers. Any
foreign alliances the country may have will also
influence naval policy and planning.
Personnel
The considerations which applied to army per-
sonnel can serve as a guide to examination of the
personnel of the navy: corps and services, rank
and rate structure, procurement, conditions of serv-
ice for both officers and enlisted men, uniforms
and insignia. United States Navy equivalents of
rank are important items of information in ob-
serving naval honors when United States naval
vessels are visiting foreign ports or when a foreign
naval vessel comes to our shores.
Reserve, Mobilization, and Training
The recommissioning of ships in time of war,
the naval reserve organization, the extent to which
the merchant marine can augment the navy, and
the adequacy of the mobilization system are major
considerations. The effectiveness of the training
system for officers and men must be assessed, in
basic and specialist schools ashore, on shipboard,
and in maneuvers of fleets and forces. Any spe-
cial methods of instruction should be described;
for example, the extent to which visual aids are
employed, the realistic nature of exercises, or the
use of educational facilities outside the navy.
Logistics
In addition to a description of the system of
procurement and supply of naval materiel, the
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policy in the construction, repair, and maintenance
of naval vessels should be noted. Are naval or
private shipyards in the country capable of doing
all kinds of such work? Must the navy rely on
foreign sources for any essential items? Where
are the main naval depots located? Does the navy
have fuel supply problems?
Ship Design and Characteristics
Of interest for strategic intelligence purposes
is the adequacy of ship design for operations in
certain areas. A ship designed for use in the
waters of the North Sea may be entirely unsuited
for tropical waters due to lack of an air condition-
ing system. Arctic operations also require special
ship design features. If amphibious operations
are included in the navy's capabilities, careful at-
tention should be given to the charactertistics of
landing ships and craft. If there are aircraft
carriers in the fleet, their strategic characteristics
must be assessed in relation to the capabilities or
vulnerablities of naval air forces.
158
Materiel
Tabular summaries of the characteristics of all
types of naval materiel are required: guns and
ammunition, torpedoes, mines, antisubmarine
weapons, electronic and communications equip-
ment. Any deficiencies in quality or supply of
particular items which affect the capabilities of
certain ships, or of the navy as a whole, are
significant considerations in strategic intelligence.
AIR FORCE
A strategic estimate of a nation's air forces
must give consideration to the same factors as
previously applied to the army and navy. The
naval air arm, if such exists, can either be included
with land-based air or discussed in connection
with the navy. The analyst must take care to
emphasize salient points of strength and weakness.
In the light of the mission of the air forces, a
careful study should be made of their capabilities,
both as regards aircraft and personnel. Doctri-
nal concepts in the utilization of available aircraft
in time of war must be studied.
Tactical Air Support
Two types of tactical air support, close and
general, must be considered. In close air sup-
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port, air action is integrated with the fire and
movement of friendly ground forces against hos-
tile targets or objectives. General air support
comprises air operations against enemy air activi-
ties, ground elements, installations, and lines of
communication which assist the supported ground
forces but are not in such proximity that inte-
gration with their fire and movements is required.
The capabilities of the air force in respect to both
types of support, must be determined. The maxi-
mum number and types of aircraft that can be
assigned to such missions initially and on a sus-
tained basis are important factors. Evaluation
criteria will be performance in past wars and
the emphasis given tactical air support in cur-
rent training programs. The air forces doctrine
in tactical air operations must be compared to that
of the USAF and the USMC.
Strategic Air Capabilities
Here the analyst is concerned with the maxi-
mum number and types of bombers available ini-
tially and on a sustained basis. Range, bomb-
load, maintenance of aircraft, availability of pilots
and crews, location of bases, and many technical
matters enter into such an estimate.
The country's air defense system, that is, its
ability to resist foreign air operations, is closely
allied to offensive capabilities. Interest will cen-
ter on the air defense organization, warning and
intercept systems, including electronic equipment,
types and deployment of aircraft defense units,
and the effectiveness of antiaircraft artillery. De-
tails will include types of radar, antiaircraft guns
and fire control equipment, guided missiles, bal-
loon barrage, searchlights, airborne electronic
equipment, and techniques in electronic counter-
measures. The average analysts will require a
great deal of expert technical assistance in the
compilation of such data.
Another capability to which attention should be
given is related to strategic air reconnaissance.
With what types of planes is reconnaissance con-
ducted? What types of cameras are used? How
skillful are the nation's photographic technicians
and photo interpreters?
Air Order of Battle
Air Order of Battle, similar to that of the army,
provides data on identification, strength, and gen-
159
eral disposition of the units, personnel, and equip-
ment of the air forces. Units are described by
types, mission, and location, with comments on ex-
tent of training, experience, and combat readiness.
Aircraft and equipment are identified according
to the numbering system, special markings, and
insignia. Source and number of aircraft acqui-
sitions are included.
The background for order of battle data is a
thorough study of the organizational relationship
of major and subordinate commands and units,
general control, and administrative and staff func-
tions at all echelons. Again as a standard of com-
parison it is helpful to have an understanding of
the organizational components of the United
States Air Force, the types of aircraft included
in the complement of each, how service and supply
functions are administered, and what facilities are
needed for effective operation.
Training
The training program of a nation's air force is
most significant for the strategic analyst. He
must evaluate its effectiveness in meeting the cur-
rent requirements of the air forces, its capability
for wartime expansion, and the adequacy of train-
ing equipment and facilities. Primary, basic, and
advanced flight training are each considered with
respect to duration in months, location of schools,
curriculum content, number of trainees admitted
annually, types of aircraft used, special training
aids, and quality of instruction. A consideration
of operational training will include such aspects
as gunnery, rocketry, bombing, navigation, instru-
ment training, night flying, and combat tactics for
each type of aircraft. The training of ground offi-
cers and airmen in such key specialties as opera-
tions, weather, engineering, supply, communica-
tions, and radar must not be overlooked.
Many foreign countries have sent air forces per-
sonnel to the United States for training or obser-
vation. The analyst should attempt to determine
the effect this contact with American training
methods has had upon training policy and doctrine
in the country from which the visitors have come.
Often their experiences have strongly influenced
relations between the two nations in areas other
than military.
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Air Facilities
INTELLIGENCE FOR
Strategic intelligence regarding a foreign air
force includes a complete description and assess-
ment of the air facilities of the nation. Each fa-
cility must be analyzed to determine its suitabil-
ity for combat air operations and capability for
airlift activity in support of combat operations.
Maps, diagrams, and photos are necessary ad-
juncts to a thorough appraisal. Current and pro-
jected construction should be included, and special
attention given to possibilities for extension of
runways and general expansion of installations.
Climate and topography are often controlling fac-
tors in a nation's development of air facilities.
Any limitations caused by these factors in certain
areas should be ascertained. The meteorological
services of the country and the use the air forces
make of them are pertinent in this connection.
Other Considerations
The study and evaluation of personnel, reserve
and mobilization systems, logistics, and materiel
of foreign air forces will embody the same gen-
eral considerations as were previously outlined for
the army and navy, with variations in details as
applicable.
BIOGRAPHICAL INTELLIGENCE
Biographical intelligence has the important
function of providing information on individual
persons in foreign countries and, as has been pre-
viously suggested, this component of intelligence
is essential to all of the others. Knowledge about
leaders in government, politics, science, education,
military services, and business will not only be
helpful in evaluating aspects of these general
fields, but also may provide valuable clues to prob-
able courses of action. The background, person-
ality, enthusiasms, and prejudices of such indi-
viduals constitute vital considerations in an eval-
uation of national strengths and weaknesses. In
the sociological component the people are consid-
ered collectively and characteristics common to
groups are ascertained; biographic intelligence re-
fines this study, centering interest on the dominant
figures within the groups.
Obviously the intelligence researcher cannot
keep extensive data on all individuals. His pri-
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NAVAL OFFICERS
mary task is therefore one of selection, but he can-
not be limited to only those prominent in the con-
temporary scene. He should always be conscious
of the fact that leaders of tomorrow may now be
in relative obscurity, but there may be signs point-
ing to rising eminence or power.
The sources of biographical information are
many. In a great number of countries volumes
similar to the American "Who's Who" are pub-
lished at regular intervals, and official registers
list persons in government service. The daily
newspapers and a great variety of periodicals will
always contain additional information. Most
valuable of all are character and personality esti-
mates from those who know or have known the
individual professionally and socially.
The paragraphs below will serve as a guide to
the content of the ideal biographical file. It will
not always be possible to obtain all the data for
every individual but the goal is defined.
Vital Statistics
The items to include are those usual for identi-
fication purposes: full name, nationality, reli-
gion, residence address, date and place of birth,
general appearance, parents, etc. Uniformity in
spelling geographical names and in trans-literat-
ing from foreign languages which do not use the
Latin alphabet is essential to a good biographical
file. Valuable aids in this respect are standard
gazeteers such as that published by the Board of
Geographic Names of the Department of the In-
terior, and the Style Manual of the United States
Government Printing Office.
Education
The data here should include schools attended,
degrees conferred, and academic honors. Extra-
curricular activities can also be significant. If
the individual became the disciple of a certain
professor at an early age it may be reflected in his
later thought and attitudes. His foreign language
proficiency is another important consideration.
Personality
Thus far the biographical file has merely com-
piled a vita for the selected individual. When
we come to personality, intelligence begins to be
produced. An evaluation must be made of the
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personality traits which govern his behavior:
moral force and character, intelligence, personal
characteristics, opinions, and loyalty. Does he
have marked qualities of leadership? Is he a man
of strong convictions or are his opinions easily
changed by others? Are his ideas of right and
wrong well defined? Is he honest?
Those who have associated with the individual
can supply the best answers to questions concern-
ing his mental abilities, but much can be derived
also from any books or articles he has written or
his published utterances. Does he quickly compre-
hend new ideas and can he rise to the occasion
when he meets the unusual? Is he well educated
in the sense that he has a broad understanding of
local and international affairs? Has his perspec-
tive been enhanced by travel abroad and contacts
with a great variety of people? Does he have cer-
tain distinct prejudices? Is he pro- or anti-
American?
Personal characteristics comprise another con-
sideration. Is he energetic or lazy? What are his
drinking and eating habits? What are his usual
forms of recreation? In what social circles does
he move? Is he bold or cautious? What is the
state of his health and does it affect his activity?
Is he loyal to his country and his superiors?
Does he inspire loyalty in others?
Family
Family position or influence must not be over-
looked. Often an ambitious wife is "the power
behind the throne." Family ties are important
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161
influences in the lives of men, and are often mir-
rored in their careers. Is he a family man? Has
he used family connections in any way to achieve
certain goals or ambitions? Does he have children
whom he is encouraging to follow in his footsteps?
Relationship of Factors
Only a final consideration of all the above fac-
tors in the aggregate will give a complete picture
of the individual's administrative ability, profes-
sional competence, disposition, tact, sobriety, inter-
national sympathies and attitudes. Biographical
intelligence thus can be used to great advantage in
strategic estimates. It is intimately related to any
field where names make news.
The objective of the foregoing discussion has
been to outline broadly the logical division of in-
telligence knowledge into component parts, and
to indicate to a degree their nature, comprehen-
siveness, interrelationships, importance, uses, and
sources. The applicability and utility of this great
body of knowledge in relation to current world
problems is suggested by the following three
chapters which are, in effect, topical summaries
in the field of international relations: elements of
world power, factors in the foreign relationships
of the United States, and salient features of World
Communism and the U. S. S. R. These chapters
will also contribute to the development of the
naval officer's perspective in his approach to mat-
ters of intelligence concern.
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CHAPTER 6
ELEMENTS OF WORLD POWER
In approaching a study of international rela-
tions a naval officer assigned to intelligence duties
should keep in mind three basic points. First, a
nation's power position in relation to other nations
of the world is determined by its comparative
strength in various of the categories described in
the previous chapter as the components of intelli-
gence knowledge. Second, a nation's strategy to-
ward other nations is influenced directly or
indirectly by its own relative standing in one or
more of these categories. Third, in the exercise of
national power there have developed in the course
of modern history certain recognized procedural
patterns which apply to relationships between
nations. A valuable aid to such a study is an
understanding of the elements of world power and
their effect on the behavior of nations.
For many years, problems of international
power relations were viewed in a somewhat de-
tached manner by the United States, and its
peoples tended to adopt an idealistic approach.
World War II and subsequent events had a tre-
mendous impact on that point of view and ap-
proach; the United States found itself directly
involved in problems of world dimension and its
idealism attacked. However, as an aid to finding
solutions, America's idealism is a vital factor, a
very real force that must be preserved, for it repre-
sents the symbol of personal freedom and justice in
a chaotic and frustrated world. But idealism is
not to be confused with a denial of realities or of
the basic facts relating to them. Perhaps for the
first time in American and world history there is
much more at stake than the survival of present
political institutions. The very structure of our
social life is threatened. Modern technology
makes all parts of the world accessible to every
other, and philosophies opposed to our own are for
the first time organized and regimented on a world
scale. Therefore, a sober concentration on solu-
tions to problems of international relations is
essential, not only for our own survival, but also
for the survival of those peoples with whom we
have kinship of spirit and tradition.
163
STRATEGIC GEOGRAPHY AND RESOURCE
POTENTIAL
Consideration of a nation's total power potential
involves all elements of its national power and
especially those of geography, resources, industrial
capacity, manpower, and technology. In study-
ing these elements separately, the intelligence offi-
cer, whatever his individual role, must have an
appreciation of the whole, an understanding of
how the particular facts he collects and assesses
ultimately compose the total estimate of a nation's
power. It will be helpful to discuss the elements
of world power from the point of view of the
United States.
Geographical Environment
Let us begin with a consideration of our geo-
graphical environment. In this world, man lives
principally on the large scattered islands known
as continents, and on lesser archipelagos. He has
made his greatest progress and shows the greatest
ambition in the temperate, lowland, regions. His
growing numbers and changing technology have
brought new stresses in the age-old fight for con-
trol of resources. In ancient times, the struggle
was for hunting, grazing, and agricultural lands.
Historically speaking, as a newcomer on the
planet, man has only recently developed written
languages and a real technology. The industrial
revolution and modern economic society date only
from the time of our most immediate ancestors,
within the last two centuries. Snowballing prog-
ress and new ambitions have centered major rival-
ries on control of natural resources, manpower,
transport routes, strategic positions, and mass
markets.
We in America find ourselves occupying a rich
continent newly settled in large numbers, with a
culture largely western European, which was
earlier subject to the civilizing influenced of Rome,
Greece and the Middle East. Our continent,
North America, in one sense is isolated by two
great oceans from the principal land mass of the
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world: Eurasia-Africa. In another sense, our iso-
lation is quite ephemeral when our map is not the
traditional Mercator but a globe or polar projec-
tion. In an age when jet aircraft, even following
the traditional routes, cross the ocean in a few
hours, and guided missiles on the drawing boards
will cross it in a few minutes, any vestigial ideas
of geographic isolation must be discarded.
Our technology is now so complex that what-
ever our military isolation or defenses at home
may be, full exploitation of our industry and our
acquired consumption habits require access to re-
sources far from our own frontiers. Possibly
only the United States and the Soviet Union would
be capable of maintaining their present living pat-
terns from the resources within their own bound-
aries. Even then our own high standard of living
would definitely be cut, and higher production
costs would be accompanied by plaguing short-
ages of key materials for which only inferior sub-
stitutes would be available.
Economic isolation is only one aspect of the
problem, for should we retreat within our own
walls, the smaller nations of the world, if organ-
ized or dominated by an aggressive power, would
in time far surpass even our own great industrial
and military potential, and today's new weapons
would banish any possibility of real defense in
depth. War in devastating form would come to
our own hearths.
Geographical Patterns
Let us then consider what are the geographic
patterns that govern what we and other nations
must defend for survival, and what are the routes
of attack, for these patterns should be basic keys
to conflict and strategy in the world, without re-
gard to political organization or to ideology so
long as mankind wars with his own species.
We are concerned with the position, the terrain,
the climate, the vegetation, the shape and size of
land, the resources, and the population of each
area or sovereign state. The power position of
each nation will be affected in some degree by
each of those elements. Power depends on mate-
rial factors, such as resources, capital goods, tech-
nology, and manpower; it also depends on in-
tangible factors that are harder to measure objec-
tively, such as the energy and central driving pur-
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164
pose, the steadfastness and traditions of a nation.
Some peoples, who by every objective test should
have disappeared long ago from the earth, have a
staying power that has helped them to survive oc-
cupation, dismemberment, and deportation.
Our first concern is with the tangible factors,
the physical patterns. The reader should refer to
a globe, if possible, and also to a good atlas, in-
cluding maps of physical relief, climate, and re-
sources distribution. Space here will not permit
particular study, region by region, but the ap-
proach and viewpoint can be delineated. Think-
ing of the military and political and economic
aspects, study your maps to observe the land and
the water pattern of the world. Where are the
land bridges that armies use? Where are water
trade routes channelized for contending naval
powers to dispute control? The patterns of
mountain ranges, and of deserts are important, as
well as the vegetation lines that indicate the shifts
from tropical rain forest to savannahs to desert
to steppe to temperate forest, and so on until the
tree line and the various crop lines mark the polar
or high central Asian regions. These changes give
clues to the significance of regions in their poten-
tial for supporting man and his crops and ani-
mals, and for their effects on military movement.
Throughout history military barriers to traffic-
ability and movement have dominated campaigns
and their outcome. Changing technology has
modified this only in part, for as men have in-
vented devices to overcome these barriers, so have
they frequently found other tools to neutralize
these advances. Deserts are of prime importance
as barriers, whether they be dry deserts of the
temperate and tropic areas or the frozen wastes
where survival is always a problem. Mountains
serve as great defense lines against military move-
ment, though, of course, the test of the barrier
lies in the passes through it, not in the individual
peaks of the main ramparts. Even open plains
are a major obstacle when by season they alter-
nate between soft mud and windswept snow or
cold. In some degree, swamps and marshes,
jungles and rain forests, oceans and rivers chan-
nelize and restrict military movement, unless the
means to bridge them are at hand. Invading
forces from the sea find that coasts are not uni-
form in nature, and that only a few beaches and
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ports lend themselves to mass invasion. Of
course, there are man-made obstacles to military
movement, but in contrast with nature's, they de-
serve scant attention here.
With these general clues to factors affecting
military movement, both history and the contem-
porary scene can be viewed in a new light as one
studies problems of military and naval campaigns.
A good grasp of the general position of countries,
the barriers of terrain, vegetation, und climate
that aid or hinder them, is basic to an understand-
ing of their power position. Clear recognition of
the difference between oceanic and continental
climates may give clues to the success or failure
of campaigns. As a further uid to full under-
standing, one should study maps from several
approaches. The geographic position of coun-
tries takes on new meaning when maps are turned
in unconventional directions. It is only custom
and convenience that makes us consider north as
"up.,,
Controlling Resources
Historians theorize that modern civilization be-
gan as the last ice age receded, allowing the two
keys of geography and resources to open the door
to progress. In the ancient world of Egypt and
Mesopotamia in the west, and in the protected val-
leys of Sinkiang and Kokonor in the east, simple
communal living rapidly blossomed into complex
civilizations. In the Middle East, rich alluvial
plains with wild rice in abundance led to settled
farming and the further domestication of animals
which had begun in nomadic days on the grass
lands of Asia. Sedentary living led to building
cities, codifying laws, and written communica-
tion. In time, smelting metals, farming, and
trade became widespread.
Today the controlling resources include more
than plentiful food, for the age of reason, ex-
perimentation, and exploration brought mechani-
cal inventions that depend on a wide range of
natural resources. The key to national power
today is not alone food, but energy derived from
coal, oil, and, to a lesser extent, water power, and
iron, which is still the chief metal, since the bronze
age was left behind thousands of years ago. These
are then the major elements of real power, but
there are a host of others, strategic in nature,
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whose particular properties support the alloys
and specialties of metallurgy, the growing chemi-
cal, plastics, and electronic industries, newly dis-
covered methods in agriculture, and, of course,
that new key to power, the development of nuclear
energy.
Food patterns are still important, for indus-
trialization and modern transport have developed
dense concentrations of population which depend
for survival upon orderly flow of their sustenance.
Wheat, rice, corn, barley, sugar, fats and oils,
fruits, beans, fish, meat and dairy products fill
thousands of ships on the ocean highways of the
world, and load the great rail networks across the
continents. Shipments of tea, coffee, tobacco, and
chocolate may also be considered essential, for they
contribute to morale, one of the intangibles in
national power.
Industrial Location
Modern economics has given importance to the
theory of location of industrial activity. In
simple terms, it recognizes that locations of raw
materials, power, labor supply, and markets all
interact with transport costs and material char-
acteristics to determine where industry is to be
found. Changing technology alters the force of
the various elements in the equation, but generally
speaking, industry is drawn to the source of the
materials it uses (if they are weight-losing in
processing) , to save transport costs. Thus the
modern dependence on mechanical power derived
from coal, oil, or hydro-electricity tends to draw
industry to these materials. Pittsburgh, the
Ruhr, Manchuria, the English Midlands all dem-
onstrate this tendency.
Some countries by strenuous efforts have tried
to overcome their natural deficiencies, but they
face a losing battle. Italy's large industrial popu-
lation tries to earn enough through trade to pay
for imported coal. Japan, now restricted to her
home islands, also depends heavily on imported
materials. Even the United States, though well
supplied with fuel, must consider the full military
implications of replacing the ore from the nearly
exhausted Mesabi range with ores from abroad,
thus losing the advantage of cheap haul through
the Great Lakes.
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INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS
Coal is still the dominant fuel of the world
and must be ranked highest among essential mate-
rials for economic, and consequently military,
strength. It generates steam to provide electric-
ity, has a major role in metallurgy, and can be
used to make a host of chemical products including
gasoline. Oil is a second important source, as a
principal source of fuel for millions of internal
combustion engines, and also as a raw material
for the chemical industry which, among other
things, supplies rubber substitutes.
Iron and steel follow closely after fuel as major
essentials, but the dominance of these particular
resources should not make us disregard the vital
though smaller role of copper, lead, manganese,
sulphur, zinc, aluminum, nickel, and tin.
Modern industry is built upon a great number
of major and minor materials. Salt, phosphate,
potash, mica, asbestos, industrial diamonds,
graphite, nitrates, mercury?all are essentials.
The metals that alloy with iron must be available
if tools are to keep their cutting edges, if armor
plate is to stop projectiles, or if springs are to keep
their resilience. Likewise tungsten, antimony,
chromium, palladium, and molybdenum must be
added to manganese and nickel to expand the list
of essential alloys.
From our fields and plantations, in addition to
food, come cotton, flax, and other hard and bast
fibres?jute, abaca, sisal, ramie, and hemp. We
also depend on wool, leather, hides, and bone.
Rubber, though increasingly available in syn-
thetic form, is provided from the tropics. Our
temperate area forests, wastefully cut until re-
cently, provide us with principal building mate-
rials, with paper, a modern-day essential, with
raw materials for plastics, with distillates, and
naval stores.
Even water is an important resource, not only
to quench our thirst and to water- our crops, but
also for industry which consumes it in enormous
quantities. It provides transport routes and hy-
dro-electric power, the latter of which can create
nitrates for fertilizer and explosives directly from
the atmosphere. Our electric power system, draw-
ing upon the energy of water, coal, oil, and gas, is
a prime target for any enemy, and its growing size
is an index of our strength.
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166
Our resources are of two types: replaceable and
irreplaceable. To date, modern technology and
field exploration have kept our standard of living
rising despite a profligate waste of irreplaceable
resources. Perhaps the sea can be made to yield
what can no longer be found on dry land, but defi-
nite dangers to our economic and military strength
loom not far ahead.
Strategic Materials
We define strategic materials as those critically
short in relation to our need for them. One of the
prices of World War II was that it greatly ex-
panded the list of strategic materials the United
States should stockpile or protect overseas, if our
security is to be maintained. The appearance of
an item on the strategic list should immediately
set in motion measures to offset the potential dan-
ger of shortage. What steps are taken depend
upon circumstances at the time, but among the
possibilities are new searches at home for these
materials, production controls and consumption
restrictions, measures to assure overseas supply
sources, creation of import stimulants and export
quotas, assignment of necessary manpower to ex-
ploit sources of these materials, initiation of con-
servation and recovery measures, the adoption of
special measures to prevent crippling sabotage of
our limited supply, and the development of sub-
stitutes. Actually, in the case of many materials
which are running short in usable form, there
may be marginal and submarginal deposits that
can be exploited, but the cost may well be inordi-
nate in time, manpower, and capital equipment.
Resources in the ground or in the forest do not
of themselves make for strength. Many richly
potential stores of materials lie in undeveloped
and weak countries. It is only with capital ac-
cumulation, know-how, manpower, and transport,
that these resources are translated into power
through production and delivery for use.
Capacity To Produce
0 ur assessment of a country's power must there-
fore measure not only its stores of materials but
also its actual capacity to produce. Quantitative
data of major semimanufactures and finished
products give a part of the answer. These data
in turn must be linked to plant capacity indices.
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Are all plants operating at full capacity ? Are
trained manpower, raw materials, power, and
transport available to work more shifts? Next,
we ask, can any of these plants readily be converted
to the production of war goods? Tractor plants
may make tanks. Automobile plants may switch
to aircraft engines or subassemblies, or it may be
that plant expansion will provide the answer to
real military strength. If the building materials
and machine tools can be set aside for use in new
factories, rather than go directly into war produc-
tion, the eventual output of war goods may be very
high. All of these matters are interrelated and
very complex. Knowledge is still too inadequate
concerning the relative effectiveness of price and
tax incentives, or of government orders and con-
trols, to give categorical answers in all situations.
It should be stressed that military power is not
measured alone by the production indices of out-
put, capacity, conversion, and expansion, for
civilian consumption may compete with military
requirements. Thirty million tons of steel in one
country may count for more militarily than one
hundred million in another, if the latter country
uses virtually all of its steel for civilian consump-
tion, as against heavy military use in the first. On
the other hand, given a big enough crisis, the rich
consumer country has a bigger cushion that can be
diverted to military ends, or may at least launch
a great program of plant expansion. These are
imponderables that are solved only by careful and
qualified analysis, not by catch phrases and popu-
lar fancy. For the length of the war, the sud-
denness of its coming, the temper of the people,
the dispersion of facilities as protection against
surprise air attack, are all variables that affect the
answer. There have been numerous examples of
the complexity of a partial mobilization in the
time since the Korean War began. How far can
taxes be pushed to curb inflation without drying
up needed capital for expansion or reducing tra-
ditional incentives? Will controls aid fair dis-
tribution at low prices, or will they create a huge
bureaucracy and reduce total supply? Well-
informed and patriotic Americans find themselves
arriving at different answers.
A number of agencies and offices of the executive
branch of the United States Government, assisted
by private research groups and congressional staff
167
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studies, are involved in guiding the planning for
war mobilization. From their work come the
plans that direct stockpiling of essential materials,
the mobilization manufacturing and control plans,
and the assessments of national strength. A com-
plete assessment of our power must be compared
step by step with that of our allies and our rivals
to draw up the balance sheet that will indicate
where there is need to expand, to divert, and to
contract for national security essential to survival,
but at the same time saving the mainsprings of
long-range progress and traditional patterns of
living. These agencies study agriculture, giving
consideration to the methods used, manpower and
materials demands, regularity and quantity of
various crops, and availability of additional lands
for expansion. The extractive industries of min-
ing, forestry, and fisheries yield data on output per
worker, capital requirements, availability of re-
serves, and new processes becoming available. The
basic metallurgical and chemical industries have
indices of production, changing methods, and
varying efficiencies; for example, blast furnaces
serve as an index of productive capacity, yet one
country may run them harder and faster than
another to increase current yield of pig iron even
at the expense of destruction of capital equipment.
Study of the permanent munitions industries is
important to the total picture, too. The shipyards,
the explosives manufacturers and arsenals, and
the atomic plants, are typical cases. Certain civil-
ian goods industries are particularly susceptible
to military conversion. The television industry of
America may have given civilians home receivers
instead of those same resources going into a com-
plete air defense radar net, but at the same time,
the existence of a huge electronics industry will
supply the conversion capacity in war for radar
on an immense scale, and the coaxial cables and
microwave relay networks may speed military
communications. The engineering and machine
tool industries are important, because their ability
to produce will determine ability to turn out novel
weapons of war in time to use on a mass basis.
Economic Vulnerability
Once such broad, general studies have been made
of our own resources, and, with the aid of intelli-
gence, of those of other countries, there are spe-
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cific studies and individual conclusions which
must next be undertaken. One area of concern is
that of vulnerabilities, both here and in foreign
countries. Is the flow of raw material subject to
interruption, as, for example, the Soo Locks or
the TAP line? Are there technological bottle-
necks in such industries as ball bearings or avia-
tion gas? Is capacity limited by poor transport
facilities; for example, the Baku oil fields and Ven-
ezuelan iron ore? Is a specialized labor force
available? Can watchmakers work on precision
instruments? Do we have sufficient oil well rig-
gers? In what degree are different industries in-
terdependent or are they competing for a common
labor or power supply? Is steel available for final
products or for steel plant expansion?
National power, too, is linked with defenses, for
a great industrial machine unguarded is an invi-
tation to attack. Defenses may be active, made up
of radar nets, jet fighters, balloon barrages, and
AA guns, or they may be passive and equally
effective, such as duplication of facilities, region-
ally decentralized into far reaches of the country,
or locally dispersed from the center of urban areas
to offer targets of lower density and therefore less
attractiveness. In some cases facilities may re-
treat to hilly country or even underground.
Transport Assessment
Increasingly, transport is being subjected to
analysis and study, for it is a major factor in
power. Britain's plan for agricultural develop-
ment in Tanganyika, many other "backward" area
development plans, and Soviet strength all have
suffered from poor transport. Even the United
States must consider the repercussions in the long
run of low railway earnings, and of inadequate
highway modernization. Assessments must there-
fore be made of facilities, as to capacity, efficiency
in ton-miles per day, and per worker, repair and
fuel needs, the bottlenecks in marshalling yards,
bridges, tunnels, and steep grades.
It is difficult to measure foreign progress ade-
quately due to incomplete statistics. Figures are
rarely comparable, frequently are withheld, and
often lack meaning due to inadequate qualification
and definition. If only a few figures are to be
chosen, the key ones for national power should in-
clude electric energy production, steel production,
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168
and transport data such as car loadings, and ton-
miles hauled.
Manpower Assessment
Manpower has already been mentioned; it rep-
resents a significant measure of power both for
the present and for the future of a country, when
coupled with information on geography, raw ma-
terials, and industry. Mere numbers alone, or
even the military age numbers, are only the begin-
ning for a power analysis. The data on numbers
must be supplemented by detailed breakdowns on
distribution by geographical location, and by den-
sity in relation to developed resources. Trends
are important. Is the population stationary, ris-
ing, or falling? If it is rising, what is the rate
of increase? At what height and when will the
population level off? The sex-age group distri-
bution or pyramid will tell what the labor force
and the military supply will be now, 10 years from
now, and even farther in the future. The supply
of females of child-bearing age, related to other
data, will forecast shifts in the population. Quali-
tative population analysis will help to assess some
of the intangibles of national power. The break-
downs by education, cultural background, and
technical skill are important. Tables on national
origin, political parties, and religion may give
important leads to questions of national cohe-
sion. Economic groupings, tied to national and
personal income statistics or land holdings, may
answer questions on the appeal of communism or
land redistribution. Although social scientists
may quarrel with the statistical validity of mass
personality traits, from a purely pragmatic view
there seems to be definite value in studying typical
traits of national character, for they may give
clues to determination, objectives, subjectivity to
hysteria or impatience, and other elements that
influence an assessment of foreign nations'
behavior.
In the long run, national population trends will
have their effects on the power position and foreign
policies of countries. Medical, economic, intel-
lectual, and religious environment factors affect
birth rates and death rates as well. A shift in
either rate will affect population growth. Al-
though we have come a long way from the pessi-
mism of Malthus, the growth of the total world
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population can be a subject of grave concern.
Density data as such are meaningless in isolation,
for Australia will never catch up with the United
States, despite her area, and China has nothing like
the overall density of the Netherlands, yet is prob-
ably more "overcrowded." Net reproduction
rates, adjusted for migration and possible life
span changes, are key data to power calculations.
Total Power Potential
These elements reviewed in the foregoing sec-
tion, then, are the basis for estimating the total
power potential of a nation. No one element is
dominant, neither industry, nor resources, nor
manpower, but all are considered jointly with
questions of geographical location, climate, and
topography. Also important are the questions of
vulnerability, of trends as well as of present situa-
tion, or capacity to produce munitions as well as
total industrial capacity. By no means can the
intangibles of national spirit and determination be
ignored, and in this day and age the ability to
adapt national life to so-called "Cold War" may
rival in importance the strictly conventional mo-
bilization of the nation. This brings us to the
next topic, the bridge between the assessment of
national resources, in the broad sense, and politi-
cal relations among nations, namely, geopolitics.
GEOPOLITICS AND STRATEGY
The formal study of all the aforementioned
power factors in relation to geography and na-
tional strategy is called geopolitics, a term that
has been made unsavory only because of its mis-
application by Nazi theorists. The scientific
study of geopolitics is not only proper, but es-
sential to our national well-being. It is of par-
ticular interest to intelligence analysts because of
its possible influence on the thinking of foreign
political leaders and, hence, on the strategic plan-
ning of various nations. A knowledge of geo-
political concepts may give clues, therefore, to esti-
mates of national behavior. Treatment of this
subject here can only be cursory.
Mackinder and Mahan
In 1904, an Englishman, Mackinder, introduced
the concept of the world island with its heartland,
safe from assault by seapower. The heartland is
169
described as the territory encompassing much of
the Soviet Union and the suzerainties under nomi-
nal Chinese control, such as Sinkiang, Mongolia,
and Tibet. The lands around the edge of the
world island, which can be dominated by seapower,
are referred to as the marginal crescent. The
Americas are regarded as an outer island. Of
course, such concepts are meaningful only in a
limited sense, for new map projections, air travel
and guided missiles rob the heartland concept of
considerable meaning. The concepts are impor-
tant, however, because they have influenced the
thinking and policies of many leaders since Mack-
inder's time. The idea "whoever controls the
heartland controls the world island; whoever con-
trols the world island controls the world" is an
oversimplification, and although it has an ele-
ment of truth, it is not a substitute for the careful
and detailed analysis of national power previously
recommended.
Mahan of the United States Navy was the great
exponent of sea power. His voluminous writings
do not precisely delineate seapower, but general
concepts can be derived from them. Seapower is
related to the control of the commercial arteries of
the world. It is the outgrowth of proper access to
the sea coupled with the industry necessary to sup-
port merchant ships and navies. The right bal-
ance of fleets, control of strategic bases and fuel
supplies, good training and morale, all combine to
create sea power. Mahan felt that no nation has
the ability and capital to be both a great sea power
and a great land power, either one resulting in a
serious drain on resources. Although in some
way a comforting doctrine, it may not be com-
pletely valid.
Other influential writers in this field were Ratzel
in Germany, Semple in the United States, and
Kjellen in Sweden. Ratzel believed that geog-
raphy dominated history, and he considered the
state as a living organism. Coordinating his
theories of selection and survival with those of
Darwin, he attributed a spatial aggrandizement
instinct to states? a theory somewhat difficult to
support as a universal law. Semple was a disciple
of Ratzel. Kjellen considered the state as not
just a legal entity but as a living being. It was
he who coined the expression "geopolitics," and in-
fluenced the pan-German movement, believing that
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one German state should spread from Scandinavia
to the Near East.
The American, Spykman, instead of opposing
seapower to land power, envisioned seapower as
joining with land power in one part of the world
to fight similar combinations elsewhere. Consid-
ering interior communications to be poor, he put
stress on control of the rimland rather than the
heartland and believed that the United States must
oppose any attempt to dominate the rimland or
crescent.
German Interpretations
Under the aegis of Hitler, Germany adapted
Mahan's and Mackincler's doctrines to her own
ends, with General Haushofer as the chief
prophet. The Auslands organization and Geo-
politic Institute combined studies of geopolitics
with an intelligence collection program for plan-
ning Germany's strategy.
Haushofer considered that a Soviet-Japanese
combination of land and sea power would be dan-
gerous. Because of improved land transport, he
tended to discount seapower and thought that if
Germany could move to dominate Eurasia, its
position as world leader would be assured. Spe-
cifically, he favored a number of policies which
markedly influenced Hitlerite Germany. These
included autarchy, (national economic self-suffi-
ciency), "lebensraum" (enough space for a vigo-
rous, growing people), and a three-way split of
the world, in which the United States would domi-
nate pan-America, Germany would dominate
Europe including Russia, the Middle East, and
Africa, and Japan would dominate Asia and the
South Pacific. He saw German control of the
marginal crescent as a means to add seapower to
her land power. Also he believed that a nation's
frontier should be along a natural boundary, for
any other frontier represented no more than a
temporary truce line in time of peace. Peacetime,
further, was viewed just as a breathing spell be-
tween wars, a time to out-flank and encircle the
enemy. International agreements were to build
balance of power, not world security.
All the great powers in considerable degree
have operated geopolitically, whether they recog-
nized the fact or not. Their use of geopolitics may
have been more or less benevolent, or it may have
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170
NAVAL OFFICERS
been aggressive. The Truman Plan of contain-
ment represents an application of Mackinder's
theories. Although unable or unwilling to strike
at the heartland, the United States has been de-
termined to prevent the heartland leaders from
seizing all of the marginal crescent that might
allow them to add seapower to their land power,
and thus dominate the world.
Many of these geopolitical concepts need re-
finement and modification in the light of the
changing conditions. Atomic concepts of war-
fare and power may well modify accessibility in
the military sense. The Arctic no longer repre-
sents a dead space, but rather a crucial direct air
route between the power centers of the world.
The concept of imperial domination has been re-
placed by that of consultation as a guiding rule
in the relationships between many world states.
Airpower Concepts
To Mahan's doctrine of seapower and the Ger-
man-Soviet doctrines of land power have been
added the doctrine of air power, first formulated
by General Billy Mitchell and Douhet, and later
vigorously presented to the public by Major de
Seversky, an ardent enthusiast. While this doc-
trine has given rise to heated debates involving
the concepts of a dominant arm versus balanced
military forces of approximately equal strength,
it may be concluded that sea power, land power,
and air power each have their potentialities and
limitations in the determination of national power.
To summarize, it must be admitted that history
has been strongly influenced by geography, that
defense in depth is a valid and compelling mili-
tary doctrine. Though the heartland and rim-
land ideas have strong elements of truth, how-
ever, modern world power is based not only on
location and size and shape, but also on resources,
demography, technology, and transport.
Power Politics
The United States in its public conscience has
disparaged power politics as an unworthy force,
and as a poor approach to world relations. Yet
the existence and use of power politics is ines-
capable, whatever this doctrine is called. We are
concerned with power to control the minds and
actions of men, particularly men organized to do
jointly what individuals could not do. Power is
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not force in its actual exercise, but it does imply
fear of force. United States power has been in-
creased by possession of the A-Bomb, even though
its use is potential. This power would be reduced
if controls were placed on its use, such as prior
approval by the United Nations or even by Con-
gress, since speed of reprisal may be the most
potent deterrent to a would-be aggressor. Eco-
nomic power can also be used for national power
purposes. Control over exports of finished goods
and raw materials needed by other countries is an
enormous source of power. There will be power
politics so long as nations keep their sovereignty.
If a few "enlightened" nations eschew its use,
they will be destroyed by the unenlightened.
Power politics may be used merely to hold exist-
ing positions, the status quo, to improve position
through expansionism or imperialism, or to main-
tain prestige by demonstrating that power.
INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL RELATIONS
It is very hard to be entirely objective in dis-
cussing international political relations. Each
nation tends to view its own conduct as above
criticism and the conduct of others as frequently
reprehensible. Even more, nations may often be
unjustly charged with responsibility for an in-
ternational situation because of the great difficulty
in accurately and correctly identifying the events
which led to the particular situation.
Any assessment for intelligence purposes must
be impartial and analytical: motivations both of
the nation and its leaders must be carefully stud-
ied. Certain general guides which may be help-
ful in making any evaluations involving interna-
tional relations are presented in this section.
The "Status Quo"
There is nothing especially sacrosanct about the
status quo, though this is a pretension of those
who are satisfied with it. The Congress of Vi-
enna, the Versailles Treaty, and the United Na-
tions have all had some part in maintaining things
as they were. It should be pointed out that status
quo does not refer to freezing of existing boun-
daries, though on occasion it may take that form,
but rather to maintaining an existing balance of
power. Those who maintain existing situations,
even though unfair, may have the weight of inter-
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national law behind them and be the upholders of
"peace." All challengers, of course, are called
"war mongers," regardless of the cause for which
they struggle. Certainly, those who would resort
to force carry the burden of justification for their
acts, and their propaganda is rarely adequate, or
accurate.
Imperialism
As opposed to the status quo, imperialism repre-
sents an attempt to bring about a favorable duinge
in a current world power situation. It refers to
a nation's policy aimed at an extension of power
over another area with or without the approval of
the peoples concerned. The motives, and the
means, for gaining this additional power may be
economic, political, military, or ideological, or a
combination thereof. Any analysis of this phe-
nomenon of national behavior will result in the
conclusion that it is exceedingly complex.
For many years, the term imperialism has been
in disrepute as the result, partly at least, of its
association with the policies of colonialism and
territorial aggrandizement carried on by various
European nations during the latter nineteenth
century at the expense of backward areas. Dur-
ing that time, a predominant motive was eco-
nomic competition, coupled with the search for
larger markets and sources of food and raw ma-
terials. However, there were other motives, such
as the desire for expanded political power and
prestige which might exert a dominating influence
in world affairs, the real or assumed need for pro-
viding greater guarantees for national security,
and the search for sources of potential military
manpower as well as areas of expansion for sur-
plus population.
There are curious inconsistencies in the inter-
pretation of this term. Mussolini found it an
expression of a nation's vitality. Marx and Lenin
explained it as entirely a product of capitalism, a
"dying" stage in which there was an inevitable
struggle between national monopolies in the inter-
national arena. They reasoned that by definition
communism could not be imperialistic because it
did not have the same need for new markets and
trade. In popular fancy, imperialism has been
associated with the "machinations" of Wall Street
and the munitions makers, the Japanese Zaibatsu
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emperor-worship, or the exploitation of colonial
subjects. But these interpretations are inade-
quate, since imperialism predates modern capital-
ism by thousands of years and, from the American
viewpoint, communist and socialist states have
demonstrated positive imperialistic tendencies, re-
gardless of the labels used.
The policy of imperialism has been considered
one of the causes of war. Wars actually arise for
many reasons which are usually composite and
complex in nature. There are so called "defen-
sive" wars, designed to keep the status quo, but
which often seek a permanent change in power to
prevent effective challenge to present positions.
Other wars are deliberately designed to expand
the power position of a country, even when it is
not threatened. The power vacuum theory applies
in some cases, too, when the strong powers, rush-
ing to dominate a newly weakened or discovered
area, clash in their efforts for supremacy. This
situation has been more recently demonstrated in
Greece and Korea. A few aggressive nations,
either for supposedly lofty or for very base rea-
sons, have also set out deliberately to conquer the
world by one means or another.
Can compromise be considered a solution to the
ambitions of such aggressive states? Repeated
examples from history, some quite recent, seem to
suggest that, at best, compromise may only shift
the time table for further aggression. This may
not be wholly bad for the compromiser, providing
he can use this time to good advantage. Rearm-
ing and defense pacts, important and inescapable
as they may be, are not in themselves an absolute
guarantee of peace, for they may create a vicious
circle of counter moves by the opponents, with no
solution short of military, economic, and psycho-
logical conflict.
Many excuses have been given for imperialism?
the "white man's burden," a "sacred trust," "leb-
ensraum," "ethnic unity," "defense against en-
circlement," and others more idealistic, such as
"liberty, equality, fraternity." We considered
both world wars anti-imperialist, and of course
for opposite reasons they were so regarded by
many Germans and Japanese fighting against us.
The Monroe Doctrine could be considered either
status quo or imperialist, depending on the view-
point and circumstances of assessment. How-
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172
ever, from an objective point of view, it should be
understood that these terms, the status quo and
imperialism, are intrinsically and morally neither
good nor bad. What these terms actually mean
when applied in international relations depend
upon the objectives, motivation, and circumstances
of particular national policies.
World Powers
World powers today can be grouped into three
general classes. The great powers are the United
States and the Soviet Union. The United King-
dom may still be considered a great power, too,
although now less able to stand alone in the world.
The regional powers, which wield considerable
influence in particular parts of the world, include
such countries as France, Argentina, Brazil,
China, and India. In a third category are the
client powers, such independent states as Uruguay,
Costa Rica, Luxembourg, and Egypt. Even
though their independence may be important to
their citizens and even to mankind, their continued
independence is at the sufferance of the larger
powers, and their conduct is largely conditioned
by external events. Under international law each
sovereign state is equal, and American policies in
considerable measure have aimed toward support
of this doctrine; however, law cannot hide the fact
that states are not equal in power and never will
be. A country like India, with hundreds of mil-
lions of people, cannot be equated in all circum-
stances with a state like Liechtenstein, even
though each is sovereign. This has been recog-
nized by the United Nations by its system of per-
manent seats in the Security Council, and the veto
system, which is not wrong in itself, but only in
its abuse. The tests of a great power, behind all
the polite words and agreements are (1) to be
able to threaten force, (2) to have the ability to
pay the price in a showdown of force against force,
(3) to have the capacity to wage active, autono-
mous war with its own resources.
This realistic approach to power is not meant to
show cynicism for the efforts which certain coun-
tries, including our own, have made to achieve a
better world for all on the basis of soverign
equality; far from it. It is merely intended as an
examination of the basic forces of existence and
survival that lie behind our best efforts.
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6
OF WORLD POWER wENTIAL
Nationalism
The armed forces of any nation, if they are to
carry out their assigned missions, must have a
sense of nationalism, to know why they are fight-
ing for their country. Extreme nationalism may
be unworthy in a world that considers itself civil-
ized, when the brotherhood of man, in the best
Christian sense, is a worthy goal. But national-
ism of itself is not bad. It may be the only means
of attaining worthwhile goals. We love our rich
and beautiful America; we want to raise our fam-
ilies in peace and happiness; we believe in the
American heritage of freedom and individual
dignity. The willingness of military men to
sacrifice their lives for such goals is, in effect, an
expression of nationalism.
Nationalism has its basis in the demand of par-
ticular groups for complete sovereignty. Inter-
nationalism on the other hand admits the sur-
render of some aspects of sovereignty to a broader
control. Each has its proper place, and the
United States for valid reasons orients its policies
both ways. No nation is willing to surrender all
sovereignty until there are guarantees that what
is held most sacred will not be harmed. But in
countless fields, from the assignment of radio fre-
quencies to the control of drugs, we willingly sub-
ordinate our complete control in the interests of
world order.
Nationalism, in many ways an intangible force,
grows out of race, religion, language, or historical
and geographical circumstances. Small countries,
lacking real power, sometimes substitute an exag-
gerated feeling of nationalism. In some ways
nationalism, as we know it today, is a relatively
new development. In both ancient and medieval
times, loyalty was shared between local people and
local rulers, as a matter of mutual protection in
the unsettled times in which they lived. In the
Western world, a broader spiritual and cultural
community was effected through the Christian
church in its struggle for survival and growth.
The development of a money economy, the end of
serfdom, and the Renaissance brought larger states
and a gradual transfer of loyalties to the symbol
of the monarch and the state. An expanding
interest in philosophy and many other multiple
forces combined to help the concepts of democracy
and self-determination emerge. A new liberal
173
nationalism gave the chief loyalty to the state, and
the ruler became at most a symbol. But some-
times the forces of nationalism, instead of leading
to liberalism which recognizes the rights of minor-
ities, leads to totalitarianism and more strongly
authoritarian states. Democracy, as we know it,
is a very fragile thing, even though it has a con-
siderable will to live among those who understand
it. Nationalism and individualism, therefore, are
frequently in conflict, but nationalism per se is
not to blame, but rather the use that is made of it,
for nationalism may be the champion of freedom.
The United States, therefore, needs nationalism,
internationalism, and individualism; all three are
inherent in its traditional political and social
heritage.
Some countries, including our own, also face the
problem of national minorities. The major group,
united by race, religion, or language, may not be
the sole occupants of a political state. National
minorities, people bonded together in varying de-
gree by different forces, may be no problem at all,
or they may constitute a threat to the solidarity
and power of the dominant group. In the United
States, for example, there are a great many sec-
tional differences, social and political, -which
appear more serious to foreign observers and
critics, than they really are. India, for example,
has religious minorities that continue to hamper
complete national solidarity.
Balance of Power
So the world is organized into multitudinous
groups, sometimes working together, sometimes at
cross purposes, gathered politically into larger
units known as sovereign states or dependencies.
These units in turn settle their differences by war?
military, economic, and psychological, or by sub-
stitute devices which will be examined in the pages
ahead. One means of avoiding war, or of jockey-
ing for position to be at the best advantage, is
through power politics, as already mentioned.
Another means is through balance of power ma-
neuvers, by which nations may achieve an equaliz-
ing of forces to avoid or postpone war. This
equalization may be achieved without destroying
the individuality of the separate states. However,
balance of power entails many devices and, in some
degree, each affects the policies of all states. One
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device is the familiar "divide and rule ;" another
is to prevent unions of competitive states. It is
often stated that British policy in the past has
been to seek a balance of power in Europe with
Britain as the strategic key to the balance. When
Napoleon was rampant in Europe, Britain was
allied with other states against France. When the
Kaiser and Hitler threatened, Britain was arrayed
with the French and others opposed to German
expansionism. In connection with the balance of
power approach, it must be remembered that situa-
tions constantly arise requiring vigorous remedial
steps which may or may not be successful.
The National Interest
What constitutes the "national interest" by
which states always claim to be guided? Perhaps
its origin was in the personal interest of the ruler,
and with the change to nationalism, the idea of
national honor developed. Some wars have been
fought for reasons of national honor. Honor alone
may be too idealistic or Quixotic for some; the
jailing of a citizen for the pulling down of a flag
may not be considered excuse enough to plunge
nations into war with great cost in lives and
resources. National interest, however, if accu-
rately assessed, is a realistic, practical considera-
tion of events from the viewpoint of national
welfare, both present and future. American na-
tional policies in earlier years were largely inter-
nally oriented, due to the farm interests in domes-
tic land expansion. Industrial growth had its
political and national consequences when a new
interest in raw materials and markets dictated
naval expansion. Tremendous responsibility for
interpreting the national interest?economic, mili-
tary, and "war of life"?rests with the President,
as well as the Congress. For example, U. S. par-
ticipation in the Korean War was interpreted as
essential for reasons of national interest.
It is because events in far away places like
Korea and Iran and Germany are cumulative in
their effects toward a buildup of destructive force
that they cannot be ignored. America's national
interest is and must be the determining factor in
American reaction to any world events.
National Character
This discussion raises a related question, that of
"national character." Is there such a thing?
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174
America has attempted major reforms in Germany
and Japan through political, economic, military,
and educational changes. Will these changes be
permanent? The answer is not simple. It may
be that class characteristics are more valid in defi-
nition than net characteristics, and particu-
lar groups or classes may dominate policies and
national viewpoint. Militarism, or communism,
or idealism may dominate in different situations.
Cultural patterns do affect the definition of "na-
tional character." It was suggested earlier that
national character may be susceptible to analysis,
but it is important to remember that it is com-
plex and not wholly predictable.
Sovereignty
Sovereignty has been referred to earlier as a
characteristic of states. It grew out of a combi-
nation of two doctrines, that of the divine right
of kings, and that of the free will. Combined
and transferred to the state, it has been the out-
come of the necessity for an unchallengeable and
supreme power to make and enforce the rules that
bind society together. Such centralized power is
the essence of government. Further, there can be
no international law with real meaning unless
there is sovereignty to consent to it. Perhaps the
corollary doctrine is that one sovereign state
should not interfere with another, though this is
more difficult of accomplishment. Sovereignty
does imply an equality among states, but only le-
gally speaking, since this is a practical impossi-
bility. A state can voluntarily accept restraints
on its affairs without destroying sovereignty.
Though states are legally equal, they may not have
equal rights in all respects, and their independence
of action may be more ephemeral than real. With
the passage of time some states have lost their
sovereignty and ceased to exist. This happens
when, voluntarily or involuntarily, the final au-
thority over their actions passes to another state.
International Law
International law is subject to considerable
abuse and even more misunderstanding, yet it
holds together the fabric of international society.
Its elements of administration, enforcement, and
adjudication have come from many sources. Do-
mestic legal concepts throughout the world are
not uniform enough for international law to be
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complete. Some law is based on common law, on
precedents; other law is administrative and ad
hoc, with judicial decisions playing a smaller role.
International law comprises both kinds, drawing
on evidence in the form of direct treaties, confer-
ence agreements, treaties of third parties, deci-
sions of international and national courts, state
papers, opinions of unofficial bodies and individual
scholars, and even upon the "general principles of
justice."
Some of the earliest recognized international
law relates to the sea, which is one reason why the
Navy has always been so interested in this field.
The commerce of the Hanseatic League led to the
foundation of international rules of conduct, and
Grotius is credited as the father of formal study of
international law. At an early period inter-
national law also dealt with the rules of war. It
deals with conduct both on public and private
levels, and also becomes a part of the domestic law
of most states. Its limitations are that it is appli-
cable only in certain situations, that it is some-
what uncertain and slow to develop, and that it
cannot be legislated or executed in the ordinary
sense. But it is developing and should grow in-
creasingly important. Now criminal law is being
added to international law, and the theory of non-
intervention is undergoing change, while the
rights of neutrals are being reduced. There is
general condemnation of genocide, and support of
a bill of rights for individuals. Even if these
rights are not yet universally accepted, they are on
their way to inclusion in the law. Genocide in-
cludes not only actual killing of ethnic groups, but
also sterilization, breakup of families, or submer-
sion of culture. The international bill of rights
includes the concept of due process of law, denies
involuntary servitude except in wars or emergen-
cies, and allows no arbitrary restrictions on free-
dom of movement, public trial, religion and press,
assembly, and similar elements familiar to Anglo-
Saxon jurisprudence.
International law holds that jurisdiction over
particular cases may hinge upon the territorial
principle ( where the act occurred) , the nationality
principle (that of the guilty party) , the protection
principle (through national interest) , the princi-
ple of universality (as concerning pirates) , or the
passive principle (that of the injured party).
175
The principle of territorial jurisdiction is most
firmly established. Where individual parties sub-
ject to one jurisdiction are required to appear be-
fore another jurisdiction, their possible extradition
is a matter of treaty.
Recognition of one state by another under inter-
national law may be either de facto or de jure. De
facto means that although no formal treaty is
signed and representatives are not exchanged, for
all practical purposes the one state admits to the
sovereignty and authority of the other over a par-
ticular territory and people. This may have its
naval application, when our government does not
choose to recognize a foreign government. Naval
commanders must be very careful that they take
no action that could be interpreted as de facto
recognition. De jure recognition, of course, is
that granted by formal treaty and exchange of
envoys.
The Laws of War
One of the chief concerns of international law is
war, for in its modern form war invades every
aspect of life. Early writers could not agree on a
definition of war. It obviously refers to the use
of force between states, but not all such cases con-
stitute war. War, from the point of view of in-
ternational law, is not per se bad, for the law deals
only with its conduct, how it was begun, the be-
havior of neutrals and belligerents, and its ending.
The legal recognition of a state of war affects mat-
ters of contraband, blockade, and censorship.
Domestically it affects contracts and government
controls. Such questions arise as to whether a
state of war can only be declared by Congress, or
whether a Presidential declaration of an "emer-
gency" which requires action by armed forces is
legally war. Under international law, the formal
declaration is not necessary. Only one of the par-
ties needs to intend war. However, police actions
and armed intervention are not necessarily war.
There is the presumption of intent to make war by
certain overt acts, especially if so regarded by the
victim, but even now there is no sharp definition.
The question of defensive versus aggressive war
also arises. These are equally difficult of defini-
tion; it is not so simple as who fired the first shot,
for some self-defensive acts and proper exercise
of sanctions would then be ruled out. In practice,
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regretfully it must be said, the winner was the
"defender," the loser the "aggressor." In sum-
mary, then, war, as such, is not illegal; it is the
prerogative of the state.
Causes of War
Much has been written about the causes of war,
and such studies should be of concern to the in-
telligence officer, because he has a continuing in-
terest in studying cause and effect patterns, par-
ticularly in the field of war. However, the causes
of war are not easy to find, although many have
been suggested. An "instinct of pugnacity" in
man, hate, military general staffs, munitions mak-
ers, and many others that do not stand the tests
of universality, have been suggested. War usu-
ally is not an end in itself, but serves as a final
means of settling disputes, preserving rights, and
remedying wrongs. Granted that it is a profligate
means, increasingly so as it threatens the survival
of the race, mere recognition of this fact does not
solve the problem. Wars will continue to occur
until a substitute is found, and other means to en-
sure security, defense, and justice must be pro-
vided before weapons will be surrendered. Dis-
armament, limitation of weapons, education,
treaties outlawing war all have great merit, but
they do not solve the basic problems of war, which
are most complex.
Psychologically, war springs out of fear, sus-
picion, greed, lust for power, hate, revenge, jeal-
ousy, and envy. When great tension has been
built up, war represents a release from pressure.
There are also economic causes: aggressive im-
perialism, both territorial and economic, and com-
petition for markets, energy sources, or essential
raw materials. Wars may start from government
protection of private interests abroad, without par-
ticular reference to the general welfare. On the
other hand, failure to protect citizens and prop-
erty abroad with decisive action may also lead to
war. Disregard for the rights of "backward peo-
ple" and population pressure, at least in its indi-
rect effects, are additional causes. Political
causes include balance of power maneuvers, secret
treaties, violations of unjust treaties, disregard for
minority rights, deliberate organization for war,
and even ineptness in government. There are
many others: exaggerated nationalism, competi-
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176
tive armaments, religious and racial differences,
general ignorance, and even war psychology, in-
duced by press, radio, motion pictures, text books,
family influences, social inequalities, social sanc-
tions, and a lack of spiritual ideals.
If all the above causes could be removed, would
war then disappear? The possibilities are poor
according to some theorists who believe that war
is cyclical, that it is related to survival of the
fittest, that heredity and environment cause it,
that it is a culture trait, an instinct, an institution,
and part of the stepladder of evolution. These
theories are far from encouraging. Accordingly,
preventive devices, such as a world state, have
been suggested. Critics of this plan, however,
have pointed out that super-sovereignty might
largely result in a shift from international wars
to "domestic rivalry" just as difficult of solution.
It is obvious that great difficulties are involved in
determining the causes for war and that there is
as yet no general agreement as to either causes or
effective solutions. Until such a time, the grim
realities of modern total war must be faced.
Prevention of War
The prevention of war is a major task of the
larger nations of the world, although it should
be stressed that prevention is by no means their
only task nor does the word imply a philosophy
of "peace at any price." Since the prevention of
war is aided by any limitation of warlike tenden-
cies, the means available to do so must be em-
ployed to the maximum degree. There are sev-
eral means. One is negotiation, the use of diplo-
macy and conferences. Actually hundreds of
minor incidents are settled by diplomacy, and thus
do not become causes for war. A third country
frequently offers its "good offices" in a dispute, or
even goes so far as to mediate the quarrel. Com-
missions of inquiry may be established to aid the
settlement. Conciliation may move on to arbi-
tration, voluntary or compulsory, but even arbi-
tration does not necessarily force acceptance of
decision. Such measures seem to work best on
problems of private law and economic matters,
rather than on strictly political matters. Concili-
ation is on the borderline between straight nego-
tiation and the compromise of arbitration. A
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ELEMENTS OF WORLD POWER CONFIDENTIAL
third general approach is through the use of judi-
cial means, but in the international sphere accept-
ance of a court decision is dependent on the will-
ingness of the parties. Major political issues,
therefore, have seldom been solved in world courts.
When diplomacy fails to solve problems of war,
security measures may be of help. These take
many forms. Disarmament and arms limitation
have had United States support but with limited
success, because few countries are willing to co-
operate whole-heartedly. Unilateral disarma-
ment coupled with neutrality laws has met with
no more success. Ratios of limitation, or stand-
ards of allocation, are most difficult to establish.
Security through education alone is illusory, for
even if we are progressive and educate against
war, will our enemies do the same? Passive re-
sistance has been proposed and even used, as by
Gandhi's followers, but they were opposing the
British who have a conscience and are responsive
to public opinion. Aggressors generally do not
have scruples, and then passivity only hastens
slavery. The Kellogg-Briand pact made a novel
approach to war: it outlawed "aggressive war,"
177
but not "defensive war," and of course each sover-
eign state reserved to itself the decision as to the
nature of the war it fought. The issues of iso-
lationism as an approach to peace have been de-
bated in the United States and elsewhere. Still
another approach to peace is through collective
security, which may mean alliances or even a world
body and world police force.
Peace between nations is a long-sought goal;
the dimensions of the problems involved are best
realized perhaps by those who first attempt to
define war itself, isolate its causes, and find its
cures. The purposes of this chapter have been
much less ambitious, and limited to a considera-
tion of the basic elements of power and the general
prerogatives and behavior of states in their power
environment. However, since war is expressive
of a particular power relationship between world
states, a better understanding of the elements of
world power should lead to a fuller appreciation
of problems of war. Other power relationships
between nations, such as those expressed in terms
of foreign policies, are the general subject of the
following chapter.
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CHAPTER 7
THE UNITED STATES AND THE WORLD
While the preceding chapter on Elements of
World Power dealt largely with concepts and
principles, this chapter will review more specific
developments in foreign policy, in international
organization, and in economic relations that are
of particular intelligence concern. All facets of
the problems presented by the topics of this chap-
ter obviously cannot be discussed because of space
limitations, but it is hoped that those mentioned
will stimulate further thinking and study. It is
also appropriate to suggest here that the solutions
of problems arising out of relationships between
states can seldom be considered in terms of ab-
solutes: good or bad, white or black. The com-
plexities of these relationships give rise to a va-
riety of alternative choices which often have rela-
tive values. It is for this reason that good in-
telligence must reflect shades of meaning in order
that all potentialities may be fully recognized.
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY
The creation of the foreign policy of the United
States is the role of both the executive and legis-
lative branches of government. Indirectly, of
course, it is affected by every kind of individual
and group reaction. Its abstract nature makes it
difficult of analysis, but it is the product of certain
major fields of common concern. One is national
security, which relates to our geographic loca-
tion, military strength, industrial power, and man-
power, as described earlier, and which is changing
due to new forces at work in the world. A sec-
ond major concern is related to our economic situ-
ation, namely, the degree of industrialization we
possess, our world trade interests, our raw ma-
terial needs, our problems of unemployment and
price levels, the availability of funds for invest-
ment, and related phenomena. A third major con-
cern is peace, and all that it implies, for peace is
a predominant desire of the American people.
Formulation and Execution of Foreign Policy
The constitution of the United States reserves
matters of foreign policy to the Federal Govern-
ment, a concept which has been upheld in many
court decisions. The Federal Government can
negotiate treaties, legally "declare" war, receive
foreign diplomats, appoint ambassadors, and regu-
late foreign commerce. States, of course, can
make lesser arrangements with foreign countries,
if Congress approves. The President, as head of
the executive branch of the government, is chiefly
responsible for foreign policy, for through the
Secretary of State he handles official communica-
tions with other governments, decides upon their
recognition, and determines states of belligerency
and neutrality. The actual declaration of war is
a congressional right, effected by the two houses
meeting in joint session. Congress can strongly
influence foreign policy through its legislative
acts, such as the tariff, and the House of Repre-
sentatives has a special power through its initiation
of appropriations. The President and the Senate
share the right to make treaties and appoint en-
voys. Senate ratification of a treaty negotiated
by the executive branch requires a two-thirds
majority vote of those present. A device increas-
ingly popular is the "executive agreement in
place of the treaty. Its ratification requires a
simple majority of the members of both houses,
which is often politically more expedient than the
standard treaty. Congressional interest in for-
eign policy is illustrated by the large number of
Congressmen traveling abroad to investigate a
great variety of subjects and conditions. For-
eign policy usually cuts across political party lines,
and the party platforms in recent years have not
differed materially in this respect. In matters of
foreign policy, while the American people re-
spond readily to moral and ethical principles, as
mentioned previously, they, as any national group,
react most rapidly to the needs of self-defense.
A brief historical survey of the development and
dominant features of American foreign policy will
provide a useful background for the better under-
standing of its current operations in connection
with other world governments.
179
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Isolationism and Expansionism
The exact meaning of George Washington's
injunction against entangling foreign alliances
has been long debated. It has been generally
agreed, however, that his concern was in perma-
nent alliances with foreign nations, and that he
did not mean to impose a ban on all close relations
to meet temporary situations. If a recommended
policy of isolationism is to be implied from his
remarks, certainly at the time it was a suitable
policy for a weak country far removed from the
European scene and well occupied with an inland
frontier. But even though in the past the United
States has avoided close political contacts, its
trade and economic relations have always been
tied in with the rest of the world. While true
that the Monroe Doctrine, for example, was iso-
lationist in one sense, in another it was interven-
tionist because it was unilaterally proclaimed by
the United States in sympathy with the Spanish
rebels in Latin America. Nor can it be forgotten
also that this doctrine for many years relied for
support on the strength of the British Royal Navy.
Internal expansion across the North American
continent was followed before the end of the nine-
teenth century by expansion into Alaska and over-
seas into the Caribbean and the far reaches of the
Pacific. The reasons for expansion beyond the
continental limits of the United States are many
and certainly cannot be blamed on the economic
lobbyists alone. For example, many sugar inter-
ests were actually opposed to intervention in Cuba
and, in the Philippines, the United States might
have withdrawn from there as readily as it did
from Cuba had it not been for the postwar revolt.
Our difficulties with Colombia over the Canal Zone
were restricted to control over a narrow strip of
land, coupled with handsome remuneration to the
injured party, an unheard of act in that day. Our
interests in Nicaragua, Haiti, Santo Domingo, and
other nearby countries never led to actual coloniza-
tion, although a later approach to inter-American
relations has been that of mutual consultation
rather than unilateral action.
The Open Door in China
In China, United States policy was long that of
the open door; self-interested, yes, but at the same
time it may have saved China from being carved
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180
up into colonies like most of the rest of Asia.
America's interest in China dates back to the days
when our clipper ships traded at Canton for tea
and silks. In the middle of the nineteenth cen-
tury, China was forced to open additional treaty
ports to foreign commerce, with concessions
granted to a number of countries including our
own. China had gradually lost many outlying
territories and suzerainties. The French had
taken Indo-China and dominated Yunnan,
Kwangsi, and Kwantung together with the leased
port of Kwangchowwan. Russia had taken the
Amur Valley, had railway concessions in Man-
churia, and dominated Outer Mongolia. Ger-
many had Kiaochow and dominated Shangtung.
The British held Hong Kong, Kowloon, and
Weihaiwei, and controlled the Yangtze Valley.
Earlier they had taken Burma, and had a degree
of control over Tibet. Italy attempted to obtain
Sanmen Bay in Chekiang, but was not successful.
Japan, as is well known, persistently pressed for
territory and privileges, acquiring the Ryukyus,
Formosa, Korea, and later Manchuria. In 1899
Secretary John Hay proclaimed our open door
policy to put an end to further territorial seizures.
We never really backed it with force until 1941,
and since then the progress of events has swept
away the opportunity for its application. It was
a generally favorable factor in our relations with
China for many years.
The First World War and Its Aftermath
First trying to be neutral, we finally entered
World War I as a crusade for democracy, with
the issue of freedom of the seas a major considera-
tion. After the war we found ourselves at odds
with our allies and facing new and unfamiliar
problems. Reparations, war debts, financial boom
at home, then worldwide economic collapse were
aftermaths of the war. Economic nationalism
and autarchy, foreign aggression and dictatorships
of right and left followed. The deterioration of
world affairs in the 1930's brought us back to war
again.
The Second World War
With much of the world in flames our neutrality
acts were quickly shown to be no guarantee of
peace. We transferred our ships to neutral flags
to rush supplies to Europe. The sudden collapse
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of western Europe under the German onslaught
brought a vast rearmament program, and overage
destroyers, preserved from the first war, were ex-
changed with Great Britain for bases. By the
summer of 1941 the Navy was in effect at war to
protect the western half of the Atlantic, despite
the doubtful legal status of such protection. Our
policy stiffened in the Far East as well, although
we were woefully unprepared for major action.
Many Americans had to revise their thinking dur-
ing that period, though the full shock of discover-
ing that we were arrayed against strong antago-
nists in a worldwide struggle was not felt until the
attack on Pearl Harbor.
Moves for Security
Our international relations after 1940 under-
went successive policy changes as our leaders and
people began to assess the meaning of events as
they unfolded. Our primary concern was with
our security. In the summer of 1941 off Argentia,
Newfoundland, Churchill, and Roosevelt met to
agree on common principles and war aims. We
emphasized that we were not interested in terri-
torial gains, and recognized the right of people
to choose their own form of government. We
agreed upon a postwar cooperative order that
called for free access to raw materials and mar-
kets, subject to existing commitments. We called
for disarming aggressors, pending the arrange-
ment of a general security system. We cham-
pioned freedom of the seas, and expressed the
famous four freedoms of the Atlantic Charter,
freedom from want, freedom from fear, freedom
of speech, and freedom of religion.
Most of the successive important international
conferences dealt largely with the prosecution of
the war, but several important doctrines related
to the present world order were enunciated and
agreed upon during that period. At Casablanca,
in 1943, Britain and the United States announced
the "unconditional surrender" doctrine. 'Whether
right or wrong, this stand may well have had a
permanent effect on the war and its aftermath.
Although Stalin was invited to attend the next
meeting held in Quebec City, he failed to come.
China participated in the negotiations of Novem-
ber 1943 at Cairo where the Atlantic Charter was
reaffirmed, and where it was agreed to strip Japan
181
of all territories outside the four main islands,
with minor exceptions. The Teheran meeting
later that month? was the first time Roosevelt,
Churchill, and Stalin actually met in person. Be-
cause of Soviet neutrality in the Pacific, Chiang
Kai-shek was not invited. The broad strategy of
the war in Europe was planned, and the demand
for a "second front" was renewed. The Russians,
of course, had a second front on the European
continent in 1939-40, but at that time they chose
to be neutral. Antagonisms and differences of
opinion were evident even in this first meeting.
Churchill favored an attack into the Balkans
through the Vardar Valley, while Roosevelt called
for a frontal assault on Western Europe because
of military and political considerations including
recognition of Soviet interests in a second front in
Europe. While this may represent an over-sim-
plification of the strategic views held, it suggests
the nature of the differences that developed.
Idealism
Meetings nearly a year later at Dumbarton Oaks
considered proposals for the postwar international
peace machinery. Continuing differences over
policy caused President Roosevelt to agree to a
trip to Yalta to try to reach a better understand-
ing with the Soviets, for as allies they were in no
sense as reciprocal of plans, men, and supplies as
were our British partners. The Yalta conferences
dealt with the treatment to be accorded Germany,
and the difficult task of forming a workable
United Nations Organization. Representation in
the organization was the first problem. The
United States modestly requested only one vote,
but since the independent members of the British
Commonwealth wanted one vote each, the Russians
demanded seventeen, one for each constituent re-
public. The U. S. S. R. finally settled for three,
technically taking one for the Ukraine, and
another for Byelo-Russia, in addition to one for
the U. S. S. R. There was agreement that in the
present state of the world the major powers should
retain a veto over substantive decisions of the Se-
curity Council. We thought also that we had won
the promise of free elections and independent
states in eastern Europe. This proved illusory,
to say the least. In an effort to shorten the Pa-
cific war and thus save American lives, we reacted
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favorably to a Soviet promise to declare war on
Japan, and tentatively accepted Russian domina-
tion of the Kuriles, Southern Sakhalin, Dairen,
and the Manchurian railways. The assessments
of this meeting, with its secret agreements, remain
highly controversial.
In the spring of 1945 the meetings in San Fran-
cisco established the United Nations Organization.
President Roosevelt died in April and Germany's
final collapse came in May. At the time of the
Potsdam meeting in August, of the original Big
Three only Stalin was still in office, for Attlee
had replaced Churchill. The Soviets were ready
to enter the war against Japan, and did so soon
after the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Naga-
saki. A completely demoralized Japan facing in-
vasion of her home islands, surrendered in re-
sponse to the Potsdam Declaration. At Potsdam,
general plans for the former German satellite
states were formulated and the zones of military
occupation for Germany and Austria were estab-
lished. A Council of Foreign Ministers to repre-
sent the Big Three, plus France and China, was
created.
Realism
In reviewing the record of these wartime con-
ferences, it is interesting to note the shifts of
position that occurred. Our first concern was that
of security, for we were engaged in a struggle for
survival, but as the end of the war came in sight,
we entered a phase of idealism. With the benefit
of hindsight it is now easy to see that the Soviets
carefully adhered to the long-term policies which
have placed them in opposition to ourselves. Any
lingering doubts about the Soviet's real intentions
were quickly dispelled in the months following the
war. Countless efforts to show good will and to
go more than halfway were met with no response
from the Soviet delegates, who continued an atti-
tude of suspicion and distrust. The record shows
that we wanted peace and were willing to make
any reasonable concessions, but no agreement
proved better than the Soviet intentions of living
up to it.
New problems arose to plague the foreign min-
isters and their deputies faster than the old ones
could be solved or shelved. Satellite treaties, in-
terference with elections, atomic energy, the
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182
Italian treaty, and control of the Danube were
debated at great length. Only the strongest of
protests through the United Nations brought
about the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran,
thus averting what might have developed into a
Soviet military penetration of the Middle East.
The Morgenthau Plan for Germany and repara-
tions on the scale demanded by the Soviets were
finally abandoned. The position of the United
States toward Germany gradually shifted when
it was realized that Germany's deficits would even-
tually be paid by the American taxpayer, and that
a prostrate Germany meant an impoverished Eu-
rope. Gradually the United States passed beyond
the idealism stage and began to see the shape of
the Soviet menace.
Cold War
Various aspects of the cold war further accen-
tuated this menace. In a major test of strength
the Soviets imposed a land blockade of Berlin in
1948. Controversial issues leading to this action
included the quantity and kind of West Zone rep-
arations to the Soviet Union, the currency reform
which started West Germany toward economic re-
covery, and the action taken to unify the Ameri-
can, British, and French zones of occupation.
Another factor was the Soviet desire to eliminate
a Western Island in East Germany. The Soviet
blockade was met with counter blockade action by
the western allies and an arduous though success-
ful airlift. Although the blockade was finally
lifted, a few false moves on either side might have
led to war.
Steps taken by the United States to strengthen
the economies of western European countries and
later their military forces, as mentioned previ-
ously, were all part of the cold war which in-
creased in intensity with the outbreak of armed
conflict in Korea in 1950. Trouble spots in Indo-
China, Malaya, Iran, and the Arab world only
served to accentuate the dimensions of this smol-
dering menace.
Relations With Latin America
Any discussion of United States foreign policy
must include developing relationships with the
Latin American countries to the south. Pan-
American relations have improved greatly since
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the time of the enunciation of the Monroe Doc-
trine, the end of our territorial expansion, and
our difficulties with Spain over Cuba. The for-
mation of the Pan American Union in 1890 led
the way to better relations with the Latin-Ameri-
can republics, culminating in the well-publicised
"good neighbor" policy in 1933. We eschewed
unilateral intervention among all the American
states. Our policies have now centered on pre-
serving the independence of republican govern-
ments, recognizing the equality of each country,
maintaining their territorial integrity, and urging
the observance of existing treaties and the peace-
ful settlement of disputes. Continental solidarity
has been the goal, coupled with nonintervention
in internal affairs, but with extensive cooperation
in all other matters. The degree of success has
been fairly high. Eventually, all the American
republics entered World War II and a number
shared in lend-lease, and made available antisub-
marine air bases as required for convoy protec-
tion. The treaty of Chapultepec, ratified at Rio
de Janeiro in 1947, binds all states on a two-thirds
vote to come to the aid of any member state that
is attacked. One of our more persistent remain-
ing problems has been sporadic disagreement with
ambitious and energetic Argentina.
Far Eastern Relations
United States foreign policy in China since
World War II has been more controversial and
the facts involved may be slow to emerge with any
clarity. It is clear, however, that the former
"open door" policy of equal access by any nation
to China has been swept away during the course
of the twentieth century by world events. Chi-
nese nationalism flared up as early as the Boxer
rebellion when there were demands for the expul-
sion of foreigners. In 1911 came the revolution
headed by Sun Yat-sen that destroyed the Manchu
Empire. His Kuomintang party has favored ex-
pulsion of foreigners and political tutelage of the
people until a proper, constitutional government
can ultimately function. Sun Yat-sen's revolu-
tionary techniques were studied and adapted by
Lenin, for in the early 1920's Soviet and Kuomin-
tang relations were quite close. After Chiang
Kai-shek made his successful march north from
Canton in 1927, he tossed out his Russian advisers
183
and broke relations with Communist Chinese
forces which withdrew into the interior, finally
making Yenan their headquarters for many years.
General Mao Tse-tung was the leader of this dis-
sident group. In 1931 the Japanese made new
advances into Manchuria, establishing a puppet
state; in 1937 the war moved south of the Great
Wall to extend Japanese control to all the major
rail arteries and port cities of northern and cen-
tral China. During World War II the Chinese
fought a desultory war against the Japanese, for
all their normal supply routes and most of their
industry were in Japanese hands. Nationalist
and Communist forces were united in an uneasy
truce against a common enemy.
At the end of the war the United States helped
to ferry large numbers of Nationalist divisions to
the coastal cities, north China, and Manchuria,
together with supplying considerable amounts of
war surplus equipment. The Communists were
equally determined to control these territories, and
swept out of the back country to lay waste the
railways of the area. With Japanese equipment,
probably turned over by the Soviets, they proved a
strong opponent to the Nationalists. General
Marshall's mission failed to find a solution to this
problem acceptable to the parties concerned.
Truce violations, attrition, inflation, and armies
changing sides brought disaster. Before it was
over, all China was Communist, aside from
Formosa and mainland guerrilla forces of mixed
allegiance.
FOREIGN POLICIES OF OTHER NATIONS
It is not possible here to discuss the guiding
foreign policies of all other nations, but a few ab-
breviated examples will at least illustrate the com-
plex and shifting nature of policy manifestations,
usually in support of some fairly persistent basic
national drives.
France
France was long the problem child of Europe.
Arrayed against the Hapsburgs and the Holy
Roman Empire, she aimed at territorial expansion
and predominant continental power which re-
quired conquest and the sponsoring of "independ-
ent" German states. Louis XIV also looked to
French-Spanish union, and control of the Low-
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lands, but was opposed by the British. Napoleon,
in the name of the French revolution, though with
somewhat modified objectives, did sweep much of
Europe. But after his defeat, French policy in
Europe largely abandoned expansionism in favor
of secure frontiers. French expansionism was
later to be active again overseas. It as only at
the turn of the nineteenth century, some years
after Germany had united into a strong nation,
that 400 years of British-French rivalry in Europe
came to an end, and certain colonial difficulties
were settled by giving Britain dominance over
Egypt and France control in Morocco. Follow-
ing the second invasion of their homeland by the
Germans in World War I, security became almost
an obsession for the French. They favored a
breakup of Germany, the demilitarization of the
Rhine, and defense in depth. The withdrawal of
the United States from European affairs may have
been a factor in the French sponsoring of the
"cordon sanitaire," consisting of alliances of the
States bordering Germany to prevent any resur-
gence of military power. Italy, following World
War I, felt that not all wartime promises had
been kept and withdrew from her former allies.
The French occupation of the Rhineland in 1923
was- an attempt in part to force Britain into a
position of greater support, but the British were
not too amenable, and gave some support instead
to the Germans. Government changes in France
and Germany brought closer cooperation between
the two countries temporarily, and the French
withdrew from the Rhineland.
Growing German nationalism was clearly re-
vealed by the 1936 remilitarization of the Rhine-
land in violation of the Versailles treaty, which
collapsed much of the French defense plan. This
change made it difficult for France to offer any real
military support to Eastern and Central Europe
in the event of German aggressions. While France
worked harder to build up the Maginot defense
tine, she left her frontiers with Belgium and
Luxemburg unprotected. French and Italian re-
lationships were very confused: rivalry was strong
in places like Tunisia, yet a partial understand-
ing gave Italy a free hand in Ethiopia. War
came to Spain. It was a proving ground for Com-
munist and Fascist armies, with a few misguided
liberals on the fringes, and the common people
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were the victims. The Polish corridor question
was boiling. Buying time, or doing wishful
thinking, Britain and France, though rearming,
watched Austria, Czechoslovakia and Memel go
to Germany. The Low Countries still thought in
terms of neutrality. The sudden shock of the
German-Soviet agreement of 1939 was the last step
before the partition of Poland and the beginning
of World War II. France, still feeling the heavy
cost of the first war, subjected to the divided pol-
icies of unstable governments and the weakening
influence of the Front Populaire, was ill-equipped
for war. What had been the greatest army in
Europe fell before the Germans, destroyed partly
by the politicians behind its back, partly by poor
strategy, partly by fatalistic apathy.
United Kingdom
British policies are famous for their thorough
relation to long-range British needs. Well-suited
to an island people close offshore from a ferment-
ing Europe, they are naturally keyed to British
self-interest and have opposed entanglements on
the mainland. The British have aimed at a bal-
ance of power on the continent, to prevent its
domination by any one group which could then
threaten British security. For the last four cen-
turies the British have had no European terri-
torial ambitions, although they have been active
overseas. They have taken what steps were neces-
sary to protect their islands, to keep world trade
routes free, and to assure the security of their
overseas holdings. These aims have naturally
enough made seapower a prime weapon. The
British usually make short-term alliances in Eu-
rope as required, though they have long continued
close relations with Portugal, a remnant of earlier
needs to counter Spain. Whenever the Rhine es-
tuary and the Scheldt River are threatened, the
British always fight. They have long felt Russian
rivalry overseas, since the Russians have long
sought access to the Indian Ocean and the Medi-
terranean, both intimately related to Britain's im-
perial lifeline.
Postwar concentration of power in the hands of
the Soviet Union and the United States has re-
quired some British adjustments. As a result,
Great Britain has associated closely with the
United States in such common undertakings as the
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United Nations and NATO. In areas such as the
Middle East and the Far East, however, British
and American interests have not always been co-
ordinated. In Europe the British have been con-
sistent with their basic policies in delaying on the
Schuman steel plan.
The purpose of this quick review of various for-
eign policies has been to emphasize that in the
world, as it actually is, any nation that is to sur-
vive as a great power is motivated by self-interest
and will do whatever is necessary for survival.
Aware of these facts, the intelligence officer is
better able to understand and interpret the foreign
policies of nations.
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
From the philosophical and even the practical
outlook, men have long recognized the existence of
a world community. The western world, for ex-
ample, is joined in common spiritual values.
Transport improvements and trade needs have
also made materialistic interdependence very
great, which in itself has demanded a degree of
world organization. We have progressed from bi-
lateral treaties to the partial recognition of in-
ternational law, and increasing reliance is being
placed on multilateral agreements and the creation
of permanent international bodies with many
powers. The achievements of international co-
operation have been many. Examples are the In-
ternational Red Cross, control of telecommunica-
tions, control of rivers for international use,
standard weights and measures, weather report-
ing, hydrographic services, copyright rules, health
regulations, and controls over slavery and nar-
cotics. The failure has been at the political level
and as a result, when states go to war, many of
these cooperative and successful economic or tech-
nical arrangements are jeopardized.
The League of Nations
There were many early attempts at multilateral
international settlements, typified by the Congress
of Vienna in 1815. At the end of the 19th century
and in the years prior to World War I, the Hague
Conferences attempted to set up an international
order, but the first comprehensive attempt, spon-
269196-54----13
185
sored by President Wilson, was the creation of the
League of Nations in conjunction with the Ver-
sailles Treaty.
The League was effective in the economic and
social fields. It failed on the key question of secu-
rity and power because of an unwillingness of its
members to make it really work, to implement in
full what it could do. The League could impose
sanctions on aggressors, but being a pioneer effort,
it was not designed to have unlimited power. Al-
though the Covenant established the League, the
interpretation of responsibilities rested with the
individual states. It was largely a body of war
victors, their friends, and their self-governing
former colonies. Later other powers joined, with
the exception of the United States which alone of
the major powers remained aloof. America's un-
willingness to participate directly in the League
was based in part on its unfortunate experience in
power politics and unpaid war debts. We did,
however, remain interested in the League during
the years it functioned, and always had an observer
present at its meetings, occasionally considering
the idea of entering, with reservations, to protect
our position. When it finally suited their con-
venience, Germany, Italy, and Japan withdrew
from the League to pursue their courses of con-
quest. The Soviets were expelled for their attack
on Finland.
The League was paralled by the World Court
whose judges were able to settle many disputes in
those cases where countries voluntarily submitted
to its jurisdiction. The League was also closely
allied to such bodies as the International Labor
Organization, which in their specific field of con-
cern, were able to do good work. The importance
and success of all of these supplementary activities
were dwarfed, if not lost to the public eye, by the
magnitude and seriousness of world security prob-
lems which the League failed to solve thereby
dooming itself by inaction. Italy bombed Corfu
in 1925, and the League failed to act decisively.
The Lytton Commission did study the war in
Manchuria in 1932, but had no way to enforce its
recommendations. The Paraguay-Bolivia Gran
Chaco War was not settled by the League. In the
Ethiopian War sanctions were ordered against
Italy, but not all members carried them out.
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The United Nations Organization
Some of the same basic elements which made up
the League are to be found in the United Nations
organization. It has a General Assembly of all
member states, a Security Council with the big
powers and regionally representative members, a
Secretariat, an International Court of Justice,
ECOSOC (the Economic and Social Council),
and finally the Trusteeship Council.
The ECOSOC is made up of a large group of
activities including: ILO (International Labor
Organization), FAO (Food and Agricultural Or-
ganization), UNESCO (United Nations Educa-
tional, Scientific, and Cultural Organization),
ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organiza-
tion), the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development, the International Monetary
Fund, WHO (World Health Organization), IRO
(International Refugee Organization), ITO (In-
ternational Trade Organization) , UPU (Univer-
sal Postal Union) , ITU (International Telecom-
munications Union), WMO (World Meteorologi-
cal Organization) , and IMCO (Intergovernmental
Maritime Consultative Organization). ECOSOC
concerns itself with matters of economics and em-
ployment, transportation and communications.
statistics, fiscal affairs, population, social prob-
lems, human rights, the status of women, and
narcotic drugs. It has as suborganizations the
Economic Council for Europe, the Economic
Council for Latin America, and the Economic
Council for Asia and the Far East. ECOSOC
by its very nature does some of the less spectacular
and more successful work of the UN. Officially
it has 18 members, appointed to 3-year terms, but
it operates with many ad hoc committees and
nongovernmental organizations. It has no ex-
clusive jurisdiction, no permanent members, no
veto problem, no coercive power; it is largely
fact-finding and coordinating. Those recommen-
dations bordering on domestic matters require do-
mestic enactment to become effective. In a prac-
tical sense, it is at work on the causes of war 'aside
from those which are political or military. Ac-
tually the ECOSOC fights communist objectives;
while the communists are trying to destroy eco-
nomic order to hasten world revolution, ECOSOC
is attempting to restore order. Despite this, the
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Soviet Union has joined several of the ECOSOC
activities when it has been advantageous to do so.
The General Assembly represents all member
nations, each with one vote, though any size of
delegation may be sent. This body discusses any
matter it chooses and may pass recommendations
to the Security Council. A two-thirds vote of
the General Assembly, plus the approval of the
big five in the Security Council, can amend the
charter of the organization.
The Security Council has 11 members, includ-
ing the United States, the United Kingdom, the
Soviet Union, China and France (all with the
veto power) and 6 other members for 2-year
terms "elected" by the General Assembly on a
regional basis. For example, a typical distribu-
tion is 1 British Commonwealth member, 2 Latin
American members including 1 from the ABC
powers (Argentina, Brazil, Chile), and one mem-
ber each from a Soviet satellite, a West European
state, and an Arab League state. The Security
Council deals with major political disputes and
can impose sanctions. It has a military staff to
aid in this duty. It also has an armed forces
committee and an atomic energy committee.
The Secretariat, of course, provides administra-
tive and research services while the Trusteeship
Council is responsible to the General Assembly
for the mandates and trusts administered by mem-
bers. Some of these are former German colonies,
others, the former Japanese holdings now under
UN control.
Regional Organizations
The United Nations has attempted to avoid the
failures of the League of Nations. Certainly it
cannot be blamed for failure to end the cold war,
because its success depends upon the honest in-
tentions of its more powerful members. Merely
having the machinery for peace does not solve the
problems of the world communist movement and
Soviet ambitions; in fact, the UN organization
was not originally designed to fight this kind of
battle. For this reason many types of regional
international organizations have been created with
definite functions to perform. The development
of some of these organizations, patterned after the
relatively successful Pan American Union, was
stimulated by such events as the fall of Czechoslo-
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vakia to "internal" forces. For example, Bel-
gium and Luxembourg have long had a customs
union. With the addition of the Netherlands to
this combination, and an extension of purposes,
these countries established "Benelux," an economic
union, sensibly designed to overcome some of the
handicaps of small size. Such a merger is com-
plex, for it not only removes tariff walls, but re-
quires agreement on fiscal and monetary policies,
the same regulation of prices and business, and a
single legal code. Such changes do not come over-
night. Benelux attempts at economic unity were
paralleled by the grouping of the Brussels Pow-
ers, namely, the Low Countries, Britain, and
France, into a military alliance with increasing
standardization of weapons and organization. In
like manner the U. S. Marshall Plan on the eco-
nomic level was matched by NATO, wherein the
United States joined with the Brussels Pact coun-
tries plus Canada, Portugal, Norway, Denmark,
Iceland, Italy, Greece, and Turkey to form a mili-
tary alliance. This movement was given signifi-
cant support by the United States Military Aid
Program and the assignment of General Eisen-
hower to the top command. The Schuman Plan,
aimed at the integration of coal and steel industries
in western Europe, has been a significant effort
toward economic unification of the participating
countries, notably France and Germany.
Still another regional development has been the
Council of Europe, not unlike a miniature Gen-
eral Assembly of the UN. It has only consulta-
tive powers, but conceivably could result in Euro-
pean federation. Although Winston Churchill
was one of its early proponents, the British posi-
tion is affected by triple interests, European,
British Commonwealth, and United States co-
operation.
The growth of these various original organiza-
tions has been stimulated by the unwillingness of
the Soviet Union to cooperate within the UN.
Examples of this unwillingness are many. Prior
to the outbreak of the Korean War the UN had
tried for several years to solve the problem of
this divided country, but the Soviets would not
allow UN observers in North Korea. Even
though the UN had demonstrated its ability to
aid in the settlement of problems in such areas as
Palestine and Indonesia, it could not even gain
access to Czechoslovakia. Early attempts to
create a permanent UN police force remained com-
pletely deadlocked. The United States offered
to supply two divisions, ten to fifteen air groups,
and two naval task groups; the United Kingdom
was willing to commit half the Royal Air Force;
all told, some two million men were offered. But
the question of the veto power deadlocked fur-
ther discussion. The questions of disarmament
and atomic energy met with similar difficulties,
since both conventional and mass destruction
weapons must be considered in any real disarma-
ment plan.
The United States' position on atomic weapons
was a generous offer to share its knowledge with
the world, including world ownership of materials
and facilities and complete inspection to prevent
secret violation of rules. However, there could be
no veto of swift punishment for all offenders.
Even though such a plan is realistic if atomic con-
trols are to be workable, they strike at the heart
of the Soviet system of secrecy and isolation. Ac-
cordingly, the Soviets, with a vast land power
strength in conventional weapons, made the
counterproposal that the United States destroy its
atomic weapons, which constituted a vital source
of military power, and that the veto power be
retained by the five major powers. In the light
of Soviet previous conduct such an arrangement
did not seem to be consistent with survival. Of
course, subsequent to the UN debates on the con-
t1-01 of atomic power, it was learned that the Soviet
Union was making rapid atomic progress herself
by combining espionage with the best scientific
brains at her disposal.
The issue of veto is one of the most crucial in
the UN. The United States, like the Soviet
Union, believes in the veto, but recognizes it must
be used in moderation if the organization is to
function at all. Actually, the charter of the UN
does not discuss the veto. It calls for 7 of 11 votes
affirmative to pass motions, except that motions
which are substantive in nature, not just proce-
dural, require affirmative votes of the big 5 among
the 7 or more votes. A state which is a member
of the Security Council can be deprived of its
vote when it is a party to a dispute, unless the issue
involves a threat to the peace which is then called
a "situation." Actually the veto power is abso-
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lute, for the question of whether an issue is a
"situation" or a "dispute" has been considered a
substantive one, and no power will vote itself out
of a veto on a crucial issue. By vetoing any at-
tempt to declare an issue to be procedural, a big
nation never loses its decisive power. This is com-
monly referred to as the double veto. A state can
veto a decision to make a question procedural, then
veto it again as being a substantive matter.
In exasperation many national leaders watching
the record of mounting Soviet vetoes in the post-
war period have turned to regional plans, or have
recommended expulsion of the Soviets, or have
talked of a new UN designed to be a real world
government. The UN obviously is not perfect,
but many of its functions are very useful.
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS
As a basis for reviewing economic relations be-
tween world states it is well to remember, first,
that states depend on various resources for their
power, and second, that economic interdependence
and political ambitions have brought them into
continuous contact with each other. It has already
been pointed out that the greatest progress in in-
ternational organization has been in the economic
sphere. This is natural because economics, like
intelligence, is largely a matter of hard-headed
realism, and economic interdependence is fre-
quently dictated by compelling economic reasons.
The United States and the Soviet Union continue
to trade, even if on a reduced scale, because there
are sound reasons for each to do so. In varying
degree, trade is carried on indirectly even by bel-
ligerents in most wars. This is of itself neither
good nor bad, and is hardly different from other
measures dealing with the conduct of war, such
as the Geneva Convention for the treatment of
prisoners. However, from the viewpoint of the
individual state, it is bad when individual citizens
secretly trade with the enemy in contravention of
national policy.
Economic Systems
Economic relations are, of course, directly af-
fected by some of the main forces at work in the
economic world expressed in terms of economic
systems. Perhaps the two extremes of these sys-
tems are "free enterprise," on the one hand, where
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economic decisions are made by individuals, and
communism" on the other, where the state is the
source of all decisions. There are other varia-
tions, of course, but these are the two major ex-
tremes of present-day concern. In between are
state socialism, as practiced in Scandinavia, and
systems which in general support free enterprise
but impose certain controls. The British Labor
Government, for example, attempted public owner-
ship of the basic industries, allowing "freedom"
elsewhere. In general, the United States has kept
private ownership, but has increasingly added cen-
tral controls.
A brief summary of the historical development
of this Anglo-American economic system is illus-
trative of the complex forces which shape such
systems. The modern era of economics began
when the rigidities of society inherent in a system
of "status" gave way to business by "contract."
The new money economies and trade were coupled
with royal grants of monopolies of all possible va-
riety. The 18th century brought strong new phil-
osophies of individualism, and the beginnings of
the industrial revolution. It was Adam Smith's
Wealth, of Nation8 in 1776 that called for an eco-
nomic revolution that would match the political
revolution in America. No simple pattern of
orderly development followed, for many of the
old restrictions were only partially removed, but
in considerable degree free competition and au-
tomatic forces were the rule. The pressure of
competition encouraged the exploitation of new
inventions, and material progress was very real.
The inefficient and obsolescent plants went bank-
rupt. New enterprises, or those able to adjust to
changing conditions, reaped profits that were
plowed back into new machinery and other capital
equipment. The corporation, an artificial legal
being, became dominant in many fields over the
partnership or individual enterprise.
Very early, however, the need for regulation of
monopolies was recognized, not as a contradiction
to free enterprise, but as a necessary policing step
to maintain it. In the United States the Granger
laws and the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887
were typical of these controls. The Sherman
Antitrust Act was of broader applicability. In
the years that have followed, the American system
has become increasingly more hybrid, and govern-
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ment has a voice in almost every phase of eco-
nomic life including labor laws, security regula-
tion, and agricultural supports. Increasingly,
too, the power of government has been expanded
by the emergency use of price controls and alloca-
tions, and taxing power and spending power have
enormous indirect effect on the direction of eco-
nomic life. Social security and direct public in-
vestment in electric power and atomic energy rep-
resent further departures from abstract "free
enterprise."
Trade Relations
The effect of economic systems on international
relations is often to be found in the circumstances
of trade between nations. Since current trade re-
lations reflect those of the past, a brief resume will
be helpful to general understanding.
The world of Adam Smith was dominated by
mercantilist concepts. The preceding centuries
had seen national states established and the switch
from feudal barter to money economies. Spain
had poured gold and silver from the New World
into Europe, but for countries without a supply of
gold and silver for their expanding economies, the
only way it could be obtained was through priva-
teering ( a polite word for legalized piracy) or
through the regulation of international trade to
keep exports greater than imports in order that
this difference could be received in bullion. This
intense interest in the acquisition of gold and silver
was a primary feature of mercantilism. There is
not space here to expose all its economic fallacies,
but any elementary text on the subject will make
clear, as did Adam Smith, that real wealth lies in
resources and labor, not in gold or silver, from
the national point of view. It is no compliment
to present-day thinking that most of the false
concepts of the mercantilists are still with us in
one form or another and still accepted by many
people.
The pressure of mercantilist theories had its
effect in the struggle for colonies with supplies of
precious metals, and in restrictive regulations to
hamper freedom of shipping and of commerce,
thus adding to the tensions and pressures that
bring war.
After Adam Smith, the following period of the
classical economists was reflected in governmental
189
policies leading to a breakdown of many tariff
barriers and trade restrictions. England in par-
ticular became the champion of free trade, though
actually the greatest free-trade area in the world
is the United States itself, where no real tariffs
are in force among the 48 States. In no small
sense, United States world leadership in economic
progress can be attributed to its continent-wide
free trade.
Moderate tariffs during the 19th century were
coupled with the use of the automatic gold stand-
ard for exchange. The gold content of the coinage
of each country set the par of exchange, while free
market fluctuations of the exchange rate were held
to narrow limits by the ability of traders to ship
gold to pay trade balances as an alternative to buy-
ing bills of exchange. A continued imbalance of
imports against exports of a particular country,
including "invisible" trade (such things as ship-
ping services and immigrant remittances), if not
corrected rapidly by shipments of gold and ad-
justment of the price level, was caused by the
processes of international investment. A coun-
try borrowing capital from abroad in effect re-
ceives that loan in goods, and this is reflected in a
so-called "unfavorable" balance of trade; namely,
more imports than exports. When the interest
payments come due and when the principal is re-
paid, then exports exceed imports. The details of
the mechanism are of no concern here, although it
may be noted that the terms "favorable" and "un-
favorable" balance are in themselves rather mean-
ingless carry-overs from mercantilist days.
World War I severely altered international
economic relations. It had marked effects on the
finances and money systems of the world, and new
trade patterns developed. Impoverished by war,
attacked by inflation at home, in heavy debt
through reparations demands or borrowings, many
countries sought to redress their position by ex-
change controls and tariff barriers. Many had
abandoned the gold standard during the war
period, and now were on paper standards. Post-
war unemployment was frequently countered by
import restrictions and "buy at home" campaigns.
Although intelligent people could see the ultimate
damage to export sales of such restrictions, it was
the easy course to take countermeasures and add
more restrictions, even though the gains would be
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temporary. Facing the political dangers of un-
employment, in some cases even revolutionary
danger, it was easiest to sacrifice long-range stand-
ards of living in some degree in order to maintain
employment through autarchy. This analysis, of
course, is greatly oversimplified, but the facts of
spiraling trade controls, quotas, and exchange
manipulations are the important ones to remem-
ber. The dangers of war inherent in policies
which deny some countries equal access to markets
and resources have been expressly recognized by
American leaders from the time of the Atlantic
Charter. However, at subsequent similar meet-
ings, corrective action on an international scale has
lagged behind recognition because of the many
intricate problems involved.
Attempts to free international trade have been
vastly complicated by domestic economic controls
in all parts of the world. State socialism is likely
to lead to state buying in place of individual trade,
as is the case in Britain's dealings with Argentina,
and price supports at home mean drastic trade
regulation, as is the case with agricultural imports
in the United States.
So-called normal trade patterns have also been
strongly affected by world events since 1939. On
a scale undreamed of before in world history the
United States through lend-lease poured out a
tremendous flow of munitions, foods, and indus-
trial materials to its allies, to save the world from
German-Japanese fascism. As a practical meas-
ure it provided a means for arming the allies in a
common cause and obviated many of the debt
difficulties of World War I. It was based on the
stated premise that free nations must stand to-
gether in the face of a great common danger.
Trade Agreements
The particulars of recent trade policy include
names and doctrines with which the naval intelli-
gence officer should have at least a limited
acquaintance. Although there are some multi-
lateral international trade agreements, especially
on certain commodities, most trading arrange-
ments are bilateral in nature. The particular
treaty devices adopted by the United States have
led, however, to many multilateral effects. When
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190
two countries sign a treaty of friendship and com-
merce, opening their ports to each other's ships,
they frequently promise "national" treatment to
each other's businessmen and citizens. This means
they guarantee foreigners equal treatment before
the courts, and usually the right to engage in busi-
ness on the same basis as nationals, though there
may be a few exclusions. For example, we re-
serve coastwise shipping, domestic air service, and
fishing in American coastal waters to our own
nationals.
Our treaties are also usually made on a bilateral
"most-favored-nation" basis, which really means
"equally favored." The net effect is that if new
tariff concessions are extended by either party to
a third country, the signatories agree to extend
the same privilege to each other. There are minor
exceptions, such as the British Commonwealth
preference agreements, and special American con-
cessions to Cuba and, for a time, to the Philip-
pines. Furthermore, we usually extend "most-
favored-nation" treatment on an unconditional
basis, which means that no new quid pro quo is
required because agreement as to what constitutes
equivalent concession is very hard to reach. Our
aim is to minimize the restrictions on trade, al-
though some of the most ardent free-enterprise
businessmen often favor high tariffs and small
quotas.
In 1934, the United States returned to a form
of additional trade negotiation it had used in
earlier years, the now well-known Reciprocal
Trade Treaties. In exchange for additional con-
cessions on selected items that were most impor-
tant in trade with a particular country the United
States, by executive agreement, lowered its im-
port tariffs (still on a "most-favored-nation"
basis) even more. While these concessions are
less subject to direct pressures by protectionist
interests, the most elaborate safeguards are pro-
vided by means of public hearings to give full
voice to affected American industries. We do not
grant concessions on items we have in surplus
We have special penalties on "dumping," and even
we use the "quota," a weapon more powerful than
the tariff. In addition, when changed conditions
require new protection for an American industry,
these agreements have escape clauses.
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Multilateral Agreements
Multilateral agreements in the control of trade
are best exemplified by the activities of the Food
and Agricultural Organization, which establishes
international quotas and price controls on certain
agricultural commodities. Further, the Interna-
tional Trade Organization of the United Nations
establishes the fundamental machinery to collect
trade data and takes corrective action to remove
trade inequities that might lead to war. This or-
ganization, which the United States has cham-
pioned as a companion to the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund, is a beginning, but
so far has demonstrated little concrete accom-
plishment, since the obstacles it must overcome are
tremendous. Of course, so long as the world is
fundamentally divided in objectives, most of these
agreements can have only limited success. The
present ITO agreements give lip service to free-
dom of trade and no discrimination, but are so
hedged with escape clauses that their practical ef-
fect is very limited. The choice has been to have
the machinery established, or to have nothing,
since the policy of free trade has not as yet been
made possible.
The milieu in which our trade policy is applied
is not entirely of our own making, but results from
events in all parts of the world. When immedi-
ate post World War I restrictions had eased
slightly, and several of the major powers returned
to the gold standard in the late 1920's, the New
York stock market collapsed and we stopped in-
vesting in Germany. Those investments had
given Germany the apparent power to pay repara-
tions, and thus in turn enabled Britain and France
to pay war debts. The collapse of the Kreditan-
stalt bank in Austria spread financial panic in
Central Europe, and the flight of short-term capi-
tal began, eventually leading to a heavy gold in-
flow into the United States. This threatened. ex-
change stability abroad, and eventually forced
most nations off the gold standard. In 1930 our
passage of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, as an
answer to mounting unemployment at home, was
soon matched by British abandonment of their
traditional free trade policies, which had already
been weakened. "Buy British" and Empire pref-
erence became the rule. A special British trad-
ing arrangement was made with Argentina in
191
1933, the first of many, due to the close commercial
relations between the two countries. The United
States and Britain did not join in a reciprocal
trade agreement until 1938. World War It
brought virtual free trade between the two coun-
tries, for after the British exhausted most of their
foreign investments paying for munitions during
our "cash and carry neutrality" days, lend-lease
and the postwar loans became major trade factors.
Postwar Britain has been heavily engaged in state
trading.
The Soviets, since their seizure of power in
1918, have used state trading exclusively, though
during the temporary N. E. P. period they did
grant some private licenses for trade. The Min-
istry of Foreign Trade controls all Soviet trade
today, setting up foreign corporations abroad to
do its buying. Special commodity trade combines
under the Ministry set their quotas in accordance
with an overall economic plan. In the United
States, Antorg, a New York corporation, is the
sole Soviet representative Amtorg's more sinis-
ter espionage activities have already been men-
tioned.
Foreign Investment
Many trade difficulties have been linked directly
with problems of international investment or capi-
tal flows, both long-term and short-term, from one
country to another. It should be pointed out that
long term private investment takes two forms, di-
rect and portfolio. Direct investment is illus-
trated by the great activity of United States firms
in establishing branch plants in the Western
Hemisphere countries. Portfolio investment re-
fers to the purchase of securities in foreign con-
cerns without the direct responsibilities of con-
struction and management. The United States
government has encouraged private investment
abroad as a necessary measure to improve interna-
tional economic good health. One of the economic
problems is that the heavy American export flow,
which has materially aided many countries and
also maintained high employment at home, must
be paid for in one or more of several ways: (a) by
taxpayers helping to pay the costs; (b) by govern-
ment or priVate citizens making investments
abroad; (c) by an equal flow of imports. The
fourth alternative, that of ending this export
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trade, has not been seriously considered in the
present world situation. Since imports either
have not been available or have come in competi-
tion with domestic goods, they have not been of
major assistance. According to various econo-
mists, the best answer is investment now, with two-
way trade as soon as possible. Our interest in
private enterprise naturally favors private invest-
ment, even though the problem is political in many
respects, because outward movements of capital
cannot really be considered investments unless
there is a strong possibility of later dividends and
repayment. Private investors are more likely to be
influenced by such factors, and to place their
money soundly, since they have no reason to weigh
political considerations. One great trouble has
been that private investors have frequently lacked
incentive for foreign investment. Political in-
stability and chaos, fluctuating exchanges, heavy
taxes, and confiscation have all meant loss to previ-
ous investors. Consequently, the trickle of such
private funds abroad since the world depression
has been quite small, except in a few "safe" areas.
Government loans have had to replace such private
flows.
War Debts
Financial adjustments growing out of the two
world wars, as has been indicated, have been dom-
inant forces in world economic relations. In the
first war the United States loaned enormous sums
which actually went abroad in the form of goods.
There was not enough gold abroad to pay for them,
yet we were unwilling to accept repayment in
kind; namely, more goods. We felt that the con-
tractual obligation was separate and apart from
the question of reparations receipts by our debtors.
Consequently, there was extreme bitterness of both
sides, and payments with minor exceptions were
halted.
Germany surrendered at the end of World War
I on the condition that no punitive damages other
than war losses, were to be collected. But the Al-
lied estimates of losses were astronomical. Of
course, they were not completely paid, but in the
process of trying, Germany experienced the com-
plete inflationary destruction of her money system,
and the accompanying despair has been identified
as a factor in the rise of Hitler. The policy after
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World War II was quite different. The United
States kept title to lend-lease goods. Perishables
were written off as one of the costs of the war.
Durables were either returned, or transferred after
the war at the best figure we could negotiate.
Some of these mark-downs were tremendous. Of
course, the significance of the mark-down has
meant little in most cases, since our policy has
in considerable measure been one of underwriting
the foreign exchange deficits of those countries
important to our defense which followed prudent
fiscal and monetary policies.
Following World War II some war debt settle-
ments were made. In the case of a few countries,
reverse lend-lease had been sufficiently great to
cancel out direct lend-lease. Great Britain agreed
to settle a lend-lease "debt" of $24 billion for $650
million to be paid over a 52-year period at 2-percent
interest. Also, in various countries some settle-
ment funds were made available under the Ful-
bright plan for the interchange of scholars, when
such funds were otherwise blocked because of ex-
change difficulties. However, no agreements were
ever reached with the Soviet Union which re-
ceived 500,000 vehicles, 14,000 planes, 7,000 tanks,
2,000 locomotives, 11,000 freight cars, and 600,000
tons of ships.
Reparations
The end of the war brought with it the problem
of reparations. The Soviet Union had suggested
that it should receiVe twenty billion dollars worth
of German reparations, separate and apart from
any "war booty," which was a flexible term that
could well include any property in territories oc-
cupied by the Red Army. At the time, the United
States was not demanding reparations but, under
the influence of the Morgenthau Plan concept, was
thinking in terms of converting Germany from
an industrialized nation to an agricultural state
which could never again threaten the world with
serious aggression. There were many astute ob-
servers who had misgivings about such a plan
because of its economic consequences, not only for
Germany but for all of Europe. While we did
recognize that Germany had no export surplus
with which to pay reparations, we envisioned that
the dismantling of German war and heavy indus-
tries could supply capital goods reparations re-
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THE UNITED STATES AND THE WORLD ruENTIAL
quired for the rebuilding of wrecked factories in
a number of countries.
By one way and another, several countries did
collect some actual reparations. Poland was com-
pensated by receiving important German terri-
tories. The Soviet Union stripped much from
the territories occupied by Russian troops, and
appropriated German external assets in Eastern
Europe even when they represented goods or se-
curities stolen by the Germans. At fictitious
prices the Soviets also bought control of most
industry within their zones. The United States
picked up portfolio German assets in Switzerland
and Latin America. Dismantled plants in West-
ern Germany were moved to Russia, partly as rep-
arations, partly to pay for food imports from
Eastern Zone.
Economic Recovery
Within a short time, the United States finally
recognized in official policy that German economic
recovery was essential both to European economic
recovery and to avert chaos and communism.
However, this required such sizable money grants
from the United States that any reparations passed
to other countries became actually equivalent to
grants in aid from the United States. Therefore,
the first charge on German exports was considered
payment for imports, which substantially ended
any large shipments of goods to the East. Be-
cause of initial confusion, the three Western Zones
ultimately set up unified economic controls, but
some dismantling continued for a time, even after
the official view had swung to the point where it
was felt a halt should be called. The failure of
the Soviets to receive all that they demanded be-
came an additional factor in East-West tension.
In the case of Japan, the Potsdam Declaration
set forth general conditions for postwar treat-
ment. War industries were to be destroyed, but
a viable economy was to be left. External assets
were taken over, and, for a period, considerable
amounts of capital goods were shipped to the
victims of Japanese aggression. The Soviet
Union regarded its enormous prize of Manchuria,
acquired in less an a week of war, as "booty,"
not a part of reparations. This was very costly to
China, destroying for years to come any real hope
of economic advance. In time the United States
269196-54 14 193
came to the position of making up Japanese trade
deficits, first for relief purposes, then for economic
recovery. This ended further reparations, and
the Peace Treaty of 1952 fairly well closed the
matter, despite the reservations held by the Philip-
pines, Indonesia, and a few others.
In the interests of an economically and polit-
ically stable world, the United States felt obliged
to extend economic aid not only to Germany and
to Japan, but also to our allies, since they lacked
the recuperative powers that we possessed. Their
heavy purchases of food, industrial materials, and
increasing amounts of capital goods in this coun-
try, caused the so-called "dollar shortage."
Therefore, lend-lease military aid was followed
first by UNRRA food and clothing, and then by a
series of other measures. We sponsored the
European Payments plan to try to restore multi-
lateral trade in Europe, and then the European
Recovery Program, a combination of self-help,
American technical guidance, and Marshall plan
goods, with stress on permanent improvements
of output rather than current consumables. The
Economic Cooperation Agency was the American
governmental body set up to administer these
functions.
The Marshall Plan and Military Aid
The Marshall plan was an astute and states-
manlike offer to the world, although the Soviet
Union condemned it as an effort on our part to
achieve world economic domination. Because of
the Soviet position, their satellites had to with-
draw acceptance of invitations to Paris to discuss
the plan, and the further division of the world into
East and West continued American aid and
European response raised the physical indices of
European production well above prewar levels, but
still left Europe woefully weak militarily against
the threat from the East. The Truman plan of
containment with military aid for Greece and
Turkey became necessary in order to save the
West's strategic position in the Mediterranean.
The Soviet answer to the Marshall plan was not
only invective, but also the creation of the Molotov
plan, which tied the satellites even closer to the
U. S. S. R. The Cominform, the latest manifesta-
tion of the supposedly dead Comintern, was also
brought into the open.
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Scarcely had the phenomenal and substantial
economic recovery of a number of countries seemed
to justify the Marshall plan and point toward its
termination when new problems arose. The
growth of the Soviet military menace to Western
Europe, and indeed to the whole free world, indi-
cated a new and general need for accelerated re-
armament. However, military demands on the
budget and material of the Marshall plan countries
threatened to undo much of the progress that had
been made. Vigorous measures by the countries
concerned were hampered by both internal polit-
ical problems and public apathy toward defense.
United States military aid was a response to the
economic and political problems faced. Both
Britain and France were experiencing particular
economic difficulties because of additional burdens
imposed by the wars in Malaya and Indo-China.
In the opinion of many government leaders, the
important economic fact of military aid was that
the issue of arms shipments versus more economic
aid was one of expediency, not of fundamentals.
Economic aid, if reflected in arms manufacture in
Europe, might be cheaper than arms shipments;
but if the latter meant arms sooner, the higher
cost might be justified.
The Allies had recognized even before World
War II ended that strong economic measures of
international cooperation were needed to provide
the basis for a working world community. The
prewar arrangements for bringing stability to ex-
change rates were studied and strengthened at
Bretton Woods in 1944. The International Mone-
tary Fund to stabilize exchanges (short-term capi-
tal movement) , and the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development to ease long-
term capital movement problems were created.
However, these measures alone, important as they
were, could not provide enough support to restore
the world economy. That is why the European
recovery plan and "Point Four," a world-wide
plan for development of backward areas, came
into being. The military aid program was harder
to foresee, for the cold war was not of our making.
International Transport
Without transport there would be neither in-
ternational relations of importance, nor modern
war machines. Consequently, the intelligence of-
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194
ficer should know something of the workings of
transport?the devices used, the control and man-
agement, and the regulation, both national and
international. Some of the most complete inter-
national controls have developed in Europe, where
modern technology with high speed and cheap
movement contrasts most sharply with the small
political units crowded into a compact geographic
area.
Modern economic life is closely linked with
railways, the chief form of land transport
throughout the world. They acquire significance
because of their combination of a fixed right-of-
way and mechanical power, forming networks
that allow the delivery of freight and passengers
without transshipment and at low ton-mile costs
anywhere in a, big territory. Such networks re-
quire a standardization of track gage, clearances,
couplers, and brakes. We have developed a great
North American net with a track gage of 4 feet
81/2 inches, covering Canada, the United States,
and Mexico. A second great network of the same
gage covers most of Europe outside of the Soviet
Union and Iberia, though there are many Euro-
pean local feeder lines of narrow gage. There
are smaller networks in Manchuria-China, Argen-
tina, and India-Pakistan, though some of the
latter systems are more handicapped by a variety
of gages. The standard being developed in Africa
is 3 feet 6 inches. Australia hopes to convert her
state systems to the American-European stand-
ard. The Soviet standard on their extensive sys-
tem is 5 feet. Europe's railway controls include
international agreements on technical standards,
car interchange, rates, timetables, and accounts.
Many of these arrangements go back to the last
century.
The commerce of international rivers and some
connecting canals are also subject to joint regu-
lation. The Danube and the Rhine are outstand-
ing examples, although under German and then
Soviet domination, international control of the
Danube in particular is illusory. A more general-
ized type of treaty usually regulates the use of
rivers flowing through or on the borders of more
than one state in all parts of the world.
Roads are more local in nature, although this
characteristic is changing as long-distance truck-
ing develops abroad as it has in America. How ?
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ever, there are agreements as to licensing, liability,
and traffic signals. Roads still remain mostly
feeders to railways in many foreign lands.
Pipelines, except by bilateral treaty, have not
figured as directly in international agreements,
although a few, such as those from the Persian
Gulf to the Mediterranean, are of very great politi-
cal and strategic concern.
International regulation of ocean shipping has
been somewhat different from that of land trans-
port, for international law has recognized the high
seas as free to all users, with questions remaining
only about the limits of territorial waters, use of
oceanic canals and straits, and the rights of bellig-
erents and neutrals. Just as railways have been
very important to economic advance, so too has
cheap ocean transport been made reliable by large
steel steam or diesel vessels. The role of the
merchant marine and its problems should require
no explanation for any naval officer. Only re-
cently has specific international regulation be-
come more extensive. Conferences on safety at
sea and rules of the road are being supplemented
by discussions of wage rates, subsidies, and work-
ing conditions. In the future, the regulations set
by international agreement might increase.
Regulations governing air transport among
countries are very complex, an inevitable develop-
ment, since aircraft have such great military and
political implications and, unlike ships, are not
obliged to stop at the frontier of a country, but can
fly to any place on the globe irrespective of bound-
aries. Early discussions of air law matured in
1919 into the first detailed set of rules. Public and
private air law were merged under a single body,
195
the International Civil Aviation Organization,
after the Chicago meetings in 1944. Regulations
govern the licensing, inspection, registration, and
technical standards of aircraft, communications,
statistics, routes, and rates are all controlled either
through the ICAO, the International Air Trans-
port Association, or by bilateral agreements.
Communications, too, bind together the whole
world and consequently are internationally con-
trolled. These controls include not only the Uni-
versal Postal Union, but also the International
Telecommunications Union, which assigns radio
frequencies, establishes rules on telegraph and
radio codes, and controls access to and use of these
facilities.
Within this chapter have been presented some
of the major geographic, economic, and political
forces that shape the environment of the world of
which the United States is a part and in which the
Navy must do its job?fields of concern which must
inevitably affect the thinking and action of in-
telligence officers. Obviously this review is not a
substitute for the years of background reading and
study and the constant day by day interest in fol-
lowing current developments that are required for
proper analytical assessment of events for in-
telligence purposes. The only aim has been to re-
fresh the thinking of the naval officer, to stimulate
him to do further reading in areas beyond his ac-
quaintance, and thus to improve his intelligence
perspective. The following chapter will outline
the problem the United States and the free nations
of the world face in the menace of communism and
its chief exponent, Soviet Russia.
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CHAPTER 8
WORLD COMMUNISM AND THE U. S. S. R.
The reality of the menace of communism as a
militant political force is evidenced by the fact
that Communist dictatorships now control one-
third of the population and almost one-quarter of
the inhabited areas of the world. In many non-
Communist states, organized groups propound the
doctrines of communism and exercise considerable
political influence. But communism is not only a
political force. Supported and directed by Soviet
Russia, world communism has become the most
extensive mass movement based on philosophical
teachings since the advent of Christianity, and
more disturbing, it is a tremendously powerful
force subversive to the democratic way of life as
enjoyed by the United States and other freedom-
loving peoples of the world. Thus it constitutes
the greatest problem we face today. However,
for the citizenry of the United States, and for the
naval officer, this problem must not only be iden-
tified; it must also be understood if adequate so-
lutions are to be found. It is therefore appropri-
ate to review briefly the doctrines of communism,
their historical development and utilization, and,
finally, some of the elements of power of the So-
viet State which is the chief advocate of Com-
munist doctrine.
THE BACKGROUND OF COMMUNISM
Communism, in theory, is far from new. Ex-
pressions of it are found in Plato's writings and
in literature even before his time. From time to
time in various areas, efforts were made to put
certain fragments of this theory into practice.
Marxist "Scientific" Socialism, or modern com-
munism, as a social philosophy evolved out of
conditions which existed in 19th century Europe
and drew extensively upon the intellectual think-
ing of the 18th century philosophers. The Age
of Reason in 18th century Europe brought an
awakened interest in philosophy, economics, and
politics, a questioning of old beliefs, and a search
for new approaches to the problems caused by
social and economic change. Although the indus-
197
trial revolution eventually led to a higher standard
of living, it also brought unusually harsh condi-
tions of labor for many people. The individual
initiative and healthful environment of an agri-
cultural life and the simplicity of handicraft man-
ufacture were increasingly replaced by the regi-
mentation of the factory, the unhealthful
conditions of the mine, and the complexity of
highly organized industry.
In trying to adjust to life in this new order, so-
cial philosophers of the period began to consider
once again the age-old question of how the com-
mon man can improve his standard of living. At
the same time, economic conditions were being
analyzed and economic principles were being for-
mulated into a broad body of doctrine by the
so-called classical economists. Some of their doc-
trines, with considerable elaboration, form the
skeleton of modern economics, but many of their
explanations of economic functions were based on
very artificial or even false assumptions. Other
writers not only tried to explain the world as it
was, but sought solutions to some of the inequities
of existence. Variant forms of cooperative life
and socialism were suggested as replacements for
the laissez-faire capitalism of the day. Some
short-lived experiments in cooperative societies
were made on a small scale, but most of these were
abandoned when it was found that new problems
replaced the ones they were trying to solve, or
that all failings could not be attributed to capital-
ism alone.
One of the intellectual theorists of this period,
Karl Marx, was to exert an influence on Western
civilization out of all proportion to the signifi-
cance of his teachings, which have been thoroughly
discredited. Very much a product of his age,
Marx conceived of himself as a prophet, a realist,
a materialist, and a social scientist utilizing "scien-
tific" methods. This unique mixture of mis-
sionary fervor and spurious scientific theory was
to be translated into action to an amazing degree
by a small band of devoted followers.
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INTELLIGENCE FOR
THE THEORY OF COMMUNISM
The Communists rely heavily on their body of
theory. Since they regard Marxism as "scien-
tific," they derive from his theories both their
long-range plans and day-to-day action, utilizing
what they believe to be strictly logical deductive
methods. Both Lenin and Stalin emphasized the
importance of theory when they wrote, respec-
tively: "Without a revolutionary theory, there
cannot be a revolutionary movement," and, "Only
a party guided by an advanced theory can act as
a vanguard in the fight." The Communists' pro-
grams of action are, in effect, applications of their
theories. It is for this reason that an understand-
ing of the theory is essential.
Communism presents an interpretation of man
and his history, a reason for cause and effect, a
guidepost for goals, and a justification for the
means of attaining them. Its doctrines have been
closely integrated to embrace all of man's activi-
ties: social, economic, political, and philosophical.
For the confirmed Communist, they alone provide
the satisfactory ? "scientific" ? explanation of
man's being, the solution to his many puzzling
and conflicting problems, and the opportunity for
a realizable better life on earth. For the Com-
munist, the only alternatives are to accept his doc-
trines or to oppose them?a middle ground is
impossible.
Although rejecting all religions as "opiates" of
the people, communism in the eyes of its adherents
has become a substitute religion; even more, it has
given them a sense of purpose, a symbol for per-
sonal dedication. While Communistic writings
are voluminous and complex, they are all built
upon a series of basic concepts which might be
called the creed of communism. The first is the
concept that all life is material in a state of con-
stant change; hence, there is no immortal soul and
no God. The only moral code is that which serves
the cause of communism. The second is the belief
that all history is the result of the laws of economic
determinism which were discovered by Marx; the
basic conflict has always been and continues to be
the struggle between social classes. The third
concept is that capitalism is an instrument of op-
pression and the primary source of opposition
which must be destroyed, together with the State
which of necessity supports it. Destruction can
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NAVAL OFFICERS
only be brought about by violent revolutionary
methods because the ruling class will never relin-
quish its autocratic power voluntarily. There-
fore, such methods are essential and acceptable for
the liberation of the oppressed classes by the van--
guard which is, of course, the Communist Party,
considered in a collective sense. In the minds of
the Communists it follows logically that true com-
munism can only be realized in the world when
all opposition has been eliminated eveywhere.
The Marxist Philosophy
The theory of communism is built on the philo-
sophical teachings of Marx which have three pri-
mary features. The first is Dialectical Material-
ism which, simply stated, is a theory of reality,
a philosophical explanation of the universe and
man. While borrowing heavily from the thinking
of the German philosopher Hegel, Marx substi-
tuted materialism for Hegel's idealism, and at-
tempted to demonstrate that the universe and man
originated from material forces in a state of con-
stant motion. Therefore, to Marx, matter was
all-important, mind was of secondary value, and
consequently the soul, immortality, and God could
not exist. He explained development as the re-
sult of the action of opposing forces. The first
force was called the "thesis ;" the second force, the
"antithesis;" and the result of their opposing ac-
tion, the "synthesis." The "synthesis" became a
new "thesis" and the whole process repeated itself
ad infinitum. The historical application of this
theory of reality was most ingenious. For their
"thesis," the Marxists took the point of view that
primitive society was classless, with tribal owner-
ship of property. The "antithesis" was class so-
ciety, with capitalism as its most extreme form.
The "synthesis," of course, was true communism
which would combine all the advantages of man's
progress with the idyllic simplicity of primitive
society.
In addition to his theories of reality and de-
velopment, Marx set forth three fundamental prin-
ciples which he called the "unity of opposites,"
the "negation of the negation," and the change of
quantity into quality. While abstruse if not ab-
surd, these principles have been applied most in-
geniously. The first justifies the combination of
oppression and freedom within a country in the
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sense that the enemies of communism are oppressed
while its adherents are free to enjoy its benefits.
The second justifies Communist warfare against
the capitalistic state because it produces freedom
for the masses. The third proposes that the trans-
formation of one thing into another is qualitative
and extreme; therefore, a violent revolution is
required to change society from capitalism to com-
munism. Reform is purely a quantitative matter
and no fundamental change ever occurs.
The historical application of Marxist dialectical
materialism also involved the division of society
into classes and an explanation of history on the
basis of class struggle. By its very nature, this
struggle was identified as the means for the even-
tual and inevitable transformation of society. In-
terestingly enough, Marx never took the trouble
to define his term, "class."
The second feature of the philosophy of Marx
is his doctrine of the economic processes, includ-
ing production and distribution. Two aspects of
this doctrine are his labor theory of value and
his theory of surplus value. While not only in-
accurate but also false, his theory is that the
value of commodities is a result solely of labor
and, further, that profit represents nothing more
than unpaid labor. In essence, this economic doc-
trine is a theory of increasing exploitation of labor
with the lot of the workers becoming progressively
worse until they inevitably rise in revolt. In ap-
plying this doctrine, the Communists regard the
economic processes as the base for the entire so-
cial structure of capitalism, including government
and law, science, religion, art, and philosophy.
The arena of the class struggle is the economic
base. Since the theory suggests that the economic
processes of capitalism must inevitably be de-
stroyed, it follows logically, in the minds of the
Communists, that the balance of the social struc-
ture must also be destroyed because it would no
longer have a foundation upon which to rest.
The third feature of Marx's teachings is his
theory of the State and of the revolutionary proc-
ess. Since he believed the apparatus of the State
to be nothing more than "a machine for the op-
pression of one class by another," he was convinced
that it would "wither away" when the true Com-
munist society came into being. However, ac-
cording to his concept of the revolutionary process,
this transformation of human society was not to
be accomplished in one step, but rather in several.
In the first, the bourgeoisie would assume power;
in the second, the proletariat would take control.
This second, transitionary period he labeled the
"Dictatorship of the Proletariat," during which
time the State would be continued, but as an arm
of the masses. Only later, at some future time
which was never defined, would all semblance of
the State disappear and the true Communist
society emerge based upon the philosophy: "from
each according to his ability, to each according to
his needs." It is this theory of the State and of
the revolutionary process which has been particu-
larly subjected to interpretation and manipulation
by Communist leaders who followed Marx.
Communism and Socialism
Any discussion of communism must also include
socialism which was already a well-known term in
the time of Marx. While space does not permit
a detailed consideration of socialism as a system
of thought and a course of social action, four
points regarding it should be mentioned. First,
socialism is revolutionary by its very nature be-
cause it seeks a basic change in social institutions
by a number of methods. This question of method
is one point of difference between present day
Socialists and Communists. Second, there are
many kinds of socialism, of which Marxist social-
ism or communism is only one. Third, as a social
philosophy, socialism includes doctrines which are
not only economic in nature but also political, edu-
cational, cultural, and sociological. Fourth, to
the Communists, socialism is a means, not an end?
a tool with which to build a world Communist
society. This Communist viewpoint that social-
ism is a lower phase of communism is one reason
why some scholars conclude that any movement
toward socialism will ultimately redound to the
advantage of communism.
The Development of the Theory
The total body of Communist theory which has
evolved during the past 100 years is the product of
the thinking and the writings of 4 men: Karl
Marx, Frederick Engels, Vladimir Lenin, and
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Joseph Stalin. Marx has been described as the
"originator" of modern communism, contributing
its basic concepts. Called the "collaborator,"
Engels worked closely with Marx to systematize
these basic concepts; his contributions included
organizational ability and aggressive leadership.
Lenin and Stalin made practical application of the
Marxist theories to the social conditions of their
own times.
Communist historians regard Lenin as the "de-
veloper." Enlarging upon the theory of the
dictatorship of the proletariat, he was able to
apply it successfully in Russia. Since he believed
that the proletariat was not as yet capable of ad-
ministering the State, he advanced the theory of
the Communist Party as the core and "the van-
guard of the proletariat, the general staff of the
revolution." Interestingly enough, he did not con-
ceive of the party as proletarian by nature; in
fact, many of its leaders have been and are intel-
lectuals and of middle-class origin. Nonetheless,
the party "expresses the interests of the proletar-
iat." Lenin expanded upon the theory of im-
perialism as the final stage of capitalistic develop-
ment. He also enlarged upon the strategy and
tactics of world revolution and played a major
part in the organization of the Third Interna-
tional. In effect, he restated the Marxist philos-
ophy in order to apply it more effectively to the
Russian State.
Stalin's place in Communist history is that of
the "continuer." His particular contribution to
theory is the concept of consolidating socialism in
one country first (Soviet Russia). He converted
the party into a strong administrative bureaucracy
and further defined its functions within the dicta-
torship of the proletariat. In rejecting the
"withering of the state" theory, he modified the
Marxist philosophy. At the same time, he ampli-
fied it by introducing the concept of State plan-
ning and emphasizing the industrialization of the
country and the collectivizing of agriculture.
Just as the theory of communism is the product
of the work of these four men, so likewise is the
growth and expansion of communism into its pres-
ent position as a world political force attributable
to their influences.
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200
THE GROWTH OF COMMUNISM
Karl Marx
A German philosopher and economic historian
who had settled in London, Karl Marx was among
the more unconventional writers of the mid-19th
century period. His massive work entitled Daa
Kapital includes some remarkably well docu-
mented and detailed descriptions of the objection--
able working conditions in the coal mines, the
mills, and the factories, as they existed in his time.
Radical as it was at the time, his analysis was an
outgrowth and a perversion of some of the theories
of the classical economists who are today often
regarded as conservative. In the light of present
day economics, many of his analytical conclusions
are easily proven false. Marx is also well-knovvnL
for his economic interpretation of history, even
though he was not the sole originator of this con-
cept. While this concept becomes absurd by ex-
cessive application, it is important enough as an
analytical approach to history to have made a
contribution to the thinking of non-Marxist
historians.
Marx was definitely a materialist; for him all
reality was autodynamic. He viewed life as a
struggle for material goods, without a question of
the hereafter. For Marx, there was nothing out-
side, above, or below nature. All was nature in a
state of eternal, dialectical flux. From his ideas
emerged the doctrine of the class struggle between
the oppressed who were the workers and the op-
pressors who were the bourgeoisie. Because he
believed the false doctrine of surplus value, Marx
saw wealth being concentrated more and more in
the hands of the few, with the wage earners unable
to buy what they themselves produced. Such a
situation, according to Marxist doctrine, leads to
overproduction and unemployment, to imperial-
ism in finding new markets, and to war. On the
basis of his economic interpretation of history,
Marx also expected that in time the desperate
proletariat would rise in violent revolution to de-
stroy the bourgeois oppressors and create a strong
dictatorship which would exist only until the last
traces of the old society had disappeared. In the
new society, when the workers owned the means of
production and no profits were paid, the need for
a dominant organized State to regulate the work-
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ers would disappear, and a new classless, stateless,
and happy society would result.
To a degree, Marx was a frustrated personality
rebelling against the social conditions of his age,
and, originally at least, quite willing for violent
death to be the fate of the "enemies" of the work-
ing class. But his false assumptions and incom-
plete analyses led him to false conclusions. His
materialistic approach to life is rejected by all
who recognize that life also has spiritual values
which transcend its material benefits. Men live
by bread, but not by bread alone.
The Marxist doctrines had a curious appeal, at-
tracting a varied but limited group of followers
in the beginning. Among these were some dis-
contented intellectuals who imagined themselves
in the vanguard of bold new thought; those who
philosophically favored the destruction of existing
institutions and moral values; those just too gulli-
ble and ignorant to see the ultimate results of a
social system that promised peace and plenty in
exchange for a violent revolutionary struggle;
and, finally, the unscrupulous opportunists who
would support any movement that promised per-
sonal rewards at the expense of society.
In connection with the "inevitable" aspect of the
social and economic doctrines advanced by Marx,
it should be noted that the American social struc-
ture has been a particular puzzle to the strictly
Marxian analysts, because its development has con-
futed their basic assumptions. Despite the
growth of capitalism in the United States and the
appearance of huge corporations, the standard of
living has steadily improved and the ownership
base has remained very broad. Public acceptance
of sound regulation has produced a pattern of life
far different from the dire prophecies of the Marx-
ists, although many of the present-day adherents
of Marxist philosophy refuse to recognize Ameri-
can accomplishments.
The First International
The age of Marx has been described as a time
of tumult and trouble. In 1848 Marx and Engels
published the Communist Manifesto, marking a
true turning point from the many Utopian social-
ist plans to a world revolutionary movement.
They called upon the workers of the world to arise,
since they had "nothing to lose but their chains."
201
Revolution broke out in Paris just a few days after
this document was printed, but it, as well as its
counterparts all over Europe, was short-lived.
Many of the German participants fled to America
and England. In the years that followed, Eng-
lish, French, German, Italian, and other working-
men met, and eventually in 1864 formed the In-
ternational Workingmen's Association, commonly
known as the First International. Marx was a
leading figure in the organization. Its purpose
was to unite and advance the workingmen's move-
ments in all European countries, but it eventually
fell to pieces because, for one reason, many of the
participants had paramount interest in their own
national objectives. In the Franco-Prussian War,
with the Germans at the gates of Paris, French
workers rose to create the Paris Commune, whose
bloody suppression was another factor in the de-
struction of the First International. In 1872 the
headquarters were transferred to New York, but
in a short time the organization dwindled away
and was finally disbanded in 1876.
The Second International
Formed in 1889, on the 100th anniversary of the
French Revolution by delegates from 17 countries
meeting in Paris, the Second International existed
until World War I as a rather loose federation of
socialist parties and a society of professional revo-
lutionaries. It had liaison and information-
gathering functions and pressure was exerted to
unite divisive socialist groups. The organization
is difficult to describe in general terms because of
its diverse elements, ranging from Marxists to
those who favored gradual reform within the
framework of existing institutions. The con-
servative elements largely supported the Allied
war cause in World War I, while the Russian mem-
bers favored a policy of revolution. It was this
split that led to the creation of the Third Inter-
national in 1919, often known as the Comintern
or Communist International.
Those parties who refused to affiliate with the
Comintern, and who had left the Second Inter-
national, formed their own organization. In 1923
they joined with the remnants of the Second In-
ternational to establish the Labor and Socialist
International (LSI). The national character of
the socialist movements affiliated in its large mem-
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bership weakened its international effectiveness,
and it finally ceased to exist.
The Russian Revolution
While the intellectuals debated and the revolu-
tionaries climbed soap boxes or plotted coups in
cellars, events of significance were transpiring in
the land of the tzars. This vast and predomi-
nantly agricultural nation had remained in rela-
tive isolation from the economic and political
changes in Europe and America, and the despotic
power of the tzars had preserved aspects of the
feudal system long after they had been destroyed
in the rest of Europe. Marx never went to Russia
nor did he envision that his doctrines would be
applied there. However, the combination of many
circumstances in that ultraconservative empire was
to bring about a violent change.
Russia experienced an aborted revolution in
1905. Some of the surviving revolutionary lead-
ers who were not exiled to Siberia escaped to Ger-
any, France, and Switzerland; others stayed
"underground" in European Russia. Marxist
philosophies were strongest among certain groups
in Germany. When the intelectual theories of
Marx were combined with the practical revolu-
tionary techniques of Lenin, in part influenced by
Sun Yat-Sen, a potentially dangerous force had
come into existence.
The terrible attrition of World War I, the
misery of the lower classes under the cumulative
oppression of the Tzarist regime, and some German
conniving brought civil war to Russia again. The
overthrow of the Tzar was followed first by the
relatively moderate socialistic government of
Kerensky, and then by the skillful seizure of power
by the Bolsheviki under Lenin. Their ruthless
methods, and the dissension among opposing
groups, led to eventual consolidation of power in
the hands of the Communist Party.
COMMUNIST RUSSIA
It should be pointed out that the resulting gov-
ernment in Russia, for all its lip service to Marx,
has yet to create a true Marxist state. The ideal
of the classless society with its common ownership,
no exploitation, no government, and "from each
according to his ability to each according to his
need" has not materialized, nor are there any signs
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that it will. From a detached intellectual point
of view, true Marxism, shorn of revolution, might
have a certain appeal to those who are willing to
overlook practical problems of human behavior
and who are unaware of the serious scientific and
philosophic errors in the Marxist analysis. But
Marxism in practice, as sponsored by the Soviet
Union and its international following, is quite an-
other matter, which should be ample proof of the
fallacies of its theory. Even the communists will
admit that Soviet Russia is in the transitional
stage of Socialism, or public ownership of the
means of production. But what has developed is
State Capitalism with a ruthless exercise of total
power by a dictatorship. Thus a doctrine, orig-
inally philosophical, has developed into a force
seeking world domination.
Reshaping Society
The Russian communist leaders have been emi-
nently practical men, willing to compromise or
adapt their principles to accomplish their goal
of consolidation of power. They have expertly
carried out the techniques of revolution by seizure,
of power following infiltration. They haw
worked hard to reshape mankind to their type of
society. Institutions and ideas that conflicted
with their own have been ruthlessly destroyed.
Religious activities, with their emphasis on moral
values, have been stifled, except when for tactical
reasons temporary concessions have seemed advis-
able. Those who had a stake in the older society,
such as property owners, officials, and community
leaders, have been liquidated or shipped to slave
camps. The flexible doctrine that any means are
justified by the end has opened the door to a
complete new code of behavior in individual and
collective life. The individual is no longer dig-
nified as such, but subordinate to the party goals.
An important feature of the Soviet state is cen-
tral planning. Some may think that the differ-
ences in planning by Communist and non-Commu-
nist states are only differences of degree, but such
a conclusion is not only an oversimplification, but
precludes correct analysis of the problem. The
Soviets plan production, confiscate resources with-
out compensation, and then exercise rigid control
of practically all human activity to conform to
the plan. Of course, a degree of central planning
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is essential for any State; for example, all coun-
tries collect data on price levels, credit needs, and
similar items of national concern. A number of
States have also created central banks to control
money supply and price levels for the minimum
purpose of stabilizing their economy. Some non-
Communist countries use degrees of planning and
control to meet their own needs that are less gen-
erally accepted in the United States. However,
there can be no question that what we know as
democracy is not compatible with the Soviet pat-
tern of life. The Soviets have combined the doc-
trines of Marx, which embody Hegel's dialectics,
Darwin's survival of the fittest, Ricardo's economic
materialism, and the economic interpretation of
history with the revolutionary techniques of
Lenin and Stalin's Communist Party dictatorship.
This is the antithesis of democracy.
Forwarding the Revolution
Lenin believed that the approach to revolution
should vary with the type of country involved.
In major nations it should begin with the ballot
and then be followed by violent revolution. The
client powers were to be oriented toward the Soviet
Union and then finally absorbed. Dependent
peoples could be taken over by directly sponsor-
ing revolution, while backward people could be
absorbed when convenient.
Once Russia had become a Soviet state, though
still weak, there arose the question of what was
to be the next step. This resulted in a struggle
for power among the Bolshevist leaders. Trotsky
was ready to go ahead with revolution on a world
scale. On the other hand, having already experi-
enced foreign intervention in the invasion of Rus-
sia and Siberia by the Allies after World War I,
other Soviet leaders thought that an issue should
not be made of world communism until it was
strong enough to be assured of success. Stalin,
although no less interested than Trotsky in world
revolution, wanted to attain undisputed leadership
in Russia first. Also, he firmly believed that an
adaptation of Marxism was necessary to permit
the establishment of a party composed of workers
and peasants. In a double maneuver to strengthen
the party and increase agricultural output, he
instituted the bloody and ruthless collectivization
of farms. Less than a century before, the peas-
203
ants had won their freedom from serfdom, and
now they were deprived of their land again. In-
dustry was also nationalized. A succession of
police organizations enforced compliance and
stamped out opposition.
Party Control
Party members, as well as passively resisting
Russian citizens have faced execution and Siberian
exile, for successive power struggles within the
party have tolerated no division of leadership or
dissent. The principle of government is the "in-
terlocking directorate ;" that is, officials wear two
hats, one as heads of government ministries re-
sponsible for management and administration,
and the other as members of the Praesidium where
policy is formulated and control exercised. For
almost 30 years Stalin was the dominant figure
in both government and party; he was chairman
of the Bureau of the Council of Ministers, the
executive organ of the Supreme Soviet, and also
General Secretary of the Communist Party, in
which role he presided over meetings of the Prae-
sidium, a powerful combination of the former
Politburo and Orgburo effected by a party reor-
ganization in 1951. Thus party control was made
absolute, and party loyalty became a paramount
virtue, the stepping-stone to prestige and influence.
Russian Traditionalism
Stalin was not only an improviser and believer
in expediency, but a natural product of his en-
vironment. Consequently, under him, many pol-
icies and views of tzarist times continued to shape
the behavior of the U. S. S. R. The traditional
Russian obsession with security has made "perni-
cious foreign influence" a major concern of both
propaganda and actual policy. Many geopoliti-
cal ideas have found expression in Soviet Russia.
The central cores of power are Moscow and the
area east of the Urals, both of which are partly
shielded by the Ukrainian food circle and by the
Arctic wastes. The next lines of defense are the
border S. S. R.'s : Karelo-Finnish, Byelo-Russian,
Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Ukrainian, Mol-
davian, the three Transcaucasian, the Kirghiz,
Uzbek, Turkmen, Tadzikh, and Kazakh. Next
comes a belt of protecting satellites : Poland,
Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, East
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Austria, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, Outer Mon-
golia, Sinkiang, China, and North Korea. Rus-
sia has evidenced interest in adding Finland,
Yugoslovia, Greece, Turkey, and Iran to the list.
The Russian policies of imperialism have found
new expression in many forms. By party activity
and strikes, the Soviet Communists have engi-
neered trouble in France and Italy. By support-
ing Communist military forces they have
attempted to further their designs in Korea,
Indo-China, and Malaya. Through intrigue, espi-
onage, subversion, and sabotage their influence has
been felt in every part of the world.
While the young Bolshevik government was
struggling to establish itself, it emphasized con-
solidation at home so long as separate Ukrainian,
Byelo-Russian, Transcaucasian, and Central Asian
governments followed parallel and friendly
courses. However, as soon as the time was ripe,
all these territories were reabsorbed into the new
Soviet-pattern Russian empire. The Soviet
Union has seemed quite intent on regaining all
former tzarist territories. This it has largely ac-
complished, except for the Finnish defiance and
the United States ownership of Alaska.
Another feature of Soviet policy has been to
make strategic moves to further traditional Rus-
sian objectives. Among these are domination of
the Baltic and Black Seas, including eventual con-
trol of their entrances, the acquisition of warm
water ports on the Pacific, Atlantic, and Indian
Oceans, sponsorship of the Pan-Slavic movement,
and the attainment of economic self-sufficiency.
To these have been added two special Soviet ideas:
overcoming capitalist encirclement, and hastening
the day of world revolution.
Soviet World Objectives
Soviet moves seem calculated to assure that the
Soviet Union itself will survive, and beyond that
point, will expand its territories as far as possible.
This requires early consolidation of power in the
countries of eastern Europe, leading to possible
political merger into the U. S. S. R. Other pos-
sible objectives are to retard and weaken such
blocks of power as may develop, particularly in
western Europe and the Near East; to destroy
Anglo-American friendship; to undermine French
cooperation in the Anglo-American alliance; to
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204
keep Japan, Red China, and Germany sufficiently
weak until Soviet control is complete; to absorb
Austria; and to establish a dominating influence
over the Dardanelles, the Suez Canal, and the
Middle East oil fields. Further objectives include
stirring up trouble in colonies and former colonies,
taking over or destroying the socialist movement,
infiltrating trade unions especially in key indus-
tries, and using international organizations for
propaganda purposes to strengthen the Soviet
Union and its satellites. All of these plans are
self-evident from the record of recent years.
Building Power at Home
Meanwhile at home the Soviet Communists are
exerting strenuous efforts to industrialize the
country, with heavy industry and armament com-
ing first, and consumer goods being produced only
in the amount necessary to prevent uncontrollable
unrest. To meet the production goals, labor is
moved by the millions to new industrial sites, to
mines, and to railway and road construction areas.
This at the same time disposes of dissident groups
or ethnic minorities and keeps costs low, since
slaves under the bayonet and whip need only min-
imum material rewards.
THE THIRD INTERNATIONAL
From the apparent scope of Soviet activities it
should be quite evident why they are of concern
to the free countries of the world. As much as
we may deplore the absence of all the democratic
advantages in certain parts of the world, we be-
lieve that foreign peoples must live their own
lives according to the pattern they choose. We
have hoped that normal social evolution in time
would correct and improve conditions abroad.
But when a powerful State not only aggressively
disseminates economic, political, and social doc-
trines diametrically opposed to our own, but also
develops great military power in a determination
to dominate an ever increasing part of the world,
the problem becomes quite different. Peaceful co-
existence with a Communist Russia, just as with
Nazi Germany, presupposes not only an isolation-
ist tendency on our part, but a basic change in
Soviet objectives. Since the U. S. S. R. has openly
and avowedly embarked on a course of world
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conquest, there is little to indicate such a while the war with Nazi Germany was in prog-
possibility.
The issue is more complicated than simply one
of imperialism versus the status quo. Some people
mistakenly believe that our quarrel is not with
communism but with Russian imperialism. The
two are inseparable, for a basic aim of communism
is world-wide destruction of noncommunistic in-
stitutions and society through violent revolution.
Such an ideological struggle involves more than
military forces; it affects every aspect of life.
The Utilization of Theory
The consummate skill and cunning with which
the Communists translate theory into action has
been demonstrated by the use made of the Third
International, or Communist International (Corn-
intern) , as an instrument for world revolution and
conquest. Unlike the earlier Internationals, this
later world organization has emphasized rigid
party discipline. National parties are not separate
sections to be loosely federated, but rather tightly
integrated units of one world movement. The ap-
plication of Communist principles in the Russian
State has not only given reality to the theory
but also has made available tremendous physical
resources. With the Soviet Union as the "Father-
land," the Communist state in being, Communists
the world over have had a tangible object to which
to transfer their loyalties. At the same time, the
Comintern has provided a means for close inter-
national ties. The resilient strength of this world-
wide organization has been indicated by its ready
adaptability to the sudden shifts and changes in
Soviet policy. On numerous occasions the various
national Communists have revealed their point of
view that what is advantageous for the Soviet
Union is advantageous for them. Thus it has
become exceedingly clear that international Com-
munism is an integral part of Soviet global
strategy.
In the period between World Wars I and II,
the Comintern openly held a series of world con-
gresses to formulate Communist policy which was
admittedly linked closely with the interests of the
Soviet fatherland. However, in 1943, to allay the
suspicions of the western powers, this organization
was dissolved as a gesture to show that subversive
activity in Capitalist countries had been suspended
205
ress?but not for long. In 1947, the Communist
Information Bureau (Cominform) was created as
a result of an international meeting of Communists
held in Poland. It was not supposed to represent
a revival of the Comintern, but to serve only as a
European bureau for the exchange of ideas and in-
formation, and to bring a degree of coordination
to "democratic" movements. These descriptions
of the Comintern and Cominform are what the
Communists themselves admit publicly. Actually,
this is a small part of the story, for the evidence is
overwhelming that the Comintern was almost ex-
clusively the instrument of the Soviet Union. Al-
though this organization was officially dissolved in
1943, its principles were not: they merely assumed
new modes. The Qominform, even more rigidly
subservient to Moscow, appears to be an apparatus
for world propaganda, subversion, and espionage.
Subsidiary Applications of Theory
As has been already indicated, communism in
various countries is the tool of international com-
munism controlled from the Soviet Union. There-
fore it is a domestic enemy to be combatted. by the
police, the courts, and the educational system, as
well as the armed forces. Few can doubt that the
United States itself is under attack by unorthodox
weapons that cannot be challenged alone by the
battleship, the tank, or the bomber. Required is
a joint effort of all social forces in the nation.
No Communist Party in any country should be
confused with ordinary political parties, because it
is essentially an underground movement. True, it
may have a conventional organization which nomi-
nates candidates for political office, and many fel-
low travelers vote for these candidates and take
part in the overt activities of the party. But it
has been thoroughly documented in recent years,
in the United States at least, that the core of the
Communist Party is made up of disciplined people
who operate at a conspiratorial level.
As set forth in published evidence, the Com-
munist Party of the United States openly em-
braces the principles of Marxism-Leninism and
advocates the overthrow and destruction of the
United States Government by force and violence.
Its pattern of action clearly indicates guidance and
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direction of a foreign origin, as well as close as-
sociation with the international Communist move-
ment. Its methods also reflect its relationships
with the Soviet Union and the Cominform. As do
other Communists, those in the United States fol-
low the "hard core" principle, which discourages
large numbers and favors fewer members who are
active and intensely loyal. Such party members
associate themselves with worthy public causes,
adopt misleading party names and alliances, en-
courage labor strikes and disturbances, and at-
tempt to infiltrate into government, the armed
forces, and police agencies. Espionage is a com-
mon feature, aimed at the transmission of vital
information to the Soviet Union to serve Com-
munist aims and objectives. Likewise, in its
fanatical loyalty to Communist principles, the
American Communist Party has a sabotage poten-
tial which can be directed against the United
States at any time.
In depreciating the seriousness of the Commu-
nist menace, some Americans have expressed the
opinion that Trotsky was a dangerous Bolshevist
type because he wanted to hasten world revolu-
tion, but that Stalin was interested only in Rus-
sia's domestic progress, although he used drastic
measures to save time. Others regard Trotsky as
an idealist betrayed by the heartless tyrant Stalin.
It seems clear that both of these men were dedi-
cated to the principle of world revolution. Stalin,
supposedly concerned solely with internal develop-
ment, was just more patient and thorough in his
plans. He built his world organization in dupli-
cating and parallel form. There are the overt
organizations whose mission is to do as much as
possible to create dissent, to recruit, to propa-
gandize. There are also the covert organizations
for the collection of information, for sabotage, and
for infiltration of every type of social group. All
represent powerful weapons whose capabilities
will not become apparent unless widespread mili-
tary war breaks out, and even then will be difficult
of assessment.
Obviously many of these organizations are par..
ticularly potent against a democracy such as the
United States. Already the Bill of Rights has
been used as a defense by those who seek to destroy
its principles. Patriotic Americans sometimes
propose measures to "smoke out subversives" that
CONFIDENTIAL
206
as a cure may be as bad as the disease. Certainly
the problem cannot be solved by strict censorship
measures or disregard for the rights of citizenship
or due process of law. Yet there are times when
national survival may require stringent measures,
applied with intelligence and discernment.
Factors in the Growth of Communism
The significant growth of world communism,
especially in the post-World War II period, is the
result of many factors, among them being: effec-
tive organization and organized deception, world
conditions which favored the acceptance of Com-
munist theory, and the war prestige of the Soviet
Union.
As already shown, the Communists, even before
the end of the war, had developed active organi-
zations which were both international and domes-
tic in nature. Armed with theory translated into
organized action, they were prepared to move into
national vacuums created by the disorganization
of social structures in the aftermath of war and
Nazi tyranny. The preparatory efforts of Lenin
and Stalin, who had stressed the importance of
organization, made possible the maximum utiliza-
tion of every opportunity which presented itself.
The operations of the Communist Parties of Italy
and France are notable examples of the Soviet
effort to influence political activities within non-
Communist states. The underlying technique in
all instances was carefully calculated organized
deception.
The terrible destruction of World War II, its
dislocation of national economies and political
structures, and its imposition of widespread hard-
ships and untold suffering on large segments of
the world's population all combined to create re-
ceptive attention in many areas to the glittering
Communist promises of security and a better life.
The situation for many people was such that they
felt they had nothing to lose, and everything to
gain. As a result, some succumbed, unaware of
the harsh, ugly realities of Communist rule. Not
to be underestimated, therefore, is the appeal of
theory as a factor in the rapid growth of the Com-
munist movement.
Backing up the organizations and the theory
have been the Soviet Armies which gained great
prestige during the war. In the postwar period,
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the threat of their power, to say nothing of their
proximity, has introduced the factor of uncer-
tainty if not of intimidation, particularly for the
nations of Europe. In addition, the wartime in-
trusion of Communists, openly devoted to their
"cause," into places of leadership within under-
ground resistance movements in Europe and else-
where has proved to be an additional source of
strength.
Since the Soviet state is a motivating force for
world communism, it is appropriate to consider
certain of its elements of power.
THE SOVIET STATE
Historical Background
As stated in chapter 5, the assessment of a state
is more than a description of its strategic position,
its resources, and its industry. It is also essential
to study its people and their background. The
historical beginnings of Russia are lost in vague
antiquity. Geographically, Russia was considered
the dividing line between the races and cultures of
Europe and those of Asia. To the east in Asia
were nomadic tribes of Mongolians, Tatars, and
Turks. Perhaps by the sixth century A. D.,
Slavic tribes from northeast of the Carpathians
began to move into the wooded areas of western
Russia and to spread along the river valleys to
the Baltic. In the ninth century the Vikings es-
tablished trading posts at Novgorod in the west,
and also at Kiev in the east. Both became im-
portant centers of government and culture. Satel-
lite colonies and subject territories spread across
much of European Russia. Novgorod became a
merchant city in the Hanseatic League of the Mid-
dle Ages. Kiev established contact with the East-
ern Roman Church at Constantinople, and thus
became Christian, also receiving the Cyrillic al-
phabet, and many features of art and architecture.
The power of Kiev declined under increasing
tribal attacks from the east, and Muscovy, because
of its more sheltered position in the upper Volga
basin, became the new center of power.
During the 13th century all European
Russia except Novgorod was conquered by the
Mongols of Genghis Khan and his successors, who
dominated the country for 21/2 centuries and em-
planted many of their own racial and cultural
207
characteristics. During the 13th century Russia
was also invaded from the west by the Swedes,
who conquered Finland and attacked Novgorod,
and by the Teutonic Knights, who invaded the
Baltic coast and established such cities as Riga.
In the 14th century Lithuania and Poland, joined
through royal marriage, dominated territories
from the Baltic nearly to the Black Sea. The
Lithuanian part is now Byelo-Russia, and the
Polish part is now the Ukraine. The princes at
Moscow gradually Odned power and finally won
freedom from Tatar control.
At this time the Ottoman Turks overran the
Middle East and took Constantinople, forcing the
Eastern church to move its headquarters to Mos-
cow. Ivan III assumed the title of Tzar (Caesar)
when he married the niece of the last Byzantine
emperor in 1472. Then began a period of expan-
sion of power. Traders and settlers pushed out-
ward all the way to the Arctic shores and in 1648
reached the Pacific. During the following 200
years there were recurrent conflicts with the Turks,
Tatars, Poles, Swedes, Lithuanians, and the Teu-
tonic Knights.
Peter the Great, in the late 17th and early 18th
centuries, tried to westernize his country. Forcing
out the Swedes, he moved into the Baltic states
and established St. Petersburg as a great Russian
seaport. Catherine the Great, 1762-96, won back
the territories occupied by Poland, and her armies
also pushed to the shores of the Black Sea. Later
the Caucasus and Finland were conquered. Rus-
sian explorers pushed far afield, establishing set-
tlements not only in Pacific Siberia but along the
Alaskan shores. By 1812 a colony was established
just north of San Francisco at Fort Ross. To
some degree Russia was involved in intrigue in
California and Mexico even after the Fort Ross
post was sold. The problem was finally eliminated
by our purchase of Alaska in 1867.
Meanwhile in Europe Russia had been at war
with Napoleon, and after his famous winter re-
treat, the Russian armies marched across Europe
to France, hailed as liberators from the tyrant.
In the years that ensued, Russia held a dominant
position in Central and Eastern Europe, helping
to suppress revolts in Austria and Prussia, but
aiding the Balkan states to win freedom from the
Turks.
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In the Crimean War of the 1850's the British
and French joined with Turkey to block Russian
expansion into the Mediterranean. Again in
1877-8, Britain, Austria, and Germany aided
Turkey to prevent Russian conquest of the Darda-
nelles. Thwarted in this direction, Russia wrested
control of the lower Amur basin from China, and
just before the end of the century laid railway
lines through Manchuria and took Port Arthur.
Rivalries with Japan in Korea brought a war that
the new trans-Siberian railway could not sustain
logistically. This led to Japanese domination in
southern Manchuria, Korea, and south Sakhalin.
Participation in the first world conflict came
when Russia declared war in behalf of Serbia
against Austria. Germany was able eventually to
overrun much of White Russia, the Ukraine, and
Finland; Rumania took Bessarabia; and the Turks
entered the Caucasus. With internal revolution
and chaos rife in Russia, the western Allies in-
vaded Murmansk, Archangel, Far Eastern Siberia,
and Baku. At the end of the war, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Finland, Poland, and Bessarabia were
all separated from Russia, and the Ukraine gained
autonomy. Revolt in Turkestan lasted until 1923.
Marshal Pilsudski in 1920 mounted fresh attacks
from Poland which led to the capture of Kiev, and
his forces reached Odessa. Russian counter-
attacks would have destroyed Poland again but
for British and French intervention.
Russia made a few overt moves, aside from re-
absorbing the Ukraine, Turkestan, and Trans-
caucasia, until 1939 when her pact with Hilter led
to the repartition of Poland, the absorption of the
Baltic states, and war with Finland. German
armies in 1941 began Operation Barbarosa that
laid waste territories extending from the Arctic to
the gates of Moscow and down to the Caucasus.
An awakening patriotism and ruthless govern-
mental measures supported by American lend-lease
aid, enabled the Russians to turn the tide after the
defense of Stalingrad, and to sweep west into
central and eastern Europe. In the Far East their
last minute entry into the Pacific War gave them
the Kuriles, the rest of Sakhalin, and, eventual
domination of the Asiatic mainland, through the
Chinese Reds, all the way to Southeast Asia. The
wars, hot and cold, of recent years are all too
CONFIDENTIAL
208
familiar for elaboration here. So much for the
bare outlines of military and political change.
Military .Geography
Geographically the U. S. S. R. is a vast conti-
nental territory, sweeping some 6,000 miles east
and west and 3,000 miles north and south. Much
of it is a great plain that reaches from Poland
across Eurasia to the Yenesei River, interrupted
only by the moderate Ural Mountains. The mili-
tary approaches to this territory are few. The
Arctic, frozen much of the year, has few transport
routes across it, and the soil is swampy and the
area insect-ridden during the brief season when it
is not frozen and wind-swept.
The Soviet Union is protected in most of its
other approaches by high mountains and by great
deserts. In the west, the Pripet Marshes are a
barrier; the Balkan frontier has the Carpathians;
the Caucasus ranges are very high. Formidable,
too, are the great mountain belts near Iran,
Afghanistan, Sinkiang, and Mongolia. The Pa-
cific flanks are also mountainous. Mongolia and
much of the Turkestan area are deserts. The
principal surface approaches are in the Mur-
mansk area, through the Baltic to Leningrad, from
Germany on either side of the Pripet Marshes, or
from the Black Sea. Entry is also possible, geo-
graphically speaking, along each shore of the
Caspian from Iran, through the Dzungarian Gap
from Sinkiang, or at the Pacific end of the country
via Dairen, Vladivostok, or the Amur River.
These military approaches, of course, are not
wide open, since Soviet defenses are strong and
the Red Army is likely to occupy most of them
before any outside force could come near. Fur-
ther, mere entry into Soviet territory is not the
same as occupying the seat of Soviet power. Key
regions of greatest strategic significande include:
(1) Moscow, (2) Leningrad, (3) the Donbas, (4)
the Caucasus, (5) the Urals, (6) Tashkent, (7) the
Kuzbas, (8) Lake Baikal, (9) Chita, and (10)
Khabarovsk. These include the major industries
and sources of raw materials. Two additional fuel
sources that feed the industrial areas must be
added : the Pechora and the Karaganda coal fields.
The areas listed above are so widely distributed
that the power of the Soviet Union, like that of a
hydra-headed monster, cannot be destroyed by the
occupation of any single one of them.
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What are some other strengths and weaknesses
inherent in Russia's geographic position? It has
already been pointed out that the country is vast,
well protected on most frontiers, and with widely
scattered centers of industry. The vastness is a
defense, but it also poses grave problems of trans-
port. Given advance preparations, the Soviet
Union from its interior position can strike out-
ward at adjacent Alaska and at Japan, strengthen
its position in China, overrun the Middle East to
reach the Indian Ocean and the Suez region, send
forces throughout Scandinavia, and of course, re-
inforce the Balkans and move its heaviest forces
westward beyond Poland to sweep Europe as far
as the Pyrenees. It is hoped that NATO strength
in time will minimize this likelihood. It may be
that concentrated attacks upon the Soviet Union
at unexpected points would create exceedingly dif-
ficult problems for the Russians in moving troops
and supplies. This possibility has been antic-
ipated by the Russians, for large forces are main-
tained at all points where attack might come, a
policy which only a country with a large man-
power pool can carry out. It has also been met by
the virtually autonomous nature of many of the
scattered industrial complexes. Munitions need
not be moved from one end of the country to the
other in all cases, for sources of supply are usually
duplicated.
Economic Development
One of the significant features of economic de-
velopment has been the percentage shift of indus-
try to the area east of the Urals, although recon-
struction and even new construction in the area
overrun by the Germans has also been very sub-
stantial. The major installations of the steel in-
dustry are in the Donbas of the Ukraine, in the
Urals, and in the Far East. Iron ore is found in
each of these regions. Coal is currently mined in
large quantities in the Donbas, the Kuzbas, and
in the Karaganda and Pechora regions. Iron ore
and coal move in opposite directions between the
Urals area and the Kuzbas, equalizing rail traffic,
while Karaganda coal moves both to the Urals
and to the Tashkent area. Pechora coal moves
both to the Leningrad and Urals areas. These
bulk movements will be vastly improved in the
years ahead as lagging transport facilities, both
209
rail and water, are improved. Already double
tracking and electrification are improving many
of the railways. New short-cut routes will carry
coal to Tashkent from Karaganda and to the Urals
from the Pechora. New dams on rivers and canals
will bring water transport to supplement the
railways.
The machinery and other complex industries
have long been associated with western centers
such as Moscow, Leningrad, and Gorky, but now
new plants, plus plants moved in the face of Ger-
man invasion, turn out these products at widely
scattered points all the way east to the Pacific.
Tanks, aircraft, and railway equipment cannot
be associated with a few areas alone.
The Soviet Union is richly endowed with vir-
tually the whole range of materials needed for
modern industry and war. Perhaps the major
shortcomings are in molybdenum, and to some ex-
tent tungsten, though Communist China can sup-
ply the latter. Although they have enough to
meet minimum war needs, they have need of more
bauxite, bismuth, cadmium, zinc, uranium, abra-
sives, quartz, and talc. Petroleum shortages are
frequently mentioned, but refining and transport
capacity are probably more immediate problems
than reserves. The country is also rich in other
respects. It contains perhaps one-quarter of the
timber stand of the world, enormous hydroelectric
potentialities, and very considerable agricultural
possibilities.
Manpower
The people themselves as a resource deserve
mention. They are hardy and accustomed to
Spartan living. Their numbers are not definitely
known, but probably exceed 200 million. Al-
though divided into many races, they showed con-
siderable unity in the war against Germany before
it was over. The population growth is such as to
provide a high military manpower potential.
Technology
The Soviet Government has been very conscious
of the need for catching up with the industrial
development in Western Europe and America.
Through 5-year plans, and frequently, ruthless
measures, rapid progress has been made in heavy
industry, the basis for both further expansion and
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for munitions. Although their total capacity lags
far below ours, direct statistical comparisons are
dangerously misleading. Since consumer indus-
tries receive a very low priority, only enough to
prevent overall lowered production or revolt, by
far the greatest effort is in further expansion of
heavy and munitions industries. In contrast, our
own so-called minimum civilian needs even in war-
time swallow up very large quantities of labor and
materials.
The rugged simplicity of Soviet weapons is in
striking contrast to the frequently indifferent re-
sults in consumer goods. Basic research and tech-
nical progress are given every encouragement, and
have resulted in such outstanding achievements as
some of the world's best tanks, artillery pieces, and
jet fighter aircraft. Their emphasis on subma-
rines is of special interest to the United States
Navy. Their achievement in atomic weapons has
been reached by much more than highly skilled
espionage; it represents technical skill and organ-
ized industrial effort. They have found a number
of sources of uranium and are now carrying on a
major atomic effort in several parts of their vast
domain.
Perhaps their two major industrial weaknesses
are an inadequate transport system and the pres-
sure that would be felt in the oil industry during
a sustained all-out war.
Natural Resources
Food supply has long been a matter of concern
for the Soviet government. In the past the coun-
try was chiefly agricultural, and it still is in con-
siderable degree, despite the strenuous efforts to
industralize. The key area agriculturally is a
long belt of steppe land reaching across the
Ukraine and out east of the Volga. Although
much of it has the rich Chernozem type black soil,
rainfall is scanty and uncertain. This limited
and unreliable ability to produce food for a rap-
idly expanding population has serious implica-
tions. Even if new areas were brought under
cultivation, less than 10 percent of the total land
in Russia is arable, and much of this is marginal.
Conquest of eastern Europe therefore represents
an important strengthening of the food position.
The Soviets have worked hard to develop new
cold-resistant fast-maturing crops to expand pro-
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210
duction into the subarctic. The principal crops
are wheat, rye, barley, potatoes, and sugar beets.
Flax is raised in considerable quantities, and in-
creased production of cotton in Turkestan, and
near the Black and Caspian Seas, is bringing self-
sufficiency. Meat has been in short supply for
many years.
The Soviet Union may well be the richest coun-
try in the world in mineral resources. Not; all
of it has been thoroughly prospected, but vast
resources of petroleum, coal, iron, manganese,
chromium, magnesium, aluminum, gold, platinum,
potash, and phosphate have already been found.
There are very considerable amounts of copper,
nickel, lead, zinc, graphite, mica, asbestos, fluor-
spar, quartz crystals, sulphur, and some titanium,
tungsten, molybdenum, tin, and corundum. Co-
balt, cadmium, and vanadium may be available as
byproducts from ores known to exist in Russia.
Where a few of these materials are in short supply
for industry, the satellites make up most defi-
ciencies. Molybdenum comes from East Germany,
antimony from Czechoslovakia and China, tung-
sten from China, and mercury for a time came
from Yugoslavia. It is harder to assess the actual
position in uranium production, but in addition
to the old pitchblende mines in the Czechoslovakia-
East Germany area, which have been thoroughly
exploited, there are additional deposits in Poland
and Bulgaria. More may be available in Man-
churia, and it is rumored in several public reports
that vast amounts can be exploited in western
Tibet. Within the Soviet Union there are known
uranium deposits at Ukhta in northern Russia,
in the Caucasus, southeastern Turkestan, the Altai
Mountains, Tannu Tuva, and near Lake Baikal.
Undoubtedly, exploration has revealed more.
Their chief need for mineral exploitation is more
engineers, more production and refining equip-
ment, and better railway transport.
Soviet oil production has not kept pace fully
with potential needs, but there are multiple sources
under exploitation. The Caucasus area still leads
in production, centering at Baku, Maikop, and
Grosny. The trans-Volga and Emba River fields
are being expanded. Other smaller fields are in
the Gergana Valley of Turkestan, at Nebit Dag
east of the Caspian, in the Kama River Valley, on
Northern Sakhalin, and in Kamchatka. Still
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other newer fields are in the Pechora, the Yenesei,
and Maya Valleys, and the Tamir Peninsula. The
Lvov fields in former Poland are now within the
Soviet Union. In addition, satellite Rumania has
the Ploesti fields. Production is conceivably only
one-tenth that of the United States, but consump-
tion by civilian motor vehicles and railways in the
Soviet Union is negligible compared to ours.
The Russians have made considerable improve-
ments in electric power production. The greatest
dam in Europe before the war was the 900,000
kilowatts-capacity Dnepr plant, comparable to
Hoover Dam in power output. Since the war it
has been restored, and a whole series of dams are
either completed or projected along the Don and
Volga. Potentially, there are large numbers of
additional sites. Hydroelectric power is also de-
veloped in the Kola Peninsula, the Caucasus, and
in southeastern Turkestan. Today output may be
about one quarter that of the United States.
Sociological Characteristics
What manner of people have the Russians be-
come ? The question is difficult to answer in a few
words. Representing a mixture of many cultures,
they seem in many ways mystical, fond of phil-
osophizing, perhaps too willing to shrug off mis-
fortune, but able to endure discomfort and incon-
venience. Because of ignorance and poverty, only
strong methods have been able to change the masses
in their habitual ways. The people as a whole
have never lived in a western democratic society,
and their present government is certainly not con-
cerned with human rights or individual dignity.
Although this is not meant to be an indictment of
the Russian people, there is now a question of
whether or not the people themselves, in their
own society, may net be changing for the worse
by our standards. The Russian nobility, prosper-
ous farmers, and business classes of the past were
killed or driven from the country. The peasants,
used to a simple and hardy life, bound by a love
for their soil, have been uprooted by the millions
to go into industry or to collective farms. The
years of revolution, war, famine, and repression
have affected family life and individual outlook.
The present generation has known nothing else;
only the old people remember an earlier life. The
Soviet government has tried in this generation to
211
reshape attitudes and behavior, using any means
regardless of the cost to individuals. It has
speeded modern improvements and corrected some
former shortcomings, but only at a terrible price
in human suffering and damage to the finer sen-
sibilities of the people. The Soviet totalitarian
state has not only brought planning to the econ-
omy, but police terror, spying, and regulation into
every aspect of life. The social and political con-
sequences of communism are just as great and as
serious as the economic.
Communist minorities in the early days of revo-
lution manipulated themselves into power and in a
conspiratorial manner have ruthlessly maintained
their hold. Division of authority is not tolerated,
and when rivals have appeared, they have been
purged by standards so extreme that their fam-
ilies and associates, regardless of individual guilt,
have also faced execution or imprisonment. Ter-
ror is the weapon used. There is no voice other
than the voice of the Party, whether it be in the
press, the school, or the political forum. The de-
tailed regulation of life with millions of informers
makes anticommunist intrigue exceedingly diffi-
cult. Children are praised for testifying against
their parents. Education and politics become the
ritualistic repetition of Party dogmas, with devia-
tion a major sin. Yet despite a generation of re-
education and suppression, there are still stresses
in Soviet society. Minorities to some degree still
have Nationalist aspirations. Normal human
feelings cannot be so suppressed that some do not
rebel at cruelty. The years of sacrifice, always
with the promise of a better future, have not
brought an easier life to the masses, instead a new
privileged class, the Party members, has arisen.
Only a few others are also favored: scientists,
artists, and military leaders. The top leaders
seem to combine a very real devotion to the Party
with an apparently considerable degree of cyni-
cism about some of the outward symbols used. In
any event, extremes of privilege are very great,
ranging according to rank within the Party, the
military, and down through the intelligentsia to
ordinary workers and peasants, finally reaching
the "untouchables" of Soviet society, those out of
favor with the Party and the slave laborers. No-
body knows how many laborers are in penal servi-
tude, but the number may be twenty or thirty mil-
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lion, representing ordinary criminals, political
minorities, the indiscreet, kulaks and petty bour-
geoisie, or just people unfortunate enough to be
within reach when more labor 'was required.
The new generation takes this society for
granted. Children old enough to go to school
join the Young Pioneers, and if found worthy, are
then graduated with suitable ritual to the Kom-
somols. In time, by rigid selection, a few join
the elite Communist Party. Its numbers, kept to
hard core strength by constant self-examination,
are subjected to rigid tests and tasks in order to
increase their usefulness to the Party.
Political Institutions
A facade of legal government, a written consti-
tution, and even elections exist, but it is the Party
that rules through the Central Committee and
the Party Presidium. It may be that there is
freedom of expression and debate within the Party
Presidium, but it is also likely that, in consider-
able degree, while Stalin was dictator, the mem-
bers waited for his nod. It is also possible that
if some got illusions of grandeur, Stalin played
them off against each other, or they suddenly died
and enjoyed elaborate state funerals.
The Party leaders live in country villas in the
suburbs of Moscow, and ride to the Kremlin in
limousines with police escort; but they also work
very long hours. During Stalin's regime, late
night conferences were customary. It is not yet
possible to assess the consequences of the poli tical
realignment which followed Stalin's death. How-
ever, there seems to be no reason for anticipating
major changes in fundamental policy or in the
basic organizational structure of the Party or the
Government.
Evolutionary Prospects
As has been pointed out, a better standard of liv-
ing for the masses has been sacrificed to capital
expansion and military strength. The Red Army,
largest in the world, represents abstractly a counter
force to the Communist Party. But precaution-
ary measures, undertaken to prevent this eventu-
ality, have been intensified, especially following
the great purges of 1937 that uncovered treachery,
imaginary or real, to Stalin. Every military unit
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nowl includes a political officer and, in addition,
there are secret informers throughout the ranks
that watch for any dissidence. Also the security
forces, under the MVD, have their own elite mili-
tary units designed to deal with insurrection.
It cannot be emphasized too strongly that those
are most optimistic who hope for internal reform
in the Soviet Union which will? change its world
outlook. Although there may be some guerrilla
bands, some dissident elements, and undoubtedly
a host of unhappy citizens, the odds are against
any upset short of major war and upheaval. Party
control of all propaganda, education, and social
activity, even including the Orthodox Church,
makes the odds very great indeed.
As has been suggested earlier, we do not have
just a Soviet problem, one of ambitious State albeit
with a different philosophy. We have a world
Communist movement which draws men of many
races and many classes into a world struggle for
domination, and which receives strength and suc-
cor from the Soviet homeland. The people of
some countries have been won over more easily,
perhaps, because by comparison Soviet domination
seemed to represent an improved way of life. The
Communists have also learned to take the legiti-
mate grievance, set up a coalition or popular front,
and then after infiltration of key posts to unmask
their complete power and win control of the new
government.
Soviet Armed Forces
The Red Army is the most powerful land force
in the world. Its strength is usually quoted as
175 divisions, not including powerful satellite and
security forces. Increasingly, the heavy arms
production of the Soviet Union is being reflected
in higher firepower and more armor and vehicles
for this army. Amenities for troops are kept at
a minimum. Under combat conditions they
largely live off the land, and advance in every kind
of vehicle, mechanically and animal powered. The
haphazard aspects of their military behavior are
not necessarily weaknesses: some are strengths, for
they are free from the high logistics costs that we
bear. Their willingness to take casualties makes
them formidable adversaries. If a minefield
blocks the way, hostages, labor forces, or their
own troops simply march through and detonate
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the mines to allow more combat troops to pass.
Although large numbers defected or were demoral-
ized in the earlier stages of the German onslaught,
extreme repressive measures, plus patriotism, plus
personal indifference to death, created a powerful
force that swept across Europe.
The Red Air Force has specialized in tactical
air support, and has long been known for its good
quality fighters. The Korean War demonstrated
that the MIG-15 jet fighter was one of the finest
interceptors in the world. Creation of a strategic
air force has been suggested by the copies of
United States B-29's that have been seen in in-
creasing numbers by foreign observers. This
development, which probably includes more
modern types, takes time, but fits logically with
their presumed atomic capabilities.
The Red Navy in the past has been largely a
coastal defense force scattered among the several
widely separated coasts of the Soviet Union.
However, it is no mean force, for its submarine
strength is the greatest in the world, and although
reports are scanty, the same German technical
knowledge in this field has been available to them
as to us. The Soviet Navy's performance is
largely unknown, since its exploits in World War
II were limited, but there have been frequently
reported stories of new surface vessel construc-
tion that reflect Soviet interest in building an ef-
fective fleet.
A chief difference between these Red forces and
our own is their use of political officers and also of
213
large para-military security forces. Unlike our
doctrine, every Soviet military unit not only has a
military commander but a political officer who
can influence a commander's decision by making
him accountable to the Party. The political
officer has additional duties in insuring loyalty
and in carrying out an intensive indoctrination
program at all levels. The security forces are so
organized as virtually to guarantee that the Red
Army itself cannot rise against the government.
These security forces also have major responsi-
bilities for guarding the frontiers against any-
thing other than major attack, and also for ad-
ministering the slave labor camps with their
estimated twenty million victims.
In summation, the armed forces of the Soviet
Union and the closely integrated satellite forces
collectively represent the greatest military power
in being in the world. They are famous for their
artillery, their tanks, their rockets, and their
fighter planes. They are politically oriented to a
fanatical degree. They are hardened by their
normal living conditions and by the most rigorous
training. However, they are not invincible, nor
is their political training a perfect shield, if the
record of World War II gives any guide for the
future. With full recognition of their strengths,
the naval officer should study them with a view
toward possible exploitation of their weaknesses,
both in conventional military warfare and in those
areas where intelligence can also aid so greatly:
the economic, the political, and the psychological.
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CHAPTER 9
THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE: COLLECTION
Intelligence as activity is embodied in the steps
or phases of a perpetual cycle consisting of collec-
tion, processing, and dissemination kept in motion
and continually reactivated by use on the part of
strategic planners and operational commanders.
Any item of collected information becomes intel-
ligence through processing and reaches its poten-
tial consumer through dissemination.
A cycle which comprises these functions is not
peculiar to intelligence; the steps are common to
any activity or industry which produces a finished
product from raw materials. In the automotive
industry, for example, the process of manufacture
begins with the acquisition of raw materials, the
ores from which the necessary metals are made.
The metals are then fashioned into the component
parts of engine, chassis, and body, which are as-
sembled into a finished product, an automobile.
The next step puts the product in the hands of
distributors or dealers who sell it to the ultimate
user, the individual motorist. The phases of such
an industrial cycle, procurement, manufacture,
distribution and sales are analogous to those of all
intelligence activity. First, information must be
collected; second, this information must be sub-
jected to certain evaluative processes by which it
becomes intelligence; and third, the intelligence
must be put in the hands of potential users
Finally, its use, either in planning or in operations,
will uncover needs for additional information
which will reactivate the cycle.
Let us relate the operation of the intelligence
cycle to the commander and his mission. In pre-
liminary staff planning, the commander's needs
and responsibilities in respect to intelligence will
require answers to the following questions:
1. Is my information on the enemy and the area
of operations complete, accurate, and timely?
2. What collecting agencies or units do I have
available for filling in the gaps in my infor-
mation?
3. What is the correct interpretation of this
information in the light of my mission?
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4. To which of my subordinates or superiors
will certain items of intelligence be useful?
In supplying the answers to the commander's
questions, the supporting duties and functions of
his intelligence officer are clearly prescribed as
they relate to the three steps of the cycle, for collec-
tion, processing, and dissemination are indicated.
The matter of use requires more explanation.
It has been stated above that use reactivates the
cycle. Returning to our industrial analogy, we
find the user, the man who bought the car, in the
same position as the commander who "bought" the
intelligence. The owner of the car reports that
its performance in general is quite satisfactory,
but that improvement in driving comfort would
be effected with the addition of foam rubber seat
cushions. Satisfied owners are essential to sales,
so the company acts on the complaint by procuring
additional raw materials, in this case foam rubber,
and later models of the car have better seat cush-
ions. Thus user experience results in a better
product.
Suppost now that the commander in the midst
of his planning finds that his information on Blue
Beach may not be completely up-to-date because
of enemy activity in that particular area. Have
beach defenses been improved? A collection task
arises and his question can be answered best by
amphibious reconnaissance of the beach. The re-
port of the amphibious patrol will then be evalu-
ated and the new intelligence considered in the
commander's plan. The cycle was reactivated by
the need for additional information in the plan-
ning stage of the operation. Likewise, the opera-
tion itself will cause the reactivation of the cycle
when in retrospect it is realized that information
was incomplete on the range of a certain type of
mortar used by the enemy. The capabilities of
this mortar must be reassessed in the light of com-
bat experience: a job for his intelligence officer.
Again the experience of the user results in a better
product, which in this case is intelligence of value
to the commander in making sound military
decisions.
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The steps of the intelligence cycle do not always
follow in the logical sequence of collection, proc-
essing, and dissemination, although this order is
normal procedure in the flow of raw information
from producer to consumer. Circumstances may
influence the sequence; certain information re-
quires no processing, since it is finished intelligence
at the time of collection. This would be true in
the case of a single indisputable fact required by
a user. Information required by a user can be
supplied on many occasions from the files of ONI
without the need for the assignment of an ad-
ditional collection task to a field unit.
The individual steps in the cycle likewise do
not represent treatment by different intelligence
activities at distinctly different times. The same
activity may be collector, evaluator, and dissemi-
nator of a certain item of information. Collect-
ing agencies themselves normally subject the in-
formation collected to a certain degree of
processing, and those who determine the final
interpretation of an item of information are
often best qualified to determine its potential user.
The cycle is flexible, therefore, in its application
to specific subjects and intelligence tasks.
Collection, processing, and dissemination and
the work of the intelligence officer in each will be
discussed more fully in the three chapters which
follow.
REQUIREMENTS IN COLLECTION
Information for intelligence comprises docu-
ments, facts, and observations which throw light
on any of the varied aspects of a subject under
study. In form, information may consist of
written articles or reports, messages, oral presen-
tations or briefings, maps, photographs, graphic
visual aids, and physical objects. In nature, in-
formation may be general or specific; detailed or
fragmentary; true or false. Only when this raw
undigested accumulation of material is subjected
to the processes leading to final interpretation does
it become intelligence to be disseminated to ap-
propriate users.
There are four basic requirements in the collec-
tion of information for intelligence: (1) GUID-
ANCE, the direction of the collection effort by means
of collection plans at all levels of command; (2)
COVERAGE, the availability of suitable collecting
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activities to fulfill the tasks imposed by the col-
lection plan; (3) REPORTING, the form and means
of forwarding information from the collecting
activity to the processing agency; (4) RECORDING,
making information readily available for present
and future processing by proper cataloging, filing,
and indexing,
Guidance
Collection requires specific guidance and control
to make it efficient and valuable. Collectors must
know what information is needed, and how soon
it is needed, in order to expend their efforts effec-
tively. Since collection of information for intel-
ligence is a responsibility of a naval commander,
it is from him that direction of the collection effort
must come. The commander's function in this
respect will be more fully discussed in chapter 12,
?
Intelligence Staff Procedures. The guidance of
collection throughout the naval establishment is
effected through certain basic requirements set
forth at the highest command level by the Chief
of Naval Operations. They are expressed in broad
terms for the general guidance of all the Navy's
collecting agencies and activities and constitute a
basic collection plan from which are derived the
collection plans of subordinate commands. The
Director of Naval Intelligence, for example, as
CNO's Intelligence Officer, bases his collection
plan upon the requirements listed by CNO, but
DNI expresses them in much more detail and as-
signs specific collection tasks to the agencies and
activities which can best obtain the required in-
formation. The field activities, such as the Oper-
ating Forces, the Attache System, and the Naval
District and River Commands, formulate their
own collection plans, based in turn on the require-
ments of DNI, but again expressing in detail the
specific items that can be obtained through the
exploitation of sources peculiar or particularly
available to each. Thus the general intelligence
requirements become more itemized and specific
as they are incorporated into the collection plans
of lower echelons of command. Some intelligence
tasks are long-range and continuing, others are
initiated by immediate needs. The collector must
be aware of the purpose, nature, and urgency of
these tasks, and he must work within the frame-
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work of an organized plan in accordance with
local conditions.
Collection directives are subject to such periodic
revision as may be demanded by the world situa-
tion and the needs of the Navy. Emphasis will
vary, interest will rise and wane, and objectives
will differ in various parts of the world. Intel-
ligence producing units, such as a geographic desk
in the Office of Naval Intelligence, should have
the closest possible contact with the field activity
which is best qualified to collect the particular
kind of information required for sound estimates
or careful planning. The relations between col-
lector and processor should always be as intimate
as possible. Each report's value should be ap-
praised and the reporting officer notified. Much
welcome guidance can be given by suggestions
through personal conferences, official inspections
at stated intervals, and official evaluations and
commentaries of field reports. Praise for indus-
trious collection and good reporting are mutually
rewarding for both collectors and processors.
Coverage
Coverage is achieved when the collecting agency,
through conscientious exploitation of all sources
of information, fulfils its assigned mission. Thor-
ough coverage depends upon a carefully formu-
lated collection plan, one which completely realizes
the collecting potential of the area or target in
question. Through the collection plan, potential
sources for information of significance are most
likely to be discovered and exploited; thus, it may
be possible to anticipate and fulfil requirements
for particular data. In connection with coverage,
the utilization of operational collection units will
be discussed in chapters 12 and 13.
Collection Agencies
As was noted in the previous sections on the
organization of Naval Intelligence, the respon-
sibility for the collection of all types of informa-
tion for intelligence required within the Naval
establishment rests with the Chief of Naval Op-
erations. Under him, the Director of Naval In-
telligence, as head of the Naval Intelligence organ-
ization, is responsible for the exploitation of all
sources in the collection of information of naval
interest, guided by such pertinent policies, pro-
269196-54-15
217
cedures, and objectives as are set forth by the
National Security Council. The broad scope of
naval interest has been presented in the first chap-
ter, and needs no further elaboration. Any infor-
mation or intelligence that might support the
Navy in carrying out the missions assigned to it
or to its component parts, including naval aviation,
amphibious forces, and the Marine Corps, is con-
sidered to be of naval interest.
The collecting activities available to the Director
of Naval Intelligence are (1) the Office of Naval
Intelligence, the "home office"; (2) the field activ-
ities consisting of the Operating Forces, the Naval
Attach?ystem, Naval District and River Com-
mands, including Sea Frontiers; and (3) the naval
sections of intelligence activities sponsored jointly
by Navy with other military services.
The Collector, Ashore and Afloat
Every person in the Navy is a potential collec-
tor of information of value to intelligence. A
seaman on liberty in foreign or United States
ports, a lieutenant unexpectedly invited aboard a
foreign naval vessel, a welder in a naval shipyard,
or a clerk in the office of a District Intelligence
Officer, may be in position to supply a missing bit
of information. Just as the intelligence required
by staff planners differs from that required by sub-
ordinate commanders only in scope, point of view,
and level of employment, so do collectors of
information differ only in the orbit of their move-
ment, their background of education and experi-
ence, and their position in the naval establish-
ment. The collector, like the newspaper reporter,
is concerned with the five W's and the H: who,
what, when, where, why, and how, but he is more
than an inquiring reporter, for he must be city
editor and editorial writer as well, combining the
discrimination of a city editor in determining what
is "fit to print" with the editorial writer's perspec-
tive in interpreting events of the contemporary
scene.
In collection activities, the intelligence officer
must have the personal qualities possessed by the
successful reporter. It is difficult to give a rela-
tive order of importance to these qualities, for
their significance will be determined by the aspects
of the collection task, and they will vary with
assignments. Answers come from questions, so
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first of all, the intelligence officer as a collector
must have an inquiring mind, an insatiable intel-
lectual curiosity about the world in which he lives.
In order to give direction to these qualities, he
must have a thorough grasp of the object, nature,
and scope of the intelligence operations in which
he is engaged. In this respect intelligence is
knowledge?knowledge gained by the intelligence
officer through study and experience. The better
his background of information is on a given sub-
ject, the more valuable and discriminating will be
his effort in collecting additional information. He,
must be thoroughly familiar with his agency's
existing file of information so that he will not
waste time in collecting what is already available.
It is on the gaps of information that he should
expend time and energy. He must ever be an
avid student, with a discerning awareness of the
significance of what he sees, hears, and reads.
In addition to mental alertness, the intelligence
officer must have physical energy. He cannot sit
at a desk and expect information to come to him.
Collecting normally requires a certain amount of
"leg-work": things to see and people to interview.
Here the qualities of initiative, tact, and resource-
fulness are paramount. If a source of information
dries up, replacement must be found; if efforts in
one direction are futile, leads must be discovered
and pursued in other directions with perseverance
and patience.
Emotional stability is yet another quality de-
sirable in a good intelligence collector. The busi-
ness of tracking down information may be tedious
and unexciting; the collector may meet with re-
buffs and closed doors. He must be able to cope
with these frustrations and devise ways to over-
come them, subduing any momentary pique that
initial difficulties might engender. Moreover, his
ability to judge facts objectively must not be
impaired by personal attitudes.
Sometimes the collector in the field will receive
spot requests for information which to him appear
to be insignificant and purposeless, devoid of back-
ground and meaning. In such cases he must
comply without questioning the reason for the re-
quest. Normally, the collector will be informed
of the purpose, but sometimes urgency or com-
munications security will not permit thorough
briefing, and message requests preclude lengthy
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explanations. To someone in the intelligence
organization, this bit of information is of vital
importance, and the collector must seek to obtain
it with the same zeal he would use in performing
intelligence tasks which seem to have more
meaning.
Intelligence agencies do not wish to stifle indi-
vidual characteristics, for interplay of personali-
ties in an intelligence organization is highly de-
sirable, but the qualifications discussed above are
basic. Some are innate, others can be acquired.
It is the collector's responsibility to strive for the
ideal through self-examination and improvement.
The Office of Naval Intelligence
The organizational structure of the Office of
Naval Intelligence was presented in chapter 2.
It is the "home office" into which all information
reports flow and where they are processed and dis-
seminated for use. Here collection programs are
established which are translated into positive col-
lection guidance for field activities. ONI also
provides the liaison with other government de-
partments and agencies which insures a full fund
of knowledge and eliminates duplication of col-
lection efforts. Although ONI fits into the intel-
ligence cycle most appropriately in the processing
phase, it must not be overlooked that the research
activity carried on by analysts is in a large sense a
collection activity as well, for evaluation requires
the patient gathering of a mass of related
materials.
OPERATIONAL COLLECTION OF INTELLIGENCE
Articles 0504 and 0506 of Navy Regulations
state that "a commander shall maintain an effec-
tive intelligence organization and keep himself
informed of the political and military aspects of
the national and international situation" and that
CCa commander shall keep his immediate supe-
rior appropriately informed of intelligence in-
formation that may be of value."
These two articles make each commander re-
sponsible for the collection, processing, and dis-
semination of intelligence within his own com-
mand and the dissemination of intelligence to
higher echelons. Without good intelligence it
would be impossible to conduct a successful naval
operation, unless there was an overwhelming supe-
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riority of forces, and even then much time, money,
and many lives would be wasted unnecessarily.
The commander must be assured of continuing
reliable intelligence as to the disposition, strength,
composition, and movement of enemy forces, as
well as intelligence on the weather and other
factors of the area of operations. He must use
every means at his disposal to gain information
of the enemy forces opposing him, and of enemy
forces in other areas, which may affect the prepara-
tion and execution of his plans. A failure to ex-
ploit every source of information may deny
important information of enemy dispositions,
movements and operations, and consequently make
impossible a decisive exploitation of enemy
weaknesses.
The difficulties involved in obtaining adequate
information and in arriving at reliable conclusions
are many. These difficulties are due principally
to the enemy's efforts to foil attempts made to gain
information. In concealing his movements he will
make use of camouflage, darkness, and weather.
He will resort to any tactical measures that offer
a reasonable chance of obtaining secrecy or sur-
prise. He will enforce both strict censorship and
communication security measures to prevent leaks
of information. He may distribute false informa-
tion and institute other measures to deceive the
collecting agencies of the opposition. He will
sometimes adopt a course of action that may ap-
pear illogical. Thus in planning and operations,
the designs of the enemy are more or less unknown
factors.
Combat operations during wartime constitute
one of the primary sources of information about
the enemy. The observations and experience of
personnel involved, when properly evaluated, are
immensely valuable in furnishing intelligence con-
cerning enemy strength, disposition, materiel, tac-
tics and capabilities, to say nothing of valuable
target information and geographical detail.
Collection by the Fleet
The Fleet has at its disposal certain units that
are ideally constituted to provide the means of
collecting certain types of information. It is im-
possible to list them in order of importance, for
in certain conditions and at a particular time each
may be of prime importance in a vital collection
219
task. The discussion here will be of a more gen-
eral nature, since details of such employment of
operational units will be presented in chapter 13
against a background of certain naval operations
of World War II.
Collection by Surface Vessels
In both peace and war the surface vessels of
the Navy are collectors of intelligence. Most na-
tions send their vessels on cruises in peacetime, not
only for training personnel and testing equipment,
but also to collect a great variety of intelligence.
Reports can be made on such subjects as weather
observations, channel soundings, sonar conditions,
port and harbor installations, radio and radar
transmissions, and many items of political, eco-
nomic, and sociological interest. It will also be
possible to enhance the value of these reports with
appropriate photographs. Collection by ship's
personnel underway or in foreign ports requires
vision in guidance and diligence on the part of
the collectors.
In actual war conditions, the emphasis in col-
lection may shift to more current information of
a tactical nature for which there is immediate
need. There will always be gaps in our basic
encyclopedic intelligence which must be filled as
opportunity presents itself. For example, naval
operations in World War II took place in parts of
the world far from the beaten track, and the oper-
ating forces not only had to find the enemy and
observe the weather, but also had to take many
soundings and do other jobs that unfortunately
had not been done before the war. Even so, op-
erations could not be wholly successful without the
encyclopedic type of information as a frame of
reference within which to study current enemy
behavior.
One of the tasks performed by surface vessels
in collection is hydrographic survey. This infor-
mation is needed by the Hydrographic Office to
revise and improve the navigation charts used by
merchant and naval ships alike. In many parts
of the world navigation charts date back into the
last century, and only the most obvious corrections
have been made since. Subsequently, islands have
been found to be mislocated and soundings in-
adequate over reefs and other obstructions. There
are geological changes, sometimes of great vio-
lence, that require resurvey.
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In World War II, existing charts were found
to be so inadequate that additional survey ships
were commissioned and given elaborate photo-
graphic and printing equipment to prepare new
charts in the field for direct dissemination to the
operating forces. The nature of hydrographic
needs has changed with naval warfare itself, put-
ting new demands on collectors. For example,
amphibious intelligence poses information require-
ments in surf and swell conditions, tides and cur-
rents. Successful submarine operations require
not only data on depths and currents, but also on
temperature and salinity.
Electronic Reconnaissance
The appearance of radar in World War II and
the subsequent advancement in the development of
electronic devices have provided our fleets and
forces with a new and important capability in the
collection of information by means of electronic
reconnaissance. Much of this capability rests with
communications intelligence which will be dis-
cussed in a later section, but reconnaissance by des-
ignated ships and aircraft of the Fleet, within
range of enemy radar or radio installations, pro-
vides a means for the collection of data concerning
their identification and location, as well as trans-
mission frequencies, characteristics, and employ-
ment.
The devices and techniques of such collection
require technical explanations beyond the scope of,
this volume. Obviously, this is a job for elec-
tronics experts, but the intelligence officer who
finds himself associated with electronic collection
activities can be of great assistance in on the spot
guidance and preliminary interpretation of the
collection effort. In an age when science and
technology are constantly changing concepts of
warfare, electronics represents a field of which the
intelligence officer can ill afford to be ignorant.
Collection by Submarines
Submarines are especially suited for collection
of information through reconnaissance because
they can remain concealed and unsupported for
long periods in enemy waters. Thus they can
reconnoiter successfully and return safely and
secretly in situations where other collection agen-
cies could either not obtain the desired information
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220
NAVAL OFFICERS
at all, or could only do so at great cost and with
the risk of giving the enemy an indication of
intentions.
One limitation of the submarine in reconnais-
sance work is the necessity of relatively deep water.
In order to remain submerged, and therefore con-
cealed, the submarine must confine its movements
to waters of ten or preferably twenty fathoms.
Close approach to the area to be reconnoitered may
thus be limited by bottom topography. In plan-
ning any submarine reconnaissance, the depth of
water must be given special consideration.
Submarines are capable of several different
types of reconnaissance:
1. Periscope reconnaissance.
( a) Visual. Best results are obtained from
the shortest possible range. Binocular viewing
by two or more observers at a time is recom-
mended; for this purpose, an auxiliary viewer
may be used, which projects the periscope field
on a ground-glass screen. It is also advisable to
use a voice recorder at the time of observations,
and to make sketches of significant details.
(b) Photographic. Makes a complete record
of observations; allows photo-interpretation if
a photo-reconnaissance strip can be made. All
major amphibious operations in the Pacific dur-
ing World War II were preceded by submarine
photographic reconnaissance.
2. Radar or radio reconnaissance. Obtains in-
formation of the locations and characteristics of
enemy transmitters on shore, ships or aircraft.
Special search receivers and associated equipment
are required. The intelligence officer should brief
submarine personnel in advance on the known loca-
tions and characteristics of all enemy transmitters
in the reconnaissance area.
3. Sonar reconnaissance.
(a) Listening. With the use of special equip-
ment, this type of reconnaissance can provide
sonar information, similar to that of radar and
radio. It not only contributes to scientific and
technical intelligence, but may be of value in
future undersea operations against the enemy.
(b) Echo-ranging. Obtains information of
the locations of minefields and other underwater
obstacles. Special sonar equipment is required.
The intelligence officer should provide charts of
known or suspected mines and other obstacles
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and should recommend search tracks, course
lines, and radar contact points. Minefield re-
connaissance by submarine is hazardous, and re-
quires a high degree of training.
4. Meteorological reconnaissance. With spe-
cialized personnel and equipment, submarines can
gather weather data in enemy waters. They may,
for example, remain on station for long periods as
mobile weather stations.
5. Hydrographie reconnaissance. Submarines
are excellent collectors of data on thermal gradi-
ents and landmarks such as fixes, profiles, and
orientation points. They are also able to deter-
mine current and tide conditions and verify depths
through soundings.
Periscope photography, discussed above, is par-
ticularly promising as a reconnaissance technique.
Its chief advantage is that it supplies a complete
and permanent record, which in certain cases lends
itself admirably to photo-interpretation.
The subjects of periscope observation, both vis-
ual and photographic, are mainly enemy shipping,
harbors, coastal areas, and beaches. Periscope
photography of such subjects is preferable to aerial
photography, especially for the production of am-
phibious intelligence. It often reveals areas and
details, such as profiles and orientation points, not
normally obtained from aerial views. It is able
to penetrate camouflage, which is usually designed
to give protection from aerial observation. The
side view which it affords is better for certain
purposes than a vertical view, for example, in
determining the gradient of a beach. Further-
more, certain objects notably offshore obstacles,
boat lanes, beach exits, and natural or man-made
means of cover and concealment, are more readily
and plainly visible to submarines than from the
air. Periscope photography can also be useful for
verifying the results of aerial photography.
A disadvantage of individual periscope photo-
graphs is their narrow angle of view?only eight
degrees at high power, which is generally used.
Because of the scale desired?not less than 1: 5000,
preferably 1: 2500?the range cannot exceed a
mile or two with certain types of cameras. For
various reasons, including bottom topography, so
close an approach is not always possible. Cameras
of greater focal length would of course permit
221
photographs of suitable scale to be taken at longer
range.
In spite of these disadvantages, individual peri-
scope photographs can provide information of
great intelligence value. Those of the following
types present data of particular intelligence value:
1. Broadside shots of naval and merchant ships,
including the ship's entire length, supple-
mented by close-ups showing the names, num-
bers, and unusual features. In wartime, pre-
attack and post-attack photographs of enemy
shipping are useful for damage assessment
and verification of sinkings.
2. Port and harbor facilities, such as docks,
cranes, warehouses, and shipways.
3. Landmarks and orientation points.
By taking a series of overlapping photographs,
a submarine can make a so.-called "strip" or "pano-
rama". If the true bearing of the periscope is
changed between photographs, the result is a
sweep panorama, which cannot be used for photo-
interpretation but can be grouped to make com-
posites for general information. Sweep pano-
ramas can be taken in a short time, in areas of
limited sea-room, and without much preparation.
Thus they are often used, especially for coverage
of harbors, coastal areas and beaches, when condi-
tions are not favorable for stereo-photography.
Photo-reconnaissance strips, also called "under-
way panoramas", are made by taking a series of
overlapping photographs (the extent of overlap
being approximately 60 percent), with the peri-
scope trained to the same true bearing while the
submarine holds a constant course. Objects ap-
pearing in two successive photographs can be
viewed and interpreted in stereo.
This is the most useful type of submarine pho-
tography for intelligence purposes. However, it
requires planning and preparation, takes time
( which may expose the submarine to discovery by
the enemy) , and requires sufficient sea-room for
the submarine to follow a continuous track while
making photographs.
Amphibious Patrols
When certain essential information is lacking
or it becomes necessary to confirm and amplify
information received from other sources, amphib-
ious patrons can be employed to gather hydro-
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graphic data, report meteorological conditions, ex-
amine beaches and terrain, locate enemy installa-
tions, determine enemy strength, capture enemy
prisoners, and make demonstrations to effect de-
ceptions. As a general rule, amphibious patrols
confine their activities to the covert acquisition of
information and fight only in self-defense.
Amphibious patrol personnel must be specially
selected and trained to do their job in all types of
terrain, such as mountain, jungle, and arctic. The
elements and principles of scouting and patrolling
must be sufficiently instilled in them to become
instinctive. The aggressive type of action in-
volved, combined with the strain of maintaining a
high degree of security, necessitates exceptional
physical condition and agility. All individuals
must have confidence in their ability to handle
themselves with ease in water.
Additional training is required in the technique
of entering hostile territory from the sea, in rec-
ognizing unusual characteristics of terrain and
hydrography, and in special communications
methods and procedures. All patrol personnel
must be able to handle small boats on the sea at
night and to estimate such factors as current, wind,
speed, and direction without difficulty. Accurate
recognition, sketching, map and aerial photograph
reading, and the ability to write objective factual
reports are also essential in the successful opera-
tions of an amphibious patrol.
Underwater Demolition Teams
During World War II one of the most useful
sources of information in the hours just prior to
amphibious landings was the result of the labors
of the underwater demolition teams (UDT's). In
early Pacific operations they proved their effective-
ness in carrying out their assigned mission of beach
clearance and they were able to operate success-
fully even in daylight provided there was adequate
fire support.
After the Marianas operation, when an intel-
ligence section was added to the staff of ComUDTs-
Pac, the mission of the UDTs was enlarged to
include reconnaissance as well as demolition. Two
intelligence officers were assigned by ComPhibPac
to the staff of ComUDTsPac and close liaison was
established. This activity expanded considerably
as operations grew larger and more complex, and
CONFIDENTIAL
by the end of the war, several intelligence officers
were on duty with ComUDTsPac. All were given
special instructions to prepare them for UDT in-
telligence work, and some were assigned to teams
for specific operations.
UDTs can obtain detailed beach information on
topography, soils and trafficability, location and
nature of obstacles, hydrographic data, location
and type of mines in beach approaches, the nature
of the shore line, defenses, visible exits, and prom-
inent landmarks along the beaches that can be used
for guiding in landing craft. If the teams are
launched in rubber boats from submarines at night,
they may be able to obtain considerable hydro-
graphic data without disclosing their presence. If
launched from submarine or surface vessels in day-
light, fire support may be necessary.
Reconnoitering enemy shores, along with demo-
lition of underwater obstacles, are important con-
tributions of the Navy's underwater demolition
teams, and the success of any amphibious opera-
tion may well hinge upon them.
222
THE NAVAL ATTACHE SYSTEM
Naval officers on duty in foreign posts provide
a large part of the information needed by the Navy
for planning purposes in war and peace. There-
fore it is desirable to deal in some detail with the
organization and function of the Naval Attach?
system.
The paramount duty of Naval Attaches is that
of intelligence collection, in the performance of
which they are an integral part of Naval Intel-
ligence and are under the cognizance of the Direc-
tor of Naval Intelligence. At the same time, they
are under the military command of the minister
or ambassador who heads the diplomatic mission
to which they are assigned. Although the attache
is not recognized under the law as a Foreign Serv-
ice Officer, he carries a diplomatic passport and
has diplomatic immunity. Thus, he is a member
of the official staff of the diplomatic mission of the
United States in the country to which that mission
is accredited and is the direct representative of
the Navy Department in that mission.
The naval attache in general defers to the wishes
of the ambassador or minister. Normally the
chief of the mission will not be concerned with
the attach? reports of classified technical and
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tactical naval information, particularly if they are
of no international political significance. The
attach? reports are forwarded directly to CNO
(DNI) , and if desired, copies are furnished to
the chief of mission.
The controlling factor in the assignment of at-
taches is the procurement of information of in-
terest to the Navy Department. The assignment,
as assistant attaches, of officers who have special-
ized in various technical or professional subjects
is usually limited to those stations which oiler
special opportunities to procure technical infor-
mation. Consultation with the State Department
in the assignment of attaches is limited, in general,
to assuring that the officer selected for the post is
persona grata to the State Department, which then
takes the necessary steps to ascertain that the selec-
tion is acceptable to the country to which the
diplomatic mission is accredited. When attaches
and assistant attaches are accredited to more than
one country, only countries whose mutual political
relationships are good are included in the same
group.
The number and stations of naval attaches vary
according to current requirements. In the cap-
itals of major powers, such as London and Paris,
a large complement is usually maintained, while
in Latin America, a single attache may be accred-
ited to several adjoining countries. Primary re-
sponsibility is usually the country of the attach?
residence; he will have secondary responsibilities
as required by naval interest or the current
situation.
The duties of the naval attache may be described
only in general terms, for the methods and tech-
niques to be followed depend almost entirely on
the good judgment and tactful discretion of the
attache himself. The opportunities and situations
which confront an attache vary so greatly in dif-
ferent parts of the world that uniform procedures
cannot be prescribed. He must be constantly on
the alert for every kind of information of possible
naval interest, using all his imagination, ingenuity,
and resourcefulness to uncover it and all his knowl-
edge of the country and of general naval subjects
to interpret it. He cannot neglect an item simply
because he has not received a specific request for it
and has no labeled folder for it in his file.
Naval attaches deal directly with the Admiralty
or Ministry of Marine, and, where the military,
naval, and air departments are combined, with the
Ministry of Defense. Official dealings with any
other ministry must be conducted through the chief
of the diplomatic mission to which the attache is
assigned. Ordinarily, naval matters will be re-
ferred to the attache by the chief of mission.
The attache can expect little official information
from a government on the real spirit which per-
vades its Navy, its concepts of strategy and tactics,
the extent and results of maneuvers, the charac-
teristics of its naval commanders, or the efficiency
of personnel and materiel. This information can
be obtained only through intimate personal and
social relationships with foreign nationals, par-
ticularly foreign naval and army officers.
Outside the Iron Curtain, the attache often has
many semi and unofficial sources of information
available to him. They include the naval and air
departments to which he has official access; visits
to ships, dockyards, and port installations; wit-
nessing maneuvers and demonstrations as an offi-
cial guest; association with industrialists, politi-
cians, and the man in the street; the press, official
publications, correspondents, and our own State
Department officers. The attaches of other gov-
ernments accredited to the same country are like-
wise valuable sources of information, and the
naval attache is at liberty to discuss with them
matters of interest which he has discovered for
himself. He should not, however, discuss or ex-
change information which has been given to him
directly by the government to which he is
accredited.
The attache can often save himself much time
and effort if he is aware of the collection activities
of other United States government agencies. Con-
sular reports, for example, contain carefully com-
piled data concerning shipping which clears for
United States ports. Regular consular officers,
commercial and agricultural attaches, and trade
commissioners assigned to missions can provide
well-documented information of importance to the
naval attache. However, when such information
is reported by the naval attache, the source should
be carefully identified in order to avoid problems
which arise from duplicate reporting.
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Private American commercial interests abroad
are always well supplied with material of value,
particularly with regard to the movements and
transfers of vessels, and unusual developments in
the field in which they specialize. Representatives
of such interest are to be found in nearly every
major port in the world, and often have extensive
and intimate knowledge of local conditions. In
connection with their work, they observe and re-
port on the activity of competing firms, both
American and foreign, keep in touch with current
political and economic trends, and maintain close
and amicable relationships with official govern-
ment sources. The naval attache can profit from
cordial relations with them. Although the report-
ing of economic intelligence is the primary mission
of other United States intelligence agencies, much
information of naval interest has its source in com-
mercial and economic affairs.
A word of caution is necessary regarding direct
requests made by an attache to foreign govern-
ments for specific information. By custom, such
a request carries with it the implication that cor-
responding data of our own will be given in ex-
change. The Office of Naval Intelligence, there-
fore, definitely prefers to acquire information on
an unofficial basis, unless it specifically authorizes
a direct official request. The same rules apply
when the attache requests permission to attend, or
accepts invitations to witness, confidential trials
and experiments. It is quite likely that the gov-
ernment to which the attach?s accredited will
expect reciprocal privileges in return. The at-
tache should know, and advise the officials of the
foreign power, what the attitude of the United
States is with regard to the exchange of informa-
tion or the extension of reciprocal privileges.
The collection activities of Naval Intelligence
abroad are overt in nature. The attache must
never jeopardize his position as a member of a
diplomatic mission by indiscreet activities which
may bring discredit upon himself, the embassy or
legation, or the reputation of his fellow country-
men resident abroad. Discretion is the key to
success. The creation of good will should always
be his aim. A sincere effort to become proficient
in the language of the country, and constant study
of the nature and customs of the people will do
much to win loyal friends and expand the social
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224
and professional circles in which he moves. If he
is fortunate enough to have his family with him,
he will be able to participate in community life
to an even greater degree. A good attache works
at his job with unfailing courtesy, tolerance, and
cooperation. He can reflect great credit upon the
United States Navy, leave a lasting impression of
admiration and respect, and make the work of his
successor easier.
Covert Collection
The demands of security naturally give a covert
flavor to intelligence collection, but by far the
greater part of information can be obtained openly
by the thorough exploitation of available sources.
In other words, an intelligence officer rarely has
to depend on people who put a price on what they
know. Few such sources are very valuable, and
the disadvantages of their use and the risks in-
volved are great. The shadow world of the pro-
fessional informer is beset with pitfalls for the
novice, and dealing with mercenary characters
even on the fringe is a dangerous practice for
anyone who desires to maintain a persona grata
status in a foreign country. Covert collection,
therefore, is not within the province of officers
assigned to attache billets.
NAVAL DISTRICTS AND RIVER COMMANDS
Under the District Commandant, the District
Intelligence Officer (DIO) is responsible for the
collection of such information as is required for
the security of naval activities within the District,
as well as that which is needed by the Commander
of the Sea Frontier in which the District is located.
The DIO's collection tasks, therefore, are prima-
rily concerned with counterintelligence problems
involving the security of the Naval Establishment
and the National Security, and with operational
intelligence in support of the sea Frontier Com-
mander. However, in consonance with existing
directives and agreements among the various in-
telligence agencies, the district intelligence organi-
zation engages in some exploitation of selected
sources of intelligence.
The collection of intelligence by Sea Frontiers
in wartime is largely of an operational character.
Operational needs frequently cut across arbitrary
district lines extended out to sea, thus making the
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plots and logs kept by the Sea Frontier vital to
effective action.
JOINT INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Collection activities can often be most efficiently
carried out by the closely coordinated effort of a
collection team composed of representatives of all
the armed services. The Joint Intelligence Col-
lection Agencies (JICA) groups which operated
in overseas theaters during World War II were
designed for this purpose. As noted in chapter 3,
naval officers also serve with the intelligence com-
mittees and groups of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
where they have unusual opportunities for collec-
tion guidance. The coordination of intelligence
reporting by service attach6s is exemplified in the
Joint Weeka reports from State Department mis-
sions all over the world which contain brief sum-
maries on matters of interest to many government
agencies.
OTHER SOURCES AND METHODS OF COLLECTION
The foregoing activities in the collecting of in-
formation are directly guided and controlled by
the Navy's intelligence organization. They by
no means comprise all sources available to the
Navy. Data collected by other government de-
partments or agencies is often valuable for the
Navy as well. The resourceful intelligence officer
has sources well-nigh inexhaustible. They await
his exploitation.
The courses, methods, and techniques of the col-
lection of information are as varied as the subjects,
operating areas, and personal qualifications of the
collectors. It is impossible to describe them all,
but a few have been selected for special discussion
as illustrative of basic principles applicable in the
work of the intelligence officer as researcher, psy-
chologist, and technician. Information gained
from enemy personnel, documents, and materiel
can be of special value because of its potential
qualities of accuracy and timeliness. These cap-
tured sources are, of course, normally available
only in time of war.
Prisoners of War
In a tactical situation, prisoner of war inter-
rogation, better described perhaps as "examina-
tion," has as its purpose the obtaining of informa-
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225
tion of immediate value which enemy personnel
may have. The advantages of such information
are conditioned by the nature of the theater of
operations, the availability of other sources, and
the skill with which it is developed and exploited.
The essential activities involved in the exploita-
tion of prisoners of war as sources of information
are: capture, screening, conditioning, and interro-
gating. The preliminary evaluation and dissem-
ination of this information by the interrogator are,
of course, necessary.
The capture of enemy personnel is a function of
combat forces whose personnel must be carefully
persuaded it is to their advantage to capture
prisoners and keep them alive. Specific instruc-
tions for handling prisoners should include: pre-
vention of cruelty, prevention of excessive kind-
ness, and prevention of unauthorized contact with
higher ranking prisoners of war; their expeditious
transport to designated interrogation specialists,
with adequate advance notice; and the simultane-
ous delivery of personal papers and effects, which
are to be taken immediately from prisoners, clearly
marked as to original ownership. Any plan for
the procurement of prisoners should be prescribed
by the careful indoctrination of operational units
and advance planning for the handling of captured
enemy personnel.
In screening, each prisoner of war is given a
preliminary examination in order to determine
whether he is likely to have any useful informa-
tion, how readily he may yield it, and which agency
is most appropriate for his further processing.
The selection of the appropriate agency is gov-
erned by the nature of the information possessed
and the military service to which the prisoner be-
longs. The screening officer should, in general,
avoid any discussion of subjects which are not of
immediate tactical interest. When it appears that
a prisoner may have information of more strategic
value, special arrangements for handling are made.
The activities of conditioning and interrogating
are complementary and often carried on simultane-
ously. The prisoner must not be permitted to
become too contented with his status and he should
remain fully aware, by subtle suggestion, that any
favors he receives come solely from the interroga-
tor. At all times, the normal military rank re-
lationship should be maintained between the pris-
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oner and his captors. So-called "third-degree"
methods are not only forbidden by international
agreement but also are ineffective and often result
in a complete failure of the interrogating process.
Interrogation is the function of trained spe-
cialists whose primary objective is to ascertain
whether or not the prisoner actually possesses in-
formation of value and, if he does, to obtain it.
Interrogation is an excellent means of corroborat-
ing information received from other sources. For
many prisoners, a short interrogation is sufficient.
The interrogating process has several prerequi-
sites. There should be no conversation with the
prisoner either before or between interrogations,
except in accordance with the pre-determined
plans of the interrogator. A secluded place is
essential, with no audience present. No effort
should be made to interfere with the work of the
interrogator: he alone is best qualified to determine
what the prisoner knows, how it may be obtained,
and when to stop. The interrogator must be fully
informed of all collateral information relevant to
the prisoner and the information he is believed to
have. The interrogator should promptly receive
any new facts or data which may assist in the
acquiring of the needed information. He should
also be advised of the relative importance of items
of required information and any changes in their
importance. In this manner, his efforts may be
better concentrated. Demonstrated confidence in
the interrogator and his work can increase his ef-
fectiveness in dealing with prisoners.
The interrogator's preliminary evaluation of in-
formation provided by the prisoner of war is al-
most always inevitable and exceedingly helpful.
The very nature of interrogation involves some
determination of the correctness and accuracy of
the information gained. In addition, personal
impressions and reactions gained by the interroga-
tor in his associations with a prisoner are of con-
siderable value to subsequent processors of the
information. Prior to disseminating his informa-
tion, the interrogator should be satisfied that he
has correctly understood the prisoner's statement
and that this statement is as accurate and complete
as he can get. In transmitting information, the
interrogator should include, in addition to the
information itself, an estimate of the extent of the
prisoner's knowledge, a statement of the facility
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226
with which it was obtained, and notification of
availability for evacuation.
The ideal interrogator is both a linguist and an
intelligence officer, since his activity is basically
an intelligence function. Not only must he have
a fluent knowledge of the prisoner's language, he
must also be familiar both with the customs and
background of the enemy and with the intelligence
requirements of his own command. In an opera-
tional situation, especially during early stages of
hostilities, this combination of attributes is always
not readily obtainable. As a result, intelligence
officers may be required to work closely with lin-
guists in developing information from prisoners
of war. The objective may well be to train a
linguist to be an interrogator, in order that he
may carry on his activities in a more independent
manner. However, even when this becomes pos-
sible, there must be the closest coordination of
efforts and interests, and the interrogator must be
guided at all times by knowledge of what infor-
mation is most urgently needed and its significance
to the command. No attempt should ever be made
to obtain information through an interrogator
without his complete understanding of the nature,
scope, and significance of the information desired.
On his part, the interrogator must cooperate fully
with the intelligence officer and endeavor to fur-
nish obtained information in a form which can
be most readily used.
Documents
When examined systematically by competent
personnel, captured documents reveal information
about an enemy. An enemy document may be any
form of recorded information regarding enemy
forces or areas. Enemy documents are both per-
sonal, found on prisoners or enemy dead, and
official.
As sources of information, enemy documents
have one unique feature?they are prepared by the
enemy for his own information and guidance and
are, therefore, just as clear, concise, and accurate
as he can make them. He does not intend that we
will ever see them. In effect, then, when we get
an enemy document, the enemy voluntarily tells
us all he knows about a particular subject; he will
tell it again and again in the same way as often as
we wish to study the subject. Information from
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documents is more authentic and reliable than
that from prisoners of war because it is less biased
and less representative of personal opinion.
During World War II documents were cata-
logued, examined, and handled so as to disclose
maximum information of obvious and immediate
significance to the command and to its subordinate
forces for use in combat operations at hand. Fur-
ther processing by rear echelons produced intel-
ligence valuable to all commands engaged in
planning future operations.
Collection by Examination of Materiel
All types of enemy equipment are studied on
the battlefield as well as behind the lines by tech-
nical intelligence personnel?cannons, tanks, mor-
tars, mines, radios, and so forth. The Navy raises
sunken submarines, and refloats beached landing
craft. Such ground and naval equipment some-
times may be repaired to test against our own, and
thus determine its performance characteristics.
The components may be examined for clues as to
assembly techniques, quality of alloys, and short-
ages of materials. During World War II, German
Tiger tanks were brought to the United States to
race against our own tanks and to test-fire their
guns; Soviet T34's from Korea have likewise been
evaluated.
Air Technical Intelligence is chosen for discus-
sion here as typical of the broader field. Technical
and scientific intelligence dealing with new weap-
ons is covered in chapter 14. A favorite story of
Air Technical Intelligence concerns the loss of an
experimental Vickers Wellesley British bomber
while on trials prior to World War II. Appar-
ently German Intelligence wanted this plane badly
enough to risk war, for it was shot down by a
German submarine off the British coast and sal-
vaged for later study in Germany. The British
chose an extraordinary way to let the Germans
know that the fate of the plane had been dis-
covered. They made a motion picture based on the
incident called "Clouds Over Europe" and released
it for showing on the continent.
The primary mission of Air Technical Intel-
ligence is the collection of information about
actual, potential, or possible enemy aircraft and
related equipment. Information at first may con-
sist of crude sketches or inferior photographs of
227
new planes, or reports of aircraft or components
from escapees. All of this data is then related
to known design trends of the aircraft of that
particular foreign country. Eventually the time
may come when actual components, or even a
whole aircraft, are salvaged on the ground for
analysis in detail. The uses of such information
are both strategic and tactical. New and better
performance may mean a new strategic situation
in many parts of the world. Detailed analysis
of turning ability, speed at different altitudes,
vulnerability to damage, and weapons employed,
may require modification of United States tactics.
Improved foreign capabilities require counter-
action by the United States armed forces both in
long range plans and immediate steps.
We made constant efforts in World War II to
keep abreast of technical developments in Japanese
and German aircraft. In the early days of the
war, the Japanese Zero and Zeke fighters proved
to be maneuverable and dangerous, although they
lacked protective armor. Readers of Recognition
magazine during the war will recall the publica-
tion first of provisional silhouettes and tentative
performance data, then subsequent revisions as
reports improved, and finally views of captured
and rebuilt planes with American markings, under
test at Wright-Patterson Field. Through adroit
collection, we often had photographs of proto-
types considerably in advance of the time that
operational models appeared in quantity. Ger-
man jets, both turbine and rocket, near the end of
the war represented extremely significant develop-
ments due to their high speed, and consequently
they were a prime technical intelligence target.
Chapter 14 describes our interest in the Peene-
miinde guided missiles center in Germany.
We lost aircraft to the enemy as well, and one
of the stranger episodes of the war was what hap-
pened to the American B-29's that had been forced
to land in Soviet territory. The fact that the
Soviets could copy those "interned" aircraft and
produce the type in quantity for a strategic air
force was a good indication of the level of their
technical intelligence and engineering achieve-
ment.
Long-range development of an air force re-
quires consideration of many technical features
that in turn depend on technical intelligence from
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abroad. For example, our strategic bombers must
not only have the range and carrying power we
decide are necessary, but must be designed to cope
with enemy interceptors, guided missiles, and anti-
aircraft guns during the expected operational
life of the planes. These questions of enemy de-
fenses require detailed answers. For example,
with regard to enemy interceptors, their future
performance, armament, and armor must be esti-
mated by extrapolating trends from the present.
Performance includes service ceiling, rate of climb,
combat radius, ability to turn, to dive, and so forth.
Sometimes direct evidence on all of these matters
is not available. However, it is possible to obtain
much information of an indirect nature, but none-
theless useful. For example, a report of no
boosters on flight controls of a particular plane
implies some lack of maneuverability at speeds
near Mach one, and also consequent added pilot
fatigue from battling the controls. On the other
hand, lack of such equipment might also mean
simpler maintenance and greater availability.
PHOTOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE
The purpose of the following discussion is to
introduce naval officers to the field of photographic
intelligence, and to point out some of its inherent
capabilities, limitations, and techniques. Efficient
staff planning and operational estimates require
close cooperation between photo-interpreters and
intelligence officers, and each should be cognizant
of mutually supporting collection services.
Photographic interpretation has been defined as
the examination of photographic images of objects
for the purpose of identifying the objects and de-
ducing their significance. Photographic intelli-
gence is the evaluated and analyzed information
obtained through photographic interpretation.
History and Development
The United States Navy's photographic intelli-
gence organization received its initial stimulus and
help from the British, who, upon being pushed
off the European continent and largely separated
from ordinary information and intelligence chan-
nels, had hurriedly improvised a system of extract-
ing desired military information from factual evi-
dence contained in photographs taken over enemy-
held territory. 'While photographic intelligence
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had been used by both sides with some effect dur-
ing World War I, it had in the interval before
World War TI become a lost technique. Despite
the improvisation, the British soon achieved re-
sults that were spectacularly successful, and Amer-
ican observers were sent to England to study the
techniques of the new system. Their enthusiastic
reports caused the Chief of Naval Operations, in
September 1941, to recommend the establishment
of the Photographic Interpretation School. Per-
haps the greatest initial stumbling block for the
School was the inability to anticipate requirements
in the new field. There were no established billets
for the graduates of the School, and many com-
manders were inexperienced both in the employ-
ment of photo-interpreters and in recognizing the
capabilities and limitations of photographic inter-
pretation. As the value of photographic intelli-
gence was realized and more photo-interpreters
became available, photographic interpretation
units were formed, either as a part of a photo
group or intelligence center assigned to an area
commander. By the end of World War II, grad-
uates of the Photographic Interpretation School
were operating in all theaters of war, contributing
significantly to all operations.
Today the center of photographic interpretation
activity for the Navy is the United States Naval
Photographic Interpretation Center which func-
tions under the Bureau of Aeronautics. This Cen-
ter prepares photographic interpretation reports
and studies for the Office of Naval Intelligence and
for the Fleet, performs research and development
work in the fields of photographic interpretation
and photogrammetry, and trains photographic in-
terpreters. Its activities include the preparation
and maintenance of reference manuals, and other
documents, the preparation of terrain models, and
the maintenance of a library of photographic in-
terpretation material and other pertinent data.
Capabilities of Photographic Intelligence
The extraction of useful intelligence from pho-
tographs is not a simple matter. The photo-
graphic interpreter must first know the conditions
under which a photograph was taken. This in-
formation is normally recorded on aerial photo-
graphs, and includes the focal length of the cam-
era, altitude of the plane, exposure and run
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number, mission number, organization number,
date, time and zone, place, and classification. Gen-
erally, the first print of a flight shows the basic
information which concerns the whole flight, and
each subsequent photograph shows only informa-
tion to identify the individual print within the
flight. A photo-interpreter should know the capa-
bilities of each type of aerial camera, as well as
the type of photograph from which he can obtain
the information desired. For this reason the pho-
tographic interpreter should be directly involved
in preflight planning of an aerial reconnaissance
mission.
Photographs as a source of information possess
many advantages when compared to other intelli-
gence sources. Some of the more important ad-
vantages are as follows:
1. Aerial photography can be used to collect in-
formation over areas inaccessible to ground
observers.
2. The photograph represents an accurate per-
manent record, instantaneously made, of all
the detail within the field of view of the
camera.
3. The photograph is a means of transmitting
an unbiased, first-hand impression to the ex-
pert most qualified to interpret it, although
he may be many miles from the scene.
4. The photograph can be studied with earlier
and later coverage of the same area to pro-
duce comparative intelligence.
5. Accurate dimensions of objects may be de-
termined from photographs.
6. As a rule, photographs need not be evaluated
as to course and reliability, but only as to
content and significance.
Other advantages of aerial photographs are
comprehensive coverage, made possible through
the use of modern equipment and techniques, and
the ability to provide current and timely informa-
tion. Under certain conditions, it is possible to
determine ship speeds, surf conditions, water
depths, the nature of beach obstacles, and to make
industrial analyses. Water depths, surf condi-
tions, and beach obstacles are particularly impor-
tant during the planning of amphibious operations.
Another important use of aerial photographs is
in the construction or correction of charts, maps,
and terrain models. Aerial mapping makes it
229
CONFIDENTIAL
possible to produce accurate maps in a minimum
length of time.
Aerial photography as a source of intelligence
has a number of limitations which should be
clearly understood. Some of these are:
1. Effective aerial photographic coverage can-
not normally be accomplished during periods
of bad flying weather. It is also limited by
the ranges of photographic aircraft, the pres-
ence of ground mist, or cloud cover, and avail-
able light conditions.
2. Since an aerial photograph represents con-
ditions at one particular instant of time, sub-
sequent photos of the same area must be
obtained for analysis of significant changes.
This is particularly important in considering
enemy build-ups of equipment and personnel,
increase in defensive positions, and air
capabilities.
3. The aerial photographic interpreter cannot
always see the fine details of a target. For
example, while the size, extent, and height of
a wall may be determined from the photo-
graph much more accurately than from
ground reconnaissance, the information as to
whether its stones are loose or mortared must
usually rest with the ground observer. How-
ever, detail, such as grain size of beach sand,
may sometimes be inferred from features visi-
ble in aerial photos.
4. The observations of the photographic inter-
preter are necessarily limited to areas shown
on the photograph. It is quite possible that
an item most important from an intelligence
standpoint may occur just off the edge of
available photo cover or under a patch of
cloud.
Teamwork of the Intelligence Officer and the
Photographic Interpreter
The Intelligence Officer and the Photographic
Interpreter have mutually supporting contribu-
tions to make in the production of intelligence.
While their relationships will vary from station
to station, a few general principles can be estab-
lished. For any target or area of intelligence
interest, there usually exists a body of background
intelligence, from many sources, such as docu-
ments, maps, and charts. Photographic intelli-
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gence can often confirm or deny the accuracy of
such data or can amplify it whenever it relates to
the physical nature of items viewed on the aerial
photography. It may help to confirm the relia-
bility of the source from which a report comes.
In addition to providing verification, the aerial
photographs can serve as a base on which various
ground observation reports can be plotted and re-
lated to each other. Generally speaking, the photo
interpreter will be able to provide precise loca-
tional data and state with reasonable assurance the
presence or absence of specific features and their
dimensions. He can also relate widely separated
features beyond the view of any single ground
observer. On the other hand, ground observation
reports can provide much more detailed data for
the immediate area in question.
Just as the photographic interpreter can par-
ticipate in the evaluation of information from
other sources, so the intelligence officer can often
aid in the analysis of data derived from aerial
photography. Frequently, because of his greater
familiarity with all of the available intelligence
regarding an area, the intelligence officer may have
a more complete grasp of the significance of data
derived from aerial photography as it affects
existing intelligence and relates to other informa-
tion. Further, data from other sources, as com-
piled and evaluated by the intelligence officer,
may provide the photographic interpreter with
clues which will lead him to a more complete
analysis of the photos. By working together as
a team, the intelligence officer and the photo-
graphic interpreter represent a combination of
great value in intelligence activity.
Types of Aerial Photographs
Many kinds of photographs are used by the
photo-interpreter in assembling intelligence data,
including aerial verticals, obliques, composites,
continuous strip, gun camera, and ground. Each
has a specific usefulness in fulfilling the intelli-
gence needs of various strategic and tactical or-
ganizations. In addition to recommending vari-
ous types of cameras and photographic techniques,
the photo-interpreter advises as to the use of spe-
cial film and filter combinations under varying
altitudes and light conditions. For instance, in-
frared film records unusual qualities of colors.
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230
Vegetation registers a light tone in sharp contrast
to non-infrared reflective objects, such as water,
roads, and buildings, that record dark on the print.
This aids in the detection of artificial camouflage
in areas of vegetation.
Verticals
Vertical photographs are the most valuable for
general use lby the intelligence officer. They are
taken with the optical axis of the camera in a
vertical or in a near-vertical position. The scale
of the photograph is equal to the quotient of focal
length (in inches) over the altitude of the aircraft
above the ground (in inches). It is apparent
that the desired scale may be obtained by changing
the focal length of the camera used or the alti-
tude at which the pictures are taken. Errors of
scale and azimuth resulting from tip and tilt, vari-
ation in relief, and optical distortions are inherent
in vertical photographs; however, these errors are
relatively small and can be compensated when
necessary.
Obliques
Oblique aerial photographs are obtained by in-
tentionally tilting the optical axis of the camera
from the vertical. A high-oblique aerial photo-
graph includes the horizon; a low-oblique does not.
Oblique photographs are of value to photo-inter-
preters for such details as gun emplacements,
camouflage positions, and underwater and beach
obstacles. Annotated obliques are used effectively
in briefing pilots and coxswains in order to ap-
proximate the views of the beach and inland land-
marks as realistically as possible.
Simulated oblique photographs may be obtained
by photographing terrain models and relief maps
from various directions and heights.
Composites
An aerial photograph made with one camera
directed vertically, and two or more cameras
mounted on an angle from horizontal, is a com-
posite. Trimetrogon photography, a form of
composite, has one camera directed vertically
downward and two cameras mounted at an angle
of 300 from horizontal and perpendicular to the
line of flight. All cameras are operated simulta-
neously, so that the area from horizon to horizon,
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perpendicular to the line of flight, is covered by
three photographs.
Composite photographs are used principally for
mapping large areas on small scale. Less ground
control is required and the flight lines need not
be flown as accurately as when a single lens is
used. This will be more fully discussed later.
The distance between flight lines can be much
greater with trimetrogon photography, since a
greater area is covered with each click of the
shutter.
Continuous Strip Photography
Continuous strip cameras photograph a contin-
uous strip of terrain by allowing the negative to
move continuously over a fixed slit at the focal
plane of the camera. The film speed is adjusted
to the height and speed of the aircraft. The Sonne
continuous strip camera has been modified to per-
mit stereo coverage by using two lenses and parti-
tioning the camera cone so that two strips are
photographed side by side on the 914-inch nega-
tive. Parallax effects are obtained by causing the
lens assembly to be rotated on a horizontal plane
so that one lens is in advance of the other. Con-
tinuous strip photography is usually taken ver-
tically although successful obliques have been
taken.
Continuous strip photography is especially
adapted to low altitude (approximately 200 feet)
and high speed flying (300 up to 1,000 miles per
hour) and permits an accurate determination of
height and depth. It is well suited for detailed
beach work; the scale (1 : 400 to 1:1,000) is such
that all visible forms of minor defenses may be
located and accurate data on gradient, spot depths,
and heights may be calculated. Strip photogra-
phy has the great advantage of "freezing" the
surface of water areas, so that the bottom may be
seen stereoscopically while the sea remains trans-
parent. Photographic interpreters, with special-
ized training, have obtained remarkable results
with strip photography in depth determination
studies.
Gun Camera Photographs
Gun camera photos are? widely used to record
hits in aerial gunnery. In such employment they
have also often proved valuable in recording new
231
types of aircraft, ground equipment, modifications
in structure or design of aircraft, and other similar
information which is extremely useful to air in-
telligence officers as well as to photographic in-
terpreters. Satisfactory measurements cannot
normally be made on gun cameras' photos. In-
terpreters use them qualitatively where possible
for new leads and as supplementary aids in iden-
tification of enemy equipment.
Ground Photographs
Ground photos are commonly used by the photo-
graphic interpreter as supplementary aids in most
types of interpretation. Where photos have been
captured or derived in other ways, important use
for them is found in identifying or analyzing
structures and evaluating local terrain. Ground
photos taken by our own forces after occupation
of enemy territory are commonly used in compara-
tive studies. Ground shots, when set side by side
with vertical stereopairs, offer valuable cross-
references and materially increase the chances of
recognizing similar installations observed else-
where on aerial photographs. Following the oc-
cupation of Japan, Kiska, Attu, and other Pacific
Islands, comparative studies were made by Navy
photographic interpreters and other members of
the United States Strategic Bombing Survey
Teams with the air or ground photographs and
measurements of important installations.
Stereoscopy
One of the greatest benefits of photographic in-
terpretation is derived from stereoscopic analysis
of aerial photographs. Stereoscopy may be de-
fined as "The science which deals with three dimen-
sional effects and the methods by which these
effects are produced." In the case of photography,
three dimensional affect, or stereo-vision, is ob-
tained by viewing two pictures of the same object
or area taken from different points, the photo-
graphs being so oriented that each eye views a
different picture. Aerial photographs for stereo-
vision are obtained by making successive overlap-
ping exposures. The overlapping parts of the
prints may be viewed stereoscopically; two such
prints are called a stereopair. Terrain features
and objects which indicate vertical delineation
appear in exaggerated relief when viewed stereo-
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scopically. This enables the photo-interpreter to
detect camouflage, to note details of terrain, to
identify and study the characteristics of aircraft,
ships, and military installations, and finally, to
determine the results of military action through
damage assessment.
A stereopair is any two photographs or dia-
grams showing a common field or view, which have
been taken, or represent a perspective, at approxi-
mately the same distance from the field but from
slightly different positions. To see photographs
stereoscopically they must be placed in the same
relative positions as when they were taken. Any
pair of overlapping vertical photographs taken at
approximately the same elevation, and with the
same focal length camera, can be viewed stereo-
scopically if arranged properly. Duplicate photo-
graphs cannot be viewed stereoscopically, since the
objects on the photographs must have been viewed
by the camera from different angles.
Vectographs and Anaglyphs
A vectograph is a print or slide in which the
two images of the stereopair are superimposed
with slight offset, and each image transmits light,
polarized in a plane perpendicular to that of the
other. The print or projection must be viewed
with polarized glasses so that the plane of polar-
ization in each corresponds to that of the image
each eye is required to see.
Vectographs are difficult to prepare, hence their
use in presentation of information is limited.
Once prepared, however, they constitute a rapid
means of presenting aerial photographs in three
dimensions to persons unaccustomed to using a
stereoscope or to a group of persons simultane-
ously. This is useful during planning in familiar-
izing staff officers with an unknown area and in
briefing pilots, coxswains, and subordinate com-
manders in the field. A vectograph eliminates
the need for stereopairs and stereoscopes in brief-
ing sessions.
The polarized light principle can also be used
whenever appropriate equipment is available, by
projecting positive transparencies of a stereopair
through a twin-barrel projector. The beams of
projected light are polarized by passing through
properly oriented polaroid plates, and the result-
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232
ant composite image on the screen is used with
polaroid glasses.
Anaglyphs in similar fashion present a 3-dimen-
sional effect by overprinting 2 films, 1 red, the
other blue. When viewed with special glasses or
cellophane eyepieces, also 1 red and 1 blue, the
resulting image appears to be 3 dimensional.
Flight Lines and Indices
A flight line is a course laid out on a map to be
followed by a plane. Principal and alternate
flight lines should be prepared whenever possible
for each photographic mission. The final plan-
ning of the flight lines and the method of execution
of the mission is the responsibility of the photo-
graphic squadron commander. Photographic in-
terpreters are trained to perform flight planning
for photo reconnaissance missions in conjunction
with the squadron commander. Intelligence offi-
cers should also understand this important process,
since it effects the quality and quantity of aerial
photographic coverage.
There are many factors to be considered in flight
planning, details of which may be found in such
specialized publications as the Photographic In-
terpretation Handbook and NTVP W.
Whenever possible the locations of photos are
plotted on a map or overlay before photographic
interpretation. The usual procedure is to use an
adjustable plastic template, included in the photo-
graphic interpreter's kit, which can be set to a
size which represents the area covered by a photo-
graph on the map or chart used as a base. By
inspecting photo detail, a series of rectangles are
drawn on the map, chart, or overlay to show the
coverage of each photograph in the sortie.
When a sortie plot has not been made, the
"pilot's trace" a rough plot of the flight line fol-
lowed by the plane, is often valuable as an aid in
locating the photographs. Detailed discussion of
plotting techniques will also be found in the refer-
ence manuals cited above.
Sometimes all photos taken on a given mission
are taped down hastily without trimming to form
a very rough mosaic which is then photographed.
This is called a photo index. In this case, photo-
graphs are usually laid so that the sortie and the
number of each photograph can be easily read
from the resultant mosaic.
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Scale Determination
Scale may be defined as the relation between the
distance on the photograph and the actual distance
on the ground. As in map reading, scale may be
expressed as a representative fraction (1: 10,000
where 1 inch on the photo equals 10,000 inches on
ground), words, and figures (3 inches equal 1
mile) , or by means of a graphic scale. The scale
of an aerial photograph can be determined in the
following ways: (1) Focal length and lens height;
(2) by comparison with a map; (3) by comparison
with the ground. The formulas and procedures
used in each method are described in detail in the
Photographic Interpreter's Handbook.
Mosaics
A mosaic is an assembly of several aerial pho-
tographs into one composite picture. There are
two general types of mosaics, controlled and un-
controlled.
Controlled mosaics are prepared by adjusting
vertical aerial photographs to the plotted posi-
tions of ground control points. Ground control
points are the result of earlier surveys or are es-
tablished by one of several methods from controls
already in existence. These ground control
points are identified on photographs and plotted
on a mounting board to the desired scale of the
final mosaic. The photographs to be used are then
enlarged or reduced to this scale by means of pre-
cise rectifying projectors which are also adjusted
to correct as much as possible for the existing tip
and tilt in the photographs. When these control
points on the photographs are placed directly over
the corresponding points on the mounting board,
the photographs are in true relation to each other.
The controlled mosaic is accurate enough in scale
and direction for most practical purposes. An
annotated controlled mosaic may be useful as a
replacement for maps of an area.
Uncontrolled mosaics include all of those not
prepared to the rather rigid specifications indi-
cated above. The simplest form of uncontrolled
mosaic is that produced by merely putting photo-
graphs together by matching detail along their
borders. More carefully prepared uncontrolled
mosaics are cut and fitted to get the best match of
detail, using only the center section of each photo-
graph. Sometimes a measure of control is intro-
233
duced by plotting in advance certain widely spaced
control points and making an attempt to meet this
control by stretching and adjusting the photo-
graphs. Uncontrolled mosaics give a good pic-
torial representation of the ground and may be
used for rough measurements. However, they
will contain distortion and errors in scale. Un-
controlled mosaics cannot usually be gridded for
military purposes.
A special type of uncontrolled mosaic is the
"strip mosaic" which consists of a single run of
aerial photographs matched and mounted to show
the flight path.
Terrain Models and Relief Maps
Terrain models and relief maps are three-di-
mensional representations of a portion of the
earth's surface in miniature. Terrain models re-
fer to plaster, rubber, or papier mache topographic
models, which show relief but do not show detailed
map information. Relief maps, on the other hand,
are basically maps which show relief in third di-
mension. The primary purpose of three-dimen-
sional terrain models and relief maps is the visual
presentation of available information on terrain
in a simple and easily understood form. Terrain
models and relief maps afford military personnel
an opportunity for prolonged and intensive study
from any height or direction thereby permitting
the observer to recognize terrain and beach fea-
tures more readily.
During World War II, plaster and rubber ter-
rain models were prepared for almost all major
offensive operations, some being made in limited
quantities in forward areas, others being produced
in small quantities in this country and flown to
task forces prior to the assault. There were six
general categories of models according to their
use: strategic planning, tactical planning, assault
landing, assault, airborne landing, and aerial
target. The scale of the models, of course, varies
with the extent of the area depicted and the needs
of the users.
The demand for topographic models frequently
exceeded production capacity, since laborious pro-
cedures were employed and most finishing opera-
tions were accomplished by tedious handwork.
Furthermore, the quality of early models was gen-
erally poor, because basic map information was
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inaccurate or incomplete and in many instances
model production equipment did not permit ac-
curate editing. Model media also left much to
be desired. Plaster and papier macho were com-
monly used in forward areas throughout most of
the war. Sponge-rubber models were not devel-
oped until 1944 and these had to be hand-painted
and could only be manufactured succesfully in rear
echelon locations.
The elimination of hand painting was first made
possible through the development of plastic re-
lief maps, a process invented by John J. Braund
of the United States Coast and Geodetic Survey.
This technique made use of normal printing proc-
esses to print standard flat map information onto
thermoplastic sheets for subsequent forming by
heat and vacuum into a negative mold. The
Braund Process marked the first major step to-
ward quantity reproduction of models and, with
certain refinements and modifications, it is the
most advanced today.
In Korea, plastic relief maps were effectively
used for operational planning, briefing and as a
map supplement for all commands. (For detailed
information concerning the construction of plastic
relief maps and plastic photomaps refer to Army
Map Service Bulletin No. 29, dated April 1950).
COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE
Just as photographic intelligence represents the
operations of collection, processing, and dissem-
ination in a technical field, the steps of the intelli-
gence cycle are similarly applicable to the
operations of communications intelligence. It too,
is a cycle within a cycle.
Only the most cursory treatment of communi-
cations intelligence can be given here, for though
it is known that major powers engage in this
activity, information as to how much or how little
our country learns through these methods and the
exact details of how we do our work might involve
a serious breach of security. There are, however,
several techniques that are generally in use and
which can be described. These are grouped under
cryptanalysis and traffic analysis.
Cryptanalysis
Cryptanalysis refers to the breaking of the
ciphers or codes used by other countries. A cipher
CONFIDENTIAL 234
is a rearrangement and/or a substitution of in-
dividual letters in a message. A code uses special
words or numbers to represent other words or even
whole sentences. Ciphers are frequently prepared
by machines and translated back into clear lan-
guage by the same means.
American accomplishments in cryptanalysis
during World War I were made public knowledge
in 1931 in a book by Herbert 0. Yardley, The
American Black Chamber. During World War
I, Yardley was the head of the MI-8 in the War
Department, which was composed of five subsec-
tions; code and cipher compilation, communica-
tions, shorthand, secret ink laboratory, and code
? and cipher solution. He soon found out that all
the great powers had well established bureaus of a
similar nature staffed by competent professionals.
Successes in this field certainly rank far above the
exploits of Mata Hari for effectiveness if not for
romantic interest. Fletcher Pratt in his book
Secret and Urgent describes several notable cryp-
tographic triumphs during World War I.
The German cruiser, Magdeburg, raiding along
the Russian coast one night early in the war, ran
hard aground in a fog. When the mists cleared
the following morning, the Russian Fleet was
standing toward the helpless vessel. In this emer-
gency the commander of the Magdeburg ordered
one of his officers to take the code books in a small
boat as far from the stranded ship as possible and
throw them into deep water. In the resultant con-
fusion the officer was pitched over the side by a
large swell, faithfully clutching the lead-bound
code books in his arms. A Russian order for de-
cent burial of all German dead was rewarded with
one of the most important finds of the war, for a
dredge drew up the officer's body with the code
books still in his arms. The books were promptly
forwarded to London where they provided the
solution for all German naval codes.
This discovery had most important effects on
the German naval effort and the course of the war.
German raiding forces were intercepted and de-
stroyed, and traps set by the German Navy for
British forces boomeranged. In the Battle of Jut-
land the German Fleet escaped annihilation only
because the British Admiralty was unable to con-
tact Admiral Jellicoe due to excess volume of radio
traffic.
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Another notable British cipher coup began by
chance aboard a small monitor in the Mediter-
ranean. It had been noted that the German radio
station at Nauen followed its regular evening
broadcast of the daily communique with a series
of signals sent so rapidly that separate sounds
could not even be distinguished. It resembled
static more than anything else. Allied code offi-
cers had reached the conclusion that these signals
were merely a method of testing the apparatus.
One very hot and quiet day wardroom officers
aboard the British monitor ran out of musical se-
lections for their portable phonograph. They de-
cided to play a record of Nauen's lightning gib-
berish for amusement. The officer who put the
record on forgot to rewind the phonograph, and
as the instrument slowed to a stop, the high-
pitched screech became a rational series of code
groups. They were a series of messages from the
German High Command to General Von Lettow-
Vorbeck, commanding in German East Africa, and
most interesting of all they were in an old German
Army cipher which the British had long held. In
East Africa the Germans had been unable to ob-
tain the new cipher, so messages to them were con-
cealed by transmission at 5 or 6 times normal speed.
As Fletcher Pratt points out, the Germans were
not without their own intelligence successes in
World War I. They are credited with working a
resounding military hoax on the Russians in the
Black Sea as a sequel to their success in solving
Russian naval ciphers. The German cruisers,
Goben and Breslau, based at Constantinople,
waited until the Russian Black Sea fleet put to
sea, then slipped in between the Russians and their
base. In naval code, as though coming from home,
they wirelessed orders to the Russian admiral to
proceed with all speed to Trebizond at the far
eastern end of the Black Sea. When the duped
Russians returned from their fruitless chase, they
found that the two lone German ships had raided
their shore establishments and broken up their
coastal merchant shipping.
Yardley's book describes the great effectiveness
of our cryptanalysis in reading Japanese messages
at the time of the Washington armament confer-
ence. His office turned out over 5,000 decipher-
ments and translations during those meetings.
Some writers believe that the Japanese denounce-
ment of the naval treaties was directly linked with
Yardley's disclosures years later.
How and to what extent any American agency
reentered cryptanalysis after Yardley's work was
discontinued in 1929, has not been disclosed. The
public knows that something was done prior to
Pearl Harbor because of the references made on
4 November 1945, by Representative Gearhart
(Congressional Record, November 6, 1945, pp.
10606-11). On 15 November 1945, came the full
disclosure to the joint congressional committee of
some 700 messages dating back to 2 December
1940. One of the most controversial features of
the Pearl Harbor investigation involved the pur-
ported "winds messages" which were said to con-
tain the signals for war.
These references to cryptanalysis, though brief,
should suggest the sensitive nature of the subject
and the need for the intelligence officer wherever
stationed to be aware of the implications of activ-
ities which concern codes and ciphers.
235
Traffic Analysis
Traffic analysis is a second major type of activity
related to communications that does not even re-
quire chyptanalysis to be useful, although code
breaking eases this work. It requires a knowledge
of how messages are put together, how they are
routed, and what kinds of organizations use radio
communications. The task is to reconstruct the
radio networks of the enemy, and to determine the
features of their operations. It includes the solu-
tion of call sign and routing systems, analysis of
the components of message externals, interpreta-
tion of radio procedure, and the use of the various
cryptographic systems passed; that is, everything
about communications except the cryptanalysis it-
self, although the two activities are mutually
supporting.
When traffic analysis is systematically devel-
oped, it may be possible to learn the call signals
of enemy stations, the frequencies and times of
transmissions, the physical location of stations,
routing codes, and so forth. From this informa-
tion a principal end product is order of battle data.
Radio networks have definite and detailed patterns
that give clues to the organizations they serve.
They may include individual links between two
points, groups working as an entity under a single
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control, or nets with common operating character-
istics and overall direction. Stations may use a
single frequency or a range to fit atmospheric
conditions. They may switch for security reasons
or when regular frequencies have been jammed.
Call signs may be fixed or be changed on some sec-
ret basis. Times of transmission may also be
varied on some irregular, secret basis.
Clues to messages and operations may come from
procedure signals and miscellaneous chatter among
operators. Such chatter may give information on
cryptographic systems used. Japanese stations in
World War II received advance notice of some of
our carrier strikes when our pilots turned on trans-
mitters to test them prior to take off. Occasion-
ally, due to unusual atmospheric conditions, mes-
sages on frequencies not intended to go very far
are bounced great distances and received by enemy
ears. Sometimes encrypted messages are refused
by an addressee, and the same message is repeated
under another system giving many important
leads. Messages have certain externals that can
convey much valuable information. These may
include serial numbers, group counts, date time
markings, routing to action and information ad-
dresses, and precedence indicators.
The location of transmitters, if not otherwise
known, may be determined by direction finding,
using several receivers and triangulation. Re-
constructing a net may come from the call signals,
the schedules, the frequencies, the routings and
routines, the cryptographic system used, the chat-
ter and names of operators. The information
obtained is plotted in diagramatic form and in
tables until meaningful patterns emerge.
Volume of traffic and direction of flow may in-
dicate what stations represent higher headquarters
or certain command relationships. Changes in
volume of messages may show that military opera-
tions are underway or about to begin. For exam-
ple, it appears that before the Pearl Harbor attack,
important Japanese fleet units kept radio silence,
an immediate clue that they did not want their
activities identified. Since changes in volume of
traffic can disclose so much, nearly all countries
now pad their traffic to maintain an even volume
and hide this kind of vital information. Dummy
nets may continue to operate to hide the moves of
real forces under radio silence. Consequently the
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236
intelligence officer must always be on guard lest the
obvious not be the real.
Thus it is apparent that the value of traffic
analysis is great, for it not only can be a source
of much information to us, but also points out the
need for protective measures to insure our own
communications security.
REPORTING
Thus far in our discussion of collection we have
described guidance, the direction of the collection
effort, and coverage, the fulfillment of missions by
collecting agencies or units. Now we come to
reporting, the means by which information reaches
its consumer. Without prompt and accurate re-
porting a collection effort is without value.
Graphically, the reporting by an intelligence
officer can be re presented thus:
See
HearEvaluate Report
In writing
Organize
Read Orally
We have here in essence a reporting cycle which
embraces all phases of the Intelligence Cycle:
collection through the eye and ear; processing by
a preliminary interpretation of the information
and its organization into logical presentation; and
dissemination through the act of reporting, either
written or oral. The intelligence officer must
therefore be able to present the information col-
lected in the manner that will best serve the user.
Words, written or spoken, are weapons to be used
with skill.
Written Reports
Written reports can be classified into three types:
(1) periodic, those required at regular intervals or
on designated dates on a continuing basis; (2)
spot, those made in reply to a specific request; and
(3) voluntary, those submitted through the collec-
tor's initiative.
Typical of periodic reports is the joint
WEEKA, prepared at virtually all United States
foreign posts by the representatives of the Depart-
ments of State, Army, Navy, and Air Force. It is
an analysis of the significant local events of the
week under review. The naval attach?s prima-
rily responsible for items of naval interest which
are briefly presented with appropriate comment.
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The intelligence officers of many operational
commands prepare succinct summaries of items of
interest for periodic dissemination to all units
within that command. The items may be evalua-
tions or interpretations of current events or merely
accurate information to correct ill-founded
scuttle-butt.
Spot reports are direct answers to specific ques-
tions. What is the depth of water alongside Pier
5 in Atlantis Harbor? What are the political
sympathies of Admiral Ivanovitch ? Has the re-
pair of the damaged crane in the Gesundheit Ship-
yard been completed? Specific requests usually
have a "due date" and replies by messages are often
requested.
Voluntary reports should make up the bulk of
a collector's reporting. We have shown in previ-
ous chapters the broad scope of subjects of naval
interest. An alert collector's reporting respon-
sibilities never cease, and conscientious effort in
insuring completeness of information will often
eliminate the necessity for specific requests to sup-
ply the missing data.
Form and Speed
The primary considerations in the reporting of
information are form and speed. The Navy has
adopted a standard information report form which
insures completeness and provides uniformity for
rapid and efficient processing. The nature and
urgency of the information will determine in what
form it should be forwarded and the means to be
used. Particularly vital information should be
submitted by telecommunications, while matters
of less immediate concern are forwarded by mail
in accordance with security regulations affecting
their transmission. Lacking specific directives,
the intelligence officer must use his best judgment.
Report Writing
The ABC's of good report writing are accuracy,
brevity, and clarity. Precision in the use of words
is essential for accuracy. To write: The vehicle
went into the water would be a most inaccurate
description if the true circumstance was: The jeep
slid into the Danube. Brevity is perhaps the most
difficult to achieve, for it is always a problem to
decide what is essential or nonessential for the
237
consumer's needs. However, one should not write:
"The be-ribboned sea-dog mounted the gangway
of the famous fighting ship and partook of a noon-
day repast together with the efficient officers who
control the intricate operations of this modern
masterpiece of naval engineering" when the sit-
uation can be simply described by: "Admiral
Burke lunched with the ship's officers on board
the Forrestal."
Clarity is achieved by a simple, direct writing
style, and a logical organization of report content.
The standard Navy information report format
consists of: (1) a succinct summary of the infor-
mation; (2) the main body of the report; (3) the
comments of the originator.
A summary or brief is required for all reports
of more than one page. Normally, it should not
be longer than a few sentences or one-fourth page.
Its purpose is to enable all who read it to determine
its significance at first glance. Therefore it should
be more than a mere outline of the paragraph titles
of the report. It should contain the main facts,
a succinct epitome or abstract of the report's con-
tents. Thus a carefully written brief serves as a
timesaver for those who initiate the processing
of the report's information. It is an essential aid
to proper dissemination, for its potential users will
be clearly indicated.
The main body of the report should be presented
with section or paragraph titles and subtitles. The
material should be factual and the writer must
strive for complete objectivity. Here again brev-
ity is desirable but never at the expense of neces-
sary detail.
At the close of the report, on a separate page,
the reporting officer should present his personal
comments. It may sometimes be advisable to elabo-
rate on the reliability of the source or to submit a
brief discussion of the pertinence of certain facts as
seen by the collector in the field. Such comment
will be most helpful to subsequent evaluators of
the information. Here the reporting officer can be
subjective and editorialize to his heart's content.
However, he should still be concise. Often the
forwarding officer in a chain of command will also
desire to add comment.
We can summarize our discussion of reporting
by setting forth a few guiding principles:
Each report should be on a single subject.
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Give careful attention to the introductory sum-
mary.
Organize facts and figures in logical sequence.
Photographs, sketches, and appropriate graphics
will always save words and enhance the value
of the report.
Be objective in the main body; be subjective in
comment.
Never include questions or requests. Such mat-
ters are subjects for separate letters.
Edit the report before submission; reread, reor-
ganize, rewrite.
Make every report represent a best effort.
Oral Reporting
Intelligence officers in operational billets will be
frequently called upon for oral presentations or
briefings to commanders, staffs, and personnel of
operating units. The effectiveness of such brief-
ings depends on the officer's ability as a speaker
and his ingenuity in the use of visual aids. Care-
ful organization is again the key to success. A
good briefing has an adequate introduction, smooth
transition in moving from point to point, and a
clear, forceful conclusion. Naturalness of de-
livery, unity, coherence, and emphasis will achieve
the desired result. Ability will come with prac-
tice, and the intelligence officer should constantly
strive for self-improvement in this important
function.
Observation and Reporting in the Field
The intelligence officer serving as an attach?r
in other billets abroad will frequently be in posi-
tion to observe things of inestimable value. The
full significance of many observations will, of
course, be apparent only to the highly trained
technician. A good intelligence officer must be
quick to realize his own observation and reporting
shortcomings in technical fields and request ex-
pert assistance whenever possible. There are,
however, certain fields in which he must acquire
observation techniques in the interests of accurate
reporting. We shall discuss two of them here:
ships and aircraft, both of which are of prime in-
telligence significance all over the world.
Reporting on Merchant Ships
Although thousands of merchant ships ply the
oceans, far outnumbering naval vessels, the aver-
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238
age naval officer is seldom equipped to recognize,
identify, and accurately describe them. Yet their
recognition is of key importance not only in dis-
tinguishing between friend and foe but also in ac-
curate assessment of the enemy's logistic capa-
bility.
Typical among current merchant ships recogni-
tion manuals is CINCPAC RIG-1, which is an
outgrowth of JMST used in World War II. Now
out of print though still frequently available is
ONI 209. Very useful, too, is Talbot-Booth's
Merchant Ships annual.
Recognition is of two types. The first is a gen-
eral overall impression, used primarily in quick
operational identification. The second is a more
detailed analysis, feature by feature, made possible
only by opportunity for prolonged observation.
The latter is the most desirable, since ships present
a great variety of characteristics and are therefore
hard to identify quickly.
There are several stages of ship recognition. As
ships come over the horizon, their sequence of
masts, kingposts, cranes, and funnels can be noted
from bow to stern. Next can be noted the general
hull form, whether flush-deck or in various com-
binations with and without raised forecastle,
bridge, and poop sections. At medium range more
detail can be noted: the shape of the bow and
stern, the funnel size and shape, position of masts
and kingposts, and often clues to length and ton-
nage. At close range the length of forecastle,
bridge, and poop can be ascertained and also the
position of deckhouses, winchhouses, ventilating
cowls, lifeboats, and many other details. The par-
ticulars of Navy merchant ship coding, largely
adapted from Talbot-Booth, are covered in official
manuals.
How is the size of a ship to be judged? Apart
from checking in a reference manual, there is no
absolute measure, for visual impressions are af-
fected by the color of sky, the kind of weather, and
the altitude of the observer. However, an estima-
tion of length may be possible from the number of
lifeboats or the ratio of length to the height of
the navigation bridge above the waterline.
Whether the ship is light or laden will possibly
influence identification of the shape of bow and
stern. Speed estimates are also important. They
depend upon a knowledge of the shapes and posi-
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tions of waves made by different kinds of bows
and familiarity with varieties of ships' wakes.
The kind and continuity of smoke will give clues
to the type of fuel burned by a ship. Mistakes
are easy to make. A three-island ship may look
like a flush decker if the well decks are loaded
with lumber, and masts may be lowered on some
ships so that they look like kingposts.
An estimate of the age of a ship will often
provide important clues to performance and iden-
tification. Age is frequently revealed by such
characteristics as shape of bow, stern, superstruc-
ture, and funnels, and ratios of length to other
dimensions, the amount of superstructure that is
glass enclosed, the type of ventilation, and the
type of lifeboat davits.
In peacetime, an aid for identification is the
coloring of such features as the hull, superstruc-
ture, booting, stripes, masts and kingposts, cowls
inside and out, and, of course, the funnel and house
flag. In wartime the task is more difficult not
only because of gray and dazzle paint, but because
of deck cargo, armament, false work of canvas and
sheet metal, and removal of dummy funnels.
In recent years there has been one development
that simplified recognition of types but not of
ownership: the building of ships to standard pat-
terns. In World War I the Hog Islander was
typical of freighters designed for mass production
to meet wartime needs. The President liners, both
535's and 502's, were cargo-passenger ships of
standard design. In the late 1930's the United
States Maritime Commission began a new program
of permanent standardized types to bring our
merchant fleet out of the doldrums, beginning with
the Cl, C2, C3 cargo types. At the outset of
World War II the British began an emergency
building program to replace submarine losses, or-
dering a very simple reciprocating engine ship
with split superstructure, the Ocean class, from
United States yards. At home and in Canada
they built similar Fort and Park class freighters
and later some better turbine and diesel ships, all
with the prefix Empire. The British Ocean de-
sign was modified in this country to a composite
superstructure type, the Liberty ship, designated
the EC2. Later in the war, the faster turbine
Victory ships (VC-2) were built in considerable
numbers. The regular peacetime program of C1,
239
C2, C3 types was enlarged, and joined by C4, C5,
P1, P2, Ti, T2, T3 oceangoing types of cargo,
passenger, and tanker designs. The C1MAV1
coastal cargo ship, an even smaller N3 type, and
many standardized tugs, barges, and lake ships
were also built. The Japanese, too, had to resort
to mass production of ships to meet emergency
needs, producing a whole series of ships with
simplified lines.
After the war, these mass-produced vessels,
American, British, and to some extent Japanese,
accounted for a very considerable proportion of
all shipping afloat. Because of surplus sales, and
lend-lease transfers not returned, a number of
American designs, especially Liberty, Victory, and
T2 tanker, are now found under many flags. These
standard types make recognition training easier,
but a positive identification of nationality often
requires more than visual observation.
Our country has led the way since the war in
building or ordering abroad so-called "supertank-
ers," grossing about 17,000 tons and carrying about
28,000 deadweight tons. These vessels are operat-
ing under a number of flags including Pana-
manian, Honduran, and Liberian, as well as the
better known United States shipping companies.
The new Mariner class vessels represent a sig-
nificant change in cargo ship design, and though
they are few in numbers now, they may be very
important in any future war.
In summary it can be pointed out that accurate
ship recognition and reporting offers considerable
opportunity to develop skill. Individual nation-
alities and shipyards have their own characteristic
building habits in design and auxiliary equipment.
Close attention and constant study will pay divi-
dends in many types of intelligence billets.
Reporting on Naval Ships
All known naval vessels are much more com-
pletely covered in official manuals than are mer-
chant ships. Additional unofficial sources that are
very helpful are Jane's Fighting Ships and
Fahey's Ships and Aircraft of the United States
Fleet. Many of the recognition problems are
somewhat similar to those of merchant ships, but
the details to be reported on each vessel are more
complicated and more urgently needed for naval
purposes. In addition to simple recognition and
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description, it is essential to obtain specific data on
performance, armament, armor, fire control, and
the efficiency of crews. Opportunities for obser-
vation may be more limited, since many countries
do not expose their naval vessels needlessly. Even
though an obscure aerial photograph may reveal
no details, the hull proportions of length to beam
may disclose the type. Generally, observation
should include noting deck lines and superstruc-
ture, the types of gun mounts and the disposition
of batteries, the peculiarities of masts and funnels,
and the shape of bow and stern.
Observation of naval vessels is frequently com-
plicated by their neutral color and complexity of
gear. Frequent refits may modify appearance so
that the vessel cannot be recognized from earlier
drawings. It is incumbent upon the intelligence
officer to be familiar with all the major vessel
types: capital ships, cruisers, carriers, destroyers,
submarines, minecraft, patrol craft, amphibious,
all auxiliaries, and yardcraft, noting that there
are many subtypes, each with a specialized and
significant use. He should also note pendant or
bow numbers, and, of course, names whenever
possible.
Attention to armament should include various
types of guns, torpedoes, guided missiles, mines,
antiaircraft weapons, rockets, directors, and radar.
The armor protection of side, deck, turret, and
tower are important, together with compartmen-
tation and damage control measures. Mobility?
speed and maneuverability?and sea-keeping
qualities in various kinds of weather must also be
ascertained. These are but the bare essentials, and
the individual officer should continue his studies
of naval vessels constantly in order to make the
most of reporting opportunities.
Reporting on Aircraft
As in the case of ships, there are two principal
approaches to aircraft recognition. One is in com-
bat operations, when rapid identification is re-
quired. The best results in this type of recognition
have been achieved by use of the American Ren-
shaw system, which consists of constant drill on
total form. The other approach is more produc-
tive of information of intelligence interest, the
British WEFT system: Wings?Engines?Fuse-
lage?Tail. It comprises a systematic detailed
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description. The observer, of course, must have
a photograph to study or actually see the plane in
a slow fly past.
Wings are described according to their position
on the fuselage, their size and shape: whether they
are dihedral, if swept back and to what degree,
gull or inverted gull, square or tapered, with
rounded or square tips. Engines are noted as to
number, whether in-line or radial reciprocating,
turbo-jet, pulse-jet, ram-jet, or turbo-prop, and in
respect to propellers the number of blades and
whether they are coaxial contrarotating. In re-
spect to the fuselage, general proportions, shape,
and position of protuberances such as cockpit, gun
turrets, radomes, and air intakes are important.
Reporting on the tail must include shape, number
of vertical stabilizers, position of the horizontal
stabilizer, and the extent to which the tail fairs
into the fuselage.
Aircraft structural terminology is part of the
intelligence officer's professional equipment. He
must also seek data on range, speed, maneuver-
ability, lifting capacity, performance at usual op-
erational and highest possible altitudes, vulner-
abilities, tactics employed, maintenance, and so
forth. The appearance of a particular aircraft at
a certain location may give clues as to unsuspected
longer range. Air technical intelligence, as noted
earlier, will supply detailed answers to many ques-
tions of production rate, metallurgy, and equip-
ment when opportunity is afforded to examine
captured planes or their component parts.
The signifiance of aircraft observation thus goes
far beyond a mere determination of friend or foe.
The appearance of German jets and rocket planes
in World War II represented an outstanding ex-
ample of how prompt recognition resulted in sig-
nificant intelligence. We were able to assess their
performance and take the proper countermeasures
to save our bombing program on the continent and
to avert defeat in the air.
Reporting on Air Facilities
Just as the proper use of the standard informa-
tion report form insures completeness of reporting
on items of general naval interest, the use of a
standard form for describing foreign air facilities
(NME-193) serves as a guide to the intelligence
officer reporting on airfields and seaplane stations.
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It systematically provides spaces for entering de-
tailed information on location, runways, communi-
cation facilities, installations, transportation,
meteorological conditions, and servicing facilities.
Such reports are augmented by enclosures which
furnish additional data through maps, photo-
graphs, approach procedures, operation regula-
tions, and other pertinent facts.
A separate report is required for each facility,
and the information thus obtained is used in the
compilation of foreign airfield lists published
jointly by the Air Force and ONI, and in the
compilation of aeronautical charts and related
publications published by the Aeronautical Chart
Service and the Navy Hydrographic Office.
Other Subjects of Reporting
The fact that ships and aircraft have been sin-
gled out for special treatment above is in no way
intended to minimize the importance of many
other items of naval interest. Ports and harbors,
of course, are to ships what air facilities are to
aircraft, and information on ports and harbors
represents a continuing requirement on naval in-
telligence. A special guide published for the col-
lector outlines the types of information desired in
considerable detail. They include complete as-
sessment of the harbor and its approaches, the
docking, cargo transfer, and storage facilities,
inland clearance, repair and servicing, and a host
of other items. A complete port study is not pos-
sible through a casual visit. It requires days and
sometimes months of the keenest observation and
most careful evaluation.
Land transportation facilities, including rail-
ways, roads, bridges, tunnels, urban transit sys-
tems, inland waterways, and so forth, are
primarily under the cognizance of the Army
Transportation Corps, yet a naval observer may
on occasion be in the best position to observe and
report on them. Irrespective of source, such in-
formation is of vital importance to Navy plan-
ning. Even the seagoing naval officer when in
port can note railway gage, number of tracks, con-
dition of rails, ties, and ballast, signaling system
used, gradient and curvature markers, location of
passing tracks, branch lines, bridges, culverts, tun-
nels, stations, repair, fuel and storage facilities,
241
size of marshalling yards, locomotive and car
wheel arrangements, fuel used, freight observed in
movement, types of couplers and brakes, and many
similar items. It is all needed for accurate assess-
ment of railway capacity and vulnerability.
Roads and highways should likewise be observed
for location and mileages, branches, number of
lanes, width of lanes and shoulders, surface mate-
rial, present condition, bridge construction and
clearance. Reports on waterways should include
information on the depths of water by seasons,
degree of maintenance required, facilities for
cargo transfer, and all dimensions of canal locks.
Telecommunications facilities, though of a tech-
nical nature, also provide material for useful re-
porting even by the amateur. Noting the efficiency
and extensiveness of the telephone and telegraph
networks, the frequencies and locations of radio
stations, and the shapes and positions of antennas
will always yield valuable data.
Power facilities are frequently keys to the capa-
bilities and vulnerabilities of an area. Noting
power lines, substations, hydroelectric and thermo-
electric plants, the voltage and frequency of con-
sumer electric power, and the availability of power
fuels, such as coal and oil, will provide material
for many reports.
Industrial reporting is complex and varied, and
accurate identification by mere observation from
the outside is often difficult. A collector going to
a foreign port should make a careful study of the
types of industrial installations he is apt to en-
counter in order to recognize them readily for what
they are: steel mills, processing plants, construc-
tion works, and so forth, and whether they func-
tion in heavy, light, or agricultural industries.
Estimations on production volume may be related
to observed flows of raw materials, and numbers of
workers. Labels on crates may give clues to ori-
gins and destinations. Pacing off or using an
automobile speedometer may give plant dimen-
sions. Good opportunities for accurate reporting
should not go begging for lack of ingenuity.
Such observations should be considered a matter
of collection and reporting routine. In this coun-
try such information is readily available to all
foreign nations from libraries, newspapers, and
brochures published by local chambers of corn-
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merce. Collection abroad is often not so easy, so
a greater burden of observation rests on the col-
lecting agency. If opportunities for observation
are fleeting, and the information is critical, the
observer must concentrate on essential elements,
and memorize them until he has an opportunity
for recording without risk of compromise. Tak-
ing pictures is subject to the same qualifications:
they are invaluable, but unless the need is very
great they should not be taken in a manner open
to easy compromise or diplomatic censure.
The Intelligence Sketch
Sketching is one of the old forms of reporting
information. Whether a sketch is simple and
rough or elaborate and artistic, it affords a graphic
means of communication which in many cases is
much more effective than a written description. In
circumstances where photography is impossible or
inadvisable the sketch is the solution, and a maxim
for the collector is: "If you can't photograph it,
sketch it!"
Some typical instances when sketching would
be most valuable and appropriate are given below:
A naval attache has been granted permission to
travel into the interior of the country in which he
is stationed and to visit certain military and indus-
trial installations. Photography has been forbid-
den, and well aware that he cannot rely on his
memory for all details, he plans certain memory
aids which will help him sketch the locations,
structures, and plant layouts when he returns to
his office.
A prisoner of war, when being interrogated, re-
vealed that he had recently been assigned to guard
duty in a restricted harbor area. Although he is
unable to describe verbally all that he saw, he can
produce a rough sketch of certain port installa-
tions and identify buildings. This information
later proves to supply missing information on
that particular harbor.
In the course of a mission, a pilot observes a
type of aircraft unknown to him. The air intelli-
gence officer, debriefing the pilot, translates a de-
scription of the new plane into a sketh. (See fig.
10.) Analysis of the sketch reveals technical de-
velopments hitherto unususpected, thus resulting
in a reassessment of the enemy's air capabilities.
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An intelligence officer, put ashore with an am-
phibious reconnaissance patrol, is able to sketch
the locations and relative bearings of a series of
beach defenses. This sketch information, when
delivered to the commander of the support group,
makes it possible for naval gunfire support to be
directed with greater accuracy.
The most elementary kind of sketching is a. two
dimensional drawing representing total form.
(See fig. 11.) To achieve proper proportions the
use of graph paper is recommended, particularly
by the intelligence officer new to his job, but expe-
rience and constant practice will soon eliminate the
need for graph paper assistance.
Problems often arise in sketching such things
as general terrain, waterfront areas, and buildings.
A plane view would meet the minimum require-
ments, but by employing a simple sighting device,
often used by landscape artists, it is possible to
include perspective while retaining approximate
scale. All that is needed is a pencil or ruler. Sup-
pose the subject is a building. Sighting the build-
ing over a pencil held vertically at arm's length
it is found that the building's height is equal to
about 2 inches of the pencils length. A 2 inch
vertical line transcribed on paper is the first step
in sketching the building. Its length is determined
in the same manner by sighting with the pencil
held horizontally. Height and length are thus
transcribed in correct proportion.
Beach sketching from seaward, invaluable in
amphibious operations, can be mastered by any
intelligence officer with the help of H. 0. Publica-
tion No. 227, The Amphibious Sketch. For self-
instruction in general sketching the following
books are recommended: Arthur L. Guptill, Free-
hand Drawing Self-Taught, published by Harpers
Bros., and Ernest W. Watson, Pencil Drawing,
published by Watson-Guptill Publications, Inc.
Adequate sketching requires no special equip-
ment other than a pencil, soft eraser, and paper.
For general purposes, a 2?H (medium) pencil is
best because it is soft enough to produce a firm
mark with minimum pressure and yet does not
smear readily. The type of drawing paper used
will naturally influence the result obtained, so for
general purposes paper of soft texture, not glossy,
is best.
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Sketching-Aircraft
HEAD-ON VIEW
(1) Draw a horizontal line, marking off a dis-
tance to represent wing span.
(2) Draw outline of fuselage cross section in
proportion to wing span, locating it to
indicate high, mid, or low wing as appro-
priate.
(3) Draw wing shape, indicating dihedral, if
any.
(4) Add wing floats or tanks, if any.
(5) Draw tail surfaces in proper proportion and
add any other features such as cockpit
canopy, engine nacelles, airscoops.
PLAN VIEW
(1) Draw a vertical line, marking off a distance
to indicate length of fuselage.
(2) Sketch outline of fuselage.
(3) Locate wing by a horizontal line, indicating
span in proportion to fuselage length.
With sweptback wings, the line should run
through tips. Mark on fuselage positions
of leading edge and trailing edge at roots.
Figure 10.?Sketching aircraft.
243
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PLAN VIEW (Cont.)
(4) Draw wing tips, with tanks when included,
and complete the outline of the wings.
(5) Add engine nacelles, if any, and draw tail
plane.
SIDE VIEW
(I) Indicate over-all length on a horizontal line.
(2) Draw general outline of fuselage to show
relative thickness as well as curvature and
taper.
(3)
Draw fin and rudder in proper proportion.
(4) Add any further prominent features?cock-
pit canopy, turrets, radomes, scoops, or
engine nacelles showing above or below the
fuselage.
(5)
Add wings, stabilizer, and other details if
desired.
For silhouette effect, fill in the outline
sketches.
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Figure 1 0.?Continued
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Sketching Warships
A.
(1) Draw a straight horizontal line to represent
the water line, marking position of how and
stern.
(2) Estimate the height of the bridge in pro-
portion to indicated ship's length at the
water line.
B.
(1) Draw the deck line and profiles of bow and
stern.
(2) Draw in outline the general mass of the
superstructure. This step is most important
as the over all shape is a major Recognition
feature.
C.
(1) Add important details?bridge, stacks, masts,
turrets.
(2) Fill in for silhouette effect.
Figure 11.?Sketching warships.
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RECORDING
INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS
A discussion of collection will not be complete
without mention of a final requirement: the proper
filing and recording of the results of the collection
effort. Information must be labeled for ready
reference. Such cataloging and indexing should
begin when the collector in the field gathers his
material for a report. The efficient collector
should keep a personal file of facts and notes on
people, places, and events. In form these may be
card files, annotated clippings from newspapers
and magazines, or penciled memoranda. Some or-
derly arrangement of this material will pay off
when information is needed for reference or sug-
gestion for leads. Just as a good reporter the
intelligence officer should write down observations
and impressions while they are fresh in his mind.
Memory can play strange tricks, and in intelli-
gence activity there is no place for hazy recollec-
tion.
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246
A standard Intelligence File Index, used by
United States intelligence agencies, assures uni-
form filing of information reports by all processing
units. Thus a report or dispatch received by the
Navy from Army or Air Force sources bears the
same file number as it would if it had originated
from a Navy collecting unit. Cross-indexing pro-
vides for further efficiency.
Further consideration to the principles of filing
will be given in the following chapter on process-
ing, for it is in the second step in the cycle that
orderly arrangement of data becomes even more
essential to the intelligence function in any mili-
tary establishment.
This chapter is not an exhaustive treatment of
collection. Aspects and applications of this first
step in the intelligence cycle will appear again and
again in succeeding chapters, for collection is basic
to intelligence activity; it sets the wheels in motion; on its efficient operation the remaining steps
of the cycle depend.
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CHAPTER 10
THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE: PROCESSING
In the continuous operation of the intelligence
cycle, Collection provides the essential raw mate-
rial and processing acts in the manner of a cata-
lytic agent, transforming pertinent parts of the
material into a meaningful product ready for dis-
semination and eventual use by appropriate action
agencies. During this second phase of the cycle,
the trained intelligence officer and the skilled
analyst work with quantities of raw information
collected from a great variety of sources, selecting,
verifying, comparing, and interpreting items of
value, and acting upon the results to produce usa-
ble intelligence. The basic problem is one of de-
termining the significance of information in the
light of past experience, present circumstances,
and possible future developments. To be utilized
by the analyst in solving this problem are the prin-
ciples of logic, reasoning, and exhaustive research.
As is true of the social sciences, intelligence is
based on observed phenomena or facts from which
generalized conclusions are drawn. Therefore,
processing is much more than the orderly assem-
bling of related facts and the determining of their
significance; it involves the deriving of total mean-
ing from these facts when related to other intelli-
gence already available.
As distinguished from the other phases of the
cycle, processing is fundamentally a mental oper-
ation, carried out primarily at higher echelons by
specifically assigned analysts who are carefully
selected and intensively trained for specalized
activities. However, limited processing may be
performed by any part of the intelligence organ-
ization, particularly at the lower echelons where
all phases of the cycle are often the responsibility
of a single unit or perhaps one intelligence officer.
This is true because information for intelligence
is never static, but in continual motion. It is
gathered, and processed to a degree, by the collec-
tor who disseminates it upward to higher echelons,
laterally to other echelons on the same level, or
downward to lower echelons where it may be sub-
jected again and again to processing by different
individuals and from different viewpoints.
247
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Even when processed information, which is in-
telligence, has been placed in filing cabinets, it is
only in suspended animation. It may already have
set in motion a chain of events, or it may be drawn
from the files at any time for use in conjunction
with later information or intelligence to activate
further events.
Processing is a continuous operation because in-
formation of intelligence interest is constantly
being collected and because each item of processed
intelligence will open new areas of collection. It
is a vital operation because collected facts and data
have intelligence value only as the result of proc-
essing; failure to process represents a costly waste
of the collection effort. Even processed informa-
tion requires frequent re-evaluation in order that
it may have current utility. Processing functions
are also activated when requests are received for
intelligence on a given topic and when solutions
are required for problems arising out of planning
for strategic, operational, or countering purposes.
In the processing phase of the cycle, three gen-
eral factors must always be kept in mind: the
completeness of the basic data, the accuracy of the
operation by which information is converted into
intelligence, and the element of time. In order
that the conclusions may be truly comprehensive
and not partial, the basic facts and data used must
be as inclusive as possible. In order to avoid
errors which would render conclusions not only
meaningless but also highly dangerous, the various
processing functions must be expertly performed.
Finally, because intelligence must be produced in
sufficient time to be of value to those who need it,
all information received by the processing unit
must be handled expeditiously.
The time-span of the processing phase is con-
ditioned both by the nature of the information re-
ceived and the urgency of the need for it. For
example, a flash report from a subordinate com-
mander of an impending enemy air attack on a car-
rier would be disseminated immediately and the
processing phase would be eliminated. Informa-
tion suggesting an imminent military attack on an
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ally of the United States might force the concen-
tration of all processing activity into a matter of
hours. On the other hand, a report including con-
flicting implications of an anticipated change of
government in a country of minor world impor-
tance might require a longer period for thorough
processing. At all times, however, speed in proc-
essing is important because of the constant possi-
bility that the final interpretation of the informa-
tion may have meaning of vital and immediate
concern to a potential user.
Because of its abstract nature, the diverse cir-
cumstances affecting it, and the varied application
of its general principles, processing cannot be re-
duced to a series of mechanical operations. It
includes a number of mental functions which are
intricately interwoven and often overlapping as
they continue toward the goal of correct conclu-
sions. At times several of these functions are per-
formed simultaneously and they do not necessarily
follow one another in fixed sequence. As a result,
there will seldom be complete detailed agreement
as to the particular functions encompassed by proc-
essing or the terms to be used in describing them.
However, the integral functions may be identified,
for all practical purposes, as selection, evaluation,
analysis, interpretation, and action. For the pur-
poses of discussion only can they be considered
separately.
There are certain techniques and aids or devices
generally used in processing, such as labeling, in-
dexing, and filing. However, they are not ends
in themselves and must never obscure the ultimate
objective of processing which is the production of
intelligence.
SELECTION
Volumes of information are received continu-
ously by processing units in the form of reports,
messages, charts, photographs, journals, and
printed material of all types. Diverse topics of
potential intelligence value may be included within
a single report or bits of information regarding
one topic of interest may be scattered among many.
Since no item may be disregarded and many may
be obscured by the very bulk of the reports in
which they are contained, there must be a careful
sifting of all information received on the basis of
interests and specific pending requests to extract
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248
data of value. Selection, then, is the preliminary
examination of information to determine the need
for it, the degree of interest it holds, its possible
use, and its meaning. If meaning is readily ap-
parent, the information will be disseminated
promptly, even at this early stage of consideration.
Selection, however, is much more than the ex-
tracting of pertinent data. It is the first step of
processing whereby controls are established over
all extracted material in order to make it available
in usable form to the appropriate intelligence
analysts. Depending upon the particular require-
ments of the analyst, the material received may be
best controlled by subdividing it under general
headings such as persons, places, organizations,
situations, and trends. The sorting and grouping
of information under headings such as these facili-
tate the current and future use of all extracted
material; they are also of immediate value to the
other functions of processing.
Related to the establishment of controls are two
additional activities by analysts which are part of
the function of selection. The first is the prompt
distribution of incoming material within the proc-
essing unit in order to maintain the rapid flow of
information to all analysts who need it. How to
minimize the circulation to analysts of informa-
tion in which they have no interest is one problem
of distribution. The second activity is that of
labelling material for later filing and indexing in
the reference files. The objective of this activity,
of course, is to insure ready availability to the
analyst of any material he has reviewed or proc-
essed, regardless of the means he may use to iden-
tify it at the time. The participation of the an-
alyst in this preliminary phase of indexing and
filing increases the probability that each item will
be identifiable under the widest variety of head-
ings by reference file personnel.
EVALUATION
Evaluation is a continuing function of process-
ing. In fact, it is perpetual within the intelligence
cycle, beginning when the collector considers cer-
tain information worthy of reporting, and con-
tinning thereafter as this information is passed
from person to person. Within a processing unit,
which has received information from many
sources, evaluation is the competent consideration
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of each item of information, the study of its rela-
tionships with other pertinent information, and
the determination of its accuracy, completeness,
and inherent meaning. A basic problem in evalu-
ation is the fact that the very nature of informa-
tion collected for intelligence purposes usually
precludes assigning it an absolute value, either
true or false. Of necessity, therefore, this infor-
mation must be evaluated on the basis of its rela-
tionship to known fact and the degree to which it
is in agreement with the known fact.
Nonevaluated information is not intelligence
and has little value for intelligence purposes. In
fact, it can be potentially dangerous if dissemi-
nated without being clearly identified as such.
Generally, every effort should be made to evaluate
information properly prior to its dissemination.
Basic considerations in the function of evaluating
information are the reliability of its source and
the accuracy of its content.
The Standard Evaluation Code
As a means of rating the reliability of the source
and the probability of the information itself, a
standard letter-figure code system is widely used
by United States intelligence agencies and should,
therefore, be thoroughly understood by all intelli-
gence personnel. As indicated below, the source
is given a letter rating of from A to F and the
content a figure rating of from 1 to 6.
Reliabflity of Source Probabiiitio of Information
A?Completely reliable 1?Confirmed by other
B?tsually reliable sources
C?Fairly reliable 2?Probably true
D?Not usually reliable 3?Possibly true
E?Unreliable 4?Doubtfully true
F?Reliability cannot be 5?Improbable report
judged 6?Truth cannot be judged
In general, collectors in the field apply this code
system to reports which they submit. Initially,
the writer of the report is the most competent
judge of the reliability of his source. Reports
based on personal observation are normally rated
"A," while those obtained from informants whose
reliability can be judged in the light of past ex-
perience are rated "B," "C," or "D." An "F"
rating simply means that the reporting officer has
nothing upon which to estimate the source's reli-
ability. It may be the first time the source has
supplied any information and the reporting officer
269196-54------17
249
cannot assess him by association, by the valued
opinion of colleagues, or by recommendation of
other trusted informants. The "E" rating is
rarely used by originators of reports, except per-
haps when distortion or falseness may provide
useful background information. However, it may
be used by subsequent processors when additional
information not available to the collector indicates
that the source is completely unreliable, as far as
the information supplied in a particular instance
is concerned.
The ratings assigned by field agencies are not
automatically accepted by the intelligence proces-
sing units; rather, they are used as guides. Since
the processing units sometimes have more infor-
mation on an original source than the collector,
field ratings are subject to change. Even the
direct observation of the originator, which has
been rated by him as "A," may be downgraded
by the analyst on the basis of previous experience
with the originator's accuracy of observation and
reporting. It is also possible that a source of the
originator may be rated as "F" by the analyst if
no information is available to substantiate the
assigned rating.
There is no firm relationship between the letters
and figures of the rating code. An "A" source
will not always produce information of "1" or
"2" rating, for mistakes can be made by the most
reliable sources. On the other hand, an "E"
source may supply information that is probably
true or confirmed by other sources. Usually,
however, the most accurate information will come
from the most reliable source; hence the source
does tend to influence the rating of the content.
Ideally, source and content should always be con-
sidered entirely separately. However, there are
instances when the reliability of the source has a
direct bearing on content, especially when there
is no other means for judging the material under
consideration. As a result, cumulative records of
the reliability and accuracy of repetitive sources
can be particularly helpful. When the originator
asigns a low rating to information there is a
tendency on the part of the analyst to accept it.
To be re-emphasized is the fact that the Stand-
ard Evaluation Code is to be used only as a guide
and not taken too literally. As is often true of
standardized rating systems, assigned values tend
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to be arbitrary and subject to diverse interpreta-
tion by its users who have varied backgrounds
of experience and training. The rating of the
content of the information is particularly difficult
since degrees of accuracy and probability are
involved. Information may be only partially cor-
rect, or, though correct in itself, may convey false
implications. It is equally the case that the reli-
ability of a source may change, so that its ratings
may vary over a period of time. Giving due con-
sideration to the ratings assigned by the origina-
tor, the analyst carefully examines the source and
content of the information received on the basis
of the total related information and intelligence
available to him.
Testing the Source
In determining the reliability of the source, the
analyst must distinguish between the actual source
and the transmitting agency. When the action
source is not revealed, however, the reliability of
the transmitter, and his evaluation of the source,
assumes primary importance. Theoretically, the
only absolute sources for the analyst are his own
direct observation and proven documentary evi-
dence. The first is seldom possible and even the
second must be verified. In testing for reliability,
the first question is that of authenticity. Is the
source from which the report ostensibly comes the
true source? Or has false information been
released for purposes of deception?
An example of the dangers of incorrect evalua-
tion of the authenticity of a source is described by
Hector C. Bywater in Their Secret Purposes:
Dramas and Mysteries of the Naval War. During
World War I, a German warrant officer discovered
charts of Russian mine fields and coast defenses
in a brief case which the beautiful Anna of Libau
claimed had been left behind by a former lover.
Much excited by his discovery, the German officer
obtained an audience with German naval author-
ities who acted on his information. Minesweepers
were sent out at night, and it was found that the
indicated clear channel was actually free of mines.
Gun flashes were observed at the shore defense
positions marked on the charts, and the Germans
worked out their gunfire problems accordingly.
The next day, a strong force of German ships
moved in, not to victory, but to disaster. The
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Russians had sown mines in the clear channel after
the minesweepers' investigation of the night be-
fore, and the gun positions proved to be dummies,
located far from the site of the actual coast defense
batteries. The warrant officer was a reliable
source, but the papers found were false, and Anna
of Libau was subsequently identified as a long-
term Russian agent.
The second question which arises in testing a
source for reliability is that of trustworthiness,
which includes the factors of loyalty, motive, and
objectivity. Trustworthiness may change with
the passage of time. A source may have divided
and conflicting loyalties, and the evaluator should
anticipate circumstances under which that per-
son's loyalty might be weakened or turned to active
hostility in the future. Loyalty of a source may
be determined to some extent by background, past
performance, and present position. For example,
an officer or enlisted man in the United States
armed forces would be given a higher loyalty
rating, and hence considered more trustworthy,
than a citizen of a neutral country or a prisoner of
war. The motive of a source in giving informa-
tion must be carefully considered. Perhaps he
acted under the stimulus of strong emotion, such
as jealousy, revenge, patriotism, or fanaticism.
Motives are sometimes revealed by the manner in
which the information is made available, or by a
study of the source's background and personality.
Objectivity is even more difficult to determine than
loyalty and motive. Every individual has certain
prejudices and no one is a completely objective
witness, so that the analyst must try to determine
whether or not the report is biased or objective.
What a collector sees and reports may be colored
by subconscious reactions to certain things or little
idiosyncrasies of which even he may be quite un-
aware. Few people have photographic memories
or the ability to reproduce at a later time all of the
significant points of a lengthy conversation. Per-
sonal interpretation is a common failing. Because
of these various hindrances to objectivity on the
part of the observer, the analyst should know as
much as possible about the reporter and be con-
tinually on guard against personality factors
which can impair objectivity.
The third question regarding reliability relates
to the competency of the source. What have been
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his training, experience, and opportunity for
judging what he has seen? An observer who is
known to be an expert in a given field of knowl-
edge may usually be presumed to be competent in
related fields. If in the past he has been a close
and accurate observer, whether or not he is aware
of the full implications of what he reports, the
chances are that his information has value. The
reporter who has lived in a foreign country for
several years will usually supply more discerning
comment than will the reporter who has newly
arrived on the scene. Competency also involves
the ability of the observer to gain the informa-
tion in question. What would have been his means
of access, or would he have been in a position to
observe what he has reported?
Testing the Information
As already indicated, the evaluation of the con-
tent of information is a matter of judging the
degree of probability and accuracy. To what ex-
tent is it true or possible? Three helpful criteria
at this point are: coherence, credibility, and con-
firmation. The use of these criteria depends, of
course, upon the quantity of similar information
received and the nature of the information itself.
If, for example, no similar information has been
received, the use of the criterion of confirmation
may not be possible.
On the average, it is to be expected that new
information of value will have coherence, that is,
it will be consistent within itself and its ideas will
be related to each other in a logical manner. If it
is self-contradictory, its probability is immediately
subject to question. Relevant details add to the
coherence of information by amplifying general
statements which might otherwise be vague and
of little value. As a criterion, however, coherence
is only preliminary and by no means conclusive.
Completely inaccurate information may appear to
be logical and consistent, while sound information
may seem to contain some inconsistencies. Nor do
details in and of themselves insure correctness; yet
they do provide additional means of verification.
Credibility is determined by the way the infor-
mation fits into the general pattern of activity of
which it is a part. It is worthy of belief if con-
sistent with the accumulated body of intelligence.
Startling information which is completely con-
251
trary to the general progress of events or the be-
havior trends of individuals or groups becomes
suspect to the analyst. The analyst's own experi-
ence in processing and general background knowl-
edge are particularly useful here. He must be
alert to the subtleties of behavior patterns which
on the surface appear to vary and change. This
alertness should prevent him from discarding in-
formation just because it does not at first appear
to be consistent with his general knowledge. How-
ever, it is more often the case that a report which
is consistent with available intelligence is worthy
of credence. A report which is at variance with
the intelligence at hand should be subject to fur-
ther study, even though it has met the criteria of
coherence and confirmation.
The confirmation of the content of information
by other specific information on the same or related
subjects greatly increases its degree of probability
and accuracy. By means of this criteria, new in-
formation may be confirmed, not confirmed, or
contradicted. Two reports containing similar
data, but originating from different sources, must
be closely compared down to the smallest details,
if the information contained therein is to be con-
firmed. Minute differences do not as a rule destroy
the value of those portions of the two reports
which can be reconciled. The compatability of
new information with known facts may aid in its
confirmation. For example, an operational report
may give a new location for certain enemy fleet
units. If these units have the capability of reach-
ing the new location from their last known posi-
tion, and if this new disposition is in agreement
with the current operational situation, then the
report assumes greater degree of accuracy.
To be emphasized is the fact that the degree of
accuracy of new information cannot be established
by satisfying only one of these three criteria.
Coherence, credibility, and confirmation are inter-
related, so that an item must be judged accurate in
proportion to the degree it satisfies all three. The
reliability of the source is another factor which
may be considered.
Problems of Evaluation
The evaluation of new information is often diffi-
cult and complicated by a number of problems,
some of which can be minimized by the collector.
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Such problems include improper identification, in-
accurate or incomplete reporting, duplicate report-
ing, contradiction, and determination of inherent
meaning.
If the new information concerns persons or
places, the greatest care must be taken to identify
them completely. Surnames must be combined
with complete given names to avoid mistaken iden-
tity. If the surname is a common one, it may be
necessary to include birthdate and physical de-
scription to make sure that there can be no mis-
understanding as to the particular individual in
question. Variations in spelling and aliases must
be noted. In the case of places, the use of geo-
graphical coordinates, reference points, and phys-
ical relationships to known positions can be ex-
tremely important. This is especially true of
places in areas which are little known, have not
been completely mapped, or where local names are
the colloquialisms of indigenous groups.
Inaccurate, careless reporting can and does re-
sult in inconsistencies and incoherent logic. Ex-
cessive wordage and long, involved comments can
obscure the facts of the case, complicating the work
of accurate evaluation. Poor editing itself may
result in failure to note typographical errors and
incorrect inferences which, in turn, can cause
faulty reasoning based on false premises. Ten-
dencies to insert personal opinions and wishful
thinking in reports make it difficult, if not impos-
sible, for the analyst to separate fact from fancy.
Incomplete reporting results from failure to in-
clude all pertinent details in a report. For exam-
ple, care should always be taken to identify the
source of the information, if at all possible. When
this is impossible or inadvisable, some evaluation
should be given of the source as well as the content.
One of the most serious problems faced by the
analyst is that of duplicate reporting. Informa-
tion regarding the same topic may be received
from different transmitting agencies so that one
report tends to confirm the other, even though both
agencies have received their information from the
same source. The dangers of this situation are
well illustrated by reports which reached Wash-
ington during World War II from two different
collecting agencies regarding the identification of
Nazi military units in an occupied country of Eu-
rope. Although the information of both reports
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252
was the same in every detail, the sources appeared
to the intelligence processing units to be quite dif-
ferent, apparently providing mutual confirmation.
It later developed, however, when the two collect-
ing agencies in the field compared notes, that the
source of both reports was identical, and hence
there was no real confirmation. Great care must
be taken to avoid false confirmation.
In attempting to evaluate new information, the
analyst may find two or more reports on the same
topic which are completely contradictory and im-
possible to reconcile. The only action possible
may be to summarize both reports, with no con-
clusion, and wait for further information which
will permit accurate evaluation. At all times,
evaluation can only be made on the basis of infor-
mation actually available to the analyst, even
though the existence of additional information is
suspected or known. In such cases, the analyst
must exercise the greatest caution and discretion,
keeping in mind that well-founded doubts must
be resolved in favor of the Navy.
Determination of Inherent Meaning
Testing for the degree of reliability and ac-
curacy of new information does not complete the
function of evaluation. It is still necessary to
determine what this information actually means
and thus how it may affect the total body of knowl-
edge relating to the subject. Sometimes a report
may have no significance, or its significance is
obvious; sometimes parts of it make good sense,
but other parts are still obscure and questionable.
A detected flight of enemy bombers may on one oc-
casion indicate a strike at only one target, but in
other situations the attack may be directed against
one or all of several possible targets. The move-
ment of enemy barges may mean the reinforce-
ment of a particular advance base or the staging
of an amphibious operation according to the at-
tendant circumstances. When the significance is
obvious, dissemination of the information should
be immediate. When the significance remains in
doubt, further processing is necessary.
This early determination of meaning in the
total processing operation does not necessarily in-
volve immediately the later function of interpre-
tation, although the nature of the information
may permit interpretation to develop rapidly from
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its accurate evaluation. In many cases, this de-
termination of meaning concerns only the direct
implications of the information to a particular
subject or situation. Therefore, further process-
ing is required in order to place this new informa-
tion in its proper perspective and to relate its
significance to the total body of knowledge. Often
confirmation of the content of information will
merge into the processing function of analysis.
ANALYSIS
Various explanations may be given of the mental
activity which takes place in many instances from
the time new information is being evaluated until
the time it is interpreted and transformed into in-
telligence. Some of these concern themselves with
features of inductive and deductive reasoning and
make use of such descriptive terms as analysis, col-
lation, and synthesis or integration. These ex-
planations can be helpful; they can also be con-
fusing. Since it is extremely difficult to isolate
or distinguish between some of these mental activ-
ities, they may all be included, from a practical
point of view, in the general function of analysis.
An essential factor in processing, analysis is the
comparison of information with known facts and
previously evaluated data in order to determine
relationships which may lead to pertinent infer-
ences or conclusions. These relationships, in ef-
fect, become new, more comprehensive facts.
During analysis, a study is made of the compo-
nent parts of evaluated and related facts, their
inter-relationships, and their effect on established
patterns of activity. After the careful weighing
of these parts and reaching of a composite judg-
ment regarding them, they are then fitted together
into a meaningful, coherent whole. The process of
analysis is one of distilling and refining, of sepa-
rating and re-combining. Sensitivity on the part
of the analyst is required to catch all implications
of the facts under consideration and to visualize
every possible combination which will lead to
fuller understanding and meaning. Analysis
often aids in resolving contradictions and reveal-
ing the need for, if not the existence of, missing
information. It frequently leads to the re-evalua-
tion of the information being studied.
For the intelligence officer and the analyst, the
function of analysis requires a fund of accumu-
253
lated knowledge, personal liaison with those who
are authorities in the particular subject field under
consideration, and intensive research. The re-
quired fund of knowledge is more than personal
training and years of experience; it involves the
ready availability of pertinent material which has
been indexed and filed, together with the utiliza-
tion of devices whereby this material can be con-
sidered in an orderly, logical manner. Effective
personal liaison is also a practical means of fur-
ther expanding the fund of knowledge, as required,
to meet the needs of the analyst. It brings to bear
on the problem additional points of view.
Research Methods
Research means careful searching, studious in-
quiry, and exhaustive investigation. It is an in-
valuable aid in helping to fill in some of the gaps
of missing information. It provides important
factual background, contributes to the verification
of new information, and assists in the identifica-
tion of material. It also contributes to the dis-
covery of relationships which give meaning and
significance to what might otherwise be discon-
nected facts and data.
The materials for research include written rec-
ords, files, reference books, newspaper clippings,
encyclopedias, and libraries, both general and spe-
cial. Careful documentation of facts is, of course,
essential to good research. In the compilation of
data, working bibliographies should be prepared
from card-index files, periodical guides, newspaper
indices, and other reference guides. Each refer-
ence should be entered on a separate card. Indi-
vidual cards should then be grouped according to
major items of interest.
From the study of evaluated information and
additional data gathered by research methods
arises one or more tentative explanations or the-
ories. As additional material is accumulated, the
tentative explanation or theory is strengthened or
weakened, or one or more appear to approach more
nearly to the truth. Logical reasoning and sound
judgment play an important part in this mental
process which results in the drawing of pertinent
inferences and the reaching of meaningful conclu-
sions. To be avoided is the ready acceptance of
the first reasonable explanation and conclusion
derived from an analytical study. Thorough re-
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search will tend to insure greater accuracy of the
function of analysis.
INTERPRETATION
Interpretation is the determining of the fullest
possible meaning of partially processed informa-
tion, considered in relation to all other pertinent
knowledge and in the perspective of current plan-
ning. Depending upon its source and content,
information can be, and sometimes is, given in-
terpretation almost immediately after receipt. In
some cases, its meaning is obvious. More often,
new information must be subjected to the process-
ing functions of selection, evaluation, and anal-
ysis before the most accurate interpretation can
be made.
The full meaning of information inevitably re-
lates to its effect on an existing condition or situa-
tion. Does this new information alter or add
significance to what is already known? Does it
tend to confirm or disprove what is now believed
to be true ? What are its implications? Correct
interpretation completes the final transformation
of information into intelligence ready for use.
When strategic uses are involved, interpretation
must take into consideration all relevant compo-
nents of intelligence knowledge: military geogra-
phy, transportation and telecommunications,
sociological, political, economic, scientific and tech-
nical, armed forces, and biographical. It must be
comprehensive if it is to give accurate indication
of a foreign nation's capabilities or intentions. As
new information is processed, the interpretations
made will affect in some manner the current intel-
ligence estimates of that nation. New capabilities
may be discovered, and old ones discarded.
When operational uses are being considered, in-
terpretation can supply the commander with in-
telligence vital to his estimate of the situation and
his selection of the course of action which will
most nearly permit the fulfillment of his assigned
mission. For example, knowledge of the disposi-
tion of opposing enemy forces is not completely
processed intelligence. Such knowledge is finally
processed only when it has been interpreted in con-
junction with such factors as terrain, weather, log-
istics, and morale. Full meaning will relate to the
capabilities of the enemy forces to initiate or resist
an attack.
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The intelligence officer and the analyst can best
perform their function of interpretation only
when fully aware of the direction of current plan-
ning. They must also make full use of their own
knowledge and experience. Other factors in in-
terpretation are logical reasoning and conscien-
tious consultation with associates in order that an
accurate and valid interpretation can be most
nearly assured. Acuteness and ingenuity are req-
uisites for the interpretation of all implications
which may arise out of processed information.
ACTION IN PROCESSING
As used in processing, the term "action" refers
to requests for further collection, the preparation
of reports and studies, and the initiation of rec-
ommendations regarding policies and planning.
At any point in the processing phase of the
cycle, the analyst may require additional informa-
tion or amplification of information being proc-
essed. Accordingly, specific requests for collection
are addressed to available agencies. Such requests
should include detailed requirements and time lim-
itations. Close coordination of the efforts of col-
lecting and processing units can greatly increase
the overall efficiency of intelligence production.
Processing units should fully understand the lim-
itations and capabilities of the various collection
agencies; at the same time, the collection agencies
should endeavor to anticipate the requirements of
processing and transmit information in lucid and
usable form.
The preparation of the first draft of reports and
studies begins with the review and grouping of
the analyst's reference cards. The objective is to
present ideas in clear and simple language, so that
the completed study may be clear, logical, and
complete. Critical, objective review is necessary
to make certain that no false implications and er-
roneous inferences can be drawn from the state-
ments made. Any excursions from the central
theme should be rigorously excluded or, if there
is a need for such observations, they should be
relegated to a separate appendix rather than per-
mitted in the main text. At times, the interpreta-
tion of new information may suggest the need for
changes in or modification of current policies and
planning. Completely new policies and major re-
visions in planning may appear to be urgently
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required. In such cases, appropriate recommenda-
tions, carefully documented and substantiated,
should be prepared for forwarding to the action
agencies concerned. The decision as to the proper
action agency and other interested agencies which
should receive the intelligence product leads to
dissemination, the third phase of the cycle.
AN ILLUSTRATION OF PROCESSING
Some of the functions of processing and prob-
lems faced by intelligence personnel may be better
understood when applied to a specific intelligence
situation. For purposes of simplification, the sit-
uation selected for discussion is one which con-
fronted a Norwegian intelligence activity located
in neutral Sweden during World War II.
Through close liaison with the underground
organization in occupied Norway, a wealth of in-
formation was received concerning the activities
of German submarines operating out of the huge
concrete pens at Bergen and Trondheim. The
underground found it extremely difficult to over-
come the stringent security measures effected at
these installations and only on rare occasions did
opportunity arise for close observation. The Ger-
mans, however, sometimes employed Norwegian
laborers to carry supplies on board U-boats out-
fitting in "Dora," the pens at Trondheim. One of
these laborers was a loyal patriot who faithfully
reported his observations to representatives of the
underground. No loitering was allowed any of
the workers around the pens, and certainly a man
bent over with a heavy sack on his back is not in
the best position for observation. Besides, he had
no knowledge of submarines and was unable to
identify technical equipment. Nevertheless, his
reports were carefully scrutinized when they
reached Sweden. One of them contained a
puzzling bit of information. In the course of a
rather garrulous account of his movements while
carrying boxes and sacks of supplies from the
warehouse to the U-boat, the observer mentioned
that he had to step over a "riir" lying on the deck.
What was this "riir" ? The Norwegian word
means "pipe" and is used to describe many kinds
of structural tubes. What was its diameter,
length, of what material was it made? Was it a
water pipe, a wire conduit, a new periscope?
Could a sketch of it be supplied? Back to Trond-
255
heim went a request for more information. In
about a week a reply was received, accompanied
by a very crude sketch. The sketch was of little
value; it revealed no detail and was not drawn to
scale. The supplementary information was some-
what more helpful, although the observer did not
really get a good look at the pipe because there
were too many German sailors standing around it.
As he recalled, the part of the pipe he stepped
over was about two feet in diameter. No, he didn't
think it was a periscope. He couldn't tell what
material it was made from since it was painted
the same color as the rest of the U-boat. It was
lying just forward of the conning tower. That
was about all he could remember.
How could these meager facts be evaluated and
interpreted? The source was certainly authentic.
Trustworthy? Yes, that too, for he was motivated
by patriotic desire to aid his country's cause, and
was completely vouched for by the underground.
Competent? Unfortunately not. He was one of
the unusual Norwegians who had never been to
sea, nor had he ever worked as a stevedore or any-
where around a dock area. He had worked all his
life with his hands, but had never operated ma-
chinery of any kind. He also doubted that he
would get another work assignment in "Dora,"
since his gang had been transferred to another
part of the city for road repair.
To what further tests could the information
be subjected. There was no possibility of con-
firmation by other sources available to the under-
ground. Was it coherent, or credible in the light
of existing information? The U-boat had been
positively identified by coast-watchers, and the
names of the commander and many of the crew
were known. It had been in the pen twenty days,
long enough for minor repairs and installation of
new equipment. Were the pens capable of making
new equipment? No, everything came from Ger-
many, but installation could be made either by
the U-boat's crew or by certain German tech-
nicians employed at the pen. Consultation with
a refugee Norwegian naval officer, who had once
been a submariner, brought no new leads or
suggestions.
At this point there was not much to analyze, or
interpret. Yet anything new on U-boats and their
operations had a high intelligence priority and
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INTELLIGENCE FOR
was eagerly scrutinized by the Allied intelligence
agencies in London. Perhaps the pipe would
mean something to a staff expert on submarines.
Accordingly the information was sent to London.
An immediate reply was received, directing that
every effort should be made to continue the obser-
vations at "Dora," and to note especially the pres-
ence of similar "pipes" on other U-boats.
The Norwegian underground renewed attempts
to penetrate the pens at both Trondheim and Ber-
gen, but several weeks passed without result. Ger-
man vigilance had not been relaxed.
Then came a report from the Admiralty that a
damaged U-boat had been captured in the North
Sea. It was equipped with snorkel. The mystery
of the "r6r" was solved. It was a logical inference
that U-boats were being equipped with snorkels at
bases in Norway. Full description and accurate
drawings were now available and coast-watchers
henceforth could identify snorkel on U-boats pass-
ing through Norwegian fjords. Strategic and
tactical planners had to cope with a new U-boat
capability.
The incident was certainly not a triumph for
intelligence, as far as its forewarning function is
concerned. It could have been if the "rOr" had
been seen by a competent observer. It does illus-
trate, however, typical frustrations in the collect-
ing and processing of information. Little things
have significance only when they are correctly
interpreted.
PERSONNEL FOR PROCESSING
Any discussion of the functions of processing
quickly reveals the requirements for a highly com-
petent and skilled staff of personnel, both military
and civilian. The experiences of intelligence
agencies during World War II emphasized above
all the need for personnel possessed of the peculiar
talents required in processing information into a
product of real value and use. It must be re-em-
phasized that not just any officer can be assigned
to an intelligence processing billet and expected to
produce satisfactorily. In an age of specializa-
tion in so many fields of endeavor, Intelligence
has of necessity also become a specialized activity.
However, particular training is not alone suffici-
ent; selected personnel must have capability and
adaptability for this particular activity. This is
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NAVAL OFFICERS
equally true for civilian personnel, so that their
selection involves much more than a consideration
of paper qualifications. Since mental capabilities
must be demonstrated, flexibility in the assignment
of personnel is essential.
Acquirable qualifications for analysis include a
college education, preferably with experience in
research methodology; demonstrated ability to
write; experience in intelligence activity, includ-
ing knowledge of intelligence functions and re-
sponsibilities; and, whenever possible, a working
knowledge of the particular language of the area
of interest to which assigned, as well as travel or
residence withi:n that area.
In addition to training and experience, the qual-
ities of the analytical mind are indispensable.
These qualities include objectivity of approach,
an enthusiasm in the painstaking search for perti-
nent data, and a capacity for developing relation-
ships between facts. Imagination, a sensitivity
to implications, and a positive reaction to subtle
changes are mental qualities which must be applied
to the problems of processing. Common sense and
a practical realization of the pressing requirements
of intelligence production are significant temper-
ing factors.
Analysts can seldom live in worlds of their own.
As integral personalities of the processing unit
they must work in the full spirit of cooperation so
that the intelligence product can be the result of
the integration of varied points of view. Over-
all harmony cif effort can come only out of indi-
vidual adaptability to and consideration of the
interests of coworkers. Self-restraint in spite of
tension and stress can do much to assure orderly
and effective activity when the time element im-
poses heavy pressures. Above all, the analyst
must have a balanced point of view and a well-
grounded sense of values; the processing unit is no
place for the extremist. Finally, he must be con-
vinced of the importance of intelligence produc-
tion and clearly appreciate the relative significance
of his own contribution.
The answer, then, to good processing is not
merely organizational structure, important as
organization and sound administration are for any
group; rather, it is the quality of personnel who
make up the structure. The simple fact is that
the quality of intelligence produced is directly
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proportionate to the quality of the individuals who
produce it.
TECHNIQUES AND AIDS
In connection with processing, two points should
be re-emphasized. First, the transforming of in-
formation into intelligence requires a high degree
of professional competency, judgment, and ex-
perience if the results are to be consistently worth-
while. Second, the functions of processing can-
not be systematized into a series of assembly-line
procedures. However, because of the quantities
of information involved, various techniques and
aids are commonly used by means of which infor-
mation can be acquired, extracted, indexed, and
compiled on a logical, systematic basis. These
techniques and aids are of material assistance to
the various functions of processing in more nearly
assuring their completeness, accuracy, and time-
liness.
The following techniques and aids can be help-
ful, although their utilization will vary according
to the requirements of a particular analyst: liaison
with sources, including records of performance;
files and file controls; situation maps, charts,
graphs, and statistical tables; and periodic digests.
The sources of an analyst's information are vital
in connection with evaluation and further collec-
tion as required. Liaison with these sources may
be accomplished by personal interview and by the
written exchange of comments, suggestions, and
analyses regarding information which has been
transmitted. Any means by which the most cor-
dial and sympathetic relationships can be estab-
lished and maintained with the sources of informa-
tion and with transmitting agencies will prove
valuable. As has already been suggested, source
identification and performance records, when it is
possible to keep them, can be helpful both to the
processor and to the collector.
Files
Card files are generally used by analysts for
day-to-day working purposes. They are a prac-
tical means of recording extracted pertinent data
from lengthy reports or more bulky written mat-
ter and for the easy assembling and arranging of
relevant facts in whatever logical manner the topic
under consideration suggests. On one card may
269196-54 18
257
be listed the chronological developments of a par-
ticular topic, so that a current situation can be
noted almost at a glance. A separate card for
each source may be used for the recording of in-
formation received on the same topic, so that ready
comparison can be made at any time. Card files
permit the subdividing of subject matter into its
smallest possible elements thus facilitating a num-
ber of the processing functions.
Reference files contain the correspondence,
reports, and more bulky written matter from
which card files are prepared. In the use of ref-
erence files, selectivity and good judgment on the
part of the analyst are required. While the loca-
tion of these files is not of major importance, it is
imperative that their contents be readily available.
Availability necessitates rigid controls.
Control of Files
The control system for any files depends in large
part on their size; if small, they are usually
organized on the basis of subject; if large, on the
basis of numerical designations, supported by a
card catalogue guide. When files are organized
by subject, particularly in the case of intelligence
card files, they are often subdivided according to
names of individuals, organizations, places, situ-
ations, and trends.
Controls are greatly strengthened by the cen-
tralization of files and the most exacting cross-
ref erencing of subject matter. When several
separate units retain reference material indefi-
nitely, the very fact of its existence may not re-
main known to all who have an interest in it, and
its transfer from one unit to another may become
haphazard or result in loss or at least uncertainty
of location. Centralized control increases avail-
ability as well as security. Cross-referencing is
a means of increasing the possibility of locating
reference material, regardless of the way in which
it is requested. For example, information about
a person will logically be filed under his name.
In addition, cross-reference cards or forms may
be filed under his country of residence, occupation,
military unit, or the incident or incidents in which
he has been involved. In this manner, the analyst
is likely to obtain all relevant information con-
cerning the topic with which he is working. Also,
pertinent data is less likely to be overlooked.
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Filing systems are established for purposes of
uniformity. They must meet the needs of the
units they are designed to serve. For United
States intelligence agencies, the Intelligence File
Index, called IFI, has been created and is in use.
It is a decimal filing system which includes a four-
digit number for each basic element of subject
matter and uses up to four decimal places for the
additional subdivision of each element. For
example, the 4000's are set aside for economic
matters; within the 4000 block, the 4200's are used
for fuels, metals and minerals; 4203 is petroleum;
and 4203-0408 refers to the production of syn-
thetic oil. When reports are received, the
analyst is expected to attach a sheet on which he
enters the appropriate IFI numbers. The report
and attached sheet then go to the filing unit where
all reports pertaining to the same subject are listed
on a master control sheet, according to the
assigned numbers.
Maintaining Files
Obviously, the maintaining of files will vary
according to the size and location of an intelli-
gence processing unit. Needs, working habits,
and physical facilities are not uniform. A unit
consisting of one officer and an enlisted man will
of necessity vary its procedures from one which
includes a larger group at the theater or depart-
mental level. However, a carefully planned file
system to meet the needs of the particular situa-
tion is required if intelligence production is to be
carried out efficiently and effectively. The follow-
ing practical suggestions will apply to a variety
of conditions.
The basic purpose of files is the full utilization
of available data. Reference files should group
individual pieces of information under general
topic headings. This may seem too obvious to
require elaboration, but the fact remains that the
average person does not know how to develop good
files with adequate cross referencing, and every
intelligence activity acquires extensive collections
of facts and data. The intelligence officer must
be able to locate precise information when it is
needed. One requirement is the orderly arrange-
ment of books in a reference library.
A logical way to proceed is to survey the physi-
cal facilities available in the form of file cabinets,
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258
card files, map and chart cabinets, and safes in
which to stow classified reports. Within the prac-
tical limits of time and space available, the intelli-
gence officer should review the missions of his
commander, particularly with respect to the geo-
graphical areas in which he is likely to operate,
and then plan hs files to meet his needs in a simple
and logical manner. In order to be prepared for
the great variety of requests for information that
will be directed to him, he must review his filing
needs with some imagination and insight.
Mere filing of information by an intelligence
officer is not enough. He must be familiar with
the contents of the file, and this can be attained
only by occasional review. He should not put too
much reliance on his ability to remember details
with unfailing accuracy. The best of cross refer-
ence systems have their limitations. Either they
tend to be incomplete or it takes too much time to
compile them. Finding the right balance between
cross indexing and an actual review of the whole
file from time to time is a matter of experience.
The clerical chore of filing may be left to office
assistants to a certain extent, but no intelligence
officer can afford to develop such an executive com-
plex that he is not intimately familiar not only
with the filing plan he creates, but also with the
actual filing that is done. An office that collapses
in the absence of the filing yeoman has no place in
intelligence activity.
The mechanics of filing also merit attention.
Manila folders or large envelopes with clearly
printed labels will prove most satisfactory.
Dividers separating groups of folders or envelopes
under more general topics are also helpful. When
special logs, card files, or charts are compiled, they
should be designed with real forethought to com-
bine logical entry of information from source with
maximum convenience in later use. Kardex files
are frequently a help, and in large archives micro-
films and film readers are a definite advantage.
Incoming publications and, reports should be
handled by a routine entry in a log with appro-
priate notation to indicate routing and final dis-
position. If a general subject index is maintained,
the new card should be made out promptly and
the file number marked on the material.
When material is loaned for outside use, normal
military practice, in accordance with security reg-
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ulations, requires custody cards and receipts. It
is suggested, however, that a card or note inserted
in the file itself will be an additional reminder of
missing material to the individual using the files.
The intelligence officer should use his imagina-
tion and good sense in planning his files, remem-
bering that orderliness and system pay very real
dividends. In operational intelligence the use of
special recording forms has been found to be ad-
visable. These will be discussed in the chapter on
Intelligence Staff Procedures.
Other Aids
Visual aids such as situation maps, charts,
graphs, and statistical tables often provide the
best means for comparing and interpreting cer-
tain types of information. Situation maps are
adapted to the study of relationships between ship
and troop location and movement, attacks, logistics
supply, production facilities, and population dis-
tribution. The influence of geographic and time
and space factors on a current situation may be-
come more apparent as the result of the use of
area maps on which appropriate information has
been plotted. By such methods, enemy capabili-
ties and limitations may be further clarified.
Charts, graphs, and tables are of assistance in
the compiling and comparing of information re-
lating to economic and sociological intelligence.
Periodic digests may be prepared in order to
summarize information for which the chronologi-
cal sequence of events is important. They are also
helpful in considering subject matter, such as
political events, which requires more detailed data
than could be easily included within a manageable
series of cards.
Mechanical Brains and Punch Cards
New technological developments are effecting
every type of warfare and even the processing of
intelligence. Some involve the techniques of
cybernetics, the use of so-called "mechanical
brains." In simple forms, electric calculating ma-
chines are standard in most offices, and punch card
tabulating and printing machines are used wher-
ever statistical needs develop on a large scale.
They produce raw census data, trade statistics, and
many industrial records. In the military field they
259
are used for personnel records, accounting, inven-
tory, and procurement purposes.
Since intelligence processing may involve the
combination, matching, and tabulation of literally
millions of quantitative facts, the punch card and
the machines which use it are familiar to central
offices such as ONI or large theater intelligence
centers.
More recent is the rapid development of elec-
tronic machines of both analogue and digital types
for solving involved problems. They are playing
an important role in military research in ballistics,
aerodynamics, and related fields, and operationally
they do the computing required by modern guns in
tracking targets and controlling fire. As these
machines become physically smaller, additional
uses will be found for them in the field. On an
experimental basis they are already being used in
solving problems of strategy. Intelligence agen-
cies will have the responsibility of supplying quan-
titative data in the tremendous detail needed for
meaningful results. The "mechanical brains" can
take raw information on enemy capabilities and
vulnerabilities, compare it with similar data on
our own forces, and statistically produce the
answers that will determine the best courses of
action to pursue. They can measure in concrete
terms whether we should concentrate on strategic
air attacks on the enemy's basic industry, or
whether our targets should be military installa-
tions, harbors, or merchant shipping. The ma-
chines can accomplish in minutes what men could
do only in months, but the machine cannot give
an answer better than the quality of the raw data
fed into it. Therefore, the successful application
of these advanced techniques will be in no small
measure due to good information. An increasing
number of intelligence officers must become aware
of the potential services the "mechanical brains"
can render.
OPERATIONS RESEARCH
A particular application of intelligence is in
operations research which represents a blending of
intelligence processing and intelligence use. The
mechanical brains and punch cards, briefly de-
scribed above, need a guiding set of principles if
maximum results are to be obtained from them.
Some of these principles are discussed in a work
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by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern,
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, first
published in 1944. The theory of games has led
to the development of mathematical theories of
strategy under the exploitation of the three mili-
tary services. This is not as strange as it seems,
for the relationships in playing games, in business,
and in war have certain similarities. The intel-
ligence significance of these studies is apparent in
the quotation: "Von Neumann's theory suggests
that the seeking of information is central to the
nature of strategy." (Fortune "A Theory of
Strategy," June 1949 p. 104.) Military applica-
tions of these principles were begun by ASWORG
(Anti-Submarine Warfare Operations Research
Group) and have continued to be used in other
problems. Some of the first naval applications
involved the problems of the pilot of an ASW
aircraft in choosing a tracking and search pattern
to maximize the likelihood of locating the
submarine.
Among the several agencies engaged in oper-
ations research, the most unique is the Rand Cor-
poration. The story of its creation and function
has been admirably told in an article by John
McDonald entitled "The War of Wits", published
in Fortune magazine, March 1951, portions of
which are quoted below:
Rand is a creation of the United States Air
Force. It is not, however, a government
agency. It is an independent, non-profit or-
ganization, similar in some respects to a
foundation but without exact precedent; and
it has numerous consultants and subcontrac-
tors in universities and industries. Its prin-
cipal business is long-range, scientific, mili-
tary research, designed to aid Air Force
decisions. Modern science and modern mili-
tary art are joined here in a program of brain-
work that may have considerable bearing on
the security of the United States.
Mr. McDonald continues with an indication of
the wide range of the Air Force problems being
considered by the Rand Corporation: A-bomb de-
fense, A-bomb delivery, tactical operations, and
logistics. Many of these studies are significant
not only to the Air Force, but also have the most
vital implications for the entire defense establish-
ment and the nation, since they have as a govern-
ing concept the preservation of national wealth
and resources. Rand's view is that "the cheapest
CONFIDENTIAL 260
way to win a war is not to have to fight one."
The staff of this remarkable organization is as
varied as the tasks they undertake. It is com-
posed of nuclear physicists, electronic experts, air-
craft and guided missile experts, students of lo-
gistics, political scientists, economists, sociologists,
psychologists, astronomers, and mathematicians.
Further quotations from the article cited above
are equally informative:
Rand's social scientists are making a study
of, among other things, Soviet Russia's in-
terests, aims, and values, her -political and
social structure, and her proba-Ole scientific,
technical, and industrial capabilities at vari-
ous future dates; in sum, her total war poten-
tial?for the purpose in part of comparing
these observations with the character and
capabilities of the United States and its allies.
But the era has passed when the techno-
logical improvements of gadgets is the only
scientific problem of warfare. Science and
technology are continuously coming up with
so many and such complicated military de-
vices that even a nation as rich and advanced
as the United States cannot afford, in terms
of money, manpower, or available engineering
effort, to develop all of them to their technical
limits and produce them in significant num-
bers (this goes for the enemy too).
Given a budget the Air Force allocates its
resources among various activities (offense,
defense, tactical air, etc.) to perform its over-
all mission in the best possible way. But in
the pursuit of this mission it does not choose
the grand strategy; its own Strategic Air
Command is responsible directly to the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, and the button is on the desk
of the Commander-in-Chief in Blair House.
(This was written during renovation of the
White House.) It cannot always choose its
targets (as between, say, military installa-
tions, industry, and cities) ; nor its weapons,
for weapons, too, are political. This was true
even before the decision to drop the first A-
bomb, and has been even more decisively the
case since then. Similarly the Air Force has
to consider the intentions as well as the capa-
bilities of an enemy, since intentions affect
the determination of when he will use what,
and the question whether he will use certain
capabilities at all.
Rand, therefore, studies the social and po-
litical framework in which the big strategical
decisions are made, along with the more
strictly scientific agenda. The bulk of its
work, however, is concerned with the alloca-
tion of resources. . . .
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In the Rand analysis the target's resistance
is defined by bracketing the enemy's expected
capabilities at a specific time era in the future.
The order of attack is set up against the ene-
my's assumed order of battle. The enemy's
deployment is an intelligence problem. The
enemy is assumed to be rational, with no holes
left uncovered in his apportionment of de-
fenses to targets?the "no soft spot" theory,
which is derived from the von Neumann-
Morgenstern theory of games. Rand math-
ematicians have extended the development of
game theory as a new and challenging doc-
trine of military decision. From the solution
of this first relatively simple bomber problem
emerged Rand's principal research technique
known in the shop as "systems analysis."
There is more to offense and defense sys-
tems, however, than allocation of resources
and specifications of weapons. The payoff of
a strategic bombing force is what the bombs
do to an enemy?particularly the will and
ability to wage war, through physical, eco-
nomic, political, and psychological effects.
Strategic bombing, for example, has a strong
influence on the attitude of enemy popula-
tions?equal perhaps to the impact of our war
aims. What then should be our policy on
enemy people and their leaders? Should we
undertake a warning system for enemy popu-
lations? What does a 90 percent target
knockout mean in terms of productivity?
Facts gathered by intelligence agencies are
not of much use without a guiding concept
with which to separate the relevant from the
irrelevant. Designers of bombing systems
thus have to take into account social problems
along with the physical problems presented
by nature.
With such broad and varied questions in
mind, Rand studies Soviet Russia, her inten-
tions and capabilities. It is common knowl-
edge that the United States industrial and
general war potential is superior to Soviet
Russia's at this time. But are they catching
up? Does the Politburo have freedom of
choice, flexibility, random behavior? What
is its pattern of political behavior? How
does the ordinary Communist have to think to
translate doctrine into action? When attack?
When retreat? When sound hostile? When
friendly ? One of Rand's contributions is a
codification of principles of action underly-
ing the Politburo's calculations, made as a step
toward predicting what it is likely to do.
This type of operations research, then, is just a
variation on intelligence processing in general,
261
though brought to a high level of achievement for
the specialized tasks assigned to the Corporation.
CONTRACT STUDIES: THE FLYING SAUCER
Rand Corporation is only one of many private
agencies that perform specialized studies for the
armed forces. Large contracts in many fields of
investigation have been made by all three services,
though by no means do all relate so directly to
intelligence matters. One particular project
which illustrates many of the problems of process-
ing, and which also involved contracts for anal-
ysis by a number of outside agencies, was the well
publicized flying saucer mystery. Kenneth Ar-
nold on 24 June 1947, claimed to have seen some
mysterious disks cavorting over the Cascade
Mountains. Within a few days saucer reports
poured over the news wires from all parts of the
country. Witnesses in time included military
pilots, weather observers, police, astronomers, and
many ordinary citizens. That summer there were
many wild rumors and quite contradictory reports
on the saucers. Despite all official denials the be-
lief persisted that the saucers were real, whoever
controlled them.
On 7 January 1948, at Godman Field, Ky., a
mysterious object was sighted in the sky by control
tower personnel. Captain Thomas Mantell who
was in the air in an F-51 gave chase, and the re-
mains of his plane were found crashed to earth.
On 22 January 1948, the Air Force set up a re-
search project on these sightings at the Air
Materiel Command, Wright Field. Astrophys-
icist Joseph Hynek, and the Rand Corporation
among others, went to work to study the reports.
Eastern Air Lines pilots, Clarence S. Chiles and
John B. Whitted, flying a DC3 on 23 July 1948,
west of Montgomery, Alabama, had a brief look
at a mysterious wingless, cigar-shaped craft which
had two rows of blue glowing ports and an orange-
red flame projecting from the tail.
On 1 October 1948, Lieut. George Gorman at
Fargo, N. Dak., chased a mysterious maneuverable
light in his F-51. These gyrations of plane and
light were watched from the ground.
Another of the more interesting cases was that
made public on his own responsibility by Comdr.
R. B. McLaughlin of the White Sands Proving
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Ground. His report of a sighting on 6 April 1948,
claimed a saucer 105 feet in diameter some 56 miles
up had been tracked by theodolites at 18,000 miles
per hour. There were also 2 smaller objects about
20 inches in diameter that maneuvered around a
fast-moving Navy missile, then passed it and
disappeared.
In 1950, 1951, and 1952, there were additional
flurries of reports. \ An Air Force release in 1949
admitted that 375 sightings had been investigated
up to that time. The count by more recent esti-
mates is not available.
What evaluation can be made of all these re-
ports? The first step was to interview those who
thought they had observed saucers in order to sort
the first hand reports from rumors and distorted
accounts. The observations were then analyzed
to discover any patterns of similarity. Agencies
responsible for operations that might be confused
with saucers reviewed all cases to eliminate easily
accounted for phenomena. The contract groups
and other agencies reviewed all remaining cases
to see whether natural phenomena, astronomical
or meteorological, or subjective reporting could
account for what was seen.
Large numbers of sightings could be explained
as weather balloons, Navy cosmic ray research bal-
loons, meteors and fireballs, lightning, light re-
flected from distant aircraft, and occasionally as
the planet Venus. Some cases were a result of
hallucination, hoax, or hysteria. To some analysts
there seemed to remain a hard core for which no
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262
definite cause could be assigned positively, al-
though plausible explanations could be offered.
Certain deductions could also be offered. If there
were real saucers and they represented a secret
weapon of either the United States or Russia, they
were exposed to possible compromise by appearing
in so many parts of the world with reckless dis-
regard for safety of cities, normal air traffic, or
security measures. Further, their reported speeds
and turning ability would indicate new propul-
sion and guidance systems far superior to those
all world powers are spending billions to develop.
Could they be from outer space? Although that
possibility does exist, certain probabilities must
be considered. Only Mars offers prospects of life
similar to that on Earth and its rarified atmos-
phere and extremes of temperature would seem to
militate against an environment that allows the
development of higher life forms. Other stars
may be postulated to have planets, but the im-
mense distances would reduce statistically the
chance of our being visited. If a superior civili-
zation were spying out the earth, it would be odd
that it would disclose its presence so many times
without making contact.
The flying saucer mystery must be left for the
present as one of those tantalizing enigmas of life
that will be discussed for a long time to come.
This brief account by no means answers the many
questions about the saucers, but it does illustrate
the many possibilities for evaluation and analysis
of this type of information.
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CHAPTER 11
THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE: DISSEMINATION
Dissemination is an essential phase of intelli-
gence activity. Every officer who receives intel-
ligence matter and passes it on, either for further
processing or for the immediate use of strategic
planners and operational commanders, partici-
pates in its operation. It is continuous through-
out the life of any essential element of information,
beginning when the collector forwards his report,
moving up, down, and laterally in a chain of com-
mand or processing agency, and coming to rest
only after use by each recipient for whom it has
value.
Two critical factors in the dissemination phase
of the cycle are: First, the selection of the appro-
priate action agency and other interested agencies
which should receive the intelligence product; and
second, the speed with which the product is trans-
mitted, as conditioned by requirements of urgency
and security.
There is no greater handicap to the intelligence
function than inadequate dissemination. Intelli-
gence material should never be relegated to an
inactive file until it has been seen by all to whom
it may be of conceivable interest. The officer re-
sponsible for routing has the initial responsibility
of designating action, information, and retention
addressees, but as the material passes from person
to person, in accordance with the security regula-
tions governing its distribution, the responsibility
is shared by each recipient.
The time interval between the interpretation of
information and its receipt by the potential user
may, in itself, determine the worthwhileness of
the total effort of intelligence production. Even
more, this factor of time may have a direct and
vital bearing on matters affecting the security and
welfare of the United States.
The dissemination responsibilities of the intelli-
gence officer are therefore concentrated in the exer-
cise of judgment in determining who needs to
know, how soon he should know, and by what
means and in what form it should reach him in
order to be most usable. These questions consti-
tute the problems of dissemination.
DETERMINATION OF RECIPIENT
Effective dissemination requires not only a com-
plete awareness of the significance of the informa-
tion or intelligence, but also a knowledge of the
specific mission of organizational units. On a
small staff the intelligence officer is well aware of
the commander's mission and the plan of opera-
tions, and is also cognizant of incoming informa-
tion, the processing required to convert it to usable
intelligence, and the particular needs of each staff
planner and unit commander. Dissemination in
such a situation is much easier than on larger
staffs, such as that of a theater command, an in-
telligence center, or in the Office of Naval Intel-
ligence. In large organizations the responsibility
for dissemination should rest with the officer
supervising evaluation and interpretation, for he
first becomes aware of the finished product.
Check Lists
Check lists of commands normally receiving
each type of intelligence are indispensable aids in
effecting complete dissemination. The lists should
be flexible; that is, by frequent revision they should
be expanded or reduced as changes in situation
demand. Thus they are always kept up to date,
and commands will not continue to receive intelli-
gence for which they no longer have need or on
subjects in which they have no further interest.
Operational Dissemination
The tremendous dissemination task of an intelli-
gence unit preceding an amphibious operation is
well illustrated by the activities of the intelligence
officers attached to CornPhibsPac, Commander of
the Joint Expeditionary Force which was to land
on Okinawa in April 1945.
A preliminary distribution of basic information,
consisting of terrain studies, maps, charts, beach
sketches, identification sheets, and miscellaneous
bulletins, was made to all staffs and ships involved
in the operation 4 months before it was to take
place. This material, the product of months of
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research and additional collection, contained most
of the accumulated strategic intelligence received
up to that time, and was intended to assist the in-
telligence officers of the various staffs and ships
in preparing their individual intelligence esti-
mates, and to be used for background information
in the acquiring of additional intelligence.
The final distribution of intelligence material
from the ComPhibsPac Intelligence Section was
forwarded from Pearl Harbor on 23 February
1945, and included all intelligence developed from
the sources described previously. This distribu-
tion was a difficult problem. It was essential
that every vessel engaged in the Okinawa opera-
tion, and those that might possibly become in-
volved, receive an adequate supply of maps, charts,
photos, and all other prepared written matter.
These included not only the strictly amphibious
vessels but all the gunfire support ships, the com-
ponents of the carrier task forces, and other ves-
sels that might be designated to assist in bombard-
ment or transport of troops as reinforcements.
The assigned vessels were staged at seven different
bases throughout the Western Pacific and some
were almost constantly at sea. Experience had
clearly demonstrated that distribution by the
echelon system was unsatisfactory, for many ships
had complained of not receiving packages or of
having received them months after they were
mailed. Therefore, arrangements were made to
fly the material by special R5D planes to the vari-
ous staging areas. One intelligence officer from
the ComPhibsPac personally made the distribu-
tion at each staging area. He had complete lists
of the ships and staffs involved, was in constant
touch with ComPhibsPac, and thus was able to
make corrections as changes took place. The
officer was also supplied with a number of addi-
tional packages for distribution to ships which
might be assigned at a later date. This system
operated satisfactorily, although there were ap-
proximately 1,340 vessels and staffs engaged in the
operation. All commands received an adequate
supply of intelligence material.
With proper security provisions and detailed
instructions, copies were forwarded to port direc-
tors, island commanders, and a few other impor-
tant commands for possible later distribution to
reserve units and ships assigned at the last moment
CONFIDENTIAL 264
because of unforeseen emergencies. A large sup-
ply of extra copies was furnished to the amphib-
ious group intelligence officers for emergency dis-
tribution. Previous experience had indicated that
there always were unforeseen requests for intelli-
gence material, and these emergency measures
enabled all participating units to obtain the needed
intelligence regardless of the date or location when
they received orders to proceed to the objective.
TIMELINESS
Timeliness in distribution of information and
intelligence is vital to the efficient functioning of
every intelligence agency. Its attainment, of
course, will be controlled to a certain degree by
the means of dissemination available and the secu-
rity classification of the subject matter. Naval
Regulations stipulate that telecommunications
should never be used when mail and messenger
services will serve the purpose. The spirit of this
general rule can be followed in the dissemination
of intelligence, for certainly all intelligence mate-
rial is not of sufficient urgency to require trans--
mission by radio, and often its length or bulk pre-
eludes the use of sitch means. Discrimination and
judgment must therefore be applied by the intelli-
gence officer in all matters affecting the speed of
dissemination. He needs a working knowledge of
the naval communications system.
Often the collector in both foreign and domestic
fields will not have United States naval commu-
nication facilities available. In such circum-
stances his knowledge of other means available
should be equally thorough. An attache, for
example, should know the best procedures for for-
warding all types of reports, including commer-
cial radio and telegraph, postal services, and the
schedules of State Department couriers. Classi-
fied information, of course, is never entrusted to
foreign mail systems, but commercial radio in
foreign countries may be used for the transmis-
tion of encrypted messages.
Naval Telecommunications for Dissemination
An intelligence officer with the Fleet will receive
and disseminate a great portion of his intelligence
material by radio. He must understand the de-
livery characteristics of each type of communica-
tions and the effect of the various degrees of pre-
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cedence. The communications channel used must
be suitable for reaching the addressees within the
time required and in accordance with security
regulations governing the handling of the subject
matter of the message. In all such matters, of
course, the expert advice of the communications
officer should be solicited and his recommendations
followed.
For any given operation, the Communications
Plan, usually an annex to the Operation Plan or
Order, allocates radio frequencies in accordance
with fleet frequency plans. Frequencies are allo-
cated for particular uses; for example, there will
be one or more for reporting enemy contacts, for
shore fire-control parties, for CAP aircraft, etc.
The Communications Plan also prescribes control-
ling publications, effective date and time zones,
crypto-systems to be used, and the procedures for
radio telephone messages, visual communications,
recognition, identification and authenticity, radio
and radar countermeasures and deception, and the
conditions of radio and radar silence.
Message Precedence
Once the intelligence officer is convinced that a
particular item of intelligence must be transmitted
by radio message, he must also decide which degree
of precedence is required. Precedence establishes
the order for the handling and delivery of mes-
sages. It should be determined by the subject
matter and the time factor involved. There are
currently six degrees of precedence:
(1) FLASH is reserved for enemy contact reports
or reports designed to prevent imminent
conflict between friendly forces.
(2) EMERGENCY is used for amplifying reports
and operational messages of high priority;
e. g., attack orders, warnings of enemy
attack.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE is used for opera-
tional messages, i. e., those that will or may
affect movements of ships, aircraft or
ground forces within 48 hours, except ordi-
nary movement reports which cannot be
classified as urgent; e. g., Operation Orders,
aircraft movement reports, changes in
tactical disposition.
PRIORITY is the highest precedence that can
be given to administrative (non-opera-
(3)
(4)
265
(5)
(6)
tional) traffic; e. g., troop or ship move-
ments (non-tactical), flight plans, move-
ment of supplies.
ROUTINE.
DEFERRED means that delivery can be de-
layed until the beginning of office hours
following the day when filed.
To specify high precedence when a lower degree
is sufficient destroys the value of precedence, tends
to demoralize communications, and frequently
delays messages of great urgency. In one case
during World War II an operational priority
message from COMINCH to the commander of a
task force in the Atlantic was delayed 61/2 hours
and finally was received too late to serve its pur-
pose. Investigation revealed that there had been
110 other operational priority messages waiting
to be transmitted on the Fox schedule that after-
noon. Scarcely a dozen were of sufficient urgency
to justify the precedence which they carried.
An Army experience further illustrates the ex-
tremes to which misuse of precedence can go. A
staff headquarters received a priority message
addressed to two officers who could not be located,
so a message was sent to the originator requesting
instructions for delivery. The reply explained:
"The two officers are on their way and will arrive
in a couple of days."
High precedence is not necessarily the best way
to get prompt action. Precedence is a guide for
communications personnel, not for addressees. It
is better to ask in the text for prompt action rather
than to use precedence in such a way as to delay
messages of greater urgency.
Reproduction
The timely dissemination of certain types of in-
telligence material to multiple addresses will often
depend on the facilities an intelligence agency has
available for reproducing it in quantity. Such
requirements should be anticipated, and the
agency should provide itself with the necessary
reproduction machines together with personnel
trained in their operation. Mimeographs, multi-
liths, or contact printers are indispensable aids
in intelligence centers, and even small units in the
field will find frequent use of portable machines
of this type.
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CLASSIFICATION
A discussion of adequate and timely dissemina-
tion cannot proceed very far before meeting the
problem of classification. Although marking
classified information and material Top Secret,
Secret, or Confidential, will insure safeguarding
consistent with its content, the misapplication
of classification can also be a definite handicap to
proper dissemination. It will be well here to
review the principles of classification as set forth
in the United States Navy Security Manual for
Classified Matter particularly in respect to their
application in intelligence activity.
Top Secret
In the Top Secret category, the security aspect
is paramount, and unauthorized disclosure could
cause exceptionally grave damage to the nation,
such as initiation of war against the United States
by a foreign government, defeat of planned war
operations, and loss of a scientific or technical
advantage which would materially affect the
course or outcome of a war.
The following items of military information are
hence graded Top Secret:
1. War plans and plans or particulars of future
major or special war operations, and related
dispositions of our forces.
2. Intelligence documents (and information
therein) which reveal a major intelligence
effort on the part of the United States and
from which unauthorized recipients would
be able to evaluate the capabilities of our
intelligence services.
3. Critical information of radically new and
extremely important equipment or other mu-
nitions of war.
4. Information primarily political or economic
which contains implications comparable to
items 1, 2, and 3.
Secret
Classified as Secret are information and mate-
rial whose unauthorized disclosure could result in
serious damage to the nation, injure national inter-
ests or prestige, or would be of great advantage
to a foreign nation.
The following items are examples:
1. Particulars of operations in progress or
planned.
CONFIDENTIAL
266
2. Instructions regarding the employment of
important new munitions of war, including
scientific and technical developments.
3. Important improvements to existing muni-
tions of war under development.
4. Information of enemy or potential enemy
material or other material, procedure, dis-
positions, and activities, whose value de-
pends upon concealing the fact that we pos-
sess it.
5. Reports of operations containing informa-
tion of vital interest to the enemy.
6. Vital military information on important
defenses.
7. Adverse reports on general morale affecting
major operations.
8. Communications intelligence information,
including security devices.
9. Certain new or specialized techniques or
methods to be used in future operations, and
the identity and composition of units which
will employ them.
10. Information concerning strength of troops,
air and naval forces, identity and composi-
tion of units, or quantity of specific items
of equipment in active theaters of operation.
11. Photographs, negatives, photostats, dia-
grams, or models of Secret matter.
12. Certain compilations of data or items which
in the aggregate warrant the higher classi-
fication, although individual items may be
classified Confidential or lower.
Confidential
The Confidential category is used for informa-
tion or material the unauthorized disclosure of
which could be prejudicial to the defense interests
of the nation.
Examples include:
1. Matters, investigations, and documents of a
counterintelligence nature, or matters whose
disclosure would adversely affect morale.
2. Routine operational and battle reports
which contain information of value to the
enemy but are not of vital interest to him.
3. Routine intelligence reports.
4. Military radio frequency allocations of spe-
cial significance, or those which are fre-
quently changed for security reasons.
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mating the threat to national security if the in-
formation should reach an enemy. Erring on the
safe side is out of the question, because neither
side is perfectly safe. Overclassification is one of
the surest ways to undermine security, as was well
illustrated in the Pacific during World War II.
At one time 90 percent of message traffic was
marked Secret. It was impossible to observe the
precautions required for its handling, since so
many people had to work with Secret messages.
The number of copies exceeded all reasonable lim-
its, and subject content was widely discussed. The
inevitable result was that Confidential and Re-
stricted messages were treated almost as if they
were unclassified.
A second result of overclassification is that the
key setup used for Secret messages becomes over-
loaded, thus endangering the security of both the
key and the system. A third consequence is the
delay in dissemination caused by the time required
for encryption, decryption, and maintenance of the
receipt system.
Among the kinds of information commonly
overclassified during the war were intelligence
summaries of past action and messages about ship
movements in nonoperational theaters. Confiden-
tial, as noted in the definition above, is sufficient
for routine intelligence reports. No gain in
crypto-security is achieved by using a higher clas-
sification than the content of the message warrants.
The prime purpose of high classification is to limit
the number of persons who may see the messages
or reports and to increase the physical safeguards
with which they are surrounded. The dissemina-
tor must determine the number of persons who
must have the information.
Underclassification, of course, endangers secu-
rity. During the war, messages which identified
fleet commands or shore-based activities were
sometimes delivered unclassified to the communi-
cation office. Unclassified reports and requisitions
sent to navy yards by ships of the fleet at times dis-
closed their location and prospective movements.
In combat situations emergencies arise when
speed of dissemination requires plain language.
Such a situation occurred during the North Afri-
can campaign, as recounted in the battle report
of the U. S. S. assachusetts. One of the spotting
planes from the flagship off Casablanca encoun-
tered "bandits" and signalled over voice radio:
267 CONFIDENTIAL
THE INTELLIGENCE
5. Information which indicates strength, iden-
tity, composition, or quantity of equipment
of troops, air and naval forces in areas ad-
jacent to active theaters of operations.
6. Technical documents and manuals used for
training, maintenance, and inspection of im-
portant new munitions of war, and the gen-
eral tactical lessons learned in operations
which should be withheld from any foreign
nation.
7. Information relating to the design and de-
velopment of new material, research or
processes of manufacture of military sig-
nificance which are not generally known.
8. Department of Defense information and
records concerning industrial mobilization
for war, including specific quantities of war
reserves.
9. Photographs, negatives, photostats, dia-
grams, or models of Confidential matter.
10. Certain compilations of data or items which
in the aggregate warrant the higher clas-
sification, although individually of lower
classification.
Restricted Category Abolished
In accordance with the directives set forth in
Executive Order No. 10501 effective 15 Dec 1953
the category "Restricted Security Information"
and the phrase "Security Information" previously
required in connection with the categories listed
above were eliminated. This order further pro-
vided that all Department of Defense information
designated "Restricted Security Information"
would be automatically declassified except in cer-
tain instances where it was felt necessary to up-
grade to Confidential. For example information
from foreign friendly governments and classified
Restricted by those governments is now upgraded
to Confidential. The same is true of material
related to Crypto systems.
"Restricted Data" as used by the Atomic Energy
Commission was not affected by Executive Order
#10501.
The Disseminator's Classification Responsibilities
Intelligence personnel responsible for dissemi-
nation must keep the definitions of the various
categories of classification clearly in mind, esti-
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"Am coming in on the starboard bow with couple
hostile aircraft on my tail. Pick 'em off?I am the
one in front !"
DISSEMINATION MEDIA
Thus far the only dissemination medium dis-
cussed has been telecommunications. A number
of others are equally common to intelligence activ-
ity, such as oral briefings, graphics, films, books
and. periodic publications, not to mention the in-
formal conferences that are daily occurrences in
any intelligence agency. Each has its particular
advantages and disadvantages in special circum-
stances.
Oral Dissemination
Intelligence is disseminated orally by means
of lectures, briefings, conferences, and ship's tele-
phone or radio conversations. Public telephones
ashore, of course, are never used for intelligence
communication. Except in a formalized situation
or classroom, lectures are not ideal means of dis-
seminating intelligence. Retention of subject
matter, presented in lecture form, is difficult with-
out reference to comprehensive notes, and the lack
of a lecture room and difficulties of assembling all
who need to know combine to make the lecture
method unsuitable in commands afloat.
Briefing, a specialized form of lecture, is one
of the most common types of oral dissemination of
intelligence. It will be discussed in detail below.
The staff conference, in which the intelligence
officer participates, provides an excellent means
of disseminating intelligence. If conducted in a
spirit of open-mindedness, free from petty prej-
udice, bias, or predetermined conclusion, the con-
ference discussion results in resolution of conflict-
ing bits and fragments of information. Panel dis-
cussions, followed by open forum question periods,
are also effective methods of dissemination.
Under actual combat conditions, or in maneu-
vers and training exercises, communication by
voice, radio, or telephone is used. For quick dis-
semination of intelligence to pilots awaiting final
instructions from an Air Intelligence Officer, com-
munication by a telephone system from intelli-
gence control to ready room, is often more expedi-
ent than the personal appearance of the briefing
officer. The principles and practices that have
CONFIDENTIAL
268
been developed in ships' battle phone systems fur-
nish a good background for intelligence dissemi-
nation by telephone.
Whatever form oral dissemination takes, it is
essentially a more or less prepared speech deliv-
ered to an audience, and it is subject to the general
rules for effective public speaking.
Briefing for Dissemination
An officer planning an oral briefing is under the
same obligation to organize his material logically,
present it coherently and fluently, and emphasize
his main points unmistakably, as the preacher,
the politician, the professor, or the salesman.
The sages of old said that man's greatest enemy
is time. A pertinent paraphrase would be: time
is the briefing officer's greatest enemy. We have
all been irritated by the speaker who begins by
deploring the fact that so little time is available
for an adequate presentation of his subject and
then proceeds to use 90% of what time is available
in undue attention to unnecessary and often ir-
relevant details. The intelligence officer will
always face a time limitation on his briefing. It
is his greatest challenge. Careful organization
is the key to success. In an 8-minute briefing, the
time allocation for a well organized presentation
should be about as follows:
Introduction: 2 minutes.
Rapport is established with the audience, the
purpose is clearly stated, and necessary back-
ground information is given.
Main Body: 5 minutes.
The fewer main points the better. Certainly in
5 minutes no more than 3 can be adequately cov-
ered. Transition from one to another should be
smooth and logical. This is the portion of the
briefing in which graphics are effective time savers.
Organization is the watch-word.
Conclusion: 1 minute.
Every briefing should close with a succinct sum-
mary or interpretation of the points in the main
body, thus leaving the audience with the definite
impression that the speaker's purpose has been
achieved.
A colored preacher when queried as to the reason
for his effective sermons summed all this up very
neatly: "First I tells 'ern what I's gonna tell 'em,
den I tells 'em, den I tells 'em what I told 'ern."
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Practice and receptivity to criticism are the best
aids to effective speaking. The avoidance of dis-
tracting mannerisms, and the cultivation of an
easy, simple, straightforward, and confident style
are essential. Every naval officer ought to be able
to speak well. To the intelligence officer it is a
functional asset.
Graphics for Dissemination
Dissemination through the use of graphic illus-
tration achieves its purposes by the precept of the
old adage: "A good picture is worth a thousand
words." Although illustrations have been used
for centuries, and maps and charts are as old as the
art of warfare, new impetus was given to the use
of graphic aids during World War II. In addi-
tion to printed and written representations, the
term "graphics" has come to include three dimen-
sional figures such as models of ships, aircraft,
terrain, cutaway sections, animated figures, and
life-size mock-ups. Plots, photographs, motion
pictures, maps, charts, sketches, drawings, posters,
statistical graphs, and numerical tables are ad-
ditional standard military applications of graphic
dissemination media. Their success results from
the fact that each is adapted to a particular
situation.
Clarity in graphic presentation will be achieved
if it is unified in purpose, consistent and unmis-
takable in use of symbols, and legible in details.
Its force and attractiveness will depend, like its
clarity, on adherence to fundamental principles
of effective design.
Nothing contributes more to the clarity of any
graphic presentation than unity of purpose. In-
telligence charts should be prepared for a specific
purpose; every item of information useful for this
purpose should appear, and all other items should
be suppressed. A chart that shows harbor in-
stallations should not be unnecessarily cluttered
with notations of irrelevant buildings and topo-
graphic details; a target folder designed for use
by bombing squadrons is not usually improved by
including elaborate hydrographic data.
In military graphic presentation, symbols are
of the utmost importance. The intelligence offi-
cer spends considerable time working with plots
and maps and charts; he should be thoroughly fa-
miliar with the technical vocabulary of this kind
269
of graphic expression, and should be careful
always to employ the accepted military and naval
symbols so that any trained person can read his
plot or overlay at a glance. Every chart for dis-
semination should have a key to the symbols em-
ployed, readily legible in the margin. Naval offi-
cers should familiarize themselves with the sym-
bol manuals: FM 21-30 and AFM 55-3.
Graphics, like any other form of dissemination,
should be convincing and attractive as well as
clear. Emphasis is achieved by bold lettering,
strong, solid outlines, and by the use of simple
and strongly contrasted colors for the different
items of information plotted. Attractiveness is
increased by varigated and properly proportioned
lettering and by the choice of harmonious colors.
A common fault is trying to put too much on a
single graphic; it is usually better to use several,
rather than to clutter up one.
When the graphic is to be projected on a screen
as a "slide," the added factors of legibility at a
distance and the adequacy of available equipment
must be considered. The intelligence officer can-
not usually control the conditions under which
motion pictures are made, but he can control the
conditions under which they are shown, and he
should make these conditions as favorable as
possible.
Preparation for Graphics
It is not practical here to discuss all the possible
methods of preparing graphics in intelligence
work, but a few suggestions regarding certain
materials that have proved effective can well be
made. Common tools are pictorial symbols made
by colored pencils, colored pins, colored string,
colored scotch tape, and various types of trans-
parent materials.
Cellulose "Scotch" tape, both the transparent
type and the colored, is very useful in graphic
presentations. The colored type can be employed
for border and area demarcations on a map or
overlay, for bar graphs, and for artistic line bor-
ders of the entire graphic. The tape is manufac-
tured in a great variety of colors, blue, red, black,
green, orange, yellow, purple, silver, and brown.
The rolls come in several widths, but experience
has shown the most practical for graphic purposes
to be 1/2",34" and 11/2".
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"Scotch" double-coated tissue tape, being adhe-
sive on both sides, facilitates the use of movable
symbols on a changing situation plot. Masking
tape can be used in the construction of portable
(folding) plots, or for joining together several
graphics into a composite whole.
In order to avoid markings on the face of maps
and charts that are being used for either briefings
or graphic displays, clear transparent cellulose
acetate overlays may be used. Usually, such ace-
tate film comes in rolls 40" wide, and 100' long.
China-marking (grease) pencils, in a variety of
colors, are particularly appropriate for graphics,
especially when used on a cellulose acetate overlay
for depicting changing situations. The tracings
can be easily removed with a dry cloth if made on
the glossy side of the sheet.
Illustration boards, both of heavy paper and
light cardboard, have many uses, such as making
formal graphics requiring good white background,
or for map or chart backing. The "boards" are
3/4" thick and usually come in two sizes, 30" x 40"
and 38" x 60".
Such items as thumb tacks, a pencil compass,
erasers, photointerpretation scales, a protractor,
speedball lettering pens, a knife or a pair of scis-
sors, and various colored inks are additional items
of equipment for the preparation of good graphics.
Most of these are readily available at Navy supply
centers or depots.
If graphic production is very extensive, time
will be saved by employing a Leroy lettering set.
With such a set it is possible to give graphics a
professional appearance.
Inasmuch as requirements differ, it is difficult to
make recommendations as to the quantities of ma-
terials or equipment needed. Operational staffs
will need a lot; attaches will need very little. The
intelligence officer must try to anticipate his needs,
and particularly if afloat, should procure a good
supply of basic materials from any supply depot
where they are available.
FORM OF DISSEMINATION
Disseminated intelligence should always reach
its potential consumer in usable form. There
should be no doubt as to its meaning. The pre-
vious discussion of reporting showed that the
format and guiding principles of accuracy, brev-
CONFIDENTIAL
ity, and clarity in the preparation of the standard
Information Report are designed for the user's
benefit. Let us extend that discussion here by
considering the drafting of messages. The prin-
ciples set forth are again those of unity, complete-
ness, coherence, and emphasis with special
attention to economy in the use of words.
Unity and Completeness
Intelligence messages, just as information re-
ports, are most easily handled by the recipient if
they deal with single rather than multiple sub-
jects. Filing is facilitated if all pertinent intelli-
gence on a certain matter is included in one
message. A message which does not give all the
necessary facts may be little better than no mes-
sage at all, especially in a combat situation. A
contact report which omits the number, types,
position, course, or time of sighting (the time
group of the message) is better than no report, but
each of these facts is needed to carry out an attack.
During 1943 an enemy submarine was able to
sink one of our ships and escape from American
waters because of incomplete messages and failure
to send messages. The submarine might have
been destroyed before it could do damage had any
one of the following errors not occurred:
1. A plane reported rescue of survivors, but
failed to give time of attack, position of the attack,
the course of the sub, or its condition.
2. Another plane neglected to make an amplify-
ing report, and wasted time asking a question to
which it should have known the answer.
3. A third plane failed to give the sub's position
and did not communicate with a plane which was
in a position to assist. It also failed to make
amplifying reports promptly, in sufficient detail,
and in plain language instead of code. Speed was
vital, and the information was of little value to
the enemy.
270
Coherence
Ambiguity of expression in a message is not only
valueless but dangerous. Misunderstood intelli-
gence can lead to catastrophe. During the final
month of the war in the Pacific, a task group made
radar contact with an unidentified submarine.
All efforts at recognition failed for visibility was
poor, but the submarine gave indications of being
hostile. At this point one of the destroyers in
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THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE: DISSEMINATION
the task group received a message from the task
group commander which was understood to state:
CLOSE TARGET EVALUATION IS ENEMY
ATTACK AND DESTROY. The destroyer at-
tacked and the target disappeared. Later it was
discovered that the sub was one of our own. What
the message actually said was: CLOSE TARGET
AND IF EVALUATION IS ENEMY DE-
STROY IT.
Brevity
Both the speed and security of naval communi-
cations are in the hands of originators to a far
greater extent than many realize. The originator
who uses 50 words to express what could be clearly
stated in 25 causes, in the aggregate, not hours but
days of unnecessary work along the entire route
of an encrypted message. He also damages secu-
rity, for the amount of material available to enemy
crypto-analysts is doubled.
There are several ways to reduce the length of a
message:
1. Eliminate nonessential details.
2. Remove superfluous words, such as "number,"
"following," and "dated," for example, in-
stead of "FOLLOWING ITEMS NEEDED
COLON" say "NEED," which represents an
85% word saving. A submarine on patrol in
the eastern Mediterranean transmitted a ra-
dio message in which the words "north" and
"east" were used 18 times in giving positions.
All 18 words could have been omitted, for
there is no south latitude in the Mediter-
ranean, and west longitude is confined, to a
far western portion.
3. Use briefer words and phrases. The length
of many messages can be reduced as much as
40-50% by consistently using the simpler and
briefer of two expressions that are equally
clear. The following are typical:
Instead of Use Save
attempt try 57%
immediately at once 45%
approximately twenty about twenty 42%
immediate future soon 73%
A simple way of saving words in a message is
by putting verbs in the active rather than the pas-
sive voice. Prepositions can often be eliminated
with no sacrifice of meaning.
271
4. Use authorized abbreviations to a greater ex-
tent and avoid excessive use of phonetic spell-
ing.
5. Delete unnecessary punctuation. The use of
the simple "X" will normally be equally
clear.
Message Drafting in Practice
Let us now apply some of the above principles
in an imaginary situation and follow the proce-
dures of an intelligence officer in his role of dis-
seminator.
The setting is Calcutta, India, early in World
War II. An allied intelligence activity of the
CBI theater has a competent Burmese undercover
agent in Japanese occupied Rangoon who reports
twice a week on enemy activities on the waterfront.
The information thus obtained is promptly for-
warded by encrypted message to the A-2 of the
10th Air Force at a base in Chabua, Assam, for
possible use in selecting targets for strategic bomb-
ing missions. In a report dated 18 March, the
Rangoon agent states that 2 days ago he saw a
large number of vehicles and great quantities of
supplies for the Japanese forces in Burma un-
loaded from ships and stored in warehouses along
the Irrawaddy River. This is interesting to be
sure, but in its present form it does not constitute
valuable target information because of its lack of
detail. Supplies are continually arriving in Ran-
goon and are normally stored in warehouses along
the Irrawaddy at a great number of widely scat-
tered locations. So first of all the Calcutta intelli-
gence unit requests the Rangoon agent to obtain
more specific data. In a few days an amplifying
report is received, and on the basis of this addi-
tional information the officer responsible for dis-
semination of target intelligence writes the first
draft of a message to A-2, Chabua
"Following information received from usually
reliable agent resident Rangoon: Japanese war
materials stored in warehouses adjoining former
docks of Burma Shell Oil Co. include 80-85 heavy
trucks, 23 sedans, 3,000 tons shells and cartridges,
and approximately 10,000 tons of food and cloth-
ing for Japanese troops."
The report now contains detailed target infor-
mation. He proceeds to examine his first draft
with a view to condensation. A-2, Chabua, has
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prepared a large scale gridded map of Rangoon
and has provided the Calcutta unit with a copy
for use in target designation. Therefore the spe-
cific location can be given by map reference as
had been done in similar messages in the past.
Consulting the map, the Calcutta officer finds that
he can pinpoint the Burma Shell warehouses at
8237N4. So he makes further improvements:
"Usually reliable agent Rangoon reports ware-
houses located eighty two thirty seven Nan four
contain colon three thousand tons ammunition
comma ten thousand tons quartermaster supplies
comma approximately one hundred vehicles pe-
riod"
Once again he studies the text for possible fur-
ther economy of words. His colleagues in the
code-room are always complaining about the chore
of encrypting messages which are unnecessarily
long, so he makes every effort to satisfy them.
All Allied intelligence activities have been
using the standard letter-number evaluation code,
and A-2, Chabua, knows from past experience
that Calcutta receives reports from agents in Ran-
goon whose reliability and reporting accuracy
have been well established by past performance.
A-2 will, however, want to know the date the
information was collected, in order to check it
with other information he may have, or it may
well be that, unknown to Calcutta, bombers of the
10th Air Force hit the same dock area on a mission
within the last 24 hours. Furthermore, A-2 will
consult his map and note that the grid location is
that of warehouses. So after some more amend-
ing, abbreviating, and deleting the final draft of
the message text reads:
RANGOON ONE SIX MAR BAKER TWO
X EIGHT TWO THREE SEVEN NAN
FOUR X THREE THOU TONS AMMO X
TEN THOU TONS QM SUPPLIES X
ABOUT ONE HUN VEHICLES.
He takes it to the code-room. "Here, Joe, is
one that will please you. Make it 'Operational
Immediate.'"
Thus by careful drafting the disseminator sends
a message that is complete, accurate, coherent,
and economical in words and encryption time.
A-2, Chabua, has usable intelligence for the com-
mander of his B-24 squadron.
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272
USE OF INTELLIGENCE
The example above is illustrative of more than
message drafting. It also follows an item of in-
formation through the steps of the Intelligence
Cycle. Collection was not complete until ade-
quate coverage was attained, and some of the
mental gymnastics of processing were apparent
as the officer kept reworking his draft into proper
form for dissemination.
The use of the finished product is, of course, the
responsibility of the squadron commander in
Chabua. The decision to make a strike against
the Rangoon warehouses rests with him alone.
Therefore, it would seem that the intelligence offi-
cer's functions stop with dissemination. In a
larger sense, however, this is not true. Certainly
A-2 does not make the command decision, but he
plays a most important role in influencing the
decision through the quality of the intelligence he
provides. The very form in which it reaches the
potential user, and the timeliness achieved
through proper designation of precedence are
vital factors in use.
Intelligence officers do not perform their duties
in support of command by sitting aloof in their
own little worlds. They are on a staff team, and
operational commanders as well as strategic plan-
ners make their decisions during or after confer-
ences with staff officers who are experts on the
various aspects of the tasks under consideration.
This puts the intelligence officer very much in the
picture when decisions are made, and working
intimately with his staff colleagues, he contributes
support in his particular sphere of responsibility:
knowledge of the enemy and the characteristics
of the area of operations. His responsibilities
do not cease even when the intelligence he dis-
seminates has been used, for the use itself will pose
new problems in collection and evaluation, and
post-action reports must be compiled.
In the three following chapters the role of in-
telligence in support of planning and operational
activities will be considered. The discussion?
however, will not be limited to use alone. Any
review of the use of intelligence will involve its
production to a greater or lesser degree, since use
activates and reactivates production.
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CHAPTER 12
INTELLIGENCE STAFF PROCEDURES
INTRODUCTION: INTELLIGENCE-A STAFF FUNCTION
Having made a general examination of intelli-
gence as knowledge, organization, and activity,
it will be well now to consider the specific ways in
which intelligence makes its contributions to the
planning and execution of military operations.
By what formal procedures is intelligence sup-
plied in an actual operational situation ? What
specific techniques do intelligence officers use in
order to make their services of value to operational
commanders?
The Commander and His Staff
Traditionally, the key to all military operations
is the authority of command personified in the
military commander. He bears the full responsi-
bility for the success or failure of all operations
entrusted to him, and because of that responsibil-
ity, he also possesses full authority to plan those
operations and, supervise their execution.
Manifestly, it would be impossible for a single
individual, however well endowed, personally to
perform all of the tasks involved in a typical mod-
ern military operation. Consequently a com-
mander has under him other individuals to whom
he delegates one or more of the component parts
of the broader task originally assigned to him.
These individuals in turn may have subordinates
to whom they will delegate certain portions of
their own assigned tasks. Thus a structure is built
up which we term the military chain of command,
a device that provides a commander with the
assistance he needs. After delegating appropriate
areas of responsibility to each of his subordinates,
the commander must plan, coordinate, and super-
vise their execution of these responsibilities.
Even this supervisory role, however, except at
the lowest echelons of command, is more than any
one individual can carry out alone. There are
273
just too many things to inspect, too many orders
to issue, and too many subjects on which to be kept
informed. And so, in addition to his subordinates
in the chain of command, the commander also has
the assistance of certain individuals who help him
to coordinate and supervise the actions of his sub-
ordinates. These personal assistants are known
as the commander's staff. In contrast to the sub-
ordinates in the chain of command, the members
of the commander's staff do not possess any dele-
gated authority or responsibility of their own.
Their only purpose is to serve the commander per-
sonally and directly, and to assist him, as he may
choose, in exercising the various supervisory
responsibilities which his command entails.
The number of these staff assistants, and to some
extent their organization and individual duties,
ordinarily varies in proportion to the size of the
commander's forces. But over the years a fairly
standard staff organization has been evolved with-
in the military profession which breaks down the
duties performed by a commander's staff into sev-
eral customary and well-recognized categories.
Traditionally there are four principal staff func-
tions: personnel and administration, intelligence,
plans and operations, and supply. On an Army
staff, for example, these four functions are per-
formed by what are called the "general" (in con-
trast to the "special") staff officers, who are desig-
nated G-1 (Personnel and Administration), G-2
(Intelligence), G-3 (Operations), and G-1 (Sup-
ply). Naval commanders also have staffs which
correspond roughly to these same designations,
though with some changes. On some naval staffs,
for example, intelligence may not be a separate
staff division, but only a subordinate section under
operations. On naval staffs communications is
ordinarily an additional "general" staff function,
on a par with operations, supply, and personnel.
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But whatever the precise organization of the naval
commander's staff may be, all staffs perform the
same basic duties, and all exist to help the com-
mander discharge his supervisory responsibility.
Besides these staff assistants who help the com-
mander in his operational functions, he usually
has one or more personal aides, depending on his
rank. On a naval staff these are the /lag lieuten-
ant and the flag secretary. Depending upon the
size of the staff they may also have other opera-
tional staff duties, with the flag lieutenant perhaps
serving as communicator, and the flag secretary
as personnel and administrative officer. The struc-
ture of a typical naval staff is shown in figure 12.
AIDE AND
FLAG SECT.
1
THE
COMIAANDER
CHIEF OP
STAFF
AIDE AND
FLAG UEUT.
N ? 1
ADMINISTRATION
& PERSONNEL
N.2
INTELLIGENCE
N.3
PLANS AND
OPERATIONS
N.4
LOGISTICS
14.5
COMMUNICATIONS
Figure 12.?Organization Chart?Typical Naval Operating Staff
Each individual staff officer is highly qualified
in some specialized field relating to military oper-
ai ions. The personnel officer, for example, is an
expert on such matters as military strengths, re-
inforcements, replacements, etc.; the operations
officer is a specialist in the strategy and tactics
involved in planning and conducting military op-
erations; and the supply officer is an expert on
matters of equipment and material needed to sup-
port operations. Within the field of his own
specialty each staff officer is expected to keep his
commander fully informed on all developments
relating to the operations in question, to do what-
ever detailed thinking and planning are required,
and to make sound recommendations for action by
the commander himself. Within the area of his
specialty the staff officer should put himself men-
tally in the place of his commander and ask him-
self, "what would you do if you were the com-
mander?", and then come up with the best possi-
ble answer.
Yet the final decision can only be made by the
commander himself. The staff assistant proposes,
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274
the commander disposes. However, the staff offi-
cer should have familiarized himself so thoroughly
with his own field, and should have anticipated
and discussed all the implications involved in the
recommendation he makes so completely, that the
commander is able to make the actual decision with
a minimum of further effort. This is what is
known professionally as completed staff work; that
is, presenting a military proposal to a commander
in such a way that he needs only to signify his
approval to put the proposal into full effect. To
a considerable extent the success of any military
commander will be in direct ratio to the thorough-
ness and accuracy of the work of his staff.
The Intelligence Officer on the Staff
The intelligence officer's field of specialty is a
dual one?the enemy and the area of operations.
No military operation can be successfully planned
or carried out unless a commander is as fully aware
as possible of what he is up against. The enemy's
strength, his dispositions, his capabilities, his fire-
power, his reserves?all of these are factors that
are bound to affect the course of action a military
commander will adopt. Without such information
he is literally fighting in the dark. It is the job
of the intelligence officer then to inform the com-
mander of what the enemy has and what the enemy
can do, in order that the commander can make the
soundest and wisest decision as to how to accom-
plish his own mission. Similarly, the nature of
the terrain in which an operation is to be con-
ducted?the beach conditions, the weather, the
location of high ground?will have an important
bearing on the final decision, and information on
those matters must also be furnished to the com-
mander well in advance. This is also the job of
the intelligence officer.
While the military staff is thus a collection of
experts, each man dealing principally in his own
specialty, it does not follow that the actual exer-
cise of military command can be compartmental-
ized in any such precise fashion. After all, every
one of the separate factors which bears on a mili-
tary decision must ultimately be brought together
in the mind of the commander before any final
decision can be made, and the end product is thus
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bound to be the result of the combination, com-
parison, interaction and mutual adjustment of all
of them. Consequently, although a military staff
is functionally broken down into specialized units,
none of these units can really function at top effi-
ciency without the fullest cooperation and mutual
understanding of the others. The intelligence of-
ficer, for instance, must keep constantly abreast
of the planning and thinking that is being done by
the operations, supply, and personnel officers if his
own work is to be entirely relevant to theirs; they,
in turn, cannot make adequate plans as to what
special equipment may be needed in an operation,
or what types of attack can succeed, without hear-
ing and understanding what the intelligence officer
has to say about the enemy situation and the
peculiar characteristics of the area of operations.
Between operations and intelligence this mutual
dependence is especially close, a fact that is borne
out in the case of those naval staffs where the
intelligence officer is a direct subordinate of the
operations officer.
Organization of an Intelligence Division
The work for which the intelligence officer is
personally responsible is actually performed, of
course, with the help of such subordinates and
assistants as may be assigned to him, organized
into what is called an intelligence "division." The
size of the intelligence division as well as its pre-
cise structure will vary a good deal, depending on
the size of the command and the nature of its
assignment. On an operational staff the intelli-
gence division may include specialists trained in
the particular types of operations being con-
ducted; a naval district intelligence office, on the
other hand, will be likely to have a preponderance
of counterintelligence personnel. Ideally, the in-
telligence division of an operational staff ought to
include some one in charge of administration and
personnel, some one in charge of security and
counterintelligence, and a number of specialists
in such fields as amphibious warfare, communica-
tions, air operations, photointerpretation, transla-
tion and interpretation, and technical intelligence.
In practice, since all but the very largest com-
mands may have at most only three or four officers
275
in the whole division, especially in peacetime, one
officer may find himself charged with several of
these duties, whether he happens to be a specialist
in them or not. In such an event, when he meets
a problem which he is not personally equipped to
solve, he should consult those who may be, or in
technical matters, request expert assistance.
THE PROCESS OF OPERATIONAL COMMAND
As a staff assistant, the intelligence officer exists
entirely to serve his commander in the execution
of operational command duties. To do a full and
effective job, therefore, the intelligence officer must
understand first of all precisely what these com-
mand duties entail.
Two major functions are involved in military
command: (1) planning the operation desired, and
(2) supervising the execution of those plans.
These two functions, in turn, may be broken down
into four specific jobs which a commander per-
forms in the process of exercising his command:
(a) make the decision on what is to be done, (b)
develop the plan for carrying out that decision,
(c) issue the directive or order putting the plan
into effect, and ( d) supervise the execution of the
directive by subordinates in the "chain of com-
mand." These four jobs embrace the four major
steps in the process of operational command plan-
ning. At each stage the responsibility of the com-
mander is clear and well-defined.
Estimate of the Situation
The first and perhaps most important job of a
military commander is to make decisions?in fact,
not only to make decisions but to make correct
decisions. Because making decisions is essentially
a mental process, the quality of a commander's
decisions will naturally depend to a considerable
extent on his own sagacity. For this reason no
precise mathematical formula can ever supply the
key to making correct military decisions in all
possible circumstances. Nevertheless, over the
years the military profession has developed the
following standard Estimate of the Situation form
for use in connection with these decisions which
every commander is expected to understand and,
more or less, to follow.
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The Estimate of the Situation Form
1. MISSION
a. Task
b. Purpose
2. THE SITUATION AND COURSES OF ACTION
a. Considerations affecting the possible courses of action
(1) The general situation
(2) Characteristics of the area of operations
(3) Relative combat power
(4) Strength and weakness factors
b. Enemy capabilities (in terms of "accomplishment")
c. Own courses of action
3. ANALYSIS OF OPPOSING COURSES OF ACTION
4. COMPARISON OF OWN COURSES OF ACTION
5. DECISION
a. What the force is going to do
b. Why this is to be done
This estimate form, which grew originally out
of a process first employed by the German general
staff in the latter part of the 19th century, has now
been officially adopted by the Joint Chiefs of _Staff
for use by all military services, and can be found
in detail in the Naval Manual of Operational
Planning. By itself, .of course, the Estimate of
the Situation form does not insure that any com-
mander who faithfully follows it in every detail
will automatically come up with right decisions
in any and every situation. Rather the form
serves as a kind of check-off list, to guarantee only
that before a commander arrives at any important
decision he will have first considered every relevant
factor. Although it may seem somewhat stylized
and artificial, the procedure involved in this Esti-
mate of the Situation actually is not too much
different from that employed by any rational indi-
vidual in arriving at an important decision in
everyday life.
As will be seen from the above form, the initial
step in the estimate procedure is to state the mis-
sion assigned to the commander by higher head-
quarters. Ordinarily this amounts to nothing
more than copying the commander's original in-
structions; but at least the statement of the mis-
sion should include both the specific task assigned
to the commander by his superiors, and the pur-
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276
pose (which may either have been stated or can
be inferred) for which that task was assigned. It
is important that a military commander under-
stand both of these points clearly at the very out-
set. Otherwise, in the process of carrying out
his assigned task, he might conceivably do some-
thing that would jeopardize its broader purpose.
The next step is to compile all the relevant in-
formation which might bear on the accomplish-
ment of this assigned mission, including, specifi-
cally, (a) a resum6 of the general situation out
of which the specific assignment has evolved, (b)
a summary of all the facts about the area in which
the operations are to be conducted, and (c) a sum-
mary of the military strength of both our own
forces and those of the enemy, together with a
tabulation of the principal elements of strength
and weakness on both sides which emerge from this
information.
Following this general summary, the commander
next makes a list of all those things which the
enemy can be considered to be physically "capable"
of doing, given the forces at his disposal and the
particular area in which he is to operate. These
are what are known in the military profession as
enemy capabilities, and in the commander's Esti-
mate of the Situation they are customarily ex-
pressed as specific objectives which the enemy will
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try to accomplish, without reference to whatever
opposition our own forces might interpose to their
accomplishment.
Once the enemy's capabilities have been listed
in this way, the commander next puts down in
equally general terms the various broad courses
of action which his own forces might undertake
to accomplish the assigned mission. The whole
point of the estimate form, in fact, is to arrive
finally at a decision as to which of these several
possible courses of action open to the commander
is the best one; but at this stage all that is required
is to survey and set down in concise form each of
the alternatives from which a final choice will
later be made.
After this the form moves on to a kind of mental
"war-game" between each enemy capability on
the one hand, and each course of action open to
our own forces on the other. In this way it be-
comes possible for a commander to visualize ex-
actly what would happen in each combination of
circumstances. No prudent commander certainly
would want to make a decision on a course of ac-
tion for the forces under him until he had tried
to foresee as fully as possible all of the implica-
tions and consequences of that decision. The best
way to do this, of course, is to visualize what would
happen if first one course of action and then an-
other were adopted. And that is precisely what
the "war-gaming" procedure involves. Each
friendly course of action is pitted in turn against
each separate enemy capability. If the original
selection of enemy capabilities and of own courses
of action was carefully and thoroughly done, all
of the possibilities which should be considered by
a prudent commander before a decision is reached
will have been covered in the process.
Next are tabulated the respective advantages
and disadvantages which this "war-gaming" has
shown accrue to each of the alternatives open to
the commander. For example, it may have been
shown that one course of action would be highly
successful if the enemy adopted a particular one
of its capabilities, but most disastrous if the enemy
were to adopt any other capability. On the other
hand, a second course of action might be visualized
as relatively successful no matter which capability
the enemy adopted. This is just the sort of corn-
277
parison which should help in making a final deci-
sion. By setting these comparative advantages
and disadvantages down in tabular form, the best
course of action may become directly apparent.
At any rate, the commander's final decision could
then be made in the light of a full understanding
of just what he stands to gain or lose.
The commander is now ready to take his final
step, the decision itself. On the basis of the anal-
ysis just completed, he must select the one course
of action?or in some cases the combination of
several?which strikes him as being the best from
all points of view to accomplish his mission. The
statement of this course of action is itself the
decision, and as such is listed in the fifth and final
paragraph of the Estimate of the Situation form.
In the standard form, the decision, like the mis-
sion, must be expressed in two parts. The first
part is the course of action decided on, for exam-
ple, "to seize X-ray Island." Following this
should come the words "in order to" plus a restate-
ment of the original mission set down at the start
of the estimate. Thus a typical decision might
read as follows: "To seize X-ray Island, in order
to establish a base for further operations against
Japan." In this way the final paragraph of the
estimate form is tied in directly with the opening
paragraph, and illustrates how, as a result of the
thought processes involved in the body of the esti-
mate itself, the commander has moved from an
assigned mission to a specific decision as to how
that mission is to be accomplished. That, of
course, was the initial purpose in undertaking the
estimate procedure.
There is really nothing mysterious or particu-
larly strange about this Estimate of the Situation.
It is no substitute, of course, for mental activity
or alert thinking. It cannot transform a man into
a military genius simply by virtue of being prop-
erly applied. But its careful use by a naval com-
mander will assist him to avoid either overlooking
or underestimating any significant bit of informa-
tion that might conceivably bear on the soundness
of his ultimate decision. That in itself is enough
to recommend it in any complicated or crucial
military operation.
In some cases experienced commanding officers
may not actually write out a full formal estimate
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in the manner just described before arriving at a
decision. For these officers the estimating process
may involve simply an oral discussion between
themselves and the members of their staffs, out of
which, after due deliberation, the final decision
emerges. But the important point is that even in
oral discussions of this kind the prudent com-
mander must see that each of the significant fac-
tors listed in the standard estimate form is actu-
ally covered either by his staff in their own pres-
entations or, at least to his own satisfaction, by
his own personal thinking.
At any rate, whether the estimate is developed
in written or in oral form, the responsibility of
the commander and his staff officers is the same.
Each staff officer must supply certain parts of the
information called for by the estimate. The in-
telligence officer, for example, must supply the
information about the enemy's strength, his capa-
bilities, and the area of operations. The opera-
tions and logistics officers must supply informa-
tion about the strength of the commander's own
forces, and recommend suitable courses of action
to accomplish the assigned mission. When it
comes to the "war-gaming" portion, the pitting of
own courses of action against enemy capabilities,
all of the staff officers will probably participate in
the discussion. To that extent, then, the final
decision, although still the immediate responsi-
bility of the commander alone, is actually a group
product of the commander and his staff, working
harmoniously as a single military "mind."
Development of the Plan
With the broad decision out of the way, the next
job of a military commander is to draw up detailed
plans for putting that decision into practical
effect. The plans are developed as follows:
Development of the Plan
1. ANALYZE THE DECISION
2. STATE ANY ASSUMPTIONS USED
3. LIST COMPONENT OPERATIONS
(a) Obtain intelligence
(b) Movement or deployment
(c) Protect own forces
(d) Isolate the objective
(e) Gain the objective
(f) Provide logistic support
(g) Provide for security and deception
(h) Other component operations as appropriate
4. DETERMINE HOW EACH COMPONENT OPERATION IS TO BE
CARRIED OUT; LIST FORCES AVAILABLE
5. ORGANIZE FORCES INTO TASK ORGANIZATION
6. ASSIGN TASKS TO APPROPRIATE ELEMENTS IN TASK
ORGANIZATION
7. SOLVE COMMAND PROBLEMS
(a) Communications
(b) Coordinating measures
(c) Location of officer in tactical command and second in command
(d) Time and date plan will become effective
8. COMPILE INFORMATION NECESSARY TO PERMIT SUBORDI-
NATES TO PERFORM TASKS INTELLIGENTLY
(a) General situation
(b) Enemy forces
(c) Friendly forces
(d) Area of operations
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INTELLIGENCE STAFF PROCEDURES
Logically, the first thing to do is to determine
what specific component operations must be per-
formed to achieve the broad, generalized goal
stated in the decision. A decision to capture a
particular island, for example, would involve such
component operations as preattack reconnaissance,
combat loading, movement to the objective area,
air and surface screening of the movement, and
gunfire support of assault troops. Whatever the
overall objective, its accomplishment will always
involve a number of smaller, more specific tasks
which the successful commander must thoroughly
canvass in advance. After that he should organize
the forces at his disposal in such a way as to per-
form these operations most effectively, and then
assign appropriate tasks to the various subdivi-
sions of this organization.
Besides the combat operations themselves a com-
mander will at this stage also want to anticipate
the various supporting details involved, such as
what supplies he will need, and when and how he
must get them; how and where he will exercise his
command; what communications procedures will
be most suitable for the operation; what addi-
tional intelligence is needed for more effective
planning; and what information is to be distrib-
uted to his subordinates to insure their intelligent
execution of their assignments. All of these de-
tails should be foreseen at this early stage, because
the more detailed the advance planning, the more
smoothly the operation will be executed. Indeed
this particular phase of the command process is
especially designed to provide a smooth transition
from the generalities of the command decision to
the concise details of the operational directive
which will eventually implement it. In some cases
this planning will be written out along the lines
indicated in the format. In other cases it may con-
sist simply of rough notes in the possession of the
commander or various members of his staff. But
unless the planning has been actually done in one
way or another, the directive that sets the opera-
tion in motion will certainly suffer.
Issuing the Directive
After the preliminary planning comes the prep-
aration and issuance of the directive. Here the
commander usually has no option; the directive
is a written document and must be issued formally
as such.
The standard format of an operational directive
is as follows:
The Directive Form
(Operation Plan or Operation Order)
Task Organization
(list all subdivisions into which the command is organized for the opera-
tion, with designating number and descriptive name for each subdivision)
1. General Situation (include here such information about the general sit-
uation as will permit a subordinate to understand current operations,
including information about enemy forces, friendly forces?not listed in
task organization?plus a statement, in the case of operation plans, of
any assumptions involved)
2. General Plan paragraph (state what is to be accomplished by the inte-
grated efforts of the command as a whole and why?in other words,
restate the commander's original decision)
3. Task paragraph (assign individual tasks to each subdivision listed in
the task organization above, plus such other tasks as may be common to
all subdivisions)
4. Logistics paragraph (indicate the availability of supplies and services,
and the general plan for logistic support of the operation)
5. Comm,and paragraph (such instructions as are necessary to facilitate
the exercise of command during the operation, such as, location of the
commander and the second in command, communications procedures,
zone time to be employed, etc.)
Annexes, Appendices, and Tabs (as appropriate)
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The directive creates the task organization, for-
mally assigns component tasks to the various sub-
divisions of this organization, makes provision
for the performance of all necessary support func-
tions, establishes times and schedules, and supplies
subordinate commanders with such supplementary
information as they may need to perform their
jobs properly. Incidentally, this supplementary
information is usually not set forth in the body of
the directive itself, but is included in a series of
annexes attached to the directive. These annexes
may include details on any aspect of the directive
which needs elaboration; for example, the task
organization, movement plan, battle plan, com-
munications plan, the logistics plan; or, as in the
case of the intelligence annex, they may supply
subordinate commanders with pertinent informa-
tion about the enemy and the area of operations,
plus appropriate instructions for collecting during
the operation itself such additional information
as may be desired.
In the operational planning that leads up to
the issuance of a directive of this kind, there is
often a persistent element of uncertainty regard-
ing one or another point that bears closely on
the success of the plans being formulated. In
developing defensive plans, for example, there
may be doubt as to the direction from which the
enemy will be likely to strike, or, in the case of
offensive plans, it may not be known whether
certain necessary reinforcements will actually be
available in time to take part in the offensive. In
cases such as these it is often the practice for a
commander and his staff to do their preliminary
planning, including even the issuance of the ap-
propriate directive, on the basis of certain assump-
tions with regard to these missing details. (See
"Development of the Plan," item 2.) When this
is done, the assumptions made must be clearly
indicated as such. As its name implies, an as-
sumption in military planning refers to a certain
condition or situation, either unknown or cur-
rently contrary to actual fact, which for the pur-
poses of planning is assumed to be true. Thus
in the case of an unknown quantity, like the di-
rection of an impending enemy attack, one plan
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might be drawn up on the basis of the specific
assumption that the enemy will attack from the
south, while an alternative plan might be devel-
oped on the basis of the contrary assumption that
he will attack from the north. Then as events
disclose which of these two assumptions is true,
the commander can also determine which of his
alternative plans should govern his actual opera-
tions. Or, to take the case of an assumption pres-
ently contrary to fact, that reinforcements not
now on hand will become available, the com-
mander might elect to put his plan into effect as
soon as the assumption becomes true, or to discard
it if circumstances show that the assumption will
not become true.
Naturally, a prudent commander will want his
plans to be broad and flexible enough to cover as
many contingencies as possible. This operational
directive, then, will be issued with the understand-
ing that it is to be carried out?unless expressly
rescinded?no matter what subsequently develops.
The commander will hope that his thinking and
planning have been thorough and extensive
enough to encompass all reasonable developments.
In that case the commander makes no assumptions
in his planning, because every assumption limits
the flexibility of his plan and to that extent weak-
ens it. This kind of directive becomes effective
upon receipt, and is known as an operation order.
On the other hand, the commander may prefer
to draw up his directive in tentative form, involv-
ing one or another assumption, and issue it with
the understanding that it will become effective
only on later notification, usually after the matter
covered by the assumption has been clarified by
subsequent events. In that case the directive will
be called an operation plan. The only difference
between an operation order and an operation plan
is that the latter includes one or more assumptions
(specifically mentioned in the general situation
paragraph) and is effective only on later signal,
while the former contains no assumptions and is
usually effective on receipt. Once an operation
plan is put into effect it functions in exactly the
same way as an operation order, and therefore, on
all other points, the operation plan should follow
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the same format as the order, and should convey
4-1-te same relevant information for the guidance
direction of the commander's subordinates.
vising the Planned Action
Finally, the operational commander must super-
vise the execution of the action which he has pre-
viously decided on, planned, and ordered into exe-
cution. Even the best-laid plans, however, can
go awry, and uncertainty and contingency are
rarely more in evidence than in the conduct of
military operations. A combat commander, there-
fore, must keep a careful eye on the actual progress
of his operation so as to be ready to alter his
original order whenever circumstances dictate.
There are four main developments, all of which
can occur on any battlefield, that justify a change
in the original order. There may have been some
error or misunderstanding; there may be a change
in the enemy's situation, or at least in what is
known about it; there may be a change in our
situation, some ship may have run into unexpected
difficulties, or some reinforcements may have failed
to show up; or, finally, there may be a change in
the mission assigned by higher headquarters, per-
haps as a result of a new situation confronting the
superior. In each of these cases, the commander
must make a decision on the spot as to how to
change his original order to meet the altered cir-
cumstances. In the heat of battle, of course, there
is rarely time for lengthy reflection or elaborate
checking and rechecking. Presumably, in such
circumstances, a commander will automatically
make a mental estimate of the situation and then
issue his revised orders. Still, the degree to which
even these spot decisions made under difficult com-
bat conditions are successful will be determined by
the extent to which the commander, in more
leisurely circumstances, has already mastered the
various planning procedures outline here and
made them a part of his normal mental habits.
INTELLIGENCE IN THE BASIC DECISION
In the light of these four steps which an oper-
ational commander must go through in carrying
2619-54-19
281
out his command responsibilities, just where do
intelligence and the intelligence staff officer fit in?
Actually intelligence has a specific job to perform
for the commander at each of these stages, and
each one of these specific jobs involves a standard
formal pattern which corresponds to a step in the
command process itself. These four jobs, and their
relationships to the stages of the command process,
are shown in the following table:
Commander
1. Estimate of the situation.
2. Development of the plan.
3. Preparation of the directive.
4. Supervision of the action.
Intelligence Officer
1. Intelligence estimate.
2. Intelligence collection plan.
3. Intelligence annex.
4. Running intelligence estimate.
Just as the four stages of the command process
form a special kind of cyclical procedure which
is repeated in the case of every new decision that
comes up as an operation progresses, so the four
steps outlined for the intelligence officer also con-
stitute a pattern which include within it the phases
of the familiar intelligence cycle applied to the
planning and execution of actual operations.
Intelligence Estimate
In connection with the commander's estimate of
the situation the intelligence officer's job is to sup-
ply all of the information concerning the enemy
and the area of operations. This information is
submitted by the intelligence officer on a form
called an intelligence estimate. In practice the
intelligence estimate, like the commander's esti-
mate, may under certain circumstances comprise
only an oral summary. But the following stand-
ard form for it has been established and is usually
followed in assembling the pertinent information,
regardless of whether it may eventually be pre-
sented orally or on paper.
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Classification
Charts or maps:
INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS
Intelligence Estimate Form
1. MISSION
2. THE SITUATION
(a) General situation
(b) Characteristics of the Area of Operations
(1) weather
(2) topography
(3) hydrography
(4) transportation & telecommunications
(5) economic
(6) sociological
(7) political
(8) other factors, as applicable
Enemy situation
(1) numerical strength and combat effectiveness
(2) composition, including order of battle
(3) disposition or deployment
(4) logistics
(5) reinforcements
(6) r&um6 of current operations
(7) time and distance factors
(8) strength and weakness factors (including enemy vulnera-
bilities)
(9) other factors, as applicable
3. ENEMY CAPABILITIES
(a) Preliminary identification (in terms of w:hat, when, where, in what
strength)
(b) Analysis of each capability
(1) relation to other capabilities
(2) effect on accomplishment of our mission
(3) evidence indicating relative probability of adoption
(c) Final listing in order of relative probability of adoption
(c)
Organization
Place
Date and Time
SIGNATURE
Distribution:
Also like the commander's estimate, the intelli-
gence estimate begins with a statement of the com-
mander's basic mission?which, of course, governs
all pertinent planning?together with a statement
of the general situation to which that mission ap-
plies. Both items are essential guideposts in se-
lecting what information should go into the
estimate under its various headings.
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Thus in compiling information concerning the
enemy's situation and the area of operations, it
is important to remember that an estimate is not
an encyclopedia; coverage must be adequate, but
it must also be distinctly limited to the specific
mission at hand. In addition, each item of in-
formation dealing with the area of operations
should be followed by some brief statement or
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conclusion indicating succinctly the practie
effect of that information on any military o, _ a-
tions that might be conducted in the area. As far
as possible the same should be done in the case of
data relating to the enemy's situation. This sec-
tion should include a complete order of battle of
enemy forces involved, and special attention should
also be given to time and space factors, that
is, to careful estimates of where the enemy can
move in what particular period of time. These
factors, if worked out with care, will prove ex-
tremely helpful later on in determining enemy
capabilities.
Under "strength and weakness factors" the net
effect of all the information thus far developed is
summarized insofar as it bears on the strength or
weakness of the enemy to conduct military opera-
tions in the area involved. It is sometimes helpful
in discussing enemy weaknesses to mention also
any specific vulnerabilities that may have ap-
peared. The statement of an enemy "vulnerabil-
ity" differs, incidentally, from the statement of a
"weakness" in that it should be phrased in terms of
the military action which might take advantage
of the specific weakness in question. For example,
an enemy weakness might be listed as a long and
overextended supply line. One way to take ad-
vantage of such a weakness, of course, would be to
direct heavy air strikes against these lines.
Therefore, the enemy would be said to be "vulner-
able" in this respect. In other words, while weak-
ness and vulnerability are closely related as
concepts, in expressing "vulnerabilities" the in-
telligence officer has carried his thinking one step
further in the direction of facilitating his com-
mander's eventual decision.
Enemy Capabilities
The intelligence estimate culminates in its third
paragraph with a statement of "enemy capabili-
ties." Like the enemy capabilities which appear
in the commander's estimate of the situation, these
capabilities represent all of the courses of action
which the enemy is "capable" of undertaking in
the future, and which, if undertaken, would affect
in one way or another the successful accomplish-
ment of our own mission.
From the point of view of planning these capa-
bilities are the central core of the intelligence
283
estimate. They are dealt with in considerable
more detail than in the commander's estimate, and
their formulation is the most exacting task the
intelligence officer has. For here he is not merely
collecting and cataloguing bits and pieces of in-
formation, but must pull the bits and pieces to-
gether, along with whatever preliminary conclu-
sions or inferences may already have been made,
into some meaningful and coherent prediction of
future enemy activity, on the basis of which his
commander can then make a sound operational
decision. Since capabilities are so important to
the whole process of command planning, it is
absolutely essential that the intelligence officer
understand clearly what they involve.
Ideally, a military commander can make a
sound military decision only if he first knows
exactly what the enemy forces opposing him are
going to do. Armed with such foreknowledge,
he could then dispose his own forces in such a
way as to achieve maximum effect; without that
knowledge he runs a greater or lesser risk of
failure. Unfortunately, this brand of prophetic
foreknowledge is rarely available to real (as dis-
tinct from ideal) human beings, and even more
rarely is it available to those engaged in military
operations. For even more than most types of
human endeavor, military operations are shrouded
in a cloud of uncertainty or inadequate informa-
tion, not merely about the enemy, but about our
own forces as well, a situation which the famous
military philosopher Clausewitz termed "the fog
of war."
It is the intelligence officer's responsibility to
dispel this fog insofar as it concerns the enemy,
and, traditionally, the notion of "capabilities" has
been the device by which he has attempted to do
so. Briefly, here is how it works. Since he can-
not say with certainty what the enemy is going
to do, at least he can determine all of the things
which the enemy is capable of doing. Then, if
his calculations have been careful and thorough,
the course which the enemy actually does select
will be among those considered. If, in addition,
the intelligence officer can also determine the de-
gree of probability that the enemy will adopt one
rather than another of these capabilities, or, in
other words, their order of relative probability,
he will actually have gone a good way towards
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reducing the area of uncertainty about the future
that attends any command decision, even if he has
not been able to predict with absolute certainty.
Capabilities vs Intentions
At first it might appear that a somewhat less
complicated solution to this problem of predicting
an enemy's future actions is available simply by
pinpointing the enemy's intentions. It might be
argued, for example (and with some merit), that
although a myriad of courses are theoretically
open to the enemy, only one can actually be se-
lected. To take all of these theoretical possibili-
ties into account before a command decision is
made, therefore, is wasteful both of time and sub-
stance. Hence why not concentrate instead on
what the enemy intends or wants to do rather than
on what he is capable of doing?
This concentration on intentions does have a
certain plausibility, but on closer inspection it
turns out to be deceptive. In the first place, in-
formation about enemy intentions, since it neces-
sarily involves the mind of the enemy's high com-
mand, is the most difficult of all to obtain; hence
the likelihood of a deduction based on solid evi-
dence rather than on some "hunch" is compara-
tively slight. Secondly, intentions, even when
accurately known, are by nature always subject
to change. Even when the commander is so for-
tunate as to have accurate word of the enemy's
intentions as of a certain moment in time, there is
always the possibility that some later development
may force the enemy to alter his plans and con-
centrate instead on some other course of which he
was equally capable but which, until then, he had
not been disposed to favor. Thus by focusing his
attention exclusively on the single course of action
which the commander is convinced that the enemy
intends to follow, and as a result disregarding
other courses of which the enemy was also entirely
capable, any slightest error in the commander's
information or any last-minute change in the
enemy's plans would prove completely disastrous.
From the vantage point of hindsight some com-
mentators have even suggested that the defeat at
Pearl Harbor was the result in part of this kind
of preoccupation with enemy intentions instead
of capabilities: convinced that any Japanese strike
would be directed to the south, we did not pay
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284
adequate attention to their alternative capability
of striking eastward.
In some exceptional cases it is possible for a
commander to get good information about enemy
intentions, and in such cases he would be making
a grave error not to act on it. A classic example
is the Battle of Midway, in World War IL Tipped
off from secret sources as to Japanese intentions
to strike at Midway, Admiral Nimitz deliberately
ignored a continuing Japanese capability to strike
once again towards Australia, and shifted all of
his limited carrier forces north to the Midway
area. That decision, of course, paid off heavily,
but even so it involved a calculated risk, not only
that the information was reliable and had been
properly translated and evaluated, but also that
the information was not deliberately leaked out
as part of a planned deception effort.
Similarly, Stalin is reported to have made the
fateful decision in November 1941 to reinforce
his Moscow defenses at the expense of his Man-
churian border positions mainly on the strength
of inside information from the Sorge espionage
ring that the impending Japanese move would be
south against the Americans and the British rather
than north against the U. S. S. R.
Indeed, on the highest level of military planning
a concern with intentions as well as capabilities
is probably inevitable, partly because it is unlikely
that a potential enemy will make any last-minute
change in basic national policy, and partly because
at the topmost level any comprehensive survey of
capabilities is likely to cover so wide an area that
it becomes almost meaningless without some addi-
tional information as to the specific direction (or
in other words, the "intent") of the enemy's cur-
rent planning. In terms of capabilities alone, for
example, the Soviet Union and her satellites could
be said to be capable of striking against the free
world at almost any of a great number of points
along a vast perimeter. Since it would be mani-
festly impossible for us to fortify all of these spots
equally well, we must therefore have some addi-
tional information as to whether the Soviets actu-
ally intend at the moment to exercise these capa-
bilities, and if so, precisely where.
Relative Probability
While a concern on the part of the intelligence
officer with enemy intentions in place of capabili-
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ties is a risky business, it is equally true that a
mere listing of capabilities will usually make the
picture of the enemy situation too broad and gen-
eral to be of any real help in operational planning.
There is a solution to this dilemma. It lies in
supplementing the bare listing of capabilities the-
oretically open to the enemy with an appraisal of
their relative probability of adoption. In this
way the intelligence officer and his commander
can focus more of their energy and attention in
some specific direction without at the same time
entirely disregarding all other alternatives.
The evidence that can be used to determine these
relative probabilities need not be as specialized as
that which is necessary to pinpoint a clear enemy
intention. Any direct "pipeline" to the enemy's
high command would, of course, supply substan-
tial objective evidence pointing to an increased
probability for one rather than another capability.
But so too would any number of other types of
circumstantial evidence, such as troop movements,
or the construction of defense fortifications. The
only restriction here is that arranging theoretical
capabilities in some specific order of probability
demands more than just a hunch; some real, ob-
jective evidence must be available, and the char-
acter of that evidence should be clearly described
in the paragraph of the intelligence estimate which
deals with capabilities. Without such evidence,
the intelligence officer can only report that no
evidence is available to indicate the relative prob-
ability of one capability over another.
"Adoption" vs "Accomplishment"
How is the statement of any enemy capability
actually phrased in the intelligence estimate?
What are the terms used to express it? To an-
swer these questions, it is necessary to review
briefly the basic purposes which this notion of
"capabilities" serves in the military planning
process.
An enemy capability has already been defined
above as a course of action which the enemy is
physically capable, with the forces at his disposal,
of undertaking (irrespective of whether he will
or will not undertake it) , and which, if under-
taken, would affect?either favorably or unfavor-
ably?the accomplishment of a commander's own
mission. In formulating these capabilities no
consideration is given to any opposition by our
own forces. They are entirely "unopposed" capa-
- bilities.
It is important for a commander to understand
the enemy's capabilities in order to make his own
decision accordingly. It is equally important for,
them to be known to the commander's subordi-
nates, so that they may be prepared for whatever
actions may be taken against their own particular
forces during the course of the actual operation.
In either case, it would seem only common sense
to express these capabilities as specifically and
exactly as possible. Ordinarily, careful answers
are required to the following four questions : what?
where? when? and in what strength? It is not
enough to say simply that the enemy is capable of
launching an attack with motor torpedo boats; if
possible, that statement should also include some
indication of where the attack can take place,
when or after what time it can occur, and in what
strength the enemy can launch it. Thus a capa-
bility might more helpfully be stated: "Attack
with up to 40 motor torpedo boats at any point
north of Cape Henry at any time after 1600 on 27
June." Whenever the pertinent information to
answer one or another of these specific questions
is not available, that fact should simply be noted
in the statement of the capability itself. Thus,
for example, without specific information on num-
bers, the capability above would be stated as fol-
lows: "Attack with an unknown number of motor
torpedo boats at Cape Henry at any time after
1600 on 27 June."
The chief responsibility of the intelligence
officer here is to reduce the broad area of uncer-
tainty_as much as possible. Even if exact infor-
mation as to how many boats are likely to
participate in such an attack is missing, it may
still be possible to indicate at least some broad out-
side limits, with the use of such terms as "with at
least" so many boats, or "with up to" so many.
Even when the limits are broad, the planners are
still better off than they would be without any
information at all.
Incidentally, in connection with air operations
there is a somewhat specialized procedure for ex-
pressing these specific details. Air capabilities,
whether offensive or defensive, are of two kinds:
maximum strength and sustained effort. The
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maximum strength, as might be supposed, is ex-
pressed in terms of the total number of aircraft of
certain types which are capable of operating over
the area in question. Sustained effort capability,
on the other hand, is measured in terms of the fre-
quency with which the aircraft available to the
enemy can attack on a continuing basis. It is cal-
culated, according to a carefully devised formula,
in terms of "sorties," or in other words, the num-
ber of flights which the enemy can make over the
target and return within some fixed period of time,
usually 24 hours. In calculating the sortie factor,
distances of different aircraft from the target,
cruising speeds, turn-around times on the ground,
and normal rates of attrition for aircraft in sus-
tained operations must all be taken into account.
No such preciseness as this is required when it
comes to incorporating these statements of enemy
capabilities in the commander's own estimate of
the situation. His problem, after all, is to decide
on some broad general course of action for his own
forces, leaving specific details to the plan and the
directive. Since the commander's decision must
be a general one, the several "own courses of
action" theoretically available to him to accom-
plish his mission, from which he must select the
best, must themselves be expressed in general
terms. This means that the enemy capabilities,
which have to be pitted or "war-gamed" against
these "own courses of action" in the commander's
estimate of the situation, must also be equally
broad and general in their formulation, if the
"war-gaming" process is to be meaningful at all.
Yet, as has just been seen, enemy capabilities as
formulated in the intelligence estimate are highly
specific and precise. Some device, then, is needed
to bridge the gap between the statement of enemy
capabilities in the intelligence estimate, and the
statement of enemy capabilities as they subse-
quently appear in the commander's estimate.
This is achieved by expressing enemy capabil-
ities in the commander's estimate in what are
called "terms of accomplishment ;" that is, in
words that designate the broad general result or
objective which the enemy will be trying to accom-
plish,' while in the intelligence estimate, on the
other hand, enemy capabilities are expressed in
terms of adoption, that is, in words designating
specific and individual courses of action which the
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286
enemy is capable of initiating or adopting, without
regard for the broad objective he may be trying to
accomplish.
Such words as "destroy," "interrupt," "sink,"
for example, are words which designate a com-
pleted result or accomplishment, while such words
as "attack" and "strike" designate an action that
is adopted without implying the results it may or
may not accomplish. By employing this "accom-
plishment" phraseology it becomes possible to boil
down a sizeable number of "adoption" capabilities
from the intelligence estimate into a single one
for use in the commander's estimate and that
means, of course, that the job of "war-gaming"
enemy capabilities against own courses of action
becomes a much simpler matter than it would
otherwise be. For example, an intelligence esti-
mate might list a motor torpedo boat capability,
an air attack capability, a submarine capability,
a coastal defense gun capability, etc., each with
different specific components of when, where, and
in what strength. Yet all of these individual
"adoption" capabilities might conceivably be di-
rected toward the same broad result, for example,
to "destroy our amphibious force prior to the
ship-to-shore movement." In that case, the latter
would amount to a single "accomplishment" capa-
bility of the enemy, which could then be used by
the commander in his own estimate of the situa?
-
tion for determining his ultimate decision.
This distinction between "adoption" and "ac-
complishment" capabilities often confronts stu-
dents with one of their greatest difficulties in un-
derstanding the estimate form. Actually, most
of the difficulty is probably semantic, with words
suggesting a greater distinction than actually ex-
ists. As long as the intelligence officer under-
stands the necessity for "boiling down" the half
dozen or so specific capabilities that he has come
up with in his own estimate into two or three more
general capabilities for use in the commander's
estimate, he should find no practical difficulty in
this distinction. The boiling-down job may be
done by the intelligence officer himself after the
intelligence estimate has been submitted, or it may
emerge out of informal discussions which the
whole staff conducts on the individual capabilities
originally worked up by the intelligence officer.
In either case the enemy's situation is the only
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proper guide. Both types of capabilities are "un-
opposed," that is to say, they are formulated
without regard for whatever opposing effect our
own forces may be able to offer, which is some-
thing that is considered, of course, at a later point
in the commander's estimate.
The discussion of enemy capabilities in the in-
telligence estimate involves three distinct stages.
First, the various "adoption" capabilities are
identified and listed, as specifically as the available
information warrants. In the second stage each
individual capability is discussed, a process that
normally covers three things: (1) the effect of the
capability, should it be adopted by the enemy,
on the accomplishment of our own mission; (2)
the relation of the capability to other enemy capa-
bilities; that is, whether it can be adopted along
with certain other capabilities, or whether its
adoption precludes the adoption of others; and,
(3) what objective evidence is available to indicate
the relative probability of adoption. In the third
stage the capabilities previously identified are re-
listed in the order of the relative probability thus
deduced. Any boiling down of these various
"adoption" capabilities into "accomplishment"
capabilities for insertion directly into the com-
mander's estimate of the situation is not a job
that is normally done within the conventional
framework of the intelligence estimate itself.
Strategic Intelligence Estimates
Before leaving the subject of intelligence esti-
mates generally and the contribution they make
towards basic military decisions, a brief additional
word is in order with regard to the form which
these estimates should take in the case of strategic
situations.
In the foregoing discussion the intelligence esti-
mate has been described as it applies to a typical
operational situation, where some specific opera-
tional mission has been assigned to a naval com-
mander. Many times, however, important deci-
sions of a military nature must be taken in times of
peace, when no actual operations against an
"enemy" are involved, such as those relating to the
deployment of defensive forces, or the rate of mili-
tary production, or the type of recruitment pro-
gram to be instituted. Circumstances which pro-
voke decisions of this type are customarily referred
to in military parlance as "strategic" situations.
The former chapter on the components of intelli-
gence knowledge indicated the tremendous variety
of strategic problems.
In strategic situations no less than in opera-
tional ones, however, it is imperative that com-
mand decisions be made on the basis of the best
information available concerning the potential
enemy and the potential area of operations. And.
so there is a need for strategic intelligence esti-
mates. At the same time the somewhat specialized
character of strategic situations dictates certain
differences in the format of strategic estimates
from that already prescribed for operational
estimates.
For one thing, since no hostilities are involved,
there can be no "mission" to govern the prepara-
tion of the estimate and determine what material
should or should not be included. Instead the
strategic intelligence estimate customarily opens
with a statement of the specific problem or question
posed by the strategic planner or other authority
which requests the preparation of the estimate.
Ordinarily this will have something to do with the
military capacity or potential of some foreign
country; for example, its capacity to oppose oper-
ations from some outside quarter. Or it may deal
with the probable future course of foreign mili-
tary operations already in progress. In each case
the nature of the estimate is determined by the
specific information which the strategic planners
are interested in getting, and the final conclusions
of the estimate should answer the specific question
posed at the outset. This means that the conclu-
sions of a strategic estimate may differ somewhat
from the rather formal statement of capabilities
and relative probabilities which has been pre-
scribed above for the standard operational
estimate.
The second major difference between strategic
and operational intelligence estimates is that in
the former more than one foreign military force
may be involved. While it is not the prime respon-
sibility of the intelligence officer to deal with the
strength or capabilities of his own forces, all for-
eign forces not under the direct control of his
commander do concern him, either as potential en-
emies or simply as elements which have to be
analyzed and appraised in order to understand
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some particular area of the world in which the
strategic planners may be interested. In fact, in
areas where foreign military forces may be actu-
ally fighting one another the intelligence officer
must not only survey the strength of each of these
separate forces in the strategic estimate, but must
also attempt to visualize the probable future course
of that conflict. This means that he will actually
have to conduct almost the same kind of mental
"war game" between opposing forces (though in
this case, none of them our own) which a com-
mander performs in his Estimate of the Situation.
It also means that the conclusions of a strategic
intelligence estimate of this kind would certainly
go well beyond the mere statement of "adoption"
capabilities in the customary operational intelli-
gence estimate to a fuller consideration of prob-
able results and developments.
Because of these differences, no standard format
for the strategic intelligence estimate has been
developed. In practice, the form which estimates
of this type take is determined by the particular
government agency which may be involved, as well
as by the type of information desired. Neverthe-
less, with the differences mentioned above, all esti-
mates follow the same general principles, and suc-
cess depends first on the careful collection and
marshalling of relevant facts, and then on the
careful analysis of all the possibilities and impli-
cations that logically follow.
INTELLIGENCE IN THE PLANNING PROCESS
Preliminary Procedures
Once the commander's decision has been made,
the staff turns to the task of working up detailed
plans to implement that decision. First of all,
the intelligence officer will probably want to block
out some kind of tentative planning schedule for
the guidance of his own division, so as to provide
enough time to do all the many detailed jobs that
have to be clone prior to the actual target date.
As planning progresses, of course, some changes
in the target date or in other details may be made
which will dictate corresponding changes in the
intelligence planning schedule, and to this extent
no schedule can be entirely hard and fast. But
at least a careful intelligence planning schedule
can serve as a reminder to all hands of what re-
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288
mains to be done and the time available for doing
it.
At this preliminary stage the intelligence divi-
sion should also adopt, if it has not already done
so, some kind of standard operating procedure
(SOP), both for itself and for the various other
intelligence activities in the forces under the com-
mander. This SOP should be issued to all sub-
ordinate units over the signature of the com-
mander, and should cover most of the intelligence
matters that are normally germane to any opera-
tion, such as counterintelligence, the handling of
captured documents and prisoners of war, the
filing of periodic reports, etc. Like the planning
schedule the standard operating procedure is in-
tended chiefly as a guide and may be modified later
as circumstances require.
Essential Elements of Information
The first substantive job which an intelligence
officer must do in the planning stage is to make
provision for the collection of whatever additional
information is needed to insure the success of the
forthcoming operation. As was pointed out
earlier in connection with the development of the
commander's plan, the collection of necessary in-
telligence is usually one of the component opera-
tions involved in the execution of any decision, and,
unlike some of the others, one that has to be
started well in advance of the actual target date.
The pertinent information on hand has already
been briefed and interpreted in the intelligence
estimate. After the decision has been made a care-
ful study of this estimate will usually show that
many items of information about the enemy or the
area of operations, which should be known to in-
sure a successful operation, are missing. Before
planning can proceed properly this missing in-
formation must be obtained. Questions like these
may have to be answered: is the soil of the beaches
firm enough to support our combat vehicles?
Will the enemy defend his beaches or counterat-
tack instead from inland positions after our troops
are ashore? Is there enough water in the area to
sustain our troops without additional supplies of
our own? Such questions are termed "essential
elements of information," often abbreviated as
"EEI."
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In practice, of course, not every missing item of
information a commander thinks he ought to know
will turn up before the operation actually gets
under way. Yet the commander may decide to go
ahead anyway. To that extent, therefore, some of
the essential elements of information are not,
strictly speaking, "essential" to the success of the
operation.
The Collection Plan
Having decided what information is needed,
how does the intelligence officer go about collect-
ing it? The first step is to determine specifically
what concrete evidence might answer the questions
posed by the essential elements of information.
For example, if one of the EEIs is: "Will the
enemy defend his beaches or counterattack instead
from inland positions ?" then evidence such as the
location of fixed defenses or established fields of
fire would tend to answer the question. Specific
bits of evidence of this kind which can answer the
EEIs are called indications, and the first step in
collecting information is to outline the indications
that apply to each individual EEI.
Now if information is to be collected, it must, of
course, be collected by somebody. The next step,
then, is to determine which units or individuals are
available, and which are best qualified, for the
collection task. In the case of beach defenses, for
example, an underwater demolition team or a
photo reconnaissance unit might be best equipped
to spot the pertinent indications.
Roughly, there are four broad categories of
potential intelligence collectors: (a) nonintelli-
gence units and personnel within our own com-
mand, such as ground troops, aircraft, submarines,
etc.; (b) personnel of the intelligence division,
such as technical intelligence teams, translator and
interpreter units, scouts, etc.; (c) military per-
sonnel not tinder our command, such as ONI, other
governmental intelligence agencies, other military
services, and friendly foreign military personnel
and agencies; and (d) nonmilitary personnel, such
as civilian informants. Personnel of the intelli-
gence division can of course be used for such col-
lection tasks as the intelligence officer himself may
determine, while the services of military personnel
not under our command would be available only
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on request through proper channels. The use of
civilian personnel would depend on the nature of
the desired information, and the competency of
the individual. Nonintelligence personnel within
the command can be used only with the coopera-
tion and approval of other staff officers, so that
the assignment of collection duties to operational
units will not conflict with other operation duty.
Indeed it is chiefly for this reason that the com-
mander himself is always considered as officially
determining the EEIs, for he alone can judge
whether some missing item of information is w
important to him that its collection becomes a
priority assignment for his own operational forces.
After collection duties have been allotted to the
units available, the next job is to draw up a sched-
ule for getting that information back to the in-
telligence division in time to use it. Some infor-
mation, for instance, will be needed almost imme-
diately or at least prior to some fixed deadline.
Other items, like the condition of beach obstacles,
for example, should be reported in terms of the
current situation. Still other information, such
as order of battle data, should be reported on a
regular and continuing basis. These differing re-
quirements dictate the need of a careful reporting
schedule, so that units doing the actual collecting
will submit reports in time to be of use.
In instructing collection personnel not trained
in intelligence work, the intelligence officer should
avoid using the broad and general terminology of
the essential elements of information or even of
the indications. Rather be should clearly describe
exactly what he wants them to look for and report.
Otherwise the collection effort may become a com-
plete waste of time. In the case of information
on beach defenses, it probably would not be enough
to tell an air reconnaissance group simply to
check and report on "beach defenses." The intel-
ligence officer should state the precise kind of
defenses he has in mind: pill boxes, trenches,
barbed wire, underwater obstacles, or coastal de-
fense guns. It is always much easier to see some-
thing when you know exactly what you are looking
for; and the intelligence officer will get better re-
sults from collection assignments if he takes noth-
ing for granted. These details, therefore, should
serve as the basis for specific orders to collectors,
and the intelligence officer's responsibility is to see
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INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION PLAN
Essential elements
of information
Indications
Basis for
specific orders
Agencies to be employed
.........,
Tim* and place for
reporting information
I I I
0 e
u ? -a
'41 vg..22
-.5-3i T 2 6" ..E - i I i
11111111
(list for each
(any additional
(designate with an "x" mark
(specify the head.
individual EEI)
instructions that
which agencies are able to
quarters or section
will facilitate
obtain the specific bit of in.
to which reports
collection of de-
"fa motion, and by circling one
should be made, the
sired inform?.
such "x" select the one which
frequency with which
tion)
will
for
have
its
major
collection)
responsibility
they should be made,
and any deadline )
Figure 13.?The Intelligence collection plan? abular form.
that they are developed with enough care to pro-
duce the results he wants.
Taken together these five steps: determining
the EEI, listing the indications, designating the
collection agencies, scheduling reporting dead-
lines, and issuing specific orders to collection per-
sonnel comprise what is known as the collection
plan. The collection plan may be drawn up in a
variety of forms, but experience has proved that
one similar to the tabular format shown in figure
13 is most useful. The important thing is not
what form is used but whether all of the essential
steps have been taken.
Collecting information is not a job which ends
when the formal directive has been issued or even
when the operation has started. It continues
throughout the life of the operation, and so pro-
vision must also be made within the text of the
operation order itself for the rules and techniques
that should govern additional collection. That is
one of the main purposes for the next major intel-
ligence job, the preparation of the intelligence
annex.
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290
The Intelligence Annex
It has been previously shown how at each suc-
cessive stage in the command process the intelli-
gence staff assistant performs some specific job
designed to aid the commander in the successful
execution of that particular stage. After the com-
mander's decision has been made and his basic
plan developed, the next command step is to issue
the formal directive, the operation plan or opera-
tion order. Intelligence has two legitimate inter-
ests in the text of this directive. One is to see that
it includes all information about the enemy and
area of operations which subordinate commanders
need to know to carry out their own parts of the
operation successfully. The other is to dissem-
inate to all subordinate headquarters such instruc-
tions as may be required to insure the full and
proper functioning of the intelligence aspects of
the operation.
In small operations, both purposes can ade-
quately be served simply by incorporating the
appropriate material within the body of the direc-
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tive as briefly and concisely as possible (sometimes
perhaps even to the point of undue brevity), and
by putting all amplifying details, including those
dealing with intelligence, into separate anaexes.
Customarily, all material relating to intelligence
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in any operation plan or order will be found in
what is known as the intelligence annex.
Following is the standard form for an intelli-
gence annex which is designed to cover the three
principal tasks which the annex must perform.
Standard Intelligence Annex Form,
File Number
CLASSIFICATION
Type of basic directive
and serial number
Title of superior of issuing command
Title of issuing command and admin-
istrative title
Name of flagship or headquarters
Place of issue
Time of issue
INTELLIGENCE ANNEX
Map or chart references:
PART I?INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
1. The Situation
a. General situation
b. Enemy capabilities
c. Characteristics of the area of operations
(1) subdivisions as required
d. Enemy situation
(1) subdivisions as required
PART II?INTELLIGENCE MISSION and COLLECTION PLAN
2. Intelligence Mission
3. Essential Elements of Information
4. Collection plan
a. Orders to subordinate or attached units
b. Requests to higher, adjacent, and cooperating units
PART III?SUPPLEMENTARY INSTRUCTIONS
5. Measures for handling prisoners, captured documents, materiel, etc.
6. Maps, charts, models, and photographs
7. Specialist teams
8. Counterintelligence
9. Reports and distribution
10. Other subjects as pertinent
Appendices and tabs (as necessary)
DISTRIBUTION LIST
Authentication
Authenticated
Flag Secretary
S The Commander
Rank
Title
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In the first part the information about the
enemy and area of operations is summarized. In
the second, intelligence collection tasks for sub-
ordinate units of the command to perform during
the course of the operation are assigned. In the
third all general procedures for handling and co-
ordinating all other intelligence matters within
the command as a whole are promulgated.
Generally speaking, the information in Part I
of the annex is the same information about the
enemy and area of operations which appeared pre-
viously in the intelligence estimate, except, of
course, that it has been revised, expanded, and
brought up to date by any information collected
since then. As in the estimate, this summary of
information, especially that dealing with the area,
should include brief conclusions as to its signifi-
cance for combat operations.
Occasionally an intelligence annex may be fur-
ther broken down into supporting appendices and
tabs whenever information of an elaborate or de-
tailed sort can be better presented outside the body
of the annex proper. Tide and sunrise tables, for
example, might well be included in a separate
appendix or tab and merely referenced in the body
of the annex itself. There is no set pattern to
follow; it all depends on the specific circumstances
and volume of information at hand.
The real meat of this first part of the annex is
the section dealing with enemy capabilities. This,
too, generally resembles the corresponding section
in the intelligence estimate, except that it must be
revised and brought up to date in line with what-
ever new intelligence may have been developed
since the estimate originally appeared. Here, in-
cidentally, the value of expressing enemy capabil-
ities in specific terms of what, when, where, and
in what strength becomes clear, for the annex is
designed primarily to guide and assist subordi-
nate commanders. From their point of view the
most important information about the enemy is
what he can throw against their own particular
force or vessels?plus when, where, and to what
extent he can do so. As in the estimate, enemy
capabilities should be not merely listed, but should
also be discussed in terms both of their effect on
the accomplishment of our own mission and their
relative probability of adoption, although both
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292
discussions may be more condensed than they were
in the intelligence estimate.
Part II of the annex comprises the latest intelli-
gence mission and collection plan. Since many
of the tasks provided for in the collection plan
which was drawn up at the outset of the planning
stage will by this time have been successfully com-
pleted, the collection plan reproduced in the in-
telligence annex will not be an exact duplicate.
Only missing information is handled in any col-
lection plan.
The collection plan of the annex will therefore
list only the current essential elements of informa-
tion and their indications. The balance of the col-
lection plan will outline the arrangements that
have been made to get that information.
Normally, these arrangements will fall into two
divisions. The first includes the collection tasks
assigned directly to subordinate units of the com-
mander's own forces, listed in the order in which
the units appear in the task organization para-
graph of the operation order. All of the details
that may be needed to insure adequate collection
should also be included here, because this listing of
intelligence collection assignments in the annex
amounts to a specific order to the subordinate units
involved to perform the collection task. In fact
from this point of view the intelligence annex is
actually an integral part of the order itself, and
must be carefully perused by all subordinates for
possible assignments. For example, the "scouting
unit," in addition to its other assignments, may
be instructed to report all sightings of ships, air-
craft, and small coastal craft, and the "air support
unit" may be instructed to make specific photo-
graphic reconnaissance flights.
The second division of collection arrangements
lists the requests for information that have been
made to other headquarters. Here, for example,
might be recorded the fact that certain informa-
tion about guerrilla activities has been requested
of Army headquarters, and will be delivered by
special messenger prior to a certain hour. The
collection assignments to units of the command
and the requests made to outside agencies together
will give subordinate commanders an adequate
picture of all cuirrent plans for getting the infor-
mation they need in time for them to use it.
Part III of the annex is a compendium of gen-
eral instructions for the guidance of subordinate
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units in carrying out all other normal intelligence
duties and responsibilities in the course of the
operation. These include such subjects as the han-
dling of prisoners of war, captured documents and
materiel, the security and counterintelligence
measures to be taken, instructions relating to maps,
charts, photographs, and the preparation of pe-
riodic reports?in a word, all of the matters which
are normally covered in the intelligence standard
operating procedure of the command. While this
procedure is already presumably in effect within
the command, the annex covers these matters in
specific relation to the current operation, and
therefore may involve certain changes in the exist-
ing SOP that are required by the particular cir-
cumstances of this specific operation. For exam-
ple, the type of prisoners captured in certain
operations may be unusual, or there may be special
counterintelligence measures required. The pro-
cedures outlined in this final section of the annex,
therefore, must anticipate all of these special sit-
uations and provide adequate guidance to all sub-
ordinate intelligence sections in dealing with them.
Without the direction thereby provided the intel-
ligence work of the whole command may suffer
from improper coordination and integration.
INTELLIGENCE IN THE RUNNING ACTION
Just as combat is the "pay-off" for the com-
mander, so too is it the "pay-off" for his intelli-
gence officer. Once an operation is underway the
commander's duty is to supervise it closely and be
ready to make whatever changes in his original
orders may be dictated by differences that develop
between the actual combat situation and the sit-
uation that was originally 'visualized by his staff
planners in drawing up the operation order.
These differences are of two principal kinds: dif-
ferences in the position of our own forces or their
rate of progress in executing the plans laid down
for them, and differences in the enemy's situation
or the character of the area of operations as the
action moves forward. Differences of the second
category, of course, will be the concern of the in-
telligence officer.
As was the case at Tarawa, it may develop that
actual underwater conditions are vastly different
from those anticipated in the original order; or,
as at Biak, it may turn out that what was regarded
in the original planning as a gentle, rolling hill is
in reality a sharp coral escarpment, filled with a
myriad of limestone caves. New weapons may be
encountered, as they were at Okinawa, or new and
unexpected concentrations of troops, as was the
case at Leyte. All of this new information, col-
lected as an operation progresses by means of the
very collection procedures which were set up ear-
lier in the intelligence annex, must be evaluated
and interpreted by the intelligence officer for any
possible affect it may have on his current estimate
of enemy capabilities. Any new conclusions that
emerge must be passed along very quickly to the
commander himself for use in his own reestimate
and in any revision of his orders.
The intelligence cycle is in high gear. New
information is collected as a byproduct of the
fighting, processed by the intelligence staff divi-
sion, and disseminated to the commander for his
consideration and possible use in supervising the
progress of the action. The tempo is rapid, for
unless information is collected, processed, dis-
seminated, and used in time it is completely worth-
less. So intelligence officers in combat have a re-
sponsibility not merely for accuracy but also for
speed. While success may to some extent depend
on individual qualities of alertness and decisive-
ness of mind, it can also be greatly facilitated by
the understanding and use of proper techniques
on the part of the intelligence division as a whole.
293
Plots
One of these techniques is the prompt and care-
ful recording of all new information about the
enemy and the area of operations that is received
during an operation. The methods of recording
may vary somewhat from command to command
and from operation to operation, but in general
all of them should prove helpful.
A plot of enemy positions and current opera-
tions is perhaps the simplest and most effective
way of recording operational data. Such plots
may be kept directly on a map or chart, or, per-
haps more readily, on an overlay, and they may
be of several kinds, depending on the specific op-
erations at hand. One plot, for example, might
show enemy submarine sightings, another the po-
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sition of enemy surface forces, and still another
that of enemy merchant ships. In an amphibious
operation some kind of plot of enemy ground posi-
tions, enemy gun batteries, and possible enemy
targets ashore would almost certainly have to be
maintained. An air plot, with arcs indicating
maximum combat radii for the various enemy
aircraft involved, is also a must if the enemy pos-
sesses any air strength at all. Order of battle
information on these plots may he shown directly
on the overlay, or on a small sheet or card posted
to one side and referenced directly to the plot
itself.
In some cases the intelligence division may also
be required to maintain a plot of friendly posi-
tions, although usually this is a job for operations
not intelligence. The intelligence plot, however,
will have to include enough information about
friendly positions so that the data about the enemy
can be properly understood.
The chief value of operational plots of this sort
is that they make it possible for an intelligence
division to record information in a form that
enables the significance of that information to be
recognized by the commander or any of his staff
officers almost at a glance. Thus it must be as
complete and current as possible. Not all of the
information which comes in during an operation,
however, can be recorded graphically, and the
nature of any plot imposes certain limitations on
the extent of the data that can be included on it.
Other techniques are therefore needed if the in-
telligence division is to do a thorough recording
job.
Journals and Worksheets
Normally the first step in recording information
is its entry in the intelligence log or journal. The
journal is nothing more than a chronological list-
ing of all incoming dispatches and other items of
intelligence value. It insures that nothing is
overlooked, and that all incoming items are
promptly referred to the appropriate part of the
division for further recording, analysis, and dis-
semination. A journal usually consists of a num-
ber assigned to each new item, a listing of the
point of its origin and time of receipt, a brief
description of the item itself, and finally a nota-
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294
tion as to its disposition within the division,
whether to plot, worksheets, file, or elsewhere.
(See fig. 14.)
Once new information has been properly logged
in, it is further recorded on the appropriate work-
sheet. Worksheets separate information into the
major categories that are of interest to the intelli-
gence division at the time. These categories will,
of course, be dictated by the character of the oper-
ations currently in progress. Separate work-
sheets, for example, might be kept for enemy sub-
marines, enemy ground forces, enemy aircraft,
enemy morale, or enemy guerrilla activity. Each
worksheet entry should include its journal number,
a risum4 of the information it contains with the
letter-number code as to source and accuracy, and
such conclusions or deductions as may properly
be drawn from it. As each new item is added on
individual worksheets, it becomes possible for an.
intelligence officer to grasp rather easily the owns-
tative effect of new information and to recognize
at any early moment any significant trends or
developments that may be taking place to alter
one or another of the enemy's capabilities. (See
fig. 15.)
Files for Operational Intelligence
The importance of an adequate filing system in
any intelligence activity has been discussed pre-
viously in the sections on collection and process-
ing. Since operational intelligence files invoice
a much more detailed job of cataloguing than do
worksheets, they cannot have top priority in the
early stages of a combat operation. Nevertheless,
an intelligence officer with a combat unit cannot
neglect the maintenance of good files as a con-
tinuing responsibility, and it is perhaps only a
mild exaggeration to say that in the long run an
intelligence division will prove to be no better
than its files.
The organization of operational intelligence
files is likewise a prime consideration. In general
the main subject headings should correspond to
the principal categories of enemy activity that
are likely to be of continuing interest to the intel-
ligence division, and these should then be further
cross-referenced with as much care and detail as
time permits.
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INTELLIGENCE STAFF PROCEDURES C 0 N FID ENTIAL
COMMAND
SAMPLE INTELLIGENCE JOURNAL SHEET FORM
From: To: Date
LOCATION
TimeIncidents,
Serial
No.
Date/
time
messages, orders, etc.
(identify, with place and time of
origin)
Action
k
to en
In
Out
'
,
'
Figure 14.?Sample intelligence loumal sheet form.
295
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SAMPLE INTELLIGENCE WORKSHEET FORM
COMMAND: SUBJECT ?
Journal No.
of source
Date of
source
Information
Evaluation and
comments
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Figure 15.?Sample intelligence worksheet form.
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INTELLIGENCE STAFF PROCEDURES
Running Intelligence Estimate
From the commander's point of view what is
needed most in supervising the execution of a
planned action is word of any significant changes
in enemy capabilities. To meet this requirement
the intelligence officer must maintain a running
intelligence estimate, an accurate, up-to-the-
minute assessment of enemy capabilities based on
the latest available information.
If all the information coming into the intelli-
gence division in the course of an operation has
been properly recorded along the lines indicated
above, the spadework for such a running estimate
will have been done. In most cases an up-to-the-
minute estimate can then be made simply by in-
specting the various plots and worksheets to see
where enemy capabilities may have changed.
There is no standard technique for interpreting
the effect of new information, but some intelli-
gence officers have found it helpful to maintain a
special notebook or clipboard for this purpose.
To a certain extent the conclusions and deductions
column of the worksheets themselves will serve as
a running estimate, provided the breakdown of
the individual worksheets has been made to con-
form with the principal enemy capabilities, and
provided also that the conclusions in the work-
sheets have been drawn up with care and imagina-
tion.
But whatever technique is used, it is important
to remember that the maintenance of a running
intelligence estimate, like the drafting of an orig-
inal estimate, is not just an automatic procedure.
In intelligence it is always possible to fail to see
the forest because of the trees; the failure can lead
to disaster. Ultimately, a sound running estimate
depends on the perception and imagination of the
intelligence officer himself. Hundreds of bits of
information can conceivably come in and be re-
corded without making a single significant change
in enemy capabilities, while one small item might
well change a whole picture. The intelligence
officer must be constantly alert to recognize that
single item in time, and no system of automatic
techniques under the sun can do the job for him.
All that the use of proper recording and cata-
loguing techniques can do is to cut down the like-
lihood of error. That alone is ample justification
for their employment.
Intelligence Periodic Reports and Summaries
The responsibilities of the operational intelli-
gence officer are not discharged when he has re-
corded new information, or cataloged it properly,
or even interpreted it correctly. That informa-
tion must get to the man who can use it?in most
cases the commander?and get there in time. In
military operations, an astute and discerning anal-
ysis that is locked up in somebody's files or on
somebody's clipboard is completely worthless. To
be any good analyses must be disseminated.
The responsibility for timely dissemination is
also the intelligence officer's. Ile must not wait
to be asked about changes in enemy capabilities;
he must see that any new word is passed along to
his commander as soon as it is available. In spite
of all the emphasis which has been placed in these
pages on formal procedures of one sort or another,
the intelligence officer must never forget that at
best these are only means to an end, never ends in
themselves.
In an actual operation dissemination to the
commander himself should be on a direct, per-
sonal, and usually informal basis. But when it
comes to disseminating new information to the
commander's superiors or his subordinates, this
is usually done more formally in one or another
of the reports and summaries which have been
prescribed by the intelligence SOP.
One such periodic report, the intelligence sum-
mary, is usually prepared and submitted in mes-
sage form every 21 hours. This summary, which
may be distributed both up and down in the chain
of command, should be as brief as possible, and
generally should include a resume of enemy opera-
tions, a brief of any significant new intelligence
developed during the period, current weather in-
formation, estimated enemy casualties for the
period, and any significant changes in enemy
capabilities.
Depending on the desires of the particular com-
mander and the circumstances of the operation,
other more extensive intelligence reports may be
issued on a less frequent basis. Once a week, for
example, is typical for a periodic report, which
would summarize enemy operations during the
preceding week in much more detail than is pos-
sible in an intelligence summary, and which would
also include more extensive discussions of any new
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items of possible interest. As reproduction fa-
cilities permit, photographs may also be included,
and theoretically there is no limit to the elaborate-
ness of intelligence reports of this kind. The in-
telligence publications of such agencies as
JICPOA and SEFIC during World War II are
typical of the sort of thing that can be done. The
graphic attractiveness of these publications is not
just a matter of aesthetic delight for those re-
sponsible for getting them out. It serves a func-
tional purpose in encouraging the reading and
study of the report by more individuals who might
profit by the information it contains. Often an
intelligence officer has a real selling job to do with
the information he has amassed, and it can fre-
quently be facilitated by the attractiveness of the
particular package in which it is presented.
Still another kind of formal dissemination of
operational intelligence is the special report, or-
dinarily submitted directly to a superior whenever
certain information of unusual significance has
been received. In cases of considerable urgency
such a report would be transmitted by radio mes-
sage, in which case it would be know as a flash
report. There is no set schedule for filing such
reports, of course, since they are submitted as
circumstances dictate.
Like all other divisions of an operational head-
quarters, intelligence will also be expected to pre-
pare a post-action report, summarizing the func-
tioning of the intelligence division during the
operation, discussing intelligence successes or
failures, and outlining any recommendations for
future operations. Reports of this kind are
usually widely circulated, and will eventually be-
come a basis for training activities, for guidance
in connection with future operations, and for writ-
ing the official history of the operation at a later
date.
CONCLUSION
This chapter has outlined the principal tech-
niques and procedures by means of which the
unique service that intelligence is qualified to per-
form is actually made available to naval corn-
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298
manders in the planning and execution of opera-
tions entrusted to them. Each of the forms
described here is appropriate to some particular
stage of military command. The closeness of that
relationship can readily be seen from the compos-
ite chart shown in figure 16.
Complicated as some of these intelligence pro-
cedures may appear to be, especially on first ac-
quaintance, the experienced officer knows how
readily they are mastered by practice and how
quickly they become an almost unconscious part
of his daily routine. Important as techniques and
procedures themselves are, they are overshadowed
by certain other considerations. The form which
an intelligence estimate or an intelligence annex
takes, after all, is not nearly so important in the
ultimate success of an operation as the extent and
accuracy of the information it contains, or the
soundness and imagination of the deductions and
inferences drawn from it. On the basis of either
of these an operational commander may well be
obliged to make a decision affecting the lives of
thousands of persons, and perhaps the security
of the Nation as a whole.
No form or technique alone can guarantee sound
decision. At best intelligence procedures are like
windows, most effective when virtually invisible,
and when the attention of their user is allowed to
focus almost exclusively on what is being pre-
sented rather than on how it is being presented.
Every intelligence officer must remember that
the ultimate purpose of intelligence, and hence the
overriding test of every bit of activity within the
intelligence division, is the extent of service which
can be performed in support of strategic or tac-
tical military operations. To be sure the forms
and techniques outlined in this chapter represent
those which have well served the intelligence needs
of operational commanders in the past. Still this
does not mean that they must remain forever in-
violate, or that future operations and changing
circumstances will not dictate certain revisions and
improvements. The wise intelligence officer should
constantly be on the lookout for such changes and
be ready to adjust himself accordingly.
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INTELLIGENCE STAFF PROCEDURES
HOW INTELLIGENCE SERVES COMMAND
The lines anti arrows indicate the points at which material developed by'the
Intelligence Staff Division is used by the Commander in his process of operational
planning and supervision of the planned action.
COMMAND
ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION
I. Mission
2. Situation and Courses election
.a. Considerations affecting possible courses
of action
(I) Tho general slfiltairal
(2) Characteristics of the area
(3) Relative combat power
(4) Strength and weakness factors
b. Enemy capabilities (in terms of accomplish.
went)
3. Analysis of opposing courses of action
4. Comparison clown courses of action
5. Decision
DEVELOPMENT OF THE PLAN
I. Analyze the decision
2. State any assumptions used
3. List component operations
(a) Obtain intelligence
(b) Movement or deployment
(c) Protect own forces
(d) Isolate the oblective
(e) Gain the objective,
(F) Provide logistic support
(g) Provide for security and deception
(h) Other component operations
4. Determine how components are to be carried
out; list forces available
5. Organize forces into task organisation
6. Assign tasks
7. Solve command problems
8. Compile necessary information
THE DIRECTIVE (Op?Plan or Op.Order)
Task Organization
I. General situation
2. General plan
3. Task paragraph
4. Logistics paragraph
5. Command paragraph
Annexes
INTELLIGENCE
INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
1. MI 16110.1 (same as command mission)
2. The Situation
(
a. General situotion
b. Characteristics of the area
c. Enemy situation
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3. Enemy capabilities (in terms of adoption)
(
a. Preliminary identification
b. Analysis
c. Final listing in order of relative probability
INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION PL.AN
11. Determine the essential elements of information
2. Analyze each EEI by identifying indications
(spell out collection orders)
I Assign collection mission to available collection
agencies (via orders or requests)
4. Establish schedule of reports of collected infor-
mation
SUPERVISION OF THE PLANNED ACTION
in order tor
1. Prevent error or misunderstanding
2. Provide for change is enemy situation
3. Provide for change in awn situation
4. Provide for change in own elision
A
INTELLIGENCE ANNEX
r's
Part 1 - Intelligence Summary
I. The situation
(a) Genera situation
(b) Enemy capabilities
(a) Characteristics of the moo
(d) Enemy situation
Part Il ... Mission and Collection Plan
2. Mission
3. Essential elements of information
A. Collection plan
(a) Orders to subordinate units
(b) Requests to higher units
Part 111 - Supplementary Instructior?s
5. POW, Documents, captured materiel
6. Maps, charts, models, photographs
7. Specialist teams
8. Counterintelligence
9. Reports and distribution
O. Other sublects as approprinte
Appendices end Tabs
RUNNING INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
(i. Situation plots
2. Journals, worksheets, files
3. Running and revised estimates
1. Periodic and special reports
Figure 16.--Intelligence-speclalIzed adjunct to command.
299
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CHAPTER 13
INTELLIGENCE IN SUPPORT OF OPERATIONAL COMMAND
Throughout the preceding chapter on Intelli-
gence Staff Procedures we saw the cycle in action
during the planning and execution of naval opera-
tions. The procedures followed and the techniques
employed are in general common to all types of
operations. This chapter will continue the dis-
cussion of intelligence in support of command,
but will be concerned more specifically with its
operational environment. Special attention will
be given to the responsibilities and duties of the
intelligence officer in operational billets to which
he may be assigned.
In order to understand the increased importance
of intelligence in a great variety of operational
commands, it is helpful to review the development
of the types of warfare in which the Navy partici-
pates, both at sea and on shore. The experiences
of World War II afford the background. Intelli-
gence can prepare itself for continued service only
by a careful study of its past performance, and
the lessons learned in former operations will point
the way to future improvements.
INTELLIGENCE CENTERS
In a global war, the intelligence needs of one
theater will differ widely from the requirements of
another. The problem of dissemination alone
makes it desirable to establish intelligence organi-
zations under the area commanders to assume re-
sponsibility for the expeditious distribution of in-
telligence material to the forces that can use it.
This need was recognized at an early date in
World War II, and steps were taken to provide
for the establishment of intelligence centers at
important bases close to the areas of operations.
Over a period of time, area commanders were fur-
nished the necessary personnel and equipment to
maintain centers which would meet their partic-
ular requirements. The Office of Naval Intelli-
gence in Washington gave technical assistance to
the activities of these centers and provided spe-
cially trained personnel for them. This guidance
301
and support was, of course, vital to the production
of intelligence. The mission of these centers was:
1. To collect, evaluate and process intelligence
required by the command;
2. To disseminate pertinent intelligence to
higher, subordinate, and parallel commands;
3. To provide long range intelligence coverage
required for national planning; and
4. To provide counterintelligence support.
Centers in the European-Mediterranean Theaters
In late 1942, the decision was made to create
a cooperative Army-Navy intelligence organiza-
tion, which was called the Joint Intelligence Col-
lection Agency (JICA) . When established, this
organization was located at Algiers under the As-
sistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Allied Forces Head-
quarters. Subsidiary units were placed at Oran
and Casablanca. The mission of JICA was to
meet certain long-range intelligence requirements
of the Army and the Navy which could not be real-
istically imposed upon the staffs of operational
forces.
The Navy assigned to the Algiers headquarters
a selected team of officers and enlisted personnel
which included specialists in the fields of investi-
gation, research, language, document analysis, air
intelligence and communications. It was the de-
cision of the Army that its responsibilities to the
new organization could be met by specialists at-
tached to the G-2s of various Army commands in
the area and by personnel of its Counter Intelli-
gence Corps. During the early period of its exist-
ence, JICA became little more than a mail and
dispatch unit. Its effectiveness was greatly dimin-
ished when some of its functions, including all
counterintelligence activities, were eliminated and
when no opportunity was found for cooperative
assistance by Army intelligence units. After a
time, most of its naval personnel were transferred
to the staff of the Commander, 8th Fleet (Com-
mander, North African Waters). However, small
JICA units remained active in North Africa.
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Eventually, British representatives were attached
to the Algiers headquarters and additional offices
were established in Egypt and Burma. As a fur-
ther development of JICA, there was organized
in Washington a joint Army-Navy agency known
as the Joint Intelligence Agency Research Center
(JIARC).
When assigned to the 8th Fleet, the former
JICA personnel were organized into a Naval Intel-
ligence Unit under the staff N-2 and rapidly ex-
panded their activities. The air intelligence per-
sonnel participated with a combined British and
American staff in photo interpretation projects
and field operations, collecting data required for
the planning of amphibious and ASW operations.
Specialists in prisoner of war interrogation and
document analysis worked with the Combined
Services Detailed Interrogation Center (CSDIC),
Allied Forces Headquarters, Algiers, to exploit
sources of naval interest for both long-term and
short-range purposes. Additional personnel en-
gaged in liaison activities with intelligence collec-
tion units of both national and combined military
services in the Mediterranean, as well as with
covert organizations maintained by OSS and the
British Secret Intelligence Services. The NIU
also formed teams from its personnel which were
assigned to designated combat forces after special
training with the Army Counter Intelligence
Corps. Included in the functions of the NIU was
the preparation of cooperative studies and reports,
similar to the present national intelligence esti-
mates and national intelligence surveys.
The field units of NIU, 8th Fleet, made effective
contributions. At the time of the invasion of
Sicily, a team went ashore before the tac-
tical situation had been secured. Through its
efforts, targets of counterintelligence value were
captured and exploited and certain threats to the
success of the landings were thus neutralized. For
example, this team acquired Italian charts
showing the swept channels in the Tyrrhenian Sea.
In addition, it gained control of key communica-
tions facilities, thus preventing the Italians from
alerting their German allies as to the size of the
amphibious assault against Sicily. Captured doc-
uments also provided valuable technical informa-
tion. The success of NIU, 8th Fleet, in its counter-
intelligence activities was such that British and
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302
French liaison officers were assigned to it, and the
Army recommended that future similar activities
be carried out by combined teams. These teams,
eventually known as "T" or Target-Forces, became
the pattern for NIU-type counterintelligence oper-
ations during later phases of the war in the
European theater, including the assault on south-
ern France.
As the Allies advanced into Italy, the NIU, 8th
Fleet, established offices in Naples and Rome,
eventually operating as far north as Genoa. It
made available its files on Italian organizations,
situations, and trends to the Allied Control Coun-
cil for Italy and to the Allied Military Govern-
ment Organization, further assisting the latter
agency by briefing assigned naval personnel. A
continuing responsibility of NIU personnel was
the exploitation of the archives of the Italian Navy
and advice to Allied Forces regarding the disposi-
tion of captured enemy material. Throughout the
period of its operation the relatively small NIU,
8th Fleet, was most effective in its intelligence
support of military command.
The 8th Fleet NIU cooperated with a similar
unit which had been established under the N-2 on
the staff of the Commander, 12th Fleet, who was
also Commander Naval Forces, Europe, located in
London. While the NIU, 12th Fleet, was sub-
stantially larger and its operations more extensive,
its activities were similar. Its personnel carried
out intelligence missions during and after the
Normandy invasion, operated with naval com-
mands in France and Germany, and participated
in some of the intelligence work of the combined
military staffs in Europe. As part of its function,
the NIU, 12th Fleet, aided in setting up intelli-
gence and counterintelligence targets and exploit-
ing them both in the field and at headquarters in
London. Exploitation of these targets was pri-
marily accomplished through interrogation and
document analysis. Eventually, the various T-
forces were combined in Germany under one or-
ganization. NI U personnel also participated with
a combined Japanese counterintelligence team
which operated on the continent. Its members
were drawn from the various military services of
the United States, Great Britain, and France, and
were attached to the G-2 Division of the Supreme
Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force,
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(SHAEF). The results of the work of this team
were made available to the Supreme Allied Com-
mander in the Far East. This team was assisted
by other allied T-forces and by the United States
Naval Technical Mission in Europe. A consid-
erable volume of information of intelligence value
to the Navy was developed by the NIU teams which
operated in Germany.
Location of Centers
Centers were established in forward areas of
the Pacific Theater soon after the outbreak of
hostilities and continued to function as long as
they were of value. At first, they were located
at Pearl Harbor for CinCPac, at Noumea for
ComSoPac, at Kodiak for ComNorPac, at Bris-
bane for Com7th Fleet under ComSoWesPac, and
at Norfolk for CinCLant. As conditions changed,
the organization and locations of the centers were
adjusted accordingly. When the South Pacific
area ceased to be an active theater of operations
after the collapse of Japanese resistance in the
Solomons, the center at Noumea was closed. As
operations in the North Pacific moved forward,
the headquarters of the advance intelligence cen-
ter moved down the Aleutian chain to Adak;
similarly, the SoWesPac centers moved up the line
from Brisbane to Hollandia, Leyte, and finally to
Manila. One of the largest and most valuable in-
telligence centers for the fleets which operated in
Central Pacific waters was the Joint Intelligence
Center, Pacific Ocean Areas (JICPOA) at Pearl
Harbor which was staffed by United States and
Allied personnel of all ser vice s. Under
JICP0A's direction offices were later opened at
Guam when the fleet admiral moved forward, and
distribution centers were also established at Leyte,
Ulithi, and Eniwetok.
Area Responsibilities
The activities of each center, while basically
similar, were of course influenced by the nature of
the warfare in the area. The center at Norfolk,
under Commander Air Force, Atlantic Fleet,
naturally concentrated on problems of antisub-
marine warfare for the operating squadrons in
that command and problems of training for
recently formed air groups which were destined
for duty in the Pacific. At Adak, the center was
303
forced to make a thorough study of the peculiar
aerological conditions prevailing in the Aleutians,
the Kuriles, and Kamchatka, since the unpre-
dictable weather distinctly limited operations in
that theater of war. In the Central Pacific area,
JICPOA and related centers concentrated on the
specialized intelligence required for carrier war-
fare and for fleet and air support of amphibious
landings. In the Southwest Pacific the short
overwater jumps preliminary to the Philippine
invasion were supported by land-based aircraft
and did not require, for the most part, large naval
supporting forces. Consequently, one of the chief
responsibilities of the Seventh Fleet Intelligence
Center (SEFIC) was to keep the Army theater
commander informed on all naval matters. Prior
to the Philippine landings, the center was con-
cerned with the development of the guerrilla or-
ganization in the Philippines, including training
of personnel, establishment of communications,
and the organization of submarine missions to
supply the guerrillas with arms, equipment, and
supplies.
Collection and Processing
As stated above, one of the missions of the in-
telligence center was to process intelligence for
the command. In most centers this mission was
carried out at two levels: First, certain officers
functioned as staff officers, furnishing information
to the commander himself and to his operational
staff; and second, a larger group of officers (fre-
quently including some of the first group) were
assigned to the various branches, divisions, or sec-
tions within the center, and were engaged in col-
lecting and processing information for the sub-
ordinate, parallel, and higher commands. The
duties of the first group have been described in
the preceding chapter; the duties of the second
were multitudinous, covering a wide variety of
subjects under the purview of various sections of
the center.
The term "objective data," as used in intelligence
centers, generally applied to factual studies, prin-
cipally of geographical nature. Some of these
studies were comprehensive, such as the Joint
Army Navy Intelligence Studies (JANIS) , ONI
monographs, and G-2 interim reports; others
treated more restricted areas, such as objective
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folders, air target folders, and information bulle-
tins; still others covered special fields, such as the
joint target group series on Japanese industrial
systems, translations of captured documents on
enemy airfields, and terrain intelligence.
The chief responsibility of the officers working
in the objective data section of a center was to
insure that information on all areas under their
cognizance was being made available to the plan-
ning and operating forces that required it. Pre-
liminary surveys were published, and as more in-
formation was received and processed, the studies
were revised and amended to incorporate the new
data.
An important part of the analysis of strategic
intelligence undertaken by intelligence centers in
active theaters was the thorough examination of
all available data pertaining to potential targets,
including photographs, captured documents, pris-
oner-of-war interrogations, and the reports of
technical intelligence teams with the object of rec-
ommending priorities and tactics for bombing mis-
sions and other combat operations. This became
a highly valuable service of the JICPOA target
analysis section, especially for carrier forces.
The cartography section of the center had cog-
nizance over the map production for the area.
Although the Hydrographic Office and the Army
Map Service provided much of this material, maps,
charts, and models for special purposes, such as
air support or bombardment, were planned at the
center servicing the area and frequently were pro-
duced there as well.
A special section of the center was responsible
for maintaining complete centralized files of in-
telligence materials, adequately indexed and cross
indexed. Accession lists were published daily, and
cumulative lists at longer intervals. These proved
invaluable in informing interested commands of
available information.
The obvious need for order of battle data on all
enemy forces required that a section of the center
record all available information on the organiza-
tion, characteristics, and numbers of the enemy
naval, air, and ground forces. The basic knowl-
edge acquired prior to the opening of hostilities
was augmented by the reports of prisoners of war,
and captured materiel also frequently yielded
valuable information.
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The intelligence center was the appropriate
place for the compilation of data on enemy mer-
chant shipping and the maintenance of special
studies and statistics on this subject.
The valuable intelligence obtained from pris-
oners of war, captured documents, and captured
materiel made it imperative for centers to include
an adequate number of language experts. When
large-scale operations were in progress, the quanti-
ties of documents and materiel and the large num-
bers of prisoners of war made it essential that
trained officers be on the spot to supervise the
efficient collection of intelligence from such
sources. Consequently, intelligence teams were
organized and sent out from the centers to follow
up all landings and major operations. In addition
to translators and interpreters, teams normally in-
eluded specialists in naval aviation materiel and
bomb and mine disposal. Saipan alone produced
27 tons of Japanese documents. The crash intelli-
gence section of the Saipan team found 23 Jap-
anese fighter planes on Aslito airfield, most of
them in flying condition, as well as 30 aircraft
engines and 300 boxes of spare parts.
Photo-Interpretation
The photographic section of JICPOA printed
and disseminated to interested commands thou-
sands of photos per day. Photographic inter-
preters identified. and filed negatives and prints
and prepared photo interpretation reports, mo-
saics, and overlays. In those instances where an
objective had not been recently photographed and
the information was needed immediately, a "first
phase" report of available data was speedily dis-
tributed. As soon as complete photo coverage had
been made, a "second phase" report was issued.
Special reports such as shipping, aircraft sum-
maries, beach studies, and photogrammetric
studies were issued as requested or deemed worth-
while. As in other sections of JICPOA, photo
interpreters concentrating on specific areas or sub-
jects were available and employed for conferences
and briefing sessions. The section also had a pool
of photo-interpreters undergoing indoctrination
for later assignment to combat units.
In addition to extensive photo reproduction fa-
cilities, the photographic section had ozalid, blue-
print, photostat, multilith, and mimeograph
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equipment, all of which was extensively used.
The reproduction of great quantities of aerial
photographs for the cartographic section was a
very important part of the photo section's re-
sponsibilities. Especially in the Pacific, where
maps, charts, and background intelligence were
either inadequate or did not exist, the photographs
and interpretation reports furnished much, if not
most, of the vital information needed by the objec-
tive data section for the preparation of the Infor-
mation Bulletins, Target Analysis Bulletins, and
Air Information Summaries.
Other Responsibilities
The technical section of the center analyzed the
information collected by representatives in the
field and converted it into usable intelligence both
for the strategists and the operational forces.
Thus, information gleaned from the serial num-
bers on crashed enemy aircraft often established
rates of production, and tests of aircraft captured
in good condition revealed the plane's capabilities
in combat.
The psychological warfare section maintained
liaison with other agencies interested in attacks on
enemy morale. At JICPOA during the war, a
vast amount of psychological warfare material
keyed to the exigencies of the current situation
was prepared and distributed directly from the
center, and the operating forces were indoctri-
nated by the center in the employment of this
material.
The chief responsibilities of a section devoted
to survival intelligence were the production of all
intelligence and equipment for air-sea rescue, eva-
sion and escape, and in general everything con-
cerned with problems of survival in friendly or
enemy areas. Experts reviewed all experiences
of personnel who had returned and disseminated
intelligence accordingly, either in f or m ally
through memoranda and articles in current pub-
lications, or officially through directives, such as
those issued by CinCPac on the standard operating
procedure for air-sea rescue in combat and non-
? combat areas in the Pacific Ocean areas. In such
fashion, distress communications procedures,
emergency flight controls, survival methods and
equipment, and indoctrination of personnel in
these matters were standardized, and prompt
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305
emergency assistance to aircraft and surface ves-
sels in distress and the rescue of survivors were
made possible. Centers also produced evasion and
escape manuals containing the latest information
available on the locations of enemy forces, guer-
rilla forces, Allied troops, and friendly or un-
friendly natives. Special sections were prepared
for each part of enemy controlled territory in
which linguistic or other differences in the native
population or terrain required special evasion pro-
cedures, and large-scale briefing maps for these
areas were included. This information was kept
current for the operating forces by supplementary
messages.
The size and complexity of operations in the
Pacific made the assembly, evaluation, and dissem-
ination of operational intelligence increasingly
difficult. Comprehensive studies were required to
determine what lessons could be learned from past
actions, and new estimates were made of the ene-
my's capabilities, tactics, and order of battle, as
well as evaluations of our own capabilities and the
effectiveness of our tactics and ordnance.
Some of the information gained from such study
was of interest principally to higher commands,
but much battle experience was also useful to
subordinate commands and to individual personnel
for general information and morale purposes as
well as an aid to tactical training. Experience
demonstrated the desirability of combining in one
intelligence center all the functions of processing
and dissemination of combat and operational ex-
perience, including statistical analysis, so that in
one coordinated operation appropriate material
might be extracted for command statistical and
analytical purposes and for dissemination to vari-
ous levels.
Detailed statistical analysis of operations was
largely the responsibility of ONI and other offices
in Washington. Nevertheless, it was found nec-
essary, in order to avoid delay in furnishing data
to combat commands and units and to secure ap-
propriate concentration on matters of local impor-
tance and interest, to initiate a large volume of
analytical and basic statistical studies in intelli-
gence centers. An example was the operational
intelligence center of ComAirPac, which pro-
duced the periodical Analysis of Pacific Air Op-
erations, Air Operations Memorandum, and briefs
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of both reports for distribution to commands of
fleet units, and also special statistical data and
operational reports for ComAirPac and CinCPac.
By virtue of conducting these studies in conjunc-
tion with a general intelligence center it was pos-
sible to produce reports that presented operational
intelligence in practical relationship to objective
and order of battle intelligence.
The principal duties of flak intelligence officers
assigned to intelligence centers were: the develop-
ment of methods of analyzing enemy AA, such as
the flak computer; the investigation of the char-
acteristics of enemy AA materiel to determine its
capabilities and limitations; the observation of all
tactical tests of flak intelligence; the statistical
analysis of AA damage to naval aircraft to deter-
mine the circumstances under which it was ef-
fected; the training of flak intelligence officers for
service with the fleet; and the dissemination of all
useful flak intelligence.
Aside from the publications of a specialized
nature which were issued by the sections described
above, it was customary for intelligence centers
to prepare a periodical of a general nature to keep
the command informed of the most significant de-
velopments in all categories. Such publications
were daily, biweekly, weekly, or monthly, the regu-
larity being determined by the amount of intelli-
gence to be disseminated and the speed required.
Some commands published more than one of these,
though the most common practice was to issue a
weekly intelligence bulletin.
Although the specialists concerned with the
identification and characteristics of own and enemy
aircraft, fleet and merchant shipping, and mobile
land equipment were at times separate units at-
tached to administrative commands, such as the
ComAirPac recognition unit during the last war,
it was nonetheless essential for intelligence centers
to insure that all such information was given ade-
quate dissemination. Furthermore, for its own
work, it was necessary to include in its organiza-
tion a sufficient number of officers to supply the
necessary data on recognition whenever required.
It was general practice to include information
which could be furnished by the recognition officer
of the center, such as photographs and statistics on
aircraft, ships, and ground vehicles.
All centers assigned to certain officers, either as
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NAVAL OFFICERS
306
a full-time or part-time duty, the task of maintain-
ing liaison with other services, agencies, or any
unit which required the information available in
the center. In turn, representatives of other units
were at times stationed in a center as permanent
liaison officers to act for their commands whenever
desirable. This was especially true at JICP0A
where, in addition to the representatives of United
States organizations directly involved, there were
also liaison officers from Allied services, such as
the British Army and Navy and the Australian
forces.
ADVANCE BASES
The intelligence duties at advance bases during
World War II varied according to the geograph-
ical location, local command organization, and
general importance. The base intelligence officer
had to be intimately acquainted with the exact
nature and limits of the mission of his command-
ing officer in order to perform his duties efficiently.
The commander of an advance base usually had
duties relating to the repair and supply of an op-
erating fleet and to the routing and control of
shipping. His intelligence officers, therefore, had
to be familiar with basic operation plans in effect
in order to keep the commander informed of all
changes as operations in the area progressed.
This was accomplished by means of comprehensive
plots on convoys and routing, friendly and enemy
submarine and surface forces, and the air activi-
ties, such as area searches and barrier patrols.
Responsibilities of the intelligence officer also
included the briefing of naval and merchant ship
captains on intelligence matters relating to their
missions. Often he was of service to them in con-
ducting investigations relating to security matters
and to counterintelligence problems. In the course
of this work, and in his general contact with naval
and merchant marine personnel, he would collect
much valuable intelligence information.
Often his duties included administration of cen-
sorship regulations, public information and liaison
with news correspondents, ship boarding, liaison
with friendly forces in the area, formulation of
regulations governing relationships with local
natives and liaison with them. Finally, he was
responsible for the collection, processing, and dis-
semination of intelligence regarding enemy forces
in the area.
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SEA FRONTIERS AND DISTRICTS
A consideration of the duties of an operational
intelligence officer assigned to a naval district or
a sea frontier is important for two reasons; first,
because it was the experience and knowledge
gained from those operations which formed the
foundation for the development of operational in-
telligence in the combat areas in World War II;
and second, because in future wars we can no
longer rely on the vast expanse of ocean which
separates us from Europe and Asia to protect our
coasts from continuous and devastating attack.
The German U-boat campaign from 1942 to 1945
demonstrated the need for a complete coastal in-
telligence network. The present development of
the submarine, the aircraft, the rocket, and the
guided missile are all further arguments in sup-
port of the continuance of such activity.
On 14 April 1942, the first victory over a Ger-
man submarine in Fifth Naval District waters took
place. The terse announcement merely stated
"U. S. S. Roper sank sub at 35-55N, 75-15W, at
0069. 29 bodies recovered." The Roper did not
stumble on the U-85 by chance, but was directed
to first contact by the accurate intelligence of Fifth
Naval District operations. District and sea fron-
tier intelligence organizations accordingly dis-
charged such responsibilities, as well as furnishing
operating units with information concerning
friendly forces and the characteristics of coastal
waters.
During World War II, the basic mission and
responsibility of all operational intelligence
branches in naval districts and sea frontiers was
to collect, from all sources, combat and operational
intelligence and information useful to the Naval
Establishment, and after coordination and evalua-
tion, to disseminate it to the action agencies of all
Naval Districts, Sea Frontiers, the Office of Naval
Intelligence, and to other appropriate government
agencies and commands. Such a program entailed
the establishment of intelligence rooms and plots
in joint operation centers and of intelligence units
at all outlying section bases, airfields, harbor en-
trance control posts, and other naval shore stations.
It involved the supervision of mine watch organi-
zations, the handling of wreck information, the
organization of a fishing vessel control plan, and
other similar activities. Coastal information sec-
307
tions of the naval districts, given the job of per-
forming operational intelligence, broadened in
scope and came to be known by the latter name.
In the various sea frontiers and naval districts,
the mission of performing operational intelligence
was accomplished by similar if not identical meth-
ods. While operational intelligence in sea fron-
tiers collected, processed, and disseminated infor-
mation and intelligence furnished by the districts
within the frontiers, districts performed the same
functions for, intelligence furnished them by their
joint operations centers, section bases, and air-
fields. In other words, the district organization
functioned operationally as a task group under the
sea frontier task force command. Physical ar-
rangements and internal organizations varied, but
in most instances accomplishments were the same.
Operational Intelligence Duties With Battleships
and Cruisers
Because operational intelligence billets afloat
were a product of World War II and because the
demands of commanding officers differed, estab-
lished doctrine for intelligence officers reporting
to single ships awaited experience, trial and error,
and zealous attention to the task by a growing
number of such officers, who ultimately were as-
signed to half the battleships, a score of cruisers,
and to numerous other units. Standard proce-
dures were forthcoming, however, and the intelli-
gence officer's value was recognized. One com-
manding officer of a battleship, in commenting on
the duties of his operational intelligence officer,
stated, "He devised means, procedures, and devel-
oped systems of intelligence reporting of such
value that he made himself of inestimable value to
his commanding officer during combat and cruising
operations."
The intelligence officer assigned to a single ship
was at all times responsible to the captain of the
ship who also defined his duties. He was, in effect,
a member of the captain's staff and he had the
same relationship to the captain as did the flag
intelligence officer to his admiral.
Since most ships during the war were in con-
tinuous operation, the intelligence system finally
employed relieved the ship's intelligence officer
of much of the responsibility for developing
sources of information aside from the battle expe-
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rience of his own ship. Instead, task force and
fleet intelligence officers and, above all, the area
intelligence center, were given the primary respon-
sibility for furnishing intelligence for use by com-
batant units. The process was never perfect, how-
ever, and the ship's officer owed. to his captain the
duty of making sure that the ship was included in
all distribution lists governing the dissemination
of intelligence publications useful to the ship.
Adequate familiarity with the intelligence center,
frequent liaison with group, force, and fleet in-
telligence officers, and extensive visiting with
shore-based commands as opportunity permitted
proved effective in making the officer aware of
the intelligence available. Intelligence while at
sea was for the most part obtained from telecom-
munications. The intelligence officer could insure
his receipt of all pertinent messages by explaining
his needs and problems to the Communications
Department.
The volume of intelligence received by an alert
ship's intelligence officer, although not so great as
that of higher echelons, required extensive study
if it was to be thoroughly mastered and necessi-
tated the employment of files useful for quick and
ready reference. A universal means employed to
evaluate and disseminate information was the
plot, for much of the intelligence concerning the
enemy situation, the theater of action, and friendly
forces lent itself to graphic presentation. The in-
formation best handled in this manner included
surface, air, and submarine contacts, sightings,
and fixes; known and probable enemy air searches;
friendly submarine operating areas, positions, and
tracks; friendly air searches; the shipping routes
and positions of friendly convoys, as well as estab-
lished fueling areas and reference points; own
ship's track in relation to that of other combat
units; minefields, whether laid by the enemy or
by friendly forces; and uncharted navigational
hazards.
In most instances, all information suggested
above could be kept on one strategic plotting chart.
The more or less permanent items could be laid
off directly on the chart, whereas information of
temporary value could be plotted on an acetate
or tracing paper overlay, which could be changed
as conditions warranted.
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Since this situation chart or plot was for the
primary use of the captain, executive officer, navi-
gator, CIC officer, and 00D, it was maintained
near the bridge, in CIC, or at both locations as
space and requirements dictated.
A function of battleships and cruisers, when
attached to a gunfire support group in an amphib-
ious operation, was bombardment of targets on
land. Fire support charts of suitable scale and
accuracy were usually furnished by higher eche-
lons and showed all known information on enemy
targets useful to bombarding units. However, as
an operation progressed, further intelligence had
to be supplied to the CIC, the gunnery officer, and
other interested personnel. Attention was paid
to prospective as well as to assigned target areas.
Of interest were gun emplacements, supplies, air
fields, radar, roads, harbors, defenses, bases, and
hideouts for small craft.
Another medium which was employed by the
ship's intelligence officer to convey current infor-
mation to officers needing it was the daily intelli-
gence report or summary. Its purpose was to col-
lect and assess the most important items of in-
formation received during the past 24 hours.
The activities of specialized departments dic-
tated more detailed attention by the intelligence
officer. Thus the development of CIC in World
War II as the operational nerve center of the ship
concurrently called for special service from the
intelligence officer, whose information from a
multitude of sources was of great value to the
evaluations and operational decisions undertaken
by radar and plotting personnel in CIC. The
CIC officer, by means of the daily summary, by
having access to the strategic and tactical plots,
and by being furnished with pertinent informa-
tion from all sources was kept well informed. It
proved desirable for the intelligence officer to
spend considerable time in CIC during sur face
engagement, air attack, or bombardment in order
to lend every aid possible to the executive officer
and CIC officers faced with weighty problems of
evaluation.
The seaplanes carried by cruisers and battle-
ships had important patrol, search, and spotting
functions and, what was probably of the greatest
value in World War II, performed difficult rescue
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missions. Briefing of seaplane pilots naturally
depended on their specific assignments, but in most
cases required information beyond the routine
needs of the ship itself.
Most major units had recognition officers as-
signed to instruct ship's personnel in identification
of friendly and enemy aircraft and ships. New
enemy aircraft and ships frequently first appeared
in publications, bulletins, or summaries received
by the intelligence officer. The disposition of such
material was obvious.
In practice, the responsibility of the intelligence
officer in keeping ship personnel informed of cur-
rent information was necessarily limited to notify-
ing key individuals. It was futile to attempt to
contact personally all ship's officers and men. Yet
all needed an adequate general idea of the overall
situation and successive events. During the past
war, one captain arrived at a satisfactory solution
by requiring all of his department heads, plus
certain designated key officers, to read the daily
intelligence summary and to see the situation plot.
Supplementing these regular information serv-
ices, other graphic displays such as maps and
frontline plots were maintained in the wardroom
for officers and in a readily accessible place for the
crew. Lectures on special subjects concerning the
enemy, the objective, or especially instructive bat-
tle experiences were likewise valuable to all hands,
not only to keep them informed but to maintain
their morale, their interest, and their desire to
fight.
The intelligence officer realized that operational
experience was a primary source of information.
Without his own efforts and those of many others
in similar jobs, first-hand information on enemy
tactics, materiel, strength, and capabilities would
have been lost. His own notes and observations
were supplemented by the reports of other officers
and men previously indoctrinated with the value
of accurate recorded observations.
Post battle duties of the ship's intelligence offi-
cer, as is true of officers in most intelligence billets,
included contributing to the ship's action report.
Intelligence officers with higher echelons depended
heavily on full and accurate detail in these reports
for vital information.
309
INTELLIGENCE FOR SUBMARINES
Submarine operations during the war with
Japan resulted in the sinking of 5,000,000 tons of
Japanese merchant shipping and the destruction
of such a large number of warships that the Jap-
anese Fleet was very seriously crippled. An im-
portant supporting aid to the submarine com-
manders in achieving this brilliant record was the
intelligence data furnished them by the intelli-
gence centers of the fleet in the Pacific areas. The
data furnished the submarine command at various
centers were basically the same, but the method of
operation varied at each center. For example,
JICP0A assigned no personnel to the submarine
command but worked through a liaison officer sta-
tioned at the center.
The intelligence support of submarine opera-
tions was largely supplied by intelligence centers
which prepared and carried on specialized pro-
grams designed to assist the submarine commands
in destroying the greatest possible number of Jap-
anese ships and likewise in reducing the hazards
inherent in submarine operations. An examina-
tion of the methods employed by the Seventh Fleet
Intelligence Center will illustrate the general
methods employed by all centers in performing
this function.
In connection with locating enemy shipping
targets, SEFIC undertook numerous studies re-
lating to enemy merchant vessels and warships,
their movements and equipment, and disseminated
the findings to the submarine command. Charts
were prepared showing individual and convoy
shipping routes, points of convergence, overnight
anchorages, and hiding points. These charts
were kept current and changes in routes based on
a compilation of new sightings of enemy shipping
by aircraft, coastwatchers, and submarines were
indicated. Statistical data, including damage
and sinkings, new construction, new armament,
radar, and special equipment on Japanese mer-
chant vessels and warships, were also disseminated
by the center. SEFIC prepared data, charts, and
drawings showing the estimated position of enemy
minefields, the estimated search sectors and patrol
doctrine of enemy patrol planes, the antisubma-
rine practices of enemy surface ships, and the use
by the enemy of picket boats.
From time to time information was received at
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the center indicating, for example, that an impor-
tant ship target had moved into an area patrolled
by a submarine of the Seventh Fleet. The center
would then communicate this information di-
rectly to the submarine command by radio for
further relay to the submarine itself.
The need for keeping the intelligence organiza-
tion in constant contact with the submarine com-
mand resulted in the establishment of an intelli-
gence unit subordinate to SEFIC and attached to
Commander, Submarines Seventh Fleet. In the
plot room of this unit situation charts, special
charts of patrol areas, minefields, and similar
items were kept, showing the current picture.
Here the intelligence officers stood a continuous
watch and performed operations duties including
the processing of operational messages to and from
submarines on patrol.
An intelligence annex to each operation order
for submarines going on patrol was prepared by
the unit. It contained all data pertaining to the
enemy of value to the submarine commanders and
included routes taken by convoys and by indi-
vidual ships, cargoes carried, ship position, type
and number of escort vessels, method of convoy,
antisubmarine measures, sonic devices, radar
shore installations, enemy bases and airfields,
radio shipping frequencies of major ports, enemy
merchant ships and fleet units estimated to be in
the operating area, and estimates of future enemy
movements. In addition to the annex, charts an-
notated with such of this information as would.
likely be needed in the operation area were pre-
pared for each patrol or special mission.
Other duties included briefing the commanding
officer of each submarine prior to his departure
for a war patrol or special mission and interview-
ing him upon return.
Additional duties were the preparation of war
patrol summaries and the compilation of digests
so that later patrols might have first-hand knowl-
edge of operating conditions. Of particular in-
terest to submarine commanders was the informa-
tion gained from such summaries on water salinity
and temperature and the force and direction of
currents.
Each day the officer in charge of the unit briefed
the admiral and his staff on the situation as it
pertained to each submarine on patrol.
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310
INTELLIGENCE DUTIES WITH TORPEDO BOATS
The employment of torpedo boats in World
War II included moving selected squadrons for-
ward with amphibious forces and establishing
them in bases from which they could defend the
newly won beaches against attack from the sea
and strike enemy supply lines. The functions of
the intelligence officer, whether he was assigned
to an operating squadron or to the commander of
an advance base, were in general determined by
these missions. In Pacific operations, the activi-
ties of the intelligence officer with torpedo boats
were influenced by several additional factors
which were highly significant both before and
after moving up to the advance base.
The primary mission of the boats, to attack
enemy warships and supply vessels with torpedoes,
was steadily expanded to include the destruction
of enemy waterborne supplies. This meant com-
bating the extensive and effective Japanese system
of night traffic by barges and other small craft
with shallow draft. They hugged coastlines to
avoid detection, utilized shallow water, took full
advantage of coastal defenses, and employed care-
fully selected bases and staging points. To be
effective against such targets, torpedo boats needed
more than altered armament. Accurate hydro-
graphic information was essential to enable them
to operate with safety in the poorly charted coastal
waters of the Solomons, New Guinea, and the
Philippines.
Therefore, when preparing to move up to an
advance base, the intelligence officer concerned
himself to a great extent with a study of the waters
and coastlines of the patrol areas newly assigned.
Intelligence publications containing objective data
were collected, full use was made of reconnaissance
photographs, any available representatives of the
coastwatchers or guerrilla organizations were
consulted, and all Allied personnel with peace-
time experience in the area were interviewed. The
location of reefs, the depths of water just offshore,
and the contour of the coastline in the area to be
patrolled were matters fully as urgent to torpedo-
boat captains as the position and capabilities of
enemy coastal defenses.
After the move to an advance base was com-
pleted and the boats began their patrols in strange
waters, the emphasis on obtaining hydrographic
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and coastal information was continued. Boat cap-
tains were expected to note, plot, or otherwise
record such information during patrols. Reefs
and other hazards in patrol areas were surveyed
and charts corrected as quickly as possible. The
contour and radar characteristics of islands and
coastlines had to be ascertained. The questioning
of boat personnel by intelligence officers yielded
valuable information for future patrols. In addi-
tion to operational patrol experience, arrange-
ments were made to obtain current aerial photo
interpretation reports and to perfect liaison with
the coastwatcher organization. New objective
data, publications of the theater intelligence cen-
ter, current translations of captured documents,
and reports of prisoner of war interrogations were
examined carefully. Unquestionably, then, the
needs of the torpedo boats for hydrographic and
other coastal information determined to a great
extent the direction and emphasis of the intelli-
gence officer's activities.
A second major influence on his functions was
the lack of communication facilities at the advance
base with which to handle the radio messages con-
taining information on the rapidly changing
enemy situation. The staff officer on higher eche-
lons could depend on such messages as the main
source of information regarding the progress of
an operation, but the torpedo boat officer was
forced to substitute extensive and continuous liai-
son with local command to obtain needed informa-
tion on the enemy. The naval base commander
was usually cooperative and gave the intelligence
officer access to the base message files. The results
of friendly air reconnaissance and strikes as they
affected the enemy shipping situation and coastal
defenses could be obtained from the local air com-
mand. Army and Marine intelligence officers will-
ingly furnished facts concerning the progress of
friendly ground forces and the disposition and
movements of the enemy on land, all of which
influenced enemy employment of surface craft for
supply, evacuation, reinforcement, or redeploy-
ment of local forces. The local coastwatcher rep-
resentative was an excellent source of information
on conditions in enemy held territory, barge and
small craft movements, routes and staging points,
supply dumps, coastal defense, and enemy inten-
tions for employment of surface craft.
311
Liaison with these and other organizations in
the vicinity of the torpedo boat base was a daily
matter. The information collected was used by
the base commander in determining the best time
and place for the operations of his command.
Furthermore, the basis for the intelligence officer's
briefing of boat captains prior to patrol was in
large part furnished by the information gathered
by liaison activities.
ASW AND ANTISUBMARINE INTELLIGENCE
Sea power is the ability of a nation to control
transportation over the seas. Its only purpose
and justification is its effect on the movements of
the transports, freighters, tankers, and amphibious
craft which carry nearly all the men and supplies
that cross the seas. To gain and maintain com-
mand of the seas is thus the primary naval
responsibility.
It will at once be obvious that antisubmarine
warfare (ASW) is essential to the success of this
mission. It is a first objective upon which we must
concentrate our efforts. If it fails, our whole
naval enterprise will fail; if it succeeds, we shall
have reason to hope for victory. Without ef-
fective ASW, we cannot wage a major war over-
seas, for the sea lanes must be kept open.
It is common to think of ASW in its tactical
aspect only, that is, the location and destruction
of enemy submarines at sea. Such a view is too
narrow. ASW may be conducted by strategic as
well as tactical means. As here used, therefore,
the term "ASW" will comprehend all efforts to
deprive the enemy of the effective use of its sub-
marines. There are many ways of effecting this
mission other than finding and destroying enemy
submarines at sea. We can, for example, prevent
enemy submarines from being built or serviced by
strategic bombing of bases and building yards,
from reaching the open sea by strategic mining
of restricted waters, from penetrating geographic
areas by passive harbor defense and escort of con-
voys, and from making contact with our shipping
by the convoy system. We can also simply keep
enemy submarines submerged most of the time by
assiduous searches and patrols whether or not any
submarines are actually found and destroyed.
Neither tactical ASW nor any of the several forms
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of strategic ASW can succeed without adequate
intelligence.
Capabilities and Limitations of Submarines
The advantages of submarines over other combat
craft are, briefly: (1) invisibility and secrecy,
providing the opportunity for surprise; and (2)
endurance and long range.
For example, a submarine is capable of operat-
ing for long periods in enemy waters, unsupported
and undetected. While there, it can perform any
of a great variety of missions. Suppose that the
mission is minelaying. In many situations, sur-
face ships or aircraft would not be physically ca-
pable of reaching the designated area or of remain-
ing long enough to lay mines, or would be capable
of laying the mines only at the cost of their own
destruction; and in any event, would reveal to the
enemy by their movements where the mines were
laid. Submarines also have a most important
capability, serving as radar pickets for early
warning of air attacks.
On the other hand, submarines have suffered
from characteristic limitations on their powers of
(1) perception, (2) communication, and (3) mo-
tion. All these limitations have been intensified
when the submarine was wholly or partly sub-
merged. Even with the use of its periscope and
accompanying radar its horizon has been very
close and its field of view very narrow. Its com-
munication facilities have been deficient. As for
motion, a submerged submarine has had very lim-
ited speed, and range, and its ability to maneuver
has been subject to sufficient water depths.
In order to overcome these limitations, subma-
rines have been forced to run on the surface a large
part of the time, and when doing so, have lost their
mantle of invisibility and have been exposed to
their enemies. This, then, has been the subma-
rine's dilemma : to be ineffective or to be vulnerable.
ASW in the Two World Wars
The Atlantic operations of German U-boats in
two world wars exemplify the ability of the sub-
marine to achieve disproportionate results in rela-
tion to the cost and effort expended.
At the height of U-boat warfare in 1915 and
1916, the Germans had an average of only 15 sub-
marines at sea at any given time. This was a third
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312
or less of their total strength, the other U-boats
being in transit or training or in port. With only
15 U-boats at sea, they were sinking, on the aver-
age, about 200,000 tons of Allied shipping every
month. The price they paid was the loss, on the
average of 11/2 U-boats a month?a profitable ex-
change. The final score for World War I was 11
million tons of shipping at the price of 178 U-
boats. Each U-boat, therefore, accounted for
nearly 62,000 tons of shipping. Thus they made
an impressive showing, especially since the U-boat
campaign in World War I was somewhat
impromptu.
In the early years of its history, the submarine
was not very seriously regarded as an attack ves-
sel, being used chiefly for reconnaissance and
patrol. Then, one afternoon in September, 1914,
the U-9, engaged in a routine scouting mission,
came by chance upon a British cruiser in the North
Sea and sank it with a torpedo. Another cruiser,
traveling in company with the first, came to pick
up survivors and was also sunk with a torpedo.
The third and last cruiser of the force, hurrying
up to investigate, met a similar fate. In less than
an hour, a single submarine had sunk three
cruisers. Struck by this proof of offensive power,
the Germans soon initiated undersea warfare on
a large scale.
At first the U-boat skippers were chivalrous
towards their victims, giving warning before they
sank merchant ships. The advent of the Q-boats
however, brought on unrestricted submarine war-
fare, in which merchant ships were sunk without
warning, and submarine attacks, mounting in
numbers and ferocity, threatened to overwhelm the
Allied cause, until they were at last turned back
by the system of convoy and escort.
In World War II the U-boat campaign had been
planned and prepared long in advance. The U-
boats themselves were much improved, being
larger and faster, with greater endurance and
using wakeless torpedoes. They soon secured
bases on the French coast from which they could
operate more effectively. Furthermore, they
learned new tactics, such as working in wolf packs
and coming through a screen of ASW ships at
night on the surface at high speed.
It may seem surprising, therefore, that the U-
boats achieved less relative success in World War
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II than in World. War I. The final score for
World War II was 13 millions tons of shipping
sunk, at the price of 751 U-boats. Each U-boat
accounted on the average for a little more than
17,000 tons of allied shipping, as compared with
nearly 62,000 tons in World War I.
This comparison reveals a striking historical
process. It is obvious to hindsight, though per-
haps it was not fully apparent at the time, that
from April, 1917, when the convoy system was in-
troduced, until the middle 1940's, the ascendance
of the submarine over its adversaries?its com-
petitive position?was slowly declining. The de-
cline was due to the system of convoy and escort,
to certain less important procedures, such as zig-
zagging, and. to the World War II innovation of
Air ASW and the hunter-killer system. It was
also the cumulative effect of many technical im-
provements in the means of detecting and attack-
ing submarines. All naval intelligence officers
should understand the methods and devices by
which, during this period, the submarine was kept
within bounds.
It will be appropriate to start with the convoy
system because of its importance and priority in
time. It curtails losses by reducing the number
of contacts that enemy submarines make, but it
is costly as well, for it reduces the effective ton-
nage of our ships nearly a third by loading port
facilities intermittently and by holding down the
faster ships to the speed of the slower ones. Hence
enemy submarines partly achieved their mission
merely by forcing us to send our ships in convoy,
since they thereby decrease our command of the
seas.
Escort is the system of screening convoys or
single ships with fighting ships or aircraft. Its
effect is to reduce the number of successful sub-
marine attacks for a given number of contacts.
Like the convoy system, it exacts a heavy outlay
of money, time, and labor.
In addition to the convoy and escort systems, a
number of ASW devices were developed during
World War I. The most important were listening
and echo-ranging equipment and hydrostatic
depth charges. These devices are familiar to all
naval personnel. Listening devices or "hydro-
phones" are directional underwater microphones
which detect and locate underwater sound sources.
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313
Echo-ranging equipment (United States "sonar,"
British "ASDIC") is a device which propagates
sound in water in order to detect and locate under-
water objects by means of the echoes reflected from
them. Bearing is determined by the train of the
sound projector ("transducer"), and range by the
time elapsed before the echo returns. Hydrostatic
depth charges are explosive charges in canlike con-
tainers, equipped with fuzes which are fired by
hydrostatic pressure and can be set for any depth
(i. e., pressure) up to a maximum.
During World War II, the technical advances
made in ASW were spectacular. Search radar
was the most important. When carried in air-
craft, it enormously extended the area of ASW
search. It kept enemy submarines submerged, and
when they surfaced, as they often had to do for
air or for observation, it could detect them at great
distances. Hydrophones evolved into sonobuoys
equipped with radio transmitters which relayed
the signals picked up by their listening devices to
patrolling aircraft. MAD (magnetic airborne de-
tection) equipment, responding to the magnetic
field created by the Submarine, made it possible
for aircraft to pinpoint submarines underwater.
An extensive direction-finder (HF-DF) system
exploited the German lack of radio and radar
discipline and provided us with a running master
plot of submarine positions. In addition, depth
charges developed into far more effective weapons:
projectile charges and faster-sinking charges,
equipped with contact or influence firing mech-
anisms.
The major ASW innovation of World War II,
corresponding to the convoy and escort systems
introduced in World War I, was the hunter-killer
system. Actually, this was merely the most con-
spicuous form of a general trend away from at-
tacks by individual ships or aircraft to coordinated
ASW attacks. Postwar analysis has shown that
coordinated ship attacks were more than three
times as effective in World War II as single ship
attacks. They have proved their usefulness, as
have coordinated air and coordinated air-surface
(CAS) attacks. III the hunter-killer system, the
coordinated attacks were made by teams composed
of one or more carriers, several ASW vessels,
search planes (hunters) and attack planes
(killers).
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By the middle 1940's, it seemed that the cumula-
tive effect of all these ASW advances had proved
too much for the submarine. To many observers,
it looked as if the submarine might become obso-
lete as a weapon of war. Then the trend was
checked and reversed. Technological changes took
place which promised to restore the old ascendancy
of the submarine. Fortunately, they came too late
to have any effect on the outcome of World War II.
Submarine Development During and After World
War II
By the end of World War II, the so-called "Type
XXI" submarine, though not yet operational, had
been perfected by the Germans. This was the
prototype of present submarines. In essence it
was simply a streamlined submarine equipped
with high-capacity batteries and snorkel (from
the German word "Schnorkel") , a stack extension
which enables the submarine to breathe while sub-
merged to periscope depth. Because of its stream-
lining and more powerful batteries, the Type XXI
was capable of an underwater speed of 18 or 19
knots, as compared with 8 or 10 knots for its World
War II counterparts- It had to use its batteries
for motive power only when fully submerged. At
periscope depth, it could run on its diesels, re-
plenishing its air supply, at about 11 knots, and
even if it slowed to 7 or 8 knots, simultaneously
charge its batteries. Its underwater cruising
radius was about 850 miles, or roughly five times
that of ocean-going submarines in World War II.
Lastly, it made use of various technical changes
which resulted in much quieter operation. The
changes exemplified by the Type XXI submarine
have greatly magnified the effectiveness of sub-
marines in attack, and then at the same time have
greatly reduced their vulnerability.
Vulnerability is lower for several reasons. A
submarine equipped with snorkel is extremely hard
to detect; in fact, practically undetectible by radar
and visual search. In the first place, it never has
to surface at sea, and it has to snorkel only about
one fourth of the time that a World War II sub-
marine had to surface. In the second place, a
snorkel head is a very much smaller object of
search than a fully surfaced submarine. Because
of its low noise level, the Type XXI and its suc-
cessor submarines are also very hard to detect with
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314
listening devices, including sonobuoys. Even if
detected and attacked, because of their greater
speed, these submarines have 8 times as much es-
cape volume as World War II submarines avail-
able to them in a given time; and because of their
greater underwater endurance, 25 times as much
escape area, about 400,000 square miles, before they
must again expose their snorkels.
Effectiveness in attack is increased, because the
submarine can now approach its targets from a
direction much broader on the bow or even come in
directly astern of a slow convoy. It is easy to see
how this capability will complicate the problem
of escort. Screens will have to be larger, perhaps
completely circular, perhaps multiple, and in any
case will require a much larger number of ships
and aircraft.
Of course, submarine development did not cease
with the Type XXL Subsequent improvements
have been continual. Most have been in the direc-
tion of still greater underwater speed and endur-
ance, and some have had to do with detection or
communication equipment. Our own Navy has
experimented with various specialized submarine
types: the antisubmarine "Killer" (SSK) ; the
submarine oiler (ASSO) ; the guided-missile sub-
marine (SSG) ; the radar picket submarine
(SSR) ; the cargo submarine, amphibious
(ASSA) ; the transport submarine, amphibious
(ASSP) ; and the atomic or nuclear-powered sub-
marine (SSN).
The last of these, the atomic or nuclear-powered
submarine, when operational, should prove to be
at least as radical an innovation as the Type XXI.
It would be the fastest of all ships. If produced
in numbers, it will present new problems in the
employment of surface vessels.
ASW Since World War II
Since World War II there have been many im-
provements in ASW detection devices and weap-
ons, but no major innovations. Shipboard sonar
has been much improved by the introduction of
the integrated sonar system. In this system, a
"scanning sonar" provides simultaneous all-round
search, which is presented on a cathode-ray screen.
The ASW officer is directly given all the informa-
tion he needs for conning an attack: bearing, hori-
zontal range ( from his ship to a point on the
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surface directly above the submarine), target
depth, and time to fire. In computing horizontal
range, the integrated sonar system automatically
corrects slant range, measured along the sonar
beam, for refraction caused by certain temperature
differences in the water. There is no doubt that
this equipment represents a solid ASW achieve-
ment; if introduced during World War II, it
might have proved decisive.
Sonar has also been adapted for use by blimps
and helicopters. Although such use is drastically
limited by wind and sea conditions, air-borne
sonar is inherently superior to shipboard sonar
because it is free from interference caused by
reverberation and hull echoes. When carried by
aircraft, sonar may be towed through the water, or
it may be "dipped," that is, lowered into the water,
used for search, raised, and moved to another
search point. It seems quite probable that sonar-
equipped helicopters, in particular, will be widely
used for ASW escort. In addition to greater
sonar ranges, they offer the advantages over con-
ventional escort ships of economy of means and
relative invulnerability to submarine attack. Di-
rectional as well as nondirectional sonobuoys are
now available. Sonobuoy information is pre-
sented on cathode-ray screens for ready use.
Since World War II, search radar has under-
gone steady improvement. Assiduous radar and
visual search, especially from the air, continues
to be one of the chief means of detecting subma-
rines and keeping them submerged. In practice,
however, it fails to attain its theoretical effective-
ness, owing to limitations of equipment and per-
sonnel, and above all to adverse atmospheric and
sea conditions. In sea states of 3 and above, the
probability of detecting a snorkel by visual or
radar search, whether from shipboard or from
the air, is extremely small.
The detection range of MAD has been increased
almost to its expectable limit. This type of equip-
ment, however, is susceptible to magnetic inter-
ference and to countermeasures. Furthermore, its
horizontal range is rather narrow. Hence, though
MAD has proved to be good follow-up equipment,
it is not efficient for primary search. It has been
successfully used: (1) for barrier patrols in re-
stricted waters; (2) to investigate suspected sub-
marine locations; (3) to regain contact; and (4)
315
for deliberate attacks, after contact has been made
by other means.
RCM/ECM equipment is essentially a radar or
radio receiver used to detect transmitting enemy
radars or radios. It is capable of great range,
assuming that an enemy is in the vicinity and is
transmitting. Even when no contact is made, the
continuous use of RCM/ECM produces useful re-
sults by curtailing enemy radar search and limit-
ing the length and frequency of enemy radio
transmissions. Post-war improvements in this
field appear to have been minor. Refinements in
the types of equipment described above, and other
detection methods exploiting similar principles,
are undergoing more or less continual research,
development, and test.
The development of ASW weapons has contin-
ued, as during World War II, in the direction of
fast-sinking charges, which may have magnetic or
acoustic influence or contact as well as hydrostatic
firing mechanisms and may be thrown in patterns
or in rapid succession. Antisubmarine homing
torpedoes have also been developed. They have
"listening" or "pinging" heads and can search for
submarines along a curved or zigzag path of vari-
able depth.
Lastly, it should be mentioned that all these
ASW detection and attack devices have given
rise to countermeasures. Some countermeasures
merely involve appropriate action, such as going
deep, assuming an East-West heading and in-
creasing speed to avoid detection by MAD, or
running silently and deep to avoid detection by
sonobuoys. Others consist in using evasion de-
vices, such as towed noisemakers and sonar decoys.
In the future, submarines can be expected to have
and use evasion measures of many kinds, each de-
signed to baffle one or more specific ASW detection
or attack devices.
The ASW Problem
Owing to the higher speed and longer under-
water range of which submarines are now capable,
tactical ASW, that is, the location and destruction
of submarines at sea, must receive special attention.
In order to be effective it will certainly require a
vigorous effort on a vast scale.
There is little doubt that the latest submarines
are beyond the reach of the ASW methods used
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in World War II. Furthermore, such success as
we did achieve with those methods was due in
large part to German deficiencies. Notably, the
Germans permitted their submarines to transmit
excessively by radio and failed to support them
adequately with air or surface forces. It is not
safe to assume that a future enemy will oblige us
by committing the same errors. The tasks that
ASW must perform are locating enemy subma-
rines, attacking them successfully, and protecting
our shipping.
The major present weakness of ASW is the ini-
tial detection and pinpoint location of submarines
underwater. Unless its approximate location
is known or suspected, a submerged submarine, or
even a snorkeling submarine in a high sea, is
practically undetectible. Furthermore, subma-
rines will no longer need to expose even their peri-
scopes and snorkels except for very short and
infrequent intervals.
The average range at which a submarine can
be detected underwater, about 1 mile, is far
shorter than either the range at which a subma-
rine can plot and track a convoy, about 6 miles,
or the range of submarine torpedoes, up to 7 miles.
By hypothesis, location is an intelligence prob-
lem. Failing the development of longer-range
methods for initial pinpoint detection, it seems cer-
tain that we will have to rely very largely on in-
telligence of the approximate locations and move-
ments of enemy submarines at sea, using every
possible means to keep track of every enemy sub-
marine from the time it is built or launched.
It seems equally certain that ASW screens must
be extended farther away from the convoys they
protect and will for this reason among others re-
quire a larger number of screening ships. The
magnitude of this requirement may be seen from
the fact that even in World War II more than 1,000
escort ships and 1,000 ASW aircraft were needed
to cope with about 100 U-boats.
Another major ASW weakness arises from the
increased space available to submarines for eva-
sion, because of their higher speed and longer
underwater range, after the attacking ship has
lost contact or has committed itself by firing its
attack weapons. This problem may be met, in
part, by coordinated operations in which one ship
or surface craft continues to hold contact while
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316
the other attacks. Such operations depend for
their success on good communications and intelli-
gence. The problem may also be partly solved by
the development of attack weapons which in effect
shorten the evasion time or otherwise reduce the
ev a si on space. Thus, faster-sinking depth-
charges and projectiles or self-propelled missiles
shorten the evasion time; homing torpedoes re-
duce the evasion space by enlarging the target to
the size of the actuation (i. e., homing) space; and
larger depth-charge patterns or more powerful
(e. g., atomic) depth-charges or underwater bombs
reduce the evasion space by increasing the effec-
tive radius of the blast.
The most extensive change resulting from the
greater difficulty and reduced effectiveness of
tactical ASW may well be the shift of a large part
of our antisubmarine effort to strategic ASW.
The forms which this shift is likely to take have
already been described. Even more pertinent to
this discussion, however, is the coming emphasis
and dependence on antisubmarine intelligence.
MINE WARFARE
Mine warfare has been defined as "the strategic
and tactical use of mines and mine countermeas-
ures in the conduct of war." The subject includes
offensive and defensive minelaying, the measures
for mine clearance ( of one's own or the enemy's
mines) , and protection against mines. No amount
of wishful thinking has succeeded in preventing
the use of mines in war when they will serve a
needed purpose. One of the belligerents may
forego use of them to his own disadvantage, but
he cannot control the enemy's actions sufficiently
to ensure that mines will not be used against him.
Under proper conditions mining can be very effec-
tive as a brief review of its history will reveal.
The advent of aerial mining has greatly increased
the effectiveness of offensive mining. Mining
capabilities made great progress in the past war,
but their limit was by no means reached.
Historical Development
Mine warfare has affected the outcome of wars
since the days of the American Revolution. Mines
were referred to as torpedoes until shortly after
the Civil War. The results obtained from their
use is of interest. During the Revolutionary War,
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David Bushnell attempted to explode charges
under enemy ships at New London and Phila-
delphia. Although the actual attempts were not
successful, they did alarm the British captains to
such an extent that they left with their ships.
Again in the Civil War, Farragut actually was
damning mines, when he said "Damn the tor-
pedoes." It is also interesting to note that during
the Civil War 27 Union ships were sunk by mines,
whereas only 9 were sunk by gunfire.
However, it remained for the Russo-Japanese
War to show the first great promise of mines as
an offensive weapon. Both the Japanese and the
Russians mined extensively in areas under the
other's control, resulting in heavy losses to both
sides and leaving both countries very mine-con-
scious. There are indications that the Russians
still are.
World War I brought the first large scale use
of mines. During that war the Allies undertook
extensive mining activities including the famous
North Sea barrage of about 73,000 mines, but the
really significant mining was carried out by the
Germans. They laid about 45,000 mines offen-
sively in and around Allied harbors and other
focal points of Allied shipping. The results were
spectacular: 586 Allied merchant vessels totaling
1,000,000 tons, and 41 British war vessels to-
gether with 225 naval auxiliaries were lost in the
minefields.
In spite of this experience there remained in
most countries a tendency to regard the mine only
as a defensive weapon. Some ventured to con-
sider the possibilites of a drifting mine as a tacti-
cal weapon, but generally speaking, not much
thought was given to using the mine offensively.
When World War II broke out, Great Britain
immediately, commenced a defensive mining cam-
paign. She laid two important defensive fields.
The first was an antisubmarine barrier along her
East Coast. German submarines abandoned the
area shortly after the minefield was announced
and before any appreciable number of mines were
over laid in it.
It had been planned to lay another field between
Scotland and Norway, but the German occupation
of Norway prevented that. So instead, a large
mine barrage was extended northwest of Scotland
toward Iceland and Greenland. The intent of
317
these fields was much the same as the old North
Sea barrage. The result has been difficult to de-
termine but their presence was of serious concern
to German submarines and aided considerably in
the antisubmarine campaign.
The United States defensive minelaying effort
in World War II is outlined in the 26 September
1945 issue of the "ONI Weekly" as follows:
Ten thousand moored contact mines were
laid by the Navy during the early days of the
war to prevent the enemy submarines menac-
ing our coast from penetrating important
anchorages, convoy assembly points, and ref-
uge areas. . . .
Operations began on the East Coast in Jan-
uary 1942 when a field of 365 mines was laid
at the entrance to Chesapeake Bay. . . .
At Key West, 3,460 mines were laid in April
and May 1942 to form a protected convoy as-
sembly area. . .
In May 1942, 2,635 mines were laid near
Cape Hatteras to form a protected refuge and
convoy area. . . .
At Trinidad, 991 mines were laid in April
1942. In June 1943 an additional 400 mines
reinforced the field. . . .
In July 1942, 575 mines were laid at Kodiak
to protect a naval operating base and between
September and November 1942, several fields
totaling 1,532 mines were laid at Adak to pre-
vent a Japanese invasion of the island. . . .
Those minefields were excellent examples of de-
fensive mining. But it remained for Hitler to
open the world's eyes to offensive mining. At the
beginning of the war the Nazi dictator had
bragged of a secret weapon which he said would
win the war for him. Everyone wondered what
the weapon would be: the British soon found out.
One day in September 1939 a British ship was
sunk while steaming through what was thought to
be a swept channel. More sinkings followed and
the British became alarmed. The cause was finally
found to be magnetic mines, dropped by German
aircraft, of a new type which sank to the bottom
and exploded only when the magnetic field of a
steel ship passed over them. The story of the
recovery and analysis of these mines and the de-
velopment of the necessary sweeping gear is a
heroic tale. Fortunately, the Germans did not lay
many of the mines until the spring of 1940, and
by that time the sweeping problem had been solved.
It has been estimated that if the Germans had de-
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layed introduction of their magnetic mines until
they could lay them in large numbers, the effect
on the British would have been disastrous. Their
premature introduction is considered to have been
one of the major German mistakes in the early
period of the war.
When the Germans found the British sweeping
their magnetic mines, they devised new complica-
tions. They introduced a ship count device which
prevented the mine from firing the first time a
sweep went over it. It could be set to fire upon
1 of 6 actuations. The effect of this was obvious.
The mine figuratively thumbed its nose at ships or
sweepers until it was ready to fire. It meant that
sweepers had to cover an area at least six times to
make certain that it was mine free. Next, a delay
arming mechanism was introduced. This would
allow the mine to become active at any time up to
6 days. It necessitated continuous sweeping for
6 days after a minelaying raid and then six com-
plete sweeps after that. The effort required to
combat all these new devices was enormous, and
minesweeping turned out to be one of the major
British naval activities of the war.
The trouble caused by German mines was
enough to convince the British of the value of
offensive mining and they undertook an extensive
campaign of their own. Their fast cruiser mine-
layers regularly laid minefields off German occu-
pied ports in France, and their submarines laid
mines off the coast of Norway. But the really
effective minelaying was done with aircraft. More
than 42,000 were aerially laid in German waters
with the result that more than 1,500 German ships
were sunk or damaged. Of significance was the
fact that the Germans were forced to employ 2,500
ships and 42,000 personnel in the minesweeping
effort.
In the Pacific, a well organized mining cam-
paign was executed against the Japanese outer
zone. It commenced early in the war and con-
tinued to the end. Allied aircraft, submarines,
and surface layers participated. Submarines laid
mines throughout the central and southwest
Pacific. Surface layer DMs did most of their
mining in the Solomons' area, and aerial mining
campaigns were conducted from China, Southeast
Asia, and the Central, South, and Southwest
Pacific theaters. None of these campaigns in the
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318
outer zone was large scale, but they were persist-
ent and widespread, and when considered with
submarine torpedo attacks and aircraft bombing,
they formed a well-balanced attack on Japanese
shipping. lt is interesting to note that the subma-
rine mining campaign netted 27 ships sunk and 27
damaged, a combined total of over 150,000 tons.
The Japanese laid a vast minefield in the East
China Sea, west of the Nansei Shoto, and through-
out the war this field protected their shipping in
that area. Japanese mines were also scattered in
the Yellow Sea and minefields effectively guarded
the entrances to the Sea of Japan until the closing
months of the war. The loss of 3 American sub-
marines was almost certainly caused by mines, and
5 others that failed to return from patrol may have
met a similar fate.
Allied minesweepers performed ably in the
Pacific, and in shallow waters where the YlVIS
(motor minesweeper) could not safely work, un-
derwater demolition teams operated with the am-
phibious forces. Special mine disposal units
joined in the clearance tasks, and shallow-draft
landing craft were fitted with light emergency
sweeping gear to assist in these operations.
In March 1945 the 20th Air Force began a mine
campaign designed to end shipping in Japanese
coastal waters, the major target being Shimono-
seki Straits. Eventually all important Japanese
and Korean seaports were mined by the B-29's and
over 670,000 tons of shipping were sunk or dis-
abled by this tremendous barrage. The Japanese
were unable to clear the clogged channels.
Acoustic, pressure, and magnetic mines, and their
type variations, were not easily swept up and the
Japanese lacked equipment for the task.
In conjunction with this offensive mining cam-
paign, United States submarines entered the Sea
of Japan with a new mine-detecting device that
neutralized the Japanese minefields defending that
body of water. With her defensive fields impo-
tent and her ports blockaded by submarines and
mines, Japan found herself in a vise.
In the United States Strategic Bombing Sur-
vey's "Interrogations of Japanese Officials, volume
I," a Japanese naval officer has this to say in re-
gard to the American mine attack on Japan:
From the standpoint of the blockade of our
bases of operations, the isolation of chief re-
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sources supplying areas, the interception of
supply routes and the blockade of important
points on lines of communication, the mine
attacks were quite effective?it cannot be de-
nied that they were one of the main causes of
our defeat.
The use of mines by the Communist forces in
the Korean conflict again demonstrated the im-
portance of mine warfare. The Reds proved that
a few innocent-looking sampans and fishing junks
employed to lay mines are capable of disrupting
the operations of mighty armadas of modern war-
ships. In October 1950 a minefield off the port
of Wonsan, North Korea, delayed for 8 days the
scheduled invasion of that port by a large United
Nations amphibious force.
Types of Mines
In order to appreciate the complexities of mine
warfare it may be appropriate to consider briefly
the types of mines employed in World War II.
There are three general types of naval mines: the
ground mine which rests on the sea bottom, the
drifting mine which floats at or near the surface,
and the moored mine which consists of a buoyant
case moored to the bottom by an anchor and cable.
The firing or actuating mechanism for mines may
be one of three general types: controlled, which is
fired by an observer in a remote control station;
contact, which is fired by direct contact with the
mines themselves; and influence, which is actuated
by some change in the physical surroundings of
the mine.
Three basic types of influence firing mechanisms
came into use during World War II; magnetic,
actuated by the magnetic field which surrounds a
steel ship; acoustic, actuated by the underwater
sound from a ship; and pressure, fired by the
change of pressure which results from the flow of
water around a moving ship in shallow water.
Combination type mines may be made by combin-
ing any two or three of these separate types of
firing mechanisms. Such a mine has the advan-
tage of greatly complicating the sweeping prob-
lem of the enemy. This is attested to by the
comments of a Japanese naval officer contained in
the USSBS volume cited above:
One thing that caused us much trouble was
the combination of two types of mines, combi-
nation of magnetic-acoustic and the magnetic-
319
pressure mine. By the end of the war we
were left with a lot of research being done
but no real effective countermeasure being
produced in quantity.
Intelligence in Mine Warfare
As in all phases of naval warfare, the intelli-
gence officer has a contribution to make to mine
warfare. First and foremost, he must keep his
commander informed as to the enemy's mine war-
fare capabilities. He must know the types of
mines which may be employed, the extent to which
they may be employed, and if possible, the areas
which may have been mined by the enemy. The
analysis of late model enemy mines by technical
intelligence personnel may lead to improvement
or modification of our own mines or mine counter-
measures.
A great amount of detailed intelligence concern-
ing the area of operations, such as depth, tem-
perature, and salinity of water, tides and currents,
and coastal topographic data, must be furnished
to the forces engaged in offensive minelaying.
The mine forces in turn may in many instances
be able to collect valuable information concerning
the enemy and the area of operations. They
should not be ignored as a vital collection agency,
for in many amphibious operations they are the
first naval forces to enter the objective area and
may be able to furnish the latest information on
enemy activity, location of enemy defenses and
beach obstacles, and inshore hydrographic data.
At present, indications point to an increased
effectiveness of offensive mine warfare. In a little
less than a century the mine has developed into
a potent undersea weapon. Employed offensively
and defensively it has turned the tide of battles,
frustrated invading forces, and destroyed naval
vessels of the largest class. In all probability
minefields will continue to guard important har-
bors and channels against invasion and will con-
stitute a threat to wartime shipping. No modern
naval commander would dare to defy the menace
with a mere, "Damn the torpedoes, full speed
ahead!"
AIR INTELLIGENCE
Air intelligence has been defined as "intelligence
pertaining to the offensive and defensive capabili-
ties of foreign countries and their vulnerability to
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air attack which is required by commanders to
plan, train for, and execute operations involving
or affected by air power." Thus air intelligence
finds its needs and applications in all types of
operations that either directly or indirectly in-
volve the use of air power.
Air Power
The air power of a sovereign state is determined
by the compilation and analysis of several sets of
figures and facts. It becomes meaningful when
presented in terms of numbers of aircraft and the
static ability to utilize and to replace them. Num-
bers of aircraft in themselves are not particularly
significant, but when collated with such other
considerations as types, performance character-
istics, availability, and operating personnel, the
relative importance of a given nation's air power
is established.
Air power is therefore dependent on the capa-
bilities of the following elements:
1. The air force in being, which consists of
military aircraft, personnel, and establish-
ments.
2. Air transport, which is composed of civilian
air transport, personnel, and establishments.
3. The aircraft industry, which comprises the
manufacturers of aircraft, aircraft parts, and
accessories. It is devoted primarily to air
transport production in peacetime. In time
of war, it is concentrated on the manufacture
of military aircraft.
Air Force Basic Tasks
The basic tasks for which the United States Air
Force must be prepared constantly are:
1. Destroy hostile air forces, which includes air
defense of the United States.
2. Deny the establishment of and/or destroy ex-
isting hostile bases from which an enemy can
conduct operations on land, sea, or in the air.
3. Operate against hostile land or sea forces,
the location and strength of which are a
threat to the vital interest of the United
States and her allies.
4. Wage offensive air warfare against the source
of strength (military and economic) of the
enemies of the United States and her allies
in the furtherance of approved war policies.
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320
5. Operate as a part of the task force in the
conduct of military operations.
Mission of Air Intelligence
The mission of operational air intelligence is
threefold:
1. To procure, process, and disseminate infor-
mation of the actual or potential hostile
forces, the area of air operations, and any
other usable information which Could assist
the commander in arriving at timely and
sound decisions.
2. To brief aviation personnel. prior to all
flights on the type of flight, operating area,
targets, flak, flight routes, expected air oppo-
sition, types of hostile aircraft, communica-
tion procedures and call signs, own and hos-
tile ships and aircraft in the area, search and
rescue procedures, evasion and escape infor-
mation, navigation, aerology, and any other
information pertinent to that flight.
3. To debrief returned aviation personnel on
all aspects of the completed flight, such as
hostile ships and/or aircraft in the area,
results of air-to-air and air-to-surface com-
bat, ground installations, troop movements,
etc.
In principle, air intelligence has the same char-
acteristics and properties as any other type of
intelligence, and the intelligence cycle is equally
applicable to its activity. Its subject matter,
however, comprises a special field and deals with
special items of information, which in many cases
require special handling and dissemination in
forms which are not necessary for other types of
intelligence. A basic knowledge of air intelli-
gence is essential to the professional competence
of all naval officers.
Air Operations
An examination of some of the aspects of air
operations will help in understanding the func-
tions of air intelligence.
Air operations encompass a tremendous subject.
When one considers the fact that large task forces
are composed for air operations alone, the term
assumes its true meaning and scope. Probably no
type of warfare has made more rapid progress
than air warfare, and as a result air operations
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have similarly been extended to include a great
number of tactical and strategic missions from
both fixed and mobile bases.
Carrier Air Operations
At the present time the primary offensive
weapon of the United States Navy is the carrier
task force. Such forces are organized to accom-
plish a specific mission, being highly mobile and
able to change their composition and disposition
in a short period of time. They are capable of
conducting modern warfare in accordance with
the highest attainable standards utilizing the
latest aircraft, ships, and special weapons. They
can strike at the heart of hostile forces and can
cruise close to hostile shores and launch devastat-
ing offensive air strikes against inland .as well as
coastal targets.
Carrier-based aircraft are divided into several
categories depending upon their primary mission
and comprise such varied types as fast fighters,
attack aircraft, antisubmarine aircraft, semirigid
airships (blimps), and helicopters. The intelli-
gence officer must be familiar with the types of
friendly aircraft operating in his area, their flight
characteristics, and performance in order to uti-
lize the aircraft either directly or indirectly avail-
able to him for the collection of information about
the enemy and the area of operation. Through
proper employment of available personnel and
aircraft in collection and on-the-spot evaluation
of information, tactical operational intelligence
is obtained during engagement with enemy forces.
The information collected by carrier-based avi-
ation personnel through observation and photog-
raphy covers many components of both operational
and strategic intelligence, such as:
1. Enemy aircraft in the area: numbers, types,
performance data.
2. Air installations: location, size and capacity,
facilities and possibility of expansion.
3. Ports and port facilities.
4. Troop movements and ground installations.
5. Ships and ship movements, both naval and
merchant.
Land Based and Patrol Air Operations
Land based air operations differ greatly from
carrier air operations for a number of reasons.
269196-54 -22
321
They place the greatest emphasis on search, pa-
trol, logistic support, and the delivery of special
weapons too bulky or heavy to be adequately
handled aboard carriers. Land-based and patrol
aircraft are usually larger, slower, and have a
greater combat radius than those flown from car-
riers. However, with the introduction of the
new flush-deck carrier, aircraft which thus far
have operated only from stationary, distant air-
fields will transfer to the highly mobile deck of the
carrier. The information available to the intel-
ligence officer from Land-based and patrol air-
craft is similar to that available from those which
are carrier-based.
Air Intelligence Production Divisions
Air Combat Intelligence (ACI) was established
by the Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics early
in 1942. Prior to that date the Navy had no
specialists in this field. Since the application of
intelligence to war in the air was more clearly a
function of aeronautics than of the Office of Naval
Intelligence as it was organized at the time, ACI
was established in the Bureau of Aeronautics.
Subsequent developments during World War II
modified these earlier concepts to such an extent
that ACI has now been transformed into the Air
Section, Intelligence Branch, of ONI.
Because the work of this section is so closely
related to that of the Air Force's Intelligence
Directorate, former joint committees have been re-
placed by a single integrated activity, for both
services known as the Air Intelligence Production
Divisions, staffed by both Navy and Air Force
personnel.
Responsibilities of the Divisions include all the
phases of the intelligence cycle as they apply to
air, as well as foreign liaison and planning. They
are the nerve centers of United States air power
to which all information flows, where research is
conducted, and from which estimates emanate.
Air Intelligence Officer Program
Since the development of air intelligence billets
in World War II, the Navy has felt that air in-
telligence officers should be specially equipped for
their duties. During World War II, officers were
trained at Quonset Point, R. I., for assignments to
air combat intelligence billets. These officers
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served with all types of operational squadrons as
well as with staffs located both ashore and afloat.
The significance of their contribution has been at-
tested by all who had occasion either to work with
them or to review the results of their work.
At the end of World War II, the school at Quon-
set Point was discontinued and most of the air
combat intelligence officers were released from
active duty, since the majority were reservists.
There was actually little need for such specialists
during the interim period between the close of
World War II and the outbreak of the Korean
conflict.
The war in Korea and subsequent international
developments again created a need for specially
trained air intelligence officers. Profiting from
World War II experiences, but well aware of
changes dictated by current needs, the Navy re-
established a school designed for their training.
The older designation, air combat intelligence of-
ficer, was changed to air intelligence officer, which
is more descriptive of the present broad scope of
their responsibilities and the services they render.
As a rule, air intelligence officers are selected on
the basis of aviation experience, either as pilots or
in activities closely related to naval air operations.
In time of ostensible peace, some of these officers
are assigned to Naval Reserve organizations to
help train Reserve air intelligence personnel.
Air Intelligence Officer Duties
In actual practice, probably no two air intelli-
gence officers perform identical functions either
qualitatively or quantitatively. This is due to dif-
ferences both in command missions and individ-
ually assigned tasks. In general, the duties of an
ATO fall within the steps of the intelligence cycle:
collection, processing, and dissemination of intel-
ligence in support of the commander, and a fur-
ther discharge of the same responsibilities in rela-
tion to ONI.
These duties, when stated more specifically for
the air intelligence officer, include the maintenance
of air intelligence files, the establishment of a ref-
erence library, the collection and dissemination
of target information concerning areas of opera-
tion, the maintenance of situation plots, briefing
the commander and other authorized aviation per-
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NAVAL OFFICERS
sonnel, the debriefing of aviation personnel, the
preparation of action reports, assistance in oper-
ational planning, and miscellaneous collateral
duties such as the preparation of squadron war
diaries, recommendations for awards, and such
other duties as may be assigned from time to time.
The foregoing list is in no way complete, for the
duties will vary depending on the relative com-
mand position of the unit the ATO serves. At
higher levels, most of his efforts will be directed
toward planning. At lower echelons, he will prob-
ably concentrate on preparing his unit to execute
the plans received.
At the squadron level, the primary duty of the
ATO is to brief and debrief aviation personnel.
At the staff levels, he will be primarily concerned
with planning functions, such as the preparation
of intelligence estimates, command briefing, the
writing of intelligence annexes to operation orders,
and the supervision of photographic reconnais-
sance. AIO's attached to intelligence centers
process intelligence reports and disseminate them
to all echelons of command.
One of the most important duties of any air
intelligence officer is the direction of the air intel-
ligence effort. This involves both comprehensive
planning and effective administration.
Sources of Information
Just as pilots and aircrewmen are dependent on
the information and materials made available by
the AIO, he in turn relies on them for augmenting
the basic information prepared and disseminated
by AFOIN and ONI. In time of war, theater
intelligence centers provide the operating AIO's
with additional intelligence pertinent to current
operations. The products of such centers might
include current situation plots, photo interpreta-
tion reports, special objective studies, enemy order
of battle, reconnaissance, and evasion and escape
reports.
It is significant to note that as aircraft capabili-
ties increase, both in range and fire power, addi-
tional forms of intelligence become "air" intelli
gence. This particularly applies to sociological
intelligence, interior terrain stu dies, enemy ground
order of battle, and air technical intelligence. In
light of recent technological developments, the
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ATO will do well to consider all sources of in-
telligence production as potential sources of air
intelligence.
AIR TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE
The following news item from the Washington
Star of 3 November 1951 serves as a summary of
the vital role of air technical intelligence:
RUSSIAN WEAPONS CAREFULLY
STUDIED IN U. S. LABORATORY (AP)
Dayton Ohio Nov. 3, 1951. . . .
The Air Force is peeking over Russia's
shoulder?in a laboratory.
The laboratory is the United States Air
Force Technical Intelligence Center at nearby
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base. What
goes on there is so secret even workers them-
selves cannot get in the restricted area "with-
out special code numbers on their passes."
An electric "code verifier" flashes like a
metal detector in a prison when each of the
workers check in or out. Armed guards will
stop you if you walk 10 feet inside the area
without an escort.
A carefully screened, select group of officers
and civilians work at the center. Engineers,
photointerpreters, metallurgists, scientists,
and specially trained evaluation experts of
all kinds are putting the enemy under the
microscope 24 hours a day, studying North
Korean Communist equipment as well as
Russian equipment.
Findings Kept Secret
What these technicians do, the technique
they employ and how much they learn is a
secret locked behind the laboratory fences.
But, their prime job is to get every bit of tech-
nical information about the enemy, evaluate
it, and make the information available to our
fliers in combat.
More than 100 tons of captured North
Korea, Chinese Red, and Russian equipment
have been shipped thousands of miles from
the fighting zone to the Ohio intelligence cen-
ter. Some was flown here. More came by
ship.
One big item is a MIG-15 jet fighter taken
by an air intelligence team shortly after it
was shot down in Korea.
"It was fairly intact," an officer said, "but
there wasn't enough to warrant reconstruct-
ing it and flying the machine."
The officer explained, however, the Air
Force could build a MIG-15 and fly it, if it
wanted to. There's another MIG-15 at the
323
base these days. But it's a pile of junk now.
A mass of turbine engine cowlings, wires,
seats, tailpipe from a jet engine, rudder fin
and elevators stacked in a storeroom. It was
more complete when they got it, but they took
it apart and studied it, piece by piece.
Much Is Learned
Col. Harold E. Watson pointed to the pile
of junk:
Sure, we learned a lot of things about it.
But we're only telling our own interested
agencies. That's what makes our work so
tough. It isn't that we're afraid to tell the
Russians about the MIG. They know all
about it. But they don't know how much we
know.
The warehouse looks like a Russian junk-
pile, with here and there supplies of intact
equipment. There are racks of clothing worn
by North Korean Navy, Air, and Army offi-
cers.
There are oxygen masks, gloves, flying
jackets, boots, helmets, new engines of a recip-
rocating type used by Russians in transport
planes.
In a warehouse cubbyhole is a partly intact
Russian IL-11 two-seater trainer. The wing
is in good condition. The fuselage, however,
is partly shot up.
IG Guns Checked
Just a junk heap? Yes, but it told United
States experts many things. For instance,
theTlane was armed. Allied trainers are not.
What kind of things do the experts learn
when they peer over the shoulder of the Rus-
sian bear?
Well, the warehouse has some machineguns
taken from the Russian MIGs. They are
larger and heavier caliber than the guns in
our F-86 Sabre jets. But they fire less rapidly
and the Sabre has more guns.
Maybe that is one reason American jets are
shooting down MIGs in Korea today.
INTELLIGENCE IN AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS
During World War I, naval operations for the
most part involved antisubmarine warfare, escort
of convoy, and fleet actions. The intelligence offi-
cer aboard ship was usually an assistant operations
officer on a staff or the head of a department of
the ship itself, and his intelligence work became
merely a collateral duty as the need arose. He
was to keep his flag or commanding officer advised
on enemy locations and movements, and his infor-
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INTELLIGENCE FOR
mation was for the most part received from scout-
ing units and intelligence sources ashore. Air
reconnaissance was in its infancy, and amphibious
operations, as distinguished from raids, were not
contemplated. It was not necessary to storm the
beaches of Europe, inasmuch as France was then
an active ally and transports could land their
troops at her ports.
During the amphibious operations training con-
ducted by the Marine Corps between World War I
and the beginning of World War II, it became
evident that the sources and collection agencies of
intelligence, normally used by ground forces,
would have to be improved upon and expanded
in order to meet requirements peculiar to an am-
phibious operation. It was found that although
the principles of intelligence remained the same,
new methods and techniques for the collection and
dissemination of enemy information would have to
be developed and perfected before an amphibious
operation could be put into effect with any reason-
able expectation of success. Continuous experi-
mental work, diligent training, and combat expe-
rience resulted in the present concept of intelli-
gence in amphibious operations. Lessons learned
early in World War II, beginning with Guadal-
canal in August 1942 and extending through the
landings in North Africa and Sicily, were invalu-
able for the planning and conduct of the amphibi-
ous landings in Normandy in June 1944.
It was realized during these early phases of
World War II that the amphibious operation was
complex, involving air, sea, and ground units, and
that intelligence officers had to be trained for these
special activities and rushed to the fleet as quickly
as possible. By the conclusion of World War II,
the succession of landings in the Philippines, on
Iwo Jima, and on Okinawa pointed conclusively
to the fact that all previous experiences had been
carefully studied and utilized advantageously.
Since World War II, developments in elec-
tronics, aerial reconnaissance and photography,
underwater demolition techniques, surface and
underwater craft, and improved maps and charts
have resulted in a more thorough, accurate, and
timely system of collecting and disseminating
enemy information and intelligence during the
planning and execution of an amphibious opera-
tion. The continuous research and training has
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NAVAL OFFICERS
eliminated a great number of the uncertainties
that endangered success in the past. However,
there still exists the need for more accurate infor-
mation about the hydrography, trafficability of
the beach, and other pertinent information of an
objective area, as was shown in Korea during the
planning for the Inchon landings in September
1950. Despite the fact that United States Occu-
pation Forces had at one time been located in the
proposed objective area, there was a definite lack
of information on which to base the planning. It
has become evident that the time to obtain most
of the necessary information is during peacetime
or other periods when areas are accessible.
Intelligence Planning for Amphibious Operations
Since an amphibious operation is joint by na-
ture, all intelligence material of common interest
must be procured jointly. All echelons have a
common interest in matters such as landing
beaches and their approaches, defensive beach in-
stallations, enemy coast defense and antiaircraft
guns, air fields and their defenses, weather condi-
tions, visibility, natural and artificial obstacles,
currents, tides, surf, and other hazards to landing.
Unified action eliminates costly duplication of
effort and effectively utilizes the combined collect-
ing facilities of the land, sea, and air components.
In preparation for joint operations, the produc-
tion of intelligence from all sources must first be
carefully planned and integrated at theater level
to prevent incomplete coverage, needless duplica-
tion, and leaks in security. The search for infor-
mation must be continuous, and the production
and dissemination of intelligence must be expe-
dited to insure the factor of timeliness.
The greatest problems in intelligence for am-
phibious operations arise during the planning
phase. A great distance often separates the
mounting and the objective areas, the landing
forces are not in contact with the enemy, the
majority of the available collecting agencies are
not organic to the landing force, and a relatively
long period of time is required for planning prior
to the execution of the landing during which the
enemy situation may undergo many changes.
Sources of Amphibious Intelligence
The available information upon which planning
will be initiated is obtained from departmental or
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theater intelligence agencies and research sources.
The publications of a number of governmental
agencies provide intelligence of a background
nature for planning an amphibious operation:
1. Central Intelligence Agency: Comprehensive
surveys and studies.
2. State Department: Information of political,
economic, and sociological nature.
3. ONI, G-2, and AFOIN : Information of for-
eign military forces.
4. Army Map Service: Maps for the Armed
Forces.
5. Army Corps of Engineers: Strategic engi-
neering studies.
6. Navy Hydrographic Office: Hydrographic
charts and studies.
7. Photographic Interpretation Center: Photo-
graphic intelligence studies and operational
aids.
8. Aeronautical Chart Service: Aeronautical
charts.
As planning progresses, more dependence will
be placed upon theater, fleet, and organic landing
force agencies for further information. Specialist
teams may be available from the theater intelli-
gence agencies for assignment to the landing
forces, such as translation and interpretation,
technical intelligence, and counterintelligence.
For the Inchon landings in Korea, the 1st Marine
Division used the 163d Military Intelligence Serv-
ice Detachment and the 441st Counterintelligence
Corps Team. Both of these specialist teams were
furnished by the Far East Command and were
composed of United States Army commissioned
and enlisted personnel with such Korean nationals
as were required for liaison interpretation and
translation purposes.
The intelligence sections of the amphibious
forces and group staffs of the fleet also produce
and disseminate intelligence necessary for the suc-
cess of an amphibious operation. These agencies
normally are based aboard amphibious force flag-
ships (AGCs) equipped with complete reproduc-
tion facilities for printing maps and charts, devel-
oping negatives, printing ground or aerial photo-
graphs, and processing motion picture film. In
addition, the intelligence sections of the amphib-
ious staffs include language and photographic in-
terpretation personnel and other intelligence
325
specialists who can render considerable assistance
to the landing force units in acquiring and process-
ing information. An intelligence officer may be
assigned the responsibility of target location, tar-
get identification, and damage assessment. The
Target Information Center, operated by the staff
intelligence section, is the repository for all perti-
nent known information on targets of interest to
naval gunfire and air support. During operations
target information is kept current by recording
results of naval gunfire and air strikes. New tar-
gets, reported by aerial reconnaissance or photo-
graphic interpretation, are immediately referred
to fire support ships and supporting aircraft. A
card index of all known targets is maintained by
the Target Information Center. Targets are num-
bered and listed according to areas of responsibil-
ity. As information on specific targets is reported
by support ships and aircraft, the results are re-
corded on the cards and also plotted on a target
map for immediate visual reference. TIC gen-
erally prepares daily for transmission to the ships
a list of those targets destroyed or remaining in
each area of responsibility.
Aerial Reconnaissance
Aerial reconnaissance is a primary source of
information for the planning of an amphibious
operation and often may be the only means of aug-
menting background information furnished by
departmental or theater agencies. Requests for
aerial reconnaissance should be exact and detailed
and submitted as early as possible to enable aerial
reconnaissance missions to be coordinated with
other missions. Aerial reconnaissance can be used
to obtain valuable information of the enemy and
the objective area. However, there are certain re-
strictions imposed by inclement weather, darkness,
antiaircraft artillery fire, hostile combat aircraft,
concealed terrain, and inexperienced observers.
Aerial reconnaissance may be divided into
visual, electronic, or photographic; of these, pho-
tographic reconnaissance is more widely used for
planning purposes. It is highly desirable that
aerial photographs of landing beaches and adja-
cent areas be available early in the planning phase.
The procedures and techniques of photointerpre-
tation have been previously described.
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INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS
Cruisers, destroyers, motor torpedo boats, land-
ing craft, rubber boats, and submarines may be
used to reconnoiter areas selected for operations
and such additional areas as may be desirable for
deceptive purposes. This may be executed by the
naval units alone or in conjunction with amphib-
ious reconnaissance patrols and underwater demo-
lition teams furnished by the landing force. The
collection capabilities of various types of ships
have also been discussed in chapter 9 and need not
be repeated here. However, some additional com-
ments on amphibious patrols and underwater de-
molition teams will be given because of their inti-
mate association with the subject at hand.
Amphibious Reconnaissance Patrols
In the early history of amphibious warfare, the
amphibious patrol as an aid to tactical planning
for a contested landing was not widely employed.
In his invasion of Britain, Julius Caesar sent offi-
cers of his staff to observe prospective landing
beaches from seaward, but they did not actually
land. During the Middle Ages and Renaissance,
if any information was gathered, it was by secret
agents and espionage.
Amphibious patrols reappeared during the Na-
poleonic Wars. Prior to the British expedition
against the French in Egypt in 1801, a patrol of
officers was sent ashore at Aboukir Bay to recon-
noiter for the projected landing. In the Russo-
Japanese War of 1904, the landing beaches at
Port Arthur were not scouted by the Japanese
on the pessimistic premise that to do so would
divulge the location of the proposed landing; the
possibility of an undetected reconnaissance was
apparently not considered. In the only major
amphibious operation of World War I, the Gal-
lipoli Campaign, no effort was made to reconnoiter
the beaches physically prior to landing, although
two amphibious patrols were used later in the
operation for the purpose of gathering informa-
tion along the flanks of the Anzao beachhead.
One of these patrols accomplished its mission with
no casualties, while the other was detected during
landing and destroyed by rifle fire.
The extensive use of the amphibious reconnais-
sance patrol during World War II was mainly
the result of modern theory and technique, stem-
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326
ming largely from recent developments such as the
inflatable rubber boat, radio communication, and
radar. These developments, together with high-
speed naval transports capable of covering con-
siderable distance during hours of darkness, made
the physical reconnaissance of a defended shore
a practical and necessary source of information
for the amphibious operation. One of the first
examples of a modern patrol was conducted by
the Marine Corps in February 1940 during the
Fleet Marine Force maneuvers. In this exercise,
the force designated to land on the defended island
sent a patrol ashore prior to the landing which
successfully located the defenses of the landing
area without being detected by the defending
force. The patrol consisted of a Battalion S-2 and
three scouts. It was transported into the area by
submarine and went ashore and returned under
cover of darkness in one rubber boat.
In January 1942, the Observer Group, Amphib-
ious Corps, Atlantic Fleet, was organized. In
September 1942, this group was transferred to the
west coast where it became an organic part of the
Pacific Fleet and was organized into a company
of three reconnaissance platoons. It was soon
discovered that the usefulness of this type of re-
connaissance was such as to make almost con-
tinual employment of the unit desirable. Since
this was beyond the capabilities of so small a
force, natural expansion followed and at the end
of the war the Marine Corps was using a complete
series of highly trained units for this specialized
duty. Each of the two amphibious corps in the
Pacific initially contained organic amphibious re-
connaissance units, enabling each to collect infor-
mation for forthcoming landings with its own
agencies. In addition, each Marine division had
its organic reconnaissance company, particularly
trained for amphibious patrolling as well as for
normal land warfare missions.
Experience has shown that the patrolling of
small heavily garrisoned areas does not as a rule
warrant the risk involved. Large land masses,
on the other hand, offer excellent patrolling op-
portunities. Well-planned, aggressive patrolling
was found to be feasible, and patrols secured valu-
able detailed information. Patrols were success-
ful on New Georgia Island, Treasury Island, and
Bougainville, returning without a single casualty.
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The patrols used by the 1st Marine Division on
Cape Gloucester and those on Tinian by the V
Amphibious Corps proved conclusively that, when
properly employed, the amphibious patrol can
secure information of the enemy and terrain not
otherwise available.
In planning employment for amphibious pa-
trols careful consideration must be given to the
following basic principles:
1. A patrol must be so constituted, both as to
size and equipment, that it can operate in
its assigned area with minimum danger of
detection.
2. Personnel assigned must be well trained in
amphibious patrolling and be in good phys-
ical condition.
3. Patrols must be given simple missions capable
of accomplishment and of sufficient impor-
tance to warrant sending out a patrol.
4. Patrols must be allowed sufficient time to ac-
complish missions assigned.
5. Patrol leaders must be chosen for their known
ability and intrepidity.
6. Before departing from base, patrols and the
commander of the transporting craft must be
carefully briefed as to where and how they
will be landed and where and how they will
be removed.
The size of an amphibious patrol is limited to
the minimum number of men and boats capable of
accomplishing the assigned mission. Therefore,
the size of patrols which are to land will vary from
2 or 3 men to a reconnaissance company, depending
upon the nature of the mission, known enemy dis-
positions, and the configuration of the terrain.
The smaller the patrol and the fewer the boats, the
greater will be the chances of escaping detection.
Personnel assigned to amphibious reconnais-
sance patrols are normally selected from recon-
naissance battalions or companies organic to a
Marine Division. At the close of World War II,
the Division Reconnaissance Company consisted
of 5 officers and 104 enlisted men, plus 4 naval per-
sonnel. The present Division Reconnaissance
Company consists of 6 officers and 121 enlisted
men and no naval personnel. The Amphibious
Reconnaissance Battalion of the Fleet Marine
Force consists of 23 officers, 291 enlisted marines
and 7 enlisted naval personnel.
327
Underwater Demolition Teams
Underwater demolition teams are the principal
Attack Force agency which can be used to recon-
noiter the objective area prior to D-day to gain
information of hydrographic conditions and
enemy beach defenses, and to destroy or remove
natural and artificial obstacles existing on the
beach or in the approaches. Frequently person-
nel of the Landing Force accompany underwater
demolition teams to obtain information of par-
ticular interest to the assault forces and to ensure
that such information is immediately made avail-
able to landing force units.
During the landings at Lingayen on Luzon, in
January 1945, ComUDTsPac requested that Army
liaison personnel from higher echelons of the as-
sault units be assigned to UDT as observers.
Rough UDT charts, showing the results of the
teams' reconnaissance, were prepared and repro-
duced on gelatin "Ditto" pads, and a limited dis-
tribution was made on D-day to some of the
command ships of the assault forces. As a result
of these experiences, it was perceived that UDTs
could in the future perform valuable work of a
reconnaissance and intelligence nature. The
teams participating in this work at Lingayen
Gulf had had no training in hydrographic recon-
naissance as distinct from the demolition function,
and consequently the information contained on
their charts, although valuable, was not complete.
Furthermore, distribution of this information was
not effected until one hour before the assault on
D-day.
For adequate underwater intelligence, it was
established that the officers participating should
have a thorough knowledge of hydrography, in
addition to an understanding of the maps, beach
diagrams, and the methods of speedy reproduction
under combat conditions. Ozalid machines, in-
stalled on the fast transports (APDs) on which
the teams were embarked, were used extensively in
the preparation of the reconnaissance charts which
were distributed immediately after the informa-
tion was brought back. Staff members and under-
water demolition team captains were briefed by
the rear intelligence section in the early stages of
planning an operation, and later the intelligence
officers assigned to TJDTs briefed all personnel
whose duties necessitated the collection of detailed
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information. All available pertinent data was
issued to them, and particular effort was made to
supply blow-ups of all the best available photo-
graphs of the beaches and reefs to be reconnoitered.
The effectiveness of careful advance planning is
well illustrated by the Iwo Jima operations. Re-
connaissance was made on D-2 day, and several
hours afterward a message summarizing the uar
information was sent to the flagship of the am-
phibious forces for relay to the attack forces
approaching the target.
On the night of D-2 day, the landing force
liaison personnel, which consisted of Marines, two
members of the UDT staff, and men from the
teams, were sent back to rendezvous with the at-
tack and support forces, bearing copies of the
messages and the UDT charts. Reports were sent
by message upon the completion of each recon-
naissance operation; briefing personnel with re-
ports and charts were put aboard APDs to
rendezvous with attack forces on D-1 day, and
were also transferred to the flagships of all Trans-
Ron, TransDiv, attack force, and two tractor corn-
in ands. The Army liaison personnel were assigned
to their respective battalions, regiments, divisions,
and corps. At dawn on the morning of D-day,
with the arrival of the attack forces in the area,
further transfers of staff personnel with the nec-
essary charts were made to command ships. Each
team furnished guides to the first landing wavesf
and the staff personnel reported to the Force
B ea chmaster.
No demolition was necessary at Iwo Jima, but
the necessity, feasibility, and importance of wide
and early distribution of UDT intelligence were
demonstrated.
Prior to the invasion of Okinawa, the UDTs had
been briefed at Leyte on all available intelligence,
and the latest photographs had been delivered to
them there. After making a reconnaissance of
Kerma Retto, which was then occupied a week
before the main assault, they proceeded to Oki-
nawa and reconnoitered the beaches 2 days before
the assault. Here they were accompanied by rep-
resentatives of the various troop commands as-
signed to the selected areas. Their reconnaissance
produced a detailed written report, including
large-scale Ozalid prints of beach and reef
sketches, which proved to be accurate and com-
CONFIDENTIAL
prehensive. The day before the invasion, repre-
sentatives of the various troop commands were
taken by destroyer to the flagships and vessels on
which troop commanders were embarked. UDT
representatives then briefed the assembled com-
manders and furnished them with the written
report.
During the UDT reconnaissance, 3,500 obstacles
in the form of wooden posts set on the reef edges
were discovered. As most of these constituted a
barrier to LVTs, it was deemed necessary to blow
them out of the beach approaches. This was ac-
complished by the UDTs without incident. In
addition, these incredibly courageous men later
reconnoitered for more suitable unloading beaches
in the northern part of the island.
Amphibious Intelligence Forms
The form used for intelligence estimates in
amphibious operations conforms to the standard
form for estimates (see chapter 12), although
certain information must be stated in greater
detail. Analysis of hydrography must include the
following factors: nature of coastline and con-
tiguous islands; the general location and extent of
usable beaches and exits therefrom; the nature of
offshore approaches, including the condition of
the bottom, natural obstacles, surf conditions,
tides, and currents. From the analysis of the
hydrographic conditions, conclusions are reached
as to the effect of these conditions on the enemy's
ability to defend the objective area and on the
execution of our mission.
The intelligence annex for an amphibious op-
eration follows in general the standard form
described in chapter 12. It differs, however, in
that many additional appendices are required be-
cause of the vast amount of detail which must be
promulgated during the planning phase of an
amphibious operation. In order to expedite plan-
ning between subordinate and higher units, the
appendices and early drafts of the intelligence
annex may be distributed as soon as prepared and
in advance of the final draft of the operation plan.
Other appendices may be issued later than the
operation plan in order to permit inclusion of late
information.
Beach studies are paramount in the work of the
intelligence officer in amphibious operations.
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They may be prepared for a single beach or for a
series of beaches in the same area. Information
can be presented in tabular form under the follow-
ing headings: (1) Location; (2) Length and
width in yards; (3) Composition and trafficability
of the soil; (4) Surf, current, and tidal condi-
tions; (5) Characteristics of the bottom, including
gradient; (6) Depth of water offshore and on-
shore; (7) Terrain behind beach and routes of
egress; (8) Natural and artificial beach obstacles;
(9) Enemy beach defenses; (10) Other pertinent
beach information.
The collection plan for an amphibious opera-
tion embodies the same considerations as those
previously discussed in chapter 12. Essential
elements of information and their indications will
determine the collection assignments.
Dissemination
The task of disseminating intelligence in the
amphibious landings on Okinawa was described
in chapter 11. It is typical of all such operations,
for dissemination is complicated by the distance
which often separates participating units. Once
the amphibious forces depart for the objective
area, dissemination becomes increasingly difficult,
and therefore it is important that all available in-
telligence necessary for briefing of troops aboard
ship be disseminated prior to embarkation.
In certain instances, intelligence produced by
specialist teams may be of value to the entire
command. It can be most expeditiously dissemi-
nated in the form of special studies or reports,
such as weather surveys, technical intelligence
monographs, translations of enemy documents,
and comprehensive reports on enemy tactical doc-
trine, order of battle, photographic interpretation,
and terrain. The value of such reports is of
course enhanced when they are accompanied by
appropriate graphics.
The intelligence officer must use the dissemina-
tion method best suited to the time, place, situation,
and nature of the intelligence. For example, radio
silence normally is in effect aboard ship until the
beginning of the landing and assault phase.
Therefore, the intelligence officer must rely on vis-
ual signals, aircraft drop, helicopter, ship's boats,
or dispatch vessels for dissemination. To assist
in the rapid dissemination of intelligence ashore,
329
an intelligence radio net is established among the
intelligence sections within the landing force.
Amphibious Intelligence in Action: Okinawa
In the Okinawa Operation, Naval Intelligence
made perhaps its most successful operational effort
in amphibious warfare, utilizing both past experi-
ence and training. Some mistakes were made, but
the intelligence activities in this operation serve to
illustrate both the problems and the complexities
of intelligence requirements in amphibious war-
fare.
In August 1944, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
reached their decision to occupy certain portions of
the Nansei Shot? for the development of bases
from which to conduct further operations against
Japan. ComPhibsPac was designated the Com-
mander of the Joint Expeditionary Force, which
meant that his Intelligence Section became the
highest echelon of intelligence for this operation.
Before the actual landings took place, first on 24
March 1945 at Kerama Retto, and second on
April at Okinawa, the facilities and personnel of
Naval Intelligence were heavily taxed to provide
the military forces involved with all of the infor-
mation they required.
The overall planning and preparation phase
consumed almost 7 months. During the first part
of this period a major task was the consolidation
of all accumulated information available on the
area to be attacked, and the preparation of co-
ordinated plans and schedules for collecting new
information. The bulk of accumulated informa-
tion was supplied by the Office of Naval Intelli-
gence, with additional information from such
sources as JICPOA, the District Intelligence Offi-
cer, Fourteenth Naval District, the Office of Stra-
tegic Services, the Bishop Museum, the United
States Geological Survey, the Hawaiian Pine-
apple Co., Pan-American Airways, and the Com-
mercial Pacific Cable Co.
For the collection of new information the In-
telligence Section of ComPhibsPac enlisted the aid
and support of some of the same sources plus the
intelligence officers of the Fifth Fleet, Tenth
Army, Fleet Marine Forces (Pacific), XXIV
Corps, XXX Amphibious Corps, ComAirPac,
Fast Carrier Force, and all amphibious groups.
Constant and close liaison with these units and
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with 0-2 was essential at all times. Prisoners of
war were carefully interrogated, a conchologist
from Arizona was employed; personnel of the
United States Geological Survey Office in Hono-
lulu were interviewed; continuing aerial recon-
naissance of the area was scheduled and carried
out; submarine reconnaissance was also conducted.
The reproduction and distribution of adequate
maps, charts, and printed material were tremend-
ous jobs. In addition to hydrographic charts of
the area, Okinawa approach charts, bombardment
charts, briefing charts, and anchorage charts of
the staging areas were prepared. There were
many essential maps, including road maps of
Okinawa; air and gunnery maps, scale 1/25,000,
from which gridded air support charts were pre-
pared; plotting maps of Okinawa, scale 1/100,000;
special intelligence maps, scale 1/36,000 to show
all defense installations; and rubber relief maps
of the southern part of Okinawa, scale 1/10,000
and 1/25,000. Printed material included a gen-
eral Information Bulletin on the area; a target
analysis bulletin; graphic and tabular studies of
the hydrography, reef, and beach conditions; a
graphic terrain study; detailed studies of reefs,
beaches, unloading conditions, surf and swell,
weather, tide tables, and daylight-dark tables.
Preliminary beach sketches showed the assault
beaches and perspective, with salient features of
each area. Controlled mosaics were prepared.
By January 1945, the Intelligence Annex for the
ComPhibsPac Operation Plan was completed, and
annexes for the operation plans of subordinate
units were underway.
The distribution of all materials was begun in
January and completed in February. It was, of
course, necessary for every ship engaged in the
operation, including those which might become
involved, to receive an adequate supply of maps,
charts, photographs, and all other prepared writ-
ten material. The size of the distribution problem
is indicated by the fact that the approximately
1,340 vessels involved in the operation were staged
at seven different bases in the Western Pacific, and
some were at sea most of the time. Special planes
and officers were detailed for this particular job.
The planning phase of this operation was ended
when the Commander of the Joint Expeditionary
Force departed from Iwo Jima on 9 March 1945
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330
to embark the commanding general of the Tenth
Army at Leyte. During the period en route to the
objective area, the work of his Intelligence Sec-
tion increased. The coordination and dissemina-
tion of late information received from a variety
of sources was most pressing. Up-to-the-minute
photography was a particularly important item.
The following plots were maintained: a strategic
plot of enemy forces, including sea, land, sub-
marine, and air; a plot covering the movement of
all allied task forces; a mine field plot; and a
running intelligence plot of the objective area.
Additional maps were prepared for the fire sup-
port ships. At the last minute, UDT reports and
CVE photography were received. The briefing
of all personnel, including coxswains, boat crews,
shore and beach parties was undertaken by lower
echelon intelligence officers.
With the arrival of the invasion forces at Oki-
nawa, the last phase of the operation began.
Speed now became a paramount consideration in
the collection and dissemination of information
during actual combat. ComPhibsPac assumed
control of all photographic reconnaissance air-
craft, with the result that the Intelligence Section
was required to furnish the pilots with all infor-
mation necessary to the efficient accomplishment
of their various missions. The briefing of these
photo aircraft by intelligence officers produced ex-
cellent coverage of designated areas. Photo-
graphic interpreters then worked closely with the
Target Information Center to assist in locating
targets and making damage assessments. Hydro-
graphic survey units, placed under the jurisdic-
tion of Intelligence, carried out extensive opera-
tions in laying buoys, setting up navigational aids,
observing tides and currents, and making special
studies of beaches and anchorages. Weather fore-
casts were issued twice daily.
Captured materiel, documents, and prisoners
were given a preliminary screening for informa-
tion of immediate value. Situation plots and the
intelligence maps were constantly maintained, and
briefing, especially of newly arrived commanders,
was a continuing responsibility. Daily situation
estimates were prepared. The problem of ade-
quate reproduction of photographs and maps re-
quired continuing attention. Finally, liaison
between the various commands, particularly when
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Army and Marine units moved ashore, was main-
tained to the extent physically possible.
For the intelligence officers of subordinate com-
mands, the major problems were those of dissemi-
nation of information and liaison with other com-
mands engaged in this operation. Their partic-
ular responsibilities and effort dealt with their
own immediate objectives, the beaches on which
their respective forces were to land and the land-
ing approaches. On a smaller scale, their work
was similar to that of the Intelligence System of
ComPhibsPac. A most important task was the
briefing of the lower echelons down to the person-
nel of the individual ships in order that everyone
would be familiar with the general situation and
the part each was to play.
The Okinawa invasion provided a practical
demonstration of the vital operational role played
by Intelligence. Its collection, processing, and
dissemination of information produced the knowl-
edge which made possible the Most effective and
successful use of a vast, complex military machine
geared to the requirements of amphibious warfare.
MAPS AND CHARTS
A thorough understanding of maps and charts
as sources of information for intelligence is essen-
tial in intelligence activity, especially in connec-
tion with amphibious operations. In addition to
familiarity with the types and scales of maps suit-
able for specific operations, the intelligence officer
must be skilled in the principles of map reference
systems to enable him to read all systems quickly
and easily. This subject is completely covered in
Field Manuals 21-25 and 21-26, which should be
studied by every intelligence officer; a working
knowledge of grid systems can be obtained from
AMS Technical Manual No. 36 and AFR No. 96-5.
The three types of maps and charts with which
the intelligence officer is primarily concerned are:
military maps, hydrographic charts, and aeronau-
tical charts.
Military Maps
In general, military maps may be classified by
scale, use, or description. Scale is the criterion
as to the amount of detail shown. Small scale
maps are 1: 600,000 and smaller; medium scale
331
are larger than 1: 600,000, but smaller than
1: 75,000; large scale are 1. : 75,000 and larger.
A standard classification of military maps has
been adopted by the armed forces of the United
States, the United Kingdom, and Canada:
1. General: Maps smaller than 1: 1,000,000?
utilized for general planning purposes.
2. Strategic: 1: 1,000,000?utilized for strategic
planning purposes.
3. Strategic-Tactical: 1: 250,000 (1: 500,000 al-
ternate)?for use when other scales are un-
suitable or unavailable.
4. Road: 1 : 250,000?for tactical and adminis-
trative troop movements.
5. Tactical: 1: 50,000, and 1: 25,000 (1: 100,000
alternate).
6. Fire Control: 1: 25,000?fire control for artil-
lery, naval gunfire, and air.
7. Photomap: 1: 25,000 (1: 12,500 alternate)?
for tactical and administrative purposes.
8. Town Plans: 1: 12,500.
9. Beach Maps: 1: 2,000?for tactical use by
assault units during an amphibious opera-
tion.
Hydrographic Charts
Hydrographic charts are published primarily
for navigational use and so are not designed as
topographic maps. Generally, they include the
outline of the adjacent land, together with the
surface forms and artificial features that are use-
ful as aids to navigation. For certain special op-
erations, large scale hydrographic charts contain-
ing both topographic and hydrographic data may
be prepared. Hydrographic charts show depths
of water, nature of bottom, contours of bottom,
and tides and currents in a given sea or sea and
land area. The standard projection for hydro-
graphic charts is the Universal Transverse Mer-
cator Projection on different scales, depending on
the use of the chart. Small-scale charts include
large areas suitable for ocean navigation; large
scale charts cover small areas suitable for coastal
and harbor navigation.
Aeronautical Charts
An aeronautical chart is a specialized repre-
sentation of mapped features of the earth, or some
part of it, produced to show selected terrain, cul-
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tural and hydrographic features, and supple-
mental information required for air navigation,
pilotage, or for planning air operations. The
World Geographic Reference System (short title:
Georef ) is used on all aeronautical charts for ref-
erencing purposes in the control and direction of
air forces engaged in large-area operations or
those of global nature. This includes the control
and direction of forces engaged in air defense,
strategic air operations, air-sea rescue operations,
and tactical air operations other than air support
or amphibious operations, in which case the co-
operating air forces will employ the grid referenc-
ing system specified by the commander of the
operations.
LOGISTICS PLANNING
A full treatment of logistics planning lies
beyond the scope of this text, but the important
relationship of intelligence to logistics merits
consideration.
Logistics relates to the procurement (design,
manufacture, training), shipment and storage (or
billeting) of materiel and personnel for military
use. In the Navy this represents in a sense a com-
bination of the greater part of the efforts of the
Supply Corps and of operations officers through-
out the service. The complexity of modern war
and its enormous demands in men and materiel
have been documented earlier in this volume.
Successful campaigns do not depend on valor or
will-to-win alone, but also on having the necessary
tools and men delivered in sufficient concentra-
tions at the right places and times. This requires
minute planning and considerable experience.
Minute planning of a particular operation re-
quires a thorough knowledge of the area of opera-
tions and the capabilities of the enemy.
Reference Tables
The logistics officer on a naval staff is closely
allied with the intelligence officer, for the latter in
effect is the enemy logistics officer, and his knowl-
edge of the area of operations not only helps to
assess enemy capabilities but is an essential ele-
ment in our own logistics planning.
Our logistics experience not only helps to plan
future operations, but in the absence of concrete
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intelligence gives many clues to enemy capabili-
ties. We now have many volumes of basic data
needed for logistics planning, such as the supply
requirements, the man-hour costs, and the transit
times over different kinds of terrain by various
transport means. These data can serve as a gen-
eral guide to the intelligence officer in assessing
both the overall strategic abilities and the tactical
behavior of the enemy. His goal should be to
develop detailed parallel tables on enemy logistics
as rapidly as the information can be collected.
His collection of intelligence on size of the divi-
sion slice, on speed of movement, on tons required
to supply initially and to replenish given enemy
units will ultimately lead to action by our own
logistics planners to match or counter that of the
enemy.
There now are reference tables published in con-
venient form (see FM 101-10, and the Navy
Logistics Handbook) that are equally useful to
the logistics officer and the intelligence officer in
their respective jobs. The intelligence officer can-
not hope to assess the enemy accurately unless he
is first thoroughly familiar with the types of data
we need to know for logistics planning for our
own forces and until familiarity with our own
needs can serve as a yardstick for assessing the
enemy.
Standard Components
The logistics planning of the Navy is well illus-
trated in the standard ACORNs, ClUBs, LIONs
and other types of advance bases developed in the
last war. Our early war experience, sometimes
accompanied by confusion, led to the development
of standard components of men and materials
that could be planned well in advance of actual
campaigns. Based upon the missions assigned a
future advance base and the intelligence on the
area where it was to be located, a large base could
be ordered from a catalogue of standard compo-
nent units. These units were assembled at interior
supply depots or at coastal centers and packed for
overseas shipment, often with unit markings al-
ready on the boxes. When the decision was made
to establish a base at a particular location the clas-
sified code word (shipping designator) was
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printed on the boxes, and they were ready to move
out in echelons to the forward area. Any combi-
nation of components these bases would need were
thus readily available.
Planning of bases extended beyond choosing
of components. A shipping priority system as-
signed booking numbers to all cargo, both initial
and replenishment. These were then linked di-
rectly to the number of ships assigned to the lift,
which in turn were scheduled to match the best
intelligence assessments of initial unloading ca-
pacity at the destination plus logistic assessment
of expected increase in discharge capacity.
A very large operation involves most detailed
planning not only of the gunfire support, landing
beaches, and air support targets, but also the cor-
rect scheduling of each combat loaded assault
wave and each resupply echelon to get the right
material to the right place at the time it is needed.
The degree of success will be related to the team-
work demonstrated by operations, intelligence, and
logistics on the staff concerned.
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CHAPTER 14
INTELLIGENCE IN SUPPORT OF SPECIAL ACTIVITIES
The responsibility of intelligence to the com-
mander is never greater than when a new arm or
tactic suddenly appears in the enemy's arsenal.
Then intelligence must discover the capabilities
and limitations of the new weapon or tactic and
what countermeasures might be instituted. Such
new developments that appeared in World War II
were the V-1 and V-2 guided missiles, the Kami-
kaze tactic, and, on the Allied side, the atomic
bomb. It is the purpose of this chapter to discuss
some of the special activities that have gained
prominence as techniques of war, namely, atomic
warfare, guided missiles, biological and chemical
warfare, guerrilla and partisan operations, eco-
nomic warfare, and psychological warfare.
For the purposes of this discussion, the role of
intelligence in support of these special activities
is stressed. Here again, the intelligence cycle is
in operation, and the intelligence officer is func-
tioning to assist strategic planners and field com-
manders. Collection, processing, and dissemina-
tion are the intelligence officer's special responsi-
bilities. In this respect, this chapter is merely an
extension of those which have preceded it.
ATOMIC WARFARE
The advent of atomic weapons in the science of
war has brought to the intelligence officer his
greatest challenge in modern times. Not only
must he have a basic understanding of the nuclear
physics which creates atomic explosions, but he
must also acquire a keen appreciation of the in-
telligence targets and problems presented by the
different aspects of a vast new field of scientific
research and development. His first responsibility
thus becomes the one which is always of prime
importance to his work: the maintenance of a full
fund of knowledge. It is by no means an impos-
sible task, nor does he have to have professional
scientific or engineering knowledge to comprehend
it, for a tremendous amount of material is avail-
able in books, magazines, and newspapers which
335
can be understood by the average layman. For
more technical treatment he can turn to the Atomic
Energy Commission's semiannual reports to Con-
gress and the wealth of scientific reports continu-
ally flowing from the research centers and labora-
tories under the Commission's control. Further,
he should read all the classified information
available to his organization or activity. As
developments in the atomic energy and nuclear
power fields progress, more and more information
is disseminated to all who need to know.
It is to our credit as a nation that we offered to
share our atomic secrets with the world in one of
the most humane and generous gestures in re-
corded history. Soviet Russia, however, was not
ready to accept this offer with all the free exchange
of scientific information and open inspection of
existing installations which were requisite to its
successful operation; hence the world is engaged
in a race for military supremacy in the use of a
discovery which should be one of mankind's great-
est blessings. Since atomic weapons and nuclear
power are new factors in current strategic esti-
mates of the situation, the intelligence officer must
consider the capabilities of potential enemies in
these fields and the nature of the essential elements
of information required in a collection plan for
atomic information.
Indications of Atomic Research
Here he meets a real problem in determining in-
dicators of atomic research and development.
There is no single process for making an atomic
bomb. There are at least two kinds of A-bombs,
one made from uranium 235 and the other from
plutonium, but both do have in common ultimate
production from uranium. However, each kind
can be made by three different separation processes,
which means that there are six different ap-
proaches to A-bomb production, each of which
allows considerable latitude in design of installa-
tions. Furthermore, when the processes of atomic
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bomb production are broken down into their com-
ponent parts, the materials, apparatus, and proc-
esses are similar to those employed in familiar
industrial enterprises. So our intelligence targets
begin with the raw materials rather than with
processing installations. Of these, uranium can
be singled out as of prime interest. Other mate-
rials which are possible indicators of processes
involved in atomic research and development in-
clude thorium, lithium, beryllium, graphite, deu-
terium (heavy water) , inorganic chemical reagents
of high purity, and non-corrosive construction
materials such as monel metal, nickel, and stainless
steel. The essential elements of information for
intelligence would be generally concerned with ore
deposits, mining statistics, exports and imports,
rates of production, and ultimate use of such
materials.
Our second atomic intelligence interest is di-
rected towards plants and equipment. Proximity
of plants to water is a first indicator, for a nuclear
reactor requires an elaborate water cooling sys-
tem. When the water is returned to the river or
lake of its origin, it may still be hot enough to
cause a rise in the temperature above normal. The
building housing a reactor will be of considerable
size, and electronic equipment will be required for
remote-control handling of the product. Separa-
tion plants in plutonium extraction require under-
ground tanks for the disposal of radioactive waste.
From the ventilating stacks of these tanks radio-
active dust may be widely scattered, not in suffi-
cient quantities to constitute a health hazard, but
enough to make detection possible in the surround-
ing vegetation and water supply.
Laboratory and engineering equipment of many
kinds should be cause for investigation, although
most of it is not used exclusively in nuclear energy
development. Cyclotrons, electromagnets, com-
pressors, vacuum pumps, and ultra-high voltage
generators, for example, have potential employ-
ment in atomic processes, and elaborate instru-
ments such as a mass spectrometer are essential to
nuclear research.
Third, we have an admirable indicator of atomic
activity in the person of the nuclear scientist and
his colleagues in atomic research and development,
the engineers, chemists, geologists, physicists, met-
allurgists, and others of allied professions. The
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activities of such people become essential elements
of information in assessing any nation's atomic
capability. The training of students in the nu-
clear sciences, the projects of university labora-
tories and research centers, and the security
measures under which their work is carried on
will all have meaning to the intelligence officer.
The manufacture of an atomic weapon is an
immense and difficult problem involving scientific
and engineering ability of the highest order and
the utilization of skilled manpower to such a
degree that, in the present economic state of the
world, very few nations could accomplish it, even
though desirable.
Nuclear Research Throughout the World
We know of course that the United States, Can-
ada, and Great Britain originally pooled scientific
knowledge of atomic energy in the common inter-
est. The French program is on a relatively small
scale compared with that of the United States
or even Britain. Belgium's contribution is of first-
class importance because of the uranium deposits
in the Belgian Congo, which is the largest supplier
of these ores to the United States. The Philips
Company in Holland has an international repu-
tation as designers and manufacturers of particle
accelerators for atomic research. Denmark is sec-
ond to none in fundamental research (Profs. Bohr
and Ilevesy) but lacks the industrial potential for
practical applications. Norway's atomic energy
research and installations are particularly con-
cerned with the use of heavy water. Sweden has
built a reactor and has the necessary high indus-
trial potential. Switzerland has the engineering
techniques and physicists of international reputa-
tion (Dr. Paul Scherer). Nuclear research and
discoveries of the greatest importance, led by
Fermi and Anialdi, are Italian contributions. In-
dia has an Atomic Energy Commission and her
scientists are famed for their genius in advanced
mathematical research, which is of special value
in nucleonics and the quantum mechanics asso-
ciated with it. India also has vast quantities of
monozite sands, and Ceylon is potentially the
world's richest source of thorium. South Africa
and Australia have extensive programs of geologi-
cal exploration. It is probable that other nations
have found sources of uranium or thorium ores in
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significant quantities, but are not publishing their
presence to the world.
As to the U. S. S. R. and Eastern Europe the
unclassified information published represents only
educated guesses. We do know that the infamous
Klaus Fuchs gave the Russians not only the inti-
mate details of the A-bomb, but something of the
potentialities of the H-bomb as well. He made it
possible for Russian scientists to attain their goal
at? least three and possibly as much as ten years
sooner than they could have done it on their own.
Russia exploded her A-bomb much sooner than
we expected, and we can believe that she has been
working on the H-bomb since 1045. Our own
progress on the H-bomb continues to be highly
classified information, although again reputable
scientific reporters have made educated guesses.
Thus far we have been dealing with atomic in-
telligence of a strategic nature. Let us proceed
to consider the operational employment of atomic
weapons and the responsibilities of an intelligence
officer on the staff of a commander who must make
decisions as to their use and also solve the prob-
lems of radiological defense. Such problems of
command become the concern of the commander's
staff.
A-Weapons in Operational Command
The introduction of new weapons of a nonper-
ceptible insidious character in warfare does not
require a revamping of our organization in order
to cope with it. It is quite evident, however, that
it will demand wisdom, tact, and ingenuity on the
part of the commander and his staff. A proven,
easily demonstrated weapon is quickly countered
by the optimum defense attainable. For the de-
fense against a weapon whose effects are either
shrouded in secrecy or not easily observed, how-
ever, implicit faith in technical staff advisers will
be necessary.
Command problems in radiological defense may
arise as a direct result of several factors. Lack
of prior planning, for instance, will require quick
decisions and improvised plans, some of which
may easily prove to be disastrous. Lack of quali-
fied and trained personnel will cause serious de-
lays. Lack of equipment of rigorous and proved
design can cause limitations in time of need. The
absence of a well-trained and well-organized radio-
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logical defense team can impose unnecessary time
delays. Command problems directly attributable
to these factors can be reduced. Other command
problems arising out of unexpected employment
of atomic weapons with regard to method, place,
or timing can be minimized by thorough intelli-
gence and counterintelligence. In the final anal-
ysis, command problems can be solved by the
adequate combination of the following:
1. A thoroughly trained radiological defense
officer backed by his commander.
2. A well-thought-out and complete plan.
3. A trained radiological defense organization.
4. Adequate equipment, supplies, and facilities.
5. Good intelligence and counterintelligence.
Methods of Atomic Attack
The extent of damage caused by the various
types of atomic bursts and the characteristics of
the explosions have been thoroughly studied.
With proper protective measures and a radiologi-
cal defense plan the chances for survival under
atomic attack have become very much increased,
and many groundless fears have been dissipated
by accurate knowledge gained from field tests.
In an air burst of an atomic weapon, the pre-
dominant effects are blast, radiant heat, instant
nuclear radiation, and secondary fires; the second-
ary effect is radioactive contamination which is
relatively small. In the downwind direction,
areas may be found contaminated by fall-out of
radioactive material, although the degree of con-
tamination may not be a primary hazard.
In an underwater burst, the predominant effects
are radioactive fall-out contamination and water-
propagated blast which constitute an extremely
serious threat. The water absorbs, shields, or
minimizes the effects of instant nuclear radiation,
air blast, radiant heat, and secondary fires. In
order to obtain an extremely large volume of
highly radioactive material on a target, the effect
of blast and heat is reduced.
The probable results of a subsurface ground
burst are purely speculative, but some broad con-
clusions can be drawn by analogy with the under-
water burst. Predominant effects would be ra-
dioactive contamination (from the fall-out of
soil-trapped fission products and from neutron-
induced reactions in the elements of the soil) and,
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to a less extent, air and ground shock wave. Sec-
ondary effects would be instant nuclear radiation,
radiant heat, and fires. Since the dissipation of
the heat generated in a subsurface ground burst
could be expected to be slower than in an under-
water burst, the cloud would rise higher and would
be influenced more by wind conditions.
Considering each of the effects of the various
probable methods of employing an atomic weapon,
it is seen that they impose large problems on the
military commander. In addition, the civilian de-
fense organization will no doubt rely strongly on
the zone of interior commander for advice, co-
ordination, and assistance, make his task even
greater. The commander outside the zone of in-
terior may have to combine his efforts with those
of a friendly power. This would further add to
the responsibilities of that commander.
Information From Tests
Much profitable information and guidance can
be extracted from experiences in operations involv-
ing large-area radiation contamination. A corn-
mand problem which was potentially very serious
arose at the Baker test of Operation Crossroads.
The Baker test explosion was different from those
at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, for there was an
added hazard from the radioactive materials
trapped in the water and rained on the target ves-
sels. Men walked through radioactive material
scattered over the decks of the ships, tracked it
around, and got it on their clothing and exposed
parts of their bodies. Since they could not see,
feel, nor smell it, they did not respect it, but they
could eat it and they could inhale it.
At Bikini, operations could be interrupted any
time plans, group training, or operational tech-
niques became inadequate to assure complete pro-
tection to personnel. During combat, however,
plans and training must be such that an organiza-
tion can continue to function.
After the Bikini tests were completed, the target
vessels were towed to Kwajalein and anchored in
the lagoon for long-term storage. The need for
further examination of the vessels was apparent,
and it was also evident that a complete quarantine
of the ships would not be practical. The ships
contained large amounts of high explosives, in-
cluding some experimental ammunition and some
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obtained from foreign navies. Removal of this
ammunition was necessary, and the longer opera-
tions were deferred the more dangerous the work
would become.
Frequent briefings of the men were held by the
officers to impress the need for caution, not only
against the dangers from radioactivity, but also
against the dangers of handling explosive mate-
rials and working in poorly ventilated spaces.
The protective restrictions which were estab-
lished were more severe than those used at Bikini.
Every tendency to relax precautions had to be
countered by a psychological campaign on the part
of the officers to insure compliance. This is typical
of what may be expected in the future. If the
nature of the danger is not directly observable, the
control of the troops will present a complex prob-
lem. There is a vast difference between impressing
a man with the fear of observable physical injury
and impressing him with respect for invisible
radioactivity. If there is careful indoctrination
regarding radioactivity, the effect of atomic weap-
ons should be decreased. If proper respect is
not instilled, the toll of lives will be increased.
It seems that the command difficulties to be
countered and the lessons to be learned in atomic
warfare will include a repetition of some of the
difficult experiences at Kwajalein. There will be
others that are more complex.
The value of any objective should be weighed
against the cost of achieving it. The costs of
achieving radiological objectives are not readily
observable. When a man has been subjected to
some cumulative absorption, which will be re-
ferred to as military tolerance, his usefulness for
radiological defense (or attack) is impaired. Fur-
ther exposure will increase the liability of his be-
coming a casualty. When a commander has held
his troops in an area of high radioactivity until he
can observe the physical effects upon them, he has
held them too long.
The commander of the future must understand
the nonperceptible hazards of atomic warfare and
know how to evaluate them accurately. He must
also know how to weigh the normal, calculated
risks against the value of his military objective.
He must understand the nature of radioactivity
and the slowness with which it acts and makes
itself evident. He must be willing to accept the
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advice of a technical staff on such matters just as
certainly as, under other circumstances, he would
accept the information of troop losses. He can-
not shift to technical personnel the responsibility
for failing to drive on to his military objectives,
but he must give proper weight to their advice.
Military command remains in his hands and can-
not be usurped by the adviser or the radiological
monitors, but the commander cannot act efficiently
if he ignores the advice of such technical person-
nel, who in such instances would actually give far
more than advice. They would tell the commander
the absolute facts and impress them upon him so
that later substantiation by troop casualty lists
and demoralization reports would be avoided.
The United States has conducted many tests
since Hiroshima and Nagasaki for the purpose of
obtaining data which will enable the development
of an efficient, adequate, and commendable radio-
logical defense operation. From each succeeding
test come additional valuable lessons pertaining
to radiation, lessons that will improve and perfect
the overall concept of radiological defense.
Captain Frank I. Winant, Jr., USN, Chief of
the Radiological Defense Division, Armed Forces
Special Weapons Project, concluded a lecture at
the Army Medical Center in 1949 with the follow-
ing observation:
We must not leave our problems of opera-
tional development unsolved awaiting a hur-
ried solution under conditions of actual war-
fare. Future atomic tests should be very
useful for developing our standard opera-
tional procedures and organizations, and
military personnel should be employed in
radiological defense work in these tests to in-
crease our service experience. These tests are
few and far between and are sometimes lim-
ited to specialized objectives. Since they fall
short of the disaster conditions toward which
our planning must be pointed, it seems vital
that there be operational development within
the services. We have a great deal to do in
properly evaluating the air reconnaissance of
radiological areas, in determining the value
of helicopters for radiological survey, in per-
fecting remote and projectable telemetering
instruments and techniques, and in complet-
ing time studies and work planning and on-
the-spot orientation methods for such condi-
tions. We have a great deal more planning to
do in the matter of provision of adequate and
339
timely personnel replacements in radiologi-
cally hazardous areas.
Operational development work will provide
a continuous testing of textbook training and
prevent stagnation of training doctrine.
Without it our training in theoretical aspects
can advance only to the limit of the most re-
cent physics text and in its practical aspects
to the limits of the last information which has
emanated from atomic tests.
No discussion of this nature could be com-
plete without some reference to civil defense.
Since most of us have families, we are natur-
ally interested in this problem. The armed
services are responsible for effecting their pri-
mary military missions in wartime and will,
in general, be unable to effect civil defense.
Recognizing this condition, it is proper that
the military should keep out of civil defense
as much as possible. This will confront the
Civil Defense Organization with the responsi-
bility of growing up to meet its own problems.
It would be sheer folly, however, to overlook
the fact that civil defense will have a great
influence on our capabilities to wage war.
The next war may very well be won or lost
on the home front. Recognizing this, we are
trying to do what we can in support of civil
defense without complicating it. Our re-
search programs are pointed toward develop-
ing equipment which will be as useful to the
civil defenders as to the military. The field
of radiological defense, from its inception,
has been a universal field with universal lan-
guage, equipment, techniques, and training.
It is a military goal to increase our readiness
in equipment and trained personnel so near
to the service requirements that if called upon
in emergency we can dispatch radiological
defense personnel to any point necessary. To
this end we have initiated a truly joint train-
ing program with the Army, Navy, and Air
Force turning out of their own schools joint
student groups who have been trained in joint
curricula under joint staffs so that in emer-
gency they can be banded together quickly
and work together with intelligence and pre-
cision as they did in Operation Sandstone.
Nuclear Power
When in August 1951, the Navy announced that
a contract had been let to the Electric Boat Co.
of Groton, Conn., for construction of an atomic
powered submarine, a new era in naval warfare
was born. The implications of this new develop-
ment are obvious, for such an undersea craft may
well revolutionize modern concepts of naval
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INTELLIGENCE FOR
power. Tactical employment of submarines which
approach a Jules Verne ideal conjures up a host
of speculation upon the future of the surface ships
which are the submarines' common target.
We can only conjecture what further develop-
ments in nuclear power will mean on the sea and
in the air. One thing is certain: the intelligence
officer will have to meet their challenge with flexi-
bility of mind, ready to cast off obsolete ideas, and
concentrate all his powers of imagination, resource-
fulness, and initiative upon the new problems they
pose. Once again the maintenance of a full fund
of knowledge is paramount. He must study the
capabilities of various aircraft as potential de-
liverers of atomic weapons and think of what they
can do if controlled and operated by the enemy.
With such knowledge he will more capably sup-
port his commander.
GUIDED MISSILES
A "Guided Missile" is defined by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff as "an unmanned vehicle moving
about the earth's surface whose trajectory or flight
path is capable of being altered by a mechanism
within the vehicle." In other words, it is a pilot-
less aircraft with built-in intelligence. The basic
components of any, guided missile are: an air-
frame; a propulsion unit; a guidance system; and
a warhead. The laws of subsonic and supersonic
flight determine the design of the airframe. As
for the propulsion unit, the jet engine is the only
existing motive system capable of economically
producing the tremendous power necessary to
launch guided missiles and propel them to super-
sonic speeds. The two main types of jet engines
are the atmospheric jet and the rocket jet. The
former may be subdivided into Pulse jets, Ram
jets and Turbo jets (for use in the atmosphere) ;
the latter into Liquid fuel rockets and Solid fuel
rockets (for use in and beyond the atmosphere).
Guidance systems under development today in-
clude radio or radar command, terrestial naviga-
tion, automatic celestial navigation, three-dimen-
sional "dead-reckoner" called the inertial sys-
tem, a preset course computer, and various types
of homing devices which respond variously to
light, radio, sound or infrared emissions, radar
reflectivity, or magnetic features of the target.
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The warhead may be of the high explosive, frag-
mentary, or special weapons categories. Or, in
the case of reconnaissance missiles, the warhead
may be replaced by a series of still, movie, or tele-
vision cameras.
Their greatest advantage is that they do not
subject the lives of trained personnel to enemy fire.
Therefore, the weight normally occupied by a
pilot, guns, protective armament, landing gear,
and survival gear, can be devoted to make the pilot-
less aircraft fly higher, faster, and farther.
The future potentialities of guided missiles are
so great that they may one day comprise one of the
major components of armed forces intelligence.
Therefore, any reported foreign development is
of tremendous technical and scientific interest.
Early Progress
The Russians pioneered in the military applica-
tion of rockets, while the Germans led the world
in the development of effective guidance systems.
In Germany, a large group of rocket enthusiasts
was at work in the early 1920's striving to break
the barriers to travel beyond the earth. At several
periods between the wars the German Army took a
direct interest in rockets, foreseeing military ap-
plications, and by the middle 1930's specific mili-
tary experimentation was underway, well guarded
from public knowledge, at the Baltic Coast sta-
tion of Peenemiinde. Several teams of engineers
were at work. One group produced a robot air-
plane powered with a pulse-jet engine, the V--/.
It carried almost one ton of explosives, had a range
of about 125 miles, and a speed of about 425 miles
per hour. It was launched from a ramp by a
booster, then leveled out on a preset course from
which it dived either on command of a cock mecha-
nism or when the fuel gave out. It was simple in
construction, requiring only 500 man-hours, and its
pulse-jet engine termed "flying stove pipe" had no
moving parts other than a flap valve at the air
intake. Approximately 10,000 were shot toward
Britain beginning a few days after D-day in
Normandy. Of these the British spotted 8,081,
and managed to shoot down 3,765 with fighter
aircraft or ant Laircraft guns. Some 2,340 are
known to have reached London, destroying or
damaging one million homes, killing 6,000 persons,
and wounding 37,000 more. It should be noted
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that the V-1 was neither a rocket nor was it com-
pletely guided, except by clockwork.
The main group of engineers at Peenemfinde
was at work on a technically more significant,
though at the time less successful, military
weapon: the long range rocket with supersonic
speed. The one pushed to completion for opera-
tional use was the A-4, popularly known as the
V?s. With a range of about 200 miles, a speed
of 3,500 miles per hour, and a 2,150 pound war-
head, it was launched vertically from any level
hard surface to arch through the stratosphere and
then drop without warning on its target. Inter-
ception was impossible because it travelled at
nearly five times the speed of sound. Pin-point
accuracy was not required, since it was directed
at concentrated urban areas. It represented a
great technological achievement, although less
effective than the V-1. Its cost was very high,
about 5,000 man-hours.
The German experimenters also made progress
with much more fearsome weapons. The A-4b,
later improved to the A-9, was an A-4 with wings
to increase its gliding range. Not tested was a
two-stage rocket, the A9/A10 which was to speed
an A-9 across the Atlantic to fall on New York
30 minutes after launching in Europe. A still
larger, three stage A9/A10/A14 combination was
to throw the A9 into space in a permanent orbit
around the earth serving as a weapon to be
dropped by radio command on any target in the
world, or as an observation station and radio relay
point, and later as the start of a manned station
in space.
The Germans also developed whole families of
other special purpose missiles. They were de-
signed for launching either from ground sites, air-
craft, or surfaced submarines, and could be em-
ployed against surface targets or aircraft. The
most advanced surface-launched antiaircraft mis-
siles were the Schmetterling and the Wasserfall,
both of which were tracked optically and con-
trolled by radio or radar. The air-to-air missiles
included the .1-4 and the HS-298. The latter was
tracked optically through a pair of binoculars
from the launching plane, and course corrections
were cranked in by radio. To overcome Allied
attempts at jamming, controls were sent to the
1-4 through a fine, flexible wire training back to
341
the launching plane. The Germans also had two
air-to-surface missiles, which proved quite effec-
tive. The Fritz-X, a 3,000 pound radio-con-
trolled bomb, was used to sink the modern Italian
battleship Roma when she was fleeing to join the
Allies. And the HS-293, an 1,100 pound radio-
controlled missile, made successful attacks on
Allied merchant ships, and also sank 7 destroyers
in the Dodecanese.
At the end of the war, German scientists, blue-
prints, test models, and partially completed mis-
siles fell into the hands of all principal victors.
They have since provided the basis for postwar
developments in both the United States and the
U. S. S. B.
Recent Developments
The years since World War II have been devoted
both to basic research and to developing interim
tactical models. The United States used its stock
of V?.'s as one phase of its upper atmosphere re-
search program, in one case throwing a second
stage rocket, WAG-Corporal, into space a distance
of 250 miles. The effort has involved metallurgy
and ceramics to find materials that would with-
stand the terrific heat of rocket motors; chemistry
to find dependable fuels delivering higher exhaust
velocities; wind tunnels and mechanical brains to
determine aerodynamic behavior; and especially,
guidance systems to improve the long range ac-
curacy of such weapons.
Guided missiles in this country have become a
major item in the military budget, with a special
office to coordinate the independent research of
Army, Navy, and Air Force.
Space Travel
As early as December 1948, it was announced
that the efforts of the individual services to de-
velop satellite vehicles were to be combined. Satel-
lite vehicles, already within present day technical
capabilities, could well be followed by manned sta-
tions in space. The Air Force has underway long-
range development programs that include studies
of space medicine to anticipate the effects of lack
of gravity, acceleration, cosmic radiation, and
meteor incidence on the human organism. In pub-
lic information releases, the Air Force has already
spoken of travel not only within the Solar System
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but eventually many light years away to other
stars, suggesting that Wolf 359, some 8 light years
away may be an early goal. Today's chemical
fuels probably can give us a space station, though
at considerable cost. A workable atomic drive,
already blue-printed in several public proposals,
or some entirely new propulsion system will be
needed for further exploration. Even if the new
fuels do not appear, by the costly stockpiling of
material at a space station we can not only reach
the moon but penetrate to Mars as well.
Therefore, interplanetary travel is essentially
an extension of intercontinental missile activity.
The reason for dwelling at such length on these
rather fantastic topics is their intelligence impli-
cations. In World War II, Allied intelligence
began to get strange reports about German activi-
ties at Peenemiinde, and pinpointed air attacks on
this center were important in disrupting activities
there. Runaway rockets which crashed on Swed-
ish soil were recovered and subjected to careful
analysis so that their nature and capabilities could
be determined. Aerial photographs and reports
from agents told about the preparation of launch-
ing sites. The invasion of Normandy came none
too soon to save considerable destruction by Ger-
man V weapons. Because of their potentialities,
prompt technical intelligence steps were required
to capture personnel and data on German experi-
ments.
Thus some acquaintance with the field of guided
missiles is a new requirement in the intelligence
officer's full fund of knowledge. Ile should read
all available literature and seek opportunities to
learn all he can from those who are engaged in this
special branch of warfare.
BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WARFARE
Biological warfare (BW) is warfare waged by
means of biological agents to produce death or dis-
ease in men, animals, and plants. Chemical war-
fare (CW) employs nonexplosive chemicals (es-
pecially war gases, smokes, and incendiaries) for
the same purpose.
Biological and Chemical warfare intelligence
are concerned with the research and the prepara-
tions for operations by foreign nations in these
forms of toxic warfare. Targets of this intelli-
gence interest are the materials and techniques
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employed, and the toxic warfare characteristics of
all possible theaters of operations, including
weather, hyd.rography, and terrain.
The subject material of the following pages will
introduce the intelligence officer to biological and
chemical warfare, and outline the additional re-
sponsibilities that become his in fields where sci-
ence is making a deep impact upon modern
military strategy and tactics. It becomes even
more significant when we consider the fact that
our enemies are very much interested in its
development.
Biological Warfare
Biological warfare is old in the history of the
human race, having been waged against man by
man at least since Old Testament times and against
man for many thousands of years by nature. As
a technique, it has been described as "preventive
medicine in reverse" and demands little more of
our industry and science than a change in point
of view.
Biological warfare is defined as warfare waged
by the use of organisms or their toxic products to
cause disease in man, animals or plants. It is
distinguished from other methods of warfare by
three striking characteristics: (1) Its action is
wholesale and indiscriminate. It is a method of
mass killing, and as such may be extremely dc-
moralizing; (2) Its action is diffusive and tends
to spread rapidly in all directions. In this respect
it is unique. It has been compared to the spread-
ing of flames from an incendiary bomb and to an
atomic chain reaction; (3) It is not destructive of
property. Un like conventional or atomic shelling
or bombing, it never destroys buildings, machines,
or other dead matter, and can accomplish its pur-
pose by affecting plants or domestic animals rather
than human beings.
At its present stage, biological warfare is by no
means comparable to atomic warfare in destructive
power. This is partly due to the problems of
producing and preserving sufficient amounts of
BW agents but even more to the difficulty of dis-
seminating them widely enough to have a mili-
tarily significant effect. Biological warfare is,
however, far cheaper than atomic warfare. It is
also more insidious and better suited to sabotage,
especially in a time of ostensible peace.
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There are four types of disease-producing or-
ganisms, or pathogens: bacteria, fungi, viruses,
and rickettsias. (Certain specimens of these types
are harmless or otherwise not suitable for BW.)
It should be noted that "bacteriological warfare,"
once a common term, is too narrow in its denota-
tion. Typhus, for example, is a rickettsial dis-
ease; and so the use of typhus culture as a BW
agent would, for consistency, have to be called
"rickettsial warfare." For this reason the term
"biological warfare" is now general.
Suitability of Diseases for BW
To be suitable for BW, a disease must have cer-
tain characteristics. It should be highly. commu-
nicable, infectious, i. e., able to breakdown the de-
fensive mechanism of the host, and virulent, i. e.,
deadly or disabling. These criteria are self-
evident. Unless a disease can spread rapidly, take
hold and run its course, and cripple or enfeeble
its victims, it cannot seriously affect morale or
capacity to resist.
It must be borne in mind, however, that the
characteristics of a disease depend in part on the
conditions under which it is used. Thus measles,
a single attack of which ordinarily confers life-
long immunity, would probably not be very infec-
tious in most countries except among small
children. Any disease chosen for BW will likely
be one to which the population attacked is sus-
ceptible, due regard being given to acquired
immunity.
Methods of Dissemination
BW agents may be disseminated: (1) by air, in
the form of aerosols (suspensions of solid or liquid
particles in air) , as occurs with common colds,
influenza, diphtheria, and measles; (2) by contam-
ination of food or water, as occurs with typhoid
and cholera; (3) by contact or contagion; (4) by
carrier, such as a rodent or insect "vector," as
occurs with typhus, malaria, Rocky Mountain
spotted fever, and plague.
A given disease may be transmitted by more
than one of the above methods, and also by others,
such as inoculation. It need not be transmitted
in the way that is usual in nature; certain vector
diseases can be effectively disseminated by air.
Aerosol diseases are easily spread, and the result-
343
ing epidemics are hard to control. They are thus
especially suitable for BW. The other types are
not easy to introduce on a large scale and, except
for vector diseases, are fairly easy to control by
ordinary sanitation and case isolation. Accord-
ingly, overt BW could be waged by means of filled
missiles and munitions, projected or airborne, to
create BW clouds (aerosols). Covert BW can also
be effected with aerosols, although the possibility
of contamination or the use of vectors cannot be
ignored.
Weather and terrain factors may favor or im-
pede dissemination by the aerosol method. The
best conditions for spreading aerosols are high
humidity, low temperature, moderate wind, and
dim light. The direction of the wind is important,
since naturally the BW cloud must be released to
windward of its objective. Personnel on high
ground may be unaffected by a BW cloud. Heavy
vegetation diminishes initial concentration and
persistence, and buildings or dugouts tend to
screen out the BW agent.
Production and Use
In addition to being able to cause a "suitable"
disease under given circumstances and being sus-
ceptible to dissemination in a given environment, a
BW agent must be adaptable to large-scale produc-
tion. Such production depends chiefly on the
medical and biological sciences and industries and
does not presuppose great resources, a vast and
varied industrial plant, or the other components of
national power in conventional or atomic warfare.
BW is especially suitable for clandestine use,
since preparations for it are easy to conceal. Con-
spicuous plants and equipment, such as must be
used in producing conventional or atomic weapons,
are not needed. Furthermore, a relatively small
supply of a BW agent is sufficient to infect even a
large population.
Intelligence Problems
The identification of a BW attack and the deter-
mination of its source may prove to be an intelli-
gence enigma. The attack may first become evi-
dent through such indications as an outbreak of
disease which cannot be explained by normal
means of transmission or the simultaneous appear-
ance of many cases in about the same stage of de-
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velopment. Indications other than human illness,
such as disease and death among animals, the un-
usual taste or appearance of food or water, and the
sudden reduction or disappearance of the residual
chlorine in water supply systems, must also be
watched.
The following factors provide an index of a
Nation's BW capabilities and vulnerabilities: (1)
the level of medical and biological science; (2) the
technological level, size, and flexibility of the bio-
logical and pharmaceutical industry and in par-
ticular, its capacity to produce cultures, antibi-
otics and immunizing agents on a large scale; (3)
the adequacy of medical personnel and facilities;
(4) the system of communications and transpor-
tation for evacuating afflicted areas, bringing them
help, etc.; (5) the target population, particularly
with respect to whether it is steadfast and well-
informed and equipped in matters of sanitation;
(6) BW research and training; (7) internal secu-
rity to prevent sabotage; (8) intelligence of BW
scientific and technical developments, the BW
capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable courses
of action of all Nations, and the BW character-
istics of strategic areas.
Chemical Warfare
Chemical warfare is defined as warfare waged
by the use of smokes, incendiaries, and poison
gases.
In some respects it is unlike BW. It is not so
indiscriminate, its action can be localized fairly
well, and, of course, it does not have the same
diffusive or "chain reaction" effect. On the other
hand, like BW it can produce casualties without
damaging installations and serves its purpose if
it merely disables or demoralizes without killing
personnel. The methods of dissemination are sim-
ilar. For toxic CW agents, the most useful appear
to be the aerosol method, such as spraying from
aircraft, and the filled-munitions methods by us-
ing bombs, shells, or grenades.
History of CW
CW has an extensive history. The Germans
initiated it in World War I by launching a large-
scale chlorine attack at Ypres on 22 April 1915.
Though almost totally unprepared, the Allies soon
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344
began to retaliate. By the time of the Armistice,
chemical shells constituted the following percent-
ages of all ammunition being expended: United
States 15 percent, British 25 percent, French 35
percent, German 50 percent. About 39 different
CW agents were developed during World War I,
the best known being mustard and lewisite gases
(vesicants) , phosgene and chlorine (choking
gases) , and hydrogen cyanide (a "nerve" or
"blood" gas). -Various irritant smokes, tear gases,
incendiaries, and screening smokes were also
developed.
In World War II, for practical purposes, poison
gas was not used at all, the deterrent being fear
of retaliation. The Allies were known to be well
prepared for CW counterattack, and it is also
quite possible that Hitler, who was gassed as a
corporal in World War I, abhorred poison gases
and opposed their use. Other CW agents, how-
ever, such as incendiary bombs, flamethrowers,
screening smokes, and "napalm," were used and
new ones were developed.
Though they abstained from using poison gas,
the Germans developed a new class of "nerve
gases," called "G" (for "German") gases, which
belong to a class of organic compounds called
"Trilons." Their properties make them deadly
war gases. One of them, "GD," for example, is
100 times as toxic as mustard gas. They are mod-
erately persistent to persistent, colorless, odorless,
tasteless, and otherwise difficult to detect, and
their physiological action is very rapid. These
gases exist in both the liquid and the vapor states.
As liquids, they are absorbed into the bloodstream
through the skin and may cause death within a
few minutes. Known antidotes or decontamina-
tion agents are effective only if used immediately.
As gases, they are absorbed into the bloodstream
through the lungs, when inhaled, and in this form
they present little serious threat to anyone pro-
tected by a standard United States protective
mask, since no significant amount of the vapor is
absorbed through unbroken skin. If absorbed
through broken skin, however, or inhaled without
a protective mask, the vapor in low concentratiOns
produces headache, nausea, retching, and pupil-
lary contraction so great that it may cause blind-
ness, and in high concentrations, paralysis of the
respiratory muscles.
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GUERRILLA AND PARTISAN OPERATIONS
Intelligence has a two-fold concern with guer-
rilla warfare. One is the production of intelli-
gence suited to the special requirements of guer-
rilla and partisan operations, and the other results
from the fact that intelligence officers are fre-
quently assigned to such groups for liaison pur-
poses in an advisory capacity, or to participate in
the execution of their missions. Guerrilla war-
fare depends more on accurate intelligence than
on mass force for successful operations, and its
varied activities provide certain collection oppor-
tunities not afforded by more conventional opera-
tions.
Missions of Guerrilla Forces
Guerrillas are usually assigned missions which
include the following: (1) Destruction of trans-
portation and telecommunications facilities; (2)
Destruction of crops, stored supplies, and fac-
tories; (3) Harassment of isolated troops, supply
convoys, unit command posts, and air installa-
tions; (4) ColleCtion and transmission of intelli-
gence?including the taking of prisoners for in-
formation; (5) Political attack by assassinating
enemy leaders, spreading propaganda, and ter-
rorizing civilians; and (6) Combined operations,
both offensive and defensive, with regular forces.
It is easy to see that intelligence can play a most
important role in the fulfillment of any one of
these missions. Assignment to duty with guer-
rillas is by no means limited to Army intelligence
personnel; in World War II, naval intelligence
officers served with such forces in Europe, Asia,
and the islands of the Pacific.
Strength and Composition
Guerrilla units, although generally thought of
as small, may vary considerably in size, depending
on terrain, environment, and enemy activity.
Examples exist of successful guerrilla forces of
as many as 30,000 men. The significant organiza-
tional characteristic of guerrilla operations is not
that the forces are small but that the separate tac-
tical entities are often small in comparison, with
conventional units and their armament is gen-
erally light, consisting of small arms, demolition
materials and perhaps mortars.
209196-54---23
Ideally, every guerrilla unit has at least one
radio operator, one explosives expert, and a person
with medical knowledge. Military experience is
of course desirable but not absolutely necessary,
for the operations of guerrilla warfare have pecu-
liar requirements and a variety of talents can be
used to advantage. Marksmen from gun clubs,
expert horsemen, hunters and trackers, miners
who can handle dynamite, loggers who know how
to control the fall of a tree, construction men,
chemists to make explosives, mechanics to repair
and operate captured vehicles or tanks?all are
welcome in guerrilla ranks. Above all, an able
leader is required, one who possesses the ability
to inspire his men and who sets an example by
his own daring and ingenuity. He must be able
to control his men, for without a certain amount
of discipline a guerrilla detachment becomes
merely a group of individual bandits with no com-
mon goal or method.
Knowledge of Operating Area
Guerrillas should operate in areas thoroughly
familiar to themselves if they are to capitalize on
their limited strength. Knowledge of the area
of operations in the intelligence sense then be-
comes of the utmost importance. There are hide-
outs and caches to be prepared and escape routes
to be planned. Terrain and cover must be studied
to determine what areas can be traversed without
detection from ground or air. Camouflage re-
quirements need advance study and planning.
The territory must be equally well known in the
dark. The guerrilla does not try to hold ground.
He uses his exact knowledge of the area to out-
distance the enemy, to avoid his attention, to plan
and carry out attacks. He must always be on the
alert, since he lives by his wits.
Support Requirements
Major success by irregular troops or guerrillas
require considerable support and sympathy of
the resident population, logistics support from
the outside, and coordinated action with other
guerrilla units and also with any friendly forces
in the area. Sympathetic inhabitants will furnish
them with food, provide necessary information
about the enemy, and protect them from betrayal.
Without airdrops or smuggled arms and ammuni-
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tion from friendly territory, continued operations
against modern armies are arduous and often
futile. Coordinated efforts in irregular attacks
are necesary even if the only goal is harassment.
When guerrillas are in close proximity to friendly
military forces, their operations can be of im-
measurable aid if controlled by the theater
commanders.
ECONOMIC WARFARE
In chapter 5 the scope of economic intelligence
was outlined, and its importance in the strategic
assessment of military power was emphasized. In
succeeding chapters economic resources were shown
to be basic elements of power among nations, and
some of the problems of international economic
relations and trade were discussed. This section
will illustrate how economic intelligence can be
directly used as the basis for the form of uncon-
ventional warfare called economic, which can sup-
port military aims in war and if the need arises
also be effectively used in times of peace.
The Concept of Economic Warfare
Economic warfare has many weapons and pur-
poses, but fundamentally it deals with the fact
that a strong and healthy economy is important
to long-range success in both military and political
spheres. The disruption of normal economic
processes or interference with economic planning
will upset the time tables of military or political
programs.
Modern war is a burden no nation can "afford"
to carry, but it continues to be practiced because
the alternatives seem even less desirable. Since
the economic cost of war in resources, man-hours,
capital investment, population shifts, financial
debt, redistributed income, and inflation is so
great, properly planned economic warfare meas-
ures can make the burden intolerable and bring
the war to an end.
Economic warfare alone is seldom successful; it
usually requires military strength to enforce its
measures. Since ancient times, wars have been
fought for economic gain, but even for the victors
there was always been economic loss to a greater
or lesser degree.
. Let us consider some of the specific devices used
as economic warfare measures: blockade, navicerts,
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black lists, embargos, exchange controls, preemp-
tive buying, rationing of neutrals, and strategic
attack.
Blockade
Blockade is one of the oldest military tactics.
Laying siege to a fortress until its food or water
supply was exhausted brought surrender without
heavy casualties to the attackers. On a larger
scale, much of the history of sea warfare has in-
volved interference with the commerce of the en-
emy. By the time of World War I, the application
of this measure through blockade had developed
to the point where it resulted in starvation in Ger-
many and an accompanying deterioration of mo-
rale and will to resist. The German countermeas-
ure was unrestricted submarine attack on ships
going to the British Isles. Insofar as it made an
issue of freedom of the seas and brought the United
States into the war on the British side, it was a
grievous error, but economically and militarily it
was a logical and nearly successful step toward
German victory.
The Germans repeated these tactics in World
War II not only to prevent the delivery of war
weapons and materiel, but also to deplete the stocks
of essential war materials. Their attacks against
lend-lease shipments destroyed not only guns,
tanks, and planes in transit to our allies, but also
hundreds of thousands of tons of oil, foodstuffs,
lumber, chemicals, and textiles.
Our war against Japan from the Navy point of
view included an economic attack through block-
ade operations. Our "silent service," the sub-
marine of the Fleet, can take much credit for the
ultimate victory. Japan was an ideal target for
such a program because its crowded home islands
depended on imported food and raw materials
both to fight and to live. It would be an over-
simplification of the facts to say the war could
have been won by submarines alone, for the lives
of many brave men on ships, on land, and in air-
craft were sacrificed to make victory possible, but
the potentialities of submarine warfare in block-
ade measures to weaken an enemy are very great
indeed.
Economic war fare through blockade is not con-
fined to actual combat operations. It can be
equally effective in times of ostensible peace. Eco-
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nomic sanctions were used by certain nations
against Italy at the time of the attack on Ethiopia.
Their failure to influence Italian policy by cutting
off vital imports can only be attributed to the
fact that the sanctions were not imposed by all
nations trading with Italy.
Blockadge has also been used since World War
II for economic warfare purposes. The Soviets
tried it in Berlin in 1948. The successful counter-
measure, the costly airlift, was an added burden on
our military budget, but its salutary effects on the
free world were well worth the economic cost.
We have also attempted a partial blockade of
the Iron Curtain countries, because we have not
wanted to supply the metals and machinery which
would hasten the attainment of Soviet goals for
military expansion. This has not been entirely
successful, because the economic characteristics of
the large Iron Curtain block are such that blockade
alone cannot solve the problem.
Navicerts
A navicert (navigation certificate) is a device
for controlling the activities of neutral vessels.
The British have pioneered in this form of block-
ade and have used it successfully in two world
wars. It is simply a certificate issued by author-
ized British officials, such as consuls, exempting
a non-contraband cargo from seizure or search by
patrol vessels maintaining a blockade. Thus ship-
ping to neutral ports and the type of cargo carried
by neutral vessels to enemy ports can be rigidly
controlled. Cargoes not correctly manifested and
covered by navicert are promptly confiscated.
Black Lists
In attempting to eliminate German influence in
Latin America and to end neutral interference
with blockade measures during World War II,
the Allies effectively used the black list method.
Economic intelligence uncovered the irregular ac-
tivities of firms and individuals trading with the
enemy, and a business house whose activities were
discovered to be inimical to Allied interests was
blacklisted. Even firms in a neutral country were
threatened with reprisals for doing business with
those on the black list.
Embargoes
Embargoes are simply prohibitions imposed by
law upon commerce, such as government edicts
prohibiting the departure or entry of ships at
certain ports. They may be used to correct mar-
ket supply and demand problems, to protect health,
and to relieve traffic congestion. The embargo
can also be used in economic warfare, but to be
an effective weapon it has to be applied to com-
modities for which no substitutes are available or
which cannot be supplied from alternative sources.
The identification of such commodities is a job for
economic intelligence.
The U. S. placed embargoes on oil and scrap
metal exports to Japan in 1941 in the hope of
stopping her production in preparation for war.
They were not successful, for factions in Japan
were determined on war, and the embargoes may
even have hastened the attack on Pearl Harbor.
As a policy, however, it was a logical measure at
the time.
Exchange Control
The usual purpose of exchange control is to
conserve limited supplies of foreign exchange to
insure essential imports, to stabilize exchange
rates and domestic prices, to control flights of
capital, or to prevent black market activities. Ex-
change control, however, like all other economic
devices, can be subverted to economic warfare ends.
For example, espionage and propaganda on a large
scale are expensive; if exchange controls can limit
the availability of funds for these purposes, the
enemy effort can be crippled. Likewise, if control
over use of exchange is tight, and dollar currency
is in great international demand, then it will be
exceedingly difficult for the enemy to buy essential
goods in world markets. If exchange control can
manipulate exchange rates, it can make purchases
very costly for the enemy even where trade con-
tinues. In support of national policy, many coun-
tries in recent years have used multiple exchange
rates which enable the offering of favorable rates
to encourage desired activities without damage to
the overall exchange and trade patterns. The
mechanics used are beyond the scope of this study.
Really effective exchange controls require a con-
siderable amount of economic intelligence, for not
only are licenses and inspection of particular ship-
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ments necessary, but investigation must also be
made of costs of production and market prices
both at home and abroad to prevent getting around
controls through fictitious prices. Additional re-
quirements are search of foreign asset holdings by
individuals and banks, study of free or black mar-
kets in our exchange abroad, and prohibiting
transfers of exchange from legitimate holders to
those who are denied such facilities.
Writers have suggested other economic warfare
possibilities related to currencies. One is the
printing of high grade counterfeit money to be
introduced into the enemy's currency circulation
to break down price controls and spread inflation
or lack of confidence. Similarly, it may be pos-
sible to drop counterfeit ration books in a highly
controlled state to break down these regulations.
It should be noted that the Soviets have already
demonstrated on occasion their expertness in
counterfeiting, and potential attack by these
means is not to be disregarded.
Preemptive Buying
Preemptive buying is closely related to block-
ade measures. During World War II, the Allies
not only bought strategic materials in neutral
countries for our own war purposes, but also tried
to buy up those materials of which the enemy had
a shortage. Such measures were generally very
effective, but it was also possible for them to stimu-
late production to the point where new problems
were created. For example, tungsten was sorely
needed by Germany, so the United States offered
to buy the total production of neutral Spain. A
characteristic of many of the extractive industries
is that production can be expanded when prices
make the exploitation of submarginal ore deposits
profitable. Under the stimulus of preemptive
buying, the digging of Iberian wolframite ex-
panded to the point where we could not buy all
of it, but at least Germany had to pay high prices
for the ore she purchased. Even less successful
were our attempts to buy up all the rabbit skins
that the Germans used for lining aviation cloth-
ing. Preemptive buying of rabbit skins soon
showed the superiority of biological multiplica-
tion over economic addition.
Preemptive buying, however, can be a powerful
economic warfare weapon. Through its use the
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348
nations of the West are effectively retaining con-
trol of all uranium ores this side of the Iron Cur-
tain, and the entire output of other types of goods
has also been preempted by long-term contracts.
Rationing of Neutrals
Blockade of the enemy and other control meas-
ures become meaningless if adjacent neutrals are
able to expand their purchases of strategic ma-
terials on the world market and thus make avail-
able to the enemy either their own former supplies
or even transship what they buy abroad. The
steps required to counteract such trade policies
help to illustrate how meaningless the concepts of
neutrality in a world war have become. Our eco-
nomic warfare specialists have no choice but to
make detailed economic studies of imports, pro-
duction, exports, and stockpiling of all essential
materials in neutral countries. Having deter-
mined the normal needs for imports and the
amount of stockpiling necessary to meet war con-
ditions, the economic warfare authorities then
control all neutral trade to keep it within reason-
able limits. If current intelligence shows that we
underestimated the ability of the neutral to export
to the enemy, the controls are tightened. The
controls are applied in the form of export em-
bargoes, ship seizures, and exchange restrictions.
Strategic Attack
Strategic attack makes even heavier demands
upon economic intelligence than does general
blockade. Blockade merely requires assessment
of overall economic dependence on trade. Stra-
tegic attack aims to destroy the key facilities in
the enemy's economic system and thus paralyze
his war effort on the home front. Successful stra-
tegic attack thus requires economic intelligence
of the most exact nature to identify what is truly
strategic in the enemy nation, where the bottle-
necks of production, transport, supply or storage
are located, and how they are to be attacked.
Consistent policies of strategic attack can be
highly decisive in war, although it has not been
proved that they alone can win wars. The Ger-
mans, for example, managed to keep production
going under repeated strategic bombings, the im-
mediate result being only temporary curtailment.
When factories move underground, strategic
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bombing is, of course, futile. The psychological
effects of strategic bombings are a different story,
which will be told in the following section.
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE
This section will consider the conduct of inter-
national relations and the implementation of na-
tional policies through the planned, deliberate
communication of ideas for the purpose of in-
fluencing the opinions, attitudes, and actions of
the people to whom the communication is directed.
Of particular interest are the opportunities which
may be presented to naval forces and naval com-
manders to utilize the planned communication of
ideas in naval operations and the contributions
the intelligence officer can make in the formulation
of such plans.
An examination will also be made of the sub-
structure which supports and makes possible the
use of ideological weapons. The bricks and mor-
tar of this foundation are bodies of knowledge?
intelligence?and many people of diverse skills
who participate in the intelligence support of
psychological operations. At the national level,
the intelligence support for such operations is
provided by the Central Intelligence Agency,
which can draw upon the data produced by the
intelligence organizations of the armed forces.
National Organization
On 4 April 1951, the President issued a direc-
tive establishing the Psychological Strategy
Board (PSB) to serve the National Security
Council by providing "more effective planning,
coordination and conduct of psychological opera-
tions within the framework of approved national
policies." Representatives of the Department of
State, the Department of Defense, and the Central
Intelligence Agency were members of that board.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff provided a Military Ad-
visor. The Board was responsible for the "formu-
lation and promulgation of overall national psy-
chological objectives, policies and programs, for
the coordination and evaluation of the national
psychological effort."
Guidance came from the Psychological Strat-
egy Board through the Department of Defense to
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Subsidiary
Plans Division (JSPD) of the JCS coordinated
349
the activities of the armed forces in this field
through liaison with the Psychological Warfare
Divisions of the respective services. The Joint
Subsidiary Plans Division also provided informa-
tion to other subdivisions of the Joint Staff en-
gaged in strategic planning.
The National Security Council assigned to the
Department of State the responsibility for the
conduct of overt psychological operations during
time of peace and the initial stages of war. The
Department of State, furthermore, was directed
by Congress to set up a program to promote the
better understanding of the United States among
the peoples of the world.
By Executive Order of 3 September 1953 the
President abolished the Psychological Strategy
Board and established the Operations Coordi-
nating Board, an interagency group directly re-
sponsible to the National Security Council. The
purpose of this new board was "to provide for the
integrated implementation of national security
policies by the several agencies" of the Federal
government. An underlying objective was to tie
together more closely the planning and action
phases of the nation's grand strategy. Specifically
exempted from the authority of this board were
any functions relating to internal security.
The regular membership of the board included:
(1) the Undersecretary of State, chairman; (2)
the Deputy Director of Defense; (3) the Director
of the Foreign Operations Administration; (4)
the Director of Central Intelligence; and (5) a
designated representative of the President. In
addition, provision was made for official repre-
sentation on the board of any other government
agency whenever matters directly related to its
responsibilities were under consideration.
As a component of military planning, psycho-
logical operations represent a legitimate subject -
for investigation and consideration by the armed
services during a time of ostensible peace or "cold
war." For the Navy, it is not a simple matter to
determine the extent or geographical location of
its potential operational responsibilities or the cir-
cumstances under which naval power may be
brought to bear. The role may be that of chief
actor, or it may be that of providing logistic sup-
port to another branch of the services or the De-
partment of State, or to an American mission over-
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seas, or to allied or neutral governments. What-
ever the circumstances, the Navy must be prepared
to plan and conduct psychological operations in
support of both its own military activities and the
actions of other government agencies. The Office
of the Chief of Naval Operations, through OP-38,
the Psychological Warfare Programs Division,
directs this activity for the Navy. It is the respon-
sibility of the Office of Naval Intelligence to sup-
port such activities by providing suitable intelli-
gence data and other services.
The Concept and Name
Military understanding of the concept and find-
ing a suitable name for its military applications
have evolved rather slowly during the period from
the start of the First World War to the present
day. The psychologists, sociologists and allied
specialists who became interested in the potential-
ities of "psychological warfare," aware as they
should have been of the proper use of Communi-
cations, did not do a thorough job of communicat-
ing their ideas to the military leaders whose inter-
est they were attempting to arouse. It should have
been foreseeable that military men, customarily
educated more intensively in the physical than in
the social sciences, would display some skepticism
and uneasiness when called upon to wage war on
emotions, attitudes, and behaviors rather than on
physical bodies and material fortifications. Yet
the very language employed by the theoreticians
and scholars was enough to discourage many a
busy soldier. Working vocabularies with such
terms as "privatization tendencies," "unstructured
situations" and "audience predispositions," not to
mention the far more technical vocabularies of
Freud and Korzibski, were hardly suitable verbal
symbols to capture the attention of the practition-
ers of "hardware" warfare. Over the course of
some 30 to 40 years from the World War I period
to the present time, the process has gone on of
working out a concept for the mission and func-
tions of "psychological warfare" in relation to the
traditional forms of military warfare and of de-
termining the general perimeters of this evolving
implement of national policy.
Granted that there are ideological or psycho-
logical side-reactions which accompany economic,
CONFIDENTIAL
350
political, and military operations; granted that in
some situations these may overshadow all other
reactions in terms of contributing toward the
achievement of objectives; nevertheless, the gener-
ating of such results is not well-described by the
term "psychological warfare." This is testified to
by Hans Speier, who commences his article,
Psychological Warfare Reconsidered, as follows:
The term psychological warfare has gained
wide currency in popular and scientific dis-
cussions, but its meaning is not clear. For
three reasons the term is debated among those
who use it freely.
First, warfare cannot readily be expected
to be waged in times of peace or, for that
matter, against the populations of neutral or
allied countries in wartime, unless it is felt
that by virtue of being "psychological" this
kind of warfare is not "real" warfare. Dur-
ing the Second World War, psychological
warfare was indeed regarded primarily as
a responsibility of the military who fought
the enemy, whereas the civilian Office of War
Information never officially professed before
the Congress and the public its concern with
it. Soon a fter the end of the war the rela-
tionship between the Soviet Union and the
Western powers began to be characterized as
a state of cold war?incidentally no less am-
biguous a term than "psychological war-
fare"?but while according to many observers
of the international scene the traditional dis-
tinction bet ween war and peace cannot be ap-
plied in the postwar period, no government
involved in the cold war has as yet stated that
it is engaged in psychological warfare against
other nations. Rather, there is talk of "in-
ternational information," and, reluctantly,
of propaganda.
Second, the terms "psychological warfare"
and "political warfare" (as the British prefer
to call their activities in this field) are mis-
leading if they designate exclusively propa-
ganda to enemy countries in time of war.
Wars are waged against enemies in order to
defeat them; yet during a war, psychological
warfare comprises not only ancillary activi-
ties to the same end by certain nonlethal
means but also actions which attempt to reach
and make f riends in the enemy camp.
For yet a third reason, the term psychologi-
cal warfare is easily misunderstood. When
it is used as a synonym for combat propa-
ganda and related activities in wartime, it
seems to be implied that other forms of war-
fare have no psychological effects; but only
physical consequences, and are conducted
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without regard for the mind of the enemy and
the moral forces at his command. . . .
The ambiguities of meaning from which
the term psychological warfare suffers stems
(sic) from the lack of a more basic agree-
ment on the nature of war. . . .
Is there available a more satisfactory title to
describe this complex of activities, sometimes mili-
tary, sometimes political, sometimes economic, all
of which have psychological ramifications, which
will take place in peaceful and warlike contexts,
and which may be directed toward target groups
of varying nationalities and living under widely
differing circumstances?
The term which not infrequently is employed
unofficially is "Psychological Operations." This
name is an improvement in that it avoids creating
the erroneous impression that psychological activ-
ities are a part only of warfare when they are in
fact just as necessary in time of peace. However,
the phrase "Psychological Warfare" continues to
be used frequently as a general title for all kinds
of psychological operations. There is evident
also in some quarters an uneasy and uncertain dis-
satisfaction about perpetuating the word "psycho-
logical." The average American, not being de-
vious by nature, and respecting a tradition of fair
play, too often has associated psychological activi-
ties with the perverted use to which they have
been put by totalitarian regimes, not recognizing
that such instrumentalities also may worthily
serve in more just causes. However, the word
"psychological" appears to be too deeply embedded
in the common, working vocabulary of the modern
world to be uprooted at this late date.
Military Applications
The clarification of the ambiguities of the term
"psychological warfare" and a definition of the
place and role of the psychological-ideological
component of military operations require careful
consideration of the diversity of responsibilities
imposed upon the military organization of modern
nations.
Harold D. Lasswell's article, Political and Psy-
chological Warfare, is helpful in the search for
clarification. A portion of it is quoted below
(italics are his) :
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The most distinctive act of Psychological
Warfare is this: it uses the means of mass
communication in order to destroy the enemy's
will to fight.
Mass communication, it should be stressed,
is not exclusively a matter of the word, spoken
or printed, or picture. It uses other media
also, such as physical acts and material de-
vices. This is notably true of assassination.
While the act of killing cannot be considered
a conventional method of communication, yet
it has been used often to affect political atti-
tudes. The act of assassination was expected
to have an impact upon the intention of the
enemy to fight that would be far out of pro-
portion to the physical damage done to his
capacity, or to the physical capacity made use
of in the killing. We are looking at the con-
duct of war in the perspective of psychology
when we are seeking to widen the gap between
the physical destruction of capabilities on
both sides and the magnitude of the impact
upon the enemy's intention to resist
As concerns the military, here is evidence that
"psychological warfare" is not something apart,
competing with traditional warfare. It is but
another perspective for viewing the conduct of
familiar military operations, another factor which
must be considered when planning future cam-
paigns, and on occasion another type of operation
to be undertaken for principally psychological
ends.
The factor to be considered is "psychological
suitability," which becomes a subject for investi-
gation by the military commander and his staff as
part of their estimate of the situation. It will in-
clude study and analysis of what psychological-
ideological results are desired in fulfilling their
current mission, through what kind of operations
the forces of the command can achieve these re-
sults, and finally, what kind of operations or
actions should be avoided because of their possible
adverse effects.
Psychological result g may be produced by the
employment of conventional military weapons as
well as by propaganda leaflets and tactical loud-
speaker teams. The screaming, divebombing
Stukas, supporting the Nazi ground forces in their
breakthrough of the Maginot Line, were as much
a weapon for achieving the psychological results
of terror and panic as they were for killing Allied
soldiers. The commander and his staff are directly
concerned with psychological results that will
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support specific operations at a particular time
and place. The support rendered may be through
demoralization of enemy troops; it may be through
encouragement of and instructions to about-to-be-
liberated friendly civilian populations; it may be
through the creation of appropriate expectations
or reactions among neutral groups who come in
contact with our military operations and our per-
sonnel. Whether the means used are psychological
or conventional, if properly selected they are capa-
ble of providing cooperating support for any mili-
tary operation. Neutralizing the enemy or de-
stroying his will to fight through psychological
pressures are results no different from those to be
achieved through the application of nonpsycho-
logical force. Here then is merely another family
of weapons stored and awaiting selection by the
field commander who needs only to become accus-
tomed to drawing on the psychological instru-
ments at his command as readily and confidently
as he selects his operating "hardware."
In scope Psychological Operations encompass
alike conditions of peaceful cooperation among
nations, of uneasy tension, and of outright war;
in influence they may extend to friends and allies,
to neutrals, and to hostile target groups. More
specifically, within each of the foregoing groups,
appeals may be directed to individual leaders or to
various religious, economic, social, or political sub-
groups that in one way or another are significant
in the life of the target society. The modus oper-
andi is the use of every medium of communication
which produces psychological results through the
employment of visual symbols, through the writ-
ten and the spoken word, and through conduct
and actions.
The results sought to be achieved may be con-
sidered in terms of effects upon the mental states
of the targets. States of mind which it is desired
to produce may range from that in which the
target feels reassured, comforted or encouraged to
the other extreme in which the target feels per-
suaded or compelled to take specific, immediate
action along lines desired and predetermined by
the communicator.
Strategic Bombing in Psychological Operations
It was mentioned in the previous discussion of
economic warfare that strategic bombing may be
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352
NAVAL OFFICERS
a more important psychological weapon than a
means of the physical destruction of enemy econ-
omy. Destruction of morale has an immediate
effect upon will to resist and will to work, hence
it directly affects civilian production. The United
States Strategic Bombing Survey studies the ef-
fects of strategic bombing on German and Japa-
nese morale. The following are excerpts from the
German study:
Strategic bombing was the major means by
which the Allies were able to strike a direct
blow at the morale of German civilians. Al-
most one-third of the Germans were subjected
to it and all lived in the shadow of its threat.
One-half of one percent were killed by bomb-
ing and one percent injured. One-fifth of all
civilians were deprived of water, gas, or
electricity, many of them for long periods.
One of every 15 civilians was evacuated to
another area. Every German, whether or not
he experienced these direct effects of bombing,
suffered such indirect results as shortages of
food and supplies, and the disruption of
transportation. There was no German civil-
ian who did not experience hardship or suf-
fering as a result of bombino. . . .
A major factor in the final breakdown of
German civilian morale was strategic bomb-
ing. . . . Morale was not an easy target to
knock out. It was never completely destroyed
by strategic bombing, although its structure
was seriously damaged. But during the
closing months of the war, the cumulative
effects of strategic bombin,or definitely began to
outweigh the powerful Nazi forces which
above all else had held the German people to
the war-industry grindstone during the two
preceding years. Poor morale did ultimately
break out into widespread popular behavior
imperiling. the German war effort. But the
actual outbreak was the result of several mo-
mentous and coinciding Gentian catastrophes,
the approaching loss of the war, the loss of
German lands to the enemy, the cumulative
devastation and disruption of the German
home front by bombing, the military, politi-
cal, and economic chaos which prevailed in the
wake of disastrous setbacks. It was in this
combination of circumstances that strategic
bombing was able to achieve its maximum
morale effect.
The general deterioration of morale due to
bombings of Germany made itself evident in var-
ious ways. There was increasing war weariness,
and skepticism of Germany's ultimate victory.
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The Survey reports that "by the beginning of 1941
three-fourths of all Germans regarded the war
as lost." Civilians in bombed areas lost confi-
dence in their leaders, and because of their loss of
homes and property thought that they were bear-
ing the brunt of personal sacrifice. There was a
strong fear and shock reaction produced by the
bombings, which made people nervously upset by
subsequent lesser alarms. The survey also dis-
covered that the government was held responsible
for the bombings and blamed for the failure to
provide adequate defense. Resentments were di-
rected against the Nazi regime more than against
the Allies. Disruption of public utilities and es-
pecially of local transportation services had an
important effect in depressing the German people.
A widespread evacuation program had to be un-
dertaken, and it in itself produced dissatisfaction
and confusion. Industrial productivity was di-
minished somewhat, although the organized sys-
tem of controls was fairly successful in keeping
the traditionally obedient and industrious workers
at a routine level of performance. Apathy, how-
ever, was widespread.
In Japan many of the same reactions to the
bombings were reported. The Survey for Japan
reported:
The importance of the air attacks in de-
pressing morale is indicated by the fact that
Japanese said they were:
The most important single factor in caus-
ing them to have doubts of victory.
The most important single factor in caus-
ing them to feel certain of defeat.
The most important single factor in mak-
ing them unwilling to continue the war.
Their greatest worry during the war, and
the thing which made most of them happy
that the war was over. . . .
The primary emotional response to the
bombings was fright and terror. Many peo-
ple abandoned their "battle stations" as fire
fighters and fled to shelters when the raids
overwhelmed defenses.
Night bombing was feared more than day-
light bombing, and high explosives were
feared more than incendiaries . . .
Air attacks were cited as an important
reason for absenteeism and lowered morale,
but the chief effect of bombing appears to
have been on the capacity of the people to
work. The workers would still go to work or
could still be forced to go, but they could
269196-54--------24
353
neither be utilized nor driven to produce as
in previous years.
The Japanese tactics in the South Pacific fur-
nish an interesting illustration of warfare psycho-
logically waged. Infantry and air strafing attacks
were made against American troops, planned and
timed to disrupt normal eating and sleeping hours.
As Prof. James N. Mosel of George Washington
University has pointed out in analyzing these in-
cidents, the prolonged disruption of basic habits,
particularly habits associated with the satisfac-
tion of fundamental drives and wants, can cause
severe frustration and anxiety and can even lead
to neurosis. It was reported that at times it be-
came impossible for American troops to maintain
routine in even the most trivial activities. The
same psychologist has called attention also to the
fact that such a situation, if sufficiently pro-
tracted, can generate emotional instability, in-
creased excitability, break down the unity of the
group, and sensitize individuals to a variety of
irrational fears and negative attitudes. Such dis-
turbances as digestive disorders, heightened blood
pressure, muscular tremors, and bodily aches and
pains may follow from such stimuli.
Political Warfare
Political warfare has been developed to its
greatest extent in the totalitarian countries rather
than in the democracies, for it violates much of
what constitutes democratic morality and political
conscience.
Prof. Mosel makes some illuminating comments
on its methods and techniques:
A basic technique of political warfare as
used by the Germans and Russians is to create
ambiguity and confusion. One way of doing
this is to assume a line of action which has
multiple interpretations?one which points
in several directions and suggests a number of
different motives. Thus the enemy country
is "kept guessing". Propaganda warfare is
frequently used to accelerate the desired
effects.
This technique requires no overt consist-
ency; its object is to mislead and complicate.
The enemy country which is attempting to
interpret these actions becomes anxious and
disturbed by their inability to understand
what they see. Many different interpretations
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spring up, bringing bickering and internal
dissension which, in turn, adds further anxi-
ety and confusion.
In their vain attempts to extract some ra-
tional meaning from the opposing country's
actions, the observing country's leaders and
experts develop one plan or policy after an-
other, each proving unsuccessful. The cleav-
ages occurring among the leaders themselves
are then further amplified by the population's
loss of confidence in its leaders' ability to deal
with the situation.
This technique requires a thorough analysis
of what constitutes "ambiguity' from the
viewpoint of the enemy country, and a com-
prehensive understanding of that country's
current political problems, its role in the bal-
ance of power, its international objectives and
the circumstances which it considers as threats
to its national well-being.
When the general populace has been suffi-
ciently undermined in its internal cohesion,
the enemy country can then step in and climax
its program with hard-hitting propaganda
warfare. The psychological factors operative
at this juncture are subtle but powerful. It
is a psychological fact when confronted with
an ambiguous, contradictory situation, we ex-
perience a strong need for meaningful clarifi-
cation. The clarification that is accepted is
in general one that (1) is presented first, (2)
when the need for clarification is strongest,
and (3) which is most satisfying. By utiliz-
ing these principles, the enemy country can
inject at just the right moment a carefully
designed interpretation" which will gain ac-
ceptance. Needless to say, this maneuver re-
quires accurate assessment of the situation,
careful timing, comprehensive political in-
telligence, and psychological knowledge of
the country's national character structure (its
symbols, loyalties, hopes, fears, personality
traits, etc.).
To investigate in detail how the Communists
carry on political warfare, utilizing ideas, words,
symbols and communication media, would require
an extensive examination of the overall method of
conduct of the international relations of the Com-
munist Party and the Soviet government. Such
an investigation would make it clear that the psy-
chological pressures and reactions produced
through political maneuvers are but one of the
interacting weapons of warfare as waged in the
Communist style. The effects attributed to this
type of weapon cannot be isolated, but they can
be studied in the context of any given campaign
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A
of the Communist-instigated war against the non-
Communist wo rld.
Communist political warfare is accompanied by
a campaign of propaganda worldwide which is of
great magnitude. It has been reported that the
Soviet Union spent close to one billion dollars on
various forms of propaganda during 1950, with
another half billion dollars spent by Communist
satellite states.
The Soviets' principal themes for external con-
sumption have been those that depict the Soviet
Union as the chief proponent of world peace and
the United States as the chief aggressive and war-
like nation threatening such peace, and the "Hate
America" campaign conducted within the Soviet
Union. The vehicle for the former theme has
been principally the Stockholm peace appeal, the
Communist-sponsored, phoney but rather success-
ful attempt to convince the peoples of many coun-
tries that the source of belligerency in the world
was the United States. The "Hate America"
campaign has been carried on in the postwar
period in the Soviet Union with an intensity and
continuity that is beyond the comprehension of
United States citizens. Emphasis has been placed
on phoney charges that the United States engaged
in bacteriological warfare in Korea and North
China and treated prisoners of war with excessive
cruelty.
American correspondents in Moscow have re-
ported that, as a result, the Soviet citizen believes
Americans to be people without principle, bar-
barous and hostilely aggressive. The feeling
against the United States is reputed to be one of
indignation, resentment, and anger.
INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL
OPERATIONS
In his book Sykewar, describing and analyzing
PW activities in World War II, Daniel Lerner
aptly illustrated the responsibility of intelligence
in psychological operations as follows:
Although (our highest-level policies) made
few overt references to intelligence, they
rested clearly on certain intelligence assump-
tions concerning the audiences to which they
were directed. The policy of Unconditional
Surrender, for example, made sense only on
the assumption that the enemy forces could
and would surrender in the face of certain
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defeat. That such an assumption involved
an important intelligence estimate (even if
the estimate was never clarified on a more
explicit level than "intuition"), will be better
understood if one recalls the enormous pub-
licity in America during the first year of the
war, given to the view that Japanese soldiers
never surrender. . . .
If the view that German soldiers would not
surrender had been taken literally, a policy
of Unconditional Surrender could have led to
nothing short of the extermination of every
last member of the Wehrmacht. This was
clearly not the intention of the Allied high
command, whose evaluation of available
information on surrender led to the conclu-
sion that the German armies would surren-
der. . . .
Similarly the announcement of peace aims
such as the Four Freedoms and the Atlantic
Charter was based on the intelligence assump-
tion that their contents correspond to
the desires of the peoples of the Allied na-
tions. . . .
This need for accurate intelligence re-
mained constant. Broad estimates of Ger-
man attitudes served a useful purpose in
framing high policies, but a continuous and
detailed flow of accurate information, prop-
erly evaluated, was required to keep these
high policies applicable to the dozens of deci-
sions which Sykewar had to make from day
to day.
Having recognized that there is a requirement
for the intelligence support of psychological oper-
ations, it is necessary to consider the nature of the
supporting activity. The problem may be ap-
proached by way of a comparison between the
intelligence work produced in normal military
operations and that required for conducting psy-
chological operations.
Earlier portions of this book have shown that
the end product of intelligence collection and
processing is frequently an intelligence estimate,
report, study or annex to a military directive.
The essence of the intelligence estimate is an ap-
praisal of enemy capabilities and their relative
order of probable adoption, formulated so as to
assist the military commander in reaching a sound
decision for the employment of forces. In psy-
chological operations, however, military concern
is to influence target attitudes and to control target
behaviour, usually through means short of the use
of overwhelming physical strength. That is, in
355
psychological operations it is vulnerabilities rather
than capabilities that are of principal military
interest.
Current textual material prepared by the Psy-
chological Warfare School of the Army discusses
this concern with vulnerabilities:
Use of the term "enemy vulnerabilities" in
military intelligence for combat operations
ordinarily is related to the physical weak-
nesses which make the enemy susceptible to
injury or defeat. Such vulnerabilities in-
clude lack of defensive terrain, shortages of
important materials and equipment, transpor-
tation bottlenecks, and concentration of de-
fense industries in overcrowded places which
can be bombed or isolated.
In psychological warfare intelligence the
term enemy vulnerabilities" is related to so-
ciological and psychological matters rather
than to physical weaknesses. Vulnerabilities
from the psychological warfare point of view
are situations or conditions which can be ex-
ploited by the propagandist.
Sociological vulnerabilities, for example,
may grow out of conflicts of interest between
racial, religious, social, economic and politi-
cal groups. They may result from the condi-
tions in which people find themselves and be
manifest in dissatisfaction with government
policies, social conditions, or economic condi-
tions or relationships.
Psychological vulnerabilities, on the other
hand, are attitudes, aspirations and person-
ality traits which when manifested in par-
ticular situations and circumstances indicate
susceptibility to propaganda persuasion.
Although vulnerabilities are the matter of pri-
mary concern with respect to hostile target groups,
their identification is not the sole requirement of
the users of psychological warfare intelligence.
The scope of psychological operations has been
broadly defined to encompass neutral, allied, liber-
ated, and analogous nonhostile audiences and to
include conditions of peace and uneasy peace as
well as conditions of war. Intelligence estimates
on such target groups seek to present conclusions
that will inform the operating agency how to gain
an openminded and receptive audience, how to
stimulate and encourage it, and how to create in
it sentiments of agreement, sympathy, and under-
standing.
In these cases, the estimate must supply answers
to such questions as: How can this policy of the
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United States be best explained to this audience?
How can this obliqueness or apparent inconsist-
ency in United States' actions be presented in the
least unfavorable light? What values does Amer-
ican life have in common with this foreign society?
How can a particular point of contact between
Americans and a foreign group be directed so as
to create mutual good will and cooperation?
Lerner's illustration, above, of the Four Freedoms
and the Atlantic Charter is a case in point when
considering such varied nonhostile audiences.
To produce conclusions of the kind discussed
above and to present them in a psychological war-
fare intelligence estimate, report, or study is a
task easily recognized as one similar to that per-
formed in the preparation of other intelligence
estimates. The subject matters may differ, but
the basic estimative process?proceeding from a
mission stated or a problem identified for solution,
through an analysis of factual elements, to con-
clusions that will be meaningful and useful to
operations agencies?is analogous to the process
illustrated in chapter 12.
A World War II illustration of a military use
of psych-warfare intelligence is to be found in the
case of the "Commander Norden" broadcasts to
German submariners, a program directed by the
United States Navy Department. "Commander
Norden" was an intelligence officer in ONI, who
possessed both fluency in the German language
and comprehension of the German character. He
had available such reliable information about cur-
rent U-boat operations, conditions inside Ger-
many, and even personal news of the families of
some U-boat personnel that his broadcasts became
very popular with U-boat crews. A byproduct of
his psychological warfare operation developed in
connection with general intelligence collection:
"Commander Norden" became so well known and
accepted by German submariners that captured
personnel on more than one occasion declared that
they would speak only to him about their experi-
ences, for they believed that he could understand
better than anyone else what they had undergone
during their war patrols.
Peacetime Support
A peacetime naval operation in which psych-
war intelligence can render service is that involv-
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ing the visit of United States Navy ships to foreign
ports. Here is an occasion calling for the paying
of mutual respects between governments and be-
tween navies. The opportunity may arise for
naval commanders to establish personal relation-
ships with their opposite numbers and to cultivate
good will between professional equals. Here, too,
is an opportunity for creating favorable impres
sions of "the Americans" as a result of orderly,
friendly, and informed conduct and manners of
naval personnel visiting ashore.
On the other hand, there is also a substantial
possibility that inadequately informed Americans
representing their naval service may create ill will
and generate unpopularity. Visitors abroad who
are not sensitive, understanding, and respectful
of the customs a:ad the ways of life, as well as the
hopes, fears and daily problems of a foreign soci-
ety, may through their ignorance make poor rep-
resentatives of their country. To foreign eyes the
conduct of such visitors typifies "America," its
manner of life and its pattern of societl behavior.
In carrying out the general purposes of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, military
missions representing the United States and its
armed services are located in many countries
throughout the world. In Europe, particularly,
plans exist for the expenditure of large sums to
build and maintain military facilities as part of
the defense of that continent. Thousands of
Americans in the armed services are living abroad,
many with their dependents who too are represent-
atives of the United States, in close daily contact
with many other nationalities participating in the
work of NATO. How well these Americans ad-
just themselves to their physical and cultural sur-
roundings is a factor of considerable influence in
the obtaining and retaining of national allies.
Illustrative of this complex of problems in day-
-to-day living is the following report in The New
York Times describing relationships between
American military personnel and the native popu-
lation at logistic bases in France:
Meanwhile, the presence of some 12,000 to
15,000 soldiers and airmen in sixteen camps
scattered through the Bordeaux and La-
Rochelle areas produces a daily crop of minor
irritations and misunderstandings, based
principally on differences of language, eco-
nomic status and social custom.
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With few exceptions these factors con-
demn the two sides to isolation in an atmos-
phere ranging from toleration to mutual
dislike.
Among the Americans' sources of irritation
are high prices demanded by French land-
lords for housing that is judged to be totally
inadequate by United States standards, the
failure of the French to manifest the same
sense of urgency about the defense task that
the Americans feel, annoyance with tech-
niques and procedures that Americans find
archaic, and the infinite number of ways in
which the social, cultural and hygienic pat-
terns of Bordeaux, LaRochelle and Angouleme
vary from those of New York, Minneapolis
and Dallas.
To many Americans and many Frenchmen,
a difference from their own standards is a
defect.
In a situation such as the foregoing there is
manifest the necessity for a continued information
and education program to explain foreign sur-
roundings and foreign peoples to our own mili-
tary personnel, a program which is a companion
piece to the psychological operation of explaining
the American visitors to their native hosts. Both
of these programs can be founded only on the
material provided in intelligence studies that
examine and analyze the characteristics of various
foreign societies and that identify in particular
those aspects of the foreign way of life that are
peculiarly sensitive to the native of that culture.
Psychological operations are coordinated at the
level of the theater command. At this echelon it
is possible to plan and carry out a psychological
campaign coordinated to support military opera-
tions within the theater and one in which the
themes and appeals employed are consistent
throughout the entire area of operations. Pro-
viding intelligence support at this level of com-
mand imposes a diversity of requirements, many
of which already have been illustrated. It is
likely that the theater of operations will include
several countries and target groups that are both
hostile and friendly, whose patterns of life may be
those of fishermen, farmers, villagers, city labor-
ers, and displaced war refugees.
A commander whose theater includes maritime
areas may encounter further specialized psycho-
logical operations problems which intelligence
must help resolve. For example, if he is required
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to perform military government functions, he may
become involved in the control of several maritime
activities. It may be that the local fishing indus-
try should be re-equipped and restored to produc-
tion as promptly as possible to relieve food short-
ages in the occupation area and to provide employ-
ment for local residents. Fishing vessels and their
crews provide a potential medium of external com-
munication and so could represent a possible threat
to military security and a channel for saboteurs
and hostile agents. On the other hand, they may
be able to give valuable support to our own mari-
time control measures and be capable of combat-
ting hostile resistance and obtaining useful opera-
tional information. Intelligence may ease the task
of reconstruction and control by informing mili-
tary government officials of the ways in which
local cooperation can be obtained most effectively.
What is true of the fishing industry is equally true
in other situations in which naval commanders
may be required to control, reorganize, and direct
indigenous affairs in ways best calculated to obtain
local cooperation. For instance, either under or
apart from military government, naval personnel
may become engaged in the rehabilitation of for-
eign ports so that they may be made available for
logistic support of further military operations.
Other situations in which the naval commander
may find a need for intelligence about one or an-
other foreign area in the world may be visualized
as a result of the Navy's characteristic capability
of providing mobile logistic support to many kinds
of operations in areas distant from fixed bases.
Naval forces may expect to play a role in emer-
gency evacuations of civilians and military per-
sonnel from danger areas, and the rescue and
transportation of displaced persons or escapees
from enemy areas.
357
Collection and Processing
The collection and the processing of information
for psychological operations are the two activities
of the Intelligence Cycle that best reveal the actual
nature of the work. A partial description of these
two activities has already been presented in fore-
going discussions and illustrations. The chief
subject for investigation is man in his social set-
ting, a topic of concern to a number of branches
of learning, particularly the fields of psychology,
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sociology, and cultural anthropology, but also to
political science, economics, history, biology, and
psychiatry. In the field of psychological opera-
tions the dependence of the military upon the
academic is particularly evident, for psychological
warfare still belongs as much to the scholar as to
the professional soldier.
This dependence upon academic support is no-
where better illustrated than in the collection ef-
fort which is carried on in two distinct milieus,
along two mutually-supporting but independent
lines. One of these is basic research, the realm of
the academician; the other may be called current
psychological intelligence, the realm of the field
observer and collector. Both functions are in
reality specific illustrations of the fundamental
collection process, first obtaining a mass of basic
data and evaluating it through scholarly research,
and thereafter augmenting it by specific pertinent
items currently collected in. the field.
In the collection effort, no component of intelli-
gence knowledge, geographical, political, sociolog-
ical, economic, military, scientific, or biographical
can be ignored, for man, individually and collec-
tively, may be influenced by any one of them.
What is distinctive about intelligence for psycho-
logical operations is the particular point of view
it maintains while performing its collection and
processing tasks. The all-inclusive essential ele-
ment of information is: What use can be made of
specific facts of geography, economic, religion, or
social customs in suggesting ways of affecting the
opinions, attitudes, and actions of those groups of
people whom it is desired to influence?
The following quotation from Ellsworth Hunt-
ington's book, Mainsprings of Civilization, illus-
trates the interdependence of the various compo-
nents of intelligence knowledge as they explain the
mode of life of man in the totality of his environ-
ment.
The seclusion of women in Moslem countries
furnishes a good illustration of the way in
which climate cooperates with other condi-
tions in encouraging social customs which in
due time become religious practices. The se-
clusion of women arises from the same human
impulse as the private ownership of property.
The possessor of something valuable wants to
keep it for his own benefit. So far as women
are concerned, this desire is more or less effec-
tive in most parts of the world, but rarely, if
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358
ever, is it more highly specialized than in the
harems of the Arabs, the zenana of the Hin-
dus. The seclusion of women is most fully
developed in the deserts and semi-arid regions
from northwestern India across Persia,
Iraq, Arabia, and Syria to Egypt and
Morocco. . . .
The seclusion of women seems to have de-
veloped most fully in the oases of Arabia
where it is appropriate to the geographical
environment. So long as man is a mere hunter
and gatherer of wild products, he cannot se-
clude his women, for the women must wander
around searching for edible roots and grubs.
Among pastoral nomads a similar situation
prevails. . . .
Only after agriculture was instituted did
the effectiv seclusion of women become feas-
ible, but not in warm, moist countries with
plenty of rain. There the normal material
for huts is rough, crooked branches with a
thatch of leaves or grass. It is difficult to
make such huts so tight that people cannot
peer in, and it is uncomfortable to cook or do
other work inside them in hot, damp weather.
Then, too, from time immemorial, the acre of
the weedy crops around tropical dwellings
has been woman's work. . . .
In a desert oases the situation is different.
The most available building material is dry
mud (adobe). Large, sun-dried bricks can
easily be piled up to form walls. In the hot,
dry air, the most comfortable place during the
heat of the day is inside a thick-walled adobe
house with a stout roof of the same material.
Hence the women prefer to stay indoors many
hours of the day. In such oases, agriculture
can be carried on only by irrigation. An ir-
rigated patch affords much temptation to
thieves. Inasmuch as adobe walls can be
built easily and last a long time, the common
practice is to surround each "garden" with a
thick wall seven or eight feet high. Thus, in
the cooler parts of the day, when the women
work outside the house, they are still sheltered
from passers-by. . . .
A veil over the face is little hardship in such
a climate. Both sexes crave heavy clothing in
the heat of noon and again in the sudden cool-
ness after sunset. . . . In the hot deserts then,
such as those of the lower Indus Valley,
Arabia, and the Sahara, the oases offer physi-
cal conditions which play directly into the
hands of the jealous male who wants to seclude
his women from other men. . . .
Another factor may enter the picture. The
men of the hot desert may have unusual cause
for jealousy. In extremely hot weather peo-
ple's ability to resist emotional impulses, in-
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eluding those of sex, appears to be weakened.
Sexual extravagance and prostitution seem to
reach a maximum in the hottest parts of the
world, that is, the dry parts of a belt located
ten to thirty degrees from the equator.
Animists, who usually live in moist, forested
regions which do not have such extreme heat
as the monsoon regions and deserts, appear to
be sexually less excitable than Hindus, Arabs
and other Moslems. . . .
Now let us see what happened when Islam,
in its great wave of conquest, imposed its cus-
toms on conquered nations. If the conquered
countries were so dry and warm that irriga-
tion and mud-walled houses and gardens were
normal, the seclusion of women could readily
be introduced and would do relatively little
harm to health . . . As (Islam) spread east-
ward in the Indo-Gangetic Valley the custom
became less and less appropriate to the climate
and hence more and more harmful. The In-
dian province of Bengal, near the mouth of
the Ganges, was conquered by Islam more
than seven hundred years ago. It now con-
tains about thirty million Moslems. . . .
From May to September . . . the tempera-
ture averages from 82? to 86? . . . the air is
constantly humid . . . Under such condi-
tions, even though one perspires freely most
of the time one is not thereby cooled because
there is such great humidity. A stay in the
stagnant air indoors is a kind of martyrdom
but the outdoor air is not much better; there
are no mud walls for shelter, and a cotton
sheet that swathes the head and covers the
face is most uncomfortable. Nevertheless,
the Moslem women, especially those of the
upper classes, are counted as grossly irreli-
gious if they fail to keep themselves well cov-
ered, face and all. Thus, by being converted
into a religious requirement and then being
transported to a new physical environment,
a relatively harmless social custom has be-
come a great detriment to health as well as
comfort. . . .
'What are some of the principal lines of investi-
gation in basic intelligence research for psycho-
logical operations, and how are investigations in
these areas undertaken by the armed services of
the United States? Such studies are carried on by
analysts, civilian and uniformed, in the research
and intelligence agencies of the respective armed
services, and also by private educational institu-
tions and civilian scholars whose research is spe-
cifically sponsored and financed through contracts
with one or another of the armed services.
Research
For the Navy, the Office of Naval Research
through its Psychological Sciences Division, and
in particular through the Human Relations
Branch of that division, is the contracting agency
that sponsors private researchers. The Army con-
ducts research through the medium of two agen-
cies, Human Resources Research Office and Oper-
ations Research Office, each of which is under the
supervision of a leading American university.
The Air Force has organized a Human Relations
Research Institute as a part of the Air University
at Maxwell Field, Ala. The Air Force also uses
the Rand Corp., whose research activities have
been described previously in this volume.
The specific subjects for potential investigation
within such general fields as anthropology,. psy-
chology, sociology, history, economics, political
science, psychiatry, and biology are, of course,
practically without number. Some of the areas
for study which have self-evident relationships to
ultimate military applications are described below.
The most pressing task of basic research is to pro-
vide data on those peoples and societies whose na-
tional strategies are a threat to the United States
and to a peaceful and stable world order. How-
ever, in view of the Communist tactic of foment-
ing economic, social and political unrest in what-
ever part of the world it may be latent, it is neces-
sary as a second priority to study almost every
national society having a potential role in the con-
flict between the free and slave worlds.
Typical examples of research on the U. S. S. R.
and its leaders are two publications of the Rand
Corp. entitled The Operational Code of the Polit-
buro and The Organizational Weapon: A Study of
Bolshevik Strategy and Tactics. A series of
studies on other aspects of Soviet life have been
undertaken by the Russian Research Center estab-
lished at Harvard University in 1949 with the aid
of a grant from the Carnegie Corporation. The
first of these, Public Opinion in Soviet Russia, by
Alex Inkeles has as its purpose:
. . . to explain how Soviet mass communi-
cation works, and why it has the particular
characteristics it possesses. But it is by no
means intended primarily as a technical dis-
cussion of the Soviet press, radio and film.
' On the contrary, I hope that this work will
359
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promote a more adequate evaluation of the
implications of the Soviet system. Since ex-
posure to a steady flow of propaganda and
agitation is a major facet of the daily life of
every Soviet citizen, no assessment of his life
situation can be complete if it does not take
account of that fact. Furthermore, Soviet
philosophy and practice in the realm of public
opinion are important indexes to the nature of
the regime.
Other publications of the Research Center include
Justice in Russia: An Interpretation of Soviet
Law by Harold J. Berman and Soviet Ideology
and Power Politics: A Study of the Role of Ideas
in Social Change by Barrington Moore, Jr.
Independent scholars have likewise made some
important contributions. In the field of eco-
nomics, Solomon M. Schwartz in Labor in the
Soviet Union describes the workingman in the
U. S. S. R. not as docile and enslaved, but still
struggling to be free. The evidence is provided
by reports of dissatisfaction and individual con-
flict filtering from behind the Iron Curtain, a vul-
nerability of interest to planners of psychological
operations.
Thus research contributes to knowledge of the
nature of man, how he is motivated, how he exists
in his particular culture, and what the character-
istics are of that culture: its folkways and insti-
tutions, its system of rewards and punishments,
its capability or its brittle inflexibility toward self-
adjustment when externally stimulated. These
are the avenues along which research proceeds
always seeking to provide fundamental data in
answer to the questions Operations asks of Intel-
ligence: How can we cause this particular society
to run like an improperly adjusted engine, to over-
strain, to slow down, to fly apart, or alternatively
to gain new strength, further hope, fresh deter-
mination and a revived will to achieve?
Further Collection and Processing
The second major subdivision of collection and
processing may be labeled "Current." It consists
of adding fresh individual items to basic knowl-
edge concerning target societies. Its activity is
typified by the work of collectors in the field such
as naval attaches, and information obtained from
travelers, defectors, and prisoner of war interro-
gators. All of these must be made aware of poten-
tial sources of information of value to psycho-
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logical operations. Collection may proceed also
through the media of technological devices, such
as aerial cameras and radio monitoring equipment,
or through the application of scientific knowledge
and techniques of analysis, as in the case of the
examination of captured equipment and material.
Any of these instrumentalities may provide fur-
ther insight into one or another aspect of the
conditions of life within a target society. _
One particular task of processing deserves spe-
cial mention: the necessity for translating the data
comiDiled by basic research into terminology and
specific conclusions (hypotheses) that will assist
concrete operational planning. A military com-
mander will not appreciate being handed a schol-
arly text and being told by his intelligence officer:
"Sir, here is all the information we need about
the oppressive economic conditions in Lower Slo-
bovia." The argument and analysis of the profes-
sional researcher must be reduced to terms that
suit the immediate requirements of the profes-
sional soldier.
In processing information for potential use in
psychological operations, it is essential constantly
to keep in mind the possible specific operational
applications of the data under analysis. An article
entitled Effective Propaganda: Conditions and
Evaluation, which appears in a volume, Propa-
ganda in War and Crisis, edited by Daniel Lerner,
sets forth the "conditions of effective propaganda"
that may help to synthesize research and orient it
and the researcher himself to operational appli-
cations:
The manipulation of expectations is an in-
strument with powerful uses, but also with
definite limits. The uses will be better served
if the limits are clearly understood. The
fundamental limitation is inherent in the in-
strument: its strategy is persuasion and its
vehicle is symbols. Propaganda does not
change conditions but only beliefs about con-
ditions; it cannot force people to change
their beliefs but can only persuade them to
do so.
Under what conditions are people most
likely to be persuaded by Symbols to modify
their expectations of the future, and conse-
quently their behaviour in the present? . . .
Several main points are clear, however, from
recent experience. We may summarize these
lessons by stating four essential conditions of
effective propaganda:
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(1) The attention of the audience must be
secured.
(2) The credence of the audience must be
secured.
(3) The predispositions of the audience
must include the modifications sought
by propaganda as plausible alterna-
tives to present expectations.
(4) The environment of the audience must
permit the course of action prescribed
by the modified structure of expecta-
tions.
These conditions seem obvious upon state-
ment. To persuade a man to do what you
tell him, you must first get him to listen to
you. Once you have his attention, you must
get him to believe what you say if he is to
take your message seriously. His credence
gained, what you tell him to believe must be
within the realm of his existing predisposi-
tional structure of expectations and aspira-
tions. It is a waste of words to try to
persuade a loyal citizen that he would rather
see his nation lose a war than win it; no such
alternative preference is possible within his
predispositional set. But it may be quite pos-
sible to persuade the same man, once you have
gained his attention and credence, to believe
that the nation is going to lose a war. . . .
A fourth condition of effective propaganda
is that the actions required of the audience
by their modified expectations should be feasi-
ble in the environing circumstances which de-
fine for them the limits of meaningful
behaviour. It would make no sense, for ex-
ample, to call on Soviet citizens in Vladivos-
tok . . . to assassinate Stalin or imprison the
Politburo. . . . Indeed, the impracticability
of such action might lead to the utter rejec-
tion of our statements, otherwise plausible,
because they impose obligations impossible to
fulfill.
The extent and emphasis of processing will de-
pend, of course, on the subject matter. For ex-
ample, the analysis of enemy radio propaganda is
valuable intelligence, for it provides data on the
particular themes that the enemy desires to em-
phasize to particular audiences at specific periods
of time. This is sometimes labelled "content anal-
ysis" or "propanal" (propaganda analysis) which
was used with some success in World War II to
predict future enemy military operations. Such
a processing task differs greatly from that of "pre-
testing" possible propaganda themes by trying
them out on a cooperative group of enemy prison-
361
ers of war in order to determine thematic effec-
tiveness and authenticity.
Another specialized collection and processing
task is to obtain and evaluate data for evidence of
the effectiveness of previous and current psycho-
logical operations. This is a correctional func-
tion, a validation test, carried out so that future
undertakings may benefit from past experience.
It may consist of conducting a public opinion poll
in a friendly foreign country for the purpose of
ascertaining listener reactions to the programs of
the Voice of America.
In addition to theme-analysis, another variety
of processing must be carried out for the purpose
of determining what words, expressions and sym-
bols will most forcefully drive the message home
to a given target group. Lerner, in Sykewar,
illustrates this point:
For example, an effective linguistic device
for Sykewar was the use of the enemy's own
words and phrases, within a context supplied
by one's own propagandists. This was par-
ticularly useful on the radio, where it gave
some Germans the feeling that their enemy
was omniscient. . . . There is evidence that
some Germans were amused, bewildered, and
sometimes even frightened by the rapidity
with which Allied radio retold anti-Nazi jokes
as they became current in some part of Ger-
many. For this sort of operation, Sykewar
required intelligence reports that Rhineland
Germans had taken to calling Nazi party func-
tionaries goldene F asanen (in addition to the
older term Bonzen) ; or that in Berlin, Goeb-
bels was commonly known as Jappch,en; or
that, on a more serious level, the pervasive
counterargument that Germans were develop-
ing against Allied charges of German guilt
was expressed in the phrase that they had been
belogen und betrogen.
Intelligence, as an aid to Sykewar opera-
tions . . . brought in both the German sto-
ries and the very words in which they were
told. The value which output personnel put
upon this type of intelligence is indicated by
David Hertz, who was in charge of radio
Sykewar against the besieged German garri-
son at Lorient: "Our existence as a function-
ing tactical weapon depended on intelligence
from prisoners. We ate, slept, and drank
with prisoners. Many nights I was awak-
ened by members of our crew dragging in
deserters, who sat on my bedroll, dropping the
waters of the river Scorff as they told us the
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latest Winchell dope on what went on inside
the fortress."
The collection and processing of information
useful for psychological operations are not, how-
ever, limited to intelligence specialists and schol-
ars. In present-day circumstances, where such a
variety of potential uses for psychological activi-
ties exists, possible vulnerabilities may be no trade
secret of intelligence analysts, but rather may be
susceptible of identification by any perceptive
reader of the daily newspapers and current peri-
odicals or by any observer of international affairs.
What can be read and observed comprises the
raw material that is grist for the mill of current
psych-warfare intelligence. An awareness of the
wealth of raw material that can be gathered by
the nonspecialist is perhaps as cogent a reason as
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362
could be cited for naval officers without extensive
specialized training in this area to become and
remain sensitive to potential exploitable oppor-
tunities in the realm of psychological operations.
It is important that those whose travels, duty
assignments, or other contacts afford opportuni-
ties to observe foreign social orders in operation
be constantly alert to observe and report on situ-
ations and events that may be capitalized on by
planners of psychological operations. It has
proved unsatisfactory in practice to attempt to
specify to a new naval attache, for example, just
exactly what to look for to aid psychological oper-
ations. It has proved far more suitable to explain
to him what it is and what its requirements are--
which is precisely what this discussion has
attempted to do.
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CHAPTER 15
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
From the definitions of chapter 1, it was learned
that counterintelligence, just as intelligence, is
knowledge, organization, and activity, but that
these elements are applied to the specific mission
of opposing the enemy's intelligence effort, both
defensively and offensively. Counterintelligence
contributes to and draws from the whole body of
intelligence knowledge. Its organizations are not
only a part of Intelligence, but often are one ahd
the same. Its activities can be identified with the
steps of the intelligence cycle. It is equally im-
portant in peace and war. The differences are
in purposes, points of view, methods and tech-
nique. To be a good counterintelligence officer
one first must be a good intelligence officer.
Because of the diversity and covert aspects of
counterintelligence activities, and because these
activities are not restricted to the intelligence or-
ganizations of the armed services but are asso-
ciated with all agencies which contribute to na-
tional security, centralization of control is essen-
tial to effective counterintelligence operations.
Nowhere is this requirement more evident than in
time of war when our own counterintelligence
efforts in widely separated parts of the world must
be coordinated with those of our allies. For ex-
ample, during World War II, Naval Intelligence
received information from a naval source in South
America that an individual in Europe, about to
embark on a Spanish ship for Argentina, was an
important German espionage agent. Although
given a low evaluation, this information was
promptly relayed to British Intelligence whose
agents removed the suspect from the ship at Gi-
braltar and determined that he was in fact en-
trusted with a highly important mission by the
Germans.
The Armed Forces Staff College manual, Coun-
terintelligenee?Theater of Operations and Joint
Overseas Operation, makes this pertinent comment
on the need for coordinated control:
There is no significant difference in the mis-
sion of counterintelligence in the ground,
363
naval, and air forces and all Services share in
the responsibility of carrying out this mission
by both active and passive measures. How-
ever, the relative number of personnel devoted
to counterintelligence is greater in the ground
force than in the other two because of the bet-
ter opportunity afforded the enemy to pene-
trate our counterintelligence screen by con-
stant contact of opposing ground forces and
the presence of indigenous or dis-Aaced pop-
ulations in the combat or occupiej areas . . .
Counterintelligence means available to all
forces are extensive, and to secure their effec-
tive employment requires close coordination
by theater headquarters.
During World War II, the Army Counter Intelli-
gence Corps had a major responsibility for coun-
terintelligence in overseas theaters. While the
Navy's counterintelligence efforts were more con-
centrated within the domestic theater, its interests
were equally, and of necessity, worldwide. Prac-
tically speaking, counterintelligence interests can-
not be arbitrarily separated according to areas,
because foreign intelligence organizations usually
operate on a broad front without regard to areas
of special cognizance; hence, all counterintelli-
gence agencies must be concerned with the totality
of counterintelligence knowledge.
In the successful achievement of its mission,
counterintelligence has three objectives: first, to
locate and identify the aggressive efforts of hostile
intelligence organizations; second, to deny correct
information or access to vital areas to an actual or
potential enemy; and third, to deceive and mislead
him. This chapter will discuss the nature of hos-
tile intelligence activities, measures and tech-
niques to counter them, and organizations most
directly concerned. The subject is difficult to dis-
cuss because of its sensitive nature and the com-
plexities of the areas of human behaviour with
which it is concerned. Post-World War II devel-
opments have magnified the responsibilities of
counterintelligence and have led to new problems
in their interpretation.
Before proceeding to a discussion of counter-
intelligence measures it will be appropriate and
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helpful to consider first the need for counterintel-
ligence and the nature of the organizations and
activities which must be countered.
THE NEED FOR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
The current compelling need for counterintelli-
gence was created by the purposes and methods
of the Soviet Union in the years following World
War II. This need was accentuated by the oper-
ations of the Soviet Intelligence System, reviewed
in an earlier chapter, as well as by the tremendous
growth of organized intelligence activity all over
the world.
Attempts to calculate the size of current world
intelligence operations in terms of personnel and
expenditures are, of course, speculative. However,
as of 1949, the United Nations World estimated
that the United States, Great Britain, and the
U. S. S. R. were employing approximately 24,000
operatives, while smaller nations were utilizing
another 15,000-20,000. The estimated total cost
annually was set at $248,000,000. No attempt was
made to estimate the additional part-time person-
nel, whose total number might be astounding. In
the same year, an estimate prepared for Great
Britain's Ministry of Defense indicated a world
total of intelligence operatives in excess of 250,000,
actual or potential. By contrast, in 1938, a year
of particular tension, the total number was esti-
mated at no more than 12,000, of whom about 5,500
were employed by Nazi Germany. Irrespective of
accurate figures, it may be assumed that the extent
of intelligence activities in the world today is
greater than ever before. One indication of this
possibility is the increased number of operatives
who have been apprehended since World War II
in widely separated areas of the world.
The challenge to all counterintelligence organi-
zations comes not only from the dimensions of this
world-wide intelligence activity, but even more
from changes in methods. The case of the British
scientist, Klaus Fuchs, for example, can scarcely
be viewed as an isolated example. When placed
in context and related to personalities and events
in Canada and the United States, it indicates a
dangerous trend toward the use of citizens to work
against their own country. As a result foreign
intelligence activity has become related to treach-
ery and interwoven with political propaganda.
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364
Whereas, in the past, speech accent and physical
characteristics might have provided leads for
counterintelligence operatives, at present the only
clues may be the expression of thoughts and ideas.
Nor can counteri:ntelligence problems be easily iso-
lated to relatively few areas or nations. Active
Soviet confederates are to be found in practically
every country of the the world; the world oppo-
nent of the United States, therefore, is two-headed,
consisting not only of the U. S. S. R. but also of
the militant organization of world communism.
As a consequence, counterintelligence is confronted
with a task involving unfriendly, neutral, and
friendly nations of all continents of the world.
The very nature of the cold war, with concepts
and methods so alien to those Of other wars in mod-
ern times, poses new problems for military and
political leaders, the solutions of which become
in turn new problems for counterintelligence. For
example, the voluntary prisoner repatriation issue
in the drawn-out truce negotiations of the Korean
War brought new tensions to the United Nations
Organization arid to relationships of the United
States with other nations, including Great Britain
and India. Riots and bloodshed in prisoner com-
pounds on Koje Island were made a subject of
vicious Communist propaganda directed against
the United States. In January 1953 evidence pro-
duced by the United Nations Headquarters of
Gen. Mark Clark in Tokyo indicated that the
communist delegates conducting the truce negotia-
tions had simultaneously planned and organized
these riots, through a "guidance bureau" which
had trained special units for camp riots and su-
pervised their infiltration into prison compounds.
Here was a new task for counterintelligence with
widespread political and military implications.
Principal among the hostile foreign intelligence
activities to be countered, which may or may not
stem directly from foreign intelligence organiza-
tions, are espionage, sabotage, and subversion. An
understanding of each is necessary to fully appre-
ciate counterintelligence measures.
ESPIONAGE
In earlier times, the term "espionage," or "spy-
ing," was practically synonymous with the word
"intelligence." In modern usage, it is broadly
defined as the activity of spying on others, the
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employment of spies or covert agents, or the sys-
tematic secret collection of information regarding
potential or actual enemies or potential or actual
theaters of military operations, including terrain
and weather. Its purpose is to gather in advance
such complete and detailed data, normally pro-
tected from exposure by a nation, as will assist in
planning for defense or attack, or by which influ-
ence, power, or control over other nations can be
gained. No item or fact is too fragmentary or
unimportant for collection and reporting.
Generally speaking, the two types of espionage
methods are designation, and saturation. Numer-
ous examples of both types are presented in chap-
ter 2: The Soviet spy system organized to gain in-
formation about the atomic bomb is illustrative of
the first, while the mass utilization of Japanese
citizens abroad prior to World War II is an exam-
ple of the second. Espionage by designation re-
fers to the assignment of particular agents, many
of whom are carefully trained, to specific targets
or to the collection of certain highly significant
"missing" items of information. Such agents
usually seek to gain access to key individuals in
governmental, military, or business affairs and to
develop a network of exclusive informers. Es-
pionage by saturation is a large-scale operation by
many hundreds of individuals few if any of whom
are trained for their assignments. It is a buck-
shot method of hitting a target, involving the col-
lection of volumes of information much of which
may be neither pertinent nor useful. Quality of
personnel and material is sacrificed for quantity on
the assumption that a careful processing of the
results will produce much that is usable and im-
portant to the total intelligence effort.
The popular conception of espionage activity is
that it is exciting and glamorous, with a back-
ground of luxury hotels, exotic foreign capitals,
beautiful women, and hot pursuits in fast, sleek
cars. There are, of course, moments of excitement,
but it has been said by confessed agents that the
time of greatest emotional excitement and stimu-
lation for the spy comes when he is caught. Ac-
tually, the life of an espionage agent is often quite
dull and commonplace, for just as the sailor in a
ship, he experiences long periods of tedious routine
and monotonous waiting, relieved only occasion-
ally by danger and suspense. Work hours may be
365
long and tiring and not as filled with hairbreadth
escapes and quick journeys as in fictional accounts.
The typical agent is inconspicuous and impos-
sible to identify from appearances because he may
be recruited from any social group, upper, middle,
or lower classes. Espionage agents come from all
walks of life, with different habits, varying char-
acteristics and capabilities, and individual pat-
terns of behavior. Indeed, on occasion, some
rather ineffective people have been employed as
agents in order to conceal the activities of those
more capable and expert. Age, physical and
mental characteristics, and social or economic
status are no criterion for identification. An
agent will often be a native of the country, in
which he is to work or will have lived there for a
long period of time; the most dangerous is the
ordinary citizen who, for one reason or another,
has decided to release important classified infor-
mation to an enemy.
While no identifying characteristics of the in-
dividual agent can be pointed out, there are four
general classifications based on mode of operation
and assigned mission: diplomatic, fixed, special,
and roving.
Depending upon the particular country, diplo-
matic agents may be consuls, diplomats, military
and naval attaches, observers, members of special
missions, or other quasi-official representatives,
any of whom may aid or direct espionage activi-
ties. As has already been indicated, the practice
of individual nations varies considerably in the
use of their diplomatic personnel for such pur-
poses, although the governments of Russia have
been notorious in so doing.
The fixed agent often poses the greatest threat
to a nation's security because he is assigned to a
given area on a more or less permanent basis. His
objective is to become an established, respected citi-
zen of his community, of unquestioned loyalty
and reputation, and with a profitable business or
comfortably retired. His "cover" may be that of
a doctor, storekeeper, farmer, or retired business-
man?preferably any occupation which will per-
mit the greatest possible activity at the least risk.
Because of the importance of this type of agent,
he may reside in a locality for years without re-
ceiving any assignments or being contacted by any
of his superiors. His objectives may be the in-
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filtration of military installations, close associa-
tion with military personnel for the purpose of
gleaning information, or the covert observation of
military establishments and activities. He may
have responsibilities for establishing, training,
and directing networks or cells of agents in his
area or acting as a point for transmittal of infor-
mation, or "letter drop," for other agents.
The special agent is handpicked to obtain spe-
cific information because he is well-versed and
highly trained in a particular field or in the pro-
cedure by which the information is to be gained.
Usually the special agent has been thoroughly in-
doctrinated at an espionage school so that he is
prepared to assume any disguise, to enter a coun-
try legally or illegally, and to carry out his work
for as long as necessary with plausible reasons
and legitimate proof to back them up. Officially
denied, these agents sometimes work under the
supervision of diplomatic or fixed agents or di-
rectly under the instructions of the intelligence
service by which they are employed. In addition
to collecting specific information they may serve
as special organizers, inspectors, supervisors, or
couriers.
As his designation implies, the roving agent is
not confined to a particular area, but may cover
many, collecting general information in various
categories or specific information in one. His
problem, of course, is to have a credible reason
for extensive travel. In the course of his work
he may conduct personal observation and investi-
gation of intelligence targets, penetrate installa-
tions for short periods, and make brief contacts
with other agents. Related to this class are part-
time agents or informers, usually employed for a
particular mission because they have or can obtain
information of special value. Once committed to
such work, and hence subject to blackmail, they
are usually available for further employment as
required and necessary.
The motives which impel men and women to
enter espionage service are many and varied, from
fear, greed, or love of adventure to idealism or
patriotism, particularly if the individual is im-
bued with love of a country or a cause. Often a
combination of reasons provides the motivation,
although money is one of the more common. The
ideological motive usually produces the most
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faithful and reliable agents from among the intel-
lectual and professional groups who are stimu-
lated by the vision of a new world order. Some
may not actually realize the implications of their
position as enemy agents or, if they do have an
uneasy conscience about their activities, may ra-
tionalize them as consistent with an inevitable
course of events. These sympathizers provide an
excellent means of penetration into government
agencies and are most difficult to discover because
their records are good, they have no obvious con-
nections with intelligence organizations, and are
often subjected to open attack by front organiza-
tions. Financial rewards are of little consequence
to the ideologically inspired.
Many of the best agents are members of the
military, naval, or diplomatic services who are
professionally motivated and trained to carry out
their assigned missions in a most competent man-
ner. The desire to be on the winning side strongly
motivates certain potential agents. They must
be particularly watched during periods when an
enemy has won the temporary advantage. Pres-
tige and love of adventure also have a strong ap-
peal, particularly for young people. Illusory
though they may be, these motives have proved
influential, as for example, among members of the
Hitler Youth Organizations during World War
II. In enemy-occupied areas some individuals
under pressure will become intelligence agents to
avoid other forms of service, such as in labor
camps, or those involving transfer to foreign
areas. An overwhelming urge to return home
may make a person a willing "line-crosser." Un-
der pressure, however, they often will abandon
their mission or volunteer the information they
have gathered. Criminals may become agents as
an alternative to imprisonment; apprehended
agents may be spared on condition that they work
for an enemy. The latter become "double-
agents," working for both sides. Dr. Richard
Sorge, whose case was mentioned in chapter 2, is
a good example of the double-agent.
During World War II, many of the German
agents who came to the United States were moti-
vated by both greed and fear, especially fear of
reprisal against their families left behind in
Europe. In the case of Soviet agents, patriotism
has seldom been a factor since many nationalities
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have often been involved in the same network.
In his book, Handbook for Spies, Alexander Foote
has given an interesting fictional account of his
recruitment as a Soviet spy during World War II.
He suggests that the motivation of spies is often
difficult to determine and that, in his own case,
he was for some time unaware of the objectives
and general purposes of the organization he
served.
The native attributes of any individual selected
for full-time work in espionage most certainly in-
clude common sense, good judgment, the ability
to size up a situation correctly, and adaptability
in learning and using necessary arts and sciences.
Personal courage, alertness, and complete self-
control are also essential. Bravery in company is
one thing, but bravery alone is another matter,
especially when the threat to exposure is constant.
Mental and emotional stability, physical vigor,
and stamina are prime requirements. Intoxi-
cants must be used with great discretion, and
romance has often been fatal. Therefore, it must
be assumed that nations employing covert agents
apply the most exacting standards in their selec-
tion.
Mental, emotional, and physical qualifications
are only the foundation for the most intensive
training which must develop others more special-
ized, such as knowledge of foreign languages and
skills in microphotography and means of commu-
nications including wireless telegraphy, and secret
inks. The curriculum of the Leningrad Espionage
School as reported by the International News
Service from Athens, Greece, in April 1952 is in-
dicative of the range of subject matter. During
the course, which lasts for about 1 year, students
are instructed in chemistry (atomic science) ,
mechanics, drawing and sketching, fortifications
and geography, sources of raw material and indus-
trial output, and details of industrial production
in the United States, Canada, and South America.
Political studies cover the history of communism
abroad as well as in the U. S. S. R., and students
must become proficient in either English or Span-
ish. Other subjects studied are the organization
of foreign armies and their weapons, topography,
photography, radio operating, and deciphering.
Each individual must learn how to conduct him-
self if captured, in prison or during trial, and he
must know how to plan an escape and return to
the U. S. S. R. either through legal, diplomatic
channels or illegal routes, making use of false
passports and disguises. Finally, instruction is
given in the transmission of secret messages and
the use of agitators and dissident groups. All
students at the Leningrad School are, of course,
politically reliable. In addition to Russians and
satellite nationals, some foreigners are accepted
as students, although fictitious names are the rule
and correct identity is concealed.
It must not be assumed that such a curriculum
is necessarily exhaustive of the possibilities.
Others might include safe-cracking, counterfeit-
ing, and a detailed study of the local customs, man-
nerisms, and peculiarities of the particular area
to which the agent is to be assigned. The perfec-
tion of cover stories, concealment of all identify-
ing clues, evasion of surveillance, and clever altera-
tions in identity all have a place in specialized
training. Regardless of the specific subject matter,
most espionage organizations have their own train-
ing schools which usually have instruction in the
following five areas : Types of information sought,
techniques for obtaining it, selection and perfec-
tion of a cover, means of transmission of informa-
tion, and methods of entering the target area.
Means of gaining access to a general area are,
of course, varied and depend upon the circum-
stances. During wartime, typical means include
line-crossing, sea-coast landing, parachuting, and
remaining behind as the enemy withdraws.
Orientation within an area may be difficult because
the agent often lands at some distance from his
intended destination and must avoid carrying
maps or inquiring directions. Other problems
may include obtaining proper identification papers
and documents. Obviously, the names and ad-
dresses of the agent's contacts will be memorized
and he will carry only such papers as are cus-
tomary for his particular cover.
The large-scale movement of immigrants, ref-
ugees, and displaced persons since World War II
has provided agents with an excellent means of
entry into their target areas. Simulating the piti-
ful circumstances of refugees escaping from per-
secution, they have been able to reach their desti-
nations in sizable numbers with marked success.
For example, it has been reported in the public
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press that Americans with friends or relatives in
Communist-dominated countries have become vic-
tims of blackmail and forced to sponsor the entry
into the United States of trained agents posing as
refugees from Communist oppression. Lists of
such potential sponsors have sometimes been com-
piled from parcels sent through the mails. Ex-
change students also provide excellent cover for
espionage activities, as do businessmen, merchant
seamen, and tourists who have legitimate reasons
for entering a country.
Once within a target area the agent must adopt
some disguise or "cover" which is suitable and
logical to justify his presence. The cover adopted
is normally an activity in which the agent is pro-
ficient through previous employment; engaging in
unfamiliar work will more readily lead to even-
tual discovery. The cover of a servant is a good
one for both men and women, especially those with
traces of foreign extraction. Maids, cooks, butlers,
and chauffeurs become intimates of households,
and can logically obtain information in a variety
of situations. For example, an agent posing as a
chauffeur installed a recording device in the auto-
mobile of a high government official, and thus
obtained valuable information for a number of
years.
Hotel employees often have served as contacts
between agents and as letterdrops. Bellhops, desk
clerks, and maids can easily overhear conversa-
tions and, in wartime, have gathered vital infor-
mation from military personnel. The transient
nature of such work and the minimum qualifica-
tions are of considerable advantage. The enter-
tainment profession provides a highly desirable
cover because it is international in nature and
brings together widely varied groups, the size and
diversity depending, of course, upon the popular-
ity of the individual entertainer. Frequent travel
lends legitimacy to wartime movement into many
areas, including military installations. The travel
factor combined with the ability to make friends
quickly and easily in the right circles, makes this
cover particularly effective.
Trades and industry have also been used for
cover purposes, especially importers and publish-
ers whose business involves foreign transactions
in peacetime and the maintenance of connections
with neutral countries in time of war. Communi-
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cations workers, contractors, and engineers are
good covers for obtaining vital military and eco-
nomic information. Diplomatic cover, of course,
has the added advantage of security through diplo-
matic immunity. The agent cannot be arrested
but only requested to leave the country; hence some
diplomatic missions have been established only for
intelligence purposes. It is apparent that the
types of cover are many and varied; those men-
tioned only indicate the tremendous range of possi-
bilities.
Techniques
The techniques of espionage are almost as di-
verse as the types of cover; the particular one
selected will depend upon the area involved, the
information desired, and the degree of difficulty
anticipated or encountered. Some of the more
common can be listed, although it must be empha-
sized that there are many other possibilities; they
are often used in combination, and are not the
exclusive province of the espionage agent. Pene-
tration, the physical entry of an agent by normal
procedures into an organization or installation for
an indefinite period, is an ideal method for per-
sonal observation and reporting. Targets for this
technique are industrial plants, military installa-
tions, laboratories, newspapers, radio stations,
government statistical and intelligence agencies,
political parties, labor unions, and any other
agency or organization which may be concerned
with information of intelligence value. Military
services and government offices are particularly
important targets and agents may enlist or start
work in the lower echelons, gradually rising to
positions where classified information becomes
available. Direct observation, without actual
penetration, is usually a more hazardous and less
profitable technique, for it depends entirely upon
the available means of cover, especially if cameras
and binoculars are required.
EmploYment agencies, language schools, and
training schools are sometimes organized specifi-
cally to facilitate penetration. Fire inspection
surveys by agents supposedly representating in-
surance companies, or actually operating out of
such companies, have been a good approach.
Bribery, theft, and purchase of documents, plans,
and information have taken advantage of men's
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weakness in every generation. The development
of friendships with individuals possessing impor-
tant data, and their subsequent subtle interroga-
tion making full use of flattery and conviviality
have been effective. Where this method has
failed, and under certain circumstances, outright
abduction of specialists and important personages
has been practiced, especially by the Soviet Union
in modern times. Search of the personal effects
of those believed to have vital information is some-
times facilitated by employees who have ready
access to such effects.
Reproduction by copying or photographing
models or documents which are only temporarily
available can be secretly accomplished so that no
suspicion is aroused. The actual appropriation
of materials, where such are desired, is often aided
by clerks, janitors, and other regular employees,
either knowingly or unwittingly. The adroit use
of informers is a common espionage technique.
Many intelligence services maintain lists of such
persons in every country for appropriate use by
agents.
Although the first major task of the espionage
agent is to collect information, the second, that of
transmitting it to his superiors, is of equal im-
portance, for only when they have received it is
the process of espionage complete. For this
reason, successful methods of communication are
vital and advance preparations for them are given
the most careful attention. In modern times, the
predominant method is the use of concealed radio
transmitters and receivers of suitable size and
power. In addition to range, other factors for
consideration include source of power, operational
wave length, antenna length, and atmospheric con-
ditions. During World War II a number of ex-
cellent radio sets for espionage use were developed,
especially by the Germans, some of which were
about the size of a shoebox. More recent electronic
developments have reduced the size even more and
made the problem of concealment easier. The
necessity for an adequate antenna creates special
problems in the location of a transmitting set,
so that night is the usual time for operations.
Since height is a factor, preferable transmission
sites are hilltops or high buildings except when
communications are directed toward aircraft in
the vicinity. The advantages of radio for trans-
369
mission are speed and comparative reliability;
some of its disadvantages are the equipment re-
quired, training in its use, and the risk of dis-
covery. Anyone with a receiver covering the
proper wave length can receive the transmitted
signal, and the agent never knows when his ac-
tivity has been detected by radio security units.
As a result, his transmissions must be brief and
infrequent and his location must be changed often
or subject to change on the shortest notice.
In spite of the risks of interception, public mail
service is often used to transmit information.
During peacetime, the risks in many countries are
reduced and mail is sent direct to commercial or
private addresses used as covers; in wartime, cover
addresses will be located in neutral countries.
Under either condition, letters, newspapers or
periodicals, ships' mail, and microphotographs
may be the means for utilizing mail service, and
such means may employ codes or secret inks or
both. The potentialities of microphotography are
particularly amazing, since a sheet of paper may
be photographed and reduced in size to a pin-
point of gelatin which may be hidden in the
gummed sections of an envelope or used as a punc-
tuation mark in a letter.
There are many other methods for transmitting
information for intelligence purposes, including
couriers, pigeons and dogs, heliographs, light sig-
nals, infrared rays, supersonic waves, clearing-
houses in neutral countries, secret letterdrops,
persons, even children acting as fronts, and coded
messages ingeniously placed to be visible to the
intended recipient. Because of the possibilities of
interception, couriers are seldom used except when
the transmittal of maps, objects, and photographs
becomes vital; the diplomatic courier has the ob-
vious advantage of customary freedom from search
or censorship. Pigeons and dogs have been em-
ployed for centuries, although the risk of inter-
ception is great and the amount of material which
can be transmitted is limited. Infrared-ray equip-
ment has special advantages and scientific develop-
ments in the field of secret communications con-
tinue to provide other devices of high potential
value.
While the activities and techniques of espionage
have a range which almost defies the imagination,
it should be recognized that they are the cumula-
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tive result of brilliant, if sometimes almost per-
verse, imaginative genius that knows no limits.
No possibility, therefore, can be brushed aside as
too impractical or improbable. Even more, mod-
ern espionage is a comprehensive, skillfully organ-
ized business with a major objective of collecting
all possible information about planning, policy,
and military secrets. Published reports by such
prominent and informed persons as the Director
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation suggest
that this activity in the United States is organized
on a scale incomprehensible to the average Amer-
ican citizen, more pervasive than ever before, and
potentially more dangerous. Literally thousands
of people, many of whom are American citizens,
are reported to be associated with espionage, at-
tempting to transmit to the Soviet Union informa-
tion which might aid that country in the cold war
or in open conflict. The possibility exists that
such persons may be located in government agen-
cies, labor unions, key industries, and scientific
organizations. The realities of espionage in the
United States should be seriously regarded.
SABOTAGE
For the purposes of discussion, the subjects of
espionage and sabotage will be considered sepa-
rately, but it should be kept in mind that their
activities are often interrelated, the personnel may
be one and the same, and methods may be comple-
mentary if not identical. Espionage is damage to
national security by the acquisition of vital infor-
mational items; sabotage is damage by injury or
destruction of important physical items. The
word "sabotage" originated in the industrial revo-
lution of the 19th century when hand weavers of
northern France and the Low Countries fearing
loss of their jobs, often kicked their sabots into
the new textile weaving machines in an effort to
destroy them. In modern usage, sabotage is more
broadly defined as "the malicious disruption or
attempted disruption of the normal functions of a
nation in any manner which intends or apparently
intends to injure, interfere with, or obstruct the
national defense or war potential of that nation."
The term is sometimes applied to certain activities
of a secretive nature, such as some aspects of
psychological and economic warfare and projects
CONFIDENTIAL 370
of subversive political groups which do not result
in obvious physical damage.
Three general purposes of sabotage are to
weaken the war potential or war effort of a nation,
to impair its internal strength and external influ-
ence, and to dislocate its economic system. Dam-
age to a nation's productive industrial facilities
can directly affect its fighting capabilities on dis-
tant fronts, while sabotage in the area of opera-
tions can cause a breakdown in lines of commu-
nications and prevent a commander from accom-
plishing his mission. Internal weakening of a
nation may disrupt its economic and political
structure so that it not only cannot meet its inter-
national commitments but also may be faced with
social strife leading to revolutionary activities.
The complexities, interrelationships, and concen-
tration of modern industrial plants magnify the
potential effectiveness of sabotage, for the de-
struction of a few vital machines and damage to
a few vulnerable plants can, like a chain reaction,
immobilize thousands of others.
Sabotage need not be direct damage or destruc-
tion: it may be much more subtle, such as the
undetected substitution of destination tags on
shipments of important supplies. Nor can it be
assumed that every act or attempted act of sabo-
tage is the result of the directed effort of an em-
ployee of a foreign service. Sabotage may be
closely related to international developments, but
it may also coincide with domestic labor disputes
or extreme dissension among industrial personnel.
Acts of violence and destruction can and have been
traced to malicious and dissatisfied individuals
who have no other motive than revenge or jeal-
ousy. In any event, it may be assumed that sabo-
tage will be directed against points of greatest
vulnerability.
Types of Saboteurs
The German Nazis, the Italian Fascists, and the
Russian Communists have all advanced the doc-
trine that service to the state justifies any act
which will aid its cause, with the result that injury
and destruction of property evokes no personal
sense of wrongdoing. The two basic types of
saboteurs are the trained agent operating under
the instructions of a foreign intelligence service,
and the independent, usually untrained, malcon-
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tent acting for personal reasons with no foreign
connections.
According to the time element of their assign-
mems, saboteurs may also be typed as long-range
and short-range agents. The long-range agent,
who usually enters a country at some time prior
to an outbreak of hostilities, is similar to the fixed
espionage agent, while the short-range saboteur
ordinarily operates during wartime within an
area of military operations. The means of entry
into a country or a particular installation em-
ployed by a saboteur are similar to those used by
espionage agents. To be remembered is the fact
that anyone can be a saboteur, of any age, from
any social group, or ar y profession or occupation.
While the activities the trained saboteur may
conform to a pattern, those of the independent
saboteur seldom do. This latter type may be un-
expectedly motivated by diverse causes: he may
commit sabotage in an effort to embarrass or dis-
credit a fellowworker, and by blaming his act on
another seek to gain personal recognition, ad-
vancement, or reward.
Methods and Targets of Sabotage
The method employed by a saboteur will de-
pend upon the nature and construction of the as-
signed target, its vulnerability, security measures
in force in the area, the effect desired, the time
available, and the material necessary to cause the
planned damage. While the range of possible
methods is great, some are more commonly used
because of their simplicity and convenience and
may be divided into four groups: incendiary, ex-
plosive, mechanical, and biological. The common
characteristic of each is damage or destruction to
life or property, except in the case of the latter
which may have more indirect results. These
methods may have a primary phase, which involves
the actual act, such as arson or bombing, and a sec-
ondary phase, consisting of acts which increase the
effectiveness of the primary, such as disconnecting
fire alarms and immobilizing fire-fighting equip-
mer it.
One of the most effective methods of sabotage is
the use of fire because of complete destruction,
concealment of evidence, and availability of means.
Taking advantage of ordinary fire hazards, such as
371
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the improper stowage of combustibles or faulty
electric wiring, the saboteur can achieve his objec-
tive with a minimum risk of detection and a, maxi-
mum degree of disguise. For example, during
World War II, a German sabotage group in Great
Britain, directed by an electrical engineer, made
use of apparent accidents to damage various elec-
trical installations. The close relationship be-
tween arson and sabotage, which differ only in
objectives, often make it unnecessary for the sabo-
teur to camouflage his incendiarism.
Rapid spread and complete destruction is most
accurately achieved when the saboteur personally
ignites combustible materials, known as acceler-
ants. Should he require time for escape or a bet-
ter alibi, he may make use of a variety of delay
mechanisms which are either improvised or manu-
factured. These mechanisms are usually chemi-
cal, electrical, or mechanical. A very simple de-
vice is a lighted cigarette and a match folder
which provides a delay of about 15 to 18 minutes.
Typical chemical mechanisms include pencil-like
incendiaries and sabotage bombs which have as
their components a delay device, an initiator, and a
main charge. Electrical and mechanical mecha-
nisms are frequently used in combination with
chemicals and adapt for their purposes ordinary
alarm clocks, mouse traps, doorbells, and tele-
phones.
The use of explosives poses a number of prob-
lems and requirements: storage, introduction into
the target area, technical skill in preparation, the
difficulties of making the explosion seem acci-
dental, and the possibilities of public indignation
resulting in intensive investigation and increased
security measures. However, explosives become
an acceptable method under certain circumstances:
when the target is such that a cutting or shattering
force is necessary for its destruction, when destruc-
tion must be immediate and total, and when no
other method will accomplish the objective. Ex-
plosives are particularly effective in destroying
cast iron forgings, reinforced concrete and stone
structures.
Usual explosive devices are bombs which may or
may not be disguised. If disguised or concealed
they may be set to explode at a predetermined time
or so arranged as to explode by means of a trigger
device activated by movement. The common ex-
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plosive materials used include black powder,
smokeless powder, nitroglycerin, and TNT.
Mechanical sabotage is by far the easiest method
to employ as well as one of the most difficult to
detect. Its most logical targets are industry and
transport, although military equipment has some
vulnerabilities. This method is accomplished by
breakage, the use of abrasives, acts of omission,
substitutions, and contamination. A wrench,
hammer, or other similar tool can easily destroy
delicate instruments, gears, pumps, and other vital
moving parts of machinery. Abrasives, placed in
lubricants and fuels, will cause excessive wear and
eventual breakdown of machines, engines, and
generators. Mere neglect to perform some im-
portant, though simple, function, such as lubrica-
tion of equipment or turning on oil feed lines, will
accomplish a saboteur's purpose. The substitu-
tion of faulty or foreign materials can materially
affect an industrial plant and the alteration of
blueprints can have equally destructive results.
The contamination of fuels and lubricants is a
procedure similar to those already mentioned.
There are many advantages of mechanical sabo-
tage: little equipment or training is needed; de-
tection is exceedingly difficult; and it can often
be continued in the same area over a considerable
period of time. For example, industrial produc-
tion may be retarded to a low level but not com-
pletely stopped. During World War I it was
4 years before damage to the propeller shaft of
an American merchant ship was discovered. In
World War II, German agents had as one of their
targets the transport system of the Allied armies
moving through northern Italy and across France;
their purpose was to slow down progress, to dis-
tract transport personnel, and to detract investi-
gative agencies from more important tasks.
Biological sabotage is aimed at the home front,
especially the labor force and seeks to cause sick-
ness and absenteeism by introducing various toxins
in sources of food and water.
Three major categories of sabotage targets are
transportation, industries, and natural resources.
The importance of transportation to industries and
to the movement of materials makes it a primary
target, with railroads, water shipping, and air
transport having priority in that order. Indus-
trial targets might specifically be, in order of im-
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372
portance : power plants, assembly lines, raw mate-
rials, individual machines, lubricants, and fuels.
The category of natural resources includes mines,
farm produce, forests, and waterways, together
with dams, breakwaters, flood-control systems, and
reservoirs. The disruption of the telecommunica-
tions facilities of a nation such as the United
States, with its complex telephone, telegraph,
cable, and radio networks, could quickly dislocate
its economic, political, and social structure; while
damage to public utilities, warehouses and supply
depots, and military installations could have seri-
ous consequences. A successful attack in any of
these categories might have a progressively serious
effect on the labor force which is always a vital
target.
In a theater of operations, and particularly in an
area formerly held by an enemy, sabotage may be
especially advantageous against such targets as
ships, port and dock installations, railroad junc-
tions, bridges, tunnels, switches, airports, radio
transmitters, landing-control equipment, impor-
tant public buildings, motor pools, and ammuni-
tion, fuel and food dumps. The list of targets of
special naval interest is extensive and includes:
naval factories of all types, shipyards, piers and
terminals, drydocks, loading and unloading equip-
ment, depots and storage areas, central power sta-
tions, transmission lines, transformers, water-
works, transportation facilities, communications,
ships of all types, and labor force.
The organized, large-scale sabotage group, care-
fully coordinated with other weapons and meas-
ures, constitutes a danger and threat in both war-
time and peacetime. In many instances these
groups are an integral part of foreign intelligence
services; in fact, some countries have maintained
sabotage units for many years. In World War I,
for example, the Germans operated an initially
successful sabotage campaign against Allied ship-
ping; in the United States this campaign was
directed by Franz von Rintelin who has described
his activities in an interesting book, The Dark
Inivader. Prior to World War II, the Nazis ini-
tiated sabotage operations in France in an effort
to impair her industrial production and so to aid
the activities of subversive groups. There are
indications that these operations were successful at
least in part.
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Nonphysical sabotage, which relates to the sys-
tematic undermining of morale and public opinion
and makes use of false propaganda and insidious
rumor, is a form of subversion which is a major
type of foreign directed activity of concern to
counterintelligence.
SUBVERSION
The dictionary definition of the word "subvert"
is "to overturn, overthrow, ruin utterly; to under-
mine the morals, allegiance or faith of, corrupt."
In its broadest sense, therefore, subversion in-
cludes both espionage and sabotage, and their con-
crete targets of information collection and phys-
ical destruction. In order to focus attention on
the mental targets of subversion, this discussion
will deal with activities relating to the corruption
of the minds of men.
A comprehensive definition of subversion is dif-
ficult to phrase because of its intermingled ab-
stract and concrete aspects. Most of its effects,
however, are political, and it thus includes any
activity carried on by an individual or group
which seeks to alter the form of Government of
the United States by unconstitutional means or
which serves the interest of a foreign government
in a way inimical to the United States. The edu-
cation law and the civil service law of the State
of New York is more specific and detailed as
quoted in the Regents' Rules on Subversive Activ-
ities:
. . . a teacher or other employee who "wil-
fully and deliberately advocates, advises or
teaches the doctrine that the government of
the United States or of any state or of any
political subdivision thereof should be over-
thrown or overturned by force, violence or
any unlawful means," or who participates in
the preparation, publication or distribution
of written or printed matter advocating such
a doctrine or advising its adoption, or who
"organizes or helps to organize or becomes a
member of any society or group of persons"
which teaches or advocates such a doctrine, or
who utters "any treasonable or seditious act
or acts," is engaging in subversive ac-
tivity . . .
Legally, subversion is the committing of a willful
act inimical to the interests of the United States.
From the intelligence point of view, subversion is
also a specialized method of political warfare
373
which demands the most astute and painstaking
counteraction.
The term subversion, often popularly described
as fifth column activity, is applied to a variety of
manifestations, from an expressed attitude to a
series of acts or statements which reveal disloyalty
and endanger the constitutional government of
the United States. Subversion, therefore, is a
matter of degree and the naval officer must be
carefully trained to recognize it in its many as-
pects. Some characteristics of subversion include
its conspiratorial nature, the secrecy surrounding
its efforts, and the devious, inconsistent, and some-
times seemingly conflicting means of approaching
and attaining its eventual objectives. Perhaps the
most serious problem is the resemblance of some
phases of subversion to legitimate activities of a
democratic citizenry, and differentiation must be
made between the loyal American who exercises
his right of criticism and the enemy who conceals
his subversive activity by making use of the same
right. The solution of this problem constitutes a
heavy responsibility for counterintelligence and
security agencies which have sometimes found
themselves dealing with cases involving inference
and personal judgment. For example, when a
case against an individual lies within the area of
ideas, even expert analyses of that case may vary
in their conclusions as to what the individual is
and what he actually represents.
Shortly after World War I this problem was
faced by Justices Holmes and Brandeis of the
Supreme Court at which time Holmes brought
forth the doctrine, as a standard, of "clear and
present danger." In the case of Schenck v. United
States, he said: "The question in every case is
whether the words used are used in such circum-
stances and are of such a nature as to create a
clear and present danger that they will bring about
the substantive evils that Congress has a right to
prevent. It is a question of proximity and de-
gree." Justice Brandeis, in the case Whitney v.
California, further amplified this doctrine when
he said: "No danger flowing from speech can be
deemed clear and present, unless the incidence of
the evil apprehended is so imminent that it may
befall before there is an opportunity for full dis-
cussion. If there be time to expose through dis-
cussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the
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evil by the processes of education, the remedy to
be applied is more speech, not enforced silence."
Nathaniel Weyl, a former Communist Party mem-
ber, commenting on this statement in his book,
The Battle Against Disloyalty, makes the point
that "the purpose of the Communist movement was
to deprive the people of the United States of any
possibility of a 'free and open encounter' between
truth and falsehood" and "is not a battle of ideas
in the arena of honest discourse. The purpose is
not to convince the majority, nor is there any will-
ingness to abide by the majority's verdict."
This fundamental problem is summarized by
Philip Selznick in The Organizational 'Weapon:
A Study of Bolshevik Strategy and Tactics, pub-
lished by the Rand Corporation:
The problem of subversion has two aspects
which are often confused. On the one hand, a
group is considered subversive when it seeks
to overthrow established authority by forcible
means. It is here that the doctrine of "clear
and present danger" most readily applies, the
assumption being that governments ought to
punish acts and not thoughts, and that meas-
ures of restraint ought to be consistent with
the seriousness of the acts committed. How-
ever, the problem is complicated when, as in
the case of communism, subversion refers not
only to a revolutionary program, but also to
the manipulation of social institutions for
alien ends, this manipulation being conducted
covertly in the name of the institution's own
values.
Mr. Selznick goes on to say that confusion in
identifying subversion can and does arise from the
fact that new social forces develop from time to
time in a community, which may be considered
subversive because their motives and objectives
are not generally understood or appreciated. The
criterion in such instances will be the limits of the
objectives sought and their realization within the
established and regulated processes of constitu-
tional government.
A study and understanding of communism can
lead only to the conclusion that it is subversive,
because its goal is unlimited power and its methods
utterly disregard and directly oppose customary
constitutional processes and restraints. Power is
sought through the insurrectionary activities of
a pivotally placed minority assisted by a foreign
power.
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374
Aspects of Subversion
Disaffection, a first step toward subversion, is a
state of mind in which there is a basic lack of
loyalty or regard for any constitutional form of
government and particularly for the Government
and Constitution of the United States. It may
be indicated by disloyal comments, not necessarily
designed to influence others, or by sympathetic
association with persons or groups who have posi-
tive subversive tendencies. In and of itself, as a
state of mind, it constitutes no criminal offense
since no act has been committed. It is particu-
larly important to distinguish between the discon-
tented and the disaffected, as well as between
disaffection and subversion. The step between
disaffection and subversion is taken when the act
is committed. Disaffection is of direct interest to
counterintelligence because of its potential danger
and easy conversion to subversive purposes. A
foreign national residing within the limits of the
United States cannot be guilty of disaffection,
since he owes no loyalty to the United States.
Sedition is described as acts, or words written
or spoken, which tend to incite the citizens of a
country to revolt or rebel against constituted
authority. While sedition involves questions of
constitutional law, the Congress has the implied
right to protect the Federal Government against
injury and the authority to punish incitements to
violate or interfere with the execution of Federal
laws. Sedition, therefore, involves any advice
urging illegal resistance to the law, any attempt
to change by illegal means the existing form of
government, and any illegal interference with the
execution of its policies. The key words in the
various sedition laws are: Insubordination, dis-
loyalty, mutiny, refusal to duty, injury to the
United States, force, and violence. In 1940, the
sedition laws were broadened to include "any per-
sons who knowingly or wilfully advocate, abet,
seek, advise the necessity, desirability, or propriety
of overthrowing or destroying any government in
the United States by force or violence." More
recent laws, still under consideration, tend to be
even more explicit.
Treason, the most serious offense that can be
committed against the Government of the United
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States, is specifically defined in the Constitution
as follows: "Treason against the United States
shall consist only in levying war against them, or
in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and
comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason,
unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the
same overt act, or on confession in open court."
The basic difference between treason and sedition
is that treason means the committing of an overt
physical act, whereas in a case of sedition, words
alone can constitute the offense. Treason is a
breach of allegiance. "Levying war" has been in-
terpreted by the courts to include furnishing to an
enemy arms, troops, supplies, information, or
means of transportation. "Adhering to their
enemies" is an offense which includes the trans-
mission of intelligence of military value to an
enemy, all acts which in any way tend to obstruct
or weaken the military operations of the United
States, and the inciting of others to aid an enemy.
It should be apparent that many legalities can
arise in connection with cases of treason and
sedition.
Nathaniel Weyl, in the book cited above, states
that "the United States has been extraordinarily
tolerant of both sedition and disloyalty. No mod-
ern state has ever defined the crime of treason so
narrowly. No nation has ever surrounded the man
accused of betraying his country with such a for-
midable barrier of constitutional protection or
been so reluctant to punish conspiracies directed
at its very existence." Since World War II, how-
ever, more vigorous measures have been taken, not
only against the underground forces of commu-
nism but also against the American Communist
Party which has waged an unceasing campaign
for revolution. One of the most important was the
indictment in 1948 of 12 men charged with con-
spiracy to organize the Communist Party of the
United States as an association of people "who
teach and advocate the overthrow and destruction
of the Government of the United States by force
and violence." This organization is characterized
by deceit, conspiratorial activity, secrecy, viru-
lence and hatred, subservience to instructions from
the Soviet Union, and a fanaticism on the part of
its members which is a way of life engulfing their
entire personalities.
375
Methods of Subversion
A study of the American Communist Party and
its activities will provide a detailed illustration of
subversion and its methods. As a part of the party
discipline each member is carefully instructed in
the basic principles of organization, propaganda,
and agitation through the doctrinal teachings of
Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin by which the
party directs the struggles of the working class in
gaining victories while avoiding unnecessary sac-
rifices. These teachings also show the party the
best methods of overthrowing capitalism, which
will lead to the establishment of a Socialist Soviet
Republic in the United States. A clue to the ad-
vantages of subversion from the Communist point
of view are the words, "unnecessary sacrifices;"
at the same time its principal methods, or tech-
niques, are identified by the terms, organization,
propaganda, and agitation, which will be discussed
in turn.
Organizational Methods
In order to understand the organizational
method of subversion it is necessary first to appre-
ciate the power generated not only by one organ-
ized group but also by an entire organized politi-
cal community. The recognized constitutional
order of a democratic state imposes positive re-
sponsibilities on group or political party power
and enforces regulations governing the use of or
accession to that power. The regulations of the
constitutional system are continually being ex-
tended into new areas where group power is being
developed and won. For example, political parties,
pressure groups, unions, and various other agencies
attaining power adapt themselves to the constitu-
tional order and so contribute to the continued
stability of the state. For this reason subversion
is not involved.
Communist political doctrine, fully recognizing
the potential of group power, seeks to exploit it in
all social institutions regardless of whether or not
they are normally political in nature, and to
achieve the consolidation of total group power by
one ruling group. Hiding behind the customary
and accepted rules of constitutional procedure,
the Communists achieve power by the manipula-
tion of minority units, thus actually circumventing
these rules. Their search for power does not stop
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short of total absolute control. For these reasons,
communistic organizational methods are subver-
sive and can be characterized as total subversion.
The implications of these methods in their totality
are indeed staggering and represent a challenge to
democratic society that is perhaps unparalleled.
The importance of ideology to communism is
well known; the almost equal importance of organ-
izational control was emphasized by Lenin when
he said: "The proletariat has no other weapon in
the fight for power except organization . . . the
proletariat can become and inevitably will become
a dominant force only because its intellectual unity
created by the principles of Marxism is fortified
by the material unity of organization which welds
millions of toilers into an army of the working
class." For the Communists, therefore, ideology
is only a beginning; the ultimate goal is the con-
solidation of total power in a select group within
organizations which can force a final and irrevo-
cable decision on society.
One method is the creation of acknowledged
political organizations, such as the American Com-
munist Party, legally constituted and openly de-
voted to the expansion of membership and the
enlistment of popular support for political control
through recognized constitutional procedures.
A second method is the development of "front
organizations" in any area of social activity, po-
litical, professional, cultural, or economic. Com-
munist-controlled from their inception, these or-
ganizations have innocent-appearing and seem-
ingly commendable objectives designed to appeal
to specific groups and individuals who may be
dominated and exploited for subversive purposes.
By such means, propaganda is disseminated
through apparently acceptable channels, informa-
tion is obtained fox further organizational activi-
ties, such as names and addresses, and subversive
groups gain at least partial control over those
which are nonsubversive.
Front organizations have the mutual character-
istics of common origin, idealistic sounding title,
rigid conformity to the Communist "line," and
deception; they are either mass, membership, or
paper organizations, and solicit and make use of
the names of prominent persons. The same party
members may belong to several front organiza-
tions. In recent years, hundreds of such organ-
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376
izations have sprung up, but have quickly ceased
to exist when exposed. In some of his writings,
Stalin has stressed the importance of these groups,
describing them as "transmission belts" and quot-
ing Lenin to support his point of view:
The dictatorship (of the proletariat) can-
not be effectively realized without "belts" to
transmit power from the vanguard (the Com-
munist Party) to the mass of the advanced
class, and from this to the mass of those who
labor.
The membership ordinarily includes four cate-
gories of individuals: (1) Admitted Communist
Party members; (2) Party members whose true
status is concealed; (3) Consistent accepters of
the party discipline although they are not party
members; (4) Those attracted by the announced
objectives of the group, the prominence of its spon-
sors, and general sociability. The means by which
these organizations are established and controlled
have been described by a former high official of
the American Communist Party in his testimony
before the Special Committee on Un-American
Activities, House of Representatives:
A front organization is organized by the
Communist Party in the following fashion:
First, a number of sympathizers who are close
to the party and whom the party knows can
be depended upon to carry out party orders,
are gotten together and formed into a nucleus
which issues a call for the organization of a
particular front organization which the party
wants to establish. And generally after that
is done a program is drawn up by the party,
which this provisional committee adopts.
Then, on the basis of this provisional pro-
gram, all kinds of individuals are canvassed
to become sponsors of the organization, which
is to be launched in the very near future. A
provisional secretary is appointed before the
organization is launched and in every instance
in our day the secretary who was appointed
was a member of the Communist Party . . .
And as president of the organization we would
put up some prominent public figure who was
willing to accept the presidency . . ., gen-
erally making sure that, if that public figure
was one who would not go along with the
Communists, he was of such a type that he
would be too busy to pay attention to the af-
fairs of the organization . . .
On the committee that would be drawn to-
gether, a sufficient number of Communists and
Communist Party sympathizers, who would
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carry out party orders, was included, and out
of this number a small executive committee
was organized . . . which carried on the af-
fairs of the organization, so-called, and this
small executive committee, with the secretary,
really ran the organization . . . when mani-
festos or decisions are made, those campaigns
are ordered by the Communist Party.
The purpose of all of these new organizations
is, of course, to produce new sources of political
power at the same time subtracting power from
established institutions. However, new effective
groupings may not be possible or desirable, so
that a third and particularly insidious method is
adopted, that of capturing established institutions,
completely or in part. While the framework and
facade are retained, the body and working mech-
anism are replaced or reoriented so that these or-
ganizations have new, though concealed, loyalties
and purposes and are no longer a normal part of
the constitutional order but instrumentalities pre-
pared for revolution. In connection with this
method two points should be noted: first, vital
nerve centers and key institutions are primary
targets so that controlling power may be achieved
with a minimum of mass support; and second,
within a target group the replacement of top lead-
ership is followed by a remolding of the entire
control system which will ensure uniformity of
opinion, complete conformity, and the greatest
possible favorable influence within the broad base
of the membership. Even if that favorable in-
fluence is not gained, the organizational mech-
anism will maintain control, so that here again
minimum support makes maximum power possi-
ble. For example, in a Communist-controlled
union, headquarters officials, organizers, and shop
stewards all become part of an integrated appara-
tus leaving the base membership with no formal-
ized, and frequently no effective, means of expres-
sion. The total impact of this organizational
method was vividly and startlingly demonstrated
in the case of Czechoslovakia where the Commu-
nists seized power in February 1948. As noted in
The Organizational Weapon:
It was not an insurrection, involving at-
tacks upon a ruling group, but a seizure of
total power by those who already held domi-
nant influence in the government. It was a
revolution nonetheless, for it resulted in a
fundamental shift in the locus of sovereignty
269196-54-25
from constitutionally restrained parliamen-
tarism to a totalitarian state. What was
overturned in Prague was an institutional
system, not a regime.
Striving to seize the power potential of any
attractive formalized group enterprise, the Com-
munists take advantage of inherent weaknesses
which can be readily manipulated to their own
purposes. Within any organization a small in-
formal group with special cohesive interests can
become a dominating force. Once an official posi-
tion has been captured, it can be used to influence
decisions and to direct the distribution of internal
and external power. Through the informal
group and the official position, steps can be taken
to reorganize the formal group, ostensibly to per-
mit greater internal efficiency or better coopera-
tion with external groups, but actually to consoli-
date the influence and controls of the informal
group. In many, if not most organizations, the
membership is loosely joined together and mobil-
ized for concentrated action only on special occa-
sions and for particular short-term reasons or
goals. The ability of the informal group to inte-
grate the membership closely and continuously
activate it provides a new source of power which
can be directed in many ways. Most organiza-
tions also have limited objectives within their par-
ticular fields of interest. However, once internal
strength is concentrated, the limited objectives
can be expanded as desired. It is apparent that
ideology becomes an important means for inte-
grating mass membership and in developing or-
ganizational power.
In selecting an established institution for cap-
ture, the Communists consider most carefully its
relative importance in the social structure, the
breadth of its base, the composition of its member-
ship, its acceptability within the community, and
the potential of its power. Their ingenuity of
analysis leads them into unexpected areas and
their systematic procedures accomplish amazing
results. Infiltration and penetration are followed
by mass political education or indoctrination.
Emphasis is placed on the importance of organ-
ized and combined positive action, an aggressive
hatred against so-called "evil forces" such as
capitalism, intense loyalty, and continuous self-
sacrifice. The membership must acquire a sense
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of mission and dedication, their lives must be cen-
tered around the group, and they must be per-
sonally committed to the principle of mutual
support.
There are many types of institutions selected
for Communist capture. Typical are the youth
groups which have been primary targets all over
the world because they are often effective breeding
grounds for social strife and unrest and for the
recruitment of new communist members. Many
of the leaders in the American Communist Party
began their work in their youth and it has been
estimated by the FBI that the average age at
which men and women join the party or its youth
branch is 22.2 years, with ages ranging from 14
to 35. The approach to young people at the begin-
ning is often indirect and may be only a matter of
parties, dances, and socials; once recruited, how-
ever, the individual becomes a virtual prisoner.
Of interest is the fact that many of these youthful
recruits have a high native intelligence and much
natural ability.
In addition to labor unions which have already
been mentioned, minority groups are excellent
areas for Communist exploitation. Differences
in language or race, suspicions, and misunder-
standings are magnified into open discontent and
disaffection which are subverted as sources of
power. For example, the Communists have en-
deavored to appear as champions of the American
Negro, promising much, and concealing their true
objectives under high-sounding words. In addi-
tion, they have attempted to undermine worthy
negro organizations. Refugee groups, often dis-
contented, have similar potentialities. The
Armed Forces and principal veterans' organiza-
tions are composite social groups of great impor-
tance. According to the FBI, Communist policy
in respect to the Armed Forces in the postwar
period has been to discourage the enlistment of
non-Communist youths; for party members to
create confusion and dissension if drafted; for
members not subject to draft to obtain work in
defense plants in order to promote dissension.
The overall purpose is to reduce the effectiveness
of the Armed Forces. In the case of the veterans,
some of their objectives have been espoused by the
Communists in an effort to win support. The
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378
control of civil police is a means of preventing
action against subversive enterprise.
For their purposes the Communists do not find
it essential to establish complete control over all
organizations, for in order to influence policy deci-
sions infiltration is often sufficient. The organi-
zational method, therefore, includes gaining access
to non-Communist groups in order to guide un-
suspecting loyal citizens into supporting policies
of the party. All types of groups, from women's
clubs to government agencies, are potential targets.
Peace petitions support the Communist world
strategy, and even the control of routine decisions
at lower levels in government can have important
cumulative results.
Leadership
It is a fundamental Communist principle that
the durability of a movement depends upon stable
leadership to insure continuity. An elite group
of directors, called the vanguard, is therefore es-
sential to maneuver the masses into the desired
position. The entire party structure is based on
strict administrative accountability and a clear-
cut chain of command. The highest loyalty and.
obedience are demanded from every party member
and those who deviate are summarily subjected to
harsh treatment.
The development of adamant leaders begins
with a psychological process of re-shaping person-
ality, which from the point of view of American
values includes the destruction of all independence
of judgment and the erasing of environmental and
educational influences. Then follows a gradual
remolding into the professional revolutionist, a
person who is totally and pitifully dependent on
the party, completely obedient to instructions,
zealously fanatic, and merciless to those who falter
or fail. This complete transformation of the
inner man is subversion of the most heartless type.
According to Nathaniel Weyl, a number of clan-
destine party schools have this as their mission,
with students carefully selected for their qualities
of intelligence, loyalty, and demonstrated courage.
Closely guarded, these students take assumed
names and are not permitted to leave the school
or to communicate with anyone outside its walls
during their training period of from 6 to 10 weeks.
The new leader emerges in the mold of the party,
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warped by revolutionary desires, filled with hate
for any society which opposes the goals he had
been taught to attain, and ignorant of all values
which give life meaning for normal people. In-
tolerant of any differences of opinion, he will fight
by the foulest means to attain his objectives; com-
munism is the only truth he knows.
Propaganda
Although the training of active or potential
party members is not intended to be as complete or
intensive as that of party leaders, they too must
be properly oriented and indoctrinated. This is
accomplished largely by propaganda, which from
the Communist point of view is indoctrination
through the dissemination of ideas to small groups
of society. Books, pamphlets, magazines, news-
papers, bulletins, letters and postcards, lectures,
movies, radio broadcasts and various kinds of
group entertainment are effective media for pre-
senting doctrine and spreading rumors.
The insidiousness of propaganda for subversion
makes it extremely difficult to identify and evalu-
ate; its specific purposes may be completely con-
cealed at the outset. Seldom will it encourage
open revolt, but will have an emotional rather than
an intellectual appeal aimed at lowering morale
and stimulating discontent. Sometimes it will
be directed solely toward effecting certain organi-
zational changes so that, of itself, it has no ap-
parent propaganda characteristics. Failure to
recognize this type of propaganda obviously leads
to errors in correctly evaluating Communist ac-
tivity. In many respects, Communist propaganda
in America appears to have concentrated on mid-
dle class groups because their vulnerability tends
to be more psychological than organizational.
Since the organizations of the middle class are
more diverse and less centralized than those of the
laboring class, organizational subversion methods
cannot have as great a power impact; the middle
class, however, is often more receptive to ideologi-
cal exploitation.
Louis Budenz in his revealing book, Men,With-
out Faces, emphasizes the effectiveness of Com-
munist propaganda in molding American thought,
and comments "we are likely to forget that it is
the Communists' hidden influence on American
opinion that has been most devastating." He
points out that one purpose of this attack on men's
minds has been to convince Americans that the
Soviet fifth column does not really exist and that
revelations of Soviet espionage activity are nothing
but the result of hysteria. He adds that the Com-
munists "have done a fairly adequate job of mak-
ing America ashamed of defending its own free-
doms." The lengthy trial of the 12 Communist
Party leaders in 1949-50 afforded an opportunity
to attack American courts in the person of Judge
Harold R. Medina who was compared to Hitler,
accused of pro-Fascist tendencies and prejudices,
described as a wealthy corporation lawyer, and
labelled as a discriminator against Jews and
Negroes. The purpose of this vicious campaign
may have been to implant the heinous suggestion
that the American legal system is no more than a
sham and a mere pretence of real justice for all.
In The Red Decade, Eugene Lyons sums up one
pattern of Communist propaganda activities in his
discussion of the American League for Peace and
Democracy:
In eight years of existence under changing
names this League probably reached more
Americans with its propaganda than any other
foreign agency in the whole history of our
country. By a generous definition of the "de-
mocracy" it ostensibly defended, the organi-
zation worked busily with all other Commu-
nist stooge groups. This process of mutual
help expanded the clamor and impressiveness
of the incredible revolution immensely?a sort
of multiple-mirror trick. The League pub-
lished a monthly magazine, distributed mil-
lions of pieces of literature, staged scores of
parades and mass meetings, lobbied for legis-
lation, sent its speakers into hundreds of
clubs and churches, promoted plays and mo-
tion pictures in line with its policies, and de-
veloped hundreds of contact points in our
Federal and local government.
A further pattern of Communist activity is a
vigorous counterpropaganda effort designed to
nullify or reduce the effects of informational and
educational programs conducted by legally con-
stituted American groups. Smear campaigns, as
well as infiltrated organizations or front groups
which protest and decry governmental and pri-
vate information programs, are commonly used.
Of particular interest is the fact that the Com-
munists not only employ propaganda for the pur-
poses of furthering their ideological program, but
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also attempt to maximize the possibilities of its
favorable results by gaining some control of the
group at which it is directed. In this manner, its
acceptance may be facilitated. This strategy in-
dicates the very close relationships of the organi-
zational and propaganda methods of subversion.
Agitation
Certain variations in the propaganda method
of subversion as applied to different social groups
justify the identification of a third method, namely
agitation. In fact Lenin made such a distinction,
considering propaganda as an output of many
ideas to small groups and agitation as the broad-
casting of a few ideas, or only one, to a mass of
people. This distinction coincides with that made
between the vanguard which is to be pursuaded
and the masses which are to be led.
Agitation has more of an action connotation
than does propaganda in that its appeal to large
groups is in the nature of an immediate solution
of current problems and the active improvement
of unfavorable situations which may have been
magnified into impending crises. One objective
of Communist agitation is the fomenting of strikes
and disorder. Before going further, however, it
should be pointed out that there is grave difficulty
in distinguishing between strikes which are Com-
munist-inspired and those which arise out of the
orderly legal processes followed by responsible
labor unions. To brand every labor strike as
Communist-led is as dangerous to the welfare of
the democratic state as to scoff at the possibilities
that they are communist inspired. It is for this
reason, among others, that the Communists find
the area of labor relations such a fertile field for
activity, and concentrate so much energy on strike
tactics. Whether or not a strike results in specific
benefits to the workers means little or nothing to
the Communist leaders. Of far greater impor-
tance is the opportunity provided to test Com-
munist strength and control over the groups
concerned, to determine the weaknesses of their
opposition, to channel the loyalties of the strikers
toward communist leadership, and to give them
experience and training in mass action. Mass
picketing which will include all the workers, their
wives, children, and sympathizers is especially
sought as a method of magnifying the impact of
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380
a strike. The Communists' own strike objective,
of course, is to solidify their controls and create a
total political power that can be decisive in the
larger struggle. They obtain a unique advantage
whenever they can force the legally constituted
government into the position of being a strike-
breaker. Lenin has described the ultimate use of
the mass strike in words of significant import:
Prior to January . . . 1905, the revolution-
ary party of Russia consisted of a small hand-
ful of people, and the reformists of those days
. . . derisively called us a "sect" . . . Within
a few months, however, the picture completely
changed. The hundreds of revolutionary So-
cial-Democrats "suddenly" grew into thou-
sands; the thousands became leaders of
between two and three million proletarians
. . . The principal means by which this trans-
formation was brought about was the mass
strike. The peculiar feature of the Russian
revolution is that in its social content it was a
bourgeois-democratic revolution, but in its
methods of struggle it was a proletarian revo-
lution. It was a bourgeois-democratic revo-
lution since the aim toward which it strove
directly and which it could reach directly with
the aid of its own forces was a democratic
republic, an eight-hour day and the confisca-
tion of the immense estates of nobility . . .
At the same time the Russian revolution was
also a proletarian revolution, not only in the
sense that the proletariat was the leading
force, the vanguard of the movement, but also
in the sense that the specifically proletarian
means of struggle?namely the strike?was
the principal instrument employed for rous-
ing the masses and the most characteristic
phenomenon in the wave-like rise of decisive
events.
COUNTERESPIONAGE
A highly specialized activity to be undertaken
only by trained and skilled personnel, counter-
espionage is directed against enemy spies and
secret agents in order to forestall, neutralize, or
confuse their activities. Since a primary purpose
is to apprehend spies and agents before they have
accomplished their mission, counterespionage
must establish an advance warning system, block
access to potential targets, and render ineffective
all efforts to locate, collect, and communicate in-
formation. Counterespionage activity takes place
both in the United States and abroad; its intensity
is proportionate to the tensions of the existing
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international situation. In time of peace particu-
lar problems are involved in applying its tech-
niques in such a way that they will not unjustifiably
restrain the rights and freedom of the individual
citizen.
The disclosure of foreign espionage services is a
most difficult and exacting assignment, first, be-
cause customary police procedures and routine
criminal detection methods are inappropriate and
generally futile, and second, because spies and
agents usually are persons with outstanding native
abilities, unusual talents, and intensive training.
Intensive study of known past activities must be
made in an effort to determine any possible weak-
nesses. Most of the spies mentioned in chapter II
were apprehended by skillful exploitation of their
weaknesses. Undoubtedly, there have been many
more who escaped detection, so it is much wiser to
overestimate rather than underestimate the abili-
ties of agents and spies and the extent of their
activities. Prior to World War I the Germans
were particularly effective in counterespionage,
apprehending 411 spies as compared to the 20
caught by the British and some 40 by the French.
Personnel Attributes
Spies and agents must be opposed by counter-
espionage personnel who likewise possess special
attributes. In his intriguing book, Spy-Catcher,
Oreste Pinto, a former counterintelligence officer
attached to Allied forces in Europe during World
War II, prescribes 10 qualities, of which only the
last 3 can be acquired by study and training. The
first is an ex,ceptional memory, not only the ability
to remember events, faces, and places for indefinite
periods of time, but also the capacity to interview
and interrogate without written notes. Infinite
patience and attention to detail may be the most
important factors in the eventual apprehension
of an agent whose cover story is air-tight except
for one trivial fact. A facile gift for languages
can be helpful in a variety of situations, from
conversing with suspects to determine their true
place of origin and to sense overtones or implica-
tions in their remarks to checking thoroughly on
letters, documents, or any written matter in their
belongings or on their person. An agent, for
example, may pose as a Spanish exporter when
881
actually he is a Pole with an excellent knowledge
of Spanish.
A working knowledge of practical psychology is
indispensable in selecting the proper approach to
different types of people, and in stimulating in-
voluntary actions on their part to prearranged
situations. The counterespionage operator must
possess courage of a high moral order, which in-
cludes an unwavering belief in the fundamental
rightness of his cause. He must be a born actor
capable of maintaining the most rigid controls
over his emotions and sentiments. This quality
is associated with knowledge of practical psychol-
ogy in that it comes into action after the counter-
espionage operator has assessed his opponent or
suspect and determined the particular approach
he will make. Successful acting also requires the
quality of patience, because a part may have to be
played for days on end and impatience or bore-
dom will betray it. Skill in the mechanics of dis-
guise must be matched by lifelike consistency in
its portrayal.
It is evident that thus far the qualities of the
counterespionage operator match those of the
espionage agent, which gives pertinency to the
saying "it takes a spy to catch a spy." There is
a difference, however; the counterspy must possess
these qualities to a higher degree and, in addition,
the mental capacity to outwit his opponent. This
involves a sense of logic which is associated with
a gift of detection. The explanations of innocent
suspects are usually more confused, incoherent,
and illogical than those of actual agents, and an
innocent man may occasionally have much more
difficulty in accounting for his presence at a par-
ticular time and place than the agent whose cover
story has been carefully prepared. For this rea-
son, counterespionage personnel must be able to
analyze available evidence logically, testing each
item, understanding the relationships of cause and
effect and distinguishing clearly between the true
and the false. Something of a sixth sense is neces-
sary to stimulate a further search for an obscure
hidden bit of information which may provide the
only clue. An unexplainable sense of impending
danger may also come from this mental attribute.
These inborn qualities can be fortified and
strengthened by others that are acquired, the first
of which, related to the capacity for detection, is
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practical knowledge of the techniques of espionage.
In the course of its long and tortuous history,
espionage has developed and made common use
of a variety of techniques, including methods of
secret writing and of communicating information.
In addition, some intelligence services, having
adopted particular methods, continue to use them
as a matter of routine and with little imagination,
one notable example being the Germans who
seemed incapable of change even after their meth-
ods had been discovered. During World War II,
they made use of microcameras resembling pocket
fountain pens to photograph documents and pro-
duce negatives which could be transmitted under
a postage stamp. Even after this clever device
was discovered, the Germans continued to use it
for mail whose addresses were suspect. Knowl-
edge of various techniques, therefore, can be of
tremendous assistance in unmasking espionage
agents. A precise knowledge of geography, with
an emphasis on cities and towns, serves as a means
of substantiating or refuting cover stories and of
facilitating movement in particular areas of ac-
tivity. To be of the greatest value, this knowledge
must be specific, as to streets, important buildings,
restaurants, hotels, and peculiar local characteris-
tics. Finally, a usable knowledge of international
law is helpful in securing certain individual rights
and privileges and in knowing when these rights
are improperly claimed.
Apprehension of Espionage Agents
Three ways to prevent agents and spies from
accomplishing their mission are: (1) to apprehend
them at the point of entry into the target country,
combat zone, or specific area of interest; (2) to
disclose their particular cover or disguise; and (3)
to intercept their communications. The last is
the most critical stage of their activities.
While security controls will be considered more
fully in a later section, it is appropriate here to
mention that in peacetime the United States is
protected against illegal entry by the Border Pa-
trol, Customs and Immigration authorities, and
other civilian law enforcement agencies. Because
of our extensive coastline, however, complete
border control is impracticable. The Soviet
Union, on the other hand, maintains a much more
elaborate system which includes extensive border
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382
patrols, barbed wire, electrified fences, and
cleared, plowed strips of land. In a combat area
during wartime, or in a military zone, additional
travel controls are enforced, such as travel per-
mits, check points, both stationary and moving,
curfew hours, and questioning of civilians. Other
controls in a military zone are provided by defin-
ing restricted areas to divert civilian traffic, pub-
lishing lists of occupations available only to cer-
tain individuals, and supervising civilian labor
groups by military personnel. In wartime, the
control of civilian signal communications and
postal service is often productive.
For a number of reasons, the detection of an
enemy agent should not always be followed imme-
diately by taking him into custody. In the first
place, he will quite probably be replaced by an-
other agent whose identity is not known; or
already detected by another intelligence agency,
he may be under its surveillance or being supplied
with false information. By leaving him at large
under constant surveillance it may be possible to
locate his associates and superiors, to determine
the true nature of his mission, which will reveal
the type of information required by an enemy,
and to discover his methods of communication.
He may also become a means for undermining the
enemy espionage system. Even if the enemy
quickly realizes that he is supplying them with
false information, it will lead to distrust of other
agents because of the same possibility in their case,
thus creating general uncertainty.
Techniques and Procedures
Advance warning of attempts at espionage can
be gained in a number of ways. One approach is
to select probable targets of a foreign intelligence
service and to determine points of greatest vulner-
ability. At these targets covert agents can be
placed and/or a friendly informant network can
be organized; in the case of the latter, it should be
extended to include likely cover firms and enter-
prises as well as places of possible communications.
In areas where espionage activities are suspected,
curtailment of the customary channels of informa-
tion may force the enemy agent to take greater
risks, thus increasing possibilities of detection.
Planned leakage of the location of sources of sup-
posedly classified information may have similar
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results. The surveillance of suspects, identifica-
tion requirements, traffic controls, and checks on
communications methods, including signalling,
may be productive. The penetration of foreign
intelligence services is, of course, an ultimate in
providing advance warning and positive clues to
covert activities.
The disclosure of an enemy agent's cover can be
a long, painstaking, and sometimes frustrating
process. In addition to stringent security controls,
appropriate techniques may include investigation
and interrogation, name checks, and question-
naires. A. sense of discrimination must be devel-
oped in order to avoid wasting time on investiga-
tions of amateur or unimportant agents. Foreign
intelligence services often flood a target country
with large numbers of relatively ainateur agents
in an attempt to overburden its counterespionage
service and to divert attention from the profes-
sional, specialist agents. Routine background in-
vestigations and the screening of refugees and
displaced persons must be conscientiously handled.
A close inspection of bank accounts, financial
transactions, and credit company records is often
productive, and, while excellent cover methods
have been perfected, as long as agents are paid or
receive funds for their operations some traces can
usually be found. Prompt reporting of all infor-
mation and evidence is essential to successful
investigation.
In interrogating espionage agents, it should be
remembered that they are consummate actors, of
whom it is dangerous to form snap judgments on
first encounter. Articles found on the suspect's
person or in his quarters often provide the basis
for initial interrogation leading to disclosure.
While lists of contacts are undoubtedly committed
to memory, there is always the possibility that the
agent will have in his possession an address on a
scrap of paper, photographic equipment of some
type, some means of secret writing, or radio or
electronic equipment. The case of Alphons
Eugene Timmermans during World War II is
illustrative. A young Belgian merchant seaman,
he had reached England by devious means and
won the confidence of the Belgian government-in-
exile with a most convincing cover story. As a
result, he obtained and transmitted information to
the Nazis regarding American troop movements
383
and locations of British ammunition dumps, air-
fields, and naval installations, among other items
of interest. Eventual search of his person led to
the discovery in his wallet of an envelope contain-
ing pyramidon powder, some orange sticks nor-
mally used in manicuring fingernails, and a piece
of cotton?all essential for invisible writing. At
his apartment was found a transportable radio
which could be strapped around the waist as a
belt.
Interception of an agent's communications may
be achieved by monitoring the air waves for sig-
nals from wireless transmitters, mail inspection,
checks on telephones and the telegraph, surveil-
lance of possible couriers such as merchant seamen,
raids and searches of suspected areas, and censor-
ship. Many of these methods are, of course, lim-
ited to times of war.
The specific techniques of counterespionage, just
as those of espionage, are closely guarded secrets.
It is obvious that economy in this aspect of counter-
intelligence can be dangerous, if not fatal, consid-
ering the potential damage a single enemy agent
can do and the relatively small additional effort
and cost which might have defeated him.
COUNTERSABOTAGE
Initially at least the activities of counterespio-
nage and countersabotage are similar, if not iden-
tical. The mission of the enemy agent may be the
collection of information or the physical destruc-
tion of particular targets or both; and most fre-
quently the collection of some information is
necessarily preliminary to an act of sabotage. The
trained saboteur, like the espionage agent, must
gain entry to his target country and/or to a specific
area for operations; he will employ suitable cover
and disguise; and he has the responsibility of
reporting back to his "home office" the results of
his efforts. In the case of sabotage, however, the
critical point is access to the specific target. While
counterespionage, to all practical purposes, oper-
ates to gain advance warning of proposed sabotage,
to prevent the obtaining of information for sab-
otage activities, and to discover potential sabo-
teurs, countersabotage takes over those activities
designed to impede or prevent the act, to reduce
its total effectiveness, and through study, to
strengthen preventive and security measures.
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While acts of sabotage usually take place only
in time of war or immediately prior to an out-
break of hostilities, their planning and prepara-
tion are undoubtedly begun in time of peace. In
previous wars, the United States, fortunately, has
been relatively free of any widespread sabotage
problems; however, in the event of any future war,
it is logical to assume that aggressive sabotage will
be attempted on a broad scale in view of the ulti-
mate decisive effects of American industrial pro-
duction. Countersabotage, therefore, has assumed
a greater significance than ever before, and it be-
hooves the intelligence officer to be thoroughly
familiar with its problems and procedures.
A first step in approaching the problem of sab-
otage is to determine the most likely and most
vulnerable targets, such as transportation systems,
industrial plants, and military installations. A
second step is to select, by process of elimination,
the points within particular installations or facili-
ties which are most vulnerable to sabotage. For
example, in an industrial plant, its source of elec-
trical power and its assembly lines could be pri-
mary, ultimate targets; however, if they are well
protected and relatively inaccessible, the most vul-
nerable secondary target, called the immediate
target, might be the power lines from their source.
The destruction of these lines might well neutral-
ize the primary target, even though it is inaccessi-
ble. A third step is to survey the potential target
area to insure that the necessary physical security
measures have been established and are being
maintained. Careful attention must be given to
eliminating any natural hazards which may be
present, such as those arising from the improper
stowage of combustibles, chemicals, and explosives,
defective mechanical equipment, and poor sanitary
conditions, in short, general plant protection.
The prevention of sabotage requires security
controls over information, communications, per-
sonnel, critical materials, and potential saboteurs
operating from within or without. General se-
curity controls over information will be discussed
in a later section. Since the techniques for de-
tecting and apprehending saboteurs and espionage
agents are similarf emphasis in this section will
be on physical security measures, the application
of counterintelligence techniques to cases of
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sabotage, and procedures to limit damage from
sabotage.
Physical Security Controls and Measures
The most common preventive measures for
physical security are physical equipment, guards,
identification systems, and the establishment of
restricted areas. Physical equipment includes
fencing, barbed wire, walls, alarm systems, special
electronic devices, and other mechanical means.
Protective screening should be placed over all
vulnerable windows, ventilators, drains, or other
small openings; and appropriate barriers should
be constructed to prevent access from adjacent
buildings, overpasses, and similarly located struc-
tures. Entrances should be kept at a minimum
and locked or guarded at all times. Within a
target area special protection should be given to
machines and equipment vital to total operation
and difficult to replace, such as switch boards, pre-
cision tools, transformers, regulator stations, and
power terminals. Exterior lighting systems
should be so designed that movement of personnel
can be readily observed.
In studying problems of physical security and
the use of preventive equipment, it should be
remembered that certain factors favor the accom-
plishment of sabotage. No unprotected fence or
barrier will completely prohibit entry to an area.
Under cover of darkness, a saboteur who is thor-
oughly familiar with his target area can move
with ease, unseen and unheard, to within reach
of almost any guard. Finally, with the inde-
pendent choice of time and place, the saboteur has
a great advantage in the element of surprise. On
the other hand, he can be impeded, if not stopped,
by such factors as adequate lighting, delays cre-
ated by physical barriers, noise inadvertently
made by him, and his own errors arising out of
the emotional excitement of the moment.
Guards are a supplement to physical equipment
and the means of enforcing general security meas-
ures. They should be well-trained, efficient, vig-
orous, well-informed, and self-reliant. Patrols
at irregular intervals, close attention to most vul-
nerable points, and alert checking on any dis-
turbances within assigned areas of responsibility
are matters of efficient organization and training.
Guards should not permit themselves to be drawn
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away from their own areas or posts by commotion
at another, and under no circumstances are in-
dividuals without proper credentials to be ad-
mitted. Materials in transit and receiving and
shipping platforms must be continually guarded.
The establishment of special restrictions for vital
areas within an installation strengthens security
controls for such vulnerable targets as power
plants, experimental laboratories, transformer
rooms, and arms and ammunition storage. Ade-
quate fire protection, including both equipment
and trained personnel, is essential to physical
security.
Particularly in time of war, concealment and
camouflage are helpful measures. In some in-
stances, vital installations are constructed under-
ground to minimize the possibilities of detection;
in others, camouflage is used to make important
targets look like something else, or nothing at all.
Various illusions are created by means of nets,
paint, and the planting of trees and bushes on
roofs of buildings.
Techniques and Procedures
Countersabotage personnel, like all others en-
gaged in the intelligence activity, make use of com-
prehensive files regarding incidents of sabotage,
including the types of targets attacked, the equip-
ment and materials used, the methods of attack,
and the particular individuals apprehended.
These files can be supplemented by information
from fire reports of insurance companies, fire de-
partments, underwriters' laboratories, and special
police department files. One of the first items of
interest is to determine whether or not the sabotage
act is an isolated case, perpetrated by the independ-
ent saboteur, or part of an organized effort directed
from foreign sources. Spot reports submitted to
intelligence headquarters are of material assist-
ance for evaluative purposes, and up-to-date files
can provide important and significant clues.
Informants among civilian and military per-
sonnel and friendly associations with plant super-
visors and security guards can do much to
strengthen all security measures. In apprehend-
ing saboteurs common use is made of interrogation
and investigation.
The investigation of sabotage will often uncover
the motive behind it. For example, a fire in a
269196-54----28
385
blueprint room may be designed to tie up produc-
tion or to conceal the theft of certain prints. If
the prints concern new aircraft design and pro-
duction, the motive assumes greater meaning.
Although the methods and the means are often
readily determined, the detection of the individual
is much more difficult. There is a close relation-
ship between the degree of efficiency of the secu-
rity measures in force at the time and the facility
with which an investigation can be made. In
conducting an investigation of sabotage, a common
procedure is to pursue answers to the questions,
What? When? How? Where? Why? and Who?
While each method of sabotage requires some
specialized knowledge on the part of the investi-
gator, there are certain general procedures appli-
cable to each. In order to establish a case of
incendiary sabotage, it is necessary to know: first,
the exact point of origin of the fire; second, the
exact time the fire started; and third, the criminal
intent to destroy. Arrival, if possible, at the scene
while the fire is still burning will permit observa-
tion of its extent, its intensity, characteristics of
smoke, and other features which may establish
point of origin and the possible use of accelerants.
Maliciously damaged fire equipment and alarm
systems, propped open door and windows, the out-
break of fire simultaneously at several points,
odors, weather conditions, and individuals at the
scene may provide clues. The pyromaniac, for
example, will often remain in the immediate area
as a matter of personal satisfaction and evidence
varying degrees of emotional excitement. How-
ever, the detection of the perpetrator and the iden-
tification of the case as arson or sabotage may take
a considerable period of time; it is seldom that the
saboteur is caught on the spot.
In the event of explosive sabotage, two primary
considerations are the preservation of evidence
and the protection of life and equipment from
further immediate damage. If a suspected bomb
has been reported, or even if it has exploded, the
area should be cleared of all personnel to eliminate
damage from further possible explosions. In
addition, all endangered utilities should be cut
off, portable equipment should be moved, and
guards posted around the area to prevent access
by unwary persons and to deny exit to undetected
and possibly suspect personnel. If an explosion
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has occurred, an examination of the area should
begin at the center of the explosion and move
outward in enlarging circles in an effort to locate
fragments or traces of devices which might have
been used, such as pieces of pipe, portions of tin
cans, wrappings of cloth, electricians' tape, rope,
wire, fragments of burned fuse, pieces of detona-
tors, batteries, or clock mechanism. Evidence of
the type of explosive used may be drawn from the
condition of objects at the scene, which in turn
may establish the saboteur's source of supply.
The placement of the explosive may indicate the
experience of the saboteur as well as the materials
and methods used. For these investigations the
services of an experienced demolitions or explo-
sives expert is e8sential, especially if an unex-
ploded bomb is involved.
Technical assistance is also required in any in-
vestigation of mechanical sabotage because the
tools used are usually common to the target area,
there may be little physical evidence which can
be studied, and the effects of its repetition on
production over varying periods of time may not
be readily apparent. Ascertaining the intent of
a suspect may be most difficult if the damage is a
result of mere failure to perform certain necessary
duties.
The fact that damage and destruction may be
caused by the independent saboteur who has no
connection with a foreign service poses extremely
difficult problems since such acts will be disorgan-
ized and unrelated. However, as a general rule,
this type of sabotage is less effective and less dan-
gerous to national security than that which is
conducted by organized, large scale operating
groups. Certain weaknesses of such groups com-
bine to assist countersabotage personnel in their
work and should be considered as important
guides in tracking down saboteurs. Their opera-
tional program, for example, tends to fall into
definite patterns. Previous success with partic-
ular methods will usually result in their repetition
and reduces any initiative to utilize new methods.
As in the case of espionage agents, communica-
tions between sabotage groups and their superiors
are a continuing source of weakness, saboteurs may
become double agents for personal motives, and
accidental exposure may result from personal
indiscretions.
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Reduction of Sabotage and Its Effects
From the countersabotage point of view the
apprehension and conviction of one saboteur is
less important than the discovery and destruction
of the organization of which he is a part. Since
a study of sabotage incidents usually reveals weak-
nesses in security controls, an important objective
is the strengthening of those controls and the de-
velopment of new countermeasures to prevent the
repetition of similar incidents. Those engaged
in countersabotage activities should ask themselves
these questions: At what point would a single act
of sabotage most seriously affect the operations
of this installation? If I had the mission, as a
saboteur, to knock out this area what would I con-
sider to be the points of greatest vulnerability?
The explicit answers to these questions will go far
toward the reduction of acts of sabotage and their
total effectiveness.
C:OUNTERSUBVERSION
Difficult as are the problems of countering espi-
onage and sabotage, they can be related to specific
areas of information or to physical targets both
of which are tangible and capable of identification
and protection. In countering subversion, how-
ever, Intellige ace is dealing with the intangible
attempts to capture and manipulate men's minds,
and there may be no obvious critical point at which
subversion becomes a clear and present danger.
Countersubversion, therefore, becomes a study of
symptoms of subversive thought and action and a
development of aggressive countermeasures on a
broad front which must be prosecuted by many
social, military, and political agencies whose activ-
ities are not always closely coordinated. The suc-
cessful application of countermeasures depends
in large part on the ability of countersubversion
personnel to identify accurately preliminary sub-
critical points such as the consolidation of Com-
munist power in various organizations, increasing
influence over leadership, the tempo and direction
of propaganda efforts, and the effectiveness of
agitation as demonstrated by strikes and coordi-
nated group attack on the constitutional order.
Any discussion of countersubversion must rec-
ognize at the outset the substantive nature of the
basic problem as well as the fact that its current
activities are in a period of definition and develop-
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COUNTERINTELLIGENCE uO
ment, as explained in the section on psychological
operations in the preceding chapter. Countersub-
version must begin with an analytical study of
Communist activities in every form, and particu-
larly of reputable disclosures of their aims and
methods of operation. A clear understanding of
the nature of Communist subversion is also essen-
tial to the development of appropriate counter-
measures which will accomplish their intended
purpose without becoming repressive and de-
structive of the institutions they are designed to
protect. This problem was clearly stated by
former President Truman in a message to the
Congress in August 1950:
We face today, as we have always faced in
time of international tension, the question of
how to keep our freedom secure against in-
ternal as well as external attack, without at
the same time unduly limiting individual
rights and liberties.
Mr. Truman continued by pointing out that the
best deterrent to subversion is:
A vigorous, functioning democracy which
succeeds in meeting the needs of its people.
A vigilant people, who exercise their demo-
cratic rights to keep their government active
in the interests of all, can defeat the efforts of
Communists to attain electoral power.
Measures to Counter Subversive Activity
Measures for countering purposes require: first,
an identification of specific aims and methods of
the subversive effort; and second, procedures aimed
directly at countering them. One double-edged
Communist objective is to become identified with
democratic idealism, liberal and reform groups,
and any dissident elements desiring change, and
thus to undermine, corrupt, confuse, and destroy
public confidence in the established constitutional
order. Once this procedure has been discovered
and localized, a series of related countermeasures
must be undertaken to expose this objective and
destroy it by means of full and accurate informa-
tion disseminated to the particular groups affected.
The general measure is a program of information
and education, implemented by other related spe-
cific measures. Truth has always been the surest
weapon in the long run to defeat secrecy, deceit,
and evasion, and the practices of communism can-
not withstand the clear view of public observation.
387
Indeed, it would appear that the staunchest sup-
porters of the philosophy of communism are those
who have never lived under its rigid political sys-
tem. This countermeasure of information and
education might well be implemented by exposure
of Communist double-talk, specifically Communist
connotations of democratic terminology to mean
something entirely different, and the positive iden-
tification of Communists within an infiltrated
group.
In employing their organizational method of
subversion, the Communists of necessity endeavor
to conceal their bid for power. A countering meas-
ure to this method is the identification and isola-
tion of the organizational targets involved, coupled
with a mobilization of anti-Communist groups
within it to expel the subversives. In the case of
Communist front organizations, means of iden-
tification were suggested by J. Edgar Hoover,
Director of the FBI, in his testimony before the
Committee on Un-American Activities in March
1947:
There are easy tests to establish the real
character of such organizations:
1. Does the group espouse the cause of
Americanism or the cause of Soviet
Russia?
2. Does the organization feature as speakers
at its meetings known Communists, sym-
pathizers, or fellow travelers?
3. Does the organization shift when the
party line shifts?
4. Does the organization sponsor causes,
campaigns, literature, petitions, or other
activities sponsored by the party or other
front organizations?
5. Is the organization used as a sounding
board by or is it endorsed by Communist-
controlled labor unions?
6. Does the organization receive consistent
favorable mention in Communist publi-
cations?
7. Does its literature follow the Commu-
nist line or is it printed by the Commu-
nist press?
8. Does the organization present itself to be
nonpartisan yet engage in political ac-
tivities and consistently .advocate causes
favored by the Communists?
9. Does the organization denounce Ameri-
can and British foreign policy while al-
ways lauding Soviet policy?
10. Does the organization utilize Communist
"double talk" by referring to Soviet-
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dominated countries as democracies,
complaining that the United States is
imperialistic and constantly denouncing
monopoly capital?
11. Have outstanding leaders in public life
openly renounced affiliation with the or-
ganization?
12. Does the organization, if espousing lib-
eral progressive causes, attract well-
known honest patriotic liberals or does it
denounce well-known liberals?
13. Does the organization have a consistent
record of supporting the American view-
point over the years?
14. Does the organization consider matters
not directly related to its avowed pur-
poses and objectives?
Supplementary countering measures to further
isolate the target and to motivate appropriate in-
ternal forces will vary according to the nature of
the target itself, just as do the methods applied
by the Communists. Whatever the particular ap-
proach, on the basis of evidence gathered, the basic
loyalties of reliable members must be stimulated
into action to set their own house in order and to
administer their own countersubversion activities.
Depending upon the seriousness of the circum-
stances, they may find it necessary to resign, or
possibly to fight to regain control. The impor-
tance of an internal attack on subversive influences
cannot be overemphasized; countermeasures by
formal opposition external to the target may result
in strengthening rather than destroying the power
of the subversive elements.
Since an organization's leaders, whether at the
top or on lower echelons, are expected to maintain
the established order and to protect the status and
integrity of the associated membership, their ag-
gregate and individual influence is tremendous.
In commenting on Communist use of such influ-
ence, J. Edgar Hoover, in his article, How, To
Fight Communism, written for Newsweek in June
1947, said:
. . . in one union with nearly 100,000 mem-
bers, 500 party members were able to control
the union. Another union with 8,500 mem-
bers sought to free itself from Communist
control but failed despite the fact that there
were less than 200 party members in the union.
In one instance a single Communist by
clever manipulation at a union convention
was able to dictate resolutions adopted by
the convention.
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The radicalism or persistence of leadership will
sometimes give evidence of its subversive and in-
dicate the degree of crisis within the controlled
group. Where Communist trained leadership is
involved, the countermeasures of identification,
isolation, and in formation may assist in uncover-
ing its deception and deceit. Outright replace-
ment then becomes a countermeasure to be adopted
internally. In the case of group leaders who have
become sympathizers and collaborators, guidance
and reorientation may be a useful countermeasure.
Appropriate guidance must encourage a self-
clarification by these group leaders of their own
position and responsibilities and point out actual
Communist methods used to manipulate other
leaders for Communist objectives. Supplementary
countermeasures to strengthen leadership before
it has been attacked are important from a protec-
tive security point of view. In the modern war
of subversion there may well be a subtle competi-
tion for power through an unsuspecting leader-
ship; countersubversive measures must be aimed
toward winning that competition by encouraging
and strengthening leadership.
An intermediate subversive method of the Com-
munists is to infiltrate organizations, not for the
purposes of domination and control, but rather to
use non-Communist groups as the means for ac-
complishing either general or limited purposes
external to these groups. Success in this method
is achieved when Communist aims become iden-
tified and unified with those of non-Communists;
and the problem becomes one of collaboration.
Countermeasures for this subversive effort must
begin with a program of education and informa-
tion, but must be further refined and directed to-
ward the affected group, reorienting some and iso-
lating others. The primary effort, of course,
should be directed toward the collaborators rather
than the infiltrators.
According to Mr. Philip Selznick in his book,
The Organizational Weapon, an examination of
Communist strategy in subversive activities will
reveal that two sources of strengths are, first, the
historic credibility of Communist doctrines and
objectives, particularly when associated with the
growth of the Soviet Union, and second, the estab-
lished constitutional processes of democratic so-
ciety which protect and encourage the rights,
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privileges, and freedoms of the individual both
singly and in organized groups. The inevitable
imperfections of the democratic society are seized
upon by the Communists who offer in their place
glittering promises and happy easy solutions.
Therefore, above and beyond the successful coun-
tering of the specifics of Communist subversion
there must be a continuing conscientious effort to
find solutions to troublesome social issues of mod-
ern times. Such solutions can come from the active
consecrated devotion of a united, informed cit-
izenry to the American way of life. Drawing upon
their own moral and spiritual strength, Americans
can, in the words of J. Edgar Hoover, "make our
democracy so strong and so workable that the
Communists can never compete with its reality."
He goes on to say that this can be done without
any "abridgement of civil liberties."
This discussion of measures to countersubver-
sion is based in part on and considerably amplified
by a chapter entitled "Problems of Counter-
offense," in Philip Selznick's The Organizational
Weapon.
Techniques in Countersubversion
All of the techniques already mentioned have
utility in the field of countersubversion. From
the naval point of view the orderly processes of
analysis and recommendations for action are im-
measurably aided by means of comprehensive files,
special studies, and effective liaison with appro-
priate governmental agencies. Suspect and sum-
mary cards, topical cards, all carefully and
completely cross indexed, permit the accumulation
of information and ready reference to any item
of possible interest. Reference and background
material on organizations, groups, trends, and
situations which may have no immediate use often
provides important clues and gives fuller meaning
to later developments. Periodic and special
studies of subversive trends can give warning of
specific dangers and suggest the use of effective
techniques and measures. Liaison between the
various agencies engaging in countersubversion
activities is extremely valuable in assuring co-
ordination of effort and in pooling information of
common interest.
The intricate, diverse, and delicate problems of
subversion require a full arsenal of countering
389
CONFIDENTIAL
techniques. In considering these problems, to-
gether with those of espionage and sabotage and
the techniques and measures of countering them,
it is not inappropriate to suggest that a good coun-
terespionage operator must first be a good spy,
a good countersabotage agent must first be a good
saboteur, and good countersubversion personnel
must first be skilled in the arts of subversion.
GENERAL SECURITY CONTROL MEASURES
From the preceding discussion it has become
increasingly apparent that protective measures
and devices for classified information, vital equip-
ment, installations, and personnel are essential
aids for detecting, deterring, or preventing for-
eign-sponsored activities inimical to the best in-
terests of the United States. Such measures and
devices are called security control measures and
may be either physical or procedural. Physical
security control measures have already been enu-
merated; procedural measures include secrecy
discipline, document security, communications se-
curity, censorship, and personnel security pro-
grams. Just as physical measures are effective
only when backed up by alert, well-trained guards,
procedural measures are effective only when en-
forced by all personnel associated with the agencies
involved, whether military or civilian. There-
fore, while counterintelligence prepares recom-
mended procedures and specific groups are
assigned to direct their enforcement, the purposes
of security control measures and the consequences
of their failure must be completely understood by
all individuals concerned. This, of course, is a
matter of specific training and realistic education;
it is by no means a mere formality.
Secrecy Discipline is the training of individuals
to safeguard rigidly and consistently any and all
classified information or material known to them
or in their custody; it relates to the dissemination
of that information or material only to authorized
persons. The human hazard to security is uni-
versal and perhaps the greatest single vulner-
ability with which counterintelligence must con-
tend. The ignorance, conceit, pride, faith, and
enthusiasm of individuals become tools in the
hands of an enemy, for people are prone to talk
and those who are untrained may quite unwit-
tingly disclose valuable bits of information. Care-
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INTELLIGENCE FOR
less boasting arising out of conceit can become an
excellent source of information through which
almost any known facts can be gained by the
patient, encouraging listener. Ignorance either
of the potential value of specific information or of
the subtle methods employed by a skilled enemy
can be highly damaging; while faith and confi-
dence in family or friends have often resulted in
the ultimate transmission of vital facts. There-
fore, training must both identify and stress the
importance of classified information and those
who have need to talk about it must use the utmost
discretion. The human hazard necessitates strict
measures in the dissemination of classified infor-
mation: only those who require it should have full
knowledge; others should be given only limited
access to the extent needed in their work. The
basic problem is not one of loyalty so much as the
hazard inherent to any conversation.
As an aid to the recognition of important items
of information or material, appropriate classifica-
tion is assigned to each in the manner described in
chapter 11 and the procedural methods for han-
dling are indicated by the classification. This
measure is known as Document Security and
covers such items as correspondence, reports,
studies, blueprints, photographs, publications,
specialized equipment and other significant ma-
terials. The problem is the assignment of a clas-
sification which is appropriate to the items con-
cerned, and the greatest care must be exercised
to achieve the proper degree of classification.
Overclassification can become a danger and a haz-
ard in itself, weakening procedures for enforce-
ment as well as the respect of individuals who are
responsible. Those concerned with document se-
curity may find it helpful to ask themselves the
question, "Will this information or material be of
value to an enemy and how valuable may it be ?"
The importance of effective document security can
perhaps be more fully appreciated when it is
remembered that high value is placed on captured
enemy documents as a source of information.
Just as the transmission of information by an
espionage agent represents a point of critical
vulnerability for him, so likewise it is a vulner-
ability for any military or civilian agency. Signal
Communications Security, therefore, covering all
types of electrical transmission, is a vital control
CONFIDENTIAL
390
NAVAL OFFICERS
measure for the safeguarding of information by
means of codes and ciphers and the protection of
the cryptographic devices or systems employed in
connection with them. Increasing dependence on
radio to transmit information between far-flung
units and their headquarters has increased the pos-
sibilities of interception and hence the importance
of message security. The encoding of classified
messages has become customary, with a possible
exception in time of war when the urgency of the
information and the fact that an enemy would not
have time to act upon it permits transmission in
plain language.
Censorship, both civil and military, is normally
a wartime control measure applied to the trans-
mission of information or material by unofficial
means such as letters, photographs, packages,
news releases, cable, and radio. From past expe-
rience it has been found that personal correspond-
ence and diaries can be rich sources of information
to an enemy regarding such matters as the location
and strength of military units, troop, and ship
movements, morale, weather conditions, opera-
tional planning, and new weapons, equipment, and
procedures. From the point of view of military
censorship, unauthorized disclosures can be re-
duced if not eliminated by successful secrecy dis-
cipline and a clear understanding by all personnel
of the reasons why censorship is necessary. In this
way many innocent subterfuges to evade the regu-
lations can be forestalled and the workload light-
ened for those who must enforce them. Censor-
ship not only operates to deny classified informa-
tion to an enemy but also to collect information of
intelligence value and to detect illegal covert
enemy operations; therefore, as a source of new
information it is more than a protective and pre-
ventive measure of security. It is also a valuable
counterintelligence device for making spot checks
on suspect individuals and groups and it provides
a means for intercepting their communications
and examining them for secret inks or writings.
It follows, therefore, that censorship personnel
must be trained and. highly endowed with the qual-
ities of good judgment, discrimination, and
perspicacity.
Since the success of all security control meas-
ures, whether physical or procedural, is dependent
upon the people 'Involved, it follows that Personnel
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Secwrity control measures are basic and funda-
mental, for the best training and the most impene-
trable barriers will have little effect if disloyal,
indiscreet, or emotionally unstable persons hold
positions where vital material is available. Per-
sonnel security, therefore, must be a comprehensive
and pervasive measure applied with equal effec-
tiveness from the various levels of government,
through the military forces, to industry and its
related services, wherever classified information
and material are involved. This measure in-
cludes investigation of all individuals holding
sensitive positions or having access to vital infor-
mation and the issuance of official security clear-
ances, but it should be emphasized that counterin-
telligence is responsible only for the investigative
aspect. Official clearance is the responsibility of
the military commander or the head of the Gov-
ernment agency, as the case may be. In reaching
a decision for security clearance the responsible
authority must carefully weigh the security risks
inherent to the position, his own knowledge of the
applicant, and the facts presented by the investi-
gation. In addition to military personnel and
employees of various governmental agencies, clear-
ances are required for individuals employed by
contractors bidding for and carrying out military
and Government contracts which relate to classi-
fied material.
The magnitude of the task of agencies responsi-
ble for personnel security is indicated by a report
of the FBI published in 1952 that over 31/2 million
loyalty forms were completed in the 5-year period
following 1947 when the loyalty program of the
United States Government was undertaken. Dur-
ing the fiscal year 1951-52, the report continues,
more than 800,000 investigations into the loyalty
of Government job applicants or employees were
made. While decisions to issue clearances some-
times present difficult problems requiring the most
careful judgment, it may be accepted that they
will not be granted by a military commander to
individuals whose background investigations re-
veal certain unfavorable facts. Such facts would
include seditious or treasonable public statements,
association with foreign agents or acts related to
sabotage or espionage, affiliation or sympathetic
association with subversive organizations, a record
of security violations, an established history of
391
serious mental or emotional instability, or positive
indications of basic weaknesses of character or
substantial and continued lack of good judgment.
A successful personnel security program will in-
sure that loyal and discreet people have been em-
ployed to fill all positions related to or concerned
with classified material; on this basis the possi-
bilities for the success of other security control
measures will be tremendously increased.
THE INVESTIGATIVE FUNCTION
A general discussion of the important function
of investigation which relates to many types of
countermeasures involves consideration of the in-
vestigator and the techniques he may use or have
at his disposal. A number of the special personnel
attributes already mentioned are applicable of
course to the general investigator. Others of his
professional requirements are gained through re-
search, study, and practical experience. Apart
from specialized forms of interrogation such as
used in collecting information from prisoners of
war, most of the counterintelligence techniques
are related or subordinate to that of investigation.
The Investigator, His Sources, and Personal
Qualities
In their book, Specific Procedures for Investi-
gations in General, Frary and Sullivan summarize
the qualities of an investigator as follows:
. . . the foundation upon which a successful
career in investigation is based comprises com-
mon sense, good judgment, good health, aver-
age mentality, accurate observation, the
ability to factually report one's observations,
and the attribute of a well-developed fund
of general information. If the above are
present and coupled with the basic qualities
of any normal, good-living individual such
as honesty, sincerity, integrity, discretion,
etc., then the foundation for his training is
adequate.
He is neat and well groomed but not conspicuous,
blending into whatever group he joins. He is
pleasant, polite but not ingratiating, poised but
not overbearing. Placing a high value on his
reputation, he is discreet, avoids gossip, and care-
fully protects the identities of his confidential
sources. With supple skill, he adjusts his train
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and pace of thought to that of the person with
whom he is dealing, drawing out critical facts
with apparent casualness and sorting the signifi-
cant from the incidental as he goes. He makes
certain that he is properly equipped to carry out
his assignment, including possession of appropri-
ate credentials.
Before starting a case, the investigator makes a
thorough analysis of it and all pertinent material
already assembled; he plans his approach in order
that his time may be employed to maximum effec-
tiveness. Methodically building his case, he is
objective in his approach, follows wherever the
facts lead, and never tries to fit the facts into
preconceived conclusions. He keeps a careful
record of progress, aware that the use of a note-
book is his best assurance that all leads have been
covered, that it will serve to refresh his memory
if called upon as a witness at a trial, and that it
may prevent him from falling victim to an un-
scrupulous opponent. In successfully handling
his assignment, he is materially aided by his accu-
mulated knowledge, by his exploitation of po-
tential sources of information, by his practical
understanding of human behavior, and by his ca-
pacity for accurate observation and reporting.
The most easily accessible sources of informa-
tion on individuals, organizations, or incidents
under investigation are records and files which
provide original information as well as corrobora-
tion for or explanations of facts already known.
Public records are available at the local Bureau
of Vital Statistics, the Registry of Motor Vehicles,
the Selective Service headquarters, the Police and
Post Office Departments, public welfare and social
agencies, Registries of Deeds and of Probate, offices
of Clerks of Courts, the Veterans' Administration,
the United States Employment Service, and the
local offices of the Treasury Department: Customs,
Immigration, and Naturalization. Public librar-
ies are excellent sources for both general matters
and specific items of fact such as may be found in
business and city directories and statistical studies.
Records of private organizations may also be made
available on a confidential basis to representatives
of governmental agencies for official purposes.
Such records are those of banks, bonding com-
panies, credit investigation agencies, fraternal
CONFIDENTIAL
392
organizations, educational institutions, hotel asso-
ciations, labor unions, hospitals, manufacturing
and business enterprises, newspapers, telephone
and t elegr a p h offices, and transportation
companies.
People are also valuable sources of information
about subjects under investigation. In cases in-
volving persons, for example, there are those with
whom the individual has been associated: club
members, neighbors, employers, friends, each of
whom has formed impressions from a variety of
connections. The investigator will make a particu-
lar effort to cultivate and develop a wide range of
personal acquaintances who, on the basis of
f riendly cooperation, will be glad to furnish any
pertinent available information either voluntarily
or when asked. Such acquaintances, known as
contacts or informants, are likely to be most help-
ful and productive of important leads in a case.
It has been estimated that about 95 percent of all
crimes are solved by informants?someone who
saw something, heard something, or experienced
something he was able and willing to report. Such
persons are not necessarily in important positions;
rather they are 'Individuals who for one reason or
another have opportunities for observing signifi-
cant incidents in ordinary daily life. The news-
dealer and cigar-store proprietor on a busy down-
town intersection meet hundreds of passersby
daily, become acquainted with many of them, and,
during the regular course of business, are present
where happenings of potential interest may tran-
spire. The milkman and the postman in suburban
areas have excellent opportunities to observe the
daily lives of those in the communities they serve,
as do the filling station operator, the barber, the
hotel waiter, the bellboy, and the bus or trolley
operator. Secretaries for executives and clerical
supervisors can also be of invaluable assistance.
Recognizing the importance of people as sources
of information, the experienced investigator will
have a ready knack for making friends and a
genuine interest in people as individuals.
The full utilization of personal contacts or in-
formants, as well as the intelligent analysis of the
individual under investigation, logically requires
a practical understanding of psychology and hu-
man behavior Such understanding is useful in
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forming hypotheses to explain certain actions of
individuals, in interviewing contacts or interro-
gating suspects, and in drawing out information
from those who possess knowledge of certain facts.
Abnormal psychology is a subject of practical
study. According to Dr. Harry SOderman, one of
the authors of the authoritative text, Modern
Criminal Investigation:
Every good detective should have a general
knowledge of mental illnesses and constitu-
tional abnormalities of the mind. In the
course of his investigations he will often meet
persons whose actions and motives may seem
puzzling to him if he is not equipped with
some knowledge of psychiatry . . .
A knowledge of the signs and symptoms
tending to prove mental illnesses is, of course,
necessary. Familiarity with the personality
make-up of neurotic persons, of epileptics and
hysterics, should be of particular interest to
the interrogator, as these conditions often
affect suspects as well as witnesses.
An individual who is not insane in. the true
sense of the word, but who nevertheless shows
great divergence in character and emotional
reactions from those of a normal person, may
be classified as a 'psychopathological person.
The intelligence of such a person is often quite
satisfactory and at times highly developed.
However, it exercises entirely too little control
over his actions, which, instead, are gener-
ally influenced by compulsive emotional reac-
tions . . . Among these persons we encounter
many criminals.
Of the many other practical items of knowl-
edge about human behavior, two merit special men-
tion. The first is the surprising degree of uni-
formity in thoughts and reactions to a common
situation, in spite of the numberless differences in
human personality. In The Art of Detection,
Jacob Fisher points out the source of strength
which the predictable sameness of human behavior
represents for the investigator. By way of illus-
tration, he cites the multiple-husband racket car-
ried on by a large number of women during World
War II in order to obtain dependency allotments
from their husbands whom they met and married
just prior to the latters' movement overseas.
This wartime activity was new to the women
involved . . . Nevertheless each of thousands
of women in every part of the United States
thought up a scheme for some easy money,
never dreaming that it paralleled almost
393
exactly the illegal schemes of thousands of
other women.
The second is the wide divergence in the capac-
ities of human beings to observe and report accu-
rately what they see, hear, smell, feel, and taste.
All knowledge and experience come to the indi-
vidual, of course, through the various sensory
organs. Since sensory perception is not uniform
among human beings, it may be expected that sev-
eral reports of a single factual situation will dis-
agree. Furthermore, physical objects and specific
situations may evoke a variety of responses because
of past experiences which result in a perceiving
of things not as they are but as the individual
thinks they ought to be or in a form in which he
perceived them on prior occasions.
This problem of accurate perception is one
which the investigator must solve in his own case.
He himself must be able to observe and report
accurately and be prepared to interpret the factual
significance of reports received from others.
Frary and Sullivan, in their book already quoted,
have this to say:
. . . there is no phase of investigative work
which is not dependent completely upon an in-
dividual's ability to observe and describe.
For example, when an investigator is interro-
gating a subject, interviewing a witness, or
evaluating an informant's information, he is
constantly observing that person for the pur-
pose of detecting any indication of falsehood
or any error in observation; when an investi-
gator is conducting a surveillance it is obvious
that his powers of observation must be com-
pletely and constantly employed, for it is im-
possible to "shadow" a man and not closely
observe him.
Realizing that inaccurate reporting can arise also
from forgetfulness or an inability to describe what
has been perceived, the investigator must take
steps to correct any such personal deficiencies.
The latter difficulty necessitates careful study in
order that he may correctly interpret the meaning
of what he observes. Frequently he is called upon
to describe individuals, their characteristics, or
peculiarities in their methods of operations. He
is expected to reconstruct in detail the physical
scene of an incident. No less important is his
ability to recognize when he himself is under
observation.
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Determination of Techniques in Investigation
The particular techniques employed will depend
upon the nature of the investigator's case, and his
plan of attack will he derived from a careful anal-
ysis of the problem. Security investigations, in
general, concern individuals or situations. The
former are investigated to determine suitability
for a security clearance. The latter concerns a
specific, suspected threat to security or the viola-
tion of a federal law by a person under naval
jurisdiction.
A personnel security type investigation is ap-
proached as a general inquiry into an individual's
background. Ordinarily, at the outset there is no
suspicion that the subject is a wrongdoer. A per-
sonal history statement provides the starting point
for an independent inquiry, including checks of
the various record and file sources already men-
tioned. The collection of data and the scope of
the investigation depend upon the sensitivity of
the work to which the individual may be assigned,
and the investigation is conducted to provide in-
formation for some naval commander for whom
the individual will be working.
An investigation into a situation believed to be
a threat to security is undertaken to develop in-
formation for use by a naval commander in safe-
guarding his command. Usually a particular in-
cident has occurred and is the impetus for the start
of the investigation which proceeds to collect evi-
dence that will prove or disprove the existence of
a threat to security. For this type of case, and
also for the case where the investigator is gather-
ing facts concerning the possible violation of a
Federal statute, there is an eventual possibility
that the investigation may result in a legal pro-
ceeding either under the Uniform Code of Military
Justice or under rules of a civil Federal court.
Therefore, the investigator not only has the task
of assembling data for the naval commander con-
cerned, but also he must collect and preserve data
in accordance with the special requirements posed
by the rules of legal evidence in order that the
facts ascertained may be admissible in a formal
court proceeding.
Technical Aids and Equipment
When determining suitable techniques, the in-
vestigator also should be aware of the technical
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394
equipment and scientific aids available for his use
or assistance in the development or confirmation
of information. Electronic equipment, much of
it portable and easily concealed, permits hearing
and recording conversations without detection.
For example, specially designed microphones
placed against a common wall will amplify con-
versations in an adjoining room sufficiently to be
heard plainly; such conversations can also be re-
corded. Other equipment will facilitate the survey
of offices and conference rooms to determine
whether or not enemy agents have installed de-
vices for broadcasting or recording purposes.
While equipment has also been perfected for tap-
ping telephone lines, the Federal courts have ruled
that conversations recorded by such means may
not be received as evidence.
In connection with scientific aids, the investi-
gator's responsibility is to understand their capa-
bilities, to be able to explain to the technician the
information desired, and to know where such aids
can be obtained to assist him. Because of their
specialized nature, the general naval investigator
should rarely attempt to use them himself; rather
he should make use of equipment and trained per-
sonnel available at the Office of Naval Intelligence
in Washington, at the District Intelligence Offices,
and at other specified locations in the field. The
Physical Security Equipment Agency located in
Washington maintains equipment for investiga-
tive work and loans it to the Armed Forces. Also,
through established channels, the technical serv-
ices of the FBI and State police organizations may
be utilized. While scientific techniques and lab-
oratory examination can provide invaluable as-
sistance in the development of information, it must
be remembered that they can never replace the
trained investigator or his personal efforts in lo-
cating and interviewing witnesses, evaluating, and.
integrating factual evidence.
Some of the more important forms of scientific
analysis are microscopy, spectrography, firearm
identification and ballistics, fingerprint identifi-
cation, document examination, and specialized
photography. Microscopy, called the bulwark of
scientific investigations, involves the examination
of minute particles of physical evidence such as
paint, dust, soils and minerals, human hair, blood
and other stains, coal dust, and ashes. Spectrog-
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raph,y is the science of measuring the wave length
of a substance. Every substance has a character-
istic wavelength, which, to a laboratory technician,
is the equivalent of a fingerprint of that substance.
Firearm identification and ballistics, utilizing
comparison miscroscopes and helixometers, pro-
vide a scientific means for determining that a par-
ticular weapon fired a particular missile. Bullets
and fired cartridge cases are therefore important
bits of evidence for scientific investigation.
Exhaustive research has led to the conclusion
that no two persons have identical fingerprints.
Therefore, identification by a qualified fingerprint
examiner is generally accepted as conclusive proof
of the identity of an individual. The FBI main-
tains an ever-expanding master file of millions of
sets of fingerprints which it will search upon re-
quest by any proper law-enforcement agency. To
satisfy the requirements of the FBI for positive
identification, additional fingerprint cards sub-
mitted for filing are accepted only if there is
furnished a complete set of suitable impressions
of all fingers and thumbs. Nevertheless, some-
times single fingerprints may serve as important
clues in the solution of a crime and the investigator
should have a general understanding of finger-
print characteristics and procedures for locating
and preserving them. Subjects analogous to fin-
gerprints include the identification of footprints
and tire tracks, all of which require special study
and training on the part of the investigator.
Document examination is a technical specialty
in scientific analysis which involves the identifica-
tion of handwriting and typewriting, the use of
inks, and the analysis of the characteristics and
age of paper and other writing materials. Pho-
tography has many specialized applications in the
field of investigation both as to types of equipment
used and as to the use of photographs as evidence.
The investigator must be familiar with the capa-
bilities of ultraviolet and infrared photography,
for example, and understand that to be admissible
in court, photographs must be inherently truthful
in what they portray.
Surveillance
An important and productive technique in in-
vestigation is surveillance. This consists of ob-
serving a person, a place, or a vehicle for a given
395
period of time in order to obtain specific informa-
tion. Illustrative purposes of this technique are:
to maintain a continuous watch on a particular
person; to identify all individuals associated with
the enterprise or activity under investigation; to
prevent an illegal act or to apprehend the indi-
vidual attempting it; to locate the headquarters
and meeting places of suspect organizations; to
determine means of communication employed by
subversive groups; to obtain factual data about a
person for later use in interrogation; to check the
accuracy of reports submitted by informants; to
locate the hiding places of stolen property or
contraband.
Although often producing valuable results, sur-
veillance may be expensive in time, money, man-
power, and equipment required; hence, careful ad-
vance planning is required after a decision has
been made that the probable results justify the
effort. Because surveillance can seldom be suc-
cessfully conducted by a single investigator, the
ABC, or three man team, method is often utilized.
The basic team positioning is for A to follow
behind the suspect individual, with B behind A,
and C abreast and across the street from the sub-
ject. C is thus in a position to signal the subject's
movements if the latter is lost to the view of A
and B. This team method permits the frequent
exchange of positions to minimize risks of detec-
tion and makes possible a continuity of the sur-
veillance even when one of the team is required to
drop out for any reason.
This technique has many exacting requirements.
Each member of a team must have an appropriate
convincing cover story should he be challenged.
Signals must be prearranged, together with special
means of communication with the home office. If
vehicles are required, it may be desirable to use
rented cars, changing them as necessary, or to pro-
cure license plates which cannot be traced. Care-
ful study must be made of the geographic area to
facilitate easy and unobtrusive movement. The
subject himself must be intensively studied both
as to his physical characteristics and as to his
normal daily routine and habits. Depending
upon the time element, a relief team must be made
available, capable of taking over smoothly and
inconspicuously.
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There are an infinite number of problems which
can develop during a surveillance and only train-
ing and experience can assist in their solution.
Indicative of the problems are the movements of
a suspect into buildings, elevators, telephone
booths, theaters, and buses, trains, or subways. It
is possible that the suspect will sense the fact that
he is being followed and deliberately attempt to
escape, or he may have a second party specifically
employed to watch for and identify surveillants.
He may confront the investigator and demand an
explanation. These hazards may be overcome by
avoiding direct eye contact with the subject, by
eliminating signs of recognition between investi-
gators, by training the investigator to be com-
pletely casual and natural. Patience is an out-
standing requirement; the investigator must be
prepared to walk and to wait for long periods of
time, sometimes in physical discomforts, always
observing carefully and taking notes wherever
possible. The activity of surveillance is both a
severe physical strain and a stern test of the
ability to concentrate.
This technique, however, is only a means to
an end. Consequently, its results must be evalu-
ated progressively in order to determine its con-
tinuing value or the advisability of shifting to
another technique which may be more productive
in the time available.
The Interview
The Interview, an indispensable technique
which plays some part in almost all investiga-
tive work, is a direct method of obtaining infor-
mation. Its rules are based on the assumption that
the environment is voluntary and that the conver-
sation with the person being interviewed has as its
purpose the providing of helpful information on
a particular subject. Whenever possible, the in-
vestigator should plan his approach in advance as
a time-saving device and to keep control of the
discussion. However, he should never attempt to
force the conversation and so prevent the person
being interviewed from relating in his own way
all that he knows; nor should be suggest possible
answers to questions asked. Of importance is an
accurate appraisal of the person interviewed in
order to establish a pleasant open atmosphere.
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396
Courtesy and tact are invaluable attributes.
Above all, the investigator should suppress per-
sonal feelings of bias or prejudice and maintain an
objective point of view. It is here that a practical
knowledge of psychology and a facility for
friendly directed conversation have special value.
Interrogation
The distinction between an interview and an
interrogation is an important one to make. The
former involves the questioning of a person who
is either willing to provide information or at least
passively neutral in his attitude; the latter con-
cerns a person who is either suspected of an offense
or unjustifiably is holding information in his pos-
session. The difference becomes a matter of de-
gree, depending upon the intensity of the conver-
sations and the attitude of the subject toward
providing the desired information. A distinction
also exists between interrogation of prisoners of
war and interrogation of persons involved in
security and criminal investigations.
Usually, the technique of interrogation is one
of the last to be used in connection with investi-
gation because its effectiveness often depends upon
the prior collection, by other techniques, of suffi-
cient data to give the interrogator leads for ques-
tions and facts to verify statements made. Inter-
rogation also may result in admissions by the sus-
pect, followed by a full confession first given
orally and then reduced to writing.
Criminal interrogation calls for a high degree
of skill, a wide experience, and a keen insight into
human personality. Well done, the interrogation
often can provide a solution to the investigation;
prematurely attempted or ineptly handled, it can
result only in the recalcitrance of the subject and
a dissipation of the strength of psychological fac-
tors involved. Interrogation is a technique which
requires detailed study and should be undertaken
only by specially trained personnel when its
employment seems justified.
In his practical book, Lie Detection and Crim-
inal Interrogation, Fred E. Inbau stresses the im-
portance of the environment for the interrogation
and the approach of the interrogator who must
make proper utilization of principles of psychol-
ogy. A suitable and strictly private room for
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interrogation with no more than one or two inter-
rogators present is essential because of the fact
that people instinctively are sensitive about speak-
ing frankly of their actions and motivations in the
presence of a, group of observers. The room itself
should contain no distracting features such as
pictures or wall decorations; however, it should be
equipped with concealed recording equipment and
a one-way mirror through which an observer can
follow the proceedings and corroborate them if
required. An interrogation should never be con-
ducted in a location where the subject feels confi-
dent or superior, such as his own home.
The particular approach of the interrogator
will, of course, depend upon the data he already
has assembled and the personality of the suspect.
In general, according to Inbau, the suspect must
be convinced that the interrogator is merely seek-
ing the truth and in no way relentlessly attempt-
ing to force a confession. Based on this objective,
the language used should be easily understand-
able; harsh, uncompromising words should be
avoided. For example, "kill," "steal," and "con-
fess" should be replaced by "shoot," "take," and
"tell the truth." At the outset, it is often desir-
able to ask non-sensitive, routine questions as a
means of conditioning the subject to answering
and to his surroundings This procedure also en-
ables the interrogator to size up the suspect and
to determine the best approach to the critical
phase of the interrogation.
When the guilt of the person involved is rea-
sonably certain and the primary purpose of the
interrogation is to obtain an incriminating admis-
sion or a full confession, the interrogator may
adopt an attitude of sympathetic understanding
if the suspect shows feelings of genuine remorse
or mental anguish. On the other hand, for those
who have no such feelings, the practical, cards-
on-the-table approach may be more suitable in
order to show the subject that other evidence of
guilt exists. If guilt is doubtful or uncertain, the
interrogator must, in the words of Inbau, "feel
his way around," seeking to detect deception and
searching for positive clues of guilt or innocence.
Such clues may be derived from inconsistent state-
ments, signs of physical uneasiness, inadequate
explanations, and attempts to lie.
397
The Polygraph
Properly associated with the topic of technical
equipment, the polygraph or lie detector is men-
tioned at this point because of its frequent use in
connection with interrogation as a means of dis-
covering deception. This instrument records and
measures the physiological changes induced in an
individual by his emotional response, usually in-
voluntary, to questions addressed to him. Rela-
tive changes in blood pressure, rapidity and ampli-
tude of pulse, variations of the respiratory pat-
tern, and minute changes in the conductivity of
the skin are detected and recorded on graphs.
While the operation of the physical equipment is
relatively simple, the interpretation of the result-
ing charts is highly technical, requiring not only
specialized training and extensive experience, but
also complete integrity on the part of the tech-
nician. The Careless, over-anxious operator who
attempts to prove more than the equipment is
capable of proving can produce interpretations
and reach conclusions which are completely un-
warranted.
The investigator, therefore, must be aware of
the capabilities and limitations of the polygraph
and recognize that its results are dependent upon
the skill and ability of the operator. Based upon
the experience of the scientific crime detection
laboratory at Northwestern University, it has been
estimated that out of every 100 subjects tested, a
competent polygraph examiner can make an accu-
rate and definite diagnosis for about 75 to 80. The
chief source of error is a failure to detect decep-
tion by a guilty person rather than the misinter-
pretation of the record of one who is innocent.
Properly used, the polygraph makes possible
greater accuracy in the detection of deception and
has a decided psychological effect in inducing
guilty persons to confess. At times this equip-
ment can be employed as an initial technique in
investigations involving several suspects. By such
means it is often possible to eliminate the inno-
cent, with a considerable saving in total time in-
volved in the solution of a case.
Legal Evidence
In any investigation which may result in court
action, the investigator is responsible for obtain-
ing and protecting available physical evidence,
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and for demonstrating a continuous chain of pos-
session through the hands of any and all of its
custodians. Knowledge relating to the admissi-
bility or inadmissibility of data as legal evidence
is also essential to avoid the dismissal of a case
on technical grounds. While a detailed discussion
of this subject is beyond the scope of this chapter,
it should be pointed out that the Manual for
Courts-Martial United States 1951, its Naval Sup-
plement, and the Uniform Code of Military Jus-
tice are basic materials with which the investi-
gator in the armed services must be familiar.
One procedural requirement which these publi-
cations impose upon the conduct of interviews and
interrogations is initial advice to the individual
of his legal rights. Article 31 of the Code provides
against compulsory self-incrimination and also
states:
No persons subject to this code shall inter-
rogate, or request any statement from, an
accused or a person suspected of an offense
without first informing him of the nature of
the accusation and advising him that he does
not have to make any statement regarding the
offense of which he is accused or suspected
and that any statement made by him may be
used as evidence against him in a trial by
court-martial.
On this basis, the Office of Naval Intelligence re-
quires that a written confession include the state-
ment that the signer was initially informed of his
rights, wherever he will agree to do so.
Formal Report
An accurate, objective formal report is the con-
cluding phase of the investigator's field work on
a particular case. In the armed services this report
is particularly important because the military
commander as the action officer responsible for
the security of his command must rely upon the
investigation report as his primary source of in-
formation upon which to predicate his action. For
this reason, the qualities of clarity, completeness,
and impartiality in presentation are essential.
The reporting responsibility of the investigator is
exacting and challenging.
In many instances the formal report will involve
the careful coordination of preliminary investiga-
tive reports prepared by a number of contributing
naval agencies, particularly the District Intelli-
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398
gence Offices, for investigative leads may be de-
veloped in several geographic areas.
Investigations of all varieties absorb much of
the time and energies of the counterintelligence
organization. Their problems will often challenge
the ingenuity of the investigator, but most of the
work is routine, requiring careful attention to.
minute detail. However, for the investigator there
is a reward in the form of deep personal satisfac-
tion when the "tough case" is broken through his
skill, imagination, and industry.
NAVAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION
While the Security Branch of the Office of Naval
Intelligence is the center of counterintelligence
activity within the Department of the Navy, a
number of other offices and agencies of necessity
play a significant part in the total effort. For
example, in the collection of information the Se-
curity Branch relies heavily upon the District
Intelligence Offices, naval attaches, fleet units, and
other governmental intelligence producing agen-
cies, both foreign and domestic. Likewise, in con-
nection with security control measures, its function
is that of disseminating intelligence since correc-
tive action to be taken is a responsibility of com-
mand. Communications security is a primary
responsibility of the Director of Naval Communi-
cations although there is close mutual support in
activities of common interest. Similar cooperation
takes place in connection with national internal
security which is a responsibility of the Depart-
ment of Justice and in contractor personnel secu-
rity which involves a number of departments of
the executive branch of the Federal government.
Thus it can be seen that collaboration, coordina-
tion, and liaison are essential to the successful
operation of the Security Branch.
From the counterintelligence point of view, the
functions of the Security Branch include:
1. The production for appropriate dissemina-
tion of intelligence to warn of and to aid in
countering threats of espionage, sabotage,
and subversion, particularly as they may af-
fect the Naval Establishment.
2. The administration and utilization of coun-
terintelligence techniques, particularly in-
vestigation.
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3. The formulation of policy concerning secu-
rity control measures, including the clear-
ance of classified information to foreign
agencies and participation in the application
of censorship and commerce and travel con-
trol.
4. The coordination of the naval effort with
that of other counterintelligence agencies.
The importance of the coordinating function
has been emphasized by the subversive character-
istics of the cold war and the worldwide locations
of naval units and activities which have tremen-
dously expanded the scope of the interests of the
Security Branch. The functions of the Branch
are delegated and distributed among the follow-
ing sections: S. E. C. (Sabotage, Espionage, and
Countersubversion) , Investigations, Security Pol-
icy, Security Control, Censorship, and Commerce
and Travel, the latter two being fully acti-
vated only in time of war. It should be noted
that a number of these sections have functions and
responsibilities which are not directly related to
counterintelligence. In considering the matter of
organization, it should further be remembered
that changes occur from time to time as needs
and emphasis shift, so that the important con-
siderations are the functions performed in sup-
porting the broad mission of producing intelli-
gence for the protection and security of the Naval
Establishment. In any event, the activities of
the various sections are closely related and con-
tinuing mutual assistance insures integration of
effort.
The S. E. C. Section is a research and evalua-
tion unit, responsible for the analysis of informa-
tion and the dissemination of the resultant intelli-
gence to appropriate naval authorities for use in
planning and executing effective counter and pro-
tective measures. Because of the pervasive nature
of counterintelligence itself, this dissemination
may include not only naval activities but also other
government agencies. The section's interests are
worldwide. Like a headquarters staff, it corre-
lates information received from a wide variety of
sources, and while it must call upon other activi-
ties for the collection of specific information de-
sired, it is not limited geographically in its col-
lection effort. From a mass of raw material, it
must extract significant items, evaluate them, and
399
disseminate them in usable form. Its research
subjects include personnel, techniques, finances,
communications, situations, trends, and objectives
of subversive and covert foreign and domestic or-
ganizations. While much of this research is of a
long-term nature, designed to produce detailed
studies of value to many branches of the Depart-
ment of the Navy and other government agencies,
the section must remain alert for any significant
single items which, when interpreted, indicate
some new threat or trend, or possibly a new ap-
proach by a subversive activity, requiring prompt
dissemination to the appropriate action agency.
Close liaison with Army and Air Force Intelli-
gence, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the
Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of
State, the Treasury Department, and other agen-
cies of the government permits a, valuable inter-
change of information of mutual interest and
benefit. Other sources of information include do-
mestic and foreign newspapers and periodicals and
transcripts of foreign radio news broadcasts.
During World War IT the various intelligence and
interrogation reports from United States and Al-
lied forces abroad were useful sources. With the
approval of competent authority, information is
also exchanged with agencies of friendly foreign
governments. In its collection and evaluation
effort, the section is materially aided by the In-
telligence Branch of ONI and the District Intelli-
gence Offices. Internally, it is organized on the
basis of major topical interests.
Illustrative of the inter-relations within the
Security Branch, the S. E. C. section receives much
routine information regarding individuals and sit-
uations from other sections; on the other hand, in
connection with security matters, it may provide
the investigations section with an evaluation of
information developed in the course of an investi-
gation of a suspect or prospective employee. In
addition, it may be able to advise the Security
Control Section that one of the members of an
official foreign mission requesting clearance for
an official inspection is a known or suspected enemy
agent. In time of war, the closest relationships
are maintained with the Censorship section in or-
der to identify foreign agents, their contacts, and
their means of finance and communications.
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Closely associated with S. E. C. is the Investiga-
tions Section which provides the Navy with per-
sonnel trained in specialized counterintelligence
techniques. The counterintelligence function of
this section is to develop information regarding al-
leged or suspected espionage, sabotage, and sub-
versive activities on the part of naval personnel,
uniformed or civilian. In addition, it is the offi-
cially designated investigative service for the Na-
val Establishment and makes investigations not
immediately related to counterintelligence. These
are conducted when specifically requested by com-
petent naval authority. Such investigations in-
clude matters involving naval contractors, war
frauds, and personnel misconduct or disciplinary
cases.
Contractors' investigations may be required be-
fore the material bureaus of the Navy Department
enter into contractual relationships with private
concerns. When, in the interest of the security
of classified naval equipment or information, the
Chief of a Bureau deems it necessary to have facts
about the general corporate structure of a con-
tractor, its financial responsibility, ability to pro-
duce, integrity of management, and especially any
possible foreign affiliations, ONI is requested to
obtain the essential information. Based on the
facts developed, the responsible bureau authority
can then make his decision regarding the placing
of the contract. These facts also contribute to
decisions concerning appropriate security controls
that should apply to classified work in progress.
Requests for war fraud investigations arise out
of the belief of a commanding officer that naval
personnel, military or civilian, are involved in
defrauding the government in connection with a
naval contract or by the unauthorized use or dis-
position of naval supplies or equipment. If evi-
dence of fraud is developed, the case is referred to
the Department of Justice and, at the same time,
the commanding officer is advised of the facts so
that he can take such action as he desires to protect
the Navy from further harm. Since the Investi-
gations Section provides the designated investiga-
tive service for the Navy, its trained agents are
called upon to determine the facts pertaining to
misconduct and breaches of discipline so that com-
manding officers can fix responsibility and better
determine appropriate punishment.
CONFIDENTIAL
Because of the diversity of its activities, this
section is closely associated with most phases of
intelligence operations as well as with a large
number of the naval commands and other offices
and bureaus of the Navy Department. While some
of its work is not immediately of a counterintelli-
gence nature, the greater part has some bearing on
security measures, and sometimes seemingly un-
related cases are productive of information of
direct counterintelligence value.
It must be kept in mind that this section, in
gathering data on an investigation, is serving only
as a fact-finding agency. Completed investiga-
tions are referred to the requesting authority for
such administrative action as he, in his best judg-
ment, believes to be necessary on the basis of the
facts presented. In order to protect sources of
information from compromise or disclosure, all
investigative reports are classified Confidential or
higher; recipients, therefore, must safeguard them
carefully and not disclose sources therein. In no
case is the subject of a report to be advised of its
existence or permitted to see it.
The Security Branch has Navy-wide responsi-
bility for originating or approving the promulga-
tion of all policies relating to the safeguarding of
classified naval information, as well as administer-
ing such policies. The Assistant to the Branch
Head (Security Policy) originates, approves, and
reviews policy and prepares for promulgation by
the Chief of Naval Operations specific directives
on such subjects as classification and security meas-
ures, the disclosure of naval information, the tak-
ing of photographs, the release of information on
new ship construction or conversion, and visits
to naval activities and installations. While direc-
tives on physical security are prepared by the Base
Maintenance Division, Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations, the branch functions in an advisory
and consultative capacity.
The Security Control Section administers and
executes various security policies and programs.
This involves a wide range of activity, a diversity
of responsibilities, and the exercise of the most
discriminating judgment. In its work this section
is assisted by qualified representatives from the
various technical bureaus and offices, the State
Department, and Army and Air Force Intelli-
gence. Included in its responsibilities is the re-
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lease of classified information to individuals and
organizations for private use, to industry manu-
facturing items of naval interest for foreign gov-
ernments, and to official representatives of foreign
governments. Generally speaking, classified in-
formation is not released for private use except
when so doing serves the interests of the Navy.
For example, it may be necessary, on occasion, to
provide merchant vessels or civilian aircraft with
classified Hydrographic Office information.
Releases to foreign governments are usually gov-
erned by high level policy decisions and by special
circumstances within the purview of the Navy's
technical bureaus and the Intelligence Branch of
ONI. Visits of foreigners to naval activities,
commercial plants and private institutions en-
gaged in classified work for the Navy require
clearance and the issue of proper credentials.
Security liaison with the Office of Public Informa-
tion of the Navy Department entails review of
articles, reports, and pictures to determine whether
or not the subject matter may be released in con-
formance with established policy. Another task
is that of the prevention and correction of security
violations by naval personnel which sometimes
occur in the preparations, handling, and marking
of correspondence. Much more serious is the loss
or compromise of classified matter. In such cases,
as required by Navy Regulations, a local investiga-
tion of the circumstances is made and a report for-
warded to CNO. Each report is reviewed to de-
termine whether the investigation has been ade-
quate, and it is then transmitted to the interested
offices of the Navy Department for information
and, when disciplinary action is indicated, to the
Bureau of Naval Personnel.
Since classified information is originated and
handled by all naval activities, an important func-
tion of the Security Branch is the integration of
procedures, the coordination of assignment of
classifications, and timely declassification. Ad-
vice to naval commands regarding security consid-
erations and coordination with other agencies is a
continuing responsibility.
When activated in time of war, the Censorship
Section is responsible for preparing basic regu-
lations for naval censors, maintaining liaison with
all other censorship organizations, and acting as a
clearing house for such administrative matters
401
as violations, proposed changes in regulations,
and general inquiries. Since naval censorship is
a function of command, officers are designated to
serve as censors for every naval vessel, base, and
activity, and special instructions in addition to
basic regulations may be prepared with the ap-
proval of ONI. As appropriate, special reports
are submitted by individual censors through the
chain of command to the Censorship section.
Such reports may be summaries of information of
a subversive nature, indications of leaks, or evi-
dence of an unusual interest in classified naval in-
formation. The questionable correspondence may
be forwarded with the report. A basic problem of
censorship is the exercise of good judgment and
common sense in the treatment of private cor-
respondence, the forwarding of photographs, the
transfer of personal funds, and the clearance
through customs of officers (not official couriers)
carrying official Navy documents.
Associated with this section in wartime is the
Telecommunications Unit which provides trained
officers for cable and radio censorship. The Navy,
with its responsibility for the safe overseas move-
ment of merchant ships and strategic materials,
is vitally interested in safeguarding movement in-
formation transmitted over commercial or private
circuits. Personnel selected for this work usually
possess a background of experience in trade,
finance, industry, and communications. The de-
fensive function of this activity is to prevent the
transmittal of information of military, economic,
or political value to an enemy, such as production
data, new devices, general shipping information,
and movements of materials, supplies, or person-
nel. Offensively, this activity can detect enemy
covert operations by intercepting agent reports,
transmittal of funds, propaganda, and requests
for special information; even more, it can assist
in thwarting espionage, sabotage, and subversive
operations. In this area, the coordination of naval
security interests with those of other agencies is
most important. During World War II this unit
and its personnel were transferred to the Cable
and Radio Division of National Censorship.
Also active in wartime, the Commerce and
Travel Section functions to prevent the unau-
thorized transmission of classified information
through merchant shipping, crews, travelers, over-
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seas commercial aircraft, and maritime personnel;
it assists in the control of persons attempting to
enter or leave United States controlled areas whose
activities might constitute a danger to the security
of the Naval Establishment. Worldwide in
scope, the responsibilities of this section are cen-
tered around the boarding of merchant ships, the
preparing of advisory information for individual
travel authorizations and inspection of travelers,
the making of special studies, and cooperative
liaison with other agencies engaged in the con-
trol of travel and commerce. While this section
operates primarily to establish and maintain
security barriers against the illegal movement of
classified information and personnel engaged in
espionage, sabotage, or subversive activities, it also
collects a large volume of information for a variety
of intelligence purposes. During peacetime, the
functions of this section are performed by estab-
lished civil federal agencies; even in wartime,
these civil agencies retain primary responsibility
and the Security Branch of ONI acts in a sup-
plementary and advisory capacity in areas of par-
ticular concern to the Navy. When active, the
Commerce and Travel Control Section initiates
policies and supervises the field work performed
by the District Intelligence Offices and related to
its mission.
The primary counterintelligence purpose for
boarding ships and aircraft entering or leaving
United States controlled ports is to ascertain that
no classified information is hidden in the ship,
cargo, or on the persons of travelers and crew
members and to insure that proper security meas-
ures are maintained in the handling of shipping
information and classified cargo assigned to over-
seas areas. Leakage of important information
can occur from the careless use of bills of lading,
marine insurance policies, and cargo manifests;
likewise, merchant seamen and waterfront work-
ers can make valuable observations of merchant
ships and cargoes. A second purpose is to obtain
by means of interview any pertinent information
possessed by merchant marine officers, crew mem-
bers, travelers, and Armed Guard personnel. Sur-
vivors of enemy attacks on shipping are sources
of information not only of immediate operational
value but also of salient details regarding the
attack: the circumstances, enemy units involved,
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names of other survivors or known dead or miss-
ing, and the status of classified publications
aboard.
Travel authorization is basically a responsibility
of the State Department, while travel inspection
rests with agencies of the Treasury and Justice
Departments: United States Customs and the Im-
migration and Naturalization Service. The ONI
Commerce and Travel Section works with these
agencies in a cooperative and advisory capacity
in matters relating to naval security. The check-
ing of passenger and crew lists in advance of the
arrival or departure of a merchant ship or com-
mercial plane is a valuable means for enforcing
security control measures, and promptness in
processing and dissemination of resulting infor-
mation is imperative. The preparation of special
studies of trends and situations by this section
serves to guide and stimulate the activities of the
field units. The closest liaison, effective at all
levels of operation, must be maintained with other
military agencies, the Passport and Visa divisions
of the State Department, the Bureau of Customs
and Internal Revenue of the Treasury Depart-
ment, the FBI and the Immigration and Naturali-
zation Service of the Justice Department, the
Office of International Trade of the Commerce
Department, the Civil Aeronautics Administra-
tion, the Maritime Commission, and other federal
and state agencies, not to mention a variety of
private agencies and companies. Particularly
close relationships exist with the Coast Guard
which has primary responsibilities for port se-
curity and the clearance of merchant seamen.
As already indicated in this review of the Navy's
counterintelligence organization, the sections of
the Security Branch both support and are sup-
ported by field activities, notably the District In-
telligence Offices. While the responsibilities of
these offices are localized within their districts,
they are no less important and usually are inter-
related not only from district to district and to the
Security Branch, but also to the field activities
of other governmental agencies. It is imperative,
therefore, that all current information regarding
counterintelligence matters be available in the
DIO's and that these offices be manned by person-
nel trained in the various security techniques and
procedures. The requirements and capabilities of
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these offices will naturally vary according to their
geographical area of responsibility; in any event,
they must be prepared to support effectively all
pertinent countermeasures if the Naval Establish-
ment and the nation are to be protected success-
fully against espionage, sabotage, and subversive
activities.
In chapter 3 the counterintelligence organiza-
tions of the Army and the Air Force were identi-
fied; it is sufficient to indicate here that their
functions and responsibilities within their respec-
tive services are similar to those of the Security
Branch of ONI. The counterintelligence activ-
ities and responsibilities of all the military serv-
ices are carefully defined by the Delimitation
Agreement and integrated with those of the FBI
which has primary responsibility for the internal
security of the United States.
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE IN A THEATER OF
MILITARY OPERATIONS
While basic counterintelligence problems and
objectives in a theater of operations are not essen-
tially different from those already discussed, the
urgency of operating conditions gives special em-
phasis to the time element and the nature of mili-
tary combat both requires and permits the use of
special countermeasures and techniques in addi-
tion to those already described. The extent and
character of counterintelligence activities are
conditioned by the particular theater of operations
and such factors as population density, composi-
tion and cultural characteristics of the people,
their attitude toward friendly and enemy forces,
their susceptibility to enemy penetration and
propaganda, and the stability of local govern-
ments.
In a theater of operations the information tar-
gets of enemy intelligence are concentrated within
the field of armed forces intelligence knowledge
described in chapter 5, with emphasis on capabil-
ities and vulnerabilities. Recognizing these prob-
able targets, the intelligence officer has a number
of counterintelligence responsibilities, such as the
planning of effective protective countermeasures
and the neutralization of hostile intelligence oper-
ations. In coordination with other staff sections,
he will plan measures and procedures for deceiving
the enemy. Counter propaganda may be his
403
sphere of responsibility, as well as censorship and
the initiation of investigations as required. In
general, counterintelligence operations in the thea-
ter are grouped into five categories: military secu-
rity; civil security; port, frontier, and travel
security; censorship; and special operations.
Special operations may include problems of
camouflage and concealment of installations,
either to mask their true identity or to conceal
them from observation completely. The intelli-
gence officer may also supply valuable knowledge
in the planning of deceptive measures such as
feints, secondary landings, demonstrations, and
false concentrations. The success of deception
depends upon a maximum of realism in execution
and complete security of information.
In combat areas, counterintelligence personnel
are responsible for or assist in locating evacuated
enemy headquarters, billeting areas, supply depots
and similar installations and searching them for
documents and other material of possible interest.
Other sources of potential value are offices for-
merly occupied by enemy intelligence services,
enemy police organizations, local semimilitary
organizations, civil government centers, signal
communications and broadcasting centers, and
known collaboration groups. Mail at enemy post-
offices should be impounded pending the arrival
of designated censors. Important personnel tar-
gets are known or suspected enemy agents, col-
laborators, and sympathizers, whose identity and
location may be facilitated by contact with local
officials and other persons known to be friendly
to our forces. On the other hand, installations
evacuated by our own forces must be inspected
to ensure that no material of intelligence value to
the enemy has been left behind.
Prior to the establishment of Controls by Civil
Affairs or Military Government units in areas re-
covered from an enemy, counterintelligence per-
sonnel cooperate with military commanders and
police units in preparing security regulations, pro-
mulgating instructions, and restoring law and
order. Frequent checks must be made to ascertain
the effectiveness of measures taken, and informant
networks must be established. Since security con-
trols over a civil population become the responsi-
bility of Civil Affairs-Military Government units,
the closest relationships must be maintained with
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them for they normally serve as the channel for
dealings with civilians in a military zone. Coun-
terintelligence personnel often continue to assist
in such matters as locating and confiscating hidden
arms and the conduct of security investigations.
As a general principle in the wake of battle, the
security of military interests has priority over the
welfare and convenience of the civilian population
in a theater of operations.
Counterintelligence Estimates and Plans
From the foregoing it is apparent that advance
planning is essential, in order that the intelligence
officer may carry out his counterintelligence re-
sponsibilities successfully. An early requirement
is an estimate of enemy intelligence capabilities,
based upon available knowledge of the enemy's
overt and covert intelligence agencies, including
organization, training, equipment, doctrine, tech-
niques, and disposition. Such an estimate should
include a critical analysis of our own counter-
intelligence deficiencies. This careful study will
indicate additional knowledge required, improve-
ments to effect, and the measures which will be
most advantageous in countering the enemy's in-
telligence effort. This estimative process for
counterintelligence is only a subsidiary phase of
the total process involved in preparing the In-
telligence Estimate discussed in chapter 12.
However, the Intelligence Estimate form itself
can be utilized as a general guide for the intelli-
gence officer as he analyzes his counterintelligence
problems and considers appropriate countermeas-
ures. The Department of the Army Field Manual
30-5, entitled Combat Intelligence, recommends
the revision of the estimate form to include the
following topics as appropriate:
a. Collection of Information.
1. Overt methods.
(a) Reconnaissance, ground and air,
including photo.
(b) Communication intelligence.
(c) Prisoners of war, deserters, and
refugees.
(d) Captured documents, including
maps, orders, and letters.
(e) Interception of radio and tele-
vision broadcasts.
(f) Interrogation of captured secret
agents.
2. Covert methods. Espionage, all types.
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NAVAL OFFICERS
b. Sabotage.
1. Military.
2. Political.
3. Economic and industrial.
c. Guerrilla Warfare.
1. Semimilitary operations.
2. Minor armed uprisings.
d. Underground.
1. Political and refugee.
2. Escape and Evasion.
3. Criminal.
e. Assassination and Abduction.
1. Military and political leaders.
2. Personnel performing critical duties.
f. Unfriendly Nations. Miscellaneous activi-
ties.
g. Analysis of our own and allied counter-
intelligence deficiencies.
The particular form used is not important.
What is essential is that appropriate measures to
counter each enemy capability be devised and as-
signed to various units of the command.
The intelligence officer should maintain for his
own use a composite record in order to make cer-
tain that he has considered all possible enemy in-
telligence operations, planned for the necessary
countermeasures, and recommended execution by
the appropriate agencies. This record may also
contain notations amplifying the planned counter-
measures for further dissemination to the action
agencies; it may indicate additional information
to be collected and reported according to a time
schedule. The results of this study and planning
are incorporated into the intelligence annex to
an operation order, described in chapter 12.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
It is hoped that this study has served to give
greater understanding of intelligence work and
the milieu in which it operates in war and peace.
This text is not intended to be complete in its
coverage of the subject matter but rather only
introductory. Of necessity intelligence impinges
on many aspects of human life. It deals with the
realities of existence and the interrelationships of
groups of people who have formed themselves into
powerful states. Inevitably, any study of intelli-
gence becomes historically dated, and while this
text has endeavored to project ideas beyond the
present, the viewpoint is that of early 1953.
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Intelligence has been described as organization,
as knowledge, and as a producing activity. Only
by the coordinated effort of many contributing
agencies and personnel at all echelons can intelli-
gence be produced to meet the needs of a nation
and its armed forces. By tracing the historical
development of intelligence, valuable lessons have
been pointed out as guides for the present and the
future. In considering functions of intelligence
in the formulation of the strategy and tactics of
world states, a proper perspective for intelligence
personnel has been suggested.
As an area of human knowledge, intelligence
specifically deals with foreign nations and geo-
graphic areas of potential operations. It helps
to answer questions of both a strategic and opera-
tional nature. Its component parts have been de-
scribed as geographic, transportation and telecom-
munications, sociological, political, economic,
armed forces, scientific and technical, and bio-
graphical. Because of their current interest to
the United States, World Communism and the
U. S. S. R. have been given more detailed
consideration.
The processes whereby information is converted
into intelligence have been shown as an unending
cycle within which is collection, processing, and
dissemination. Use by planners and operational
commanders sparks new requests for collection,
while throughout the cycle, guidance controls and
channels the various phases of activity. The in-
telligence cycle is practically applied by the in-
telligence section of a naval staff in its support of
the naval commander as he makes his decisions
and supervises his planned action. It has con-
tinuing practical application in the support given
by intelligence to all types of naval operations in-
cluding air, surface forces, submarines, and joint
and combined operations including amphibious.
It is at work in the intelligence support of special
activities such as atomic warfare, economic war-
fare, psychological warfare, and guerrilla and
partisan operations.
All of these aspects of intelligence?organiza-
tion, knowledge, and activity?find special and
concentrated application in counterintelligence
which is directed against hostile intelligence or-
ganizations and their activities threatening the
welfare and security of the nation.
405
While Naval Intelligence is the primary consid-
eration of this text, it has been necessary to deal
with the general field of intelligence, because only
by so doing can the purposes, responsibilities, re-
lationships, and contributions of Naval Intelli-
gence have real meaning.
THE FUTURE OF INTELLIGENCE
Those assigned to intelligence duties can some-
times become overenthusiastic as they consider
the potentialities of their activities. On the other
hand, those unacquainted with the capabilities of
intelligence, or familiar only with its limitations,
can find few values comparable to the hardware
of war. There is, of course, a middle ground
where realistic appraisal and appreciation meet.
Knowledge and understanding will lead to the
recognition that intelligence can make very real
contributions, but that it can predict the future
only within the limits of the social sciences which
aid in its production. Insofar as facts can be
collected, intelligence can at least produce reason-
ably accurate estimates of capabilities and, at cer-
tain levels, give sufficient indications of intentions
to alert action agencies to possible dangers and
threats.
Intelligence is not an end in itself, but only a
means to an end which can be constantly used to
effective advantage by both civilian and military
leaders as they formulate and implement the grand
strategy of the nation. As a staff function intelli-
gence is an integral part of command and never
an independent activity.
Intelligence activities, carefully planned and
wisely guided, have been demonstrated histori-
cally to be a profitable investment that will more
than repay the cost in manpower and resources.
However, its benefits cannot be obtained by hasty
improvisation. A working organization is much
more than the creation of units and lines of control
on a paper chart, and its product can have full
meaning only when developed over many years.
The exploitation of sources of information is grad-
ual and painstaking, while improvements in the
techniques of processing come only from long ex-
perience. Dissemination is also a matter of train-
ing and experience in making certain that the
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right knowledge reaches the right people at the
right time.
The experiences of World War II and the post-
war years have awakened and sharpened general
interest in and knowledge of intelligence needs.
The development of a United States Intelligence
organization with an emphasis on coordination
and guidance starting at the highest national level
gives promise that the nation will be better
guarded and better guided than it has in the past.
With full and continued public support, United
States Intelligence must continue to merit the
trust of those it serves.
COMMENTS ON STUDY
The readers of this text will be primarily naval
military personnel in many types of assignments.
Some, having nonintelligence duties, will be inter-
ested only in a general understanding of intelli-
gence; it is hoped that such has been gained.
Others, assigned to intelligence duties, will recog-
nize that this book is not a detailed working man-
ual. Many of its sections can be considerably
expanded. Individual tasks must be learned
either on the job or at such special training schools
as may be organized for that purpose. However,
for intelligence personnel, this book will have
served its purpose if it has given a fuller insight
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into the totality of intelligence activity and pro-
vided direction to further study.
The ingenuity and interest of the individual will
be required to expand his own sources from books,
periodicals, newspapers, naval operational experi-
ence, foreign travel, and acquaintance with people
everywhere. Equally as important as the study
of books is learning more about people and why
they react as they do. A characteristic of the
good intelligence officer must be a genuine interest
in people and places, an awareness of the world
about him, and the ability to view it with objective
detachment.
The cursory inspection of this text for the sole
purpose of locating facts to copy into written as-
signments will have limited and incidental value.
The hasty formulation of answers to essay-type
questions will be equally unrewarding. Clear
thinking and real understanding are goals the
reader should set for himself. He should particu-
larly derive from essay questions the experience
of analyzing and interpreting topical material, to-
gether with that of the preparation of intelligence
reports which have the qualities of clarity, con-
ciseness, and completeness. For the naval officer
with much more than an idle curiosity and passing
interest in intelligence this text will provide a
good beginning to his own development as an
intelligence officer of real value to the Navy.
U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICES 1954
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