INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS

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CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9
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December 2, 2003
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January 1, 1954
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Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R0001 INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS Prepared by U. S. NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SCHOOL For BUREAU OF NAVAL PERSONNEL NAVY Declassification/Release Instructions on File NAVPERS 10889 Approved For IlafAigekibg93/ NAVPERS 10889 /09: CIA-RDP85G00105R0001002' INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS Prepared by U. S. NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SCHOOL For BUREAU OF NAVAL PERSONNEL 1954 0002-9 CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09: CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The following material is reproduced by permission of the copyright owners: Chapter Page Author(s) Publication Publishers 1 2 J. F. C. Fuller "The Pattern of Future War," Brassey's Annual, The Armed The Macmillan Co., New York, N.Y. Forces Yearbook, 1951. 1 2 "The Living Thoughts of Clause- wits," Infantry Journal. David McKay Co., Inc., New York, N. Y. 1 4 Editor, Thomas R. Phillips Roots of Strategy Military Service Publishing Co., Harrisburg, Pa. 1 11 Omar N. Bradley A Soldier's Story Henry Holt & Co., New York, N.Y. 1 12 Sherman Kent Strategic Intelligence Princeton University Press, Prince- ton, N. J. 1 16 "The Living Thoughts of Clause- wits," Infantry Journal. David McKay Co., Inc., New York, N.Y. 2 19 Editor, Thomas R. Phillips_ _ Roots of Strategy Military Service Publishing Co., Harrisburg, Pa. 2 23 Flavius Vegetius Renatres__ _ The Military Institutions of the Do. Romans. 2 36 Corey Ford and Alastair Mac- Cloak and Dagger Random House, New York, N. Y. Bain. 2 44 Ian Colvin Master Spy McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., New York, N. Y. 2 46 Ralph Ingersoll Top Secret Harcourt, Brace & Co., New York, N.Y. 2 49 Corey Ford and Alastair Mac- Cloak and Dagger Random House, New York, N. Y. Bain. 2 58 Donald Robinson "They Fight the Cold War Under Cover," Saturday Evening Post. Curtis Publishing Co., Philadelphia, Pa. 4 99 George F. Kennan American Diplomacy, 1900-1950_ The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Ill. 4 100 B. H. Liddell-Hart "Strategy", 14th edition, vol. 21__ Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., Chi- cago, Ill. 4 103 Hugh Gibson The Road to Foreign Policy Doubleday, Doran & Co., Inc., Garden City, N. Y. 4 105 Hugo Fernandez Artucio__ _ _ The Nazi Underground in South America. Farrar & Rinehart, Inc., New York, N.Y. 4 112 John R. Deane The Strange Alliance The Viking Press, New York, N. Y. 4 114 Walter Lippmann In his column, of the New York New York Herald Tribune, Inc., Herald Tribune of Mar. 29,1947. New York, N. Y. 4 121 Roger Hilsman, Jr "Intelligence and Policy-Making in Foreign Affairs," World Poli- tics, vol. 5, No. 1, October 1952. Princeton University Press, Prince- ton, N. J. 5 126 Dwight D. Eisenhower Crusade in Europe Doubleday, Doran & Co., Inc., Garden City, N. Y. 5 145 B. H. Liddell-Hart The Revolution in Warfare Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn. 5 156 H. G. Thursfield "Brassey's Annual: The Armed The Macmillan Co., New York, Forces Yearbook, 1951." N.Y. 10 260 John McDonald "The War of Wits," Fortune, March 1951. Time, Inc., New York, N. Y. 10 260 do "A Theory of Strategy," Fortune, June 1949. Do. 10 260 do "The War of Wits," Fortune, March 1951. Do. 111 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL Chapter Page Author) ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Publication Publishers 13 323 Dispatch datelined Dayton, Ohio, Nov. 3, 1951. Associated Press, New York, N. Y. 14 350 Hans Speier "Psychological Warfare Reconsid- ered," in the book "Propaganda in War and Crisis," edited by George W. Stewart Publishers, New York, N. Y. Daniel Lerner. 14 351 Harold D. Lasswell "Political and Psychological War- fare," in the book Propaganda in War and Crisis, edited by Do. Daniel Lerner. 14 354 Daniel Lerner Sykewar Do. 14 356 Article, "Daily Crop of Annoy- ances," New York Times, Nov. New York Times, New York, N. Y. 17, 1952. 14 358 Ellsworth Huntington Mainsprings of Civilization John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York, N. Y. 14 359 Alex Inkeles Public Opinion in Soviet Russia__ Harvard University Press, Cam- bridge, Mass. 14 360 Daniel Lerner "Effective Propaganda Conditions and Evaluation," in the book George W. Stewart Publishers, New York, N. Y. Propaganda in War and Crisis, edited by Daniel Lerner. 14 361 do Sy kewar Do. 15 374 Nathaniel Weyl The Battle Against Disloyalty _ _ _ Thomas Y. Crowell Co., New York, N.Y. 15 374 Philip Selznick The Organizational Weapon: A McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., New Study of Bolshevik Strategy and York ,N. Y. Tactics. 15 376, do The Organizational Weapon: A McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., New 377 Study of Bolshevik Strategy and York, N. Y. Tactics. 15 379 Louis Francis Budenz Men Without Faces_ Harper & Bros., New York, N. Y. 15 379 Eugene Lyons The Red Decade The Bobbs-Merrill Co., New York, N.Y. 15 380 Philip Selznick The Organizational Weapon: A McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., New Study of Bolshevik Strategy and York, N. Y. Tactics. 15 388 J. Edgar Hoover "How to Fight Communism," Newsweek, New York, N. Y. Newsweek, June 9, 1947. 15 389 "Don't Be Duped by the Commu- nists," Redbook Magazine, June Redbook Magazine, New York, N.Y. 1948. 15 393 Harry Soderman and John J. O'Connell. Modern Criminal Investigation__ _ Funk & Wagnalls Co., New York, N.Y. 15 393 Jacob Fisher The Art of Detection Sterling Publishing Co., Inc., New York, N. Y. CONFIDENTIAL iv Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL PREFACE Intelligence is an indispensable element in the successful operation of any modern navy. World War II and the subsequent hostilities in Korea have more than demonstrated the value to planning and executing naval operations of sound, properly interpreted information about the character of the enemy?the product of naval intelligence. This value is even greater in periods of peace or in the twilight zone between war and peace such as we have experienced since the end of World War II. The extent, direction, and timing of our naval preparedness in these years depend directly on the depth and accuracy of our understanding of the hostile or potentially hostile forces that confront us. Accordingly the training of capable intelligence officers is one of the Navy's primary tasks. A good intelligence officer must first be a good naval officer; but, in addition, he must have spent long hours learning and perfecting the specialized skills that make it possible for him to penetrate the curtain of secrecy that enshrouds an enemy. Naturally these skills cannot be acquired simply by reading this or any other single book. At the postgraduate level the Navy trains its intelligence officers at the Naval Intelligence School. This text, which covers in a general way the major aspects of naval intelli- gence and their relationships to the other functions of our naval establishment, meets two significant needs. First, for those officers assigned to intelligence duties for the first time, or with prior experience in one or another of the various components of naval intelligence, it provides a greater understanding of intelli- gence as a whole. Second, to the general line officer preparing himself for more responsible operational commands, it gives an intimate acquaintance with the capabilities and limitations of one of the most important supporting elements in successful operational command, with the result that he will find himself better equipped to make use of the services which intelligence is qualified to perform for him. This text makes no claim to being an exhaustive treatise. Neither is it a book of rules and regulations, since that particular need is covered by the Naval Intelligence Manual and the Naval Intelligence Directives issued by the Office of Naval Intelligence. This is a textbook issued by the Standards and Curriculum Branch of the Training Division of the Bureau of Naval Personnel to bring to the officers and men of the Navy and the Naval Reserve such infor- mation about the functions of Naval Intelligence as can appropriately be disseminated through the medium of a training text. This is the second revision of the original text, NavPers 16047, published in February 1946 and reissued in 1948. It was prepared by the staff of the United States Naval School (Naval Intelligence), Washington, D. C., and reviewed by the Office of Naval Intelligence. Suggestions, comments and criticisms are invited. CARL F. ESPE, Rear Admiral, USN, Director of Naval Intelligence. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL CONTENTS Chapter Page 1. Intelligence: A General Orientation 1 2. The Development of Intelligence 19 3. U. S. Organizations for National Security. 63 4. An Intelligence Perspective in a Changing World_ 97 5. Components of Intelligence Knowledge 123 6. Elements of World Power_. 163 7. The United States and the World 179 8. World Communism and the U. S. S. R 197 9. The Intelligence Cycle: Collection 215 10. The Intelligence Cycle: Processing 247 11. The Intelligence Cycle: Dissemination 263 12. Intelligence Staff Procedures 273 13. Intelligence in Support of Operational Command 301 14. Intelligence in Support of Special Activities 335 15. Counterintelligence 363 Summary and Conclusions 404 vii CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL CHAPTER 1 INTELLIGENCE: A GENERAL ORIENTATION INTRODUCTION The word "intelligence" has a long history in the English language. In the sixteenth century, in addition to its primary meanings denoting the power, capacity, and product of the intellect, it began to signify "information, news, or advice," and this secondary meaning implied that such in- formation was secret, obtained through the clan- destine efforts of spies employed by rulers or gov- ernments. These agents were called intelligen- cers, a word now obsolete, and the organization in which they operated came to be known as the Intelligence of the directing authority. In mod- ern professional usage the word in its secondary sense has come to have three connotations: first, a body of knowledge; second, the formal organi- zations engaged in producing this knowledge; and third, the activity or processes by which the knowl- edge is produced by the organizations. When re- ferring to a formal organization the word is usually capitalized. The popular concept of intelligence as a mys- terious, glamorous, and hazardous activity has in part been derived from fictional accounts of in- ternational intrigue on the Riviera, as described in the novels of E. Phillips Oppenheim, or from the published "cloak and dagger" exploits of two World Wars, both truth and fiction. Indeed, in- telligence cannot be denuded of all mystery, glamor, and hazard for they are inherent to some degree in the work of all intelligence organiza- tions. However, the aura of mystery is caused in greater part by the fact that the nature and purpose of intelligence activity are always guarded from public scrutiny by stringent se- curity measures. In general, Intelligence is sim- ilar to any other military staff section or govern- mental agency performing tasks in the national interest. Because of the essential security of its opera- tions, and the somewhat sinister quality attributed to it by popular literature, intelligence has long 26910e-54 2 1 been considered an activity foreign to American custom and procedure. Not until World War II was there a real national interest in intelligence and a universal appreciation of its functions in military command and civil leadership. Even in the postwar period there has not always been com- plete general agreement as to what intelligence means and what it can or should do. When prop- erly forged, intelligence is a potent weapon, and its efficient use is based on certain indispensable principles and procedures. It is an exciting ad- venture in forecasting what men and nations might do; in both offensive and defensive actions it is a sword and a shield. Under the stimulus of world events, America has become "intelligence-conscious," for experi- ences of the past two decades have demonstrated that intelligence is essential, not only to military command, but also to the government of any na- tion with worldwide interests and responsibilities. The phenomenal success of Nazi and Fascist dic- tators in the years preceding World War II, the disaster at Pearl Harbor, and the forward march of Soviet communism in the postwar period have indicated the need for coordinated intelligence upon which to base policy and decision to insure the national welfare. There has been a growing realization that America cannot afford to be caught off guard or be forced into an unfavorable defensive position in the world scene. This new appreciation and support of its en- deavors has given the intelligence profession more stature, and increasing use has been found for its products in solving a greater variety of problems. Intelligence has also acquired a technical vocabu- lary to explain its processes and concepts, and for the first time in American history qualified persons, civilian and military, are being encour- aged to make it a lifetime career. This study will describe the milieu in which intelligence operates, the concepts and principles CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS that govern its employment, and the professional tools which modern science and technology have made available to its personnel. To the profes- sional intelligence officer, it can be no more than a review of what he has learned through training and experience; to the uninitiated it can serve only as an introduction. But to all concerned it will show the inseparable intermeshing of the activities of Naval Intelligence with those of other military and national intelligence organizations, and the corresponding interaction and cooperation that continually links intelligence with planning, policymaking, and operations at every level? from the White House to the foxhole. Naval Intelligence represents only one part of the na- tional intelligence effort. To see the activity of his own service in proper perspective the naval officer must understand and appreciate the vast body of intelligence knowledge, the agencies which produce it, and the methods by which it is made usable. Our first consideration is the significance of intelligence today, its total meaning, and the scope of its interests, activities, and responsibilities. THE CHANGING NATURE OF WAR The changing nature of war itself has created an increased need for intelligence. Men and weapons within the area of conflict have always been primary considerations, but by the 20th cen- tury nations began to give attention to achieving their aims through influencing the minds of other men. By the written and spoken word nations now strive to affect the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behaviors of the peoples of other nations, both friendly and hostile. During World War I, three theories of warfare were developed, all of which emphasized the psychological rather than the physical objective, and which were made practical by the development of the aircraft and the radio. The first theory shifted the purpose of the attack from physical destruction to demoralization of the opposing force by paralyzing its command. The second, "strategic bombing," not only was directed against the enemy's economic capabilities, but also aimed to overthrow the political govern- ment by destroying the morale of the civilian population behind the battle lines. The third was based on a delay in physical attack until the moral CONFIDENTIAL 2 disintegration and internal decay of the enemy had been accomplished by propaganda and other means of psychological operations. In World War II these theories were put to use and greatly refined. The mobility of tanks and aircraft was utilized to overwhelm enemy com- mand. Aircraft and aircraft carriers turned space into speedways of conquest. Guerrilla war- fare and the submarine were utilized to exploit enemy weakness. Amphibious warfare developed a new means of invasion. Radio propaganda was employed to confuse and to demoralize. The new strategy, or large-scale planning and directing of operations, used political, economic, and psycho- logical as well as military warfare against entire enemy populations to accomplish ultimate objectives. In the modern era, as trade in finished indus- trial products and raw materials was extended to all parts of the world, so likewise military con- flict assumed world dimensions. War became total, directed against total populations and all human activities. Both Nazis and Communists have demonstrated consummate skill in using eco- nomic, psychological, and subversive, rather than military weapons, to accomplish their basic objec- tives. War by conventional military weapons has become only one aspect of total war; while so- called "peace" has become a period when the other weapons have been used with devastating results. Though the war of shot and shell was over, the war of words and ideas was rigorously continued by Russia and directed against all noncommunist countries, and in particular (those of) her wartime allies. Within 5 years this bloodless war enabled the Soviet Union to establish an ideological empire cov- ering nearly a third of the land surface of the globe and including 40 percent of its inhabit- ants, a conquest unequalled in history (J. F. C. Fuller, Brassey's 1951 Annual, p. 138) . By the middle of the 20th century, the well- known Clausewitz definition that "war is the con- tinuation of state policy by other means" had been reversed by the Soviet Communist Party. Soviet state policy had become the continuation of war by other means. A more appropriate definition at the current stage of history might be: "War is the imposition of one State's policy on another in such a manner that freedom of group will is lost." Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09: CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002.9 uunFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE: A GENERAL ORIENTATION The key to the definition of any period as war or peace may well be found in the means employed and the effect of those means. In considering the changing nature of war it is significant to note that the strategy of total war differs completely in its fundamental premise from the old strategy of limited or battlefield war- fare. As Fletcher Pratt points out in his book America and Total War, the old strategy was to attack the enemy where his strength lay. When his strongest force was defeated, the remainder fell with it. The new concept is to concentrate on weakness and not to encounter the enemy's strength, if at all possible. The point of view of the Soviet Union is indicated by Lenin's statement that "the soundest strategy of war is to postpone operations until the moral disintegration of the enemy renders the delivery of the mortal blow both possible and easy." As a result, the Soviets have employed political, psychological, economic, and technical means to achieve warlike objectives, wholly or in part, without the more expensive re- sort to military force. By utilizing these means as part of a total subversive effort, the interna- tional communists have fatally weakened certain of their target states, notably Czechoslovakia. Subversion, therefore, has been demonstrated as a new instrumentality for making war. The strategy of total war makes it increasingly diffi- cult for any state to remain neutral in the struggle for power between dominant groups of nations. In the post-World War II period, world com- munism has continued to emphasize the weapon of ideas in preference to, although supported by, the traditional weapon of physical force. Just when or if there may be a shift in emphasis, and how the United States should conduct its national poli- cies to meet and thwart any means employed by its adversaries, are vital questions we face today. A survey of current international conditions, to- gether with a clear understanding of the pattern and methods of total war, gives unmistakable meaning to the popular term, "cold war." In this situation at least two factors, other than the nature of total war, have given emphasis to the funda- mental importance of intelligence and the need for its use: the increased scope and speed of war and the world commitments of the United States. 3 Increased Scope and Speed of War No longer is space itself a conclusive element for defense, nor are geographic features of the earth's surface impassable barriers to enemy at- tack. The awesome technical improvements with which scientists are transforming the aircraft and the radio of World War II have given the speed of sound to the initiation of military attack. In World War II the German Blitzkrieg combined the use of planes and tanks to conquer France in 35 days, while in the Pacific, the aircraft carrier brought naval forces separated by hundreds of sea miles into decisive conflict. At the same time de- velopments in submarine and amphibious war- fare withered the extended sea power of Japan and brought men, guns, and supplies over thousands of miles of ocean to overwhelm her vital defenses within a relatively short period. Strategic bombing, guerrilla, submarine, and psychological warfare carried the war far behind the battlefronts to entire civilian populations, vital industries, sources of the raw materials of war, and communications systems. The master plan of the two major Axis partners, Germany and Japan, encompassed the globe. To meet this threat, the United States fought in the far reaches of the Atlantic and the Pacific and sent forces to distant continents. All parts of the world felt the direct or indirect impact of a world at war. World Commitments of the United States In the interests of its own security and national welfare, the United States has assumed world- wide commitments, both military and economic. The decisions which must be made are funda- mental, far-reaching, and exceedingly complex. The problems involve such intricately related questions as economics, finance, national politics, raw materials, industrial capacities, communica- tions, manpower, weapons, and scientific and tech- nological developments. The growing interrela- tion of political and military decisions has made it impossible for the responsible leaders in either field to take action without the closest coordina- tion of effort, based on a full and mutual under- standing. The decisions of the military com- mander are no longer so directly circumscribed by the elements involved in a tactical field of action. The factors of total war, the increased scope and CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR speed of war, and interlocking world commitments have added to the complexity of both staff and field decisions. Obviously, the effect of these fac- tors on the commander varies in degree with the echelon of his command. But at any echelon in- telligence has become a necessity. Intelligence?An Essential Function More than 2,400 years ago a Chinese general named Sun Tzu is reported to have said: "Hostile armies may face each other for years striving for victory which is decided in a single day. This being so, to remain in ignorance of the enemy's condition . . . is the height of inhumanity. One who acts thus is no leader of men, no present help to his sovereign, no master of victory. Thus, what enables the wise sovereign and the good general to strike and to conquer, and achieve things be- yond the reach of ordinary men, is foreknowl- edge." Intelligence, properly performed, can provide foreknowledge both for government and for mili- tary commanders. It can reduce the possibilities of surprise, give estimates regarding both the po- tential enemy and the area in which he might op- erate, and so aid in reaching sound decisions which are vital not only to the security and welfare of the nation but also to success in combat. Intelli- gence, properly used, has its place not only in war or preparation for war, but also in peace and keep- ing the peace. INTELLIGENCE AS KNOWLEDGE "Intelligence regarding the loyalty of the aver- age indigenous peasant to the present hostile gov- ernment of . . . is important (1) to an evalua- tion of the stability of that government and its capacity to extend its influence and (2) to the selection of an area along its coast for the landing of amphibious forces." By this hypothetical statement, the following charactertistics of intelligence are illustrated: (1) it is a body of knowledge; (2) it deals with a pos- sible enemy state; (3) it affects a possible area of operations; (4) it can be used by top-level plan- ners in government and on military staffs; and (5) it can aid the military commander in the planning of a specific operation. Knowledge regarding the "average indigenous CONFIDENTIAL 4 NAVAL OFFICERS peasant" is much more than the sum of bits of information regarding few or many peasants, gathered from every conceivable source. Some of these bits of information may be true or false; some may be detailed or fragmentary; some may be general or factual in nature; some may come from sources which are accurate and reliable, some from sources which are inaccurate and unreliable. At any rate, many bits of information regarding the "indigenous peasant" must be gathered to- gether and evaluated; they must be carefully analyzed and compared to see that they are plaus- ible; and, after having been boiled down to an essence most closely approximating probable truth, they will provide a conclusion which is meaning- ful. From the facts or information comes some- thing new, called knowledge or intelligence. Information, then, includes such things as facts, documents, and observations, but is not intelli- gence until it has been carefully screened and digested to provide accurate meaning. Intelligence, however, does not include the total substance of human knowledge, but only that which military and civilian leaders must have to make the vital decisions for today and tomorrow. It is the basis for a country's foreign relations, and, as a function of command, it is also essential for the planning and execution of military operations. In either case, it is knowledge upon which a suc- cessful course of action can be based. It has been aptly stated that intelligence ideally is that knowl- edge which a potential enemy has about himself. The scope of American national intelligence is exceedingly broad because the United States in the interests of its own welfare must know a great deal concerning the attitudes, activities, in- terests, and long-range plans of all other states in the world. The concentration of interest, of course, will depend upon the conditions of inter- national relations at any given time. Since it is impossible for any nation to attain the ideal of having all pertinent knowledge about potential enemies, certain gaps always exist. Intelligence, therefore, resembles a vast collection of jigsaw puzzle pieces. Some pieces belong to different puzzles, some will not fit any apparent gap in the picture, and some obviously belong but must be patiently fitted into the picture in order to solve the puzzle. Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 INTELLIGENCE : A GENERAL ORIENTATION CONFIDENTIAL Component Parts In assembling this comprehensive knowledge it is essential to break it down into component parts for better understanding and ease in handling. A systematic classification is achieved by a detailed compilation of, first, all the factors of physical environment and, second, of the characteristics that govern human behavior in a given country. Eight major divisions are generally used: military geography, transportation and telecommunica- tions, sociological, political, economic, armed forces, technical and scientific, and biographical. Each of these components, discussed in detail in chapter 5, are indicative of the tremendous range of intelligence subject matter. All components are closely interrelated; no one can be considered separately. A valid estimate can be reached only by considering each in relation to the others. For the intelligence officer a similar comprehen- sive knowledge about his own country is a neces- sary tool, since only with this accurate and more familiar yardstick can he make valid comparisons and relative estimates. The Factor of Time The components listed above represent a divi- sion of the subject matter of intelligence into broad fields of knowledge. A consideration of the fac- tor of time produces a further breakdown into relative elements, labelled as follows: Basic, which is descriptive of the more permanent and signifi- cant past; Current, which deals with the present; and Estimative, which concerns future develop- ments. The truly significant element of intelli- gence is, of course, the Estimative which projects situations and trends into the future. This fore- casting, however, must be built up accu- rately and painstakingly from both past and cur- rent knowledge. The basic element is encyclopedic in nature and includes geographical and historical data. It provides the broad background against which to interpret the present and predict the future. It is a part of all the components already mentioned, but especially of those which cover the area of operations and the sociological, political, and eco- nomic background of a people. As in the pre- vious example of the "average indigenous peasant," in order to predict his reactions at some future time, the analyst must have a comprehen- sive knowledge of the peasant's past attitudes, group habits, environment, and responses. Also, in deciding on possible landing beaches on the coast of the country in question, the intelligence officer must present to his commander a complete description of the beaches along the entire coast. The geographic knowledge must include soil; exits from beaches, topography behind the beaches; ac- cessibility to roads, rail-lines, towns, water, build- ing materials; recognizable features of the coast- line; the slope of the beach, the sea bottom off the beaches, the surf, currents, tide, underwater ob- stacles, sea approaches, and so forth. When it is realized that there may be a number of possible beaches along the coastline of a given country, the quantity of knowledge required becomes apparent. During World War II, the monographs and area studies prepared by Naval Intelligence provided detailed background knowledge of an encyclopedic nature which was indispensable to the planning of operations all over the world. The Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Studies (JANIS) were also developed to provide background knowledge of areas about which little was previously known. The extensive encyclopedic documentation on heavy industry within Germany, for example, en- abled intelligence personnel to note change or ex- pansion, and to estimate the effectiveness of strategic bombing. The experience gained and lessons learned from these wartime studies have emphasized the need for continued coordinated efforts on the part of all intelligence activities in developing and maintaining a fund of basic knowledge in order that the day-to-day situation can be better interpreted. The National Intelli- gence Survey program is a more recent step to- ward meeting that need. The current element records the changes con- tinually occurring among all groups of peoples, as well as those which may occur in the physical geography of the world. Knowledge about the past must be brought up to date. The significance of change lies in the possibilities not only of progress but also of decay. For example, in con- sidering any other state, friendly or unfriendly, our military and civilian leaders are vitally in- CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS terested in knowing whether its steel production has increased or decreased to a significant degree; what changes have occurred in population, espe- cially in the distribution of age groups; or whether there is a decided swing in popular support from one political doctrine to another. In considering financial aid to the Nationalist Chinese Government after World War II, United States leaders needed to know details about such matters as current economic conditions in China, and how they were affected by government poli- cies; the needs of the people for food, clothing and shelter; the morale and status of equipment of the military forces; and the effectiveness of military and political opposition forces. From an infinitely complex situation an accurate esti- mate was required in order to determine if finan- cial aid would be of assistance and, if so, in what manner it should be given. Even the most limited description of the basic and current elements of intelligence indicates the enormous quantity and variety of details involved. It becomes readily apparent that there is a physi- cal limit to the production of such a volume of knowledge. The question quickly arises: Since it is impossible to achieve the ideal, how should the effort be distributed? The only possible answer is to concentrate on those areas which are most directly related to the present and future deci- sions of military commanders and civilian leaders. In any event, the basic and current elements of intelligence must be formulated so as to provide an accurate basis for the estimative. The estimative element deals with the future. It is knowledge of what a state or a military force of that state can or might do. In respect to in- ternational politics, it includes the influence which any state can exert in the world and what forms that influence may take. In respect to a military force, it considers the effectiveness of that force at a given place and time and the objectives that force is capable of gaining, or might try to gain. In effect, this element of intelligence represents inferences from past and current knowledge which may or may not be complete. Involved in the estimative element are four pri- mary factors: situations which exist or may eventually exist; vulnerabilities or specific weak- nesses which may be exploited; capabilities; and CONFIDENTIAL 6 probable courses of action. An intelligence esti- mate, to have real meaning, must relate to a situa- tion, that is, to a possible enemy, to a possible place, to a possible time, and to the probable means which may be employed. No estimative knowledge can have meaning in a vacuum. Given the concept of total war, the vulnerabili- ties of another state are particularly significant. Weaknesses may exist in any aspect of its national life?political, sociological, or economic. They may be found in its military forces or in its geo- graphic position. The skillful exploitation of weaknesses may produce results out of all propor- tion to the means employed. Conversely, failure to exploit them because of lack of knowledge can be costly to a disastrous degree. In both World Wars, Great Britain's insularity was a vulnera- bility upon which Germany concentrated by means of its submarine force. Extremely serious situations resulted from this underwater warfare directed against the shipping which carried food to Britain's population and raw materials to her industries. In World War II, one of Hitler's blunders was his failure to invade England after the withdrawal from Dunkerque, an admirable illustration of failure to take advantage of a mili- tary vulnerability because of lack of knowledge and planning. In the case of France, on the other hand, the moral weakening of her political struc- ture, and internal dissension and corruption helped to create a vulnerability which the Ger- mans exploited to the full. The capabilities of a state relate to its qualities of strength. The fundamental?and ultimate? capability is that of military power, expressed in time and force, which includes not only men and guns, but also economic and industrial strength. Other strength factors include: geographical po- sition; population, especially of military age; raw materials and industrial plants; transportation facilities; the stability of political structure; and the moral fibre of the people. During World War II, the German and Japanese Governments underestimated both the industrial capability of the United States and the strength and determi- nation of the American people. In planning military operations, the following additional factors of strength or weakness are con- sidered: numerical military strength, effect of Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 INTELLIGENCE: A GENERAL ORIENTATION CONFIDENTIAL time and distance, efficiency of personnel, quality of equipment, special weapons, and logistic sup- port and reinforcement. Given the situation, together with the enemy's vulnerabilities and capabilities, the estimative ele- ment of intelligence takes the form of probable courses of action. It may be deduced, therefore, that this element of intelligence represents guesses or opinions rather than verifiable facts and hence is of doubtful value. It is true that estimative knowledge is not absolute nor as exact as basic and current. However, if based on accurate informa- tion carefully analyzed, it constitutes an educated guess and a carefully considered opinion of a much more valid nature than that derived from an in- dividual "hunch" or snap judgment. Intelligence, then, is a body of knowledge which encompasses in greater or less degree, all world states, and all possible areas of operation. Its ele- ments and component parts are interrelated and intermeshed. Its infinite volume of detail re- quires emphasis only on those portions of knowl- edge which are or will be needed by military com- manders and civilian leaders. It is knowledge for a purpose. The only justification for its col- lection and interpretation is to assist those who will use it in reaching vital decisions. Those who produce intelligence must keep this purpose fore- most in mind. Use for Strategic Purposes Military commanders at all echelons of com- mand draw upon the body of intelligence knowl- edge in solving particular problems and in reach- ing command decisions. Those in top echelons of command, and top-level leaders in government, use areas of this knowledge in formulating plans and policies and reaching decisions affecting the security and welfare of the entire nation. In time of peace, top-level commanders determine how best to dispose and utilize available military forces for the national security and assist the top-level ci- vilian leaders who formulate the national policy toward other nations of the world. In addition, in time of war, these military commanders are re- sponsible for the conduct of total military opera- tions. This employment of intelligence is called Strategic Use. Strategic Use furthers the master plan of the nation's world relationships in both 7 war and peace?its grand strategy, which encom- passes both military planning and foreign policy, and has an inevitable impact on domestic policy as well. From the military point of view, strategy does two things: it determines and assigns objectives which, if achieved, will aid in winning a war and strengthening the peace; and it allocates and gets to the right place at the right time an adequate and suitable force to accomplish each objective against enemy resistance. In respect to national policy, strategy is positive when it aims to im- prove a current situation in world affairs; it is defensive when it strives to prevent a situation from becoming more unfavorable. When the na- tion has a choice of several favorable policies, it then has the strategic initiative. In the restricted military sense, strategy con- notes the application of armed force or the threat of that force; in a broader military-political sense, it includes the use of economic-political- psychological activities to gain diplomatic or trade advantages or to influence the group think- ing of another nation in a manner which will promote the welfare of our own Nation. The strategic role of intelligence when there is no armed conflict is to aid the chiefs of state in formulating grand strategy and to enable military leaders to plan in such a way as to support the decisions of the chiefs of state. An example of the use of intelligence for the purposes of grand strategy is afforded by Hitler's early development of a world-wide system for gathering information which was scientifically analyzed and evaluated. With this weapon he was able to implement his revolutionary methods of warfare, which took economic, political, and psychological forms during the years from 1938 to 1940. It made possible his "fifth-column" ac- tivities, his "war of nerves," and the corruption of high public officials. It was the basis for a succession of historic events: the annexation of Austria, the occupation of Czechoslovakia, Nor- way, the Netherlands, and Belgium, the diplo- matic isolation of the Balkan countries, and the fall of France. Through intelligence activities the Nazis probed the defenses of the Maginot Line, and through a skillful "war of nerves," followed by the ultimate CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS "blitzkrieg," 200,000 men were enabled to defeat a nation with 5,000,000 men under arms. In modern war, strategic bombing has increased the requirements for intelligence knowledge upon which military planners are dependent for target selection. In World War II the bombing of Ger- man industrial targets required information about basic war industries and the thousands of industrial plants involved. For example, a great deal of study preceded the Allied decision. to bomb plants producing aircraft and their compo- nent parts, ball bearings, synthetic rubber and oil, and thus to cripple a most important segment of German war production. The term, "Strategic Intelligence," then, is de- scriptive of one use of intelligence knowledge. Other terms, commonly employed, relate not only to a use of this knowledge but also to the user. "National Intelligence" describes the knowledge used as a basis for reaching comprehe:asive deci- sions regarding national policy, welfare, and se- curity. It also identifies the users as top-level governmental groups whose interests are broader than those of any one department or agency. "Departmental Intelligence" identifies the user as a department of the federal government and re- fers to the knowledge used in the carrying out of its mission and assigned responsibilities. "Naval Intelligence," for example, is one kind of "departmental intelligence." "Interdepartmental Intelligence," which lacks the scope of "National Intelligence," describes knowledge of. common concern to more than one department. Finally, other terms are employed to describe many of the component parts of intelligence knowledge ac- cording to their content: such as "political intelli- gence," "economic intelligence," and "technical intelligence." A. problem in the use of terms such as these has been the resulting erroneous impression that each represents a kind of intelligence that is different from all others. While these various terms are quite acceptable for convenient reference, the point to remember is that they do not describe separate, distinct or compartmented kinds of intelligence. All kinds are irrevocably interrelated; the mean- ing of each, as well as the meaning of the total, is complete only when all are considered together. Regardless of terminology, intelligence can be only CONFIDENTIAL 8 one body of knowledge with component parts and elements which are drawn upon according to the needs of the user. Use for Operational Purposes While toplevel military commanders use intelli- gence for broad planning purposes, they can never lose sight of the fact that their policies and deci- sions must be translated into action by the lower echelons of command. Hence the knowledge used by all echelons is both broad and specific. The only difference is one of emphasis, which stems from the problem to be solved by the user. For example, the knowledge used becomes less broad and more specific as the toplevel decision is trans- ferred for action to the theater commander, down to the task force commander, and so on to the com- manders of the operatng fleet units. Thus intel- ligence is used specifically for operational pur- poses when it is a basis for decisions involving the physical employment of particular men and mate- riel against a particular adversary. Here the current element of intelligence plays a most im- portant part. As one illustration, in the latter days of World War II, the decision to drop an atomic bomb on Hiroshima was made at the highest policy and command levels on the basis of the most compre- hensive available intelligence in view of the stra- tegic implications for the entire Pacific war. At the same time, potential Japanese air opposition required the use of intelligence for specific opera- tional considerations in determining whether or not such a mission could be successfuly carried out. It has often been said that intelligence is used for strategic purposes in time of peace and for operational purposes in time of war. Such a statement might have been approximately correct prior to World War I, when periods of war and of peace could be more accurately labeled. How- ever, just as the pattern of total war has materially reduced the distinction between strategy and tactics so likewise has it resulted in a merging of the uses of intelligence for strategic and opera- tional purposes. In time of peace, or when widespread military conflict is not involved, intelligence may be used for operational purposes, as well as stra- tegic. The ideological war waged by the Soviet Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 INTELLIGENCE: A GENERAL ORIENTATION CONFIDENTIAL Union against many nonCommunist countries, in- cluding the United States since 1945, is illustra- tive. The weapon of ideas has been employed in an effort to incite unrest among labor and racial groups, and to capture the minds of men with false words. To take action against this weapon, radio programs, such as those produced by the Voice of America, have been instituted as a means of pre- senting a true picture of American life and aims. Intelligence has an operational use when it serves as a basis for decisions regarding such matters as audience targets. In times of armed conflict, intelligence has many varied and vital operational uses. In planning and executing a large amphibious operation, such as that at Okinawa, the responsible commanders required the most detailed and comprehensive knowledge concerning the Japanese forces and de- fenses on those islands, the physical area of opera- tions, and enemy forces in adjacent areas which would be capable of interference. In a smaller specific combat situation, such as a submarine mis- sion in the Formosa straits, the submarine com- mander required specific knowledge as to when and where Japanese naval and merchant ships could be expected and which were the best targets. If a merchant ship carrying rice from Saigon to Tokyo was given first priority, that selection might well have represented a strategic as well as an operational use of intelligence. The knowl- edge required as a basis for operations involving aircraft carriers separated by hundreds of miles may be both operational and strategic. For operational purposes, then, there is a need for the most detailed and specific knowledge about the enemy and the anticipated area of conflict. This is true for all types of military operations, amphibious, submarine, antisubmarine, mining, air, fleet, and reconnaissance patrols, to mention only a few. Similar knowledge is also required for the action phase of other types of modern war- fare such as economic, political, and psychological. For convenience of reference in operational ac- tivities, the knowledge involved has been labelled according to its use and its user. For example, the following terms are common: operational intelli- gence, amphibious intelligence, air intelligence, and fleet intelligence. During World War II the term "operational intelligence" was defined as "in- 9 telligence needed by naval commanders in plan- ning and executing operations, including battle," and referred to operations of an extensive and time-consuming nature. A second term, "combat intelligence" was used to describe that part of naval operational intelligence required by naval commanders actually engaging enemy forces dur- ing the comparatively short time of a naval battle. As in the case of the various terms applied to the strategic use of intelligence, it must be pointed out again that no separate or distinctive kinds of in- telligence are involved. The parts or elements of the total body of knowledge are simply being used for a particular purpose which, in this instance, is operational. In connection with military operations, it must be emphasized that intelligence has one primary function: to aid the commander in resolving his mission and supervising the planned action against the enemy. This function, together with the role of the intelligence officer on an operational staff, will be discussed in chapter 12. Use for Countering Purposes A third major use of intelligence arises from the need for countering the positive efforts of poten- tial enemies to carry out against a nation certain inimical activities known as espionage, sabotage, and subversion. In general, these activities have the common objectives of weakening or destroying any or all elements of a nation's total power and warmaking potential, thereby increasing the power advantage of the nation initiating them. Simply stated, espionage is the clandestine collec- tion of information about a foreign country. To a degree, it is the art of spying. However, it may also be any unobserved or unapproved collection of information which, when gained, is used to the disadvantage of the subject nation. The target of espionage is particular information which will aid in determining a nation's capabilities and inten- tions, its strengths and weaknesses. Sabotage is activity directed toward the damage or destruction of physical facilities vital to a na- tion's total power, such as its industrial system and military establishment. Sabotage, however, is not only physical. It may be nonphysical, though just as effective, if its objective is the weakening or destruction of a program or a policy, domestic CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR or foreign, related to a nation's strength, security, and general welfare. This type of sabotage in- cludes enemy activities which have as their result the creating of terror, panic, and civil disorders. Subversion may be described as activity aimed at attacking men's minds for such purposes as destroying primary loyalties and faith in consti- tuted authority, encouraging continued dissension between social and racial groups, or causing in- dividuals and groups to act consistently contrary to the best interests of a nation's government. As an ultimate objective, subversive activities are di- rected toward transforming social institutions and eventually altering a form of government through unconstitutional means. While it is often difficult to differentiate between the activities of nonphysi- cal sabotage and subversion, one point of distinc- tion is the fact that subversion involves a com- plete change in attitudes and points of view, a permanent transfer of loyalties and faith. A dif- ference, then, is to be found in the degree of finality of the results achieved. Because of the common objective and related methods of espio- nage, sabotage, and subversion, the term "subver- sion" is sometimes used to include all of these detrimental activities. Quite naturally, every nation actively endeavors to prevent any other from carrying out success- fully such activities. These opposing efforts are called counterespionage, camtersabotage, and countersubversion. Since it is apparent that some nations of the world have organizations trained to carry out espionage, sabotage, and subversion, the United States Government and its military services must be prepared to counter them in at least two ways. First, adequate security control measures must be established and maintained to safeguard informa- tion, personnel, equipment, and installations against these inimical activities of foreign nations and of disaffected or dissident groups or individ- uals which constitute a threat to the national se- curity; and second, both the foreign organizations and the groups or individuals involved must be actively opposed and prevented from accomplish- ing their objectives. In order to achieve maxi- mum success, our responsible departments and agencies require both comprehensive and detailed knowledge regarding the objectives, plans, and CONFIDENTIAL 10 NAVAL OFFICERS methods of the enemy, and particularly the or- ganizations, groups, and individuals trained in and assigned to the specialized activities described above. The knowledge used to counter these ac- tivities may be called counterintelligence. How- ever, it must be noted immediately that the term "counterintelligence" means much more than "knowledge"; it encompasses both organization and activity. In its comprehensive sense, there- fore, counterintelligence is a specialized phase of intelligence related specifically to security control measures applied against the enemy's activities of espionage, sabotage, and subversion. A more com- plete discussion of this subject will be given in chapter 15. The use of counterintelligence knowledge is closely and continuously related to the uses of in- telligence for strategic and operational purposes. Regardless of the purpose, information concern- ing it must be denied to the enemy, and his efforts to interfere by means of espionage, sabotage, or subversion must be opposed. This is essential in both peace and war. In time of peace for example, information regarding the grand strategy of the United States must be most carefully guarded. In time of war, the military commander usually includes a counterintelligence plan with his opera- tions plan or order. Hence, while intelligence is being used for other purposes, it is being used concurrently to protect those purposes. The na- ture and form of security control measures depend upon knowledge of the enemy and of the particu- lar activities to be countered. The vital part which counterintelligence must play in time of peace is well illustrated by the Gouzenko incident in Canada in 1945. Through the voluntary confession of a cipher clerk in the Soviet Embassy at Ottawa, evidence was revealed that a Soviet spy ring had obtained much vital technical information regarding the atomic bomb. Subsequent additional evidence pointed to the probability that the Soviet Union, profiting from extensive espionage activities, was much further advanced in its atomic research program than had been considered possible. An immediate result of this information was a reduction in the world power advantage of the United States and her allies, maintained as long as she was in exclusive possession of the secrets of the atomic bomb. In Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 INTELLIGENCE: A GENERAL ORIENTATION CONFIDENTIAL view of this newly determined Soviet capability, both our national and military planning and poli- cies became subject to revision. The deficiencies of counterintelligence in this instance had ob- viously significant effects on a worldwide scale. Preparatory to the Allied invasion of Nor- mandy counterintelligence was needed by appro- priate authority to formulate protective, decep- tive, and aggressive measures in the United States, the United Kingdom, and in enemy-occupied' France in order to thwart Nazi efforts to gain vital information regarding invasion plans. It may be assumed that the enemy concentrated his espio- nage activities on finding out the time and place of the Allied landings, and the numbers and disposi- tions of ground, air, and naval units involved; fur- ther, that every effort was made by means of sabotage and subversion to disrupt the imple- mentation of Allied plans. The responsibilities of counterintelligence were tremendous and its contributions substantially effective. These illustrations indicate that knowledge prior to enemy action is of inestimable value. Even more, they imply that positive action in ad- vance which will deny to an enemy the opportunity to commit the act is of even greater value. This action feature of counterintelligence sets it some- what apart from the uses of knowledge already mentioned. As was true of the other two major uses of in- telligence knowledge, various descriptive terms have been applied to counterintelligence in order to define it. For example, it has been labelled as "domestic intelligence," "negative intelligence," "security intelligence," or "passive intelligence." Since these terms are not entirely accurate or com- plete they should be noted only for reference pur- poses. To be remembered is the fact that knowl- edge used for countering purposes is still a part of the total body of knowledge, deriving its full meaning only when considered in the light of the whole. Other Uses There is frequent need for specific items of knowledge; in some cases, merely factual data or information .from which is derived the encyclo- pedic or basic element of knowledge. For ex- ample, in the formulation of a new policy or in the solution of a military problem, an agency or a commander may need to know the cargo unloading capacity of a certain port, the depth of water alongside a particular pier, the source of water for a town, or the lowest recorded temperature at the South Pole. Various departments or agen- cies concentrate on specific areas of knowledge and must be prepared to provide reference service to organizations working on related problems. When knowledge or information is used for this purpose it is known as Spot Intelligence or Spot Informa- tion. It is usually obtained by intelligence agen- cies or collection units in response to a specific re- quest. Important as this use is, care must be taken to ensure that concentration on the requirements of Spot Intelligence does not result in a neglect of the overall requirements of the intelligence mission. Other uses of intelligence may well arise in years to come. Since 1945 a concept of world state communities has been growing out of the activities of the United Nations and its associated regional pacts. As the United States increases its participation in these activities it is quite possible that there will be new uses for intelligence in such joint enterprises. But regardless of any new uses, or special terms to describe them, the knowledge involved will still remain a part of the total body of intelligence as far as the United States is concerned. In discussing various uses of intelligence, the users have been described in general terms. They include not only civilian leaders within the federal government and military leaders in all echelons of command, but also individual military person- nel with specialized jobs?such as pilots, boat- swain's mates, and tank drivers. Even those who produce intelligence must use it in order to con- tinue the orderly expansion of the total body of knowledge. It is the organization of these pro- ducers that gives a second connotation to the word intelligence. INTELLIGENCE AS ORGANIZATION In his book, A Soldier's Story, General of the Army Omar N. Bradley makes the following com- ment: "Later in the War, I often explained to my Staff that 0-2 (Intelligence) existed to tell me what should be done on the basis of his in- 11 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR formation concerning the enemy." In this statement, General Bradley is referring to the or- ganiZation which produces the knowledge he, as a commander, must have for his use. When spelled with a capital "I," Intelligence means organi- zation. The historical development of intelligence or- ganizations, and characteristics of the United States intelligence system are more fully discussed in chapters 2 and 3, but it is pertinent here to stress the impact of the pattern of total war on all intelligence organizations. Not only has to- tal war caused a tremendous expansion of the total body of knowledge needed by civil government and military command, but it has also forced an intensive development of organizations specializ- ing in many fields to gather and to produce that knowledge. Some nations, having maintained intelligence organizations for hundreds of years, have a substantial background upon which to draw. The United States, however, has a much more limited background; and only in recent years has it endeavored to stabilize the structure of its national intelligence system. The poten- tialities of this system, in peace and in war, are great indeed; its youth is a limiting factor which will be overcome only by inspired leadership, hard work, and continuous years of experience. Prior to, during, and even after World War I, intelligence production was handled on an indi- vidual basis, with little coordination of effort. Total war, however, has brought about require- ments for knowledge based on information of such complexity and pervasiveness throughout the total of man's activities that it cannot be encom- passed by individuals working singly. Meaning- ful intelligence requires the group effort of many individuals whose activities must be carefully directed and coordinated. Therefore, efficient organization and skillful production have as- sumed great importance. Sherman Kent has aptly stated that good in- telligence organizations must possess certain char- acteristics of a large university faculty, a great metropolitan newspaper, and a good commercial business organization. First, management must appreciate and tolerate broad individual freedom in the search for truth by personnel selected for their abilities in research and analysis. Second, CONFIDENTIAL 12 NAVAL OFFICERS organizational doctrine must emphasize rigid ad- herence to the time requirements for completion of assignments, an observance of editorial policy, and an individual responsibility for accuracy, completeness, and clarity of meaning And third, the producers must be sure that the product is prepared and packaged in accordance with the needs and wishes of the consumer. They must also consider its value in relation to its cost. Like 'a good business, Intelligence must stress plan- ning; it must study the market, consumer reaction to its product, and new consumer problems which will require the development of new products. Intelligence must be a carefully defined, smoothly operating organization which remains sufficiently flexible to permit adjustment to emergencies. Continued application of the principles of mod- ern management will aid in streamlining intelli- gence organizations to reduce duplication of effort, without sacrificing complete coverage. Special efforts of management must be directed toward the development of a sense of purpose for each organization, an understanding of the over- all intelligence production problems, and an ap- preciation of the interdependence of the various producing organizations. Close coordination of the intelligence production of the various serv- ices, departments and agencies, together with the greatest care in selection and training of person- nel, can do much to develop smoothly operating organizations. Many problems of United States intelligence organizations stem from inexperience and from the inevitable fact that much information collected is incomplete and imperfect. Still others arise from the techniques employed to refine the infor- mation. It should be clearly understood that, since this information relates substantially to the variables of human behavior, its processing into intelligence cannot apply fully the techniques of scientific research and laboratory method used by the exact sciences. An appreciation of various basic reasons for some of the problems of intelli- gence organization can, in itself, benefit both the producers and the consumers of intelligence. Of necessity, intelligence work has become a profession, deriving its substance from other pro- fessional fields, especially from the exact sciences and the social studies, but also requiring the con- Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 INTELLIGENCE: A GENERAL ORIENTATION CONFIDENTIAL tributions of the historian, economist, lawyer, and linguist. No longer is it desirable for individuals to be impressed into Intelligence service with the hope that they can "pick it up." The require- ments for each worker include an accurate fund of knowledge which is not only broad, but also specific (in at least one field) . In addition, cer- tain basic personal qualities are indispensable. Basic Attributes of Personnel Intelligence is an organization made up of peo- ple; its effectiveness and success rest upon them. What then should be some. of their personal qual- ities? First of all is flexibility of mind, which may be defined as the ability to meet new situa- tions effectively as they arise. One who possesses this quality is capable of bold and original thought, and he does not hesitate when the need arises to depart from traditional procedure. A second quality is the ability to assimilate quickly a large and perhaps diverse number of facts into a comprehensive whole, from which sig- nificant meanings may be drawn. This quality obviously implies others, such as a faculty for ab- sorption and retention of background information, a natural curiosity, well-ordered mental processes, and imagination tempered by common sense. The ability to speak and write clearly, concisely, and accurately is essential if the information or intelligence is to be successfully transmitted to those who need to know. Personal enthusiasm, a strong sense of balance and proportion, and a wholehearted spirit of co- operation rank high on the list. Because intelli- gence work represents group effort, no one person should depreciate the work of others and magnify his own; he must recognize that there is much he can give and much he can receive in the total pro- duction effort. He should never lose sight of the fact that he is contributing to overall objectives and meanings which may be vital for his country- men's survival. Loyalty, then, is also basic. Intellectual honesty is that quality which will compel the intelligence work& to transmit the true meaning of his knowledge as he sees it, and not as the potential user would like to hear it. Emo- tional stability is essential to continued good judg- ment as well as to the indispensable quality of re- liability. The significance of these qualities is well illustrated by the case of Col. Alfred Redl, head of all Austrian espionage during the days of the Old Austro-Hungarian Empire prior to World War I. Because of his homosexuality, he was successfully blackmailed by a Russian agent who obtained Austrian secret war plans, military codes, and a list of Austrian agents in Russia. The appalling defeats suffered by the Austrians in Galicia early in World War I were partly attrib- utable to Redl's vulnerability. Other qualities and abilities are required in in- telligence work, varying in degree according to the particular duties assigned. They will be dis- cussed as appropriate in later sections of this text. The intelligence officer must possess qualities of leadership commensurate with the responsibilities of his billet. In general, he must have a minimum amount of knowledge in all fields relating to his work so that he may recognize the existence and general nature of any problem. For example, he must know enough about an area of operations to appreciate any conditions which might give rise to problems of health for a landing force. He must be able to coordinate the precise technical knowledge of the staff expert with his own general knowledge about the enemy in order to evaluate the full implications correctly. Finally, he must be able to integrate subsidiary conclusions in order to reach the essential overall estimate. It becomes apparent that the requirements for the intelligence officer are highly exacting. The body of knowledge with which he must concern himself is both comprehensive and widely varied. The question immediately arises as to where such personnel may be found and how they should be selected. Selection of Personnel In the case of officers for Naval Intelligence bil- lets, a basic knowledge regarding the United States Navy is a first requirement. This knowl- edge can best be obtained from active naval serv- ice, although good training at naval schools can be an emergency substitute. The importance of this requirement has been indicated previously, when it was noted that the production of knowledge about the enemy and the area of operations is often facilitated by knowledge of our own forces and our methods in comparable operations. In addi- 13 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS tion to naval knowledge and training, officers must be carefully selected on the basis of the personal attributes described above and the particular re- quirements of the billet for which they are being considered. Specialized intelligence training is also essential. In general, intelligence personnel should be se- lected from those who have specialized in fields of knowledge to which intelligence is related, such as architecture, archeology, engineering, geology, cartology, hydrography, photogrammetry, law, transportation and shipping, languages, the nat- ural and physical sciencies, and the social studies. Valuable experience includes extensive foreign travel, investigative work with federal and state agencies, research and analysis, executive and ad- ministrative. While it is true that the selected specialists are well versed in their own fields, they are entering a new field, and must learn to perform their assigned duties in Intelligence in accordance with new techniques. Training of all personnel is imperative. The Value of Training At least two facts emphasize the necessity for the most exacting training: First, the production of intelligence involves an intricate developmental process for which all pertinent material is seldom available; and second, the finished product may be vital to the welfare and security of the Nation and to the very lives of fellow countrymen. In order to contribute effectively to this produc- tion, intelligence personnel must fully explore all possible sources for information; they must know when and how to explore; they must thoroughly understand the process for refining this informa- tion: the adding, subtracting, tempering, and test- ing which go into the forging of intelligence. In this refining process, they need experience to ap- preciate the degree of improvising possible when essential items are missing, and the logical se- quence to be followed in interpretation of informa- tion. Above all, they must never forget that the product has no value unless it can be used. The critical factors of time and space in modern war- fare subject them to a great amount of production under pressure. To say that intelligence workers are made, not born, implies that there are no substitutes for CONFIDENTIAL 14 training, continuous study, conscientious effort, and years of experience. As in other fields, the mechanics of training are not enough; the motiva- tion must come from the worker himself. No out- side assistance can be of real value without a determination on the part of the individual to become not just another intelligence worker but the very best. Although he may be a specialist in a particular field, the intelligence officer must develop an ap- preciation of the other fields which comprise the sum total of intelligence knowledge. With this appreciation, he can more effectively direct his own efforts. Training must encourage that har- mony of effort so important for the success of any organization. Learning through doing is another important training requirement. Painstaking, detailed work is part of the routine, a necessary preliminary to exciting accomplishment. A continuous training program can help to define the goals and objec- tives. Such a program must also include Reserve personnel. Indoctrination in security measures for han- dling classified material is an essential part of training. The intelligence officer must not only be thoroughly familiar with the regulations as set forth in the Navy's Security Manual for Classified Matter, but he must also have a real appreciation of their guiding principle, that classified material is made available only on a "need to know" basis. Intelligence personnel can provide accurate knowl- edge regarding a problem only if they have access to all data bearing on that problem. If the clas- sification of certain data restricts availability, knowledge will be incomplete and false conclu- sions may be drawn. Intelligence officers, there- fore, rank high on the list of those who need to know. There seems to be no question but that training, and continued training, is of inestimable value for developing the highest caliber of personnel to produce the highest caliber of intelligence. A program of training for reserve military person- nel in peacetime has assumed more importance because of the rapidity with which the military services must expand in the event of total war. If military intelligence organizations are to be sufficiently flexible to continue adequate and effi- Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 INTELLIGENCE: A GENERAL ORIENTATION CONFIDENTIAL cient production of intelligence under wartime con- ditions, there must be a substantial reserve force, well trained, which can be activated in a minimum time interval. Since World War II, the develop- ment of a permanent intelligence corps in each branch of the Armed Forces represents a step toward improving this situation. While the ac- complishments of reserve personnel in World War II were phenomenal, considering the fact that their training was carried out "on the job," mis- takes were made. Modern warfare has reduced materially the available time to recover from mis- takes. Only training can maintain reserve mili- tary personnel at a degree of efficiency which will permit them when called upon to contribute ef- fectively to the production of intelligence. Undoubtedly, one of the most difficult aspects of training is that of method in intelligence produc- tion. This term, production, brings our discus- sion to the third connotation of the word "intelligence." INTELLIGENCE AS PRODUCTION "Intelligence involves the collecting of infor- mation, its processing, and the disseminating of the resultant knowledge to those who need it." In this illustrative statement, intelligence means production. The production effort, known as the intelligence cycle, includes collection, processing, and dissemination. Since the cycle is the subject of later chapters, only certain general comments need to be made here. A technical intelligence vocabulary has been developed to apply to the various phases of production. Different terms are sometimes used by different organizations to describe the same working tools, working proce- dures, and mental processes, but if the basic proc- esses involved are kept clearly in mind, confusion over definitions can easily be avoided. If the intelligence cycle is to be effective, there must be careful planning and firm direction to the production effort. Priorities in collection must be established, and a continuing program of guidance instituted for economic and efficient op- eration throughout all phases of the cycle. Intel- ligence organizations must be kept informed of overall plans and policies so that everything they do will have meaning and value. 15 Emphasis on the collection phase of intelligence production has resulted in the use of special terms to describe sources of information. For example, covert intelligence refers to information obtained by secret means, through spies or undercover agents, without the consent of the country in- volved. While it is this type of collection which has given intelligence activity the flavor of ad- venture and mystery, by far the greater amount of information is derived from sources available to anyone who knows how and where to look. Such sources include the newspapers, periodicals, governmental and business reports, radio broad- casts, and diplomatic representatives. Informa- tion gained from such sources is often called overt intelligence. Intelligence Collection in Time of Peace It is readily apparent that the collection of in- formation and the production of intelligence in peacetime is facilitated because information is customarily more easily available than in war- time. With the exception of some areas con- trolled by totalitarian states, data can be collected the world over to provide the encyclopedic knowl- edge which forms the broad base of intelligence. It is in such periods that Intelligence can make its greatest contribution to the nation by pro- ducing knowledge which can be used to thwart the nonmilitary aggression of other states, to pre- vent surprise, and to avoid devastating military conflict. In preparing for total war and avoiding sur- prise, collecting information, and developing knowledge regarding the scientific and technical advances of other nations assume particular sig- nificance. Science has always been applied to the perfecting of weapons of war. The improvement of old weapons and the invention of new ones have progressed rapidly since World War II. Never before has the fate of nations been sus- pended so precariously in the balance or depended so completely on the efforts of scientists racing against time. The increasing range of weapons and new tactics in their employment have brought home to the United States the awesome prospect of being caught by surprise. Ignorance might be a deciding factor in total war; intelligence is the weapon which must combat it. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS The importance of intelligence in peacetime is well known to the French. The Prussian collec- tion effort, prior to the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, was so thorough that Bismarck's armies practically walked into Paris. The Nazi suc- cesses prior to World War II provide more recent and equally appropriate examples. Intelligence Collection in Time of War The collection of information in time of war is accomplished by methods which are usually more costly in terms of men, money, and materiel. The enemy, once identified, expends even greater efforts to deny information regarding himself or to con- trovert this information for the purposes of deception. Clausewitz pointed out the difficulties of war- time collection when he said: "A great part of the information obtained in war is contradictory, a still greater part is false, and by far the greatest part is somewhat doubtful. What is required of an officer in this case is a certain power of dis- crimination, which only knowledge of men and things and good judgment can give. The law of probability must be his guide." In time of war, collection is aided by such opera- tional means as aircraft, submarines, reconnais- sance patrols, ships, and by the interrogation of prisoners. Photography then becomes an indis- pensable means of collection, and a source of knowledge for both strategic and operational pur- poses. The accurate interpretation of photo- graphs reveals both the activities of the enemy and the terrain characteristics of the area of opera- tions. Because the factor of time has assumed such importance, continuing efforts are being made to develop techniques which will speed the trans- mission of photographic information from its source to those who can interpret and dissem- inate it. The numerical requirements for trained intelli- gence personnel rise sharply in wartime. In the case of the Navy alone, hundreds of additional officers and enlisted men must be assigned to the expanded fleet organization, flag staffs, motor tor- pedo boat, and air squadrons; to intelligence cen- ters and advanced base units; to sea frontiers and naval districts; to naval attache posts; and to joint or combined military staffs. Rapid expan- CONFIDENTIAL 16 sion can be accomplished only if there are sub- stantial well trained reserve groups which can be quickly activated. To insure the continuous flow of intelligence production, however, adequate numbers must be employed at all times, in peace as well as war. The curtailment of this produc- tion can be as disastrous to the nation as the failure to keep pace with the development of physical weapons. Processing Information The collection of information is a time-consum- ing and expensive operation. It can be an almost futile effort unless its results can be converted into usable knowledge. This conversion phase is much more than the physical handling or rearrangement of information received; it involves original think- ing as well as logical thought processes. Ob- viously, many difficulties arise in large organi- zations where volumes of factual material must be so catalogued and disposed that interrelation- ships can be studied and new meanings derived. Processing data may be compared to refining crude oil. The oil is subjected to many stages of cracking; at each stage a different substance is developed; until, at the final stage, a new product is created. So it is with the processing of in- formation. When received, the original informa- tion is studied. From this study, first conclusions are drawn. These conclusions are then studied in connection with those supplied by other basic data. At each stage of study, the subject material is transformed into a new conclusion. As in the oil cracking process, each stage must follow a logi- cal sequence. For ready reference at each stage of production, a complete and systematic filing system is essential. At no point, however, can any study or solution be considered as irrevocably definitive, in view of the fact that it concerns the activities of men in which there is constant change. Therefore, no conclusion may be said to be final; each is subject to possible change. Of course, material dealing with certain physical con- ditions, such as terrain, are the least subject to change. A basic problem of production is that the in- formation received may be incomplete and con- tradictory, requiring the application of the most searching standards of proof for all conclusions. Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 INTELLIGENCE: A GENERAL ORIENTATION CONFIDENTIAL The processing phase itself is a delicate operation and subject to errors resulting from the omission of necessary comparisons, the inclusion of false data, or failure to follow a logical sequence. The problems of processing and the application of scientific methods in intelligence production will be discussed at more length in a later chapter. Intelligence Action In the military services, intelligence is a staff function operating as an adjunct of the com- mander. Intelligence takes a vigorous part in helping to formulate the action which will be taken by or in the name of the commander. In- telligence, therefore, is not an action agency, if by the term is meant chain of command authority. However, action, and plenty of it, is involved constantly in the collection of information and in the prompt dissemination of intelligence to those who need it. Skillful action also is required in countering the intelligence efforts of potential ene- mies, as exemplified by the activities of the Army's Counter Intelligence Corps. To be stressed is the fact that Intelligence must maintain a positive and aggressive point of view, together with a keen sense of responsibility for its part in any action which will be taken. Intel- ligence personnel can never retire from the scene of decision after presenting their recommenda- tions; they continue to function after decisions are made and often become a part of action taken. CONCLUSION The purpose of this chapter has been to acquaint the naval officer with the meaning and significance of intelligence. It has been emphasized that in- telligence is one great body of knowledge, used for a variety of vital purposes. It is the result of skillful production by organizations composed of carefully trained personnel, and in the right hands at the right time, it provides a sound basis for diplomatic and military decisions affecting the welfare and security of the nation. Such intel- ligence, coordinated at the highest governmental level, is of common concern to more than one or- ganization and transcends the exclusive com- petence of any one part of the total system. It must not be assumed, however, that Intel- ligence is infallible or that it can provide all neces- sary knowledge. The most desirable situation would be the presentation of the precise intentions of potential enemies: when and where and with what means they plan to strike. Because such precise knowledge is seldom obtainable, Intelli- gence strives to provide the closest approximation. Limitations of Intelligence Intelligence is not without its limitations, the first being that information regarding potential enemies is often incomplete and inaccurate. While a vast amount of information is available for col- lection, the most vital is obviously concealed to the greatest degree possible. Often, incorrect in- formation is made available for purposes of de- ception, and its true identification requires both skill and experience. Since he seldom knows the enemy's specific objectives, the collector of infor- mation does not always grasp the significance of what he gathers, and his reports become meaning- ful only when collated with other data by the intelligence producing unit. A second limitation arises from incomplete un- derstanding of our own plans and objectives. In the field of national affairs, this limitation is caused by the fact that the United States is still trying to interpret its own position of world lead- ership and to formulate specific objectives which can aid the world today in the struggle against the threat of global conflict. In the field of mili- tary command, Intelligence will be limited by the extent of its knowledge of the commanders' plans and problems. A third limitation is that of personnel with suffi- cient skills and experience. Only in recent years has Intelligence been considered as a professional field, and its personnel in general require more training and more practical experience. Its doc- trines of method and procedure are still in the de- velopmental stage. In the military services, there has been additional limitation of numbers, for in the past, Intelligence has been manned almost ex- clusively by reservists called to duty in time of actual conflict. In time of so-called peace, it has been skeletonized to the degree that production has been critically limited. A fourth limitation of intelligence lies in the research process itself. An error in basic data, if not recognized, can become magnified progres- 17 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS sively to produce entirely false conclusions. In intelligence work the cost of such errors may be measured in human life. Recognizing this limi- tation, intelligence workers must exercise every effort to avoid the use of incorrect data and to re- view most carefully the conclusions reached at each stage of the production effort. Other more specific limitations, such as those of the physical equipment sometimes used in the collection of information, will be noted in other sections of this text. In connection with the gen- eral limitations indicated above, it is apparent that several can be reduced to a minimum and perhaps eliminated. The controlling factors include time, with its accumulation of experience, and an in- creased understanding of the problems involved in intelligence production. The Place of Naval Intelligence The comprehensive body of intelligence knowl- edge may be compared to a large pyramid, at the top of which are placed the most highly refined estimates needed for national policy decisions. Each contributing organization is represented by a cross section of the pyramid. Into these sec- tions is channeled the raw data acquired from thousands of sources at home and abroad. There is a descending as well as an ascending flow of knowledge within this pyramid, as specific re- quests for estimates are passed from the top down. The same holds true even within the organiza- tional levels. There is also movement horizon- tally between organizations on the same level. The speed with which the knowledge flows within and to the top of the pyramid depends upon the efficiency of the various organizations which make CONFIDENTIAL 18 up the pyramid. Because of the changing nature of war itself there can no longer be watertight compartments of knowledge nor can any one of these organizations be considered self-sufficient. Each contributes to and receives from the total body of knowledge. Naval Intelligence is an integral part of this pyramid. It produces what is known as depart- mental intelligence. It contributes to the total body of knowledge through the use of the pro- fessional naval training and experience of its per- sonnel in interpreting and evaluating data con- cerning an enemy. It provides specialized naval agencies particularly adaptable for the collection of certain types of information. It gives guid- ance to the collection effort to assure that the in- formation procured is relevant to the needs of naval planners and policy makers. It produces intelligence which will directly serve naval com- manders in the solutions of their problems and the reaching of decisions both for overall plan- ning and specific operations. While Naval Intelligence must therefore con- tribute to the total body of knowledge, it must also utilize those parts of the total body of knowledge which directly or indirectly affect the successful accomplishment of its assigned respon- sibilities. The same applies to all other organi- zations of our national intelligence system. The only difference is one of emphasis. For these reasons, the scope of this text is neces- sarily large, in order that it may serve at least two purposes: to indicate to the naval officer the broad body of knowledge with which he must be familiar, and to point out the specific naval uses of this knowledge. Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL CHAPTER 2 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTELLIGENCE INTRODUCTION Intelligence is neither new nor peculiar to mod- ern times, whether it be interpreted as knowledge, as organization, or as production. While the em- phasis on its many aspects has varied from time to time, intelligence has always existed in one form or another. Ever since men organized themselves into community groups they have sought for var- ious reasons to dominate other groups, by means of military force or by political or economic measures backed by military force. Whatever the means employed, advance information about the enemy, when collected and processed, has been used to advantage from time to time throughout re- corded history. The story of armed combat is fundamentally a record of the historical evolution of military or- ganization: from primitive men who fought as independent individuals with stones and clubs to modern men who fight as part of an intricate mass machine. As the organizations grew in size, so did the battles fought, requiring more and more the use of military staffs to assist the commanders in planning and carrying out their decisions. The history of this military growth has been divided into three periods: the first, from the beginning of written records to the fall of the Roman Em- pire, a period when military methods evolved from mob action into a recognized art, including prac- tically all of the modern principles of war; the second, the Middle Ages, when there was almost no progressive military thought; and the third, from about 1632, the time of Gustavus Adolphus, to the 20th century, when modern military ma- chines emerged. As military organization has de- veloped, so has Intelligence. Thus Intelligence has a military origin. Full knowledge has always been essential for the suc- cessful general. The French Marshal Maurice de Saxe, in recording his experiences, commented: "You cannot give too much attention to spies and guides . . . They are as useful as the eyes in your head and, to a general, are quite as indispensable." To be found in one form or another in the ancient writings about war is the maxim: "Other things being equal, victory goes to the commander with the latest and the best information." Political leaders and the governments of nations have also made use of intelligence since the beginning of recorded history. While both military and political leaders have long recognized the importance of gaining ad- vance information, there have been times when they either failed to obtain it or neglected to make use of it. A study of military history reveals that many defeats in battle have resulted from failures to use intelligence. Indeed, there are indications that intelligence has had a marked effect on the shaping of world events. Illustrative of a failure to use intelligence, and the effect on later events, is the case of the British Admiral De Robeck whose Anglo-French fleet won a complete victory in the Dardenelles during World War I. As a result the Turkish Govern- ment began the evacuation of Constantinople, and the Allies might have taken the city, had De Ro- beck made any effort to obtain information about the enemy. In ignorance he withdrew, and con- sequently the ill-fated and disastrous Gallipoli campaign was undertaken. A striking feature of the historical development of intelligence is its slow progress, shown by the similarity of ancient and modern methods. There is little difference between the instructions of Moses to his 12 spies who were to go into the land of Canaan and those of Stieber, Bismarck's In- telligence Chief, to his agents who were to infil- trate France. The difference is merely in the numbers involved. In fact, modern intelligence seems to have little that is really new, although the character of intelligence has changed from time to time. Before the rise of nationalism, the collecting of information was a trade carried on 19 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS by those whose services were at the disposal of the highest bidder. With the upsurge of the modern states, patriotism gave new motivation to the ac- tivities of the collector. In recent times, some of those engaged in intelligence activities are moti- vated solely by an ideological fanaticism which recognizes no national boundaries. It is obviously quite difficult to trace the his- torical development of intelligence. It is seldom exposed to the public eye, and for reasons of se- curity, those making use of intelligence cannot disclose methods, sources of information, and ex- tent of knowledge. Available records, therefore, are relatively few and incomplete. It is clear, however, that intelligence has not only been the first line of any nation's defense, but also the springboard of offensive action aimed at surprise and deception. At times it has taken the form of a shadowy undercover war of world-wide proportions. As a result, the outcome of great battles involving armies, navies, and air forces, has depended upon the result of conflicts between intelligence organizations. These have often taken place long before a declaration of war, and have continued after the signing of an armistice. The intensity of the total intelligence effort be- fore and after World War II indicates that intelli- gence activity is of a long range and continuing nature. Intelligence has served many purposes. From earliest times tyrants have subverted intelligence organizations into repressive systems of political police, thus placing exaggerated emphasis upon domestic espionage and counterespionage. Free people, too, have used intelligence to advantage in promoting and maintaining their national inter- ests. Historically speaking, Intelligence has not been the exclusive tool of armies and governments, for it has also been used by revolutionaries, church- men, bankers, trade unions, and criminals. In this historical review, the intelligence activi- ties of armies and governments are of primary interest. Much can be learned from past experi- ences for contemporary application. EARLY HISTORY The desire for advance information about a prospective adversary is an instinctive character- istic of man. Even primitive tribes, with only CONFIDENTIAL the crudest weapons and no appreciable sense of group discipline, carried out reconnaissance of their enemies. For example, before a band of forest Indians set forth on the warpath, their chiefs sent the most able warriors to learn about the trails and streams in the area of attack and to discover the numbers, disposition, and state of preparedness of the enemy. The early successes of the American Indians against numerically su- perior and better armed white men were often the result of the Indians' superior, though primitive, system of intelligence. 20 Intelligence in Antiquity Intelligence activity is as old as war. One of the earliest and best known records may be found in the Bible. Moses selected men from each of the twelve tribes and sent them into Canaan with these instructions: "See the land, what it is; and the people that dwelleth therein, whether they be strong or weak, few or many; And what the land is that they dwell in, whether it be good or bad; and what cities they be that they dwell in, whether in tents, or in strongholds; And what the land is, whether it be fat or lean, whether there be wood therein or not." It is to be noted that he chose leading men to do the job, and that their instructions included both the characteristics of the enemy and the area of potential operations. But long before Moses, the Pharaohs of Egypt were receiving regular intelligence reports from their agents scattered beyond the valley of the Nile. The Egyptian army had a rudimentary staff organization which included an intelligence function, that of receiving reports from recon- naissance units. With the Assyrian armies as models, the Persians under Darius made further advances in military organization and planning. Herodotus' account of their invasion of Greece describes the extensive preparation that preceded their military campaigns. A system of staff or- ganization was developed, and there is evidence of the functional existence, at least, of intelligence officers. The soldier kings, apparently, did not delegate any operational functions, but kept them inherent in command and so they have remained ever since. It is also most likely that the so-called "intelligence officers" were primarily collectors, and that the early military commanders who led Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 THE DEVELOPMENT their followers into battle solved their own intelli- gence problems and did not rely on intermediaries to digest information reports. However, they did develop extensive courier services for the rapid transmittal of intelligence and administrative reports. Alexander the Great inherited an efficient mili- tary machine from his father and for thirteen years carried on continuous campaigns throughout the then-known world. While the basis for a military staff existed in the form of several officers under his personal direction, Alexander appears to have been his own intelligence and operations officer. He relied heavily on reconnaissance, which was essentially on operational function. Military postal censorship is reported to have orig- inated with this Greek conqueror. During one of his expeditions into Asia he heard rumors of dis- affection among his allies and mercenaries. In order to determine the true situation, he announced that he was writing home and encouraged his officers to do likewise. When all the messages had been collected, he examined them and proceeded to correct such conditions as appeared to have been justly criticized. Intelligence in Ancient India At about the same time that Alexander was ex- tending his conquests, the famous Brahman, Kautilya, is reputed to have overthrown the Nanda dynasty and established the first Mauryan king on the throne of India. Kautilya is known not only as a kingmaker but also as the greatest Indian exponent of the art of government, the duties of kings, ministers, and officials, and the methods of diplomacy. A Sanskrit book of ad- vice to rulers, attributed to him, reads in part almost as a modern manual on military and polit- ical intelligence. It emphasizes the fact that a highly organized intelligence service is essential to the state and of first consideration in both peace and war. In discussing the expansion and se- curity of the state Kautilya says, " . . . he who has the eye of knowledge . . . can, with little ef- fort, make use of his skill for intrigue, and can succeed by means of conciliation and other strate- gic means and by spies . . . in overreaching even those kings who are possessed of enthusiasm and power." OF INTELLIGENCE 21 CONFIDENTIAL Kautilya recommends that his ruler should first strike the enemy at his weak points by means of spies. In describing the means to conquer an en- emy's stronghold, he lists first "intrigue, spies," and "winning over the enemy's people." "Siege and assault" are last on the list. Although his terminology is a bit obscure, he accurately de- scribes the modern fifth column and Soviet sub- versive activities when he says: "The arrow shot by the archer may or may not kill a single man; but skillful intrigue devised by wise men can kill even those as yet unborn." Distrust and suspi- cion are powerful weapons when forged within an enemy country. Before beginning a military operation, Kautilya advises: "The conqueror should know the compar- ative strength and weakness of himself and his enemy" and no war should be undertaken without a careful examination of all the factors as reported by the king's spies. These factors could well serve as an outline for an estimate of the situation pre- pared by a modern military staff. "Having ascer- tained the power, place, time, the time of march- ing and of recruiting the army, the consequences, the loss of men and money, and profits and dan- ger," the conqueror "should march with his full force." Kautilya divides the king's army into five parts: elephants, chariots, horsemen, archers, and spies and of these he considers the spies the most important. The spy system of the Mauryans apparently rivaled that of the modern Soviets. It included many classes, both military and political, operat- ing within India and in adjoining countries. One class shadowed the king's ministers and officials and attempted to determine their very thoughts. Another, drawn from the merchants and farmers, reported on the wrongdoings of the people. A third, whose sons and wives were kept at home as hostages, operated secretly in foreign countries, spreading unrest, committing acts of sabotage, and even assassinating political and military leaders. Official envoys to foreign kings were instructed to make friends with officials of the enemy, to con- trast military stations, war material and enemy strongholds with those of their master, to deter- mine the size and location of forts, to identify local intrigues, to sow dissension, and to determine en- emy intentions. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS Counterspies and watchmen were employed; there were border guards to check on all who attempted to enter or to leave; and travelers had to have passes. In order to dispose of seditious persons who opposed the king, these persons were secretly incited to reckless action and then con- demned. Kautilya reminded his king that he would be able to know all things through his spy system, and that his information should be con- sidered reliable if received from three different sources in exactly the same version. He also em- phasized the importance of the speedy transmis- sion of information. The Mauryan Empire of India appears to have been a police state in the most modern sense. Kautilya's book seems to have been a standard manual for the Mauryan rulers, and to have been based on experience. A study of the methods of this ancient dynasty, which was able to conquer and hold a greater part of India, sheds consider- able light on the intelligence operations of any despotic state. Intelligence and War in Ancient China It is indicative of the early development of civilization in Asia that outstanding military and political leaders were recording their experiences and knowledge long before the same was done in Europe. About Kautilya's time in India, a Chinese General named Sun Tzu wrote a treatise on the Art of War which was so sound that its principles may be easily adapted to modern war- fare. Sun Tzu discussed the fundamentals of war and the influence of politics and human na- ture on military operations. His writings indi- cate, in a striking manner, how unchanging these fundamentals are. Writing as a field commander on the subject of strategy and tactics, Sun Tzu emphasized the im- portance of terrain study and accurate informa- tion about enemy strength and intentions. He stressed maneuver and deception and the attain- ment of victory by indirect methods. Like Kautilya, he recommended battle only as a final resort and placed primary importance on a good intelligence service: "A hundred ounces of silver spent for information may save ten thousand spent on war." His formula for victory aptly states the basic reason for maintaining an intelli- CONFIDENTIAL 22 gence service: "If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor your- self, you will succumb in every battle." Sun Tzu warns against information derived from appearances alone, and accepts only that which is obtained from intelligence agents. Most effective are those who have penetrated the high councils of the enemy and the operators whom we now term "double-agents." In addition, it is profitable to employ inhabitants of an enemy country to act as local spies, and to have other agents spreading false rumors for purposes of de- ception. Finally, there must be spies in the enemy forces to be firsthand sources of informa- tion. In selecting intelligence personnel Sun Tzu would employ only those with natural abil- ity and of high mental caliber. He continues with the observation that if military warfare be- comes necessary, "spies are a most important ele- ment, because on them depends an army's ability to move." Another Sun Tzu maxim has been heeded by both Nazi and Soviet leaders of recent years: "To fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance with- out fighting." Developments by the Romans Quite independent of the Oriental generals, but about the same time, the Romans were developing their own military organization and doctrine in Europe. By the time of Julius Caesar the staff of each legion included ten "speculatores" who served as an information collecting agency. Caesar's successful campaign against the Helve- tians was aided materially by advance information he acquired about their strength, movements, and plans. The "speculatores" are the first intel- ligence personnel to appear definitely in a military staff organization, and there is evidence that the Romans differentiated between the staff functions of intelligence and operations. This early dis- tinction was not "re-discovered" by military com- manders until relatively modern times. The military success of the Romans was also aided by their communications system. Frontinus Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTELLIGENCE CONFIDENTIAL and Lipsius, in their writings, describe the train- ing of swallows as long distance messengers and the use of carrier pigeons, which explains the amazing speed with which the intelligence of Im- perial Rome was transmitted. An efficient intel- ligence organization was thus able to give warning of an impending surprise offensive by Hannibal and Antiochus in Asia Minor in time to enable Lucius Scipio to regroup his forces and administer a crushing defeat at Lydia. The Romans also em- ployed ciphers to ensure the secrecy of communica- tions. Skillful covert operations were of positive mili- tary value. Scipio Africanus used his officers dis- guised as menials and servants to secure reliable data on the strength of the opposing Numidian army. His methods have a peculiarly modern flavor since, in order to gain time for accurate ob- servations, he entered into negotiations with the Numidians, presumably to arrange a treaty. In the following centuries of Roman imperial- ism, intelligence continued to be fostered by the emperors, and covert activities were practised to an unscrupulous and vicious degree in palace cir- cles. Vegetius, in his advice to the Emperor Vu- lentinian, states that a general may avoid defeat if he employs spies on whose intelligence he can depend. Like the military writers of Asia, he em- phasized the importance of trying to sow dis- sension among enemy peoples, and comments that no enemy nation, regardless of how weak, can be completely ruined "unless its fall be facilitated by its own distraction." The professional army of the Byzantine Empire also had a well organized intelligence service. Much more colorful, however, was the elaborate spy system of the Empress Theodora which per- meated the entire governmental structure of the Empire. It should be noted that the oriental mind has always appeared to stress political over mili- tary intelligence. The Middle Ages Military intelligence in this period of chivalry was of little consequence to warriors for whom fighting was an individual sport. On the other hand, the Mongol conquerors who swept into east- ern Europe from Asia during the 13th century made use of not only an efficient intelligence sys- tem but also of an effective propaganda machine. Agents of the Mongol commanders ranged far in front of the invading hordes spreading rumors of Mongol terrors and collecting information on the weaknesses and rivalries of Europe. Local citizens were used to advantage. The Venetians, for example, striving to gain superiority over their rivals, supplied information to the Mongols in return for help in ousting Genoese traders from the Crimea. In addition to agents disguised as merchants, the Mongol commanders maintained a screen of scouts in front of each column of soldiers. They appreciated the need for the rapid transmission of information, and established a pony post system across the whole of eastern Europe. The code of laws set up by Genghis Khan instructed his gen- erals to send out spies and to bring in prisoners who would be forced to give information which could be checked against the reports of the spies. The Mongols provided for Western Europe an un- heeded example of an effective military intelli- gence and staff communication system. They greatly influenced the Mogul Emperors of India who perfected an amazing political intelligence service. Among the personnel of this service were spies who visited houses twice daily for the osten- sible purpose of removing refuse and trash. Although the knights of medieval Europe scorned the advance collection of information about their enemies, the churchmen had no such scruples. They not only utilized already known intelligence collection methods but contributed variations of their own. De Torquemada, head of the Spanish Inquisition, developed a political intelligence system which has scarcely been equalled. Thousands of intimidated men, women, and children were encouraged to give information which would incriminate their own relatives and acquaintances. Large groups of spies were care- fully trained, and a manual of instructions was prepared for their guidance. The Renaissance of Intelligence With the rise of nationalism and the develop- ment of modern armies the need for intelligence became apparent to the larger states. Following 23 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS an Italian lead, the principal courts of Europe be- gan to exchange resident ambassadors, one of whose functions was to collect information on the political and diplomatic activities, the plans, and the military strength of potential enemies. As time progressed an increasing volume of political and military intelligence, collected by covert as well as overt means, flowed into the various capi- tals of Europe to be processed and filed for use in making important strategic decisions. As early as the 15th century French and German military organizations known as "Landsknechts," meaning "men of the country" as opposed to for- eign mercenary troops, were developed. The staffs of these armies embodied the principal char- acteristics of the modern regimental staff. Be- cause the quartermaster general had to precede the troops on the march in order to arrange for quartering and feeding, he also became responsible for reconnaissance. This functional development exerted considerable influence on the German and English staff systems. Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden created a "Chief of Scouts" on his Su- preme Staff, indicating both his awareness of the importance of intelligence and his realization that intelligence as a staff function should be separate from operations and logistics. It is generally agreed that the military organization developed by Gustavus served as a pattern in Europe until the 20th century. With him, therefore, modern military history began. While there are records of intelligence activities throughout English history and especially from the time of Cromwell and Henry VII, it was Sir Francis Walsingham, under Elizabeth, who gave England its first national intelligence service. His crowning achievement was the employment of a spy on the staff of the Admiral in command of the Spanish Armada. Thus he was able to ob- tain the most detailed information regarding the state of readiness of the Armada, its ships, equip- ment, forces, and stores. In addition, under Wal- singham's guidance, the English Government per- suaded the bankers of Genoa to withhold certain loans to Philip of Spain which delayed his naval offensive against the English. In France, the crafty Cardinal Richelieu de- veloped an effective intelligence organization. It CONFIDENTIAL 04 included a network of covert collectors who trans- mitted prompt and accurate information to Paris regarding the activities of the many rebellious and dissident elements of the kingdom. An ex- pert in political intrigue and diplomatic maneuver, Richelieu used his intelligence forces to strengthen the central government of France. After him, Louis XIV consolidated his personal power by means of a systematized political police, continu- ous surveillance, postal censorship, and a peace- time military intelligence organization. The famous French general, Maurice de Saxe, organ- ized an intelligence service which represented a considerable improvement over others of his time. Unlike the Germans, the French based their mili- tary staff organization on Roman theories. As a result, the French staff included officers charged with the separate functions of supply, administra- tion, operations, and intelligence. By 1700 the pattern was set for the French staff system of World War I, and consequently for the system used by the United States Army. The French military writers of this early period appreciated the value of reconnaissance in major military plan- ning and stressed professional knowledge as in- dispensable to national military power. Intelligence activity appeared in other coun- tries during the 18th century. In Russia it took the form of a political police system under the personal supervision of the Tzar. The forerunner of the dreaded Ochrana was the "Special Office," later called the "Secret Office," which was used extensively by Peter the Great. In colonial Amer- ica, Baron von Steuben served as an intelligence and operations officer on Washington's staff. His recorded intelligence activities include an analysis of British and American capabilities and limita- tions and a personal reconnaissance of General Clinton's forces before the battle of Monmouth. All of the great European military leaders, in- cluding Marlborough, Prince Eugene, Maurice de Saxe, and Frederick the Great, appear to have recognized the importance of intelligence and used it. Each, in his own way, contributed to its de- velopment. Frederick the Great, for example, established four classes of agents for the collec- tion of information and set up careful rules for selecting and training them. Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTELLIGENCE CONFIDENTIAL Expansion of Intelligence Activities Under Napoleon Napoleon once said: "One spy in the right place is worth 20,000 men in the field." The truth of his remark was amply substantiated by one of his own agents, a man named Schulmeister, who man- aged to become the Chief of Intelligence for the Austrian general in command of armies opposing the French. Every Austrian plan and move was carefully reported to Napoleon, while false infor- mation was supplied to the Austrians. Undoubt- edly the clever machinations of Schulmeister contributed materially to the brilliant French vic- tories at Ulm and Austerlitz, which led to the sur- render of Austria. It is of interest to speculate on what might have been the historical results had Napoleon's agent failed in his efforts. Napoleon's personal staff included two bureaus of interest. The first, and most important, was the Bureau of Intelligence, staffed by two officers and an unknown number of agents. Its function was to consolidate all incoming information re- garding the enemy for presentation to the Em- peror, and to obtain such special information as he desired. The second, closely related to the first, was called the Topographic Bureau. Here was maintained a large situation map covering the latest information regarding both enemy and friendly forces. In the field the French Head- quarters Staff was divided into four sections, one of which was responsible for reconnaissance, op- erational planning, communications, postal serv- ice, and the employment of guide companies. It was at the beginning of the 19th century that large conscript armies came into general use, and with them large scale military maneuvers. Napoleon's genius for efficient military organiza- tion brought him resounding successes and tre- mendously influenced modern military theory and tactics. His military staff system was much more effective than that of the Prussians, and Intelli- gence served him well during a part of his spec- tacular career. It should be noted that during the wars between the French and the Germans, in 1806 and again in 1870, victory came to the side which had the superior staff system. It may also be said that victory at Waterloo came to the gen- eral who had advance information concerning the enemy and the area of operations. 289196-54-3 25 In addition to his military intelligence organi- zation, Napoleon maintained an effective secret political police service over all of Europe. Under the shrewd and remorseless direction of Joseph Fouche, and later of Savary, this service was held in fear and terror. It was during this period that the system of spying upon spies reached such pro- portions that the term "counterespionage" came into popular usage. Like England, France has had a governmental intelligence system almost continuously since the 15th century. But only during the time of Napo- leon, and during and after the First World War, did the French system achieve the international scope of the English. The Status of Intelligence in the United States As already mentioned there is evidence that General Washington made some use of intelli- gence methods; however, there was no organiza- tional development in the United States until the late 19th century. At the beginning of the Civil War the Federal forces had no intelligence organi- zation, and Gen. George B. McClellan relied al- most entirely on the Pinkerton Detective Agency to collect and evaluate information for him. Pinkerton himself served as a staff Intelligence Officer to McClellan, although he proved to be a poor substitute for a trained military observer. For example, in July 1862, McClellan based his military plans on Pinkerton's inaccurate estimate of Lee's strength at more than 200,000, while the actual opposing strength was less than 90,000. During the Civil War both the North and the South made use of spies. The tapping of tele- graphic wires was employed for the first time. One writer of this period, while acknowledging the importance of intelligence and listing a num- ber of recognized collection methods, felt it neces- sary to justify them as "honorable means of secur- ing victory over the foe." It was during the Civil War that the United States Secret Service was or- ganized, first as a military activity, and later as a Federal Government function. Wilhelm Stieber and Modern Intelligence Systems Together with the Frenchman Schulmeister, Stieber, who served as Prussian Minister of Police under Bismarck, developed the pattern for mod- CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR ern intelligence systems. His claim to fame in this field is based both on the quality and the ex- tensiveness of his organization. His influence throughout Europe was tremendous, especially in France and Russia. With Stieber's assistance Bismarck was able with lightning speed to over- whelm Denmark in 1861, Austria in 1866, and France in 1870. Even the great German General Moltke was amazed at the vast amount of perti- nent military information supplied by Stieber for facilitating the rapid advance of the German armies, to the extent of making possible an accu- rate timetable for the victorious march into Austria. Stieber's activities in Austria for the 2 years prior to the invasion are an early modern example of the German fifth column technique. Methodi- cally he gathered information on fortifications, troop concentrations, and supply capacities, and recruited agents and saboteurs. By the time of the Franco-Prussian War he had an estimated 12,000 spies scattered throughout Europe, and boasted that some 85 writers on French news- papers were under his control, not to mention paid sympathizers among Italian, Austrian, and Eng- lish journalists. He set up a system of military censorship and organized a Central Information Bureau for propaganda purposes. He concen- trated on developing statistical and biographical knowledge, including the industrial potentials of possible enemy states and detailed data regarding their politicians, diplomats, and higher civil em- ployees. In addition to gathering information about roads, bridges, arsenals, fortifications, and lines of communication, he was interested in data on population, commerce and agriculture, local politics, and patriotism. Imitating Napoleon, he established the first formal system of German counterespionage. As one of Bismarck's most trusted advisers, Stieber organized an effective secret police system. He was also adept in the field of political intelli- gence. His work in alienating Russia and France prior to the war with France in 1870 was highly effective. In 1867 he arranged for an attempt to be made on the life of Alexander of Russia who was on a diplomatic mission to Paris, but he also arranged to frustrate and capture the assassin. To cap it all, at the trial he bribed the French CONFIDENTIAL 26 NAVAL OFFICERS jury and obtained an acquittal. The ultimate ef- fect was that the Russians were antagonized and canceled further efforts to form an alliance with France. Stieber created for Germany a superior intelli- gence system which was feared and respected throughout the continent of Europe. Because of his influence, however, the German intelligence system always retained some of the characteristics of a police organization. Beginnings of Japanese Intelligence The Japanese early applied their imitative tal- ents to the organization of up-to-date intelligence systems for both their Army and Navy. As a re- sult, they were able to use Intelligence as an effec- tive offensive instrument in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 and to overwhelm its Russian coun- terpart. The Japanese victory in this war has been attributed in large measure to the effective- ness of their intelligence activities. For example, at Port Arthur advance information was obtained regarding the Russian minefields and the power station, transmission lines, and powerful search- lights designed to blind the attackers. With this knowledge, the Japanese fleet captured the port with minimum losses in a remarkably short time. The Japanese were particularly successful in the speed with which they collected and transmitted information. During the 18th and 19th centuries, intelligence was centralized and systematized primarily at the highest governmental levels. It therefore had a political emphasis and often a secret police bias. In the military field, each general often served as his own intelligence officer and directed his own intelligence system. With the increasing com- plexity of modern warfare, together with the added burdens imposed by larger, more diverse armies, greater logistical support and expanding areas of operations, commanders came to require better staff organizations, including adequate in- telligence sections. The impact of the striking Prussian victories of 1867 and 1870 had a tremen- dous effect on European military thinking and gave credence to the writings of such theorists as Berthier and Clausewitz. By 1900 the major European powers had developed modern staff sys- tems and had placed intelligence on the same level Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTELLIGENCE with personnel, operations, and logistics, designed to function in times of peace and war. The Development of the United States Intelligence Organization?Navy The improvements and expansion of the world's navies during the latter years of the 19th century caused the Navy Department to realize its need for information from abroad. The building of new ships of steel instead of wood had begun, and the best available technical data were required in order that these ships might incorporate the latest methods of construction and the most up-to-date equipment. Accordingly, in March 1882 the Sec- retary of the Navy established by General Order an Office of Intelligence under the Bureau of Navi- gation for the purpose of "systematizing the collec- tion and classification of information for the use of the department, in relation to the strength and resources of foreign navies." The following year the Secretary emphasized two functions for the Office of Intelligence: the collection of informa- tion regarding the progress of naval science and the dissemination of that information. Not only commanders, but all other officers, were directed to collect and submit appropriate professional ma- terial to Intelligence. From the beginning, there- fore, Intelligence was given the primary mission of collecting, interpreting, and disseminating in- formation of value to the Navy. Commanders in chief were also directed to appoint an officer, pref- erably of their personal staffs, to perform the duties of fleet intelligence officer; and com- manders of ships were to appoint an officer of their command for similar duties. The emphasis was on positive foreign intelligence and on technical information such as ship construction and ord- nance. There was some initial opposition to the new intelligence office from some of the Bureaus, but the office was soon accepted. Lt. T. B. B. Mason was selected to head the new office and was designated as the "Chief In- telligence Officer." To him is due much credit for the early organization of the Office of Naval In- telligence. He was assisted by two other officers in Washington, with one naval attache in London. In view of the fact that the office was not estab- lished by congressional action, there were no ap- propriations for maintenance; accordingly, clerks 27 CONFIDENTIAL and equipment were borrowed from other offices and bureaus. This situation existed until after the Spanish-American War. The activities of Naval Intelligence during the Spanish-American War are of particular interest. There was a broadening of responsibilities, with a shift in emphasis to intelligence for strategic and operational use. The Office of Intelligence prepared data on the strength of the Spanish Navy and the condition of Spanish home and colonial ports. At the same time, the attaches were au- thorized to negotiate abroad for the purchase of ships and munitions of war, and six cruisers were purchased in this manner. In order to strengthen the position of attaches in collecting information abroad, requests for information by official for- eign representatives in Washington were chan- neled through the office. After 17 years of operation, the Office of Intelli- gence was established on a permanent basis by Congress in 1899, with regular appropriations for carrying on its work. It was charged with ob- taining information concerning the latest con- struction and equipment of warships during peacetime, and producing knowledge of the strength and disposition of enemy forces in time of war. It was to assist in maintaining the Navy in a proper state of readiness for naval operations and in providing knowledge to aid in the conduct of hostilities. The administrative responsibility for the Of- fice of Intelligence was shifted a number of times during the first 30 years of its existence: from the Bureau of Navigation, to the Office of the Secre- tary, to the Office of the Assistant Secretary, back to the Bureau of Navigation, and to the Office of the Aide for Operations. Finally, in 1915, when a Chief of Naval Operations was created by law, the Office of Naval Intelligence was established permanently as one of the divisions under Naval Operations. During its formative years the Office of Naval Intelligence was organized on the basis of the sub- ject matter with which it was concerned: there were desks devoted to ships, ordnance, personnel, communications, and steam engineering and elec- tricity. At this time technical information took precedence. One early Intelligence publication was entitled "Coal, Docking and Repair Facilities CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS of the Ports of the World: With Analysis of Dif- ferent Kinds of Coal." At various times prior to 1900 the Chief Intel- ligence Officer had additional responsibilities, such as: translation of foreign documents, preparation of the War Plans of the Navy and the Auxiliary Naval Force. Intelligence also prepared various kinds of information reports for the Naval Bu- reaus and for the Naval committees of Congress. In 1889 the regular report of the Secretary of the Navy included the following comment regarding Intelligence: "Its value to naval legislation and to naval administration is now fully recognized." Prior to World War I the development of a com- prehensive intelligence organization was slow, and serious problems arose in connection with the availability of trained officer personnel. As a re- sult civilian employees were used as much as pos- sible to permit continuity of effort. Since collection was a basic responsibility of Naval Intelligence, the collectors assumed an early importance. The United States Navy sent its first attache to London in 1882, the year the Office of Intelligence was established. One additional at- tache was later accredited to France, Russia, and Germany. As late as World War I, the Director of Naval Intelligence expressed the opinion that his office existed largely for the support of the at- tache system. As official agents for collection purposes, the naval attaches were cautioned to use reputable business methods. Adequate financial support was a major problem, and officers volun- teered for attache duty with full knowledge that their expenses would exceed their pay and allow- ances. This situation soon created a prejudice against these posts and rendered difficult the as- signment of qualified officers. The Development of the United States Intelligence Organization?Army The Army's Attache System dates from 1889. However, prior to World War I, the military at- taches received little guidance or support; nor is it certain that the information they collected was properly disseminated. As in the case of the Navy, financial support was a serious problem and the selection of officers as attaches was often a haphazard matter governed either by personal ac- quaintance or by the availability of an officer with CONFIDENTIAL 28 a personal income which would enable him to meet the expenses of diplomatic life in a foreign capital. The importance of intelligence to the Army was emphasized by Mr. Elihu Root when in 1902, as Secretary of War, he argued for the creation of an Army General Staff. In this connection he said: The Commanding Officer "must determine at what points and by what routes the place shall be ap- proached, and at what points his troops shall land . . . ; and for this purpose he must be in- formed about the various harbors of the island and the depth of their channels; what classes of vessels can enter them; what the facilities for landing are; how they are to be attacked; the character of the intervening country; how far it is healthful or unhealthful; what the climate is likely to be at the season of the proposed move- ment; the temper and sympathies of the inhabit- ants . . ." Primarily as a result of Mr. Root's efforts, the Congress created in 1903 an Army General Staff with three major divisions: Administration, Mili- tary Information, and War College and Military Studies. In subsequent years new divisions were established and Intelligence was placed under the War College. The few officers assigned to Intel- ligence before World War I had a constant strug- gle against prejudice, a half-hostile tradition, and inadequacies of operating facilities. Such intel- ligence effort as was possible was confined to col- lection, with little processing or dissemination. As late as April 1917 the Army's Intelligence Sec- tion consisted of only 2 officers and 2 clerks. Such was the status of military intelligence in the United States just prior to the First World War. By contrast, the major European powers at the same time had military intelligence organi- zations operating as general staff divisions. WORLD WAR I The many tensions which had been building up for 50 years finally exploded in World War I. Perhaps some of them were observed by various intelligence groups, especially during the fateful year of 1913. Some writers have suggested that certain situations, such as the Austro-Balkan con- flicts, might have been averted had intelligence Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTELLIGENCE CONFIDENTIAL knowledge and organization been properly ex- ploited. In any event, the various military intelligence services of Europe all believed themselves to be prepared to handle any situation, but they were not prepared for a long general war. Suddenly they found themselves short of trained personnel, and without sufficient funds. Their peace-time efforts had not been adequate. The German sys- tem was coasting on its past reputation, while the Russians had never developed a modern or ef- ficient system. Although British Intelligence was small, it had a nucleus of organization and a back- ground of experience capable of rapid expansion. French Intelligence, in the first critical days of the war, failed in its estimate of enemy strength. It did not anticipate the possibility of early German use of reserves, which put twice as many troops against the French armies as had been estimated. General Joffre's battle plan was based on this erroneous estimate and had to be completely re- vised, practically at the time of actual conflict. Belgian Intelligence, activated as late as 1912, collected vital information on the new German siege guns, the capabilities of which indicated serious weaknesses in the Belgian defenses at Ant- werp, Liege, and Namur. However, the General Staff considered the reconstruction of these de- fenses too expensive and too time-consuming to be worth the effort. In addition, it was believed inadvisable to disturb their popular King with such bad news. The high command was also in- formed by Intelligence of the presence near the Belgian border of a German force of six brigades with a mass of artillery. The German tactical surprise at Liege, therefore, cannot be credited as much as a German success as an Allied failure to take proper countermeasures. Failures attributed to Intelligence have often been failures of a high command to utilize the intelligence available to it. As an additional example, at the Battle of St. Quentin the British Army suffered its most shat- tering defeat of World War I. At the same time, it had available the most elaborate collection sys- tem to be found in an area of combat. The nature of this war, of course, determined the pattern of intelligence activities. Develop- ments in transportation?the railroad and the motor truck?made possible the use of large ar- 29 mies and permitted the movement of sufficient ammunition and supplies to support the great ar- tillery battles and the masses of men engaged in trench warfare. This tactical situation, in which the defensive position was stronger than the of- fensive, resulted in the static kind of warfare characteristic of World War I. Discipline, train- ing, and tactics were important factors in deter- mining victory. Intelligence, therefore, concen- trated on information about the armed forces of the enemy and their capabilities. The introduction of aircraft as implements of war added a new method of collection: aerial reconnaissance. Both the area of operations and the activities of the enemy behind the battlelines were brought into focus for observation, report- ing, and use. A Cryptographers' War The employment of great armies over broad areas increased the requirements of communica- tions. These were met by the perfection of wire- less telegraphy. Codes and ciphers assumed a new significance and intelligence found an ex- panded field of operations. In fact, from the intelligence standpoint, World War I has been described as a cryptographers' war. At times the outcome of land and sea battles was determined in advance of actual conflict by those who inter- cepted and broke the enciphered operational mes- sages of the enemy. Several examples will be given in a later dis- cussion of communications intelligence, but two can be mentioned here because of their particular impact on the course of the war. At an early stage of hostilities two Russian armies, the First and the Second, were advancing separately against East Prussia, with the objective of joining forces for an attack against Hindenburg's army which was numerically superior to each, but inferior to their combined strength. The First Army failed to receive the field communications code which both were to use and was forced to send in plain language a message advising that it would be delayed three days in joining the Second. On the basis of this intercepted information, Hinden- burg attacked and massacred the Second Army in the famous Battle of Tannenberg; then crushed the First Army 3 weeks later. Russia never re- CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR covered from this action and gradually slid into ruin and revolution. Early in 1917 the German ambassador to Mexico was given secret instructions to negotiate an al- liance with Japan in order to promote an attack by that country on the United States, with the aid of Mexico. As her reward Mexico was to receive three of the American States. This secret mess- age known as the Zimmerman note, was intercepted and broken by the British who gave it to the Amer- icans. This incident had much to do with bring- ing the United States into the war. A War of Spies and Agents Many tales have been told of the colorful per- sonalities in World War I who worked secretly to obtain information or to protect it. The story of Mata Hari, the exotic dancer and condemned spy, has come to epitomize the romantic and ad- venturous secret operative and to give the general public its strongest impression of those associated with intelligence activity. In spite of this fact, her actual effectiveness as an agent is considered questionable. There were agents, however, whose work was of considerable importance. One of the better known was Capt. Franz von Rintelen, a German agent who contributed in no small measure to impeding the flow of American supplies to the British prior to the entry of the United States into the war. With a talent for or- ganization, he promoted pro-German and anti- British sentiment in this country. His efforts on the New York waterfront were particularly suc- cessful. There his ingenious sabotage caused ships bound for England to blow up or catch fire. Labor unions were goaded into crippling strikes against production and war shipping. A phoney supply firm was organized which took several million dollars of Russian money for war material which was subsequently destroyed at sea. The Middle East was the scene of widespread and significant underground activity, German ver- sus British. In Persia a German agent named Wassmuss was so effective that four B ritish war- ships and several thousand troops were eventually dispatched to curtail his efforts. On the other hand, Lawrence of Arabia organized and con- trolled local tribes so effectively that he had more CONFIDENTIAL A?r-yrifilekr 79/1 30 I?? ro*: is I rill is III _? NAVAL OFFICERS value to the British than many thousands of soldiers. According to Gen. Maximilian Ronge, director of the Austrian Intelligence Service, secret agents were able to advise the enemy well in advance of every major attack that was projected in World War I. However, military high commands re- peatedly failed to take advantage of this vital in- formation. One interesting example is the Battle of Caporetto which the Austrians mounted against the Itrilians in October 1917. From the Austrian point of view, this battle was their most successful surprise attack of the entire war. It combined sound military judgment and thorough prepara- tions with a skillful offensive use of intelligence. Weeks in advance of the battle information was gathered regarding critical adverse political con- ditions existing within the civilian population in northern Italy. This information was dissemi- nated to the Italian front line troops just before the battle by means of carefully initiated Italian newspapers. Espionage, counterespionage, cen- sorship, and propaganda were all employed in this operation. The effect was devastating and the Italians lost 600,000 men as casualties and pris- oners. The success of this engagement, however was not the result of surprise. The Italian gen- eral had been fully warned of the intentions of the Austrians from several sources, including Ameri- can Military Intelligence. It was successful be- cause the Italians failed to act. The Myth of German Intelligence In 1914 German Intelligence still enjoyed a high reputation for offensive effectiveness throughout Europe. However, in the absence of strong lead- ership supported by the government in power, the formidable organization created by Steiber under Bismarck had deteriorated badly. In addition, the German Imperial Staff was so confident of a quick victory that it could see no need for Intelligence. Actually, at the outset of the war the German military intelligence system broke down. From 1906 it had concentrated its collection efforts in Russia and France. Its work was seriously handi- capped by inadequate financial support, lack of trained personnel, and active opposition from the diplomatic corps and other groups within the gov- Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTELLIGENCE ernment. When Col. Walther Nicolai was ap- pointed Chief of the Intelligence Service for the High Command in 1913, he found that there was no top level guidance for military intelligence. As a result, his organization did not understand the political and economic factors involved in its work. Apparently Naval Intelligence was more effective, but liaison was poor and there was no coordination. When war began, unlimited funds were allo- cated to Intelligence; but, Nicolai commented afterward, "money alone will not build up an In- telligence Service." The German collection effort in the British Isles had been neglected because the High Command did not believe Britain would enter the war. In addition, British counterintel- ligence was quickly able to apprehend the few German agents who were operating in the home islands. German Intelligence immediately suf- fered a black-out of information and had no ad- vance knowledge of the arrival in France of the British Expeditionary Force which joined with the French Army to defeat the Germans at the First Battle of the Marne. Nicolai found it necessary to reorganize military intelligence under the most adverse conditions. When appointed to his post he held the rank of major, and he soon found that his junior status was a real handicap. When war started his best officers were transferred to staff duty with the vari- ous armies. The commanding general of the army marching through Belgium considered his intel- ligence officers so unnecessary that he left them behind at Liege. Reasons for the initial failures of German Intel- ligence included lack of preparedness, general neglect of overall responsibilities, and lack of foresight. Military and political leaders failed to recognize the importance of developing a good intelligence service at the right time and over- looked the vital necessity for coordination of ef- fort. Counterintelligence was also understaffed and handicapped at the start of the war, with no central direction, especially within Germany itself. In spite of its weaknesses and initial failures, German Intelligence improved materially as the war progressed. It achieved considerable success in its espionage and sabotage activities in the 31 CONFIDENTIAL United States under the direction of von Rintelen, and completely disrupted the French Intelligence Service prior to the Battle of Verdun. It aided the Russian revolutionary movement by transport- ing Lenin across Germany into Russia. After the war was over, Nicolai wrote a de- tailed account of the wartime problems of German Intelligence and the conditions under which it operated, stating: "Its character and methods . . . should be generally known if it is ever to succeed both in carrying out its own tasks and in thwarting the activities of the opposing Intelli- gence Services. This applies also to States which possess no Intelligence Service, have no adequate idea of its importance, and do not realize how their people and their political freedom are threatened . . ." On the basis of subsequent developments, there is reason to believe that Adolf Hitler read Nicolai's book most carefully. French Intelligence The influence of Stieber in France was tremen- dous. By 1900 the Deuxieme Bureau had been established as part of the General Staff System and made responsible for all enemy information and the topographical service of the command. The staff was composed of the following divisions: administration, intelligence, operations, and sup- ply. This French system was to exert a strong influence on the development of the United States Army Staff during World War I. French naval attaches, unlike the British, were given direct con- trol of the Naval Secret Service operating in their areas. A Civil Intelligence Service operated under the chiefs of police of the various larger cities, with headquarters at Paris. This service was based on the organization established under Napoleon III. Nicolai considered France as the "perfect master" in the field of political and military intelligence, "directed by a strong and deliberate power policy." Russian Intelligence Under the Tzars, Russian military intelligence had no centralized administration and suffered be- cause of an inadequate number of personnel and no system for training. Full use was made of military attaches in the collection of information, CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS although some were compromised by disclosure of their undercover activities. The incompetence of the General Staff had a direct effect on the work of Intelligence which was far from consistent in performance. It failed in Germany, while it suc- ceeded in Austro-Hungary. By means of black- mail, the Russians obtained from the Chief of Austrian Intelligence, prior to the war, a list of Austrian agents operating in Russia and, more im- portant, the complete Austrian battle plans. However, the Russian High Command, relying on this accurate information, failed to anticipate the probability of any changes in plans by the Aus- trians when they learned of the treachery of their Chief of Intelligence. As a result the Russians al- most lost the Battle of Lemberg in Galicia. Spying has always been a specialty of the Rus- sians and they have been adept in the arts of counterintelligence. Using the informer system established in France under Napoleon as a model, the Ochrana perfected the employment of the "agent provocateur" for purposes of internal se- curity and political repression. Some of the most active Russian revolutionaries were trained by the Ochrana. In addition, the so-called Black Cab- inet served as a private censorship office of the Tzar and for a time brought under its cognizance even officials of the Ochrana. British Intelligence The statement has been made that the British entered World War I with the worst intelligence system in Europe and ended with the best. Whether the first part of the statement is true or not, it is apparent that the initial organization was small, with limited funds available. At the be- ginning of 1914 there was a total staff of 14 to handle the counterintelligence section of military intelligence. Only 2 years earlier military staff doctrine had been formalized to include operations and intelligence functions within the same branch. Still earlier, the modern British Secret Service Department had been founded in more or less its present form. At the outset, however, the British were able to capitalize on the weaknesses of their opponents and to counter successfully the intelli- gence activities of the Germans. In an amazingly short time sources of vital information were being exploited with significant results. It is quite pos- CONFIDENTIAL 32 sible that the economic and financial organizations of the far-flung British Empire were helpful in developing many of these sources. Naval Intelligence expanded rapidly along with the total British Intelligence Service, achieving its greatest successes by means of censorship and its code room, the celebrated Room 40 0. B. With these means were combined a skillful use of covert agents. For example, an agent was placed in the German Admiralty where he had access to secret codes. On this agent's initiative, Admiral von Spec was ordered to attack the Falkland Islands. When the German squadron arrived it was met and destroyed by the waiting British. Illustrative of the work of the code room was an intercepted message which warned the British of an impend- ing German naval attack on the eastern coast of England. The result was the Battle of Jutland which forestalled the coastal attack and crippled the German Grand Fleet to the extent that it re- mained in its home ports for the balance of the war. The unfailing ability of Room 40 0. B. to break the enemy's codes aided immeasurably in the war against German submarines. By early 1918 the British Intelligence Service had reached a new peak of efficiency in the col- lection of information and the production of in- telligence. Nicolai, commenting later on British Intelligence, expressed the opinion that its work was unique and unsurpassed. The American Forces in Europe, which depended greatly on British Intelligence, regarded it as the best service in the world. The amazing accuracy of British information may be attributed in part to the ex- treme care with which all reports were checked. The reporting records of all agents were kept in great detail in order to determine their degree of accuracy and reliability over long periods of time. Some agents, known to be employed by the enemy, were left at large in order that the British might know what the enemy wanted them to believe. Another basis for the strength of the British Service may have been its reported corps of covert agents scattered throughout Europe, quite independent of its recognized attache system. The British record in World War I was not without blemish. One failure occurred at the Battle of Jutland when vital information failed to reach the commanding officer in time to be of use. Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTELLIGENCE CONFIDENTIAL As a result the German fleet managed to escape destruction. In retrospect, the British com- mander commented that the shore intelligence or- ganization and the command afloat must be more closely linked "to insure mutual confidence and service." The problem, in this case, appeared to be one of coordination and communications. United States Naval Intelligence When war broke out in Europe the Office of Naval Intelligence was an organization inadequate for war purposes. Its personnel included 8 offi- cers, 10 civilians, and 6 attache's. In an effort to keep abreast of rapidly changing conditions, Naval Intelligence, in 1915, established a War Informa- tion Service to obtain military, political, and eco- nomic information regarding potential enemies. At the same time, the office was reorganized on a functional rather than a subject matter basis. Four major sections were created. Section A was given administrative responsibilities and the con- trol of the collection of confidential information at home and abroad. Section B included crypto- graphic activities and a clipping service. Section C acted as a processing agency, while section D handled dissemination, archives, and a reference center. There were other sections concerned with translation, disbursing, filming, printing, and mail. For the first time, funds to carry on confi- dential work were provided by the Congress. Immediately upon the entry of the United States into the war there was a great expansion in the organization and activity of Naval Intel- ligence. The number of officers on duty jumped from 8 to 300, and the number of attaches was doubled. Since it was apparent that the intel- ligence services of the Allies could supply full information regarding the enemy in the European theater, domestic counterintelligence became a principal activity. This work was delegated to Aides for Infor- mation, now known as District Intelligence Of- ficers, who were assigned to each of the Naval Districts. Their responsibilities included investi- gations, plant protection, ship inspection, and naval personnel, both military and civilian. Branch Intelligence Offices were established as undercover agencies in large seaports and manu- facturing centers. These offices grew to consider- 269196 54- 4 33 able size and accomplished much useful work. As an indication of the extent of naval counterintel- ligence in the United States, over 3,000 individuals were actively engaged in its various activities at the peak of the war. Although cable and radio censorship was under the cognizance of Naval Communications, Intelligence provided consider- able assistance. In the domestic field there was some conflict of interests between Naval Intel- ligence and such other Government agencies as Military Intelligence, the Departments of Justice and Treasury, the Emergency Fleet Corporation, and the War Industries Board. Abroad, the naval attaches continued to have as their primary responsibility the collection of in- formation. The quality of their work during the war was subject to considerable criticism, espe- cially by staff officers assigned to United States Naval Forces, Europe, with headquarters in Lon- don. Adm. W. S. Sims, in command of this force, was also critical of the evaluation of initial reports by Intelligence headquarters in Washington. At the same time, he fully recognized the importance of intelligence and stated that the "efficient and intelligent exercise of command is entirely de- pendent upon information." It was his expressed point of view that there should be an entirely sepa- rate Intelligence Section on a naval staff which would work in the closest cooperation with the other staff sections. He stressed the opinion that Intelligence should be prepared to be the first in the field in the event of war. Some of the criticism of the work of the naval attaches can undoubtedly be attributed to the fact that the number of per- sonnel was inadequate to permit the satisfactory performance of their assigned responsibilities. It was also found that the personalities of officers per- forming attache duties and their ability to work easily with representatives of foreign intelligence services were of great importance. United States Military Intelligence Col. Ralph H. van Deman, called the "father of American Military Intelligence," played an im- portant role in the postwar recognition of Intel- ligence as a separate function of the Army's Gen- eral Staff. He was materially aided by the Sec- retary of War, the Army's Chief of Staff, and Gen- eral Pershing himself. The latter made Intel- CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS ligence a coordinate section of his staff even before his forces landed in England in June 1917. The British, and especially the French staff systems influenced the staff organization of the American Expeditionary Forces in Europe, with the result that Intelligence sections were created at both higher and intermediate echelons. When America entered the war, Army Intelligence was rapidly expanded. The central office in Washington was organized into three branches. The positive branch was as- signed the functions of collection, evaluation, and dissemination. Its responsibilities included prep- aration of situation estimates and translation of documents. The negative branch carried out counterintelligence functions, including investi- gations regarding disloyalty and sedition, enemy activities, and graft and fraud in organizations under the control of the War Department. Thousands of officers and men were engaged in this field. The Geographic Branch was concerned with the production of maps, photographs, and terrain studies. In addition there were sections for administration, collection of information by attaches and troops, and codes and ciphers. In connection with MIS, the code and cipher section, it should be noted that this type of work was almost unknown to the War Department prior to World War I. Its activities were many and varied and have been recorded in some detail by II. 0. Yardley in his book, The American Black Chamber. However, this section was regarded only as a wartime agency by the Director of Mili- tary Intelligence and high Government officials, and was discontinued shortly after the war was over. During its relatively short existence, it demonstrated the importance of cryptography as an intelligence procedure essential to the success- ful prosecution of war. In the European Theater there are interesting examples of the effectiveness of Army Intelli- gence. One concerns the discovery of vital in- formation on German submarine operations in the North Sea and around the British Isles. In Oc- tober 1917, after a successful raid over England, the German zeppelin L-49 was forced down in France. Scraps of an operational map were ob- tained through the persistent efforts of an Ameri- can colonel who waded through a swamp over CONFIDENTIAL 34 which the zeppelin had traveled. The map con- tained a code covering the North Sea and British Isles area. It meant little, however, until a code book was recovered from two American souvenir hunters who had rifled the cabin of the L-49 prior to the arrival of Intelligence representatives. With the map and the code book, the Allies gained complete data on German submarine operations and were able to surprise and destroy a large num- ber of U-boats at their designated rendezvous. The activities of the military attaches in Eu- rope and the military observers attached to the European armies during the first part of the war appear to have been handicapped by organiza- tional deficiencies. In the War Department's Annual Report for the year 1919, the Chief of Staff commented that the valuable information gathered by these military observers was never properly used. During this period, the attaches were involved in counterintelligence work which proved both difficult and delicate. It was not until August 1918 that the Military Intelligence Division was established officially as coequal with the other Divisions of the Army General Staff. In commenting upon this devel- opment, the Director of Military Intelligence stated that correct military information can be obtained only as the result of correct staff organi- zation. He added: "Our Army now has its eyes open. It is the duty of every officer to study and support our intelligence organization in order that our Army eyes may never again be closed." At the height of its activity, near the close of the war, the Division in Washington was staffed by more than 1,200 highly specialized persons, of whom the majority were civilian employees. The field force was enlarged and improved, with rep- resentatives in all important foreign countries, in the major cities of the United States, and in each military unit at home and overseas. Army Intelligence personnel were utilized by the Ameri- can Commission during the peace negotiations in Paris. By the end of this war, there was apparent rec- ognition of the close relationships which should exist between intelligence and national strategy and between intelligence and war planning. Brig. Gen. Marlborough Churchill, Director of Military Intelligence, wrote that national policy is based Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09: CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTELLIGENCE on accurate predictions regarding the interna- tional future and that war plans must be grounded on correct detailed information. "There is hardly an officer who does not realize that at a G. H. Q. and at the headquarters of every army, corps, di- vision, and similar unit, G-3 cannot make good plans unless G-2 furnishes good information." A strikingly similar statement was to be made more than 30 years later by the Army's Chief of Staff, Gen. Omar Bradley, in relating his personal ex- periences in World War II. Perhaps the most important single contribution made by the United States to the development of offensive intelligence method was the employment of aircraft to transport covert agents over the battlelines to and from areas under enemy control. In this connection, however, it should be noted that the head of Army Intelligence, at the end of the war, believed that covert agents could not be justified by the military in time of peace. In this belief he appears to have reflected the thinking then current among Washington officials. THE INTERWAR PERIOD In the period between World Wars I and II, political developments in each of the major na- tions distinctively shaped the emphasis on and therefore the results of intelligence. Having fought a war to end all wars, the United States sharply curtailed its military expenditures and em- barked upon a program of world peace. Public opinion was such that there was a necessary and rapid demobilization of both civilian and tempo- rarily commissioned personnel. A similar situa- tion existed in Great Britain, where a conservative government sought a return to the status quo. In France, Intelligence suffered increasingly from growing political corruption. On the other hand, restrictive political police systems became the foundation and support of autocratic govern- ments in Germany, Italy, and Soviet Russia, not to mention other smaller countries in central and eastern Europe. The Neglect of Intelligence in the United States The intelligence organization which had begun to assume some form by the close of World War I deteriorated rapidly. Military Intelligence, such as it was, suffered from insufficient funds, lack of 35 CONFIDENTIAL appreciation or sense of responsibility on the part of the State, War, and Navy Departments, and, most of all, from a feeling by most officers that an Intelligence assignment was undesirable. For the most part, Intelligence billets were filled by officers awaiting retirement. Such capable officers as were assigned found little opportunity or en- couragement to improve the situation. There was no successful effort to recruit or train new personnel. The organization of Naval Intelligence prac- tically fell to pieces. Contributing factors were the general desire to return to "normalcy," and a feeling of antagonism toward any organization involving classified activities. In 1920 the Secre- tary of the Navy assured the Congress that the activities of Naval Intelligence in the collection of information at home had been restricted and the office reduced to its prewar status. At the same time, the Director of Naval Intelligence was constrained to state that the activities of his of- fice were now the same as they had been in 1882. The number of attaches abroad was cut dras- tically. By 1938 world political conditions had stimu- lated an increase in the number of naval attaches. However, the collection of information was in- adequate and there were too few trained persons to process what was collected. By late 1941 the organization of Naval Intelligence had been ex- panded in Washington, in the naval districts, and overseas. The volume of incoming information increased correspondingly, but the years of neg- lect and inactivity could not be overcome so quickly. The Condition of British Intelligence The published records of expenditures ap- proved by Parliament for governmental intelli- gence organizations indicate roughly their status during the period from 1919 to 1939. More than $5,000,000 were appropriated in 1919. The fol- lowing year operating funds were cut to about one fifth of that amount, and during succeeding years there were still further reductions. Al- though the British had developed the best intelli- gence organization in Europe during World War I, they soon found themselves with little more than a skeleton force, incapable of much CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS productive action. Fortunately, however, the vital nucleus was retained upon which to build again. By 1935 there were indications that British Na- val Intelligence was active once more in the Mediterranean area. One of its self-revealed agents, Dod Orsborne, has given an interesting ac- count of his own assignment. His purpose was to obtain and to transmit information about Mus- solini's activities in Ethiopia and about the prog- ress of events in Spain. He was disguised as the skipper of a boat whose appearance could be radically altered from sailing vessel to steam trawler to diesel-driven fishing boat. He landed agents in Spain, the Balearic Islands, Morocco, Algeria, and Libya and brought back vital infor- mation to his contact at Gibraltar. His story is not only colorful, but also indicative of one type of intelligence operations in the Mediterranean during the period of increasing tension some years before the outbreak of war. By 1939 the funds reported as available to Brit- ish Intelligence had been increased to more than $2,000,000. Once again the British were to de- velop the most efficient intelligence organization in the world. Two of their initial and basic problems were those of personnel and training. For the im- pending war, therefore, their early intelligence efforts were necessarily defensive. Their success has been attributed, in part at least, to qualities of discipline, imagination, and improvisation. The Decline of French Intelligence At the close of World War I, France had one of the most efficient and extensive intelligence sys- tems in Europe. The head of Military Intelli- gence, through his membership on one of the important Allied commissions, was able to expand his organization of covert agents throughout Eu- rope during the early postwar period. As the newly created national states of central and east- ern Europe developed their own governmental structures, their intelligence systems were closely coordinated with that of France. By this in- genious method France was able to advance and to protect its national interests and to maintain an intricate network of agents and informers. The resulting organization was superior to that of Stieber and the equal, at least, of that of Napoleon. CONFIDENTIAL 36 In the decade before the Second World War, this organization was fatally weakened by the germs of internal corruption which spread throughout the nation, and which eventually aided the Germans in infiltrating both the political and military structure of France, thus further weak- ening the French intelligence system. The Expansion of German Intelligence As early as 1924 the Chief of German Military Intelligence, Nicolai, declared: "Now that inten- sive military, political, and economic espionage, after its successes in the World War, has become an official organ of the state, it is time that the public should recognize the fact." While the United States and Great Britain sought peace through the reduction Of their wartime organiza- tions, the Germans strove to profit by their mis- takes and to forge invincible weapons for military victory. The growth of a dictatorship under Adolph Hitler and the National Socialist Party encouraged, promoted, and soon absorbed this ef- fort of the German militarists. The militarists, including Ludendorff, were con- vinced that World War I had been lost because of a failure to organize the country for total war, behind the battlelines as well as at the front. Acutely aware that this war had shifted the em- phasis of attack to the minds and emotions of both soldiers and civilians, they recognized the great importance of propaganda. Lenin had enunciated the idea of an initial moral disintegra- tion of the enemy before attempting physical at- tack; and Hitler was in complete agreement. In Nein Kampf, he wrote, "In the future, the place of the artillery barrage as preparation for an in- fantry attack will be taken by revolutionary propa- ganda, designed to break down the enemy psy- chologically before the armies begin to function at all." To carry out this new type of warfare a new armament of knowledge was required. As soon as Hitler assumed power he gave high priority to the organization necessary to produce that knowl- edge. By 1937 the new German intelligence sys- tem was operating at peak efficiency with all of its many branches carefully coordinated by a Liai- son Staff, of which Rudolph Hess was the chair- man and Nicolai a permanent member. Included Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTELLIGENCE CONFIDENTIAL in this system were: the Intelligence Service of the War ministry, under the direction of Nicolai ; the Abwehr, or Military Intelligence, under Ad- miral Canaris ; the Auslands Organization (AO), or Organization of Germans Living Abroad, headed by Ernst Bohle ; the Special Service of the Foreign Office, headed by von Ribbentrop; the Foreign Department of the Propaganda Min- istry, under Goebbels; Rosenberg's Foreign Polit- ical Office; the Foreign Department of the Min- istry of Economics and Finance; the Reich Colonial Office; and the Foreign Department of the Gestapo, under Himmler and Heydrich. Hitler's personal plan for world conquest was based upon means which were not only military, but also economic, political, and psychological. To make it effective, full information and accurate estimates were required concerning the entire re- sistance capability, both actual and potential, of prospective enemies. Knowledge of actual re- armament was not as important as rearmament potential; the capacity of an enemy's war industry was not as significant as the total industrial po- tential which could be geared to war purposes. Prof. Karl Haushofer's Geopolitical Institute at the University of Munich thus became an ad- ditional important branch of the German system devoted to the collection of information and the production of intelligence. With unlimited funds available, Haushofer employed more than a thou- sand research workers at home and abroad, in- cluding historians and economic statisticians. De- tailed analyses of the more important countries of the world were prepared from the point of view of their political, economic, and sociological struc- tures. Both geographic vulnerabilities and mi- nority group problems were included in these studies. Such was the comprehensive and complex Ger- man intelligence system. It was a worldwide or- ganization for the gathering of vast quantities of information, with elaborate facilities for classify- ing, evaluating, and converting that information into intelligence. Under the Nazis, intelligence as an activity was a huge enterprise, operating with the precision of a modern machine. No longer was intelligence a matter of individual ac- complishment but rather the combined achieve- ment of many groups. The dimensions of the new organization were drawn to accommodate the re- quirements of global war, fought by many means. It was a system new to the modern world. In developing this organization the Nazis were influenced considerably by Soviet methods. For example, the machinery of diplomacy was care- fully geared to intelligence operations. Special agents were attached to embassies, legations, and consulates throughout the world under the guise of military, naval, air, commercial, and press at- taches. Networks of covert agents were tied in with these special groups. The worldwide or- ganization of German-born men and women was exploited wherever possible. Its potentialities were great, as indicated by the size of its mem- bership which was officially reported in 1937 to be 3 million, and an additional 100,000 sailors serving on German ships. Special organizations in Ger- many were utilized, such as the Students' Bureau, the Bureau for Educators and Teachers, and var- ious labor and cultural groups. Even the Ger- man youth were carefully organized and trained to believe that sabotage, murder, and spying were natural expressions of loyalty to the State and Per Filehrer. Every conceivable method was employed to gain information. One of the more technical was the breaking of diplomatic codes. A clever device of the German Foreign Ministry was the delivery of an important note to foreign embassies on a quiet weekend which would require the embassy to re- quest instructions from its government. When such enciphered messages were presented to the Reichspost for transmittal, German cryptanalysts would attempt to break the codes used, capitaliz- ing on the possibility that the message had not been paraphrased and would contain the German note verbatim. Whether or not this particular device was used against the Belgians, it is true that their diplomatic code was known to German Intelligence before the outbreak of World War II. Initially at least, within the War Ministry, Nicolai was able to coordinate all Military Intel- ligence activities?army, navy and air?and to achieve an overall political guidance through liai- son with the Foreign Office. Under Hitler, there- fore, Nicolai's theories became practice for a lim- ited period of time. In addition, he was able to expand the field of military intelligence interest 87 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS to include not only fortifications, military person- nel, and materiel, but also such behind-the-line matters as communications systems, public utili- ties, and scientific and technical developments. Careful and early planning was a key feature of the German system. For example, the Abwehr, under Admiral Canaris, had selected its foreign listening posts and personnel with the greatest of care years before war came. There are indications that even the isolation of Germany by its enemies was given consideration, and well-laid plans were prepared by the Abwehr to permit the continued flow of information into Berlin from various areas outside of Europe. Intensive advance planning, in which Intelli- gence played a vital part, found its most startling expression in Hitler's development of the modern offensive weapon which came to be known, after the Spanish Civil War, as the fifth column. Highly effective in a number of foreign countries, this weapon consisted of corrupt, politically dissatis- fied, self-interested people who were won to the Nazi cause by means of propaganda and master- race doctrines. Many of these people remained in- active and unknown, to be used for special pur- poses when military conflict began. Then bridges were seized and road blocks formed by men in civilian clothes or local uniforms; and planned sabotage threw into confusion local defenses, sup- ply systems, and transportation and telecommuni- cations. German Intelligence operations abroad were many and met with varying degrees of success. In France the political and moral disintegration provided the Nazis with a most rewarding oppor- tunity for fifth-column activities. A number of Frenchmen whose loyalties were bought by Ger- man gold and promises held important positions in government and came from some of the first fami- lies of the land. The frequency of trials for trea- son in the prewar period revealed the gravity of the situation. Involved in some of these trials was betrayal to the Germans of secrets of the Maginot Line, the Belfort fortifications, and plans of the Metz fortress and the Toulon Naval Base. In other countries of Europe the appearance of the quislings after war began revealed the success of earlier German operations. Fully aware of the failure of German Intelli- CONFIDENTIAL 38 gence in Great Britain in 1914, the Nazis were determined that it should not fail again. Accord- ingly, large numbers of agents were sent into Eng- land years before Poland was invaded. The extensiveness of their activities is indicated by the number of espionage cases which were uncovered during the years from 1935 to 1939. Not all were caught, however. One successful agent who went by the name of Van Schullermann first arrived in England in 1927. By 1932 he had become a natu- ralized citizen, well established in a modest busi- ness near the naval base at Scapa Flow. Over a considerable period of time he seems to have gath- ered accurate information about the antisubmarine defenses for this base. At any rate, to his efforts is attributed the German success in penetrating Scapa Flow and sinking H. M. S. Royal Oak early in the war. At the outset of their intelligence efforts in Britain the Germans were able to take advantage of the fact that the British were in no way prepared for hostilities, either in fact or in. spirit. But again, in 1939 as in 1914, the Germans were unable to cope successfully with British counterintelligence. Emphasis on quantity rather than quality of effort, and stereotyped methods, again were important factors in the German failure. Nazi intelligence activities in the United States began in 1933, soon after Hitler came to power. German shipping was utilized to introduce covert agents into the country and to transmit informa- tion back to Berlin. By 1938 vital defense secrets were reaching German Intelligence files. Among them were blueprints for new bombers and fighters, stolen from aircraft plants in New York and Pennsylvania; key designs of naval ships, re- vealing possible weaknesses; and certain codes of the Army Air Force. On the west coast German agents were relaying information to the Japanese; and members of the German-American Bund were striving to obtain classified maps of fortifications in the Panama Canal Zone. Within Germany itself, Hitler's intelligence sys- tem was equally comprehensive. The Nazi leaders fully realized that they must- establish absolute control over the German people if they were to control the world. Accordingly, even before Hitler came to power his henchmen had laid plans for a secret police system. In 1932 there were Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210Q02-9 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTELLIGENCE C 0 11 Fl DENTIAL 138,000 German police; a year and a half later there were 437,000, of whom almost half were members of the Nazi Elite Guard, called the Schutz-Staffel, or SS. By 1940 the SS alone totaled 432,000 men, organized into 36 divisions of 12,000 men each. During war this army was des- ignated to hold the inner front. A significant part of the SS was the secret police force called the Gestapo, a name which came to strike fear and terror into the minds of men. The Gestapo was not only inquisitive in nature; it was an inquisi- tion. Its purpose was to hunt out, repress, and destroy all enemies of the Nazi State. Its meth- ods were characterized by brutality, if not bestial- ity. Its eyes and ears gradually penetrated all phases of German life. It must have seemed to the Nazis that they had indeed forged an invincible weapon for their com- plete success. It was well made; and Hitler soon put it to triumphant use in Austria, Czechoslo- vakia, and other areas of Europe. However, the Nazis failed to control the inevitable human factor which eventually led to the serious weakening of their entire Intelligence apparatus. Distrust arose and increased between the leaders of the Gestapo and those of the Abwehr of the Army General Staff. There were conflicts between the secret police and military intelligence, especially as to spheres of authority and responsibility. Rivalries became intense, with much personal jealousy and animosity. By 1938 Hitler found it expedient to form a high command of the armed forces and to relieve the general staff of any responsibility for the interpretation of intelligence. The political direction, urged by Nicolai, became political domination. Italian Intelligence Mussolini's major military intelligence effort was demonstrated briefly during his campaign into Ethiopia in 1935. It took the form of sub- version of the Coptic priests in order to render even easier the overthrow of their government. The principal Italian Intelligence organization was the Fascist Secret Police, known as the OVRA, established officially in 1926 as a direct result of the insecurity of the Fascist government and a succession of attempts to assassinate Mussolini himself. Its weapons, applied with liberality against the Italian people, were fear, terror, and absolute power over life and death. The OVRA, as part of the state militia, devoted itself to ob- taining information about all enemies of the state, both within Italy and abroad. Agents provoca- teurs were active in Europe and in North and South America, where they attempted to hunt down and destroy Italian antifascists. One of their effective weapons against those who managed to escape from the country was holding as hostages families who had been left behind. In 1938, when Mussolini entrusted his political fortunes to Hitler, the German Gestapo entered Italy in force and rapidly replaced OVRA with its own organization. The Rapid Growth of Japanese Intelligence Even before Hitler began to implement his con- cept of total war in Europe, the Japanese were putting many of the same theories to use in Asia. For example, the political and moral disintegra- tion within Manchuria?an early objective for ag- gression?provided an excellent opportunity for the use of the fifth column technique. For many years the head of the Army's Bureau of Military Information, Colonel Doihara, had been active in China. Using many disguises, from peddlar to priest, he had traveled about the country, gathering information and enlisting the services of dissident elements and criminal groups. He was particularly successful in utilizing agents provocateurs to create incidents which would jus- tify interference in China by Japanese military forces. In the summer of 1931, for example, he arranged for the kidnapping of the commander of the Manchurian Infantry. Several days later, a group of men dressed in uniforms of the Man- churian Infantry provoked an argument with a Japanese officer on the streets of Mukden and bru- tally killed him before a crowd of onlookers. Taken into custody, these men stated that they had acted under the direct orders of their com- mander. When an explanation was demanded by the Japanese Government, the commander, of course, could not be found. Immediately the Manchurian Government was accused of protect- ing this officer and encouraging atrocities against the Japanese. After diplomatic denials were pre- sented, the officer in question reappeared. Hay- 39 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09: CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 ADDroved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTML INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS ing been well treated, he was unable to support his story of kidnapping and was completely discredited. In addition to this type of direct pressure, the Japanese employed more subtle, though equally effective, methods. The Chinese opium industry was exploited and the sale of its product promoted among the people, with the double-edged result of further destroying their moral fiber and at the same time providing financial support for the whole operation. As Japanese plans for expansion in Asia devel- oped, so did her requirements for information to be used to support conquest by military, economic, political, and psychological means. The alloca- tion of more than $3,000,000 to official Japanese in- telligence services for the fiscal year 1934-35 is indicative of the attention given to their develop- ment. Listening posts and personnel were gradu- ally established in Malaya, Singapore, Burma, Java, the Philippines, Morotai, French In do- China, and India. After the "China Incident" of 1937 the activities of military intelligence mate- rially increased. With Manchuria and Korea as bases for operation, the collection effort against Soviet Siberia was intensified. Long before their attack against Pearl Harbor, the Japanese had ex- tended their intelligence network throughout the world, utilizing agents of many types. Trained agents were provided in part by the Army General Staff. As the demand for personnel increased, it became necessary to establish secretly in 1938 a Rear Area Service Personnel Training Center, which was soon expanded into an Army Intelligence School. Officers trained at this school were sent abroad as military attach4s, diplomats, newspaper reporters, businessmen, or special agents. Their activities included: the collection of information and liaison work; the organiza- tion of small guerrilla groups, especially in China, for scouting and undercover operations; and sab- otage and subversion, which was concentrated in southeast Asia and the islands of the Pacific. These officers were the vanguard for Japanese mil- itary action, paving the way for the occupation of various areas by Japanese troops. Naval officers also acted as special intelligence agents and were distributed throughout the mer- chant marine and fishing fleets disguised as wire- CONFIDENTIAL 40 less operators, crew members, and ships' officers, especially in the Pacific. Thus training maneu- vers of the United States Fleet, for example, were watched by expert eyes from nearby Japanese cargo ships or fishing craft. There were, of course, many situations in which Japanese person- nel could not be used because of their oriental appearance. As a result, Caucasians were often employed, particularly Germans, in such areas as Hawaii, the United States, and South America. In addition to their trained personnel, the In- telligence services had available literally thousands of amateur collectors of information, for one char- acteristic of the Japanese is careful and conscien- tious observation. More important, they feel impelled to report their observations to proper authorities. As a result, great quantities of in- formation were channeled into Tokyo from trav- elers, tourists, Japanese living abroad, and business firms operating in foreign countries. These amateurs usually had cameras and made the most of their opportunities to photograph war- ships, naval bases, and other subjects of possible military interest. Reports and photographs were turned over to military authorities, either directly or through consulates, special messengers, or rep- resentatives of the merchant marine. While much of this information was inaccurate or with- out value, it was all carefully classified and proc- essed by the Intelligence agencies of the Army and Navy and the Information Bureau of the For- eign Office. This technique of capitalizing on the mass collection of information is a Japanese con- tribution to the modern development of intelli- gence activity. The collection procedures of the Japanese in the prewar period also indicate their appreciation of the importance of peacetime planning and preparation, years in advance of actual conflict. An excellent illustration is provided by one of their agents, a Dr. Kuehn and his family, who came to Oahu, T. H., from Germany in 1935. Dr. Kuehn posed as a scientist interested in the an- cient history of the islands. About 1939 his daughter, Ruth, opened a beauty shop, which served as an excellent source of information gath- ered from its patrons who were the wives of United States Navy personnel. As Japanese require- ments for information became more definite, Dr. Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTELLIGENCE CONFIDENTIAL Kuehn began to forward through the Japanese and German consulates specific information re- garding naval ships at Pearl Harbor. On De- cember 2, 1941, a complete report on the number, types, and exact locations of United States naval ships in the Hawaiian area was prepared for the Japanese consul who transmitted it by short-wave radio to Japanese Naval Intelligence Headquar- ters. At the appropriate time, the Kuehns were to be evacuated to Tokyo by submarine; but this plan failed to materialize because they were appre- hended and taken into custody as the result of action by the United States Naval Intelligence. The Trend of Soviet Intelligence During the early years between the two World Wars, the development and consolidation of power within Russia consumed much of the attention and energies of the revolutionists who had seized con- trol of the government in 1917. For this reason Soviet Intelligence was, first of all, a security po- lice system, with military intelligence occupying a position of secondary importance. Conditioned to an atmosphere of distrust and suspicion while they were revolutionary conspirators, the Soviet leaders fully appreciated the need for a highly organized and pervasive Intelligence system to maintain rigid controls over the actions and even the thoughts of the Russian people. Within 3 weeks after the revolution had become an accom- plished fact, they established the Cheka which con- tinued not only the tradition but also the methods of the Tzarist Oehrana. The Ch,eka was given great independence of ac- tion, with the power to carry out searches, arrests, and executions. Its ruthless and brutal methods inspired such fear and terror that it became the object of widespread opposition within a few short years. As a result, in 1922, when the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was established, the Ch,eka was abolished. It was quickly replaced, however, by the 0. G. P. U., which had its head- quarters in Moscow, with branches known as G. P. U. in each of the member republics. The purposes, powers, and methods of this new or- ganization were substantially the same as those of the Ckeka, but its jurisdiction was expanded. The border and internal security troops were placed under its control, and a military section was created to insure the political allegiance of the Army and the Navy. In 1934, the 0. G. P. U. was replaced by the N. K. V. D. At this time there was further centralization of authority and a reorganization to include all police and firemen engaged in overt security duties. New sections were added to direct the surveillance of the civil- ian population and of foreign espionage agents. Soviet Intelligence had now become a full-scale commissariat of the government, far more com- prehensive and powerful than anything ever en- visioned by the Tzars. Its stability and deadly influence were fully demonstrated by its bloody purge of Red Army personnel in 1937. The record of Soviet Intelligence within Russia during the period from 1917 to 1939 is one of steady expansion and increasing influence in every aspect of Russian society. Abroad it became more and more active, developing networks of agents and informers by many means. The inter- national organization of Communists, the Comin- tern, provided excellent opportunities for intelligence activities in many countries. Diplo- matic and trade channels were exploited for the collection of information by carefully placed in- telligence agents. For example, more extensive Soviet intelligence activities in the United States are believed to date from 1933 when diplomatic relations were reestablished between the two coun- tries. In fact, every conceivable situation was skillfully turned to the advantage of intelligence operations. In 1929 when Stalin expelled Trot- sky from the Soviet Union, the N. K. V. D. made use of this situation to send abroad a number of covert agents posing as escaped sympathizers. Some legitimate sympathizers were permitted to leave the U. S. S. R. only after they had agreed to serve the N. K. V. D. The double result of this procedure was to provide a good cover for intelli- gence personnel and to confuse and discredit anti- Soviet groups outside the country. The Spanish Civil War was also used to good advantage for intelligence purposes. Not only did Soviet personnel receive excellent practical training, but also valuable information was gained regarding the capabilities of other coun- tries involved. One seemingly insignificant, but important, procedure initiated by the Soviets in this war was the careful collection of the pass- 41 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS ports of volunteers who came from many coun- tries to fight in Spain. The passports of those killed were saved for later use by Soviet agents in other parts of the world. This procedure pro- vides a good illustration of long-range planning. There are indications that Soviet Intelligence, or the use of intelligence, was not always success- ful in the pre-World War II period. At the out- set of the Russo-Finnish War of 1939, Soviet forces suffered some amazing defeats at the hands of inferior Finnish armies. There was subse- quent speculation that the Kremlin may well have been led by Finnish Communists to believe that their country's armies would not materially resist Soviet military maneuvers. If this was true, then Soviet Intelligence may have suffered from a tendency to place too much reliance upon infor- mation derived from affiliated foreign Communist organizations. During the early part of World War II, a fur- ther reorganization of the Soviet Intelligence System resulted in the establishment of the Peo- ple's Commissariat of State Security, called the N. K. G. B. This new agency relieved the N. K. V. D. of its functions in internal surveil- lance and the collection of information abroad. WORLD WAR II The Second World War has been described as one of unparalleled mobility, tremendous destruc- tiveness, and intense savagery. The technologi- cal improvements in tanks and aircraft, when used in combination, made possible the lightning war, or "Blitzkrieg," so successfully employed by Hit- ler. Poland was conquered in 18 days and France fell in 35. The French General Staff, complacent and unprepared, was paralyzed by this new war- fare of fluid movement. The techniques de- veloped by the Germans were later used with equal success by General Patton in his drive on Paris. Other methods of warfare were developed with notable effectiveness. Strategic bombing brought destruction behind the battlelines to all parts of enemy countries, while transport aircraft carried conquering airborne forces across geographical barriers. Amphibious craft made possible the launching of land attacks from the sea which had been considered too difficult in previous wars. In- ventions in the field of electronics produced such CONFIDENTIAL 42 weapons as radar and guided missiles for long- range battle use. The aircraft carrier replaced the battleship as the capital ship and made pos- sible the waging of sea battles across hundreds of miles. Guerrilla warfare sprang out of internal resistance movements and was exploited on a wide scale. The submarine harassed lines of communi- cations and committed sizable organized forces to its pursuit. The radio permitted an intensifi- cation of propaganda and the waging of psycho- logical warfare in all parts of the world, a type of "strategic bombing" of equal effectiveness in peace or war. World War II was much more than a series of battles between armies and navies; it was a gi- gantic struggle between peoples for survival and for the perpetuation of their economies and ways of life. Hitler's intelligence weapon had to be improved upon and surpassed by the opposing nations. The variety of the modern methods of warfare imposed even greater demands upon In- telligence, for it had to cover not only the armed forces of the enemy, their discipline, training, and tactics; in addition, it had to be conversant with industrial capacity, technological abili ties, trans- portation and communication facilities, internal political situations, and the will of the people to resist. The speed of this war placed a premium on the time factor in the collection of information and the dissemination of intelligence. The com- plexity and scope of military action increased the problems of preparing accurate intelligence esti- mates which in turn led to the demand for more highly trained personnel. The sheer volume of advance knowledge required for success in battle forced the expansion of organizations to a size adequate for its production. The resistance move- ments in occupied and enemy countries aided ma- terially in the collection of information. The un- precedented number of covert agents stepped up the work of both intelligence and counterintel- ligence. Radio and aircraft facilitated the trans- mission of information. The total impact of all of this intelligence activity rendered doubly im- portant the most stringent security measures. At the beginning of World War II, the pre- ponderance of land and air military strength was in the hands of Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union. Likewise, the offensive intelligence Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTELLIGENCE CONFIDENTIAL strength of Germany and Japan was superior. On the other hand, for over 2 years the Western Al- lies were harassed, driven back, and on the de- fensive, while they took time to prepare a counter- offensive. The Effectiveness of German Intelligence The Nazis began the war with the world's best organized intelligence service. Without detract- ing from the effectiveness of the German military forces, it is generally agreed that their early rapid progress was greatly facilitated by the advance preparations of Intelligence, which preceded and accompanied troop movements. Polish resistance was paralyzed by the Nazi fifth column which spread false rumors, issued conflicting orders, and transmitted vital operational information to the German General Staff. France, from the military point of view, was potentially much more power- ful than Poland, yet fifth column activities had fatally weakened her ability to fight and, even worse, her will to resist. Greece and Yugoslavia were able to prolong their resistance to German covert penetration. Time and the examples of Poland and France were of some assistance to them. In addition, the Italian OVRA, which had assumed some responsi- bilities to prepare these countries for invasion, failed miserably. In Greece, for example, Ger- man forces were required to save Mussolini from being thrown back into the Adriatic. The German intelligence service had available unlimited funds, an army of agents, and a net- work of collection centers. At the beginning of the war $200,000,000 were reportedly being spent annually on intelligence organization and propaganda. In 1943 the Abwehr was allocated $11,700,000 and had a personnel strength of 30,000 including 7,000 officers. In Denmark alone there were 750 Nazi agents. The four major Intelli- gence centers established by the Abwehr for the collection of world information were located at Konigsberg, Munich, Cologne, and Hamburg. Madrid, Lisbon, Berne, Ankara, Stockholm, Buda- pest, and the Vatican were centers for the collec- tion of information on a long-range basis. Brussels, Warsaw, Sofia, Bucharest, The Hague, and Paris were considered short-term centers. One network of agents was distributed among the 43 various diplomatic, consular, and commercial posts in these capitals. A second network worked inde- pendently in the collecting and transmitting of in- formation for strategic and tactical use. One of the specialized types of collectors was a group of deaf-mutes who were skilled in the reading of lips and the recording of conversations seen but not heard. In Great Britain, during the early months of the war, the Germans achieved some successes. The transmittal of vital information regarding war factories in Birmingham and Coventry aided in the bombing of those areas. The German lega- tion at Dublin served as one collection center; while Lisbon and Oslo were relay points between England and Berlin. However, British counter- intelligence soon proved more than a match for German Intelligence, whose effectiveness rapidly dwindled in the British Isles. In fact the British success in forwarding inaccurate information, ostensibly from German agents who had actually been taken into custody, confused and bewildered headquarters in Berlin. The entire Middle East was the scene of inten- sive intelligence activities by German agents lo- cated in Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Afghanistan. The total organization extended from the Mediterranean coast of North Africa to the Indian Ocean. The objectives were to under- mine British influence among the Arab peoples and to prepare them for German domination by means of corruption and subversion. In these ef- forts the Germans had the active assistance of the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem. The German com- mercial attache at Ankara was instrumental in fomenting an unsuccessful rebellion against the pro-British government of Iraq. The German ambassador at Ankara, Franz von Papen, was pro- vided with more than $4,000,000 in gold to finance his work in the Middle East. But in spite of this well-organized and numerically superior machine, German Intelligence failed in its efforts. It also failed to forecast the Allied invasion of North Africa. Of particular interest is the "Cicero" affair which took place in Turkey during late 1943 and early 1944. "Cicero" was the code name of an employee in the British Embassy at Ankara. He became a German spy, motivated by a desire for CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS money and possibly an old hatred of the British. As a result of his efforts the Germans were pro- vided with highly classified material of incredible value: a record of official messages passing be- tween the British Ambassador and the Foreign Office in London. In this manner it is believed that the German Government was fully informed of the latest figures of American lend-lease deliveries and anticipated shipments; the minutes of the Allied Casablanca Conference; a resume of Allied conversations at Moscow between Stalin, Anthony Eden, and Cordell Hull, including a re- port of the Russian demand for a second front in. Europe; decisions reached between Roosevelt, Churchill, and Chiang Kai-shek at Cairo; and, finally, the conclusions of the Teheran Conference, including decisions of the military staffs of the Big Three. But even more incredible than the nature of the information itself is the apparent fact that the German military and political lead- ers failed to make use of it. Von Ribbentrop seems to have questioned the accuracy of the in- formation and the source remained suspect. The only real value to the Germans of "Cicero's" work was the breaking of the British diplomatic code. In South American countries, German Intelli- gence exploited important sources of information. The German Ambassador to Argentina, Baron von Thermann, coordinated the collection effort in this part of the world. For transmittal pur- poses he had available 12 powerful secret radio stations, operating with the knowledge of Argen- tine authorities. As of 1942, over $2,000,000 were being spent annually in Argentina to subsidize German cultural organizations. There can be little doubt that information derived from Buenos Aires and various other ports in South America aided the operations of German submarine warfare in the Atlantic. Weaknesses in the German intelligence service rapidly diminished its overall effectiveness. Its elaborate mass training of agents resulted in a standardized type of operation and response which facilitated detection, and overcentralization of or- ganization tended to reduce individual initiative. Political considerations were an increasingly lim- iting factor. Tension and distrust grew between political and military leaders on the one hand and Army General Staff Intelligence personnel on the CONFIDENTIAL 44 other. As the war progressed actual leadership was concentrated in the hands of political leaders and military men chosen and influenced by them. Vital decisions were reached more and more by Hitler himself on the basis of intuition, rather than intelligence. This was particularly true in the campaign against the Soviet Union. Hitler and his henchmen often refused to accept unfavor- able reports, even though well documented. As a result, intelligence personnel on all echelons came to color their reports, emphasizing the favorable factors and withholding or mitigating the unfavorable. There is some evidence to support the conten- tion that Admiral Canaris, Chief of the Army Intelligence Section, was in active sympathy with those German military leaders whose opposition to the Hitler regime resulted in an abortive at- tempt to assassinate Der Fuehrer in 1944. At the Nurnberg trials following the war, Ernst Kalten- brunner, the head of the German Security Police, stated: "I had to accept this post (the Reich Se- curity Office) at a time when suspicion fell on Admiral Canaris of having collaborated with the enemy for years . . . In a short time I ascer- tained the treason of Canaris to a most frightful extent." Whether or not the individual involved was Canaris himself will probably never be de- termined. It is known, however, that the British gained possession of information which could have come from very few other sources. For ex- ample, all German plans for aggressive action prior to the invasion of France were reported to the British. They were warned of the impending attack on Norway in 1940. Winston Churchill had some knowledge of the plans for the invasion of England at a time when only a few highly placed officers of the German General Staff had similar information. It is of interest to note that much of this information gained by the Brit- ish was disregarded, perhaps for lack of con- firmation. Suspicion against Canaris reached such propor- tions that he was relieved of command of the Abwehr in 1941 when Hitler established a unified secret intelligence service more directly under his personal control. German military intelligence was weakened by the attitude of the officer group toward it. In the Approved For Release 2003/12/09: CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTELLIGENCE CONFIDENTIAL German staff organization, Intelligence was sub- ordinated to Operations. While intelligence of- ficers were expected to have a clear understanding of tactical situations, no particular specialization of knowledge or training was considered essen- tial. German officers did not regard an intelli- gence assignment worthy of a soldier and, conse- quently, endeavored to avoid it whenever possible. However, the performance of military intelli- gence must not be underrated. It remained a formidable weapon during World War II. The relationship of Intelligence to Operations kept the study of the enemy situation on an immedi- ately applicable basis. All officers had been care- fully trained to develop qualities of thoroughness, sense of duty, logical approach to problems, and accuracy. In spite of no special training, they became competent in these assignments as a re- sult of hard work and careful study. Their abil- ity to gather facts and piece together an accurate picture of the enemy situation was often amaz- ing. They were most successful in the interroga- tion of captured enemy personnel. Their radio intercept work was of a high order and a profit- able source of information, especially after the Germans lost their air superiority. It was un- fortunate for military intelligence that those officers who had trained themselves in intelligence were transferred in due time to other assignments more to their liking and ambition. But, as far as results were concerned, German military in- telligence, which had been only mediocre in World War I, performed rather successfully in World War II, especially when permitted to func- tion without the blight of political interference. The Errors of Japanese Intelligence The remarkable mass collection system of the Japanese provided Tokyo with a wealth of vital information prior to the outbreak of war. For example, when it was ready to move troops into Southeast Asia, the Imperial High Command had complete and accurate models of the defenses of Hong Kong down to the last gun position. Its detailed information regarding ship positions and movements in and around Pearl Harbor was used with devastating effect. However, the Japanese intelligence organization was not provided with a sufficient number of trained personnel at the higher echelons to assemble and evaluate the mass of material which had been collected. At the time of Pearl Harbor the Intelligence Section of the Army General Staff included only 17 officers. Its growth was negligible until early in 1945 when 40 additional officers were assigned to be trained for duty with the armies organized for the defense of the Japanese islands. The de- velopment of Naval Intelligence was equally slow. Beginning with 29 officers attached to the Naval General Staff, the total number was increased to 97 by early 1945. The Kempeitai, or secret police, was primarily responsible for counterintelligence and was well organized, with trained personnel to carry out this function. It achieved a reputa- tion similar to that of the German Gestapo, and many of its methods were comparable. The slow and limited development of Japanese Intelligence appears to have resulted from the high command's concept of a short war, defensive in nature, following the initial conquests. Based on the possibilities of an early German victory in Europe and the rapid consolidation of her own newly won territories, Japan believed that the United States would settle for an advantageous compromise peace. As a result, neither the Army nor the Navy expanded their intelligence organi- zations to make possible the production of intel- ligence for dissemination throughout all levels of command. At the headquarters level, intelligence for both the Army and the Navy was subordinated to the war plans sections and responsible prima- rily for the production of background intelligence. There was apparently little coordination between the intelligence effort at headquarters and at the operational levels. In the field, intelligence units were utilized by military commanders for such purposes as the collection of tactical information, penetration and subversion of native peoples, and the exploitation of economic sabotage. These units often worked with the military governments established for con- quered territories. The unit attached to the Nan- king Government Military Affairs Committee, for example, was particularly active in the prepara- tion of surveys and statistics and in attempting to influence and control the activities of the local Chinese. In general, however, these units were not effective, for a variety of reasons. In the first 45 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS place they were not organized in sufficient time to permit the accomplishment of their responsibil- ities. One unit, created for the battle of the Pacific islands, became operational just 2 months before hostilities began. Another reason was the Japanese failure to appreciate the customs and habits of other peoples and an attempt to impose their own, without change. They alienated those whom they sought to control, and operated by means of intimidation and threats. There was continuous conflict over responsibility and author- ity between military commanders, intelligence units, and representatives of the secret police. Finally, many operational commanders had no appreciation of the potential value or use of the intelligence units assigned to them, particularly from a long-range point of view. When Japan's diplomatic relations with many countries were broken, her primary sources of in- formation were reduced to Allied communications transmissions, short wave and medium wave radio broadcasts, and newspapers and magazines pro- cured through neutral sources. Special agents planted in the Western Hemi- sphere continued to supply some information, with diminishing degrees of success as the war pro- gressed. The case of one American citizen who served as an agent is illustrative of the use made of the nationals of various countries for espio- nage purposes and, incidentally, of the devious means employed for the transmittal of informa- tion. Mrs. Velvalee Dickinson, owner of an ex- clusive doll shop in New York City, made use of her occupation and clientele to transmit infor- mation regarding the movement of United States Navy ships. Various kinds of dolls provided an ingenious code. Her messages were transmitted via a contact in Buenos Aires. The suspicion which led to her discovery was aroused when one of her letters to Argentina was returned to the United States, addressee unknown. The Japanese had failed to notify her that her contact had moved. This incident has been popularized as "The Case of the Talking Dolls." These, then, were some of the errors of Japanese Intelligence, which were in turn errors of the Japanese High Command. They contributed to heavy losses in Japanese manpower and materiel and were factors in Japan's eventual defeat. CONFIDENTIAL 46 The Resiliency of British Intelligence Although decidedly inferior to that of the Ger- mans in numbers and resources at the beginning of the war, British Intelligence made maximum use of its available strength and centuries of ex- perience. Much of the German Intelligence ac- tivity in Britain had been carefully followed and its organization penetrated. When the Germans marched into Poland, therefore, it was compara- tively easy, by means of extensive raids and ar- rests, to destroy the overall effectiveness of Ger- man Intelligence in Britain in much the same way as it had been accomplished early in World War I. After Dunkirk, when the British faced one of the most precarious and dangerous situations of their history, Intelligence proved to be a bul- wark of defense. Appalling weaknesses were suc- cessfully concealed from the Germans and accu- rate information made possible the skillful use of inferior military forces. In his book, Top Secret, Robert Ingersoll has aptly commented: "Intelli- gence was always the Empire's ace in the hole. When British fortunes were at the lowest ebb, it was their Intelligence organization which saved them." Once the country was on a war basis, ample funds and personnel became available, but the training of personnel required considerable time. It was not until several years had passed that Brit- ish Intelligence was able to develop its outstand- ing organization, again conceded to be the "world's best." By that time many covert agents of Brit- ish, French, and German nationality were active within Germany itself. Innumerable bits of in- formation, often irrelevant in themselves, flowed regularly into London for analysis by various in- telligence agencies. Through the European gov- ernments-in-exile, in London, encouragement was given to the underground resistance movements which sprang up against the Germans all over Europe. The time came when British Intelli- gence was able to operate fifth columns in many countries of Europe as effective as those of Hitler. The British had many assets upon which their intelligence organization could draw. In addi- tion to comprehensive experience, internationally educated, politically informed soldiers and civil- ians were available who were adept in dealing Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTELLIGENCE CONFIDENTIAL with foreign peoples. Their basic research and available source material were tangible assets. Their military and political leaders had a real and full appreciation not only of the value of intelligence, but also of long-range planning. Typical of British Intelligence personnel was a young man named Rankin who had lived all of his life in the inaccessible Chin hills of Burma. He knew the Burmese, Chin, and Manipur lan- guages, dressed and lived like the natives, and had a sincere affection for them. Even though the na- tives in these hills were anti-British, Rankin was able to influence them to support the Allied cause. A more intangible asset was the ability of the British to improvise. When their armies were driven off the continent and their channels of in- formation blocked, they devised a means of ex- tracting military information from photographs taken over enemy-held territory. In a relatively short time the results obtained were successful to a spectacular degree. The development of photo- graphic interpretation as a technique for the col- lection of information was a significant British contribution to intelligence in World War II. A further asset was the control of the informa- tion upon which military decisions were made. This control, as well as effectiveness of presenta- tion, was well demonstrated at the major political and military conferences held by the Allies during the war. In the European theater, for example, their intelligence organization was so complete that they were given primary responsibility for enemy intelligence in that theater. In the Middle East, British agents, experienced in local customs and traditions, surpassed the Germans in winning the support of those peoples. As is often true in the Orient, the bribe was the key to support, and it was often a case of outbidding the Germans. One of the real achievements of Intelligence was a delay in the German use of V-bombs against Britain. Preliminary reports about German de- velopment of V-weapons were received as early as 1942, and a female special agent was able to trans- mit vital information concerning the activities and installations of the main research station at Peene- muende. As a result of her work, one of the most effective Allied air raids of the war was carried out against this area at a time when some of Ger- many's key scientists were there. Over 200 per- 47 sons were killed during this raid, including the director of the station and the Chief of Staff of the Luftwaffe. The raid substantially retarded the production of these new weapons. British Intelligence, however, was not always successful. One of its failures contributed to the defeat of General Montgomery's forces at Am- helm. Just prior to this engagement Intelligence lost track of one German Panzer corps and was unable to determine its location, which unfortu- nately was Arnheim. The well-guarded move- ment of this corps is reported to have resulted from a betrayal of Montgomery's plans by a Dutch traitor. In any event, British losses were heavy. Some of the troops who managed to es- cape were aided by British agents in that area. Throughout the war, Intelligence continued to underestimate German production capabilities, re- cuperative powers, and capacity to wage war. Basing its decisions on such estimates, the British General Staff discouraged an invasion of the con- tinent from the west, believing that Germany's surrender could be brought about by aerial bomb- ing. Opposition to invasion plans was further strengthened as a result of overestimating the strength of German fortifications along the chan- nel coast. Captured German generals later pointed out that this overestimate had been caused by effective propaganda. A much earlier failure of Intelligence was its incorrect appraisal of Ger- man intentions in Norway, just prior to the occu- pation of that country. For a short period during the war there was intense rivalry between the Intelligence and Oper- ations staffs, which temporarily blocked the inter- change of important information. As a result, on one occasion, both groups put agents ashore at the same place on the coast of Norway within an interval of 3 days. The agents from Operations destroyed vital targets in the area and withdrew. When the Intelligence agents arrived they re- ceived a warm welcome from the German field police. In the field of counterintelligence the British were of considerable assistance to the Federal Bu- reau of Investigation in both North and South America, and this mutual cooperation was of real value in smashing the Nazi espionage activities there. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS The Rapid Growth of a United States Intelligence Organization Surprised and dismayed by the progress of world events leading up to World War II, the United States gradually became aware of the in- adequacy of its intelligence agencies which it had so pointedly neglected. The success of the Jap- anese attack at Pearl Harbor disclosed the tragic results of this neglect. Even more, it revealed a lack of coordination of effort in the collection of information, interdepartmental jealousies which stymied effective exchange of information, and in- correct estimates of the war capabilities of the enemy. As a result, the older intelligence agencies were expanded and strengthened, and new agencies were created to develop sources of information and new techniques. Among these agencies were: a foreign propaganda agency, an economic warfare agency, a war production agency, the Office of Strategic Services, a branch of the foreign eco- nomic administration, and special units in the De- partments of Justice, Interior, and Agriculture. Founded in 1908 and reorganized in 1924, the Federal Bureau of Investigation was officially given responsibilities for counterintelligence in 1939. After the war began its personnel expanded to more than 15,000. It had a tremendous task in weeding out potentially dangerous aliens, as is indicated by the fact that over 7,000 Germans and 5,000 Japanese were detained or imprisoned after war was declared. The size of the job can be estimated somewhat from a partial list of ma- terial collected from the hiding places of enemy agents: 4,626 firearms, including modern auto- matics and submachine guns; 307,506 rounds of ammunition, 2,340 sticks of dynamite, 2,800 dyna- mite caps, 3,787 feet of fuse, 1,700 items such as time bombs, teller mines and boohytraps ; over 3,000 illegal radio receivers and shortwave trans- mitters; 4,000 cameras, navigational instruments, naval charts, aeronautical maps, tens of thousands of detailed photographs of coastlines, ports, in- dustrial plants; and thousands of feet of micro- film containing vital records prepared by covert agents. Aided by Naval and Army Intelligence, the Federal Bureau of Investigation was emi- nently successful in thwarting sabotage efforts. Although the sabotage of American factories was CONFIDENTIAL a part of the Nazi plan, there is no definite evi- dence that organized German sabotage achieved any major destruction. One of the most clever counterintelligence feats of the Federal Bureau of Investigation was made possible by a German-born American citizen named Wilhelm Sebold, who was employed as an engineer by the Consolidated Aircraft Co. In 1939 Sebold made a trip to Germany to visit his parents and relatives. While there he was de- tained by the Gestapo and "persuaded" to become an undercover agent in the United States, with his family held as hostages in Germany. After train- ing in espionage and radio transmission at a Nazi spy school, he was permitted to return to America with instructions to gather detailed statistics on aircraft and poison-gas production. He had been able to advise the FBI of his predicament through the American consul in Germany. Upon his re- turn, Sebold was established by the FBI at Center- port, Long Island, where the most modern short- wave transmitter equipment was made available for his use. For a period of 16 months both fake and genuine information was transmitted to the unsuspecting Germans. By means of Sebold and his shortwave transmitters, the Nazis were thor- oughly deceived as to the number of aircraft avail- able to the British for the Battle of Britain and the FBI was able to round up over 30 Nazi agents in the United States and to gain information about others located in Cuba, Brazil, Argentina, and Chile. 48 The Office of Strategic Services The establishment of the Office of Strategic Services in 1941 under Maj. Gen. William J. Dono- van was an unprecedented act on the part of the United States Government. Its early functions included research and analysis of military, politi- cal, and economic information us it affected the security of the country. After Pearl Harbor it was placed under the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Its mission was twofold: to act in support of the Army and Navy in the collection and analysis of strategic information; and to be responsible for the plan- ning and operating of special services. These special services involved covert operations which would not normally be carried on by the armed forces. Personnel were selected for this work only Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 THE DEVELOPMENT after the most intensive screening and psychologi- cal testing for mental aptitude and emotional sta- bility. Their training in subversive warfare was rigorous, extensive, and carried on under condi- tions of the greatest secrecy. Altogether, during the war, thousands of OSS operators made their way into enemy countries to engage in black war fare, a term applied to the often unrecorded yet decisive struggle between spies and counterspies. Their weapons were bribery, treachery, and sub- version. Although inexperience resulted in some mistakes, the agents of the OSS were able to achieve considerable success and to measure up favorably to the professional agents of the European powers. Early success marked the efforts of the OSS agents who helped to pave the way for the invasion of North Africa. A total of 15 men were in North Africa for almost a year before the actual invasion, operating 5 secret radio stations, transmitting vital information which facilitated the movement of troops ashore, and arranging the contacts between representatives of the Allies and friendly elements in that area. The Jedburgh Mission, developed in 1943 by the OSS and its British opposite num- ber, proved most successful in integrating the ac- tivities of friendly European underground resist- ance groups with the overall plans of the Allied Command. The program of this mission was to parachute scores of three-men teams into France, Belgium, and Holland on D-day ahead of ad- vancing Allied armies, to provide resistance groups with military supplies, and to lead them in coordinated guerrilla activities designed to create confusion and havoc behind the German lines. In commenting on the success of the Jed- burgh Mission, General Eisenhower said: "In no previous war, and in no other theater of this war, have resistance forces been so closely harnessed to the main military effort." OSS agents encouraged the labor resistance movement in the occupied countries of Europe, while in Germany itself 80 separate contacts were established and workers were organized even in the factories of the Ruhr. When Allied troops reached the Rhine German bargemen were avail- able to help them cross the river. In the Balkan countries the OSS helped to set up successful escape and evasion operations. Shortly after the 49 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 OF INTELLIGENCE CONFIDENTIAL surrender of Rumania a total of 1,050 airmen were rescued from prison camps around Bucharest. The extraordinary heroism and bravery of one OSS agent, Corp. Frederic A. Mayer, resulted in the declaration of Innsbruk, Austria, as an open city and its capture by American troops without a fight. In Burma, OSS personnel helped to organ- ize a guerrilla warfare campaign against the Japa- nese. The intelligence they gathered provided the basis for almost all of the combat missions flown in that area by the 19th Air Force. In 2i/2 years of operations, the Kachin guerrilla forces in Burma killed over 5,000 Japanese troops, dis- rupted their lines of communications, and spear- headed the advances of the Allies under the com- mand of Gen. Stillwell. Further American Expansion In addition to the establishment of new intelli- gence agencies, there was a tremendous expansion of the older military intelligence organizations. For example, at the peak of its wartime effort the Office of Naval Intelligence had a sizable number of officers, enlisted men, and civilian personnel in the United States and scattered throughout the world. After the Battle of Midway, naval com- manders came to appreciate more fully the value of Intelligence officers attached to their staffs for operational purposes. Accordingly, the demand quickly exceeded the supply available. A more detailed discussion of the development of naval operational intelligence will be found in chapter 13. However, it should be noted here that intelli- gence was recognized as an essential function of the staffs of the operating forces afloat. The surface naval forces themselves were often valuable sources of information. For example, in June 1944 the aircraft carrier, Guadcalanal, captured a German submarine undamaged off Cape Blanco, French West Africa, and obtained five German acoustic torpedoes, submarine code books and the key to their changes, and every chart, publication, and general order that an oper- ating German submarine carried. These items were, of course, of great value to Intelligence. One of the greatest contributions of the United States to the general development of intelligence was in the field of amphibious warfare, where the closest coordination of many types of intelligence CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS activities was required to provide adequate knowl- edge upon which to base the successful operation of a complex military force transported over water with the objective of establishing itself on an enemy-held shore against opposition. The mere fact that such an operation involved Army, Navy, and Air Forces required the greatest ingenuity and diligence on the part of Intelligence to coordi- nate and to consolidate all the diversified knowl- edge into a package which was comprehensible, usable, and effective. The successes of United States Intelligence in World War II were particularly notable because they were achieved primarily by personnel drawn from the civilian population: business and profes- sional men and women with an infinite variety of vocations. At the outset urgent personnel re- quirements permitted only cursory initial train- ing; it had to be done on the job. Therefore mis- takes were made, not through lack of industry and devotion, but because of inexperience. In the winter of 1944, for example, Intelligence failed to interpret correctly the movements of von Rund- stedt's troops on the western front, and the Ger- mans broke through the Allied defenses in the Battle of the Bulge to inflict heavy losses of men and materiel. Despite its failures and frustrations, Intelli- gence gained recognition from military and politi- cal leaders in the United States to a degree never before attained. The Contribution of Chinese Intelligence At the beginning of war in the Pacific, United States Navy planners recognized the importance of cooperation from the Nationalist Government of China for ultimate victory over Japan. In March 1942 Comdr. Milton E. Miles, now Rear Admiral, left for Chungking to solicit the assist- ance of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek in obtain- ing information regarding weather and other matters of vital intelligence value to the United States Pacific Fleet. The result of Miles' mis- sion was the formation of the Sino-American Cooperative Organization (SACO) , of which he was Deputy Director. The Director of SACO was Lt. Gen. Tai Li, Chief of the Bureau of Investigation and Statis- tics (BIS) of the National Military Council of CONFIDENTIAL 50 China, an intimate friend and adviser of the Gen- eralissimo. Tai Li, known for many years as a mystery man of Asia, had tremendous power and a reputation which inspired more fear and hatred than admiration. As early as 1926 he had asso- ciated himself with Chiang when the latter took command of the Nationalist Armies at Canton. During the march into North China Tai Li acted as an advance agent, collecting information about popular sentiment, military and political devel- opments, and advantageous routes of approach. The intelligence he produced was an important factor in the successive victories which led to the unification of China under the Nationalist Gov- ernment. When Chiang was captured by the Communists, Tai Li aided in his rescue. In 1937, as commander of the loyal patriotic army, Tai Li held Shanghai for 3 months in the face of over- whelmingly superior Japanese forces. He had almost unlimited energy and stamina and acted with a directness that was more western than Oriental. Because he had escaped death so often he was considered invulnerable, and his avoidance of all personal publicity added to the aura of mystery which surrounded him. Tai Li organized China's secret police, the BIS, in 1932, and directed its activities until his death in 1946. During this period he established a complex network of covert agents not only throughout China but also in Indo-China, Burma, India, Bali, Borneo, Formosa, and the Philip- pines. He controlled the uniformed police in Free and Occupied China, as well as the Chinese puppets of the Japanese. Smuggling and anti- smuggling activities came under his jurisdiction. He was Director of the Bureau of Communica- tions and Transportation and Head of the Office of Freight Transportation Control. Thus he wore many different hats which gave him a power not only far-reaching but even paradoxical. A major function of the BIS was espionage and counterespionage directed against Japanese spies and Chinese Communists. Some of its agents were high ranking officers, well educated and well trained. Others were peasants, recruited from Chinese families which had suffered from Japa- nese mistreatment. Representatives were located in the smallest villages and largest cities of China. The BIS formed the nucleus of an effective guer- Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTELLIGENCE CONFIDENTIAL rilla army aimed at driving the Japanese out of China and combatting subversive elements. As the Director of SACO, Tai Li contributed to it the full support of the Chinese Intelligence Or- ganization, which made possible the activities of almost 3,000 Americans (Navy, Army, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard) assigned to SACO, known as Naval Group, China. Their responsi- bilities included weather reporting, coastwatch- ing, guerrilla training, and combat operations. Their activities were made effective by the estab- lishment of a radio communications network. Weather data supplied by SACO was of signif- icant value to the first air attacks on the Japanese home islands and to the attacks on Iwo Jima and Okinawa. Information provided by SACO coastwatchers on Japanese naval and merchant shipping was the basis for the successful sweep of the South China Sea and its ports in January 1945 by the United States Fleet. SACO also made possible the sensational destruction of Japa- nese ships by the United States submarine Barb, as well as the sinking of thousands of tons of Japanese shipping by other American submarines. Tai Li and his organization made a significant contribution to the successful prosecution of the Pacific war. His untimely death shortly after the war was a serious blow not only to Chinese Intelligence but to the Nationalist Government itself. The Expansion of Soviet Intelligence Occupied as they were with military and politi- cal developments in western Europe prior to the outbreak of the war, the leaders of Soviet In- telligence in no way neglected the situation in the Far East. The clever and adroit activities of their spy ring in China and Japan during the period from 1937 to 1941 give some indication of Soviet operating techniques. The principal figure was Dr. Richard Sorge, a German national who was sent as a covert agent by German Intelligence to the Far East in 1933 posing as a foreign news- paper correspondent. Among his close friends and associates were the German Ambassador to Tokyo and Ozaki Hozumi, a Japanese newspaper man prominent in government circles and a friend of various members of the Imperial Cabinet. Together, Sorge and Hozumi cultivated a num- 51 ber of important sources of information, includ- ing the German, British, American, and French Embassies, the Dutch Legation, the Japanese War Ministry, and the Japanese cabinet itself. From them they gathered invaluable data including esti- mates and opinions at the highest official levels, which they evaluated and forwarded not to Berlin but to Moscow by means of radio, by courier through Shanghai, or through the Soviet Em- bassy in Tokyo. The significance of their efforts is revealed by some of the reports transmitted to the Kremlin. In 1937, when the Japanese attacked China, Sorge reported that there would be no attack against the U. S. S. R. in Siberia. In May 1941, Moscow was warned that the Germans would attack the U. S. S. R. along the entire western frontier on 20 June with a force of from 170 to 190 divisions, the major objective being Moscow. The actual attack came on 22 June. In October 1941, Sorge forwarded his well-documented con- clusion that the Japanese would attack to the south in Asia and that there was no serious danger of any attack along the Siberian frontier. On the basis of this information the Soviets were able to transfer large units of their forces in eastern Si- beria to the western front to strengthen their de- fenses against the Nazi invasion. It is somewhat ironic that Sorge's activities were revealed by a Japanese Communist. A tendency of the Soviet leaders to permit the reports of their Communist friends in foreign countries to override the reports of other units in their intelligence system is shown by their initial reaction to indications of Hitler's decision to attack the U. S. S. R. The Communists inside Germany are believed to have reported that the Germans would refuse to march into the Soviet Union. When the attack actually came, the Soviets were taken by surprise. As the war progressed, the Soviets were able to take full advantage of association with their wartime partners in the expansion and extension of their intelligence activities. In the United States since 1924 there had been an organization known as Amtorg, created for the purpose of pur- chasing all kinds of material for the Soviet Union. During the war the activities of this organization were intensified, together with those of the Soviet Purchasing Commission which worked closely with CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS Amtorg. In addition to the procurement of mate- rial, the collection of detailed information con- cerning American industry was stepped up. Factory techniques, production statistics and labor relations were all matters of great interest, in addition to any fact which might have future in- telligence value. As one example, all of the Amer- ican patents concerned with carbon compounds were purchased?a total of about 30,000 in this field alone. By 1946 a comprehensive catalogue had been compiled of every mill, factory, refinery, and engineering plant in the United States. The Four Continent Book Corporation in New York City was developed as an agency for the purchase and transmittal of American technical publica- tions, trade papers, and patents. In addition, it handled Communist propaganda literature in English and Spanish, forwarding the latter to various Latin American countries. By 1944 Soviet intelligence and propaganda ac- tivities were expanded in Latin American coun- tries through Soviet diplomatic representatives. In Mexico an extensive organization was devel- oped for the purpose of destroying American in- fluence first in Mexico and later in other countries of South America. As a part of this process, the Soviets aimed at the elimination of American busi- ness interests and the eventual domination of the economies of these countries. Various cultural organizations were fostered, such as the Russian- Mexican Clubs, to serve as propaganda media and sources of information. In Europe, during the war, a new counterintelli- gence agency was created. It was known as "Smersh"?from the Russian words: "death to spies." It seems to have been organized originally in connection with the administration of the Soviet occupied areas of Europe, and was concerned with disaffection among Soviet troops and anticommu- nism in any form. By painstaking processes it attempted to liquidate all individuals who were not proCommunist, including those active in any democratic-type parties, throughout Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, and the Carpatho-Ukraine. Its carefully selected person- nel, intensely loyal to the Soviet State, showed no mercy or compassion in their work. While positive information is not available, "Smersh" appears to have been organized into five CONFIDENTIAL 52 major departments: administration, operations, investigations, prosecution, and personnel. With central headquarters in Moscow, there were sub- divisions established for each military district in Russia, as well as in Europe. Agents were at- tached to all units of the Soviet Army, and net- works of spies and informers were set up in the occupied countries, to make particular note of trends in political thought. The investigations department developed the science of interrogation to a high degree of perfection, while the prosecu- tion department utilized three men courts to dis- pose of those found guilty. Prior to World War II many improvements had been made in the functional organization of the Soviet military staff. One of these was an in- creased emphasis on intelligence, notable because this function was weak in the staff organizations of both the Tzarist and early Soviet armies. Re- vised military doctrine now included a reconnais- sance, or intelligence, section at the division level, headed by a chief of section. He was responsible for the preparation of the reconnaissance plan, including air reconnaissance; the assignment of missions to subordinate agencies; the maintenance of the enemy situation map; the collection and analysis of information; keeping the commander and chief of staff informed of all intelligence in- formation; and the dissemination of information to higher, coordinate, and subordinate units. Dur- ing the war the intelligence organizations of the Army and the Navy apparently functioned sep- arately; however, by 1946, there was some evidence that they had been combined. The pattern of Soviet Intelligence operations which seemed to emerge during the war period was that of comprehensive, overlapping informer networks within all countries under Soviet rule and of burrowing, multiplying systems of sym- pathizers and agents within foreign countries of exploitable interest. The extensiveness of its op- erations abroad was to be clearly demonstrated in the postwar period. THE POSTWAR PERIOD Great enthusiasm throughout most of the world greeted the unconditional surrender of Germany and Japan, the inauguration of the United Na- tions Organization, and prospects for world peace. Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTELLIGENCE CONFIDENTIAL Amidst the glow of military victories the wartime Allies frequently met to chart a new world of freedom and prosperity. But many boldly pro- jected plans failed to materialize, diametrically opposed points of view were bared, and even peace treaties were delayed interminably by disagree- ments or failed completely of final approval by all concerned, as in the cases of Germany, Austria, and Japan. Two contrary concepts of world re- lationships became more clearly defined in the opposing policies of the United States and the U. S. S. R. Gradually the peoples of the western world, especially in the United States, became aware of a new threat to their political and social institutions and their way of life. The aggressive ideology and world power ob- jectives of the Soviet Government found expres- sion in the absorption of the countries of Eastern Europe, a closely knit alliance with Communist China, and the encouragement of Communist or- ganizations throughout the rest of the world. In an effort to counter these activities, the United States assumed world leadership to aid in reestab- lishing the economic stability of those countries ravaged by the war but as yet free of Communist domination. Economic stability was considered to be fundamental to political and military sta- bility, and through the improvement of standards of living the United States sought to destroy the conditions of poverty upon which Soviet propa- ganda most effectively feeds. The Truman Doc- trine of 1947 brought economic and military assistance to Greece and Turkey threatened by Soviet penetration. The European Recovery Program of 1948, popularly known as the Mar- shall Plan, had as its objective the restoration of the economic productivity of Europe and the healthy employment of all its peoples. This am- bitious program was gradually extended in a les- ser degree to other parts of the world. In 1951 the United States frankly embarked on a Mutual Security Program which tied together economic assistance and military cooperation. The outbreak of the war in Korea in June 1950 brought into clearer focus the grim realities of the so-called "cold war," a term descriptive of various forms of the conflict between Communist and non-Communist countries which had been un- derway for a number of years but which became 58 more apparent after World War II. In the light of postwar experience, some earlier events as- sumed even greater significance than they did at the time. In 1943, for example, a group of young physicists working in the radiation laboratory of the University of California turned over to a Communist agent technical data for transmittal to a Soviet Vice-Consul. In 1944 Soviet representa- tives in South and Central America were ordered back to Moscow for retraining. By that time the military defeat of Germany was assured, so that Soviet emphasis could again be directed toward bringing about the political and economic collapse of the non-Communist countries of the west. To achieve this ultimate objective, the Soviet Government has employed, initially at least, methods other than the force of arms. Penetra- tion and subversion, propaganda and detailed organization have proved to be highly effective in various countries. The use of nationals as agents within their own countries has presented a most difficult problem for the counterintelligence agen- cies of those countries. The Soviets have imple- mented a plan to collect great quantities of information about non-Communist countries, ob- viously in order to determine strengths and weak- nesses. During this "cold war" Intelligence has assumed even greater importance than during World War II. The scope and methods of Soviet Intelligence in the postwar period have been indi- cated by the disclosure of some of its activities in various parts of the world. Soviet Intelligence in Canada In September 1945 Igor Gouzenko, a cipher clerk in the Soviet Embassy at Ottawa, deter- mined to expose the activities of Soviet agents and sympathizers in Canada. The documented information which he was able to furnish to the Royal Commission finally appointed to conduct a full investigation was a startling revelation of the extensiveness of the Soviet intelligence system in Canada, the type of individuals who were in- volved, and the nature of the information which was being transmitted to Moscow. The impor- tance attached by the Soviet Embassy to Gou- zenko's testimony and substantiating documents was indicated by the strenuous efforts made to re- gain custody of both. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR The evidence uncovered by the Royal Commis- sion definitely revealed the existence in Canada of a fifth column, organized and directed by Soviet agents. Within this fifth column were a number of spy rings, possibly as many as five, of which de- tailed information was available only on the one headed by Col. Nicolai Zabotin, Soviet Military Attache in Ottawa. Additional rings appeared to be operated by the MVD, the Naval Attache, the commercial and political representatives, and the Embassy itself. Each of these rings was com- pletely independent of the others, using separate codes and agents, and was apparently organized rather simply into various cells composed of agents working on similar tasks. Only one agent in each cell had contact with a Soviet representa- tive and each made use of a "cover" name. The Royal Commission concluded that the Soviet or- ganization in Canada was the product of careful and detailed preparation by trained men. Of sig- nificance were the indications that the Canadian organizations were associated with similar ones in other countries, notably Great Britain and the United States. In Zabotin's ring only two individuals were Rus- sian-born, and these had become naturalized Ca- nadian citizens: Sam Carr, the Organizing Sec- retary of the Canadian Communist Party, and Fred Rose, a member of Parliament. The re- mainder were Canadian or British by birth and were motivated by Communist sympathies. Money was apparently of only incidental concern. Scientists and civil servants were especially cul- tivated by Zabotin who approached them through local Communists, fellow travellers, and sym- pathizers attending study-groups and special lec- tures. The care with which prospective agents were selected is indicated by the positions held by those found guilty of turning over classified in- formation to Soviet representatives: a senior worker with the National Research Council; two additional members of this Council who supplied information regarding explosives, atomic energy, and aircraft development; an employee in the Of- fice of the High Commissioner of the United King- dom; an employee in the Department of Muni- tions and Supply; and a staff member of the cipher division of the Canadian Department of External Affairs. The most prominent individual involved CONFIDENTIAL 54 NAVAL OFFICERS was Dr. Allan Nunn May, a nuclear scientist em- ployed in research for the Canadian Atomic En- ergy project at Montreal. The investigation dis- closed that he had been a Communist before coming to Canada. The Royal Commission was particu- larly astounded by the success of the Soviets in enlisting Canadians in positions of responsibility and trust who were willing to betray their country. Since the activities of Soviet Intelligence had been going on for some years, it was difficult to determine the amount of information which the Soviets had managed to accumulate. The evi- dence indicated, however, that a considerable quantity of classified information had been trans- mitted with regularity from various Government departments and agencies. Specific information included samples of uranium ore; data about atomic plants and processes; 'details of Asdic, a submarine detection device; formula of new ex- plosives and blueprints of fuzes, such as the V. T. fuze; economic reports; and political reports, in- cluding diplomatic messages exchanged with Great Britain and the United States. Of particular significance was the fact that much of the infor- mation sought was technical and concerned the postwar defenses of Canada, Great Britain, and the United States. Two interesting Soviet Intelligence procedures were revealed by Gouzenko. The first was Zabo- tin's plan to arrange for the entry into Canada of additional agents under the guise of personnel attached to a proposed Soviet Trade Mission. The second was the use of forged passports to permit the entry of agents into other countries from Canada. Soviet Intelligence in the United States The Report of the Canadian Royal Commission, published in June 1946, excited worldwide atten- tion and particularly, attention was given to it in the United States where the evidence indicated that similar Soviet organizations were operating. Several Congressional committees found new sources of information regarding un-American activities and accumulated volumes of data. These committees were aided materially by a few repentant American Communists who, like Gou- zenko, found themselves completely disillusioned by the wide gulf between Communist promises and Approved For Release 2003/12/09: CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTELLIGENCE practices. Louis F. Budenz, editor of the official newspaper of the American Communist Party, the Daily Worker, was one such person. His testi- mony, given in November 1946, disclosed the close relationship between American and Soviet Com- munists. Further, it gave clues to the activities of Soviet agents operating in the United States. Gerhart Eisler, for example, was pointed out as the representative of International Communism in the United States and, as such, the boss of all American Communists. His true position could not be determined, but his status as a representa- tive was substantiated. Eisler, a professional revolutionist, was active in the United States dur- ing the 1930's, speaking before many groups, help- ing to organize Communists and Communist sym- pathizers, and identifying those who might be en- couraged to aid the Communist cause. During the war years he may well have headed a Soviet spy network. In the late 1940's he evidently con- centrated on artists, writers, and intellectuals. He was reported to have said that New York City would become the center of International Com- munism outside of Russia. Because of the dis- closures before the House Un-American Activities Committee in early 1947, Eisler was no longer use- ful to the Soviet effort in this country. He es- caped to Europe and later turned up as an official for the East German Government, operating under direct Soviet control. In July 1948 Elizabeth Bentley testified on her activities as a courier for a Soviet espionage system in the United States during the war. She col- lected information from various Government em- ployees in Washington, and turned it over to Soviet representatives in New York for transmit- tal to Moscow. Her contacts in Washington were individuals employed by such Federal Depart- ments as State, Treasury, Army, the War Produc- tion Board, and the Office of Strategic Services. Among those she incriminated was William W. Remington who was first employed by the War Production Board and later by the Department of Commerce. In both these positions he had access to secret information, and in Commerce he headed a committee responsible for the clearance of mate- rials for export to the Soviet Union. Unlike Gouzenko in Canada, Bentley was unable to docu- ment her testimony. 55 CONFIDENTIAL During the summer of 1948 Whittaker Cham- bers, reformed American Communist and a senior editor of Time magazine, appeared before the House Un-American Activities Committee in Washington. He described in detail his activities as a Communist from 1924 until 1938, when, dis- illusioned and embittered, he renounced com- munism and determined to expose the Soviet ac- tivities of which he had been a part. Of primary interest was his work as an underground courier for a Communist cell, from 1934 to 1938, collecting classified information in Washington and carrying it to a Soviet agent named Colonel Bykoff in New York City. The purpose of this cell was the col- lection of military and political information from the State Department. The sensational aspect of Chambers' testimony was his ability to produce documentary evidence which included copies and photographs of highly important British naval papers and extremely confidential reports from China, Yugoslavia, and Poland. The keys to cer- tain secret American diplomatic codes were also involved. These substantiating documents proved beyond question that in 1938 some individual in the State Department had made important classi- fied information available to him. That individ- ual, according to Chambers, was Alger Hiss, a brilliant young man in the State Department, a prominent figure in the creation of the United Nations, and president of the Carnegie Endow- ment for International Peace. Volumes of evi- dence were accumulated in the succeeding sensa- tional Hiss-Chambers legal actions which finally resulted in the conviction of Alger Hiss for per- jury and a sentence of 5 years imprisonment. Additional cases involving suspected Soviet es- pionage and Communist activities continued to be brought to light in the United States. In the spring of 1949 the Federal Bureau of Investi- gation released evidence against Judith Coplon, first employed by the Justice Department in its economic warfare section and later assigned to its internal security section as a political analyst. She was accused on two counts: taking unlawful possession of Government documents and spying for a foreign power. Her contact was a Soviet engineer employed by the United Nations secre- tariat in New York. Her sensationalized trial on the first count in Washington resulted in convic- CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR tion, although subsequent trials on the second count in New York City failed of conviction be- cause of certain legal technicalities. During 1949 and 1950, while the Justice De- partment was prosecuting the leaders of the American Communist Party for conspiracy against the United States Government, the FBI was accumulating evidence against other individ- uals suspected of treason in connection with the atomic bomb and military uses of atomic energy. In May 1950 Harry Gold confessed that, in 1944 and 1945, he had acted as a courier in relaying atomic information to a Soviet agent for transmis- sion to the U. S. S. R. His motives appeared to be basically ideological. His confession involved Al- fred Dean Slack, a chemist, and David Greenglass, a New York machinist. The former was charged with revealing details of the manufacture of RDX, a secret high explosive developed during the war, and supplying a sample. The latter con- fessed to turning over sketches and descriptions of the atomic bomb while he was employed at Los Alamos, N. Mex., working on the top secret Man- hattan project. These men in turn incriminated other individuals including Ethel and Julius Rosenberg and Martin Sobell. These were accused of complicity in espionage work for Soviet Intel- ligence, transmitting information concerning the atomic bomb. The evidence presented during these trials was startling. It became apparent that the Soviet Union had gained considerable information about the Manhattan project and the work of some of its scientists during the latter months of 1941; fur- ther, that the schedule for the explosion of the first atomic bomb at Alamagordo was known at least a month in advance. Months before the first bomb was dropped on Hiroshima the Soviets had learned the principles of its construction. Rosen- berg stated that he had procured information per- taining to the use of atomic energy for aircraft. The series of shocking disclosures in the postwar period clearly indicated that Soviet Intelligence had developed intricate systems of covert agents in the United States for the purpose of channeling vital information of a political, military and scien- tific nature to Moscow through both official and unofficial representatives. CONFIDENTIAL 56 NAVAL OFFICERS Soviet Intelligence in Great Britain The Canadian Spy Case and the disclosures in the United States had eventual repercussions in Great Britain. Tipped off by the FBI, Scotland Yard initiated investigations which resulted in 1950 in the apprehension of Dr. Emil Julius Klaus Fuchs, head of the Ministry of Supply's Theo- retical Physics Division and the deputy chief scientific officer at Harwell, England's principal atomic installation. Fuchs was accused of releas- ing American atomic secrets to Soviet representa- tives in 1945 and British secrets in 1947. His con- fession left no doubt as to his guilt. While the amount of information he had given was not pub- licly announced for security reasons, it was appar- ent that Fuchs had detailed knowledge of the con- struction of atomic bombs and, further, that he was conversant with the initial studies for the hy- drogen bomb. The tremendous advantages accru- ing to the Soviets from this information are diffi- cult to estimate, although it is obvious that their atomic program was greatly advanced. At the same time irreparable harm was done to the na- tional security of both Great Britain and the United States. The investigations of Fuchs revealed that he had been a Communist for many years and that his motivation, like so many others already men- tioned, was ideological. He was the scientist from whom Harry Gold had received his information, and his confession was of material assistance in the prosecution of Gold, Greenglass, and others. Soviet Intelligence in Sweden In September 1951 the long suspected activities of Soviet espionage in Sweden were dramatically exposed. A 42-year-old petty officer in the Royal Swedish Navy, Ernst Hilding Andersson, was accused of betraying military secrets to a foreign power, found guilty of treason, and sentenced to life imprisonment. From 1949 to 1951 he had pre- pared and transmitted reports and maps of the defenses of naval bases at Stockholm and Karls- krona, and of an air base, naval station, and the Boden fortress in northern Sweden. His three contact men were: a former Soviet Embassy sec- retary, a former Tass news-agency correspondent, and an assistant to the Soviet Naval Attach6. While small money payments were made for in- Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RIOPM920105R00010021 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTELLi MFMENTIAL formation delivered, Andersson's motivation was to aid communism. Investigation showed that he had become a Communist in 1928, but that his first assignment in espionage was not made until 1949. According to the Swedish Chief of Staff, incal- culable damage to Sweden's security had been caused by Andersson's activities. Even more harmful, perhaps, were the similar efforts of Fritiof Enborn, a Swedish journalist, discovered. in February 1952. Sweden faced a new threat to her security and national defense system. Soviet Activities in South America In Mexico the Communist group appeared to fall into three categories: the professional agents, carefully trained in the art of collecting informa- tion and spreading Soviet propaganda; the ideal- ists, motivated by the propaganda; and the fellow travelers, inspired by their own liberalism. The Soviet Embassy in Mexico City made use of each category to promote its primary objectives of propaganda, penetration, and the destruction of the economic position of the United States and its favorable pan-American relationships. The Mexican pattern was apparent in other countries. In Guatemala in 1951 there were charges that the Communists were infiltrating both the government and labor. A primary target was the United Fruit Co. which was harassed by strikes and one-sided labor laws. In Chile the large and active Communist Party encouraged a series of strikes in the copper mines which helped precipitate a copper shortage crisis in the rearma- ment program of the United States. In Panama the Communists attempted to capitalize on the po- litical unrest in the country. In the postwar period, there were other positive indications and significant disclosures of Soviet Intelligence activities in various trouble spots of the world. The United States and her Allies found themselves faced with the necessity of com- batting diverse problems of major proportions. The Readjustment of the United States Intelligence Effort At the end of World War II the demobilization of the Armed Forces was accelerated almost to a point of disintegration, at least from the point of 269190-54----5 view of ready effectiveness. The drastic reduction in personnel seriously affected all military activi- ties and especially those of Intelligence. For ex- ample, by 1946 the strength of Naval Intelligence had dropped sharply from its wartime peak. Pre- war problems of Intelligence, such as personnel and production, once again developed, though to a lesser degree because of what appeared to be a positive if gradual change in both the popular and official point of view towards Intelligence. Even before the end of the war, top level plan- ners had become convinced of the need for a perma- nent well coordinated national Intelligence system. The result was the passage of the National Se- curity Act of 1947 which for the first time in the history of the Nation, outlined the structure of such a system to operate in times of war and peace. The deterioration of the international political situation created urgent demands upon all intelli- gence agencies. Moving into Greece to aid in the defense of that country, the United States Army was immediately involved in problems arising from guerrilla warfare and the infiltration of communist groups from the Sovietized Balkan countries. In Western Europe, advance informa- tion concerning the trends of Soviet activities was essential to the formulation of any military or foreign policies which would effectively protect the interests of the United States in that area. Months in advance information was obtained regarding Soviet plans to blockade Berlin. The communist coup in Czechoslovakia was anticipated by 3 months. Evidence was accumulated to show that the Soviet Union was supplying arms and am- munition to Communist groups in France and Italy. In the spring of 1948 events in Europe gave rise to serious misgivings that the Soviet Union might be contemplating offensive military action. Under terrific pressure, the Central Intelligence Agency produced an estimate that such action would not take place within the next 2 months and, in all probability, not within a year. With the outbreak of war in Korea the Navy, Army, and Air Force were faced with many se- rious problems, including an acute shortage of Intelligence personnel and data. Drawing sub- stantially upon their reserve organizations, the military services overcame these shortages and 57 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09: CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS rapidly increased the production of intelligence for operational purposes. Once again the need for intelligence was clearly demonstrated. POSTWAR INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS The impact of the cold war in the postwar period is shown by the emphasis given to intelli- gence organizations and activities by both larger and smaller nations of the world. The United States intelligence system is dis- cussed in detail in chapter 3 of this text, but certain general developments in military intelli- gence should be mentioned here. Intelligence ac- tivities have been expanded in order to provide the intelligence required for strategic planning. Broad programs involving research and special studies of foreign powers have been undertaken. Increasing importance has been placed on person- nel training through the encouragement of reserve intelligence units and an emphasis on training schools for both regular and reserve officers. There has been some indication of a trend in the Army and the Navy to encourage officer personnel to spe- cialize in intelligence work. Gen. Omar N. Brad- ley, Army Chief of Staff, has been quoted as say- ing: "I am recommending to the General Staff that the Army establish an Intelligence Corps in which personnel can specialize in Intelligence just as artillery men concentrate on guns, and armored corps men on tanks." The training of personnel assigned to attache posts has been improved. The work of counterintelligence has received more and more attention. As a newcomer to the field of intelligence, the United States has learned much in a relatively short period of time. Intelligence organizations have improved the quality of their product, and despite "growing-pains" have accomplished a great deal. The British Intelligence Service The British intelligence service is composed of several intelligence agencies. Of special impor- tance is the British secret service whose operations and organization are closely guarded secrets. For budgetary purposes it is sponsored in Parliament by the British foreign office. Appropriations for the secret service are usually passed without com- ment, and if a question is ever raised, the foreign CONFIDENTIAL 58 secretary replies that the matter is a secret of state which, if revealed, would no longer be secret. The British secret service corresponds, in many of its functions, to the United States Central Intelligence Agency. The war office, the admiralty and the air minis- tries have separate intelligence agencies which co- operate closely with the British secret service and other agencies. The military intelligence division (MID) is divided into some 20 different depart- ments. In addition to purely military matters, sections of MID deal with the problems of spies at home, in the dominions and British possessions, and in foreign countries. The naval intelligence division is also divided into several departments for specialized work, as is the air intelligence division. Another organization of the British intelligence service is generally referred to as MI 5. This organization is devoted to counterespionage and security. It has jurisdiction in the British Isles and in the British possessions overseas. Many of its functions are similar to those of the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation. MI 5 cooperates closely with the special branch of Scot- land Yard as well as with the British secret service and the military intelligence agencies. The special branch of Scotland Yard, which may be included as a part of the British intelli- gence service, is charged with guarding the Royal Family and important British officials and visiting foreign dignitaries. It is also concerned with counterespionage and problems of national secu- rity. Some of its functions are similar to those of the United States Secret Service and the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation. There are several British joint intelligence com- mittees and boards which include representatives from the major British intelligence agencies, mil- itary and civilian. These joint committees and boards are subordinate to the British military chiefs of staff, though they contain civilian repre- sentation. These committees and boards prepare estimates of all kinds and serve all interested min- istries of the British Government. The French Intelligence System The principal French intelligence organization is the Service de Documentation Exterieure et de Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTELLIGENCE CONFIDENTIAL Contre Espionenage (SDECE.). It was established under this name in December 1945 and is a devel- opment of intelligence organizations which oper- ated under General de Gaulle from 1940 to 1945. General de Gaulle set up the Bureau Central de 1?enseignements et d'Action (BCRA) in London in 1940. This was an expansion of the Service de Renseignements (SR) , a part of the old Deuxieme Bureau of the French General Staff. After Gen- eral de Gaulle left London and went to Algiers, he combined the BCRA with an intelligence organi- zation of General Giraud and created a new intel- ligence organization called the Direction Generale des Services Speciaux (DGSS) . The DGSS was replaced shortly after the liberation of most of France by an intelligence organization called the Direction Generale des Etudes et de Recherches (DGER), out of which SDECE directly evolved. Historically, the Deuxieme Bureau of the French general staff has been the most important French intelligence organization. In the post World War II organization of French Intelli- gence, the SDECE appears to have taken over most of the functions of the traditional general staff Deuxieme Bureau, leaving to the Deuxiemes Bureaux of the armed services responsibility mainly for operational military intelligence. The SDECE is subordinate to the French national de- fense ministry and is divided into two main sec- tions (called by the French, Offensive and Defen- sive) which are concerned respectively with stra- tegic intelligence and counterintelligence. The Surete Nationale, under the French interior min- istry, is also a part of the French Intelligence system. The Surete is similar in some respects to the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation and the British Scotland Yard. The Soviet Intelligence System Often described as omnipotent and omnipresent, the Soviet intelligence system is in many respects unique in the postwar world. It is a vast, intri- cate organization with an incredible amount of duplication and involving literally millions of people. With its two-pronged objective of inter- nal security and external espionage, it maintains agents in every village of the U. S. S. R. and agents or potential agents in all countries of the 59 world where there are Soviet diplomats, trade rep- resentatives or Communist Party groups. Within the U. S. S. R., the intelligence-security system is the cornerstone of the police state, re- sponsible for insuring rigid political and eco- nomic controls and rooting out all dissident ele- ments. It can be assumed that the average So- viet citizen is aware of the secret police to the ex- tent that he knows he must remain where he is registered, perform his work satisfactorily, and refrain from any criticism of the government. He must also hope that his relatives and friends will do likewise. Should there be any deviation from the established pattern, he can anticipate severe punishment including death or hard labor in a penal camp. Within the borders of the coun- try, the closest observation is maintained not only over all citizens but also over all visitors. Abroad, the strength of Soviet Intelligence lies basically in the worldwide organization of the Communist Party. As already indicated, the So- viets have emphasized the use of agents who are citizens of the country in which they are to oper- ate. These prospective collectors of information, recruited by the regular Communist Party organ- ization, are fellow travellers and sympathizers not known as Communists. Either they are already in an exploitable position or possess the necessary qualifications. Sold on the basic doctrines of com- munism, these individuals transfer their loyalties from their own country to the U. S. S. R. They are given small sums of money for "expenses" and so become subject to blackmail. Each new recruit becomes the member of an independent cell, but only the leader of the cell has a direct Soviet con- tact. Thus this system is capable of almost in- definite expansion and, of even greater impor- tance, is subject to a minimum risk of exposure. In connection with this recruitment program, So- viet Intelligence has an amazingly complete dos- sier coverage of individuals all over the world: their appearance, interests, weaknesses, and politi- cal inclinations. The counterintelligence activity of the Soviets is particularly noteworthy. Its defensive effec- tiveness makes the term "Iron Curtain" most ap- propriate. No one may cross the borders of the U. S. S. R. without great hazards of detection. All means of communications are rigidly con- CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS trolled, and the gathering of any information in- side the country by foreign agents is notoriously difficult. The offensive aspects of Soviet counter- intelligence are even more unique and constitute a Russian contribution to modern intelligence. The objective is the dissemination of false infor- mation designed to mislead and confuse opponents and prospective victims. Seemingly "anti-Com- munist" propaganda and individuals are skillfully utilized in a cleverly organized program. The controls of this tremendous organization were further overhauled and centralized at the top level in 1946. As a result, the major agencies pri- marily concerned with intelligence activities from 1946 to 1953 were: Military Intelligence, and the Ministry of State Security, or MG-B, formerly known as NKGB. During this period the MVD, Ministry of Internal Affairs (the former NKVD), appeared to have lost most of its police and intel- ligence functions. Currently, the Military Intelligence organiza- tion, known as GRU, is a part of the Soviet gen- eral staff. From the military point of view, it is interested in political events and economic con- ditions abroad and so collects information for in- telligence purposes all over the world, It also di- rects foreign sabotage. It maintains networks of agents, directed both by military attaches and by special agents assigned cover positions in Soviet diplomatic and consular posts. From 1946 to 1953 MGB had broad responsi- bilities for political espionage and propaganda abroad and for the control of espionage activities of foreign Communist Parties. Its foreign de- partment, known as INO, maintained an agent in every Soviet diplomatic, consular, and trading mission abroad. KRU, another department, had the objective of countering foreign political es- pionage in the Soviet Union and the activities of anti-Soviet groups abroad. EKU, the economic department, was organized originally to control foreign economic activity within the U. S. S. R. Later it was composed of two sections: the first exercised political control over the domestic econ- omy by means of secret police; the second directed external economic espionage and encouraged class warfare, industrial crises, and strikes. Two other departments, SPU and DTU, had responsibilities within the U. S. S. R. and were charged, respec- CONFIDENTIAL 60 tively, with purging counterrevolutionary activi- ties and suppressing espionage or sabotage activi- ties directed against transportation. The careful correlation of all foreign intelligence at the top level was accomplished to formulate or to revise Soviet foreign policies. The personnel of MGB included: border guards and internal troops; specially trained spies and covert agents; highly placed Soviet citizens, who were not only specialists in such fields as econom- ics, foreign trade, education and cultural activi- ties, but also were well-trained in the work of in- telligence; unofficial Soviet citizens who were na- tionals of various satellite governments; and for- eign Communist Party members. The Soviet Union has maintained the largest diplomatic corps of any country in the world, and the size of indi- vidual missions has been far in excess of normal requirements. For example, in Ottawa the U. S. S. R. has maintained a diplomatic staff of 70, as compared with maximums of 12 to 24 main- tained by other countries. In Cairo the Soviet Ambassador has had a staff of more than 300; while the Egyptian Ambassador in Moscow has had fewer than 12. In London the U. S. S. R. has had more than 250 persons representing various agencies; while in Washington it has had approxi- mately 1,100 official representatives. At the same time, in Moscow Great Britain was limited to 32 representatives and the United States to about 175. The MVD cooperated with the MGB and con- trolled the administration of the slave labor camps. It had its own troops, politically reliable and ready to crush any armed revolt within the country. Its activities were primarily internal. However, shortly after the dramatic announce- ments of Stalin's serious illness and death in March 1953, news releases from Moscow revealed an important administrative reorganization of the Soviet Intelligence System. The MGB and the MVD were combined as the Ministry of Internal Affairs. There are several possible weaknesses of Soviet Intelligence. The most vital may be that of inter- nal suspicion. In striving for the greatest possi- ble efficiency, Soviet leaders place little trust in their operatives, whom they keep under careful surveillance, including even their diplomatic rep- resentatives. Complete thoroughness may, in it- Approved For Release 2003/12/09: CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTELLIGENCE self, become a weakness. A second possible weak- ness, similar to that of the Nazi Germans, is an emphasis on intensive training for their agents which has led to standardized methods and reac- tions. While there is no way to determine the degree of success of Soviet agents, the fact that some of them have been discovered, especially in the United States, indicates that they are not com- pletely successful. Since it must answer to only a small group of Communist leaders, Soviet Intelligence has almost absolute power. It acts as the eyes, ears, and punishing arm of the government in authority. Fear is one of its most effective weapons. There are, however, indications of an underground op- position movement, especially in satellite areas, en- gaged in sabotage and propaganda warfare on a considerable scale. The organization of Soviet Intelligence is fur- ther strengthened by the intelligence agencies of the various satellite countries, including Poland, Hungary, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia. Each of these countries is engaged in intelligence activi- ties which seem to be geared to those of the Soviet Union. The extent of these activities is illus- trated by Hungary, for example, which has an or- ganization out of all proportion to its size, inter- est, and national income. The Rebirth of German Intelligence The political and economic conditions in post- war Germany, divided as it has been into eastern and western zones, have led to underground re- sistance movements with several intelligence or- ganizations, each active in espionage, sabotage, and propaganda. The "Fighters Against Inhu- manity" and the "Investigating Committee of Free Jurists in the Soviet Zone" are two such groups directing their activities against the Soviet occupation forces and the Soviet-sponsored Com- munist Government in East Germany. The "Red Gestapo" is a security service organized by the East German Government to combat the covert activities of the West German groups. CONCLUSIONS A review of the development of the intelligence activities and organizations of various countries of the world throughout recorded history points CONFIDENTIAL up certain general principles and significant les- sons. First of all, intelligence as activity is a product of war and the fear of war. In one form or another, it has always been an inevitable ad- junct of military activity and command. Its de- velopment, therefore, has been associated with that of military forces. History has shown that no major military endeavor has been better than the staff responsible for its direction. At the same time, the degree of the success of any major staff effort has often been proportionate to the knowl- edge, or intelligence, upon which that effort was based. Intelligence has been used for other purposes as well. Wisely employed, it has given direction and meaning to the foreign policies of nations. Basely subverted, it has supported and maintained the autocratic power and authority of police states. There are many lessons of importance to be learned from the history of intelligence. Of these there are six which seem to have particular sig- nificance. The first is the demonstrated need for continuity of performance. No successful organi- zation can be improvised overnight: years of ad- vance planning and preparation are required. Collection and production are effective only on a longterm basis. This means that intelligence ac- tivity must be continuous in times of peace and times of war. The closest possible relationship exists between intelligence operations in peace- time and their effectiveness in wartime. History has demonstrated time and again that adequate peacetime preparations have given a significant offensive advantage when military operations be- gan. Associated with this lesson of history are two others: trained personnel are essential to in- telligence organization; and adequate funds must be made available to maintain the personnel and the organization. The lavish outlay of funds for intelligence in times of crisis is not sufficient. Only longterm support, regardless of the apparent requirements of the moment, can assure continued success. A fourth lesson is the importance of unified di- rection to coordinate and to concentrate the total intelligence effort of a nation. The failures of German Intelligence in World Wars I and II give particular emphasis to this point. 61 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09: CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS Fifth, the effectiveness of intelligence rests upon the speed of its dissemination and the adequacy of the communications systems upon which it must rely. Finally, intelligence must be used. Its func- tions must be understood and its value appreciated by potential consumers. Time and again in mili- tary and political history failures of intelligence have actually been failures to make use of it. The development of intelligence has been grad- ual, almost imperceptible at times, and paced by the historical trends of nations and peoples. It would be difficult to determine with any finality the extent of its influence on historical events. There seems to be evidence, however, that intelli- gence activity has had a marked effect upon the outcome of specific situations which have influ- enced significant world events. In the broadest CONFIDENTIAL sense, therefore, the lessons to be learned from a study of the history of intelligence merit the most attentive consideration of those military and po- litical leaders of any nation who bear in large measure responsibility for its security, its well- being, and its destiny. Since this chapter has dealt with development, there has been an emphasis on intelligence in re- lation to both military and political history. The illustrations of covert operations may have excited the particular interest of the reader, but the pur- pose of this chapter has not been to give an exag- gerated build-up for intelligence, nor to suggest that it is the answer to all military and political problems. In considering its importance the reader must see it in proper perspective. He must also recognize clearly that covert operations are but one aspect of its total activity. Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL CHAPTER 3 UNITED STATES ORGANIZATIONS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY INTRODUCTION A study of its historical development has re- vealed how and why, by the middle of the 20th century, intelligence has become exceedingly im- portant to government and its supporting armed forces in their mutual objective of promoting and maintaining the security and welfare of any na- tion in its relations with other nations. Foreign policies, to be sound and constructive, must be based on realism and fact. Military policies, as part of foreign policies, are subject to the same requirements. Since foreign and military policies are a product of the world environment interact- ing with national aspirations and objectives, they are affected necessarily by the increasing complex- ities of international relations. In recent years as a part of its foreign policy, the United States has assumed additional respon- sibilities under various treaty and pact arrange- ments with other nations on a world, regional, or bilateral basis. Thus special organizations have been required to carry out these new international tasks and new missions and responsibilities have been created for the armed forces. For these rea- sons, the United States has found it imperative to reorganize and expand the agencies responsible for the formulation and direction of plans and policies relating to the national security. The organizations which produce the intelligence re- quired by these agencies have likewise been sub- jected to frequent change in order to carry out the tasks of new responsibilities. This chapter will review the organization of the various United States agencies which have respon- sibilities in connection with foreign policy and will show how Intelligence is related to them. Two concepts must be kept in mind: first, that Intelligence is a service organization, not an end in itself; and second, that Intelligence is a unity and is not the exclusive province of any one agen- cy. By tracing the interrelationships of these agencies and their Intelligence subdivisions, these 63 concepts should become clear and the intelligence officer should better understand his own position and functions. By reason of the frequency of joint operations, he must also be informed of the detailed organization of the army and air force. NATIONAL SECURITY ORGANIZATION The National Security Act of 1947, and the leg- islation supplementing or amending it in 1949, produced fundamental and far-reaching changes in the organization and relationships of the armed forces of the United States. The pumpose of the Act was stated as being: To promote the national security by pro- viding for a Secretary of Defense; for a -De- partment of Defense, for a Department of the Army, a Department of the Navy, and a De- partment of the Air Force; and for the co- ordination of the activities of the Department of Defense with other departments and agen- cies of the Government concerned with the national security. The policy expressed in the Act and its subse- quent amendments was stated by the Congress as follows: In enacting this legislation, it is the intent of Congress to provide a comprehensive pro- gram for the future security of the United States: to provide for the establishment on integrated policies and procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of the government re- lating to the national security; to provide three military departments, sep- arately administered, for the operation and administration of the Army, the Navy (in- cluding naval aviation and the United States Marine Corps), and the Air Force, with their assigned combat and service components; to provide for their authoritative coordina- tion and unified direction under civilian con- .. trol of the Secretary of Defense, but not to merge them; CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS to provide for the effective strategic direc- tion of the armed forces and for their opera- tion under unified control and for their integration into an efficient team of land, naval and air forces; but not to establish a single Chief of Staff over the Armed Forces nor an Armed Forces general staff (but this is not to be interpreted as applying to the Joint Chiefs of Staff or Joint Staff) . Major Features of the National Security Legislation The major features of the Act were the establish- ment of: (a) the National Security Council, the National Security Resources Board, and the Cen- tral Intelligence Agency; (b) a Department and a Secretary of Defense to provide unified control over the Armed Forces; (c) the Department of the Air Force as a separate command under the Department of Defense; ( d) the following agen- cies under the Department of Defense (in addi- tion to the three military departments) : the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, the Munitions Board, the Research and Development Board, and the Armed Forces Policy Council. The 1949 Amendments to the Act increased the authority previously granted to the Secretary of Defense to exercise further centralized control of the military departments, and created the posi- tions of Deputy and Assistant Secretaries of De- fense, and the position of Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Air Force Organization Act of 1951 further clarified the organization and command structure of the Department of the Air Force, the Chief of Staff and the Air Staff, and the United States Air Force. By mid-1953, various Presidential Reorganiza- tion plans had resulted in a number of changes in some of the agencies and offices created by the National Security Act of 1947. It also resulted in the redistribution of some functions originally as- signed them. For example; Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1953 abolished the National Security Re- sources Board and transferred its responsibilities to the Office of Defense Mobilization. Within the Department of Defense there was a reorganization of some of its subordinate agencies and offices as the ? result of Presidential Reorganization Plan No. 6 of 1953. CONFIDENTIAL 64 Continuing efforts are made within the executive branch of the Government to increase efficiency of operations and to insure the greatest coordination of its widely varied activities, particularly as re- lated to problems of national security. The National Security Council (NSC) The NSC is composed of officials specifically designated by statute. Among these are: the President of the United States; the Vice Presi- dent; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of De- fense; the Director of Defense Mobilization; and the Secretary of the Treasury. The President acts as chairman. In addition to the foregoing officials, the Presi- dent is given authority to appoint (subject to the advice and consent of the Senate) as additional members of the Council other administrative gov- ernment officials, including the Secretaries and Under Secretaries of other Executive Departments and of the Military Departments. The law provides that it shall have a staff headed by a civilian executive secretary. The function of the NSC is stated as follows: to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters in- volving the national security. In addition to performing such other func- tions as the President may direct, for the pur- pose of more effectively coordinating the poli- cies and functions of the departments and agencies of the Government relating to the national security, it shall, subject to the direc- tion of the President, be the duty of the Council? (1) to assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States in relation to our actual and potential military power, in the interest of national security, for the purpose of making recommendations to the President in connection therewith; and (2) to consider policies on matters of com- mon interest to the departments and agencies of the Government concerned with the na- tional security, and to make recommendations to the President in connection therewith. The NSC is concerned with the ultimate correla- tion of the Government's best military and diplo- Approved For Release 2003/12/09: CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 UNITED STATES ORGANIZATIONS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY CONFIDENTIAL matic thought on problems relating to the position of the United States in the world society of na- tions, and has the additional responsibility of making sure that our commitments do not exceed our abilities to carry theM out. The Secretary of State and his Department continue to exercise leadership in charting our foreign policy, but other branches of Government, including the military, have a chance to state their views before decisions are made. The NSC does not seek publicity but works quietly and secretly. When the President or one of the members of the NSC asks for advice on a particular situation, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency has a summary of the situation prepared, which includes an appraisal of world reactions to it. A working group made up of representatives from each department recommends a course of action which may be acted upon with dispatch by the NSC itself. Disagreements not resolved are settled by Presidential decision. The long range purpose of the NSC is to provide a thoughtfully developed and clearly stated foreign policy in balance with military strength so as to give continuity to policies even as administrations change. The NS C also specifically guides the ac- tivities of the Central Intelligence Agency. THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE The National Security Act of 1947 created the "National Military Establishment" under the Sec- retary of Defense; the 1949 amendments changed the organizational title to the "Department of De- fense." The latter statute also made the Depart- ment of Defense one of the "executive" depart- ments of the Government equal to the other departments headed by cabinet officers; the De- partments of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force became "military" rather than "executive" departments, the Secretaries no longer being cabi- net members. The current organization of the Department of Defense is indicated in figure 1. Office of the Secretary of Defense The Secretary of Defense is the principal as- sistant to the President in all matters relating to the Department of Defense. He is normally a 269196-54 6 65 civilian and cannot have been a regular commis- sioned officer within 10 years of appointment to the Secretary's post. A special congressional act waived this restriction in the case of General of the Army George C. Marshall. Congress has restricted the Secretary's powers to change through administrative acts the func- tions of any of the military services that have been fixed by legislation. Further, each of the three military departments is separately admin- istered, and their respective Secretaries as well as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have the right, after informing the Secretary of Defense, to express freely their recommendations on defense needs to the Congress. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the Joint Staff Although a body bearing the title Joint Chiefs of Staff has operated since 1942, the official per- manent organization was not established until 1917. At that time the position of Chief of Staff to the President was replaced by that of the Chair- man, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the other members being the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force, and the Commandant of the United States Marine Corps. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, frequently termed the JCS, are the "principal military advisers" of the President, the NSC, and the Secretary of De- fense. Their duties specifically include: (1) preparation of strategic plans and provision for the strategic direction of the military forces; preparation of joint plans and assignment to the military services of logistic respon- sibilities in accordance with such plans; establishment of unified commands in stra- tegic areas; review of major material and personnel re- quirements of the military forces in accord- ance with strategic and logistic plans; formulation of policies for joint training of the military forces; formulation of policies for coordinating the military education of members of the mili- tary forces; and providing United States representation on the Military Staff Committee of the United (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 roved For Releawaqmp igikAIRDE85@pilalgR000100210002-9 CONFIDENIff CONFIDENTIAL I LI L J < ..1?11=110 66 ...111???1111? RTMENT OF THE N DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 UNITED STATES ORGANIZATIONS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY CONFIDENTIAL Nations in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. The chairman, selected from among regular of- ficers by the President, has no vote and exercises no command over the JCS or any service. He serves as presiding officer, provides the agenda for meetings, and informs the Secretary of Defense or President when the JCS has been unable to reach agreement on issues. He is appointed for a 2-year term renewable only once, unless a state of war would make change unwise. The Joint Chiefs have a Joint Staff not to ex- ceed 210 officers drawn from the three services and headed by a Director appointed by the JCS. This relatively small, compact body in no way usurps the direct operational functioning of the individ- ual armed services, but plans and coordinates. If the JCS must undertake operational functions, the service Chief most directly concerned acts as "Ex- ecutive Agent" to control field and other agencies. The JCS exercise command authority as a body; they do not decide questions by majority rule. Most questions are satisfactorily resolved, but re- maining differences of opinion are decided by higher authority. The Joint Staff is divided into three groups: the Joint Strategic Plans Group, the Joint Logistics Plans Group and the Joint Intelligence Group. Of necessity most studies involve intergroup col- laboration. The Staff works full time for the JCS, and its members are not responsible to their own services. Since considerable amounts of JCS work involve detail that must be provided by the in- dividual services, a number of Joint Committees have been established to work with the Joint Staff. The principal ones are the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, Joint Strategic Plans Committee, Joint Intelligence Committee, and Joint Logistics Plans Committee. The first of these committees is the senior policy planning and advisory group for the JCS, dealing with broad political-military problems from a mil- itary viewpoint. The other three committees are part-time, staffed by officers with regular duties in their own departments closely related to their com- mittee assignments. Plans prepared by any of the groups are reviewed by the appropriate com- mittee before submission to the JCS and com- mittee members are able to call upon their respec- 67 tive services for advice. Thus the particular requirements and problems of the various services are coordinated in the planning of the Joint Staff. There are of course, still other specialized com- mittees as depicted in figure 2. And ad hoc com- mittees are also created to meet specific additional needs. The responsibilities of the JCS have been de- lineated in the excerpt from the law given earlier in this section. The JCS contribute to the estab- lishment of priorities to insure the meeting of military needs. Increasingly, too, they are work- ing on budget allocations of the three services to be sure they match the strategic and logistics plans agreed upon. Specific questions come to them from the Services, cabinet secretaries, other Gov- ernment departments, or from one of their own joint staff groups. The complexity of the problems of the JCS can be quite readily illustrated. For example, they have to consider the problem of stockpiling: How much will we require of certain specific materials? Other typical problems might be: How great is the threat of submarine warfare? How much oil and gas will be required in war and how long will the war last? Are reserves adequate? Is ration- ing feasible? What is the availability of men and weapons? In planning the need for bases they must evaluate requirements in relation to avail- ability, defense, and cost of acquisition. Of great importance are intelligence estimates regarding both enemies and allies, what they may or can do. Since planning can never be on the basis of un- limited strength, the JCS must decide what risks can be accepted, what ones are unavoidable, and how these policies or positions interact upon each other. Future weapons planning is also an un- certain and complex problem with tremendous consequences at stake. Many of these weighty problems hinge upon estimates of future interna- tional developments, a matter of good intelligence assessment. All of the planning must be done within the limits of available money appropria- tions. When the JCS finally prepare a strategic plan, it consists of four essentials: (1) a statement of national war objectives; (2) a statement of enemy capabilities; (3) a broad general concept of op- erations; and (4) a statement of a number of time- CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 71111113010103 NOTE: BOXES INCLOSED BY BROKEN UNE INDICATE THE JOINT STAFF JOINT STRATEGIC SURVEY COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN'S STAFF GROUP REPRESENTATIVE OF J.C.S. ON SENIOR STAFF OF N.S.C. SECRETARIAT OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN UNITED STATES DELEGATION UNITED NATIONS MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE 1........ UNITED STATES DELEGATION INTER-AMERICAN DEFENSE BD. HISTORICAL SECTION }-- JOINT MIUTARY TRANS- PORTATION COMMITTEE HUNITED STATES MIUTARY COOPERATION COMMITTEE JOINT METEOROLOGICAL COMMITTEE JOINT MUNITIONS ALLOCATIONS COMMITTEE JOINT COMMUNICATIONS- ELECTRONICS COMMITTEE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF COMMUNICATIONS ELECTRONICS JOINT INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES AGENCY JOINT MATERIEL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY JOINT STAFF ????1 OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR JOINT STAFF JOINT STRATEGIC PLANS COMMITTEE JOINT STRATEGIC PLANS GROUP JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE JOINT INTELLIGENCE GROUP JOINT LOGISTICS PLANS COMMITTEE JOINT ADVANCED STUDY COMMITTEE JOINT LOGISTICS PLANS GROUP L - J Figure 2.?Organization Chart?Joint Chiefs of Staff. September 1952 INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 UNITED STATES ORGANIZATIONS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY CONFIDENTIAL phased military tasks to be undertaken by the military forces, including the major tactical units to perform the tasks. The importance of the intelligence function in such planning is evident. THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY. An understanding of the organization of the Navy Department is important to the intelligence officer for at least two reasons. In the first place, since Intelligence must supply many kinds of in- formation required by the planners and command- ers, its ability to supply meaningful information in no small measure depends upon its understand- ing of the organization it serves. Secondly, In- telligence is dependent upon its whole parent organization for most of the raw material which it is to process into finished intelligence. Like- wise, since the same information may be of use to all three services, and any part of another service may be a source of intelligence useful to the Navy, an understanding of the other national security agencies is also important. The National Security Act of 1947 describes the functional organization of the Department of the Navy as follows: The term "Department of the Navy" as used in this Act shall be construed to mean the Department of the Navy at the seat of government; the headquarters, United States Marine Corps; the entire operating forces of the United States Navy, including naval avia- tion, and of the United States Marine Corps, including the reserve components of such forces; all field activities, headquarters, forces, bases, installations, activities, and functions under the control or supervision of the De- partment of the Navy; and the United States Coast Guard when operating as a part of the Navy pursuant to law. In general the United States Navy, within the Department of the Navy, shall include naval combat and service forces and such avia- tion as may be organic therein. It shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations at sea. It shall be responsible for the preparation of naval forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned, and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Navy to meet the needs of war. All naval aviation shall be integrated with the naval service as part thereof within the Department of the Navy. Naval aviation shall consist of combat and service and train- ing forces, and shall include land-based naval aviation, air transport essential for naval operations, all air weapons and air techniques involved ,in the operations and activities of the United States Navy, and the entire re- mainder of the aeronautical organization of the United States Navy, together with the personnel necessary therefore. The Navy shall be generally responsible for naval reconnaissance, anti-submarine warfare, and protection of shipping. The Navy shall develop aircraft, weapons, tactics, technique, organization and equipment of naval combat and service elements; matters of joint concern as to these functions shall be coordinated between the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy. It also describes the organization and functions of the Marine Corps: The United States Marine Corps, within the Department of the Navy, shall include land combat and service forces and such aviation as may be organic therein. The Marine Corps shall be organized, trained and equipped to provide fleet marine forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign. It shall be the duty of the Marine Corps to develop, in coordination with the Army and the Air Force, those phases of amphibious operations which pertain to the tactics, technique, and equipment employed by landing forces. In addition, the Marine Corps shall provide de- tachments and organizations for service on armed vessels of the Navy, shall provide security detachments for the protection of naval property at naval stations and bases, and shall perform such other duties as the President may direct: Provided, That such additional duties shall not detract from or interfere with the operations for which the Marine Corps is primarily organized. The Marine Corps shall be responsible, in accord- ance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of peacetime components of the Marine Corps to meet the needs of war. Historical Development On April 30, 1798, Congress established the De- partment of the Navy and the Office of the Score- 69 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09: CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR tary. Before that time the Secretary of War was responsible for naval affairs. After 1815 the or- ganization was modified to include a board of three naval officers to serve as professional assist- ants to the Secretary. Then in 1842 this board of Navy commissioners was abolished, and the system of technical bureaus was established. By the time of World War I, the post of Chief of Naval Opera- tions was established, and between the two world wars an Assistant Secretary for Air was also ap- pointed. The immense new responsibilities de- veloped during World War II were formalized in the legislation now governing Navy organization. Present-Day Navy Organization and Functions Although the National Security Act of 1947 set forth basic Navy responsibilities, later amplifica- tions have been promulgated. The President and the JCS issued a paper on April 21, 1948, entitled "Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff." It specifies four purposes com- mon to all three services for military operations: (1) to support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign or domestic; (2) to maintain, by timely and effective military action, the security of the United States, its possessions, and areas vital to its interest; (3) to uphold and advance the national policies and interests of the United States; and (4) to safe- guard the internal security of the United States. Among the more specific functions this document describes is that of providing adequate, timely, and reliable intelligence for use within the Na- tional military establishment. Using this 1948 document as an authority, the Department of the Navy, in General Order No. 5, established three principal organizational com- ponents and enumerated four principal tasks. The principal components are: 1. The Operating Forces: the several fleets, seagoing forces, sea frontier forces, district forces, and such of the shore establishments of the Navy and other forces and activities as may be assigned to the operating forces by the Presi- dent or Secretary of the Navy. 2. The Navy Department: the executive part of the naval establishment located at the seat of the government, which comprises the bureaus, boards and offices of the Navy Department; the Headquarters of the Marine Corps; and the CONFIDENTIAL 70 NAVAL OFFICERS Headquarters of the Coast Guard (when as- signed to the Navy). 3. The Shore Establishment: all other activi- ties of the naval establishment including all shore activities not assigned to the operating forces. It is fundamental naval policy to "maintain the Navy as a thoroughly integrated entity in suffi- cient strength on the sea and in the air to uphold, in conjunction with our other Armed Forces, our national policies and interests, to support our com- merce and our international obligations, and to guard the United States including its overseas possessions and dependencies." The implementa- tion of this policy imposes upon the administra- tion of the naval establishment four principal tasks: 1. First, to interpret, apply and uphold the national policies and interests in the develop- ment and use of the naval establishment. This task may be described as the "policy control" of the naval establishment. 2. Second, to command the operating forces, and to maintain them in a state of readiness to conduct war; and to promulgate to the naval establishment directives embracing matters of operations, security, intelligence, discipline, naval communications, and similar matters of naval administration. This task may be de- scribed as the "naval command" of the naval establishment. 3. Third, to coordinate and direct the effort of the Navy Department and the shore establish- ment in order to assure the development, pro- curement, production and distribution of mate- rial, facilities and personnel to the operating forces. This task may be described as the "logis- tics administration and control" of the naval establishment. 4. Fourth, to develop and maintain efficiency and economy in the operation of the naval estab- lishment with particular regard to matters of organization, staffing, administrative proce- dures, the utilization of personnel, materials and facilities, and the budgeting and expenditure of funds. This task may be described as the "business administration" of the naval establish- ment. The first and third tasks require additional com- ment. Policy control includes guidance of the Navy as a whole, appraisal of its overall perform- ance, and public relations in the broadest sense. Logistics is further described in General Order No. 5 as having two phases: consumer logistics, Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 UNITED STATES ORGANIZATIONS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY CONFIDENTIAL and producer logistics. The former involves the planning and forecasting of requirements on the basis of operational plans, a responsibility of the Chief of Naval Operations. The latter involves the developing and procuring of these require- ments. Consumer logistics is intimately asso- ciated with naval command while producer logistics is a matter of business adminstration, although, of course, the two are intimately related. Distribution of Executive Responsibilities Figure 3 outlines the principal subdivisions of the Department of the Navy. It will be noted that the secretary has 4 civilian executive assist- ants and a larger number of naval professional assistants, including the naval command assistant (Chief of Naval Operations) and up to 12 naval technical assistants (counting the Chief of Naval Reserve, Chief of Naval Material, and, when so as- signed, the commandant of the Coast Guard). The Secretary directs and controls the entire naval establishment and retains immediate respon- sibility for policy control, public relations, morale, and budget. The civilian executive assistants handle business administration and producer logistics, exercising top management coordination of the work of the many bureaus and offices in the Navy Department. Bureau heads, however, have direct liaison with the Secretary, although routinely most of their business is transacted either through the Chief of Naval Operations or one of the civilian executive assistants. The bal- ancing of military with civilian authority and responsibility within the Navy is shown by the division between the naval command assistant with his subordinates and the civilian executive assist- ants with their staffs. Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) The Chief of Naval Operations is the highest ranking officer in the Department of the Navy. As such he is a member of the JCS and is the prin- cipal naval adviser to the President, Secretary of Defense, and Secretary of the Navy. He is in command of the operating forces and includes among his responsibilities their training, readi- ness, and war planning. He is required to deter- mine the personnel and material requirements of the operating forces and to this end coordinates 71 and directs the efforts of the various bureaus and offices of the Navy Department. His Vice Chief of Naval Operations (VCNO) supervises the General Planning Group and the work of the five Deputy Chiefs of Naval Opera- tions (DCNO) : Personnel, Administration, Op- erations, Logistics, and Air. There is also an Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Naval Re- serve) advanced from his former position under the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Person- nel). The General Planning Group prepares broad strategic plans and aids in developing logis- tics requirements in support of such plans. These naval plans are based on overall plans received from the JCS. Another more recent change is the Progress Analysis Group to report on Navywide progress and readiness for war. Both the Com- mandant of the Marine Corps and the Comman- dant of the Coast Guard (in wartime) deal di- rectly with the Chief of Naval Operations on matters of common interest. The office of the Chief of Naval Operations is or- ganized along the same lines as the general staff of the Army, although different titles are used and there are some variations. For example, per- sonnel and administration are separate sections. The latter directs United States naval missions, Navy participation in pan-American affairs, naval records and history, the Naval Observatory, the Naval Hydrographic Office, and the Naval Com- munications Service. Air also has its separate organization to develop aircraft and guided mis- siles, to organize aviation logistics, and to develop air warfare operating plans. The DCNO (Opera- tions) Division includes intelligence and plans, so that the Director of Naval Intelligence is subordi- nate to the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations. This same subordination exists in the Air Force. Training responsibilities are allocated as fol- lows: individual training to the Chief of Naval Personnel, group training to the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (operations) , and aviation to the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air). By general policy either the Chief or the Vice Chief of Naval Operations must be a naval aviator to insure full representation of aviation needs. The Vice and Deputy Chiefs derive their authority solely from the Chief of Naval Operations, in the same manner as with staffs afloat. Although not in- CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 1VIIN3011N00 DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY I TIE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY SUM= OF AIL NAVAL MORS NAVAL COMMAND ASSISTANT OM OF 1LAVAL OPULA110145 Or On.n. rOof vc ow Of NAM 0PIRA106 oma OF THE CHILI OF NAVAL OPERATIONS I' ON NLIO-1 TT.? PT LOGISnr MOO10, COMA ? ? 12. CIVRIAN EXECUTIVE ASSISTANTS OWN SECRETARY OF 1111 NAVY MIAMI SE011TARY ASSISUMT SECRETARY FOR MN EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY .0.00snan Foc ? ? Orr.. on. Mr. Of TNT COMPTROLLO of. MIMAGMEM sTATI Oft. Cf COOM/I. off Cf HON. mATER. PIELAnOTO ort. Or XT... 1111101.LUM Room. ICI of OFTP2 of .OLISIS .VIDO InnTRAL Onflf? nOARD OTT . of .nOinT boon. NAT. o.?05 THE OPERATING FORCES OF THE NAVY fu,m COMMON,' =g..? COM OM/ 'row. f TEO j.a.STRAT.n ? 0.01/01 FLIT'S OR 1?1173 scoop. rum AND 0.0.0?Wen MICE 1.6TFON moon. .001.11.3 woo.. ITONMS Stlinvol C0.1.06 0.11,106 Of5TO MART AMMO 03?05 APOLTRIA NOTTROTO AMOCO N.. no0C6- "ZeTY"TC'TO"' SICTIT TATT4an% TT LANTK COTTFCearr'S liTGir,..L.T=T fa,SJ SZTACNT. 74.7fr TYPE 001.1003 INSTROVCOS pjg? kairi=p3 ATM% C503.5 TATTiblon-CAO.E. TC4iCfS late. CON?tudd 110.00144 ccom.TNTS COTT... MOTS ".laulgtrsoonCT T.12 answolp "rvti?'"Co.0.00: MEMIRTA ATIOATIC MST 114.1 TLII1 tave. TCWCES ALM. SCA MON CIATIO.F.0 TROn 'TTIT Tor MID .1 TORCE TT./ REIT RC.? nal VON TIM 41011,1 flOCT Prmarei By: Noy Ilmagemeel Slag DeWitt d the Navy I AUGUST 1953 1""' 13 13 0 MARINE CORPS COMMAND ASSISTANT 0- ? COMMANDANT MAME OWE 0 NAVAL TKIINKAL ASSISTANTS ONIf Of NAVAL MUM ? OLIU OF NAVAL ASLEEP -ONUS OF SNUANS ? AWE ADVOCATE GENERAL Of Tina .401.5 MK. MO MATTO LOME .3.1.1 MCAMP PI ?MOM. neCOAL.151 rpopotTOO. OKTIONITOTI LoPS ALM. atinuAICE St??106 Amp T.CCOO B.A.T eniscammi. COCKS ATTE nt 40?fainCAL ?TSET TTC 4106. TOOBS. 01.00[3 FOC.T TIC ?00.5.16 orCol? 0.6 M... 0 LOCO. MM. InnlorT cit KOSOn.a. Fro 07.1 =IA " 71. OCCS LTC /11.1Mit VIA SEA MGM COMAIMIVIRS MKT C CONM ITC THE SHORE ESTABLISHMENT nt MOW, NM, IN Tom n APTI, miXTAIM. ormol Calown105 aloaCTO.4.1 MO sof OLT MTOTIMI. WPC. '4".jiKat PROPRT.O. PL.005 510.41 .POTS TESTI/. AC/man. n[10 PoTC.51. 1001 OnoT6 ? .01CT Of s PMM, KCOUNT NO 0 Ow* COMO MIMM. MSC.. ? '241741.? ToTainT.S. VATTLOT..S. SE..5 awarataa M.S. ETC *RESPONSIBLE TO CNO WHEN CNO IS ACTING IN HIS CAPACITY AS NAVAL EXECUTIVE TO SECNAV **COLLATERAL RESPONSIBILITIES TO SECNAV ***DUAL RESPONSIBILITIES TO SECNAV AND CNO Figure 3.?Organization Chart?Department of the Navy. APProved- IL S. MINE COWS mmpSTRAT gm, Tomoo. COPEMEXT. StlerLT 1 ',INEEL7 ^ s1.1 CON ACTIN!, ^ IMOCO Lowry el tio Noy INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 UNITED STATES ORGANIZATIONS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY flexible or fixed by formal regulations, the most frequent relationships between CNO and the Bu- reaus are found as follows: DCNO (Logistics) with Yards and Docks, Ordnance, Supplies and Accounts, Ships, Medicine and Surgery; DCNO (Personnel) with Personnel; and DCNO (Air) with Aeronautics. The Naval Inspector General reports both to the Chief of Naval Operations and to the Secre- tary of the Navy. He investigates and reports on all matters affecting the discipline and military efficiency of the Navy, making such recommenda- tions as are required. In his work he has great latitude, and every part of the service is open to his scrutiny. His investigations are not to be confused with those made by the Office of Naval Intelligence which relate to security and are made only on request of competent authority. The Operating Forces Since World War II, all United States forces outside the continental limits have been organized under unified area commands. Each is under a commander-in-chief who has control over all United States forces?Army, Navy, and Air Force in his area?as assigned by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Under the Executive Agent concept men- tioned earlier, the Chief of Naval Operations holds that JCS position for the Pacific, Atlantic, and Eastern Atlantic-Mediterranean commands. The Chief of Staff, United States Army, is the Execu- tive Agent for the Far East (FEC) , Caribbean, and European (EuCom) commands as well as United States Forces in Austria. The Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, is the Executive Agent for the Alaskan and Northeast commands, the United States Air Force Europe, and the Stra- tegic Air Command (SAC). The Chief of Naval Operations has under his direct control the Pacific Fleet, Atlantic Fleet, and Naval Forces Eastern Atlantic and Mediter- ranean. Each fleet has type components: Am- phibious, Fleet Marine, Air, Battleships and Cruisers, Destroyers and Destroyer Escorts, Mine, Submarine, Service Force, and Training Com- mands. Under Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet (Cin- CPac) is the First Fleet, operating in the Eastern Pacific, and the Seventh Fleet, in the Western 73 CONFIDENTIAL Pacific. However, during the Korean fighting operational control of the latter fleet has been held by the Commander-in-Chief, Far East (Army) exercised through Commander Naval Forces, Far East (ComNavFE). The Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet ( CinCLant) , has the Second Fleet, and the Operational Development Force for evalu- ation tests. Commander-in-Chief Eastern At- lantic and Mediterranean (CinCNELM) has the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, receiving logis- tic support from CinCLantFlt. Each of these fleets is composed of appropriate ships tempo- rarily assigned from type commands, and each is a purely operational command, the administration remaining under the type commander. Naval Forces, Germany (NavForGer) is under Commander-in-Chief, Europe (Army) . The Mili- tary Sea Transportation Service (MSTS) is under the Chief of Naval Operations. In addition there are Pacific and Atlantic Reserve Fleets made up of the "moth-ball" ships. The Commanders of the Western and Eastern Sea Frontiers respec- tively command these fleets as additional duty. Sea Frontiers Sea Frontier forces are part of the Operating Forces of the Navy. Geographically there are five such forces. The Eastern Sea Frontier (East- SeaFron) includes waters off the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts and the 1st, 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th, 8th, and 9th Naval Districts, plus Naval Commands of the Potomac and Severn Rivers. This sea frontier command is under CinCLant. The Caribbean Sea Frontier, under the Commander- in-Chief, Caribbean (Army), includes the 10th and 15th Naval Districts, plus adjacent waters in the Caribbean and nearby Pacific. The Western Sea Frontier (WesSeaFron) under CinCPac in- cludes the 11th, 12th, and 13th Naval Districts, as well as eastern Pacific waters. The Hawaiian Sea Frontier also under CinCPac includes the 14th Naval District and central Pacific waters. The Alaskan Sea Frontier is under Commander-in- Chief Alaska (Air Force) and includes the 17th Naval District and north Pacific waters. These command relationships are in the field of military operations. Sea Frontier commanders are responsible for maintaining adequate plans for the defense of their respective areas, both of a CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS naval and a joint nature. They also must be ready to expedite and protect merchant shipping in their areas. Naval participation in search and rescue operations is under their control. In addition to operational duties, Sea Frontier commanders are administratively in the chain of command between the Chief of Naval Operations and the District Commandants. This is military command and coordination control in the interests of uniformity of action and avoidance of duplica- tion among the districts. District Commandants still can deal directly with the Navy Department on matters not involving coordination or the mili- tary readiness of their forces. The Shore Establishment The shore establishment includes the field ac- tivities of the bureaus and offices of the Navy De- partment and all shore activities not assigned to the operating forces. These activities are largely involved in producer logistics for the support of the operating forces. Although located princi- pally in coastal areas, they may be scattered any- where throughout the United States and its terri- tories. It is appropriate at this point to provide an ex- planation of the formal command relationships which apply specifically to the Shore Establish- ment, based on General Order No. 19 which gives the official definitions. Command is the authoritative direction exer- cised over a unit or individual of the Naval Estab- lishment in all matters pertaining to the conduct of naval affairs not specifically expected by higher authority and is commensurate with the responsi- bility imposed. Inherent in command are prec- edence over all personnel serving with the com- mand, the responsibility for coordinating the ef- forts of the units or individuals commanded, the power to enforce the official will of the commander through the exercise of the necessary military di- rections, the authority to make inspections to in- sure compliance with such directions, and the initiation or application of authorized discipli- nary measures incident thereto. A commander, within his discretion, may delegate the execution of the details to be performed by his authority to appropriate subordinates, but such delegation does not relieve him of the overall responsibility for CONFIDENTIAL 74 the performance of the personnel or units under his command. In General Order No. 19 "command" is subdi- vided into four components which are defined as follows: Military Command is the authoritative di- rection exercised over activities of the Naval Establishment in military matters together with the power to exercise authoritative direc- tion in all matters when circumstances dictate. Military command stems from the Chief of Naval Operations, and is exercised over activities of the shore establishment through the Sea Frontier Com- manders and the District Commandants, the Chief of Naval Air Training, and the Comman- dant of the Marine Corps. It includes matters characteristic of a military organization, as con- trasted to matters of the type provided for under Management Control in industry or business. Coordination Control is that necessary di- rection of separate units of the naval estab- lishment to insure adequately integrated relationships between all of these units. Coordination Control is a responsibility of the Chief of Naval Operations, exercised through the Sea Frontier Commanders and the District Com- mandants, over shore activities located within the several districts. It fulfills the twofold purpose of providing for orderly and complete service in support of the operating forces and coordination between shore activities under different commands. Management Control is the direction exer- cised, in other than military matters, by an authority of the Naval Establishment over a unit of the naval shore establishment in the administration of its local operating func- tions. Management Control is exercised by the desig- nated bureau or office of the Navy Department over a field activity in the non-military adminis- tration of its functions. Bureau management re- flects the policies and procedures of the Civilian Executive Assistants in the fields of Business Ad- ministration and Producer Logistics, and includes overall responsibility for the work performed. It is to be noted that in the operating forces Man- agement Control is included in "Command" and is always the responsibility of the Chief of Naval Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 UNITED STATES ORGANIZATIONS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY Operations. Command in the operating forces is not divided into the four components specified in General Order No. 19; however, commands of the operating forces which control activities of the Shore Establishment exercise that control in ac- cordance with these four components. Technical Control is the specialized or pro- fessional guidance or direction exercised by an authority of the naval establishment in technical matters. Technical Control is exercised by the bureaus and offices of the Navy Department according to their specialized technical responsibilities. This con- trol extends throughout the naval establishment. The shore establishment consists of district ac- tivities, fleet activities based ashore, Marine Corps supporting activities, and the Naval Air Training Command. Their relationships with the districts, sea frontiers, fleet commands, and bureaus, are governed by the regulations indicated above. A District Commandant is an officer of the line qualified for command at sea. In his naval dis- trict he acts as the representative of the Secretary of the Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, Sea Frontier Commander, and the various bureaus of the Navy Department. His responsibilities in- clude support of the operating forces, defense of the district, control of public relations, mainte- nance of industrial mobilization plans, control of naval reserve matters, and maintenance of an ef- ficient intelligence service both for security and operational purposes. Additional duties include operation of naval communications, collaboration with other Government authorities, supervision of legal matters, public works, and transportation. Each major harbor or operating area within a district has a Naval Base Commander, with pri- mary responsibility to support the operating forces. A Naval Shipyard is but one component of a Naval Base. There are also Naval Air Base Commands with appropriate subordinate oom- mands, including all aviation activities within a district with the exception of training commands, Marine Air commands, and weather centrals. The United States Marine Corps The Marine Corps, whose mission has been stated earlier, is divided like the Navy into three com- ponents: the headquarters, the operating forces, CONFIDENTIAL and the supporting establishment. Headquarters include the Offices of the Commandant, the Supply Department, and the Personnel Department. In the Offices of the Commandant, the Division of Plans and Policies formulates intelligence plans. The major commands of the operating forces are Fleet Marine Forces, Atlantic, and Fleet Ma- rine Forces, Pacific, each under a Commanding General, located respectively at Norfolk, Va., and at Honolulu. These forces contain balanced land, air, and service elements. The Marine Corps Se- curity Forces guard naval shore activities, with a Marine Barracks established at each. Ship de- tachments, actually a part of the security force, serve as gun crews and small-sized landing parties. The supporting establishment includes the quar- termaster depots and other facilities required to service the Operating Forces. OTHER DEFENSE DEPARTMENTS The Department of the Army and Department of the Air Force resemble the Department of the Navy in structure, but different histories and mis- sions have brought about somewhat different solu- tions to their organizational problems. The Department of the Army This title refers both to the whole Army estab- lishment and to the executive offices in Washington. The Department of War, created in 1789, became the Department of the Army in 1947 at which time the Department of the Air Force was established. The Secretary of the Army has responsibilities and an organization similar to those of the Secre- tary of the Navy. His department includes a Chief of Staff, a General Staff, a Special Staff, various administrative and technical staffs and services, the Office of the Chief of Army Field Forces, the continental armies, and the overseas commands. The mission of the Army places its primary interest in all operations on land, but its forces include also such aviation and water transporta- tion as may be organic to its land combat and service forces. Figure 4 shows the Washington offices of the Department of the Army. Most of the titles are self-explanatory. The chiefs of the technical serv- ices, however, have a dual role. They not only 75 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 1V11N3011N00 ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT 1 DEPARTMENT COUNSELOR DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY SECRETARY OF THE ARMY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY (General Management) ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY (Manpower & Res Forces) UNDER SECRETARY OF THE ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF VICE CHIEF OF STAFF SECRETARY OF THE GENERAL STAFF COMPTROLLER OF THE ARMY DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR OPERATIONS & ADMINISTRATION GENERAL STAFF COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVE POLICY DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR PLANS ACCOUNTING 8, FINANCIAL POLICY DIVISION AUDIT DIVISION ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF G-1, PERSONNEL BUDGET DIVISION MANAGEMENT DIVISION PROGRAM REVIEW & ANALYSIS DIVISION ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF G-2, INTELLIGENCE GENERAL SPECIAL CHIEF OF INFORMATION STAFF STAFF CHIEF OF LEGISLATIVE LIAISON ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF G.3, OPERATIONS ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF G.4, LOGISTICS PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE CHIEF OF FINANCE INSPECTOR GENERAL CHIEF OF AtILJTARY HISTORY ADMINISTRATIVE STAFFS AND SERVICES THE ADJUTANT GENERAL PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL CHIEF OF CHAPLAINS THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL CHIEF NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU TECHNICAL STAFFS AND SERVICES OFFICE OF THE EXEC FOR RES & ROTC AFFAIRS 1 SURGEON GENERAL CHIEF OF ORDNANCE CHIEF OF ENGINEERS QUARTERMASTER GENERAL Figure 4.?Organization Chart?Department of the Army CHIEF OF TRANSPORTATION CHIEF SIGNAL I OFFICER CHIEF CHEMICAL OFFICER Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 UNITED STATES ORGANIZATIONS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY CONFIDENTIAL serve in the manner of the chiefs of technical bu- reaus in the Navy in determination of require- ments, procurement, and storage of supplies, under the direction of the Assistant Chief of Staff 0-1 Logistics, but they also command their technical branches and certain installations. For example, the Chief of Transportation commands Ports of Embarkation, Railway Repair Depots, and other Transportation Corps facilities. The Army organization provides for each mili- tary commander a staff to aid him in his work. Divisions and larger units have a Chief of Staff to direct and coordinate a General Staff which in its four divisions, G-1 Personnel, G-2 Intelligence, G-3 Operations, and 0-4 Logistics, includes all functions of command. Under the coordinating General Staff is such Special Staff organization as may be required, including all other staff officers in a headquarters not specifically part of the General Staff. In brigades or smaller units the director and coordinator for the commander is called the. Executive, and there is no special staff, but there is an equivalent of the General Staff, known as S-1 Adjutant, S-2 Intelligence, S-3 Operations and Training, S-4 Supply, and such other staff officers as may be required. Since the same pattern of organization appears at every level of the Army, there is no loss of efficiency when officers are transferred from one unit to another or between levels, for their respon- sibilities are clearly defined and understood. The American General Staff system has one interesting variation from that of other countries, such as Germany. The United States Army rotates offi- cers between staff and command assignments; the Germans built a preferential elite corps ear- marked almost solely for staff assignment. The Office, Chief of Army Field Forces, is the field operating agency of the Department of the Army for the continental United States and is located at Fort Monroe, Va. The Army Field Forces are responsible for training, development of doctrine, and equipment. Its responsibility for overseas forces is limited to setting training standards and doctrine, and determining opera- tional readiness. Orders to overseas commands are issued through the Department of the Army. The United States is divided geographically into six Army Areas and a Military District of Washington. The Commanding General of each area, or district, commands all units and activities within his area except those specifically com- manded by one of the Technical Services or other agencies of the Department of the Army. Army Territorial and Troop Organization The Army refers to any land, sea, and air masses involved in the conduct of war as theaters of war. A theater of operations refers to an area where actual tactical operations are or can be conducted," and it may be subdivided into a combat zone and a communications zone. The combat zone may include division areas at the front, behind them corps service areas, and behind those in turn army service areas. The communications zone relieves combat commanders of responsibility for logistics and security operations not concerned with their primary combat missions. It is divided into an advance section, an intermediate section, and a base section. That part of the theater of war not included in the theater of operations is called the zone of the interior?a term usually applied to the United States, but on occasion also to foreign territory whether allied, neutral, or hostile. Army troop organizations range from the army group down to the rifle squad. An army group is primarily a tactical command made up of sev- eral field armies. A field army includes a head- quarters, certain organic troops, and a variable number of corps and divisions. The army is both administrative and tactical. A corps also includes a headquarters and certain organic troops plus a variable number of divisions. It is primarily a tactical unit but can be administrative. A divi- sion is the basic unit of combined arms, includ- ing headquarters, infantry, armored or airborne units, artillery, and other units as required. It is both administrative and tactical. There are smaller units such as the brigade, a tactical unit of two or more regiments, headquar- ters and other small units; a group, a flexible organization with various attached units to ac- complish a particular mission; a regiment, with headquarters, service company, and two or more battalions, or other smaller units; a battalion, the basic tactical unit; a company or battery, the basic administrative unit; a rifle platoon; a weapons 77 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS section; and a squad. An army rifle squad has 9 men; in contrast, the Marines divide their 13-man squads into three 4-man fire teams. The rifle pla- toon is the smallest infantry unit commanded by a commissioned officer. Such personnel and equip- ment as are not required consistently by a particu- lar unit are pooled and assigned to a higher unit. When particular tactical groupings are re- quired, special task forces are created, preserv- ing as much as possible the integrity of compo- nent units. Armored divisions sometimes have combat commands with their own headquarters companies to direct temporary tactical groupings. The infantry division frequently uses a combat team consisting of an infantry regiment, support- ing artillery, and engineers, or possibly also a signal detachment, medical battalion, and so forth. This is called a regimental combat team (RCT) . The Army classifies as "arms": the Infantry, Armored Cavalry, Field Artillery, Coast Artil- lery, Corps of Engineers, and Signal Corps. It classes as "administrative services": the Adjutant General's Department, the Chaplains, the Corps of Military Police, the Inspector General's De- partment, the Judge Advocate General's Depart- ment, and the Finance Department. It classes as "technical services": the Chemical Corps, the Corps of Engineers, the Quartermaster Corps, the Transportation Corps, the Ordnance Depart- ment, the Signal Corps, and the Medical Depart- ment. Department of the Air Force From a modest beginning in 1907 as the aero- nautical division in the Office of the Chief Signal Officer, the United States air arm has developed tremendously under the impetus of two world wars. In World War I the Army Air Corps was used in combat operations, and during World War II the Army Air Forces expanded to nearly 21/2 million men operating 80,000 aircraft. After the war there was a reduction in size, but by 1950 the objective was a total of 143 wings as a result of the Korean War and the world situation. The National Security Act of 1947 and its sub- sequent amendments created an Air Force Estab- lishment, a Department of the Air Force, and the United States Air Force. The civilian Secretary and his assistants have functions comparable to CONFIDENTIAL 78 their counterparts in the Department of the Navy and Army. The Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, is the principal military adviser to the Sec- retary and exercises command over the Air Force. His Air Staff includes a Vice Chief and Deputy Chiefs as shown in figure 5. The five deputies are for Comptrolling, Personnel, Development, Operations, and Materiel. As was pointed out earlier, Intelligence is under Operations, together with Plans, Communications, Manpower, and Organization. The Air Force is charged with the responsi- bility of being "organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained offensive and defensive air operations." Its missions as for- mally defined include (1) defense of the United States against air attack; (2) the defeat of enemy air forces and the control of vital air areas; (3) the interdiction of enemy land power and communi- cations; (4) the furnishing of combat and logisti- cal air support to the Army, including air lift and resupply of airborne operations, close combat air support, aerial photography, tactical reconnais- sance, etc.; (5) the carrying out of a campaign of progressive planned destruction of the enemy's war-making capacity; and (6) the providing of air transport for the Armed Forces. There are also the collateral duties of interdiction of enemy sea power, antisubmarine warfare, protection of shipping, and aerial minelaying. The latter are closely coordinated with naval efforts. Major Air Commands There are 13 major commands in the United States and 5 overseas, all under the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force. Those in the United States are grouped functionally as follows: (a) operational: Strategic Air Command, Tactical Air Command, Air Defense Command; (b) sup- portive operational: Military Air Transport Serv- ice, USAF Security Service, Headquarters Com- mand; (c) training: Air University, Air Training Command, Continental Air Command; (d) de- velopmental and logistic: Research and Develop- ment Command, Air Materiel Command, Air Proving Ground Command, Special Weapons Command. The Strategic Air Command (SAC) includes heavy and medium bombers, long and medium Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 1VIIN3011N00 SURGEON GENERAL THE INSPECTOR GENERAL THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL CHIEF OF STAFF VICE CHIEF OF STAFF ASS'T VICE CHIEF OF STAFF AIR ADJUTANT GENERAL SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY BOARD SECRETARY OF THE AIR STAFF SPECIAL ASST FOR RESERVE FORCES DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF COMPTROLLER DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF PERSONNEL DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF DEVELOPMENT DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF OPERATIONS DEPUTY CHIEF Or 5TAFF MATERIEL ASSISTANT FOR PLANS AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS ASSISTANT FOR GROUND SAFETY SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR AIR FORCE ACADEMY MATTERS ASSISTANT FOR DEVELOPMENT PLANNING ASSISTANT FOR ATOMIC ENERGY ASSISTANT FOR PROGRAMMING ASSISTANT FOR MATERIEL PROGRAM CONTROL ASSISTANT FOR LOGISTICS PLANS AUDITOR GENERAL DIRECTOR, WAN CHIEF OF AF CHAPLAINS ASSISTANT FOR - DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMING ASSISTANT FOR MUTUAL SECURITY DIRECTOR OF ACCOUNTING DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL PLANNING DIRECTOR OF REQUIREMENTS DIRECTOR OF INSTALLATIONS DIRECTOR OF MAINTENANCE ENGINEERING DIRECTOR OF STATISTICAL SERVICES DIRECTOR OF RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE DIRECTOR OF SUPPLY & SERVICES DIRECTOR OF MILITARY PERSONNEL DIRECTOR OF PLANS DIRECTOR OF BUDGET DIRECTOR OF INDUSTRIAL RESOURCES DIRECTOR OF COMMUNICATIONS DIRECTOR OF MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS SERVICE DIRECTOR OF CIVILIAN PERSONNEL DIRECTOR OF TRANSPORTATION DIRECTOR OF MAVOWER AND ORGANIZATION '1 DIRECTOR OF 'PROCUREMENT AND PRODUCTION ENGINEERING DIRECTOR OF FINANCE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS Figure 5.?Organization Chart?Department of the Air Force. Approvefh,h90,91?(*gg gpfaigtgpokcikgzig,gglip 002100Q2a- vunrIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS range reconnaissance aircraft, transports, and jet fighters. Organizationally it includes the 2d, 8th, and 15th Air Forces, each with several air divi- sions; overseas it maintains the 5th and 7th Air Divisions. Its missions may carry it to any part of the globe. The Tactical Air Command includes fighter- bombers, light bombers, reconnaissance aircraft, and troop carriers. Organizationally it includes the 9th and 18th Air Forces. It works closely with the Army Field Forces in developing tactical air support doctrines. The Air Defense Command (ADC) controls fighter-interceptor units, air bases, and radar sta- tions along the possible air attack routes in this country. It consists of three regional forces, the Eastern, Central, and Western, each made up of several air divisions, supplemented by Air Na- tional Guard wings. Their operations are closely integrated with the Navy Sea Frontier system and the respective Army Anti-Aircraft Artillery com- mands. Elements of ADC may be assigned to commands outside the United States by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Military Air Transport Service (MATS) combines the former Air Transport Command and Naval Air Transport Service. Its routes extend around the world, and it can provide military air lift as required. It provides supplementary serv- ices such as airways communications, weather reporting, air and sea rescue. It includes person- nel of the Navy as well as of the Air -.Force. A special operation of MATS is the Air Resupply and Communication Service (ARCS) which trains Air Force units in the preparations and dropping of psychological warfare pamphlets. The USAF Security Service produces and dis- seminates communications intelligence and main- tains communications security within the Air Force. The Headquarters Command is primarily an administrative adjunct of the Headquarters, United States Air Force, and operates the base for the heavy traffic in and out of Washington. The Air University includes a variety of schools and institutes ranging from the Air War College to the Extension Course Institute. The Air Train- ing Command is responsible for all training below the Air University level from recruit to flying offi- cer, and for this purpose uses the Flying Training CONFIDENTIAL 80 Air Force and the Technical Training Air Force. The Continental Air Command constructs and maintains air bases and other facilities within the United States, using as subcommands the 1st, 4th, 10th, and 14th Air Forces. The six research centers of the Research and Development Command work on aircraft, mis- siles, and armament. The Air Materiel Command buys, supplies, and maintains Air Force equip- ment throughout the world. The Air Proving Ground Command develops operational tech- niques and makes recommendations on require- ments for equipment. The Special Weapons Com- mand is part of the joint Army-Navy-Air Force atomic weapons organization. Overseas there are five air commands. The gen- erals of the Alaskan and Northeast Commands are also theater commanders over all three services in their areas. The Caribbean Air Command and Far Eastern Air Force (FEAF) are under Army theater commanders and the United States Air Force in Europe (USAFE) operates under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Although the preceding discussion of organi- zations for United States security is relatively brief, it provides a necessary background in nomenclature and functions. The balance of this chapter will deal with supporting intelligence subdivisions, emphasizing those within the De- partment of Defense, but including others which are of interest. NAVAL INTELLIGENCE Naval Intelligence includes all the organizations that carry out the intelligence and counterintelli- gence missions of the naval establishment. The responsibilities of the Director of Naval Intelli- gence are: (1) to provide the naval elements re- quired in the production of national intelligence; (2) to produce for naval commanders adequate and timely intelligence needed both for planning and conducting operations, and for estimating the capabilities, vulnerabilities, and proper courses of action of foreign nations; (3) to warn naval com- manders of threats to the security of their commands. The components of Naval Intelligence are: (a) the Office of Naval Intelligence; (b) Intelligence foreign posts (Attaches, Observers, and Liaison Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 UNITED STATES ORGANIZATIONS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY CONFIDENTIAL Officers) ; (c) Naval District and River Command Intelligence organizations; (d) Intelligence sec- tions and units of the operating forces including outlying bases; and (e) joint and combined In- telligence and liaison activities. Each of these components will be discussed in turn. It will clarify our point of view to think of all naval intelligence officers as serving on the intelli- gence section of some commander's staff, the size and organization of the section depending on the needs of the command. On lower echelons, the intelligence section may consist of a single officer who also performs other duties, such as that of assistant operations officer; and the commander? for example, the captain of a ship or an air squad- ron?may not be normally thought of as having an organized staff at all. On higher echelons, in- telligence duties may require the full time services of many officers. The higher the echelon of com- mand, the more extensive the staff organization, and the larger and more complex the intelligence section. The highest echelon of the United States Naval Command is that of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) . CNO's Intelligence Officer is the Direc- tor of Naval Intelligence (DNI) , and his intelli- gence section is the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) . Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) Under the Director and Assistant Director of Naval Intelligence, ONI (0P-32) is divided into three branches which carry out the various objec- tives necessary for the accomplishment of the gen- eral mission of Naval Intelligence. Each branch of ONI is subdivided into sections, which are fur- ther divided into units and desks. Figure 6 indi- cates the current ONI organization. As the counterintelligence arm of the Navy, the Security Branch (OP 321) is charged with the safeguarding and security of naval information, personnel, equipment, and naval installations. Its five sections are: Investigations; Sabotage, Es- pionage and Counter-Subversion (SEC) ; Secu- rity Control; Commerce and Travel; and Censorship. Of particular interest are the Investigations Section and the SEC Section. The Investigations Section conducts investigations as required to pro- 81 tect the Naval Establishment against espionage, sabotage, subversion and unauthorized disclosure of classified information. It also conducts other types of investigations upon request by competent authority?for example, investigations of appli- cants for naval employment. The SEC Section functions as a research and evaluation unit, co- ordinating and disseminating intelligence relating to sabotage, espionage, and counter-subversion. These two sections work as a team. The SEC Sec- tion keeps track of the danger spots; its work is primarily a desk job. The Investigations Section acts as the hands and feet of the SEC Section. The Intelligence Branch (OP 322) is responsible for strategic and operational intelligence, specifi- cally including air intelligence, and for the coordi- nation of naval intelligence activities on foreign posts. It is required to collect and process infor- mation, and to disseminate intelligence produced or received; to maintain liaison with other Federal intelligence agencies; and to direct and coordinate the preparation of intelligence directives, plans, and manuals. Its five sections are Estimates, Collection and Dissemination, Foreign, Operational, and Air. The Collection and Dissemination Section main- tains official intelligence liaison with the Army, Air Force, State Department, and the Central In- telligence Agency. This Section also discharges the responsibility of the Intelligence Branch for the collection of information by Naval Intelli- gence foreign posts. One of its subsections main- tains the CNO Chart Room; another provides maps, charts, photographs, and related material for intelligence purposes. The Foreign Section is responsible for supplying intelligence on foreign powers to the policy, planning, operational, and logistics agencies of the Navy. The Operational Section insures that timely intelligence, both basic and current, is disseminated within ONI and to the operating forces. The Air Section provides intelligence on foreign air power and coordinates the naval aspects of the joint air production intel- ligence activities of ONI and the Air Force. The Administrative Branch (OP 323) super- vises all management activities within and for ONI. Its five sections are: Field Activities, Gen- eral Services, Personnel, Fiscal, and Training. General services include such matters as: publica- CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09: CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Co OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTOR OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE POLICY AND PLANS I COORoINATION FOREIGN LIAISON HEAD OF SECURITY BRANCH ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT HEAD OF INTELLIGENCE BRANCH ASSISTANT TO BRANCH HEAD SECURITY POLICY HEAD OF ADMINISTRATIVE BRANCH 1 ASSISTANT TO BRANCH HEAD FOREIGN SECT! ON COLLECTION & DISSEMINATION SECTI ON CENSORSHI P SECTI ON INVESTI GATI OHS SECTI ON SEC SECTION ____L____ (OMIERCE & TRAVEL SECT! ON ESTIMATES SECTI ON AIR SECTION OPERATIONAL iNTELLIGENCE " SECTION SECUR I TY CONTROL SECTION ASSISTANT TO BRANCH HEAD FIELD ACTIVITIES SECTION GENERAL SERVICES SECTION Figure 6.?Organization chart?Office of Naval Intelligence, PERSONNEL SECTION FISCAL SECTION TRAINING SECTION INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 UNITED STATES ORGANIZATIONS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY CONFIDENTIAL tions, editorial review, reproduction, mail, files, and translation. The Personnel Section is re- sponsible for the Naval Intelligence Reserve Program. Included within ONI are also offices responsible for Plans and Policies, Foreign Liaison, and Sec- retariat. The Plans and Policies office prepares and coordinates Naval Intelligence plans. The Foreign Liaison office maintains official liaison be- tween? ONI and foreign attaches, missions, and distinguished visitors. It also advises United States Naval officers in matters of protocol. The Secretariat reviews correspondence, reports and messages and otherwise relieves DNI of admin- istrative details. Intelligence Foreign Posts (Attaches, Observers and Liaison Officers) Naval Attaches and their staffs who reside abroad are officially a part of ONI and thus under the cognizance of DNI. At the same time, at- taches and assistant attaches have diplomatic status and report for duty to the ambassador or minister who is the chief of the diplomatic mis- sion to which they are assigned. Naval Attaches are in command of naval attache offices whose size is determined by ONI in accord- ance with the importance of the area controlled by the governments to which the attaches are accredited. The primary function of Naval In- telligence officers stationed abroad is to collect information in accordance with the official delimi- tation of topical material between the Navy, Army, Air Force, and State Department, and to forward it, after preliminary evaluation, to the Collection and Dissemination Section of ONI. Foreign Posts are supported by the Intelligence Branch. Naval District and River Command Intelligence Organizations General Order No. 19 states in part: ". . . The Commandant shall maintain within the district an efficient intelligence service, including such in- telligence matters as affect the security of naval activities within the district, and such operational intelligence matters as are required by the com- mander of the sea frontier in which the district is located . . ." Accordingly, in each District and River com- mand, a District Intelligence Officer (DIO) serves on the staff of the Commandant, just as DNI serves on the staff of CNO. In certain designated dis- tricts, the DIO has additional duty on the staff of the Sea Frontier Commander. The District Intelligence Office under the DIO is thus the Intelligence Section of the commandant's staff. While each District Intelligence Office is under the military command of the Commandant, its activities are coordinated by ONI which provides administrative support. Each District Intelli- gence Office is organized in a manner similar to ONI although its primary mission is in the field of counterintelligence. Just as the Intelligence Branch of ONI supports naval attaches and other naval intelligence officers on foreign duty, the Security Branch supports the DIOs and their or- ganizations. The relationships and responsibili- ties of the DIO to DNI and to the Commandant are comparable to those of the naval attache to DNI and to the Chief of Mission. The District Intelligence organization consists of a headquarters office, zone and subordinate of- fices as required, and intelligence units at naval stations and other naval activities as designated by the Commandant. The personnel of zone and subordinate offices are directly under the DIO. Intelligence officers assigned to naval stations and other naval activities are members of the staffs of those commands. Under the technical guidance of the DI0s, the various naval districts and river commands con- duct specialized intelligence training programs for officers of the Naval Intelligence Reserve. Intelligence Sections and Units of the Operating Forces, Including Outlying Bases In the fleet, as in the district and river com- mands, the basic pattern of the intelligence or- ganization is that of the staff section. On the staff of each area, fleet, type, and task force commander, and on the staffs of all flag officers exercising com- mand, there is an intelligence section headed by a flag Intelligence Officer. Sections 0504 (4) and 0506 (1), Navy Regula- tions, 1948, provide, respectively, that a com- mander in Chief, or commander of any other or- ganization or unit of the Operating Forces shall "maintain an effective intelligence organization and keep himself informed of the political and 83 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS military aspects of the national and international situation" and shall "keep his immediate superior appropriately informed of . . . intelligence infor- mation which may be of value." These two articles make each commander re- sponsible for the collection, processing, and dis- semination of intelligence within his own com- mand, and the dissemination of intelligence to higher echelons. Because of the complexity of present-day naval operations, and the consequent need for a steady and voluminous flow of intelli- gence, a commander must rely on his staff to carry out most of his intelligence responsibilities. Wartime intelligence organization in the oper- ating forces was by no means uniform. This di- versity was due in part to the relative independ- ence of the various commands, and in part to their widely differing needs. Late in World War II, considerable progress was made toward uniform- ity. Nevertheless, the exigencies of any future war are likely to result in intelligence organiza- tions quite different from those of peacetime, since each commander must bear the responsibility for organizing his intelligence section to meet his par- ticular needs. But no future development will alter the responsibility incumbent upon intelli- gence officers with the operating forces--as upon all members of Naval Intelligence?to see that all intelligence received or produced flows upward to the higher echelons where it can be properly evalu- ated and disseminated and so, ultimately, reaches the Office of Naval Intelligence. For background purposes, the organization of fleet intelligence during World War II need be only summarized. In general, the area command- ers were served by large intelligence centers, which later set up offices in forward sectors for more rapid collection and dissemination. These intelli- gence centers proved their usefulness, and counter- parts of them are likely to be established in any future war. They were intelligence agencies, usu- ally large, which served the commander and all subordinate units of his command, but were sep- arate from the relatively small intelligence section of the staff itself. So far as practicable, they were joint activities of the Navy and the other armed forces. Their normal work included photog- raphy, photo-interpretation, hydrography, car- tography, target and flak analysis, interrogation CONFIDENTIAL 84 and translation. On the lower echelons of the area command, an intelligence officer?sometimes with one or more assistants?was assigned to each flag afloat, including fleet air wings. Intelligence officers were also assigned to battleships, cruisers, destroyer and motor torpedo boat squadrons, all major amphibious units and all carriers, air groups and air squadrons. Since World War II, ONI and the Bureau of Naval Personnel have had the objective of plac- ing trained intelligence officers in all echelons of command. In practice, however, on many staffs, no trained intelligence officer is available, and a staff officer is given additional duty in intelligence. Shipboard intelligence organizations also have suffered from a lack of personnel. Article 0916, Navy Regulations, 1948, provides that the opera- tions officer of a ship, under the commanding offi- cer, shall be responsible for the collection and analysis of intelligence information. Accord- ingly an intelligence officer, when available, is as- signed to the operations department of every capital ship and of other ships as conditions warrant. The primary responsibility of intelligence offi- cers assigned to the operating forces is to meet the intelligence requirements of their immediate commander. However, they have an added re- sponsibility, through their commander to ONI, in collecting information for not only their im- mediate command but also the Naval Establish- ment as a whole. Intelligence Sections and units of the operating forces are supported by the In- telligence Branch of ONI. Joint and Combined Intelligence and Liaison Activities During World War II the scope and diversity of the fighting required an unprecedented degree of joint and combined activity and hence joint and combined intelligence. United States naval intelligence officers served as observers with the British Fleet. British personnel were attached to American armed forces. Amphibious opera- tions in both the Pacific and the European theaters were planned and supervised jointly by sea, ground, and air specialists. Naval Intelligence participated in joint intelli- gence activities on all echelons during World War Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 ApprovecLfor Re Lease. ZQQ3(12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002.9 u.N.r.reo h.vrATEb outinivizATIONS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY uuNFIDENTIAL II, from the Joint Intelligence Committee, the in- telligence agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, down to small field units engaged in such tasks as the exploitation of captured documents and the interrogation of prisoners of war. Less than a dozen of these joint intelligence activities sur- vived the peace. Several trends initiated in wartime have con- tinued in the postwar period?namely, the trends toward joint and combined scientific research and development, joint and combined intelligence pro- duction, and joint and combined staff training. All commanders of naval operating forces are authorized and directed, subject to the prior ap- proval of DNI, to conduct or participate in joint intelligence activities which they believe are re- quired for successful execution of their missions. Among the assignments open to naval intelligence officers are participation in the work of the Joint Staff, under the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and duty in the Central Intelligence Agency. MARINE CORPS INTELLIGENCE While the United States Marine Corps draws its intelligence information from the Navy, it pat- terns its Intelligence organization after the Army. The Commandant of the Marine Corps has a staff Intelligence Officer (G-2) and a headquarters in- telligence section which produces intelligence of interest to the Corps on such subjects as foreign coasts, landing beaches, and associated subjects. Most strategic intelligence is obtained directly from ONI. During joint operations the Marine Corps also obtains intelligence from the Army. Intelligence Officers are assigned to all Marine operating units of battalion level and higher. The size of the intelligence section varies with the size and needs of the unit. For example, a battalion has but one intelligence officer, while a division may have five officers in its intelligence section. Marine intelligence officers are also assigned to duty in ONI, in Naval Attache billets, on naval operating staffs and with the Central Intelligence Agency. ARMY INTELLIGENCE The Army intelligence organization is officially called the "Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, 85 0-2, Intelligence, General Staff, United States Army." The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, is a member of the General Staff, United States Army, and is coequal with the heads of the other General Staff divisions. He is thus an echelon higher than his naval counterpart, the Director of Naval In- telligence, but his responsibilities are substantially the same. As shown in figure 7, there are five operating di- visions in the Army's 0-2 organization: Adminis- trative, Collection and Dissemination, Production, Security, and Training. Each consists of several branches. The Administrative Division contains the following Branches: Attache, Fiscal, Message Center (communications), Personnel, and Service (including records and translation). The Collec- tion and Dissemination Division operates the War Room, is responsible for intelligence requirements and publications, and maintains the 0-2 Docu- ment Library. The Production Division is com- posed of the Estimates Branch, three geographic branches?Eastern, Western, and Eurasian?the Technical and Special Research Branches, Area Resources Branch, and the Air Intelligence Com- ponent which works with the Air Force. In the Security Division are the three branches respon- sible for censorship, personnel security, and the security of military information. The Training Division is concerned with regular and reserve in- telligence training, and also operates the Map and Photo Branch. The Army Security Agency (ASA) and the Counter-Intelligence Corps (CIC) are specialized organizations of importance. ASA is responsible for communications intelligence and security. CIC is the counterintelligence agency of the Army; it makes all investigations for which the Army is responsible under the Delimitation Agree- ment, and also investigates compromises of mili- tary information and cases involving foreign na- tionals both in the United States and abroad. Each of these agencies takes care of its own ad- ministration, including the procurement, training and assignment of personnel, and the development of equipment and doctrine. Their work, however, comes within the purview of G-2, and close liaison and coordination is maintained. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 6-Z0001Z001?000t1901.00998dCIU-VIO : 60/ZI./COOZ eseeleu Jod peAwddv STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE SCHOOL ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2 DEPUTY for Intelligence DEPUTY for Operations EXECUTIVE SPECIAL ASSISTANT LIAISON OFFICERS (Army Security Agency) (Counter Intel. Corps) MANAGEMENT OFFICE FOREIGN LIAISON OFFICE POLICY AND COORDINATING OFFICE PRODUCTION DIVISION Branches: Eastern Estimates Eurasian Western Technical Special Research Area Resources AFOIN component ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION Branches: Attache Fiscal Message Center Personnel Service COLLECTION & DISSEMINATION Branches: Requirements Operations Plans & Research Document Library Publications SECURITY DIVISION Branches: Censorship Personnel Security S. M. I. TRAINING DIVISION Branches: Organisation & Training' Reserve Components Map & Photo Figure 7.?Organization Chart?Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Intelligence, General Staff, U. S. Army. APPr?v&M21; M??ReoiRAN 0 30200N il[A) oslocnosroyo 1 00210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL AIR FORCE INTELLIGENCE The Directorate of Intelligence under the Dep- uty Chief of Staff for Operations, Headquarters, USAF, is usually abbreviated "D/I" and desig- nated AFOIN?literally Air Force Operations /Ntelligence?a term corresponding to "Op 32" in the Navy. In command structure, the Air Force follows the Navy, rather than the Army, in making Intelligence subordinate to Operations. This Air Force organization deserves special com- ment for several reasons. It differs from ONI and 0-2 in that it has no responsibility for counter- intelligence; it formulates no policy for safeguard- ing military information; and it specifically pro- duces intelligence for the other military services. The Navy and the Army provide approximately one-third of the personnel in the intelligence pro- ducing divisions of the Directorate in return for processed air intelligence for the Army, Navy, and Marine air arms. Figure 8 indicates that Air Force Intelligence is headed by a Director of Intelligence assisted by three Deputy Directors: for Collection and Dissemination, Estimates, and Targets. The Di- rector also administers the Air Technical Intelli- gence Center. The Director's responsibilities include collect- ing information on the air potential and air forces of foreign countries; producing intelligence from this information; and disseminating this material not only within the Air Force, but also to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Central Intelligence Agency, and other departments and agencies as appropriate. He directs and controls all USAF intelligence activities, including the Air Attache system. He sets up the air intelligence require- ments for USAF photo reconnaissance, mapping and charting and geodetic surveying programs. He is further responsible for meeting the intelli- gence requirements of the continental and over- seas air commands, and the air administrative and technical services. The Director also repre- sents the Air Force on intelligence matters with other departments and agencies of the United States Government and with foreign governments. The Office of the Director of Special Investiga- tions, an agency under the USAF Inspector Gen- eral, is the counterintelligence agency of the Air Force. It is responsible for safeguarding military 87 information, and for investigating all cases of espionage, sabotage, treason, subversion, etc., within the Air Force. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (FBI) The FBI is the chief internal security agency of the Federal Government. It is now responsible for investigating violations of more than 100 Fed- eral laws. Under some of these laws, such as the Atomic Energy Act and the Federal Em- ployees Loyalty Program, specific responsibility has been given to the FBI by the law itself or by Presidential Directive. Under others, the FBI exercises its general investigative functions in all cases where the United States is or may become a party in interest. The FBI also promotes scien- tific crime detection by means of its laboratory, its fingerprint files, and the FBI National Acad- emy for law-enforcement officers. The FBI is organized in seven Divisions: (1) Identification; (2) Training and Inspection; (3) Administration; (4) Records and Communica- tions; (5) General Investigations; (6) Labora- tory; and (7) Security. The latter division is of primary interest to Naval Intelligence because of mutual counterintelligence responsibilities. THE DELIMITATION AGREEMENT The Delimitation Agreement originated in a Presidential directive of 26 June 1939, which pro- vided that investigations of all matters concerning espionage, counterespionage, subversion, and sab- otage (the "four categories") should be conducted and controlled emclusively by Naval Intelligence, Military Intelligence, and the FBI. The heads of these three agencies were directed to form a committee to pool information and coordinate ac- tivities. This became the Interdepartmental In- telligence Conference (IIC), which worked out the Delimitation Agreement, prescribing the juris- diction and investigative duties of each of the three agencies. Under the original Agreement, the Navy assumed responsibility for the investi- gation and disposal of cases in the "four cate- gories" involving (a) personnel of the Naval Establishment, including civilians employed by the Navy, and (b) personnel in areas under its administrative control: Guam, Samoa, Palmyra, CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 1V11N3OHNO0 DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AIR TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE CENTER (Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio) Policy & Management Group jDEPUTY DIRECTOR for COLLECTION & DISSEMINATION Policy & Mgmt Group COLLECTION OPERATIONS DIVISION Branches: Collection Control Reconnaissance Supplemental Research Air Attache DISSEMINATION CONTROL DIVISION Branches: Processing Dissemination Documents Foreign Liaison DEPUTY DIRECTOR for ESTIMATES Policy & Mgmt Group TOPICAL INTELLIGENCE DIVISION Branches: Indications Current Intelligence Intel. Exploitation Air Intel. Digest INTEL INTEGRATION DIVISION Branches: Analysis & Review Military Services National Estimates Survey Planning Estimates MILITARY CAPABILITIES DIVISION, WEST Branches: Analysis & Review Western Establishments Western Air Facilities Western Support MILITARY CAPABILITIES DIVISION, EAST Branches: Analysis & Review Eastern Establishments Eastern Air Facilities Eastern Support Weapons Analysis (World Wide) DEPUTY DIRECTOR for TARGETS Policy & Mgmt Group Special Studies Group TARGET ANALYSIS DIV. Branches: Military Vulnerability Industrial Vulnerability General Vulnerability PHYSICAL VULNERABILITY DIVISION Branches: Weapons Application Weapons Effects Mathematical Analysis TARGET MATERIALS DIV. Branches: Production Target Integration Radar Target Intel. Figure 8.?Organization Chart?Directorate of Intelligence, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Headquarters, USAF Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 UNITED STATES ORGANIZATIONS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY CONFIDENTIAL Johnson, Wake, and Midway. In Japan, the Navy and FBI had joint responsibility. After the War, changes in the Delimitation Agreement were necessitated by the Atomic En- ergy Act of 1946, which provided that everyone authorized to have access to "restricted" atomic data should have been investigated by the FBI. Some of the people for whom such authorization was desired wore Army or Navy uniforms. Ac- cordingly, the FBI was required to conduct in- vestigations of all Armed Forces personnel for "Q clearances" for access to "restricted" atomic data. However, as a result of the Agreement of February 1951, Armed Forces personnel are now given access to "restricted" atomic data on the strength of their military security clearances, ex- cept in cases involving contractors with the Atomic Energy Commission or their employees. The Delimitation Agreement was also affected by the Federal Employees Loyalty Program (Ex- ecutive Order 9835 of March 21,1947). Although this applied mainly to civilian employees in the Executive Branch of the Government, it directed the Armed Forces to take such steps as necessary to ensure the loyalty of their own personnel. It also directed the FBI to make all investigations. Accordingly, the Navy is no longer responsible for investigations in the "four categories" of civilians whom it employs or over whom it has administra- tive control. Nevertheless, in areas under Naval Administrative control, the Navy in practice still does the job for the FBI, and also investigates all cases involving personnel of the Military Sea Transportation Service. For purposes of the De- limitation Agreement, Reserve personnel on in- active duty are civilians. To sum up, in the "four categories", the Navy now restricted to investigations involving ac- duty and retired naval and marine personnel, the exceptions stated above. However, its Iction to make general security investigations the "four categories" is not restricted either 3 Delimitation Agreement or any other regu- 17 document; and it still makes many investi- ions involving civilians, for example, in cases Involving its own employees, applicants for naval employment, and employees of naval contractors. By provision of the National Security Act of 1947, the Director of Special Investigations, 269196-54----7 USAF, joined the Director, FBI, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and the Director of Naval Intelligence on the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference. Thus the Air Force is governed by and participates in the provisions of the Delimita- tion Agreement. STATE DEPARTMENT INTELLIGENCE The Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, Intelligence, has the rank of Assistant Secretary of State. His office provides the departmental intelligence of the State Department. In the field of national intelligence, it is primarily, though not exclusively, responsible for political, cultural, and sociological matters, by NSC directive. In practice, it has also produced most economic in- telligence and considerable scientific intelligence. It has a special responsibility for coordinating overt intelligence activities abroad, since, by NSC directive, the Chiefs of Mission are the coordina- tors of such activities. As shown in figure 9, the State Department Office of Intelligence has two major suboffices, each of which has a number of divisions. The Office of Intelligence Research (OIR) plans and de- velops an intelligence research program along regional and functional lines, and coordinates it with that of other Federal agencies. In this manner the Department is provided with the in- telligence necessary for the formulation and exe- cution of foreign policy. On the other hand, information pertinent to national security is fur- nished to the Security Council, the Central Intel- ligence Agency, and the Department of Defense. In addition to carrying on intelligence research, OIR prepares or participates in the preparation of studies and spot intelligence for authorized recipients in the Department and other Federal agencies. It continuously scrutinizes world situa- tions and deals with intelligence problems sub- mitted to it by the Secretary, Under Secretary, Planning Adviser, and other State Department officials, as well as the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense. It directs De- partment of State participation in the National Intelligence Survey basic research program and works in close cooperation with the Central In- telligence Agency and other governmental agen- 89 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09: CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS OFFICE OF SPECIAL ASSISTANT ? INTELLIGENCE r-- ISPECIAL PROJECTS STAFF EXECUTIVE STAFF OFFICE OF LIBRARIES & INTELLIGENCE ACQUISITION (OLI) DIRECTOR ACQUISITION & DISTRIBUTION BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION LIBRARY & REFERENCE SERVICES OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH (01R) DIRECTOR FAR EAST HWESTERN EUROPE HNEAR EAST, SOUTH ASIA & AFRICA USSR 8, EASTERN EUROPE AMERICAN REPUBLICS FUNCTIONAL INTELLIGENCE Figure 9,?Organization Chart?Office of Intelligence, Department of State. cies engaged in the production of National Intelligence Survey materials. The Office of Libraries and Intelligence Ac- quisition (OLI) has a collection responsibility and also maintains a library program for the Depart- ment, which includes policy guidance and assist- ance to the libraries of the Foreign Service establishments overseas. It collects and evaluates biographic information on foreign individuals, involving the preparation of analytical biographic studies as well as the maintenance of the Depart- ment's central collection of biographic and sem- rity information of foreign persons, It collects, processes, and evaluates security intelligence per- taining to foreigners and organizations abroad. The security program of the State Department and the Foreign Service is supervised by the Office of Security and Consular Affairs, in large part through the Division of Security. The functions of this Division include development of security policy for the Department and the Foreign Service CONFIDENTIAL 90 and provision for their personnel and physical security by: (1) conducting investigations of ap- plicants for employment in the Department and Foreign Service; (2) directing those investiga- tions requiring coverage overseas in connection with the President's Loyalty Program; (3) evalu- ating investigative reports and making recom- mendations to the Loyalty and Security Board in appropriate cases; (4) establishing and supervi' ing control measures for documentary, commr cations, and building security for the Depart, in Washington; (5) directing, through appi ate channels, the security program in Service establishments. Further, it furnishes additional investigt. services for the Department with respect to: passport, visa, munitions control, and other cases, (2) individuals, organizations, situations, trends, and developments constituting a threat to the security of the United States; (3) other matters, as requested. Approved For Release 2003/12/09: CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 UNITED STATES ORGANIZATIONS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY The Security Division also provides security protection for official guests of the United States Government and other distinguished visitors, and for international conferences in the United States. It maintains official liaison with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Treasury Depart- ment, the Post Office Department, and other do- mestic security and law enforcement agencies. It cooperates with Department of Justice on ques- tions of policy in connection with the Foreign Agents Registration Act. No foreigner can get a visa for entry into the United States unless he has been cleared through the Visa Division. Such clearance is effected or denied on the basis of information gathered by the Department and other governmental intelligence agencies with which it maintains close liaison. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION INTELLIGENCE Because of the importance of intelligence con- cerning the military applications of nuclear power, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) has an Office of Intelligence and a Division of Security. The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 first provided four divisions, Research, Production, Engineer- ing, and Military Applications, to aid the General Manager in carrying out his duties. Other divi- sions were needed, and in 1948 a Division of Security and Intelligence was created. Shortly thereafter, this division became the Division of Security when a separate Office of Intelligence was formed with a Director. The Office of Intelligence has no collection function, but it may request information from other agencies. When information of atomic and thermonuclear interest is received by any govern- ment agency (including the non-intelligence agen- cies such as Commerce), it is forwarded to the AEC where a group of highly trained scientists in the Office of Intelligence evaluates the incoming information. The Director of Intelligence may also call upon the leading scientists in the country for consultation on the proper evaluation of in- formation received. The resultant intelligence is disseminated to the President, the National Se- curity Council, the Department of Defense, CIA, and others as appropriate. This evaluation is AEC's important contribution to intelligence. 91 CONFIDENTIAL A great and continuing concern of the Atomic Energy Commission is the safeguarding of our atomic program from espionage, sabotage, theft, and destruction. This counterintelligence func- tion is taken care of by the Division of Security. In Washington, on the General Manager's staff, the Division of Security has four sections: Physi- cal Security, Personnel Security, Document Con- trol, Violations and Visitor Control. The functions of each section are essentially what the names imply. The Division also supervises field security offices at nine installations in the United States. Internal security investigations are ini- tiated by these offices, but if it appears that a regulation of the Atomic Energy Act has been violated, it becomes a case for the FBI. INTERDEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES There are many areas of activity and interest where the intelligence requirements of two or more government agencies or departments coin- cide; therefore, in the interests of efficiency and the coordination of effort interdepartmental in- telligence agencies are established. If all the par- ticipating departments are military, the agency is called "joint." Intelligence Organization for the Joint Chiefs of Staff The Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) , to- gether with its full-time staff, the Joint Intelli- gence Group (JIG) , is the intelligence agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As such, it is the high- est-level intelligence agency within the Depart- ment of Defense. Its members are: the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, General Staff, U. S. Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; and the Deputy Director of the Joint Staff for Intelligence. In short, the Joint Intelligence Committee is composed of the intelligence chiefs of all the armed forces, plus a fourth member who directs the Joint Intelligence Group. The JIC is charged with: (a) the preparation of joint intelligence estimates for the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their subordinate committees; (b) the coordination of photographic, mapping, and charting activities of the Department of Defense; and (c) security matters within JCS jurisdiction. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS Since the three departmental committee mem- bers devote only a part of their time to JIC mat- ters, a full-time working staff is required to prepare joint estimates, reports, plans and policies for Committee approval. This staff is the Joint Intelligence Group of the Joint Staff. The JIC/JIG differs from other intelligence organizations relating to the national security in that it is neither a collecting nor a disseminating agency. It does not duplicate the work of the departmental agencies or the CIA, but merely uses the intelligence material of those agencies to meet the intelligence requirements of the JCS and their supporting committees and groups. Interdepartmental Coordinating Committees Where the intelligence requirements of two or more departments coincide, the necessary collec- tion and production operations are brought into common action by special-purpose committees. There are a number of such coordinating commit- tees, the most important being the Interdepart- mental Intelligence Conference (TIC), discussed in connection with the FBI, the Intelligence Ad- visory Committee (IAC), which serves to coordi- nate the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) with the other Federal intelligence agencies concerned with the national security, and the National In- telligence Survey (NIS) Committee. The IAC is composed of the intelligence directors of the Justice Department (FBI) ,the State Department, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force and the Joint Staff, in addi- tion to the Director of Central Intelligence, who acts as chairman. During World War II, the main source of basic intelligence for the armed forces was a series of handbooks known as Joint Army-Navy Intelli- gence Studies (JANIS). The deficiencies of the JANIS series emphasized the fact that basic in- telligence must be produced on a much broader scale, over a longer period, and, as far as possible, in time of peace. Therefore, on 13 January 1948, the NIS program was initiated. The NIS Program represents the combined in- telligence efforts of the CIA, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the State Department. It is supervised by the NIS Committee, which consists of representatives of all the contributing agencies, CONFIDENTIAL 92 and is coordinated by the CIA. Its purpose is to produce a concise digest of basic intelligence, such as, encyclopedic knowledge of the geographic, eco- nomic, socio-political and military characteristics of every foreign country. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY During World War II, intelligence-coordinat- ing agencies including the Office of -War Infor- mation (0W1) and the Office of Strategic Serv- ices (OSS) were created by Presidential directive and a Joint Intelligence C ommittee (JIC) was es- tablished under the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The JIC soon recognized the need for, and proposed, a national agency to coordinate intelligence produced by the various Departments. Its pro- posal resulted in the Presidential letter of 22 Jan- uary 1946, which created the National Intelligence Authority, and the Central Intelligence Group as its operating agency. The Authority was di- rected to plan, develop, and coordinate all Federal intelligence activities "so as to assure the most effective accomplishment of the intelligence mis- sion related to the national security." The National Security Act of 1947 established the National Security Council (NSC) which took the place of the National Intelligence Authority, specifically abolished by the act. The Central In- telligence Agency (CIA) was established under the Council as the statutory successor of the Cen- tral Intelligence Group. The Director of CIA The Act specifically provides for a Director of Central Intelligence, appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Director may be either a civilian or an officer of one of the armed forces. In the latter event, the Act provides the safeguard that, during his tenure, the Director shall be subject to no greater military control than would any civilian; nor shall he have or exercise any control, other than as Director, over any component of the armed forces. Service as Director is to have no effect, except as described above, on the status, office or rank in the Armed Forces of any military man so appointed. One of the most important provisions of the Act gives the Director the right in his discretion to "terminate the employment of any officer or em- Approved For Release 2003/12/09: CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 UNITED STATES ORGANIZATIONS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY CONFIDENTIAL ployee of the Agency whenever he shall deem such termination necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States." This provision frees the director from civil service restrictions. In an in- telligence agency, where security is paramount, freedom in dismissing employees is an obvious necessity. The duties of the CIA are set forth in section 102 of the Act, as follows: (1) to advise the National Security Coun- cil in matters concerning such intelligence activities of the Government departments and agencies as relate to the national security; (2) to make recommendations to the Na- tional Security Council for the coordination of such intelligence activities of the depart- ments and agencies of the Government as re- late to the national security; (3) to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such in- formation within the Government using where appropriate existing agencies and fa- cilities: Provided, That the _Agency shall have no police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers, or internal security functions: Provided fur- ther, That the departments and other agencies of the Government shall continue to collect, evaluate, correlate, and disseminate depart- mental intelligence: And provided further, That the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized- dis- closure; (4) to perform, for the benefit of the exist- ing intelligence agencies, such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more effi- ciently accomplished centrally; (5) to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the na- tional security as the National Security Coun- cil may from time to time direct. The first paragraph of Section 102 directs and authorizes the CIA to serve as intelligence ad- viser to the NSC on all matters relating to the national security. The second paragraph requires the CIA to make recommendations to the NSC for coordinating such intelligence activities of the Government as relate to the national security. In performing its duties under this paragraph the CIA has the coun- sel of the Intelligence Advisory Committee de- scribed in the preceding section. Through the IAC, the CIA is able to maintain close contact with all the departmental intelligence agencies concerned with the national security; it can bene- fit from their knowledge, experience and judg- ment, and keep itself informed of their intelli- gence requirements. Their views can serve as the basis for recommendations made by the CIA to the NSC. In particular, the IAC can help the CIA determine the primary fields of intelligence responsibility of the various departments and agencies. Thus it can help in promoting efficiency by the elimination of duplicate missions, func- tions, and services. The third paragraph of Section 102 provides for the correlation and evaluation of intelligence re- lating to the national security. This task involves the production of national intelligence. Just as the NSC integrates national policies that could not be integrated by either the State or the De- fense Department alone, so the CIA draws upon the intelligence produced by the various depart- ments, supplements it, and integrates it into a product which is suitable in content and form for national planning. However, the CIA does not interfere with the production of departmental in- telligence. Each department must still evaluate, correlate, and interpret that intelligence which is within its own exclusive competence and is needed for its own use. The CIA is further charged with the dissemi- nation of national intelligence within the Gov- ernment. Because of this responsibility, CIA must at all times know the intelligence require- ments of the various Government departments and agencies. This function of disseminating na- tional intelligence to the departments that need it is clearly essential. Owing to the volume and complexity of intelligence information available, it should be a centralized function; and the proper place for centralizing it is the focal point where all the streams of incoming intelligence converge. Thus the Act gives the CIA two major functions of intelligence?production and dissemination. It makes no explicit provision for the third major function?collection. Nevertheless, the duties of the CIA under the second paragraph of Section 102, with respect to the coordination of depart- mental intelligence activities, entail the coordina- tion of foreign intelligence collection. As to col- 93 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS lection, then, the role of the CIA is at least to pre- vent gaps, cross-purposes, and wasteful duplica- tion among the various departments and agencies. On the one hand, to give a fictitious example, some department or agency should collect economic in- telligence information. On the other hand, the Air Force should not concern itself with the col- lection of detailed sociological information about Java. The fourth paragraph of this Section gives the CIA a further warrant for foreign intelligence collection by authorizing it to perform "such addi- tional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally." In eliminating waste- ful duplication of collection functions, therefore, the CIA can use either of two methods. It can discontinue the overlapping collection efforts of all but one of the departments, and arrange for that one to serve all the others. In doing so, it would merely be coordinating. Or, instead, it may supplant the collection efforts of all the depart- ments with its own collection effort, and perform the collection function itself as a service of com- mon concern to the existing intelligence agencies. Which, if either, method is used in any given case is of course determined by the NSO. To sum up, then, the National Security Act rec- ognized the need for departmental intelligence, and in fact specifically provided for its continu- ance; at the same time, the Act recognized the need for the coordination of departmental intelligence, and for the production and dissemination of na- tional intelligence, and created the CIA to per- form these functions; and, finally, the Act pro- vided that certain unspecified intelligence func- tions should be centralized in the interests of efficiency. OTHER UNITED STATES AGENCIES PRODUCING INTELLIGENCE Although it is not possible to trace in detail the organizations of all agencies of government that collect information and process it into intelli- gence, it is most important for the naval officer engaged in intelligence work to realize that his sources are not limited to the national security agencies alone. With proper liaison he will dis- cover that there are available vast analytical and CONFIDENTIAL 94 cataloguing resources in the federal government, and also many operating agencies with functions closely allied to security. Department of the Treasury A number of offices and bureaus within the Treasury have intelligence functions. The Office of International Finance studies foreign econ- omies, international capital movements, gold movements, and exchange controls. It can block the movement of foreign assets under United States jurisdiction. The Bureau of Customs not only collects duties on imports but is concerned with preventing smuggling, registering vessels, and stopping the export of controlled materials. The Bureau of Narcotics controls trade in nar- cotic drugs and of necessity works closely with some foreign governments. The Alcohol Tax Unit may become involved in blocking illegal al- cohol operations if of an international scope. The United States Secret Service tries to prevent counterfeiting, and provides various protective services including guarding the President and his family. The United States Coast Guard, though a part of the Department of the Navy in wartime, is nor- mally under the Treasury. It not only saves lives at sea, provides navigation aids, and sets safety standards for merchant ships, but also has major responsibility for port security and checking on the loyalty of seamen. Department of Commerce This is another department of interest to In- telligence. It contains the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce with a subordinate Office of International Trade, a major collector and proces- sor of economic and commercial intelligence from the whole world. The Federal Maritime Board has to study foreign costs of ship construction and operation, and approve any international rate agreements that involve United States steamship companies. The Civil Aeronautics Board makes many studies of world aviation developments, and works closely with the International Civil Avia- tion Organization of the United Nations. The Patent Office collects and analyzes the official jour- nals of all foreign patent offices. The Weather Bureau collects weather reports from all over the world to add to its domestic analyses. The Coast Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 UNITED STATES ORGANIZATIONS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY CONFIDENTIAL and Geodetic Survey collects data on United States territorial waters and on a number of overseas areas that are important to naval operations. The Bureau of the Census as a service agency manipu- lates data fed to it by government offices, and these include foreign trade statistics and international statistics in general. Other Agencies There are additional agencies. Some of the more obvious include: (1) the Office of Interna- tional Labor Affairs in the Department of Labor, which watches developments abroad in use and behavior of labor and labor organizations; (2) the Office of Alien Property in the Department of Justice, which keeps track of foreign assets under our jurisdiction and possible trading with the enemy; (3) the Immigration and Naturaliza- tion Service, also in the Department of Justice, which watches for violations of immigration laws and maintains border patrols; (4) the Depart- ment of Agriculture's Office of Foreign Agricul- tural Relations which has attaches abroad to collect data and makes analyses of world-wide de- velopments in agriculture; (5) the same De- partment's Bureau of Entomology and Plant Quarantine, which like the United States Public Health Service may be in the forefront of detect- ing biological warfare attacks upon the United States; (6) the Post Office Department's Bureau of the Chief Post Office Inspector, whose studies of postal law violations may turn up much informa- tion of intelligence interest; (7) the Department of Interior's Office of Territories and many special commissions and corporations which serve as sources of intelligence on our own territories; (8) the Federal Communications Commission, which tracks down clandestine radio stations and keeps 95 track of use of frequencies by transmitters both at home and abroad; (9) the Federal Reserve Board, which makes studies of international fi- nance; (10) the Tariff Commission, which studies foreign costs, protective measures, and other re- trictions ; (11) the Smithsonian Institution, which collects and studies scientific data the world over, and its subsidiary International Exchange Service which trades scientific publications with foreign countries; (12) the Library of Congress, which also has exchange and collection functions; (13) the Office of Civil Defense with its physical security functions; and (14) such quasi-official or private groups as the National Geographic Society, which can send expeditions to remote places, and prepare finished maps based upon data collected, and the Bureau of Railway Economics, which also has very wide collection and processing facilities. The above list, by no means exhaustive, indicates the variety of agencies that are in some way useful to Intelligence, although they are not intelligence agencies in the strict sense of the term. In any review of United States Organizations for National Security it must be kept in mind that, in actuality, they are not inanimate spaces on a formal chart but rather living vital composites of many individuals each of whom is daily contribut- ing his talents and energies toward the production of a total coordinated product. The best finished product is possible only when each individual con- tributor has a clear perspective of the total field of which he is a part so that his own efforts will blend effectively and harmoniously. Therefore, in order to aid the naval intelligence officer to carry out his assigned duties and responsibilities most effectively, the following chapter will be de- voted to a consideration of the proper intelligence perspective he must have. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL CHAPTER 4 AN INTELLIGENCE PERSPECTIVE IN A CHANGING WORLD The iob of Intelligence is "to winnow the extraneous data from the vital facts and to set these facts In proper perspective . . ." This statement was made following World War II by Rear Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter in describing the function of intelligence to produce usable knowledge. Its key words, "proper per- spective" aptly describe the central theme of this chapter. Cause and effect, action and counter-action are woven into an unending pattern of conditions and situations which must be followed with infinite care the world over. The relentless continuity of events makes it impossible to consider them singly or outside their frame of reference. Mili- tary policies and international politics are inter- dependent and neither can be effective without the other. Similarly, the strategies of nations may begin and end within a period of war, or they may be conducted, with or without change, continuously between wars. The intelligence officer must be schooled in the field of international relations in order that he may develop a broad sense of world affairs and recognize the trends which will give the fullest meaning to emerging situations. In de- veloping this sensitivity he must keep in mind the functions of intelligence, its past influence on world events, and the purposes of the various agen- cies which it supports. In chapter lit was stated that Intelligence has three primary functions: first, to give warning of any hostile plans directed against a nation or a military force; second, to provide the knowl- edge upon which policies and plans can be based; and third, to counter the intelligence efforts of opposing nations. The very nature of military warfare maximizes the opportunity of Intelligence to predict the time and place of attack. The greater variables in time of peace, however, re- quire Intelligence to evaluate with care the par- ticular factors which may produce specific developments within certain periods of time. The importance of such evaluations was stressed by Maj. Gen. William J. Donovan when he said: 269196-54-8 97 "Government policy must be based upon a tested knowledge of the facts. What facts? The capa- bilities, the intentions, and the policies of other nations . . (Intelligence is) just the careful gathering and analysis and interpretation of many bits of evidence." The need for intelligence in time of war has been generally recognized; its importance in time of peace is still a topic of considerable argument among some political leaders and students of government. A British writer recently com- mented that, prior to World War II, intelligence seemed to have little purpose as long as the vital interests of the nation did not appear to be threat- ened. As late as August 1952, a well-known American, in describing United States intelligence organizations, remarked that they would be un- necessary if American relations with the Soviet Union were normal. This failure to understand the need for continuity in intelligence activity arises from a misconception of the terms "war" and "peace." Certainly they are not exclusive concepts. For example, it is almost impossible to pin-point the causes of wars and the exact times when each really began. Since basic national in- terests remain relatively the same, the transition from war to peace is merely a shift in emphasis on the means employed to promote those interests. Instead of military force, the means may be poli- tical, economic, psychological, or a combination of all three. Likewise for intelligence the end of a war means only a shift in major interests. Instead of the numbers and movements of troops and ships, in- terest centers on the capabilities of new weapons, the acquisition of new strategic bases, and the development of new areas of political influence. Political machinations in the world's trouble spots, exploitation of markets for manufactured goods, and the control of strategic materials become sub- jects of concern. Knowledge of these matters may CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09: CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR alter relationships and determine the attitudes of one nation toward another at international confer- ences or at meetings of the United Nations. In- telligence has the responsibility not only to acquire such positive information regarding other nations of the world, but also to perform its equally im- portant function of preventing the disclosures of vital information and countering foreign es- pionage. Consideration of the historical development in chapter 2 led to the conclusion that Intelligence has often influenced the outcome of military and political events which had world-wide repercus- sions. The intelligence officer, therefore, must be fully aware of the scope of his interests and the implications of his activities. The guerrilla war- fare carried on by Lawrence of Arabia in World War I had a strategic significance out of all pro- portion to the size, area of combat, and equipment of his modest forces. The German agent, Wass- muss, held southern Persia under his personal influence and did much to prolong the British mili- tary campaign in that area. Early in World War II, a cipher clerk in the American Embassy at London provided Germany with vital diplomatic information passing between Washington and London. When his treachery was finally discov- ered, during the dark days of Dunkirk and the fall of France, all classified communications of the American State Department had to be sus- pended until new codes were prepared and. distributed. The impact of this failure of counterintelligence was brought out at the Nurem- berg trials when various Nazi leaders stated that the information derived through the American cipher clerk influenced their decision to curtail military activity during the winter of 1939-40 while they prepared for the spring offensive against France. The use of the Italian Embassy in London for the transmittal of this information may well have influenced Italy's decision to post- pone her entry into the war for about ten months. In the preceding chapter, the purpose of the discussion was to review the various government agencies responsible for planning and formulating the foreign policies of the United States and to describe their supporting Intelligence subdivi- sions. The Office of Naval Intelligence, as one of these subdivisions, contributes significantly to CONFIDENTIAL 98 NAVAL OFFICERS the production of the total knowledge used as the basis for national policy decisions which guide relationships with other nations in times of war and peace. This knowledge is also a fundamental source of support to the military commander in the area of operations and to both military and political agencies at all levels in their efforts to oppose the intelligence activities of other nations. When used at the national planning level, this knowledge is called Strategic Intelligence; at the naval planning level, it is called Naval Strategic Intelligence, the importance of which to any na- tion depends upon the extent of that nation's sea power. At the operational level, this knowledge is termed Operational Intelligence. To be emphasized is the fact that, regardless of the level or echelon by which intelligence is used, those engaged in its activities, whether mili- tary or civilian, cannot properly perform their duties without a comprehensive understanding of the world scene, from which is derived a clearer view of relationships between events wherever and whenever they occur. As early as World. War I, Brigadier General Marlborough Churchill, then Director of Military Intelligence, made this pertinent comment The reason why we have decided to study the whole world is that we believe it to be impossible correctly to predict the points which are going to be sensitive in the future, unless we take the trouble to find out the sit- uation in all countries, and all the factors which go to make up an international situa- tion. . . . If it is remembered that the assas- sination of an Austrian Prince in 1914 started a conflagration which our Army was called upon to play a major part in extinguishing, it will be seen that MID is not doing its full duty if it does not attempt correctly to re- cord and promptly to bring to the attention of the proper authority everything that is going on in the world. He also made the observation that, prior to World War I, Regular Army officers tended to limit their interest and training to matters of specific military content. We failed to realize that it is the duty of every Army officer to follow the example set so many years ago by the Navy, and make himself not only a fighting man, but also a well-informed man of the world. Approved For Release 2003/12/09: CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 AN INTELLIGENCE PERSPECTIVE IN A CHANGING WORLD CONFIDENTIAL Important contributory elements which are the basis for a clear and proper perspective for in- telligence personnel include an understanding of basic national interests and objectives, a knowl- edge of the place and meaning of strategy and the resulting foreign policy, and an appreciation of the ultimate purposes of operational activities to implement both strategy and policy. The intelli- gence perspective cannot be static: it must be ca- pable of rapid adjustment to changing conditions and altered circumstances. It must always be positive, with a clear and unbiased view of its own purposes and responsibilities. The following dis- cussion of these elements, although by no means exhaustive, should serve to portray the perspective which all intelligence personnel must acquire if they are to perform their duties successfully. It should also serve to indicate the necessity for further reading and continuous study. NATIONAL INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES In view of the vast amount of knowledge about the world and its peoples, guidance is essential if intelligence activities are to be economically con- centrated. Normally, specific guidance emanates from higher authority, but it is important to rec- ognize that ultimate guidance is provided by the fundamental national interests and objectives which must form the basis for national strategy and policy. Our own national interests have never been more succinctly expressed than in the words of the Dec- laration of Independence: "Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness"; other expressions repre- sent only the means toward these ends. Over the years these fundamental interests have gradually been broadened to include the preservation of na- tional independence, freedom from war and the threat of war, improvement in standards of living so that everyone may have the opportunity to earn an even better and more secure livelihood, and the maintenance of friendly relations with all peoples of the world. From such interests come national objectives which include the protection of the American form of government and way of life at any cost from every challenge, the support of endeavors aimed at the peaceful resolution of all international prob- lems, the encouragement of a healthy world econ- omy, and the championship of nations threatened by any ruthless imperialistic aggressor. Em- bodied in these objectives are certain definite social values, such as those enunciated as the Four Free- doms by Roosevelt and Churchill. Of particular importance is the value of popular power which emphasizes the orderly process of making decisions through democratic participation. Few can find fault with these interests and ob- jectives; the problems lie in their interpretation and implementation. For many complex reasons interpretations vary between various social groups within the nation and the power of one group may permit it to dominate the expression of national objectives at a given time. Historically, the popu- lar power value when applied to foreign relations has resulted in the implementation of the objective of national security through international law and organization, a sincere effort to deter aggressive nations from their intentions by bargaining and persuasion. In his book, American Diplomacy, 1900-1950, George F. Kennan has pointed out what appear to be not only certain theoretical deficien- cies in this approach, but also the serious implica- tions of its resultant theory of "unconditional surrender": It is a curious thing . . . that the legalistic approach to world affairs, rooted as it unques- tionably is in a desire to do away with war and violence, makes violence more enduring, more terrible, and more destructive to politi- cal stability than did the older motives of national interest. A war fought in the name of high moral principle finds no early end short of some form of total domination. If our national objectives as they relate to the rest of the world imply a defense of free countries of the world so that they may remain free, there is the added implication of an ability to wage war when necessary. However, atomic warfare of the present and the future could well bring ruin to a degree never before experienced and with it the destruction of what the war was fought to pro- tect. For this reason alone, national objectives must transcend the mere winning of wars; they must include the realization of the purposes for which war is waged. These purposes, when de- fined and understood, might well control the tac- tics, targets, and even the weapons used; even more, they might alter the concept of total victory. 99 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS In the past, American objectives, expressed as abstract moral principles, have led to some mis- understanding and disappointment. In. the pres- ent world crisis, there have been suggestions that they be more concretely defined: what are our spe- cific objectives, our capabilities for reaching them, our plans for carrying them out? Various stu- dents of government have raised the problem of what they describe as an American tendency to- ward a negative approach to objectives; that is, expressing them in terms of opposition to those of another nation. They recommend a positive ap- proach to objectives which might provide greater illumination and stimulation, not only to the American people, but also to the rest of the world. To point out the problems in connection with the interpretation and implementation of national objectives is easy; to solve them is a matter in- finitely more difficult. Dr. William L. Langer, long associated with government agencies con- cerned with national planning, has suggested the possibilities of a special staff, under the National Security Council, specifically charged with the long-range study of national objectives, together with provisions for the close exchange of ideas and coordination of action between the executive and legislative branches of the government. It is his belief that, by such means, greater unity of pur- pose and action might be achieved. Without ques- tion, clearly defined and well understood national objectives are fundamental to a national grand strategy aimed at encouraging our allies and dis- couraging our adversaries. GRAND STRATEGY As a term, strategy has long been associated with war as an art of military command, but as a result of the modern complexities of war and of the-so- ciety from which it stems, the strategy of today has come to embrace many factors other than mili- tary: political, economic, technological, moral, and psychological. It has come to embrace activi- ties of government and diplomacy aimed at the control and utilization of a nation's total resources, of which military forces is only one, for the pur- pose of promoting and protecting national inter- ests against actual or potential enemies. The di- mensions of modern strategy become even more profoundly impressive when groups of nations CONFIDENTIAL band together for the promotion and protection of common interests. Simply defined, strategy is the basic pattern for employing instruments of power. In its broadest sense, therefore, it is known as grand strategy. In chapter 1 grand strategy was defined as the master plan of a nation in both war and peace, in- cluding not only military planning but domestic and foreign policy as well. A more complete definition by B. H. Liddell-Hart is given in the Encyclopedia Britannica (14th edition) : Grand Strategy should both calculate and develop the economic resources and manpower of the nation in order to sustain the fighting services. So also with the moral resources? for to foster and fortify the will to win, and to endure, is as important as to possess the more concrete forms of power. And it should reg- ulate the distribution of power between the several services, and between the services and industry. Nor is that all, for fighting power is but one of the instruments of grand strat- egy. It should take account of and and apply the power of financial pressure, diplomatic pressure, commercial pressure, and, not least, ethical pressure to weaken the opponent's will. A good cause is a sword and a buckler. Fur- thermore, while the horizon of strategy is bounded by the war, grand strategy looks be- yond the war to the subsequent peace. It should not only combine the various instru- ments, but so regulate their use as to avoid damage to the future state of peacefulness, se- cure and prosperous. There are other terms with which the intelli- gence officer should be familiar in order to under- stand this element of the intelligence perspective more thoroughly. Combined Strategy refers to the common strategy of coalitions of nations. Na- tional Strategy is used interchangeably with strat- egy and grand strategy, while Military Strategy is a more restrictive term, denoting the art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national policy by the application of force, or the threat of force. Naval Strategy is the result of planning for the effective employment of naval power in support of national objectives. Other military terms have been found useful in describing the activities of nations. Strategic offensive, strategic defensive, and stra- tegic initiative?all defined in chapter 1?apply to nations as well as to combat units. 100 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 AN INTELLIGENCE PERSPECTIVE IN A CHANGING WORLD CONFIDENTIAL Interrelationships of Military and Political Factors The interchange of vocabulary is but one indi- cation of how closely interwoven the military and political factors of our Nation's strategy have be- come. Another indication is the reliance placed on the opinions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the Chief Executive and by the National Security Council, and the fact that the nation's military leaders are included in consultations involving top- level planning in many areas which are not di- rectly of a military nature. As shown in the pre- ceding chapter, Congress has officially recognized the role of the military forces in connection with national strategy. World conditions, of course, have exerted a tre- mendous influence in bringing about this situa- uation in the United States. Specifically, the emphasis on force and the threat of force in the foreign policies of the Soviet Union has strongly affected the international relationships of nations. The problem of Korea provides a good illustration of the interplay of military and political factors. As early as 1947, $510,000,000 in military aid for South Korea was proposed. When the Soviet Union suggested a conference on Korean unity, the United States State Department dropped the military aid program. Later, when the U. S. S. R. took the strategic offensive and formally withdrew from Korea, leaving behind a trained North Ko- rean Army, the United States had no alternative but to withdraw also, leaving no comparable army behind. When South Korea was invaded in the summer of 1950, it was the State Department, not the Department of Defense, which encouraged military support of the South Koreans. Having committed military units to Korea, the military leaders found their planning sharply circum- scribed by strategic political considerations. Admiral Mahan set forth the proposition that "The strategist is he who always keeps the ob- jective of the war in sight and the objective of the war is never military and is always political." In the past, the leaders of American military forces have tended to overlook this dictum, undoubtedly because of the meritorious, long-established, and deeply-rooted American conviction that overall civilian control of the Nation's military forces must be maintained at all costs. The Military Point of View The American military mind in the past has con- centrated on the military factors involved in achieving victory and avoiding defeat; it has not associated itself officially with a consideration of the political implications of victory or the political situations which might lead to further conflict. As a result, when called upon, it has tended to concentrate on the use of direct, overpowering force to accomplish its objectives, leaving to other agencies the considerations of other means to carry out strategic plans. The developments following World War II, however, have had a profound effect on the think- ing of both military and political leaders in the United States. It has become apparent that throughout that war the Soviets were guided in their strategic military planning by their postwar political objectives. For example, it has been sug- gested that Soviet insistence on committing Allied forces in Italy to an invasion of southern France was based primarily on an effort to keep them out of the Balkan countries. As a result, there were no substantial British or American military units in Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary to retard the extension of Soviet control over those countries in the postwar period. The military objectives of the Korean war from 1950 to 1952 were obviously limited by broad political considerations. The American system of government and way of life will always assure civilian control of its military forces. The military themselves will be the first to reject any suggestion that they assume leadership in formulating national strategy and directing foreign policy. Since, however, our mil- itary leaders are involved in national strategy, they must be thoroughly conversant with all the politi- cal factors in order to contribute effectively to overall planning for the welfare and security of our Nation. Basic Considerations in the Formulation of Strategy Four concepts should be basic in the thinking of all those responsible for planning national strat- egy. The first is that modern strategy is global. The interdependence of all parts of the world has increased to the extent that a changed condition in one area is quickly felt in many others. The 101 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS Soviet "war by satellite" strategy has made clear the fact that many widely separated parts of the world are vital to our national security; while Stalin's comment that victory in Europe may first be won in Asia gives added significance to the drain on the military strength of France caused by the situation in Indo-China. An appreciation of this concept can serve as a constant warning not to concentrate on the security of one area without a full awareness of the possibilities of weakening the security of another. The second concept is that international rela- tions are unstable; hence the strategic planner must be prepared to adjust rapidly to the prob- abilities of change, perhaps even radical change. American relations with the Soviet Union, chang- ing from allies in World War II to adversaries in the postwar period, illustrate the validity of this concept. It should be remembered also that the United States and Great Britain have not always been allies. The situation in postwar Eu- rope demonstrates all too well the instability and delicate balance of relations between countries: an unfavorable resolution of internal conflicts within Germany, France, and Italy might sharply alter our relationships with those countries; and cer- tainly the position of Yugoslavia has changed radically in a few short years. The Communist purges in the Soviet satellite countries during 1951 and 1952 might indicate that the Soviet Union has not yet achieved complete stability in its relations with its involuntary associates. The significance of this concept is two-fold: fixation on a particu- lar situation which exists at any given time can distort the evaluation of developing events and throw long-term planning off balance; strategic planning must be dynamic, sensitive to indications of change, and prepared to take the initiative as changes occur. The third concept is that of consistency to prin- ciple. American goals and ideals have long been a source of inspiration to all people of the world who see in the United States a land of opportunity and a haven from tyranny where freedom has real meaning for the individual. Consistency in the championship of human liberty, wherever it is sought, is essential to any long-term success in strategic planning; inconsistency contains the seeds of self-destruction. In itself, this concept CONFIDENTIAL 102 poses some exceedingly difficult problems in a world where force is a constant threat. However, simply stated, it means that those responsible for national strategy must never lose sight of basic national objectives. The fourth concept is that the various means available to strategy are employed in varying de- grees at all times to strengthen the master plan of one nation while restricting the plans of another. The availability of military force is a factor which constantly affects the formulation of strategies, as is illustrated by the effect of the postwar ac- tivities of the Soviet Union in Europe and in Asia. Diplomacy, which pursues a more peaceful ap- proach to the solution of world problems, endeav- ors at all times to win friends and to create condi- tions favorable to its own objectives. Economic power is exerted to strengthen and to destroy. In postwar Europe, the United States has used its economic resources to restore war-ravaged coun- tries; while at the same time, in China, it has em- ployed this power to weaken the Communist con- trolled government. Similarly, the sociological instruments of emotion and culture are being ex- ploited by opposing forces all over the world, on the one hand to build and on the other to tear down. In more recent years, science and tech- nology have become powerful weapons; the atom bomb alone has played a significant part in the planning of world strategies. The essential point of this concept is that war and peace are relative terms and that no wise strategist can consider them to be mutually exclu- sive with particular instruments appropriate only to one or the other. Such a point of view might lead to the sacrifice of long-term objectives for short-term advantages. A keen appreciation of this concept can immeasurably strengthen a na- tion's grand strategy by permitting the skillful employment of all available instruments in the right degree at the proper place and time. All of these concepts can be reduced to the sim- ple fact that strategy must be based on realities, and hence requires the availability of all perti- nent knowledge. The approach to this require- ment involves: first, a continuous awareness of the unknown. factors and an effort to uncover them; second, a full appreciation of the known factors and their realistic application to the solu- Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002A AN INTELLIGENCE PERSPECTIVE IN A CHANGING WORLD ouNFIDENTIAL tion of the many problems of planning; and third, the conscientious use of logical reasoning. Success in the formulation of strategy is achieved when the resultant policies are so inte- grated with available instruments that war be- comes either unnecessary or is undertaken with the optimum assurance of victory. POLICY IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS The net product of grand strategy, which is based on national interests and objectives, is called "policy"; when that policy concerns relationships with foreign countries it is called "foreign policy." Obviously policy cannot be established in the best interests of a nation without a great deal of care- ful advance study and planning; thus it represents the last step in a nation's strategic planning proc- ess and gives expression to its master plan. For- eign policy is that element of the total plan, devel- oped from experience and knowledge, which aids in the conduct of government business with other governments. In the postwar period there has been a notable growth of popular interest in American foreign policy, and much has been written on the subject. There has been criticism of certain aspects, such as the lack of realism, the absence of continuity, and excessive improvisation. In his book, The Road to Foreign Policy, Hugh Gibson, a long- time career diplomat, refers to the "Open Door" policy in China, "Dollar Diplomacy," and the "Monroe Doctrine," among others, as "fragments of foreign policy" and suggests that some Ameri- can foreign policies "can be described not too un- kindly as hobbies of successive secretaries of state." From such discussions and criticisms it may be concluded that a real need exists for a better un- derstanding of what foreign policies are, the proc- esses from which they are derived, and an expres- sion of the policies themselves in language unmistakably clear, with no possibility for mis- interpretation. Such an understanding is aided by a recognition of the fundamental character- istics and qualities which all policies should have. Foreign policies are rooted in the historical background of nations; they develop gradually, are the result of objective thinking, and have qual- ities of stability and permanence. They never 103 spring suddenly into being and can seldom arise out of the emotional excitement of the moment. George Washington, in his Farewell Address, was encouraging the idea of objectivity when he warned against "passionate attachments." In dis- cussing basic policy in his book, Mr. Gibson com- ments that, in the light of subsequent events the post-World War II policy of the Allies to destroy the power of Germany was not a true policy be- cause it was emotionally conceived and lacked the quality of Objectivity. The term "policy" should be applied only to something that is fundamental and of a long-range nature; it should not be con- fused with tactical devices used to implement the basic plan. The Marshall Plan, for example, has been merely a device for implementing a basic policy of denying the control of Europe to one aggressor nation. However, it gives continuity to that policy and should not be misunderstood as an improvisation. Obviously, a policy is never one-sided; it always involves other nations and other peoples who have much to do with its effectiveness or ineffectiveness. The success of the balance of power policy in Europe depends upon the whole-hearted response and cooperation of various countries participating in the Marshall Plan, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the European Defense Com- munity. The success of any policy depends also on the high caliber of those responsible for its ad- ministration, their training, experience, and sen- sitive perception of its many aspects and impli- cations. The measure of success should never be gauged by spectacular immediate results, because the results achieved over a period of years are often much more significant. Since a policy must be judged on a long-term basis as it grows and develops, it cannot always be evaluated at a given time; rather, the degree of its effectiveness will be demonstrated by the manner in which it influences subsequent events. Since a true basic policy grows out of national objectives which are the common interest of all groups within a nation, it does not represent a partisan point of view. On the other hand, the implementing tactics or devices may well origi- nate from the elected representatives of the people in control of the government at a given time. Finally, all policies are not of equal importance. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR The defense of American policy in China, for ex- ample, would not elicit the same immediate re- sponse as the defense of our policy to protect the Western Hemisphere from aggression. A review of common characteristics should lead to the conclusion that foreign policies are the re- sult of long-range planning and that shifting re- lationships between nations will affect their execu- tion, so that adaptability is essential to successful operation. An understanding of these character- istics should do much to sharpen the intelligence perspective in identifying the broad patterns of policy, often obscured by tactical devices which are no more than implementations. Even more, it becomes apparent that the successful execution of policy requires at every step a great amount of knowledge and a full appreciation of cause and effect relationships. While the instruments of policy and strategy are the same, it must be reemphasized that they are the machinery through which policies operate and that their effective use is necessary if any policy is to have real meaning or ultimate value. Diplo- macy and military forces are two basic instruments whose significance merits further consideration. Diplomacy is not a function limited to the diplo- matic service. It is carried on through any official or unofficial activities which affect foreign rela- tionships such as: a restrictive tariff act or a gen- erous foreign aid measure passed by Congress; the movements of the 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean; the behavior of American citizens, military or ci- vilian, in a foreign capital; formal addresses or off-the-cuff remarks by high Government officials. It is true that the diplomatic service itself must be a highly trained body of devoted men and women capable of administering policy wisely in a con- fused and troubled world. At the same time, pub- lic opinion has much to do with diplomacy as an instrument of policy; the more enlightened it is, the more advantageously effective it can be. The importance of this instrument is self-evident; its failure results inevitably in war. Military forces are not only an exceedingly im- portant instrument of policy, but also affect policy directly or indirectly. United States Army oc- cupation and control in Germany, for example, will have an effect on American policies in Europe for many years, and likewise our occupation and CONFIDENTIAL 104 NAVAL OFFICERS subsequent retention of military bases in Japan have given a definite pattern to American policies in the Far East. Close coordination of military and political policies, therefore, becomes essential to the national interest. To be remembered also is the fact that military power as an instrument of policy must be adequate to support that policy; further, that the knowledge required to determine what constitutes adequacy must be supplied by an effective intelligence service. THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE Since modern nations can scarcely afford to maintain military forces sufficient to meet all even- tualities, the production of knowledge from which to determine adequacy becomes a contribution of major consequence. Intelligence can also have great value in helping to compensate for certain deficiencies in military instruments available to carry out strategy and policy. Prior to World War II, one of the German military theorists, Captain von Gadow, recognized this value in an article prepared for Militaerevessenschaftliche Rundschau We must be far-sighted in our policies. The next war will depend on the success or failure of the great sea powers. Germany is not and cannot become a great sea power. But we can protect certain interests by erecting effi- ciently working outposts which would have to fulfill highly important tasks in the sphere of naval strategy and may also often play a de- cisive part in our foreign policy . . . In evaluating the military factor, Intelligence must inevitably assess the relevant political, eco- nomic, psychological, moral, and technological factors. In so doing, it produces knowledge which can be used as the basis for the successful employ- ment of these additional factors in total war. The preceding discussion of the planning of strategy and the formulation and execution of policy has indicated the quantity and scope of knowledge required. It has also suggested in general terms the necessary breadth of the intelli- gence perspective. A review of some of the strat- egies, policies, and tactical operations of Germany, Japan, and the Allied Nations before and during World War II and of the Soviet Union after- wards will more specifically illustrate the vital Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 AN INTELLIGENCE PERSPECTIVE IN A CHANGING WORLD CONFIDENTIAL role played by Intelligence and the perspective its personnel must have in support of that role. Dur- ing this review it will be well to keep in mind the intelligence organizations developed by these na- tions as described in the latter sections of chap- ter 2. GERMAN STRATEGY BEFORE AND DURING WORLD WAR II The grand strategies of the Axis powers were formulated separately in the 1920's and were im- plemented and combined in the 1930's. Their tenuous roots may be traced to Mussolini's march on Rome and his establishment of the first dic- tatorship; the Japanese fortification of their newly acquired Mandated Islands in the Pacific; and Hitler's dramatic presentation of himself and his scheme for world conquest in Mein Kampf. When Hitler became Chancellor of Germany in 1933, Nazism was established as a political and military force and secret preparation for war was begun. Germany, however, did not take the stra- tegic offensive in the international arena until 7 March 1936, when she reoccupied the Rhineland. A year earlier Italy had taken the strategic of- fensive when she moved against helpless Ethiopia. By 1936 Hitler had created the "Rome-Berlin Axis" and, with Mussolini, had intervened in the Spanish Civil War for the purpose of testing new weapons and tactics, to say nothing of further undermining the stability of that country. By 1936 he also had evolved and put into action the new Nazi strategy, which utilized not only mili- tary but also economic-political-psychological means. Because he held the strategic initiative, Hitler was able to a large extent to predict and determine the course of events. In the period from 1936 to 1940 it became in- creasingly clear that the grand strategy of the Nazi regime was territorial aggrandizement by means short of war, and the forging of armed might against the day when conflict with major powers could no longer be avoided. During this period Mussolini played second fiddle to Hitler; his ambition was perhaps not so grandiose, and certainly his resources were not comparable. He basked, however, in the reflected glory of the Nazi state as it gradually assumed hegemony over one European country after another from 1938 to 1940. 105 Hitler's spectacular successes were in large meas- ure due to his "combined strategy" which adapted grand strategy to the purposes of a ruthless dic- tatorship in which total mobilization could be en- forced immediately for the waging of total war. That the Nazi grand strategy was truly global in scale, and was directed, among other objectives, at gaining a foothold in Latin America, was rec- ognized in 1942 by Hugo Fernandez Artucio, who wrote in his "The Nazi Underground in South America": An undeclared war is being waged in Latin America today against the democratic insti- tutions and the independence of the New World Republics. The war is being con- ducted with fearful efficiency by the soldiers of the Third German Empire, who have been distributed by the thousands throughout the political underground of this continent. They are the agents of Adolph Hitler, whose mission it is to put into practice here, as in Holland and Belgium, Czechoslovakia and Norway, Austria and France, the principles of totalitarian warfare. In this concept of war, actual armed invasion becomes merely a link in a long chain of underground prepa- ration . . . A political scheme of international implica- tions has been set afoot on the American con- tinent . . . Its object is to set up a govern- ment as nearly like the totalitarian regime as possible, and the method employed is "the war of nerves." Its creators know, with Machiavellian cunning, the political function of fear. Nazi strategy was ably supported by the world- wide German Intelligence Service, the concepts of which were broadened in order to implement new and revolutionary methods of warfare, such as the "blitzkrieg," the "war of nerves," and the "fifth column." The effectiveness of German In- telligence in contributing to Nazi strategic pur- poses in Spain is described by Hansjurgen Koehler in his book Inside the Gestapo. The particular device used was the Hagenbeck Circus which was sent to Spain to roam the countryside for months. Gestapo agents were included among the large numbers of circus employees. With this excellent "cover," these agents had little difficulty in obtain- ing a great variety of important information. This circus also provided a means whereby Nazi propaganda could be distributed with little or no CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR difficulty. As a result of the Nazi intelligence ef- fort in Spain, anti-German elements were almost completely eliminated, Germans residing in the country were enlisted as collaborators, and vital strategic data on Spain was collected. Tremendous sums of money, estimated at $200,- 000,000 annually, were allocated for intelligence purposes, including the creation of fifth columns and the conduct of propaganda activities. Such expenditures were possible because of the Nazi planned economy in Germany, and, from their point of view, it was money well spent--except in England and the United States. Although the ruthless aggressions of the Axis powers were in open defiance of existing treaties and international law, the western democracies were impotent, and could only helplessly observe the progress of events. For some time Hitler was not taken seriously, certainly not by Ramsay Mac- Donald and Stanley Baldwin, although as early as 1934, Winston Churchill had begun to issue solemn warnings of the new peril which was taking shape beyond the Rhine. Thus England remained on the strategic defensive, and Neville Chamberlain's policy of appeasement did not im- prove the situation. England was not alone, how- ever, for the other democracies shared this unfavorable position. One problem was that England and France were getting very little intelligence out of Germany, because it was a part of the Nazi strategy to infest the homeland with armies of counterspies, to pun- ish betrayal of military or industrial secrets by well-publicized beheading, and to employ torture and execution to stamp out disaffection whenever and wherever detected. But a greater problem was lethargy in the British Government and cor- ruption in the Government of France which pre- vented the right kind of action from being taken in response to such intelligence as was received regarding the German rearmament. As can be seen, the advantage of strategic ini- tiative, and hence the advantage of surprise, lay with the totalitarian states dedicated to world conquest. Innumerable acts of aggression, almost imperceptible at their inception and fully identi- fied only after they were accomplished facts, were carried out in times of ostensible peace by scores of fanatical and capable agents. Powerful nations CONFIDENTIAL 106 NAVAL OFFICERS were lulled by skillful propaganda into a false sense of security; while others, less powerful, were threatened, coerced, and attacked. The Axis powers sought to change the existing world situa- tion to one more favorable to themselves and, up to a certain point, each succeeded remarkably well. Failures in German Strategy The period up to and including the fall of France was characterized by brilliant Nazi suc- cesses; thereafter, when Hitler was forced into war with both England and the United States while still embroiled on the continent of Europe, Nazi blunders were the order of the day. Of par- ticular interest are the failures in strategy which led to failures on the field of battle and on the diplomatic front. The publication of war his- tories, memoirs of key political and military fig- ures, the texts of hitherto top secret international agreements, and "post-mortems" obtained through the interrogation of high-ranking prisoners of war, all shed light on different facets of German planning and strategy. The "post-mortems" are very illuminating although compensation must be made for personal bias. There is evidence that no war with England or the United States was contemplated by the Ger- man High Command during the period of initial Nazi successes. An essay by Admirals Schniewind and Schuster includes this statement: A war on such a tremendous scale?or even with England?was in 1939 quite beyond the range of the preparations and intentions of the Government. But the policy of the Gov- ernment and its political negotiations did not make any provision for this idea, as subse- quent developments showed. They completely failed to realize the determination on the part of those who were later to become her enemies to declare war in the event that Germany car- ried out any further activities similar to the occupation of Austria, Sudetenland, or Czech- oslovakia. Germany, her armed forces and especially her navy, were thereafter taken un- aware and had to enter the war inadequately equipped. Additional evidence is found in an article by Vice Admiral Hellmuth Heye, entitled, "From Panzer- schiffe to E-Boats :" Foreign politics were of particular impor- tance from the naval point of view. The re- Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 AN INTELLIGENCE PERSPECTIVE IN A CHANGING WORLD CONFIDENTIAL lease of Germany from the Versailles Treaty . . . was . . . a hopeful development. Ad- miral Raeder, in common with all the best naval opinion, held the view that the war of 1914-18 was lost as a result of Anglo-Ameri- can sea power. The land decision was only a result of Anglo-American superiority at sea. The Navy therefore held the view that the waging of modern warfare is only possible, especially in the air age, when there is no de- termining enemy superiority at sea. Natu- rally all the necessary conditions appertaining to the use of the sea in an essentially conti- nental country like Germany were difficult to achieve. From the to downward all im- portant offices in the Ministry of War and in the air arm were occupied by persons who were essentially land-trained. The Navy found it impossible to introduce qualified of- ficers into either the Air Ministry or the War Ministry. Naturally this state of affairs could not but have an influence on the decision taken on all questions connected with the sea and sea war- fare. Nevertheless, every effort was made on the highest level to avoid under all circum- stances hostilities with England. This hope, as I see it, remained up to the very day of the declaration of war by England. There is no better evidence on this than the fact that until close up to the outbreak of war, I believe 1938, the Navy was expressly forbidden to study or consider the problems presented by a war with England. This almost incredible failure in German basic planning was to have costly results in 1940 when the opportunity arose to invade the long-invulner- able British Isles. Detailed plans for Operation Sealion had been prepared and were ready to be put into effect, but Nazi strategy had failed to foresee and prepare for this opportunity, and Ger- many lacked the necessary landing craft and other naval units to carry out an invasion. Air power and land armies had been highly developed while sea power had been neglected. This crucial error in strategy seems to have resulted in part from a failure of German Intelligence to predict in ad- vance the psychological factors which would make England a belligerent. Even this error might have been counterbalanced by a skillful diplomatic effort directed toward gaining and preserving an attitude of neutrality in England, but the Nazis lacked this capability and Hitler's personal short- comings were reflected in the conduct of his foreign policy. The first major error in strategy involved Hitler in a land war and a sea war simultaneously and prevented him from mounting an invasion of Eng- land in her weakest hour. A second, equally se- rious, resulted in an all-out offensive against the U. S. S. R. in the winter of 1941-42. The land war now had to be fought on two widely separated fronts, a situation particularly dreaded by the members of the German General Staff. From the very first, Hitler underestimated Soviet strength and miscalculated Soviet intentions. Interesting comments on these failures in strategy were made by Colonel Gottschling, Chief of Staff of the Ger- man Air Staff in Italy, during interrogation: Hitler's "idee fixe" was to wage war against Russia. The failure to invade Great Britain, the ever-increasing amount of aircraft Britain was receiving from the United States and Germany's ever-increasing number of aircraft losses served to spur Hitler on and in his ob- session drove him to attack Russia. Luftwaffe fighter and bomber units needed in western Europe were dispatched to Bul- garia, Rumania, etc. FIitler overruled every objection of the General Staff with his gift of persuasion. . . . I would summarize Germany's war mistakes as follows: a. Overestimation of England's ability to resist invasion. b. Underestimation of Russia. c. Overestimation of Germany' s allies, such as Italy. d. Our failure to treat France as an equal and obtain full use of the wealth and resources of the French colonial em- pire. This could have been a stepping stone for the invasion of Great Britain. e. Declaring war on America. The High Command should and must have known that America's entry into the war meant Germany's defeat. ?Defeat, Headquarters Army Air Forces, January 1946. A theme which reappears time and again in the various "post-mortems" is the disastrous result of Hitler's personal and complete control over Ger- man grand strategy, particularly after the war began. Colonel Gottschling stated: 107 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR I have seen the most brilliant and deter- mined men of my acquaintance go before Hit- ler, determined not to acquiesce to his whims. These brainy and critical men returned fasci- nated and for weeks remained under the spell of Hitler's charms or hypnosis. Thus, Hit- ler exercised his influence on his General Staff. Vice Admiral Heye is quoted again in this connection: During the preparations for the operations in Norway I was only once present at a con- ference with Adolf Hitler. In the course of this he emphasized the importance of the oc- cupation of Norway for the whole conduct of the war and said he was the only man who could assume responsibility for such an opera- tion. In the course of the war, as is well- known, he on many occasions acted against the advice of his military chiefs and sometimes he met with successes. This fact may have caused him and many officers to regard him not only as a statesman but also as a superior general in the field. His intervention in mil- itary operations grew at all events noticeably more pronounced. The German High Command progressively lost its freedom to reach military decisions of a strategic nature; more and more these were made by Hit- ler himself on the basis of "intuition." It would appear that the major errors already listed, and some of their far-reaching consequences, might have been avoided if Hitler had been persuaded from exercising complete control over German grand strategy, and if more comprehensive and more accurate intelligence had been available to the High Command. Fortunately for the Allies, much of the information collected by the Nazis was unreliable and inadequately processed; even more, either the resulting intelligence was not disseminated to those who needed to know, or, if disseminated, was not used. Strategy, when for- mulated by one individual on the basis of intui- tion rather than fact, cannot fail to reflect not only the brilliance but also the faults of that in- dividual. Further, when faulty intelligence is in- volved, the errors are compounded and magnified. Other errors in German strategy included the failure to bring Spain into the Axis camp, a lack of appreciation for the advantages of joint opera- tions in battle, and miscalculation of the enemy's total industrial capacity. Regarding the latter two, General von Senger was most outspoken i CONFIDENTIAL 108 NAVAL OFFICERS The General Staff failed to understand the modern idea of warfare. It still thought in terms of Nineteenth century land battles, whereas we should have had a combined staff like Italy. Our General Staff was primarily occupied with army strategy rather than co- ordination with the navy and air force. . . . The tragedy of the General Staff is historical rather than military. It saw its enemy in the Allied field soldier?whereas the real enemy was Allied industrial capacity far beyond the front, out of reach of bombs or the range of artillery. ?Defeat, Headquarters Army Air Forces, July 1945. The turning of the tide against the Germans is generally agreed to have occurred in the fall of 1942 when the Allies landed in North Africa and went on to defeat Rommel and to invade Italy. The Allied advantage lay in the important ele- ment of surprise, not only in tactics, but also in the employment of many new types of landing craft and weapons. Initial military success led to a major political triumph, the fall of Mussolini. The way lay open to the "soft underbelly of Eu- rope," but the Allied strategic initiative in the Mediterranean theater, except for long-range bombing of the Rumanian oil fields, dwindled in the face of stubborn German resistance and diffi- cult terrain. Elsewhere in Europe, however, the success of air operations from bases in England, and the advance of Soviet armies following the defense of Stalingrad, gave the Allies the strate- gic initiative on both western and eastern fronts. Meanwhile, in the Atlantic, the strategic offen- sive maintained by Nazi submarine warfare was reduced to the defensive, and as the situation became more desperate it should have been ap- parent to Hitler that victory was beyond his grasp. The landing in Normandy, the devastating sweep through France, and the junction with Soviet forces in Berlin were but the final stages of suc- cessful Allied grand strategy in Europe. Japanese Strategy Before and During World War II Japan took the strategic initiative on the main- land of Asia on 18 September 1931 when she ar- ranged the Mukden Incident as a pretext for the invasion of Manchuria. Thereafter, she became deeply involved in a land war in China. How- ever, unlike Hitler, who initially at least had a Approved For Release 2003/12/09: CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 AN INTELLIGENCE PERSPECTIVE IN A CHANGING WORLD CONFIDENTIAL healthy respect for the military and industrial potential of the United States, the Japanese com- pletely underestimated America's war-making capability and deliberately provoked a conflict. The attack on Pearl Harbor exploited surprise, the range of carrier task forces, and the power of aircraft to sink surface vessels. Not only did it surprise the United States but also Nazi Germany, for it now appeared that Japan was determined to fight her own war independently, without more than a perfunctory liaison with the Third Reich. Thus an early failure of the combined strategy of the Axis powers was the lack of effective coor- dination?a problem which continuously plagued the German High Command. The final decision of Japan to make war, reached with the full concurrence and active con- sent of Japanese military and civilian leaders, was based upon the following evaluation which is very well presented in the Summary Report (Pacific War), published by the United States Strategic Bombing Survey: a. The threat of Russia on the Manchurian flank had been neutralized by the decisive victories of Germany in Europe which might eventually lead to the complete collapse of the Soviet Union. b. Great Britain was in such an irretriev- ably defensive position that, even if she sur- vived, her entire war-making potential would be spent in a desperate attempt to protect her home islands. c. The forces which the United States and her Allies could immediately deploy in the Pacific, particularly in the air, were insuffi- cient to prevent the fully trained and mobil- ized forces of Japan from occupying within 3 or 4 months the entire area enclosed within a perimeter consisting of Burma, Sumatra, Java northern New Guinea, the Bismarck Archipelago, the Gilbert and Marshall Islands, Wake, and from there north to the Kuriles. d. China, with the Burma Road severed, would be isolated and forced to negotiate. e. The United States_, committed to aiding Great Britain, and weakened by the attack on Pearl Harbor, would be unable to mobilize sufficient strength to go on the offensive for 18 months to 2 years. During this time, the perimeter could be fortified and the required forward air fields and bases established.. So strengthened, this perimeter would be backed by a mobile carrier striking force based on Truk. f. While the stubborn defense of the cap- tured perimeter was undermining American determination to support the war, the Jap- anese would speedily extract bauxite, oil, rub- ber, and metals from Malaya, Burma, the Philippines and the Dutch East Indies, and ship these materials to Japan for processing, to. sustain and strengthen her industrial and military machine. g. The weakness of the United States as a democracy would make it impossible for her to continue all-out offensive action in the face of the losses which would be imposed by fa- natically resisting Japanese soldiers, sailors, and airmen, and the elimination of its Allies. The United States in consequence would com- promise and allow Japan to retain a substan- tial portion of her initial territorial gains. Most of this evaluation was incorrect, because it was based on faulty intelligence. At the very outset of the Pacific War, therefore, the seeds for Japan's eventual defeat were sown. She was unable to comprehend or to predict those psychological and moral factors which bolstered the Allied cause in a time of severe trial and mis- fortune. Since the Japanese concept of the state involved ruthless tyranny and the complete sub- jugation of the individual, she was also unable to appreciate the power potential of the Allies in obtaining a supreme voluntary effort from the in- dividual, whether on the field of battle or on the production front. Individual response to a noble cause is one of the great strengths of a democ- racy. Before a democracy fights, however, the enemy has usually gained the strategic offensive. The magnitude of their early successes at Pearl Harbor, in Malaya, in the Philippines, and at Wake, Guam, and Rabaul, encouraged the Japa- nese to commit an outstanding error in grand strategy?expansion beyond the perimeter origi- nally planned. The nature of this new plan and its inherent weaknesses are also described in the Summary Report (Pacific War) : Accordingly, a new plan was approved, pro- viding for (a) an advance into the Solomons and Port Moresby., to be followed, if success- ful, by a further advance into New Caledonia, Samoa, and the Fiji Islands; (b) the capture of Midway; and (c) the temporary occupa- tion of the Aleutians. Accomplishment of such a program would cut the line of com- 109 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR munication between Australia and the United States, reduce the threat from Alaska, and deny the United States all major staging areas more advanced than Pearl Harbor. By stretching and overextending her line of advance, Japan was committed to an expen- sive and exacting supply problem. She de- layed the fortification of the perimeter origi- nally decided upon, jeopardized her economic program for exploiting the resources of the area already captured, and laid herself open to early counterattack in far advanced and, as yet, weak positions. It should be pointed out, however, that this new plan was partially successful; for example, sig- nificant strategic gains were achieved by the tem- porary occupation of Kiska in the Aleutians. The United States was immediately placed on the de- fensive in an area from which it had planned to take the offensive. The Japanese action denied to the United States Fleet advance bases for opera- tions in the northwest Pacific and the Bering Sea, from which aerial reconnaissance could be main- tained over the northernmost Japanese Islands. Furthermore, it was a threat to the shipping routes between the west coast of the United States and the east coast of Siberia; it endangered sealing and fishing in the Bering Sea, and imperilled the northwestern area of Alaska. The influence of Japanese technical intelligence on this decision to move into the Aleutians is indicated by the fol- lowing quotation from the United States Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific) : In Commander Hashimoto's opinion the Japanese move into the Aleutians was con- ceived as a flanking operation to the occupa- tion of Midway. Once Kiska and Attu were occupied it was decided to hold them for the purpose of blocking a United States amphibi- ous advance toward the Empire via the Aleu- tian Chain, and also to deny the use of the western Aleutians as bases from which long- range bombers might operate. He said that the Japanese were aware in the latter part of 1942 that the United States had plans for a high altitude, long-range bomber, and, in about February 1943, had information con- cerning the B-29. This information was later confirmed in a radio broadcast by an Ameri- can general. He went on to say that the B-29 appeared in operation 8 months later than the Japanese had estimated it might ap- pear. When Attu was re-taken by the United CONFIDENTIAL NAVAL OFFICERS States, the Japanese expected long-range bomber operations from Massacre Bay. ?Interrogations of J a p anese Officials (Vol. I) The operation launched against Midway, also a part of this new plan, was far from successful. In fact, in the words of Captain Tsuda : The Battle of Midway was the beginning of the Japanese failure in the war, I do not mean that this was the decisive battle of the war, but the loss of our carriers and some of our best pilots and officers affected us throughout the war. It called for the reorganization of the carrier divisions and the Naval Air Force in general. Due to the loss of ships we were unable to meet the Americans in force in the Solomons. ?Interrogation of Jap an e se Officials (Vol. I) United. States Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific) The explanation for this fatal error to expand the original perimeter may be found in the com- ments of Admiral Toyada, one of her top naval leaders: I think the decision to expand the area of operations so widely might be attributed to a feeling on the part of the Japanese authorities at the time that the state of mind under which you fought the war and the state of mind under which we fought the war were very different, in that to us this was the war for our very national existence, whereas in your case it was merely a case of national honor or per- haps protection of your economic interests in the Far East; and, because to you the war under such conditions would be of relatively slight significance compared with ours, there might have been a feeling on the part of our leaders that, should the war continue a little longer, you would lose your will to fight, and with that idea we might have continued spreading the battleline. ?Interrogations of Jap an es e Officials (vol. II) United States Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific) If this explanation can be accepted as authorita- tive, the cause for such a fundamental error in strategy was an incorrect understanding of the psychology of the American people. Here again inaccurate intelligence had repercussions of the first magnitude. 110 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 AN INTELLIGENCE PERSPECTIVE IN A CHANGING WORLD CONFIDENTIAL Although the United States had early been placed on the strategic defensive, by the end of 1942 precarious footholds had been consolidated and reinforced in the southwest Pacific, thus up- setting the enemy's strategic plan. The Battle of Midway dealt a heavy blow to the Imperial Fleet, and the strategic initiative passed to the American forces. Thereafter, having ousted the Japanese from Attu and Kiska, the north Pacific units were employed as a holding and diversionary force, while the major Allied attacks were carried out by carrier task force raids, amphibious operations, and strategic long-range bombing always aimed at the final target, the Japanese home islands. ALLIED STRATEGY BEFORE AND DURING WORLD WAR II Allied strategy in its entirety during this par- ticular period serves to illustrate two points: the tremendous ultimate value in coordinating the strategies of allied nations; and the long term effectiveness of strategy formulated in times of peace as well as war. As has been mentioned, the grand strategy of the Axis was sharply divided, so that effective concentration of power against major objectives was never possible. On the other hand, the war effort of Great Britain and the United States was most closely coordinated. Varying degrees of co- ordination were achieved from time to time with the U. S. S. R., and with other Allied nations. Perhaps the outstanding feature of Allied grand strategy was the early implementation of the prin- ciple of combined British and American conduct of the war. Gen. George C. Marshall has com- mented on this feature as follows: On December 23, 1941, Winston Churchill, Prime Minister of Great Britain, accompanied by the British Chiefs of Staff, arrived in Washington to confer with the President and the American Chiefs of Staff. Out of the series of discussions which then followed re- sulted an agreement, not only regarding the immediate strategy of our combined conduct of the war, but also for the organization of a method for the strategical command and con- trol of British and American military re- sources. Probably no other Allied action, in the field or otherwise, has exerted as power- ful an effect on the conduct of the war as the prompt establishment of a prescribed pro- cedure for achieving unit of effort through the medium of the Combined Chiefs of Staff acting under the direction of the leaders of their respective Governments. ?Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, July 1, 1939 to June 30, 1941. The pooling of resources and ideas generated a total power which swept the Axis countries into defeat. This concentration of power also included the use of Army, Navy, and Marine Corps in joint operations, especially in the Pacific. Joint and combined intelligence activities contributed substantially to strategic planning. For example, the results of British experiments in photographic interpretation were made available to the United States, while air intelligence methods, and operat- ing procedures aboard United States carriers were provided the British Fleet through special train- ing and liaison arrangements. This mutual ex- change at many echelons was invaluable to the combined allied strategy. It has already been suggested that grana strat- egy is conducted in time of ostensible peace as well as in wartime. This is well illustrated by the fact that the United States began to cooperate with Great Britain in her war effort more than 3 years before Pearl Harbor, and was actually at war with Germany long before formal declarations were made. Arrangements for the exchange of de- stroyers for bases under 99-year lease agreements, the convoying of merchant shipping, and the American Lend-Lease program were all early in- dications of combined strategy and military planning. NATIONAL STRATEGIES IN THE POSTWAR PERIOD The events of the postwar period, which have their roots in past decades, will continue to influ- ence the events of the future. The fate of the world, or of civilization as it is now known, con- tinues to hang in the balance, years after the termi- nation of World War II. Former enemies and former allies have united into new combinations in peacetime, striving to achieve their objectives. New strategies are being implemented and new pressures applied in support of them. The confusion and turbulence in relationships between nations, both large and small, all over 111 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 _Anproved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS the world, and the crises caused by many diver- gent often delicate situations, tend to obscure a clear view of national strategies. However, it is apparent that a dominant influence upon them has been the fact that only two nations emerged from the war with the full stature of major powers-- the United States and the U. S. S. R. It is neither possible nor practicable to consider current events in detail, or to speculate on developments in the immediate future, but there are indications now which shed light on the postwar strategies of these major powers. United States Strategy In his book, The Price of Power, Hanson W. Baldwin presents an interesting discussion of United States strategy. His thesis is that in con- tinuing to strive for the fulfillment of her objec- tives in support of democracy and a just and last- ing peace for the world, the United States aims to preserve the political integrity of the "fringe- lands" of Europe and Asia in order to prevent the extension of Communist influence either to the Atlantic in Europe or to the East and South China Seas in Asia. This implies the restoration of a balance of power. There are, of course, many subsidiary aspects to this strategic purpose. Bald- win goes on to describe the United States as "home base" for operations with additional advanced and intermediate bases, both fixed and mobile, required because of the limitations of even the latest weap- ons of warfare. Okinawa is illustrative of a fixed base, while the United States Navy provides stra- tegic mobile bases. Such a system of widely dis- persed military bases becomes fundamental to strategic planning. Of equal importance is the development of "positions-in-readiness," that is, friendly and allied countries who can contribute to strategic purposes, both military and political. The necessity for advance military bases was dis- cussed by Colonel Clifford J. Heflin in the Air University Quarterly, Fall 1947: The idea of operating from home bases, without the burden of establishing and main- taining advanced and intermediate bases, would be welcomed by every Air Force officer, if it could be realized without paying too pro- hibitive a price. From the inherent character- istics of the airplane as developed during the last 40 years, however, it appears probable CONFIDENTIAL 112 that the price of such a method of operating will continue to be extremely high in the meas- urable future. Even if aircraft had attained the range necessary to launch bombing at- tacks from a distance of 6,000 to 8,000 miles, it would be likely to remain much more eco- nomical in materiel, and therefore more effi- cient, to operate from nearer bases, wherever they could be obtained . . . If the coastal areas of Europe and Asia are of most importance in United States strategic plan- ning, then the significance of both sea and air power, becomes readily apparent. The Atlantic and Pacific Oceans are American sea frontiers which must be protected, for only across them can the United States exert its strength, whether it be military, economic, or cultural. Strategic air power is expressed by planes, both land and car- rier based, capable of transporting atomic weap- ons. Logistic superiority involves not only the American industrial system, but also the capacity of the United States and her allies to move their products throughout the world by means of su- perior sea power and merchant marine. Other aspects of United States strategic planning may well include an ideological offensive and a highly mobile military force capable of almost immediate retaliation against any aggressive action. The Strategy of the Soviet Union In his book, The Strange Alliance, John R. Deane, formerly a Brigadier General in charge of the United States Military Mission to the U. S. S. R., says: In my opinion there can no longer be any doubt that the Soviet leadership has always been motivated by the belief that communism and capitalism cannot coexist. Nor is there any doubt in my mind that present-day Soviet leaders have determined upon a program pointed toward imposing communism on those countries under their control, and, elsewhere, creating conditions favorable to the triumph of communism in the war against capitalism which they consider to be inevitable . . . The program of the Soviet leaders is being carried out with equal aggressiveness in two ways: First, by the introduction and compul- sory acceptance of communism in those coun- tries which the Soviet Union controls either by force or by the threat of force; and second, by the infiltration of Communist ideology into Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 AN INTELLIGENCE PERSPE those countries which, for the moment, are beyond the orbit of Soviet control. In be- tween are some nations that are subject both to Soviet threat of force and ideological in- filtration. Among these are Greece, Turkey, Iraq, and to some extent China. It is safe to predict that these countries will be subjected to a war of nerves which they will be able to resist only by the firm support of the western democracies . . . The program of infiltration is world-wide. It is evident throughout Latin America, Canada, the British Empire, Asia, and not least?the United States. In attempting to achieve world domination the Soviet Union aims to exert pressures in many areas by many means in order to extend her political influence and to weaken her adversaries by causing them to overextend and to dissipate their strength and power. Subsidiary elements of her strategic planning include substantial military forces in being, the threat of attack with atomic weapons, propaganda and subversion. In propaganda and subversion the Soviets have been highly successful. Their strategic purposes have been well served by the widespread employ- ment of radio broadcasts to disseminate the com- munist point of view and to vilify the western democracies. The Nazi techniques of the "war of nerves" and the "fifth column" have been most effectively employed. Intensive effort has been directed toward the development of new weapons and electronic equipment, the large scale produc- tion of interceptor and long-range aircraft, and the expansion of a submarine fleet. In attempting to combat the logistic superiority of the democracies, the Soviets have concentrated the production of their heavy industry on arma- ments. In addition, it is of vital interest to the U. S. S. R. to prevent the translation of Ameri- ca's tremendous war potential into actual strength. The tortuous course of the Soviet "peace" offen- sive seems to be directed toward this end. A po- tentially much more dangerous approach has been the suggestion of the availability of the Russian market for the sale of the products of foreign industry: a proposition particularly attractive to the business interests of the western democracies beset by economic problems and the urgent need for expanding foreign trade. CTIVE IN A CHANGING WORLD CONFIDENTIAL The Atomic Bomb The successful adaptation of the principle of nuclear fission to war purposes has had a marked effect on national strategies in the postwar period. Just how marked the effect has been is a matter of personal opinion. Some writers have felt that the initial possession of the atomic bomb gave to the United States a dominant world power posi- tion. Winston Churchill, speaking before a Tory party conference in Wales in 1948, solemnly observed: It is my belief?and I say it with deep sor- row?that . . . the only sure foundation of peace and of the prevention of actual war rests upon strength. If it were not for the stocks of atomic bombs now in the trusteeship of the United States, there would be no means of stopping the subjugation of Western Europe . . . If the United States were to consent, in reliance upon any paper agreement, to destroy the stocks of atomic bombs . . . they would be guilty of murdering human freedom . . . In connection with the development of an atomic bomb, the strategic initiative was first held by Germany. It was the knowledge that the Nazis were engaged in intensive atomic research that prompted the United States to undertake its own program and to expend nearly $2,000,000,000 in order to gain the strategic initiative in atomic power. Secretary of War Stimson considered the success of this program to be a great historical achievement attained through the integrated ef- forts of scientists, industrialists, labor, and mili- tary personnel. The fact that the United States alone possessed the atomic bomb was a great, if temporary, advantage and undoubtedly influenced strategic planning. The announcement in September 1949 that there was evidence of a recent atomic explosion within the U. S. S. R. and subsequent similar announce- ments in 1951 have had a profound effect on na- tional strategies and no longer does the United States have its unique power advantage. The part played by Soviet Intelligence in bringing about this change has been described in chapter 2. However, the development of tactical atomic weapons for offensive use in war makes the concen- tration of military forces or supplies extremely hazardous, and what was once a capability be- 113 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS comes a vulnerability. Thus, the Soviet capabil- ity to mass large military forces is not now as significant strategically as it was prior to 1952. On the other hand, Soviet progress in the harness- ing of atomic energy has been much more rapid than was expected and, even if the United States maintains its production lead, the time might come when the Soviet Union would have enough atomic weapons for an attempted knock-out blow against American industry. Progress in the development of the hydrogen bomb represents a new factor in strategic plan- ning, as do other scientific projects in related fields. As a result, the most detailed knowledge possible regarding scientific activities in the atomic age becomes a matter of great importance to grand strategy and represents a grave responsibility for intelligence. Indications of Strategies in the Postwar Period After 1945, disturbing reports from Soviet zones .of occupation revealed that these areas were being drawn into the Soviet orbit along the typical lines of Communist-operated countries. The guaran- tees of free elections in the Balkan countries and the promise of the ultimate unification of Korea were brushed aside. Red Army garrisons were re- duced or withdrawn only after communist dom- ination and control of the various coalition governments were assured. The drive for extension of Soviet influence into the eastern Mediterranean, a centuries-old Russian objective, was renewed in several indirect ways. Occupation forces in Iran were withdrawn only in the face of stern threats of action by the United Nations. The Soviet Foreign Minister advanced the proposal of Soviet trusteeship of the former Italian colony of Libya. Pressure was exerted on Turkey to agree to joint control of the Turkish Straits, and Communist guerrilla activities were intensified in Greece, weakened by the Nazi occu- pation, internal dissension, and admitted British inability to provide a stabilizing influence. Amer- ican planes, lost over Yugoslavia, were shot down. It was apparent that Soviet strategy aimed at the exploitation of political and military weaknesses whenever and wherever they could be found. In the light of Soviet intransigence and double- dealing on many major issues throughout the CONFIDENTIAL 114 world, the United States evaluation of this situa- tion was that Soviet domination in the eastern Mediterranean would threaten the independence of other states in the Middle East, vital supply routes through the Suez Canal, and important sources of oil upon which the United States Navy depends for a sizable proportion of its fuel sup- ply. Accordingly, as a counterstrategic move, the Truman Plan was promulgated to provide mili- tary and economic aid to Turkey and Greece. The strategic aspects of this plan were summarized by Walter Lippmann in March 1947: The reason for intervening in Greece and Turkey is that of all places in the world they are the best suited strategically for the em- ployment of American military power to check the expansion of Soviet military power. The power of the Soviet Union is in its inex- haustible reserves of infantry capable of pressing upon its wide land frontiers in Eu- rope and Asia. There is no other power or group of powers capable of mobilizing the troops to hold, much less push back, the masses of the Red Army on land. The power of the United States is on the sea and in the air. This kind of power can be exerted to check the Red Army only if it can be brought within striking distance of the vital centers of the Soviet Union. The obvious and unique strategic approach, as all history proves and the Russians are most keenly aware, is across the Black Sea to the Ukraine and the Caucasus. The en- trance to the Black Sea is in the eastern Med- iterranean through the Aegean Sea and the Dardanelles, that is to say between Greece and Turkey . . . Insofar as we are able to exert American sea and air power in the Black Sea, we have the means of checking the advance of the Red Army westward into Europe. We are on its flank and in its rear, and we are able to main- tain a balance of power, without which serious diplomatic negotiation is impossible. Since the sea and air power of the United States Navy is intimately associated with the strategic situation in the Mediterranean, it follows that Naval Intelligence can and must make a signifi- cant contribution to strategic planning. American success in Greece, strengthened rela- tionships with Turkey, and the deviation of Tito from the Moscow orbit have all combined to serve the strategic purposes of the United States. How- ever, it should be pointed out that there is still Approved For Release 2003/12/09: CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 AN INTELLIGENCE PERSPECTIVE IN A CHANGING WORLD CONFIDENTIAL little room for complacency or undue optimism. The oil supply was cut off from Iran in 1951 and the unstable government of that country is seri- ously threatened by Soviet subversive efforts; while, at the same time, the nationalistic aspira- tions and racial prejudices of the Arab peoples throughout the Mediterranean basin are being ex- ploited as a means of weakening the position of the United States, Great Britain, and France in that area. This development has been particu- larly serious in that it poses a threat to the chain of United States strategic air bases located along the North African coast. In the fall of 1952, the purging of presumably dissident elements in Czechoslovakia appeared to be serving the double purpose of stabilizing Communist control in that country and appealing to the anti-semitic preju- dices of the Arab world. In view of the general unrest, the United States Gth Fleet has played a major strategic role in the Mediterranean, show- ing its flag in ports from Trieste to Istanbul, thus bolstering local confidence and deterring overt Soviet action. The Soviet land blockade of Berlin in 1948-49 represented a major test of strength. Although the airlift was very costly to the western democ- racies, its strategic significance was tremendous. In the first place, it showed that the United States was not ready to be driven out of Germany; and, even more important, it strengthened the will of the Germans and other peoples of western Europe to resist Soviet aggression. Economic support to the anti-Communist nations of western Europe further aided United States interests, while influ- ence was effectively applied in support of anti- Communist political parties in a series of crucial national elections in France and Italy. In Asia, Communist control was gradually ex- tended over all of China, with the exception of a few offshore islands and Formosa. Even inacces- sible Tibet fell under the domination of the Com- munist government in Peking, thus posing a po- tential threat to India. The control of China, plus that of Sakhalin and the Kuriles, gave the Soviet Union the strategic initiative in Asia. Not only did it make possible the application of strong pressures on the large resident Chinese popula- tion in many areas of the Far East, but it also pro- vided a strategic support base for guerrilla war- 115 fare and Communist encouraged nationalist re- volts in Indo-China, Malaya, Burma, and Indo- nesia. The strategic position of the United States in the Philippines, Okinawa, and Japan was im- mediately threatened. If Soviet influence were extended to Southeast Asia and the Persian Gulf area, India and Pakistan would be in a very pre- carious position. Faced with mounting commitments all over the world and with Soviet pressures exerted at many points from one extreme of the Eurasian continent to the other, the United States did not have ade- quate military or political strength to support its commitments fully or summarily resist all pres- sures. In Japan, for example, in June 1950, there were only four inexperienced American divisions, all understrength, engaged primarily in routine occupation duties. When the military blow was finally struck in Korea, the United States was un- prepared to support the political integrity of that country. However, its strategic significance re- sulted in action by the United Nations. The Korean war, from the strategic point of view, has indicated on the one hand that World Communism will resort to military force to achieve its objectives when other means prove un- successful. On the other hand, it has shown that the United States will employ the most vigorous defensive measures to halt Soviet penetration and control of the coastal littorals of Asia. An exten- sive rearmament program has been initiated in an effort to attain military strength consonant with world commitments and adequate to deter the mil- itary power which the Soviets have maintained and increased since World War II. In this re- spect, the war in Korea may eventually prove to be an event of tremendous consequence to the na- tional welfare and security of the United States. This brief review of postwar strategies shows that planning and intelligence are closely linked, for Intelligence must provide the knowledge for the planners. It must aid in the assessment of Soviet actions wherever they take place and pre- pare realistic estimates. Timing and method are of tremendous importance. Are the Soviets pre- pared to exert military force in several areas, and, if so, where and when? Will they continue to hope for military, political, and economic decay in the western democracies, or will they strike CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09: CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS while their military strength is relatively sups. nor? Do they feel that the extension of their influence by nonmilitary means is fast enough, or will they decide in favor of open war even at the risk of the atomic destruction of their population centers? A great number of diverse elements are involved in finding answers to any of these ques- tions: the progress of Soviet technology, the tem- perament of individuals in the Kremlin, increased exploitation of natural resources, the morale of the peoples of western Europe, and economic problems in all parts of the world. To find the right an- swers, the resources and skills of the personnel of all United States Intelligence agencies will be taxed to the utmost. IMPLEMENTATION OF STRATEGY In an effort to prepare neat definitions, much has been said and written on the subjects of strat- egy and tactics, although the nature of modern warfare has led to the inevitable conclusion that the differences between the two cannot be drawn as clearly today as they were formerly?just as the distinctions between war and peace are no longer clear-cut. Tactics, as a military term, re- fers to the employment of units in combat and to their ordered arrangement and maneuver in rela- tion to each other or to the enemy. In connection with the employment of the nonmilitary factors of strategy, tactics is simply descriptive of the various implementations of a nation's master plan. Strategy and tactics are directly related to strate- gic intelligence and operational intelligence, the meanings of which have been discussed in chapter 1. In brief the intelligence officer, in his perspec- tive of the world scene, must recognize that strat- egy is the forest, tactics are the trees, and neither has meaning without the other. He must not only understand the relationships between world events as they occur, but also be able to predict how an enemy may react in a given situation. In con- sidering the matter of tactics, he must realize that although operations may vary in size and intensity, they are always designed to further the strategic plan and national objectives. Thus far it has been emphasized that intelli- gence materially serves strategy, and that it has an important responsibility in assisting the im- CONFIDENTIAL plementation of strategy by non-military means. In a tactical or operational military situation in- telligence plays an equally significant part. Here, the intelligence officer must have a professional competence in matters relating to military opera- tions and their component elements. This involves knowledge of the characteristics, capabilities, and new developments of ships, aircraft, weapons, technical equipment, personnel, and materiel, to- gether with procedures, methods of employment, and techniques. His professional competence will be further increased by study of the art, theories, and history of warfare. Principles of Warfare The Principles of War, or general truths adopted as guides for action, are based upon the writings of theorists and the experiences of suc- cessful military men from ancient to modern times. The many books on this subject merit the attention of intelligence officers, because they are basic guides to the organization, maintenance, and application of all types of military forces. These principles influence tactics, and an understanding of their application gives greater meaning to the procedures involved in developing operational sit- uations. They can serve as a check-list for analyti- cal purposes, but it must be remembered that they cannot be considered individually since they are all closely interrelated. The Principle of Objective emphasizes the need for relating all tactical objectives to national ob- jectives and has been mentioned in the preceding discussion. The Principle of Offensive means concentration of all possible effort toward obtain- ing the objective by successful offensive action; it is based on the truism that military victory can only result from offensive action. An offensive has the advantages of initiative and freedom of action, and compels the enemy to disperse his strength, thereby limiting concentration of forces for effective action. Finally, an offensive raises the morale and determination of both the fighting force and the supporting civilian force; while, at the same time, it may effectively lower the morale of opposing forces. Defensive action is not con- sidered a principle of war, because it is tolerated only for purposes of security or for gaining ad- vantages leading to ultimate offensive action. 116 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 AN INTELLIGENCE PERSPECTIVE IN A CHANGING WORLD CONFIDENTIAL The Principle of Mass includes a concentration of combat power, proper timing and placement, a sufficient number of personnel who are carefully trained and thoroughly indoctrinated for preci- sion work, the availability of weapons and mate- riel for fire power in adequate quantity and of proper quality, and the facility to move both men and materiel as required. Accumulative mass is based on a systematic plan and timetable to re- duce the enemy's power of resistance effectively. To the physical shock effect of mass attack must be added the psychological effect in creating anx- iety and fear in the minds of both troops and civilians. Related to this principle is that of the Economy of Force which directs the distribution and alignment of forces for combat to achieve de- cisive results. This principle does not mean the saving or non-commitment of military force. Marshal Foch once made some pertinent com- ments on this subject: There is a proverb which says you cannot hunt two hares at the same time. You would catch neither of them. Efforts must be con- centrated. Those who would say economy means sparing one's own forces being careful not to disperse one's own efforts would only state part of the truth. Those would come closer to the truth who could assimilate the other art of knowing how to expend usefully and profitably to make the best possible use of all available resources. The appropriate distribution of force reduces the element of risk; forces are not committed to battle before sufficient strength has been gained to in- sure success. This principle acts as a check and a balance on the others. The Principle of Movement concerns the mobile qualities of combat units and their proper and prompt logistic support; it conditions and limits the principles of offensive, mass, and economy of force. Mobility involves not only the speed, range, and maneuverability of equipment, but also the ability to transport combat units as entities with a minimum loss of time. The security of lines of movement becomes a vital factor in a successful operation. For example, in the North African campaign of World War II, logistic support was denied the Nazis by Allied naval and air forces which sank German ships and shot down German transports which were attempting to bring in addi- tional troops and materiel. This principle largely determines the possibility of Surprise which is an- other principle of war. The employment of sur- prise permits the more effective use of combat forces when the enemy is unaware of the time and place of their impending effort. Surprise is often possible as a result of security, rapidity of move- ment, deception, and the audacity of the com- mander in striking under conditions which appear unusually difficult and therefore unlikely. New weapons and new or different methods of making use of current weapons may also make surprise possible. Obviously, surprise can magnify the effects of an offensive or a mass attack. However, advantageous as surprise may be, it must be kept in mind that the enemy may employ it too, so that all preparations must be taken to guard against surprise. The Principle of Security is applicable in times of peace as well as war and is closely associated with the warning function of intelligence and the activities of counterintelligence. In an opera- tional situation close attention must be given to such matters as camouflage, dispersion, antiair- craft weapons, radio and radar countermeasures, early warning networks, and defensive armament. The Principle of Simplicity recognizes the great importance of clear-cut military organization and easily understood administrative procedures in order to obtain the greatest degree of cooperation and coordination. Simplicity reduces to a min- imum the possibilities of faulty execution through misunderstanding and makes easier the handling of an unexpected situation. Clarity in command responsibilities and relationships and the publica- tion of Standard Operating Procedures contribute to the required simplicity of military operations. Confidence, a minimum of confusion, and a max- imum of efficiency are qualities which can be de- rived from careful attention to this principle. The Principle of Cooperation provides for unified ef- fort toward a common goal; unified command, joint training, economy of joint effort, and self- lessness of interests are all contributory factors. 117 World War II Battles in the Pacific The use of intelligence for operational purposes is discussed in detail in later chapters, but in order to assess the part played by intelligence in the im- CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS plementation of strategy, a consideration of spe- cific operations which took place in the Pacific during World War II is most helpful. The suc- cesses and the failures of the opposing forces were directly related to the effectiveness of their re- spective intelligence efforts. For the attack on Pearl Harbor the Japanese commanders were provided with intelligence which was amazingly complete, accurate, and usable. The contribution of intelligence to their success is well summarized in the United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Japanese Military and Naval Intelligence Division: The shocking success of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was due to careful planning based upon nearly complete intelligence as to the position, movements, and strength of United States forces in the area . . . The Japanese had a large amount of de- tailed information concerning United States fleet units, air strength, and other military in- stallations at Pearl Harbor which was put to effective use in the surprise attack. After the raid, crashed Japanese planes and a beach midget submarine yielded annotated charts and other documents which set forth the United States situation in fairly accurate The midget submarine had on board a United States Navy hydrographic chart which had been used as a track chart for the sub's intended transit of the harbor. It was annotated with detailed navigational data, with the names and positions of major units expected to be in the harbor, and with the berthing areas of minor units and auxiliaries. Similar intelligence concerning ship anchor- ages? charts for aircraft torpedo runs against specified targets, and data on Honolulu radio frequencies were found in crashed planes. The leader of the first attacking flight, Cap- tain Fuchida, has reported the careful prep- arations which accounted for the effectiveness of the attack. The attacking pilots were briefed on 23 November, 3 December, 7 De- cember, and at a final session two hours before the attack on 8 December (Tokyo time). At the briefing the day prior to the attack, the re- vised estimate of the major units at Pearl was announced as no carriers, 7 battleships and 7 cruisers. Actually there were 8 battleships and 8 cruisers. At the final briefing, the pilots were given mimeographed sheets indicating? with names in most cases and with substan- tial accuracy?the probable positions of the CONFIDENTIAL 118 warships berthed around Ford Island and at the Navy Yard. Conditions affecting the United States Forces during the period immediately following the at- tack are discussed in the Report of the Joint Com,- mittee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack : While it appears that some planes under Navy direction were assigned to search the sector to the north of Oahu, generally re- garded as the dangerous sector from the standpoint of an air attack, they were diverted to the southwest by reason of a false report that the Japanese carriers were in that direction. Admiral Smith, Chief of Staff to Admiral Kimmel, said he did not get the information as to the probable location from which the Japanese carriers launched the attack for some 2 days. There is a great deal of con- fusion including false civilian reports of troop parachute landings and a false report from one of our own planes concerning an enemy carrier to the south. A chart showing the position of the Japanese carriers was taken from a Japanese plane by the Army on De- cember 7 but was not shown the Navy until the afternoon. The deplorable feature of the action follow- ing the attack was the failure of the Navy and Army to coordinate their efforts through in- telligence at hand. The same Army radar unit that had tracked the Japanese force in, plotted it back out to the north. Yet this vital information, which would have made possible an effective search, was employed by neither service. The situation in connection with the Japanese occupation of the Philippine Islands was some- what similar. Here again, accurate intelligence regarding American forces on Luzon made pos- sible effective operational planning, which was coupled with the element of surprise. The Jap- anese estimate of the situation in the Philippines proved to be substantially correct and their forces enjoyed early and economical success in spite of the fact that the United States ground forces main- tained organized resistance longer than had been anticipated. The basis of Japanese success in this operation was the destruction within a week of American air strength by the Japanese 11th Air Fleet based in Formosa. According to information brought Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 AN INTELLIGENCE PERSPECTIVE IN A CHANGING WORLD CONFIDENTIAL out by the interrogation of Vice Admiral Shirai- chi, then Chief of Staff of the 2d Fleet, and of Captain Takahashi, then on the 11th Air Fleet Staff, the Japanese began their attacks on 8 De- cember with almost exact information regarding the strength and disposition of the American air forces. Making use of surprise, the invaders were able to destroy most of the American planes on the ground. This vital information was obtained by reconnaissance aircraft on 24-25 November which reported 300 planes in the Luzon area?there were actually 317. Prior to the Battle of Midway in mid-1942 there was a tremendous decline in the efficiency of Jap- anese Intelligence, with the result that the Jap- anese commanders entered into this battle with an abysmal lack of anything approaching accurate knowledge. The Japanese Estimate of the Situa- tion, discussed in the ONI Review for May 1947, included the following specific points: (1) Al- though the U. S. Navy "lacks the will to fight," it will counterattack if Midway is occupied; (2) "The enemy is not aware of our plans ;" (3) the United States has no carrier force in the vicinity; and (4) after attacking Midway by air and de- stroying American shore-based strength, the Jap- anese Striking Force will still have enough planes "to destroy any enemy task force which may choose to attack." On the other hand, the United States forces had available a rather accurate estimate of Japanese plans and preparations drawn up by Intelligence from various items of information derived from many sources. One of the vital decisions of the Pacific War was made by Admiral Nimitz when he accepted the estimate of his intelligence section that Midway and the Aleutians were primary ob- jectives of the enemy. By 23 May, Rear Admiral Bellinger, Naval Air Commander at Pearl, was able to predict the Japanese plan of attack, the composition, approximate routes, and timetable of the forces which were threatening Midway. This battle was a major success for U. S. Intelligence; the "United States Strategic Bombing Survey" comments: The battle of Midway was a notable early occasion where United States intelligence con- cerning the enemy was superior to the enemy's intelligence concerning the United States, thus affording an opportunity to organize and employ our forces effectively and achieve a victory of decisive importance. Just as the Battle of Midway is generally con- sidered to have been a turning point in the war, so it was also a turning point in the intelligence effort. As the war progressed, American intelli- gence increased in quality and quantity while that of the Japanese decreased. The Imperial Staff continued to underestimate United States strength and capabilities and concluded that no major op- erations could be attempted before the end of 1912 because of American naval losses at Pearl Harbor and heavy shipping losses in the Atlantic. These faulty estimates were partially responsi- ble for the success of the Allied counterattack through the Solomons area which marked a change in pace from the defensive to the offensive. The American landings in the Guadalcanal area in August 1942 caught the Japanese completely by surprise at the particular time when they were not prepared to defend the area or to mount an effective counteroffensive. Their difficulties were compounded by two disastrous errors: the first was an initial intelligence report that less than 1,000 American troops were involved in the land- ings, while actually there were more than 19,000, including the 1st Marine Division and two Army battalions; the second was an underestimate of troops required to recapture Guadalcanal, based upon experience in China and in Malaya. Using this inaccurate and incomplete informa- tion, the Japanese made a number of attempts to regain the island with insufficient forces which were destroyed one after the other. In August, 1 battalion was committed and destroyed; in Sep- tember, 3 battalions mounted an unsuccessful as- sault; in October, after the extent of United States strength was realized, a joint Army-Navy opera- tion involving two divisions of 29,000 troops was carried out which also failed. Further attempts were equally ineffective and Guadalcanal was finally abandoned in January 1943. By continu- ing to underestimate the strength of the American forces, the Japanese gave them the invaluable op- portunity to strengthen their position gradually so that each attack was successfully repulsed. The glaring error of the Japanese during the Solomons campaign in underestimating United States strength resulted in a serious weakening of 119 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDEifirved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS their air and naval power by piecemeal commit- ment in a series of ineffective counterattacks. Their best carrier air groups were decimated, and their warship strength in all categories was ma- terially reduced in the long series of naval actions. At the same time, heavy transport shipping losses progressively curtailed their offensive operations, not only in the Solomons-New Guinea area, but later in other areas as well. The effects of this poorly conceived plan of operations in the Solo- mons were far-reaching. Since the carrier air groups had been drawn from the Combined Fleet based at Truk, their destruction made it impossible for the fleet to support Japanese positions in the Gilbert and Marshall Islands either by surface or air action. Before replacements were possible, American forces were able to over-run those is- lands. These persisting losses had a deteriorating effect on Japan's total military strength from which she was never able to recover. At the battle for Leyte Gulf the Japanese naval operation, carried out by means of a three-pronged attack, was planned and executed with almost no intelligence available. In numerous instances in- dividual commanders could not employ their units effectively because of the lack of knowledge re- garding their opposition. The effect on the out- come of the battle is summarized in the United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Investigation shows that a continuing basic weakness in the Japanese position throughout this action was the lack of adequate opera- tional intelligence. This is seen to have con- tributed to their other difficulties and to have compounded them. They were unable to get adequate timely information as to the strength, location, and movements of the United States forces, and as a consequence were operating a large part of the time by guess and chance. The chief cause of the lack of adequate intelligence in this situation was the recurring failure to maintain air recon- naissance, which was admittedly a cardinal weakness. There is no indication that there was any effective Japanese submarine scout- ing in these actions. In this battle, as was later the case at Iwo Jima and Okinawa, United States naval commanders were able to base their operations on much better intelligence regarding the strength, disposition, and composition of opposing forces. CONFIDENTIAL 120 It is true that in the latter stages of the Pacific war the Japanese were able frequently to prepare fairly accurate estimates of impending Allied op- erations; but it is equally true that the number of possible objectives was rapidly reduced as the Allied forces approached their ultimate objective. The campaigns at Midway, in the Solomons, and in the Gilbert and Marshall Islands each reflected progressively sharper drops in the quantity and quality of intelligence available to the Japanese operational commanders. As a result, they were forced more and more to rely on professional spec- ulation which contributed to defeat rather than to victory. From a review of the various Pacific campaigns, it is concluded that intelligence con- tributed materially to successful military opera- tions, while a severe and sometimes insurmount- able handicap was imposed upon the commander who did not have it, or who failed to use it. DYNAMICS OF STRATEGY, TACTICS AND INTELLIGENCE Just as strategy and tactics are formulated in part from the knowledge provided by Intelligence, intelligence activities are likewise affected by de- velopments arising from strategies and tactics. The intelligence perspective, therefore, must have flexibility and the capacity to adapt itself to changing conditions and circumstances. Events can and do take place in the world scene and in operational situations which have a direct and immediate impact on planning, so that Intelli- gence must be prepared to react promptly if it is to make its full contribution. During the course of their long history, British planners have shown a remarkable capacity to make use of changing events, extracting the ad- vantages presented and adapting their plans and policies accordingly. Such a procedure at the higher planning levels might be critically de- scribed as improvisation and opportunism; how- ever, since the British have not deviated from their basic national objectives, its merit has been his- torically demonstrated. In this connection, Churchill has commented: "We assign a large importance to opportunism and improvisation, seeking rather to live and conquer in accordance with the unfolding event than to aspire to domi- nate it often by fundamental decisions." Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 AN INTELLIGENCE PERSPECTIV World War II is replete with examples of the ability of American commanders in the field to adapt themselves readily to changing circum- stances; the ingenuity of the individual American soldier, sailor, and airman has reflected a common national characteristic. American top-level plan- ning in the past has tended to differ from that of the British. In noting this difference, Churchill again has said that "in the military as in the com- mercial or production spheres, the American mind runs naturally to broad, sweeping logical conclu- sions on the largest scale. . . . They feel that once the foundation has been planned on true and com- prehensive lines, all other stages will follow natu- rally and almost inevitably." The approach of American planners has been to prepare several carefully analyzed plans each of which, if selected, will lead to inevitable conclusions. The success of this approach has also been amply demonstrated. In view of the trends of modern warfare, however, it is entirely possible that American planners may now find it advantageous, if not necessary, to make full use of developing situations. Whenever this is true, Intelligence can make a substantial contribution. For the greatest success of their mutual effort, the relationships between policy-makers and In- telligence should be closely scrutinized at frequent intervals. In his provocative article, Intelligence and Policy-Making in Foreign Affairs, Roger Hilsman, Jr., serving with the Joint Military Ad- visory Group in Europe in 1952, has analyzed these relationships and found a division of labor which, in his opinion, may not be the best. Intelligence on the one hand and policy- making and action on the other are separated physically, organizationally, chronologically, functionally, and by skills?separated in every possible way. His suggestion, in part, is a reconsideration of or- ganizational structure. Regardless of what sug- gestions may be offered, it is true that the dy- namics of strategy, tactics, and intelligence can best operate under the most carefully coordinated conditions in an atmosphere of mutual understanding. Attitudes for Intelligence In assuming its share of responsibility, Intelli- gence must maintain a perspective that is positive, 269196-54--9 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 E IN A CHANGING WORLD CONFIDENTIAL clear, and keenly alert; it must never lose sight of its own purposes and objectives as determined by the requirements of those responsible for na- tional strategy and its implementation. In Mr. Hilsman's opinion, . . . the important step for intelligence is an intellectual reorientation designed to create a new set of attitudes?a frame of mind which is manipulative, instrumental, action-con- scious, policy oriented. The major task before the researchers is one of recasting their thought to the context of action, and adapting their tools to the needs of policy. Ultimately, both operators and researchers must move from hunch and intuition to an im- proved capacity for explicit and disciplined policy analysis. If at the same time the re- searchers become policy-oriented, there may develop a more effective integration of knowl- edge and action . . ? The first problem is one of attitudes and skills. ?World Politics, 0 ctober 1952. Although critical, this statement serves a good purpose in that it stimulates a thoughtful con. sideration of appropriate attitudes. Two things merit special attention. The first is that planners must recognize that intelligence is a continuous activity and that planning must be grounded on fact rather than on conjecture. The second, is that Intelligence personnel must con- sider their work in time of peace as important as in time of war, if not more so. General Donovan has appropriately said: It is much more difficult to prevent war than to wage it. It is even more important in peacetime, in a sense, to know what people are up to, and what's going on, so that the peace can be preserved. If you want to have peace in the world, you've got to know the truth of what is happening and not be forced to rely on rumor. Rumor might make us act in one way, and knowledge would compel us to act in another. Shortly after World War I, Colonel Nicolai, well- known German intelligence officer, urged that the peacetime functions of Intelligence be maintained and said, "But if even today certain circles believe that nations can cooperate, they ought to make sure the way of cooperation is illuminated by a good Intelligence Service . . ." Nicolai also summarized the role of intelligence in the world scene when he said: "The Intelligence 121 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS Service moves ahead of developments into the dark future, in order to discover what it will be and to influence it." This discussion has stressed the importance of accurate, pertinent knowledge as it relates to the fields of strategy and tactics. The tremendous volume and scope of such knowledge require that CONFIDENTIAL 122 it be reduced, for the sake of manageability, to its logical component parts in order that it may be efficiently collected, carefully evaluated, and made available in usable form. The following chapter will outline by component parts the con- tent of intelligence used by strategic and opera- tional planners. Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL CHAPTER 5 COMPONENTS OF INTELLIGENCE KNOWLEDGE Intelligence knowledge is generally divided into eight component parts: geographic, transporta- tion and telecommunications, sociological, politi- cal, economic, technical and scientific, armed forces, and biographical. Each part is then often identified as a type of intelligence. While this division is not completely standardized and varia- tions can be debated, it is agreed that no one com- ponent can stand alone. Each is interdependent and interrelated with one or more of the others. In order to gain a proper perspective when using this knowledge, all parts must be integrated into a well-balanced whole. In connection with use, two points must be em- phasized: first, for purposes of planning and reaching decisions at almost any command level, the user can seldom confine himself to only one component; and second, depending upon the par- ticular problem at hand, he will usually select various items from different components in deter- mining the best answer. In other words, point of view and particular needs govern the use of in- telligence knowledge and the parts thereof. In estimating the capabilities of an opposing military force, for example, the commander must know more than its size and fire-power, as gained from enemy order of battle reports. He must also be informed of the enemy's economic and technical resources and the personal characteristics of op- posing commanders and personnel. Under some circumstances, political and social forces govern- ing enemy behavior may be important. Thus knowledge not encompassed by the category of Armed Forces Intelligence may be of inestimable value to a subordinate command in carrying out its assigned task and represent a vital saving in time and lives. An Underwater Demolition Team is greatly aided by advance geographic knowledge regarding such matters as beach gradient; avia- tors need meteorological data as well as target information; and those responsible for logistics require a wide range of intelligence knowledge in 128 order to perform their responsibilities efficiently and economically. Since these various components are mutually supporting, the intelligence officer cannot wisely confine his energies to the mastery of only one, as will be pointed out in the ensuing discussion. GEOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE Geographic intelligence is the military evalua- tion of all the geographic factors which may in any way influence a military operation. Military geography embraces all aspects of the physical en- vironment of man, both natural and artificial: the position, size, shape, boundaries, weather, climate, water characteristics, land forms, drainage, vege- tation, and surface materials of all parts of the earth; also the cultural or man-made features such as cities, transportation routes, industries, mines, and farms. Frontiers The problems of location, size, shape, and fron- tiers for a territory are largely strategic. Loca- tion basically affects the economic, political, and social nature of a country because of its relation to markets, to agricultural and mineral resources, to terrain and climate, and to transport. Military problems grow out of the economic, political, and social. Size and shape and frontiers have mili- tary significance, for great size may afford an opportunity to trade space for time. Air power may shrink distances but size will still give min- utes or hours of warning of conventional air at- tack to centrally located industrial sites. On the other hand, size is a weakness when there is waste or undeveloped land that requires expensive long hauls for industry and long military movements of materiel and personnel from one frontier region to another. The shape of a country, of course, determines the relative amount of frontier to be defended. Frontiers have multiple significance. Strong natural frontiers as opposed to artificial CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR ones may tend to isolate countries from other peo- ples and ideas and hamper trade. Purely politi- cal frontiers that shift with the fortunes of war will affect the military and political views and behaviors of nations. Sea frontiers will influence the growth of seapower. The military study of frontiers must consider man-made features such as fortifications and bridges. In a time of cold war, the fact that satellite frontiers have been de- nuded of farms and villages, stripped bare of vegetation at the boundary itself, and protected by electrified wire, mine fields, and patrols with dogs is no small intelligence consideration. In the planning of conventional military campaigns, frontiers may be studied for their tank traps, dragons' teeth, bunkers, and access roads, as well as for their natural physical elements. Topography Land forms, drainage, surface materials, and vegetation, all elements related to topography, are of more than army interest. The general char- acter of continents and islands, even of plains, mountains, and plateaus, are of strategic interest. For example, the broad sweep of the North Ger- man plain across Germany, Poland, and into Russia, as well as the Pyrenees barrier, are of importance in assessing the potentialities of Soviet military advance in Europe. But whether col- lected in strategic encyclopedias or observed in field operations, military concern extends to in- dividual valleys, basins, ridges, cliffs, hills, and other features. In this age of joint operations, all three services are concerned with these elements of topography. Of special importance to the Navy are the detailed characteristics of coasts and land- ing beaches. All these topographic features affect the movement and supply of forces, the types of equipment that can be used, the methods of attack and defense, the possibilities of concealment and surprise, and many other operational matters. Land forms and drainage conditions are so closely related that it is almost impossible to con- sider one to the exclusion of the other. Whether an area is fully or partially drained, the number, width, depth, and direction of rivers and streams, and the condition of their banks and crossing- places, are determining factors in the movements of troops and the tactics employed in any given CONFIDENTIAL 124 NAVAL OFFICERS area. The number, size, and distribution of lakes, ponds, lagoons, swamps, and marshes are elements that may play an important part in military oper- ations. Subsurface water is a principal source of water supply, and in many areas constiutes a ma- jor drainage problem in excavation and construc- tion. In recent years rivers and swamps have many times shaped military actions. Examples are the causeway from Johore to Singapore's back door, the Remagen bridge across the Rhine, the Yalu river, which freezes over to allow troops to cross without bridges, and the Rapido in Italy which was a barrier for so long. Military interest extends to soils analysis as well as to land form. The materials of the surface of the earth determine, among other things, what kind of vehicles can move over it, whether it is suitable for entrenchments, how quickly it will drain, and the effect of frost. Surface materials have a definite significance concerning the con- struction and maintenance of roads, airdromes, and other engineering problems. In addition, in the broader picture, soils affect agriculture, min- ing, and basic transportation routes. There are many regions where seasonal weather changes re- lated to local soils bar virtually all movement ex- cept along established railways and better roads. Japanese ability to honeycomb some of their war- time positions proved to be a major factor in slow- ing the reduction of their military power. This was noted in such places as Iwo Jima and Okinawa where soft rock allowed relatively rapid digging. The coral of some south Pacific atolls proved to be a superb construction material for airstrip run- ways. The muck of Attu rendered inefficient much of our artillery fire in the landing at Massacre Bay. Coasts and landing beach intelligence, of special naval interest, is now becoming so specialized and requires such development that its detailed discus- sion is reserved for the amphibious section of chapter 13. It involves a study of the sea ap- proaches, the coastal terrain, the beaches them- selves, the beach exits, and adjacent terrain. The presence or absence of forests, brush, grass- land, cultivated crops, and other forms of vegeta- tion has a vital effect on military operations. Vegetation may be in either the primeval state or the result of cultivation. In any case, its charac- Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 COMPONENTS OF INTELLIGENCE KNOWLEDGE CONFIDENTIAL ter, distribution, and seasonal variation have im- portant bearings on cross-country movements, deployment, concealment, and visibility. Local supplies of food, forage, and timber are also re- lated to the nature of existing vegetation. Exten- sive areas of dense vegetation, such as woods and jungles, or the relative absence of vegetation, as in the desert areas, may be a major consideration in strategic and logistics planning. They may result in a need for special types of organization, equipment, and methods of supply. When these areas are not too extensive, they are considered primarily from the tactical point of view. How different were the wars of the Burma jungle with small units filing through the brush and the great armored sweeps of the Afrika Korps and the opposing "Desert Rats" between El Alamein and Bizerte Hydrography Hydrography, and especially its subdivision, oceanography, is of particular naval concern when detailed information is required. Amphibious operations are especially affected by hydrographic considerations. Hydrography, of course, refers to the measurement and charting of all bodies of water; oceanography is concerned more specifi- cally with phenomena of the oceans and seas, in- cluding gulfs, bays, and estuaries. Naval con- cern includes tides and currents, sea and swell, sea water characteristics of salinity and temperature, bottom topography, sediments, and marine life. Knowledge of ocean currents, tides, sea, and swell is important to all ships at sea, but particularly to craft engaged in amphibious operations. The significant and costly effect of a lack of such knowledge is illustrated by the unhappy position of landing craft stranded off Tarawa in the Pacific during World War II when a change in the wind varied the depth of water over offshore reefs and the Marines had to wade ashore in the face of withering enemy fire. The needs for detailed hy- drographic data were again sharply demonstrated prior to the Inchon landing in Korea in 1951, when landing craft had to thread their way through restricted waters to land in a harbor where tides were all-important and the existence of extensive mud flats directly affected the types of landing equipment which could be used. 125 Studies of temperature, salinity, and density of sea water are especially important to the use of sonar in submarine and anti-submarine warfare. Again, in the broader sphere, warm and cold cur- rents strongly affect the habitability of many re- gions of the world. The Gulf Stream makes northwestern Europe important in one sense, while the Labrador current has quite different ef- fects across the Atlantic. The configuration of the ocean bottom, depth of water, type and distribution of bottom sedi- ments are important elements in navigation in- structions and in the location of anchorages. These conditions together with information on reefs, shoals, and other obstructions, help to deter- mine the location of naval bases, and the planning of naval and amphibious operations. Someday when the means are found to exploit the seas for more than fisheries and offshore oil wells, control of marine resources may become a compelling stra- tegic issue. Even marine biology is of naval concern in a variety of ways. Whales or other sea creatures may be mistaken for submarines. Some forms of marine life create enough noise to obscure more significant sounds on the sensitive hydrophones used in submarine and antisubmarine warfare. In a number of parts of the world a ship or snorkel- ing submarine may leave a tell-tale fiery wake be- cause of the bioluminescence from the plankton growing in the water. All military personnel, whether sailing or flying over the seas, or wading ashore in a landing, need some knowledge of the habitat and habits of poisonous or savage marine life. This applies to TJDT's who work in the water and to those involuntarily brought into the water due to aircraft failure or ship sinking. There are stinging jellyfish and some nonedible fish that may poison the unwary, as well as the well-publicised sharks that infest many regions. Aerology Aerology or meteorology refers to the study of the atmosphere, especially its variations of heat and moisture, its winds, and so forth. Weather refers to the meteorological conditions such as wind, temperature, rain, snow, and cloud, that affect an area at a given time or for a short period of time. Climate, on the other hand, refers to the CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR average and range of meteorological conditions affecting an area over a long period of time. In a sense climate is strategic in nature since it af- fects the basic planning of military operations and of course affects the economic and social life of an area through the crops that can be raised and the density of the population. Operations of a military nature frequently must be planned in the light of known seasonal changes of weather based on climate studies. It is impossible to read military history without an awareness of the im- portance of weather to operations planning. The Japanese carriers that hit Pearl Harbor came in behind a cold front with heavy clouds and rain that shielded their approach. General Eisen- hower's Crusade in Europe makes constant ref- erence to aerology and hydrography : There was unusual operational hazard con- nected with the Casablanca project. During the late fall and winter the northwest African coast is a forbidding one from the standpoint of small boat landings. The long Atlantic swells break up on the beaches in terrifying fashion and even in relatively good autumn weather this condition exists, on the average, four days out of five. . . . After the abandonment of the May target date, the next combination of moon, tide, and time of sunrise that we considered practicable for the attack (on Normandie) occurred June 5, 6, and 7. We wanted to cross the channel with our convoys at night so that darkness would conceal the strength and di- rection of our several attacks. We wanted a moon for our airborne assaults. We needed approximately forty minutes of daylight pre- ceding the ground assault to complete our bombing and preparatory bombardment. We had to attack on a relatively low tide because of beach obstacles which had to be removed while uncovered. These principal factors dictated the general period; but the selection of the actual day would depend upon weather forecasts. If none of the three days should prove sat- isfactory from the standpoint of weather, con- sequences would ensue that were almost terri- fying to contemplate . . . When the commanders assembled on the morning of June 4 the report we received was discouraging. Low clouds, high winds, and formidable wave action were predicted to make landing a most hazardous affair. The meteorologists said that air support would be impossible, naval gunfire would be ineffi- CONFIDENTIAL 126 NAVAL OFFICERS cient, and even the handling of small boats would be rendered difficult . . . When the conference started the first re- ort given us by group Captain Staff and the Meteorological Staff was that the bad condi- tions predicted the day before for the coast of France were actually prevailing then and that if we had persisted in the attempt to land on June 5 a major disaster would almost certainly have resulted. Aerology as a science is becoming much more complex because of the heavier demands upon it. Although a physical science, it has so many var- iables that predictions on weather have some of the indeterminate character of the social sciences. We no longer are interested in the "weather" alone. We need to know what conditions are at many different altitudes. Close to the ground much more detail is needed in order to prepare defenses against use of toxic warfare. Aloft flying weather, headwinds, and tailwinds are quite dif- ferent at various altitudes and such reports are routinely required for all flying operations. Now research into weather is extending into the upper atmosphere never before explored, in order to pre- pare the way for turbojet and rocket flight of aircraft and missiles. Collection of weather data in war is so impor- tant that very considerable efforts are made to obtain it. German weather stations were set up in Greenland to give advance warning of condi- tions in the Atlantic and Europe, since weather moves generally eastward. To support our own carrier operations in the Pacific we had to estab- lish stations in Siberia and also in China. Naval Group, China, operated literally hundreds of se- cret weather stations deep behind the Japanese lines to report the weather that later would gov- ern our carrier strikes in the Pacific. Today we would face some difficulties in weather data col- lection from the vast Soviet territories if war were to come. One solution made public is a robot weather station that can be dropped from an air- craft. On parachuting down, it would automati- cally rise on extensible legs, push out an antenna, and broadcast coded radio signals on the weather in the same way as telemetering missiles. Weather reporting is now so technical that trained meteorologists must make detailed fore- casts. But the intelligence officer, being responsi- Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 COMPONENTS OF INTELLIGENCE KNOWLEDGE CONFIDENTIAL ble for reporting on the area of operations, must have some familiarity with the subject. He must at least be able to read weather maps, station models, sequence reports, and to interpret their meaning. Urban Geography A subdivision of military geography is con- cerned with cities and other cultural factors. The applications of this information are numerous. Strategic targets of factories, transport, and hous- ing need study. Tactics frequently involve seiz- ure of a town, and require detailed information on construction of buildings, possible strong- points, main thoroughfares, power, water, and communications facilities. Later there may be questions of billeting space in what is left. Cer- tainly vulnerabilq. to fire, high xplosive, or atomic attack 9kiley consideration Descriptive Analysis of Military Regions In practically all nations except the very small- est, sufficient variation in geographical character exists to make it impractical to confine a study to the geography of a nation as a whole. Conse- quently, studies are often broken down into re- gions having geographical characteristics which would exert a definite influence on military oper- ations. By definition, a military region is a re- gion of any size in which the combination of geographic conditions is relatively uniform, and, as a result, permits the use of the same types of equipment, organization, and mode of operations throughout the region. These may be areas where mountains, plains, river systems, deserts, indus- trialized areas, or other factors are predominant and thereby establish the nature of the region. Local minor variations in geographical conditions are treated as subregions. In preparing the de- scriptive analysis of a military region, the area is first considered from the over-all viewpoint and then is broken down into appropriate subregions for detailed consideration. This type of encyclo- pedic information used for general military plan- ning usually needs additional detailed analysis and current reporting to meet tactical needs. Preparing Geographic Intelligence The importance of peacetime efforts in acquir- ing the data needed for strategic studies has been 127 emphasized, and this is certainly true of geo- graphic intelligence. Compilation of good charts and maps, painstaking analysis of soil surveys and other data from a variety of sources, and the matching of aerial photographs with existing charts is time consuming work that should go on continuously. Inevitably in war there are new demands and many of these processes must be speeded up. As potential areas of operations be- come actual areas, the emphasis shifts from stra- tegic to operational intelligence. The strategic area studies and surveys prepared by United States Armed Forces in World War II merit special mention here. In ONI, in the Naval Districts and River Commands, and at intelligence centers and joint intelligence collection agencies in operational areas, whole sections of specialists devoted their entire time to the evaluation, com- pilation, and distribution of reports. Often, like the Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Studies (JANIS) , these reports were the result of joint effort. The surveys drew upon many divergent sources for their material. They contained data collected by aerial photographs over enemy territory, often supplemented by information gained from inter- viewing engineers who had built or managed the installations photographed. Beach gradients were calculated from photographs taken from warplanes and even from snapshots taken by tour- ists and missionaries; these pictures were supple- mented by the notes of American geologists, nat- uralists, and conchologists who had worked in the area, and by the reports of friendly natives or guerrillas. New Horizons of Geographic Intelligence The horizons of geographic intelligence have been pushed farther in several directions as a re- sult of technological progress and political change. This of course, as is amply demonstrated else- where in this book, applies to all intelligence. These geographic changes are easily illustrated by reference both to the World Wars and to more re- cent events. World War I was largely fought in traditionally strategic areas, but included opera- tions in places as remote as the Falkland Islands, Tanganyika, the Hejaz, and Cocos Islands. Much more striking were the changes of World War II CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS that took hundreds of thousands of Americans to such unlikely spots as Ulithi Atoll, that make commonplace in American thought the Hump, Kasserine Pass, Eniwetok, and Coral Sea. Cur- rently we have become vitally concerned with new names: Abadan's refineries, Shinkolobwe's pitch- blende, and the oil of Leduc. The turn of events has given America and consequently her Armed Forces heavier responsibilities than ever before. The new technology demands much greater geo- graphical detail and accuracy. The long range guided missile, when it acquires range, command, speed, destructive power and accuracy, must still find the right targets. Since existing charts and maps have errors of many miles in some parts of the world, finding the target becomes a major problem, and constitutes a challenge to the geo- graphic intelligence of the future. Polar Intelligence One of the expanded horizons of geographic in- telligence is in the north polar regions. The old Mercator view of the world of sailing ships has been amplified by polar projections and the realis- tic views of Richard Edes Harrison, well-known cartographer. The fact that the United States and Canada are really polar neighbors of the So- viet Union is a familiar theme both of the Sunday supplements and military strategic estimates. The implementing of plans to meet this new challenge of the air age is a greater task than the mere recog- nition of new problems. An immediate require- ment since World War II has been to collect new geographic intelligence and operational experi- ence on cold weather operations to overcome the admitted Soviet lead in this field. Such opera- tions as Muskox, Frostbite, Icebox, Frigid, and Williwaw in the Arctic, and Higkjump in the Antarctic, have been directed to that end, as have also the daily weather flights from Ladd Field to the North Pole. Our general strategy has been revised to strengthen Alaska, string radar barriers and weather stations in belts across Canada, and to rebuild base facilities in Greenland and Iceland. We have mapped the Arctic, learned to sail in the northern seas, to cross tundra and ice, and devel- oped clothing, fuels, lubricants, housing, and elec- tronic gear suitable to the extreme temperatures and raging storms that are common to the north. CONFIDENTIAL We have also found out with guidance from vet- eran Arctic explorers that operations in extreme latitudes are entirely possible with proper prepa- ration. Though the likelihood of large land cam- paigns in the polar area is not great, the extension of aircraft range and the advent of guided missiles make it imperative that intelligence officers have an awareness of the new problems of Arctic war- fare and their influence on strategy and tactics. The Arctic cannot be defined by merely drawing the Arctic circle around the globe at latitude 66?30'. A more descriptive line is the northern limit of trees, above which there is only tundra or ice. Below this the subarctic begins, and in- cludes the northern limit of cereals, the continental taiga of all but southern Canada, much of northern Russia, and certainly the eastern half of Siberia. The low latitude Tibetan plateau is Arctic-type tundra, and winter operations even in the conti- nental forest areas such as the Great Lakes, St. Lawrence Valley, Hokkaido, the Baltic, and Cen- tral Russia, involve "Arctic" problems for mili- tary purposes. The topography of the Arctic varies from the broad plains in Russia, parts of Siberia, and around Hudson Bay to the high plateaus of Green- land and Tibet, and towering mountain ranges. often poorly mapped, in the Yukon, Alaska, northeastern Siberia, Kamchatka, the Himalayas, Pamirs, Altai, and Hindu Kush. The Antarctic, largely ice covered like Greenland, includes high plateaus and towering mountain ranges in some areas. Drainage is a major geographical factor in the Arctic. Many of the greatest rivers of the world, such as the Mackenzie, Yukon, Ob, Yenesei, and Lena, are not only Arctic but flow in a generally northerly direction. Many major rivers of China, Southeast Asia, and India-Pakistan have their sources in Tibet. Overland travel in the Arctic is generally easier in winter than in summer, for tractor trains can travel on the frozen rivers. With the coming of summer the river mouths to the north are still frozen while the southerly reaches thaw and overrun the banks to form vast lakes in the valleys. Canoes with portage from one body of water to the next are a principal means of transport. The frozen surface of winter turns into an impassable bog for tracked vehicles 128 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 COMPONENTS OF INTELLIGENCE KNOWLEDGE CONFIDENTIAL in the summer because the frozen subsoil prevents adequate drainage. Roads or railways built across such terrain need new ballast season after season and even so trains frequently are derailed. The epic struggle of the Canadian Government in building the Hudson Bay Railway to Port Churchill is an example of transport difficulties. Coasts and landing beaches in the Arctic vary from those which are eminently suitable in all re- spects for amphibious landings to those which are impossible because of forbidding overhanging cliffs. Most are open and exposed, although Greenland, Iceland, and Norway have deep fjords. By our definition the true Arctic areas are de- void of forest cover. Some are glacial like the interior of Greenland, northern Baffinland, North- ern Novaya Zemlya, Ellesmere Land, and Ant- arctica; more are tundra that offers no real cover, but in the summer may include edible berries and a profusion of wild flowers. The subarctic's forests are scrub growth and often extremely diffi- cult of passage either for vehicles or men on foot. The hydrographic conditions of the Arctic are of special naval concern. In contrast to the con- tinental land mass at the South Pole surrounded by shelf ice and stormy seas, the Arctic is a shal- low sea basin surrounded by land with entrances at Bering Straits, through the northern Canadian archipelago or from the Atlantic approaches near Greenland, Spitzbergen, and Novaya Zemlya. The great ice pack is virtually impassable to ships. Those caught in it, if they escape destruction, over a period of many months may move hundreds of miles with the clockwise drift of the ice and emerge at another point. Due to the pressures of current and wind the ice piles in ridges and irregu- lar masses. A few parts of the pack are flat and thick and the possibility of using them as floating air bases has been exploited by both the Russians and ourselves. Winter shore ice builds out from bays in virtually all of the Arctic Ocean to meet the permanent ice pack and also closes much of Bering Sea, the Sea of Okhotsk, Hudson Bay, the Baltic and even parts of the Caspian and Sea of Azov. Icebergs from Greenland's fjords move far south and constitute a hazard in the North At- lantic shipping lanes. The classic example was the Titanic disaster. In the short summer season cracks open in the 289196-54 ---10 129 ice pack near shore, and ships may be able to make their way through the northwest passage around North America and the northeast passage around Eurasia. Usually, such ships are specially strengthened, are of shallow draft to allow them to use the primitive ports, and are preceded by powerful icebreakers to clear the way. Aerial reconnaissance minimizes the chances of being caught and crushed, but a change in the wind may often bring that threat. Amphibious landings can be quite difficult if ice close to shore will not support heavy equipment, or if storms have blown up a great barrier of tumbled ice on the beach. A sudden storm may trap both big ships and landing craft by driving the ice pack toward shore and thus removing the frequently limited open water. The life forms found in the Arctic are of special interest to men awaiting rescue. In the extreme north there may be polar bears, walrus, and seals, but the interior of Antarctica offers little. Es- kimos manage to live in good health on meat and blubber, and so can military personnel if it is necessary. Farther south there are many small animals, fish, and in summer birds that can be trapped or shot by the trained men. It is the weather of course, that offers the great- est challenge to military operations and survival. The temperature range is from over 90? F. in the summer in the Yukon Valley to a winter ? 90? F. in northeastern Siberia. In the subarctic, summer is a time of torment because of flies and mosquitoes. Snow and fog may cut visibility for many days or weeks on end, affording cover but also limiting travel or navigation. The aurora borealis (or australis at the south pole) restricts radio recep- tion. Compasses are unreliable and it is to be remembered that the magnetic poles neither coin- cide with the geographic nor are they entirely fixed. Daylight and darkness conditions, reach- ing the extreme of 6 months of day and 6 of dark have important implications both for observation and for morale. In winter cold, all human move- ments are slowed by the protective clothing worn. Logistics needs are increased by the kind of hous- ing required and the greater quantities of fuel and food consumed. Urban geography of the Arctic is largely Soviet, for the only cities of importance in the area are CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09: CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS Russian and Siberian. They have tried to develop mining, lumbering, and commerce along the north- east passage as well as building military bases. Aside from some Alaskan and Canadian mining and trapping, and the new military bases, perhaps the most important economic development in the free world Arctic has been the uranium discoveries near Great Bear Lake. In the approaches of the Antarctic it is the international rivalries of the whaling industry that are of particular interest. In summary, the great circle routes across the Arctic represent the most direct flight lines for strategic bombers and guided missiles to reach the key populated and industrial regions on earth. The Arctic then is of great concern for aviators who must navigate across it and who may be forced down in it. It is of further concern as an area for detection and interception of such air strikes. It is also an area rich in mineral resources awaiting exploitation. Finally, it requires continued study as a route of travel and invasion by military forces. Its problems are being solved with growing skill, ingenuity, and confidence. The requirements of its climate have produced new developments in housing and weapons. TRANSPORTATION AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE A second major component of intelligence knowledge is that of transportation and telecom- munications. Information about these facilities in all parts of the world is needed for planning both our strategy at the highest echelons and tac- tics at lower command levels. All forms of such intelligence are used on occasion by the Navy, even though other agencies collect and process much of the information. Ports and Harbors Port and harbor intelligence includes every con- ceivable type of information on these facilities. Harbors refer to natural locations that may be used as anchorages by ships or as protection and setting for man-made port facilities. Harbors may be bays, rivers, or combinations of both. When a port completely lacks protection and shoreside berthing facilities, it is called a roadstead. Some ports have been created by means of artificial har- bors. In the broad sense, a port includes not only CONFIDENTIAL 130 the piers and wharves used by shipping, but also all the transfer, storage, and land transportation facilities used in connection with shipping. In fact a port area includes frequently a considerable tributary area with manufacturing, fuel and water facilities, banking and customs houses; that is, the whole range of the appurtenances of modern commerce. Sources of information on ports are numerous. Naval observers, as described in chapter 9, can col- lect some port information. Commercial steam- ship companies collect much information, too, for their own operations. Individual masters and sometimes crew members make reports to their governments as needed to supplement collection. There are various chamber of commerce and port commission studies available for the asking, as well as tourist guides, foreign government maps, com- mercial photographs, and data from business houses supplying foreign orders. All are useful sources of information. Port data are so complex and detailed that most naval powers prepare specific port studies on in- dividual foreign ports. This is a Navy responsi- bility in our country, but the Navy is not the sole user. The Army needs such data for establishing ports of embarkation. The Navy needs to know what servicing facilities would be available to the fleet. Some foreign ports are studied for their military or commercial importance and vulnerabil- ity to attack. During wartime the individual uses of ports may give many clues to the enemy's activities. Shipping Ocean shipping is the principal means for the bulk movement of freight internationally. It is characterized by the large tonnage carried by in- dividual ships at very low ton-mile costs, fre- quently over very great distances. The routes most vital to this commerce of the world are: (1) the North Atlantic from Canada and the United States to the English Channel, North Sea or Medi- terranean areas; (2) the Suez route through the Mediterranean to India, Australia or the Far East; (3) the South Atlantic route from Europe and North America to Argentina; (4) the South Africa run from Europe or North America to South and East Africa with extensions to Aus- Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 COMPONENTS OF INTELLIGENCE KNOWLEDGE CONFIDENTIAL tralia and Indian Ocean points; (5) the trans- pacific routes from North America to Asia; (6) the Panama routes linking many continents and several coasts. A handful of countries build most ships and these same countries are the principal operators of substantial numbers of ships. The United States, Britain, and Norway are the three big operators, though in time Japan and Germany may regain their former positions. The Navy is concerned not only with the areas where ships operate and with the total carrying capacity of various merchant fleets, but also with the building capacity of various shipyards and the repair facilities. Because of its operational and strategic needs, it must also know the speed, age, tonnage, dimensions, appearance, fuel, draft, ownership, location, and use of every individual merchant ship in the world. Collection of most shipping information is largely a matter of organization and thoroughness, and most of it can be derived from regular com- mercial information services. Lloyd's Register provides ship particulars and Lloyd's List gives vessel movements. A series of trade journals in Britain, the United States, France, Japan, and other countries report building, give vessel plans and pictures, discuss trends in chartering, marine insurance, rates, conference agreements, and so forth. It is only the Iron Curtain countries which hide or disguise their shipping information thus requiring other nations to take special measures in order to develop comprehensive worldwide re- ports on merchant vessels. Shipping intelligence has many forms. It may be absorbed into other intelligence as a part of a larger subject. Summary statistics of all sorts are prepared, and card indexes of vessel activity and large wall plots showing estimated location of all vessels are used for operational purposes. The uses of shipping intelligence are many. Any blockade operations require detailed ship movement information together with manifest data. Protection of shipping against submarines and aircraft requires location data. When an H- bomb hidden in a nondescript neutral freighter becomes a possibility, shipping intelligence needs will be further increased. Railways Since railways represent the principal arteries of land transport and have the greatest tonnage capacity for movement overland from place to place, they are of considerable military interest. The Transportation Corps of the Army is chiefly responsible for collection and processing of land transportation data. Essential informational needs include detailed maps of the lines, descrip- tions of bridges and tunnels, a working timetable, a gradient profile chart, and lists of motive power and rolling stock. Even though a railway may seem relatively static, its capacity is affected by many factors: the maintenance and improvement of the right of way (including ballast, ties, rails), the addition of automatic block signals or train control, the realinement of track to ease ruling grades and reduce curvature, the strengthening of bridges, the switch to new motive power such as dieselization or electrification, and the traffic load with its seasonal and directional differences. Data may come from newspaper stories, the order books of equipment manufacturers, trade statistics, and trade journals such as the Railway Gazette published in London, which is the best for world coverage. Information from behind the Iron Curtain is harder to obtain, but there are publicly announced 5-year plans, radio broadcasts of new construction and attainment of traffic goals, and the reports of refugees. The use to which such information is put varies. It may contribute to a strategic estimate involving a country's capability to meet overall war require- ments or provide specific data concerning the coun- try's ability to move forces to a particular front. The Navy is interested in many details on rail- ways, arising out of such matters as the movement of landing craft or submarine subassemblies over particular lines that may or may not have limited clearances. Preliminary to an amphibious land- ing the Navy may have air support missions which will include selecting railway targets such as tun- nels, bridges, and yards. For both amphibious and land operations, similar targets are sometimes involved in connection with naval gunfire support. The success of naval ships in providing gunfire support to land operations during the Korean War illustrates naval use of intelligence regarding both railway systems and roads. 131 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS Roads Roads generally serve as feeders to railway lines, although in a few parts of the world they constitute an independent, fairly usable network. They have the military advantages of reaching more places than railways and being more flexible in alternate routes. If trees block a road, vehicles occasionally can drive through fields around the obstacle. Most military transport organic to land units is intended for road use. In most foreign countries roads are typically poor by American standards, having a low tonnage capacity and a rapid deterioration rate. Maintenance thus be- comes a problem when they are used for heavy military traffic. Road maps are available in most foreign coun- tries, but they are frequently inaccurate, and their condition is subject to change with the seasons. Road reports should not only describe the seasonal condition of roads, bridges, and shoulders, but should also note the availability of surfacing mate- rials, local labor, and repair machinery. Bridges, steep grades, and narrow single lanes are typical limiting factors to the usefulness of a road. Pipelines The bulk movement of petroleum, gas, and water is increasingly being accomplished by pipeline. Modern technology permits the dispatching of several different products in succession through a line with metering, sampling, and water plugs to keep each one separate. A recent development is the use of radioactive isotopes to identify particu- lar shipments by Geiger counter. Pipelines represent a mass means of delivery relatively free from interference by weather. Underground lines are reasonably safe from at- tack, but the pumping stations, storage tank farms, and other surface installations remain vulnerable points. Pipelines may have more than economic signifi- cance. Some United States lines, for example, represented a countermove against German sub- marine attacks. Others in Burma, France, and Alaska provided direct tactical support. Aerial reconnaissance will usually reveal the construction of new lines, but lacking that opportunity, infor- mation on the manufacture and delivery of the necessary pipes and pumps will give many clues. CONFIDENTIAL 132 Inland Waterways Inland waterways in many foreign countries are a major element in the transportation system. Their usefulness depends upon their general loca- tion and direction of flow. The current, control- ling depth, turns, constancy of channel, subjec- tivity to freezing, bridge clearances, and cargo transfer facilities are important details. Reports on foreign waterways are processed primarily by the Army Transportation Corps, and the sources of information are official documents of foreign governments and direct observation. From them are obtained answers to logistics questions. Aerial mining of waterways, and destruction of locks or dams by bombing can be made possible through adequate intelligence. Aviation Civil aviation rightly comes under the general cognizance of air intelligence. Although avia- tion competes with railways only in countries where railways are lacking, it is important to know the role it plays in the rapid movement of critical freight and personnel. Today, airlines under many flags not only blanket their home countries, but extend internationally into far reaches of the earth. Thus they also provide a unique instrument for observation and collection of information. Our own widespread aviation interests are in a position to report on foreign aviation progress everywhere this side of the Iron Curtain. Trade journals in many languages are likewise extremely helpful. We are interested in new transport air- craft performance and production, the frequency, reliability, and control of air lines, the provision of navigation aids and. airfields, and the training of personnel. In time of war or other emergencies, commercial aircraft and aviation facilities play important auxiliary roles. The degree of subsi- dization of aviation may give clues to intended use. Deutsche Lufthansa went so far as to con- vert "commercial" Ju-52's into bombers and para- troop transports when war came. Italy's commer- cial air service to Rio de Janeiro reported ship movements off Brazil to German raiders in the early days of the war. Considerable aviation intelligence is assembled in convenient form by such unofficial yearbooks as Jane's All The World's Aircraft. The Navy's Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 COMPONENTS OF INTELLIGENCE KNOWLEDGE CONFIDENTIAL own large interests in aviation make all such in- telligence of considerable interest. Telecommunications Telecommunications include telegraph, tele- phone, radio, television, cable, and all related serv- ices and equipment. Each type of signal has its own advantages and disadvantages of cost, avail- ability, secrecy, range, number of channels, and so forth. While the National Security Agency is the agency with direct cognizance over intelli- gence in this field, earlier references to the collec- tion of intelligence from communication sources indicate the importance of such information to all branches of the military service. The interruption of communications in any mod- ern state, especially a highly centralized one, can bring its national life to a standstill. Such sys- tems thus become prime targets in war. Further, an understanding of the various channels of sig- nal traffic is basic to maintaining the security of classified information. Therefore, knowledge of a nation's telecommunications is helpful for a variety of purposes. Information on world systems comes from such sources as trade journals, records of purchases of new equipment from leading manufacturers, and, of course, observation and the piecing together of many bits of information. SOCIOLOGICAL INTELLIGENCE Sociology is the study of man and his human environment. It deals with all the phenomena arising out of the group relations of human beings. There is still some disagreement whether sociology has reached a stage of development which would entitle it to rank as a science, but it is uniformly recognized that the methods used in sociological research and the conclusions reached may be strictly scientific when based on extensive observa- tion and careful analysis. In the introduction to this chapter it was stated that no one of the eight components of strategic intelligence can be considered alone; they are all interdependent and closely interwoven. This is particularly true of the sociological component which is closely allied to the geographical, politi- cal, and economic, and which strongly affects armed forces, particularly with relation to man- 1,33 power. The cultural traditions of a people and their intellectual achievements based on a sound educational program, have tremendous effect on their scientific capabilities. Sociological assess- ment of a nation also embraces anthropological and psychological factors. The aspects of sociological intelligence which are important to military planners are those which determine the military potential of a nation, but the analyst will soon find that his task is in no way restricted. True interpretation must weigh all facets of sociological significance, and it is im- possible to ignore any of them. The importance of sociological intelligence has never been more clearly evident to Americans than in recent years, for the understanding of foreign peoples has become essential to the successful ad- ministration of American aid programs all over the world, both civil and military. Throughout their service careers naval personnel visit many foreign ports, and those on special naval missions, stationed at bases abroad, and on attache duty are intimately associated in their daily life, profes- sionally and socially, with people whose culture, customs, and traditions are different from their own. An appreciation of the forces and factors which govern the behavior of foreign peoples is therefore a prime objective of sociological intelli- gence. All naval officers, and particularly those in intelligence activities, can with profit be avid stu- dents of sociology as it applies to the assessment of the capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable courses of action of a foreign country. The sociological component comprises the fol- lowing major considerations: Population; charac- teristics of the people; religion, education, and public information; morale and public opinion; health and public welfare. A brief examination will be made of the significance of these elements in sociological intelligence. Population Intelligence on the population of a country is much more than a mere numerical count. To be valuable it must provide data on density and geographical distribution; classification by age groups and sex; growth or decline; immigration and emigration; future trends and government policies which affect population problems. Sta- CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR tistics are given meaning through interpretation by averages and percentages, and by comparison with familiar standards. Populations in many countries of the world since World War II show marked departure from the patterns of past dec- ades, and it has become increasingly important to obtain up-to-date information before coming to any conclusions. Lt. Col. Robert C. White makes some pertinent observations on population change in an article entitled "Sociological Factors in Strategic Intel- ligence" published in the Military Review, No- vember 1949: From an intelligence standpoint, it is the increase, stability, or decline in the size of a population upon which we first focus our in- terest. The future size of the population of a foreign nation may be of more importance to us than its present size. Knowledge of future size will help us keep our estimate of a foreign power's war potential correct. Consider what has been happening to the world's population in the past 150 years. We are living in a period of unparalleled (but uneven) growth in the world's population. Since 1800, the population of the world as a whole has more than doubled. This rapid, almost explosive, growth first started in Europe, where the population since 1800 has trebled. The number of Chinese and Jap- anese has increased greatly, also, but their increase did not commence until well after the middle of the nineteenth century. In other regions, the timing of rapid population growth has varied. The clue to rapid population growth is to be found in the changing relationship be- tween birth rates and death rates. Before the Industrial Revolution, high birth rates al- most negated high death rates, and there was little natural growth in population. The ef- fects of the Industrial Revolution?in raising standards of living, sanitation, and health, and therefore in reducing infant mortality and in increasing life expectancy?were felt first in Western Europe, the United States, and Canada. Therefore, the populations of these areas increased rapidly during the nine- teenth century. However, in more recent decades, because of cultural changes, such as the decline of the large family ideal, for ex- ample, there has been a drop in the birth rate. Thus, the margin between birth and death rates has been narrowing. The tendencies in these areas, therefore, is for population to level off, even to decline. With the extension CONFIDENTIAL 134 NAVAL OFFICERS of modern industrialization, sanitation, and. medical care to other parts of the world, this same pattern of changing death and birth rate has appeared. Thus, China, India, the Soviet Union, and other areas more recently affected by industrialization are now in the stage of population growth that was characteristic of Western Europe several generations ago. It is likely that they, too, will in time pass into the stage of stable or even declining popu- lation. The intelligence analyst is also concerned with a nation's labor force and available military man- power. He must know the age-sex distribution of the population, the number of males and females of a given age or within a certain age group. The labor force is found between the ages of 15 and 65, while military manpower can be derived from the number of males between the ages of 15 and 45, with particular emphasis on the 18 to 35 group. There can be considerable margin of error in these statistics if account is not taken of those who may be disqualified for either labor or military service by reason of physical disability. The geographical distribution and density of population are further vital considerations in so- ciological intelligence. The density of population per square mile of arable land has much more in- telligence significance than the density per square mile of total land. The concentration of popula- tion in certain areas of a country is likewise valu- able knowledge. Since, for example, a sixth of the population of Argentina is located in Buenos Aires, destruction of her capital city would be a crippling blow to that country. Population analysis (demography) requires ex- pert understanding of statistical terms and the methods employed in the compilation of data. Progressive countries of the world have govern- ment sponsored census bureaus and keep popula- tion registers, but less than a third of the world's population has ever been officially counted or reg- istered. Some peoples of the world are just not age conscious. An American or European child when questioned will readily report his age to the fine degree of 61/4 or 13 years 5 months. In the villages of the Orient the same question will be greeted with either a blank stare or a smiling: "I don't know." Experiences of World War II in the enlistment of women both in the Armed Forces and on the Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 COMPONENTS OF INTELLIGENCE KNOWLEDGE CONFIDENTIAL home front have placed new emphasis upon their contribution to the usable portion or manpower factor of a nation's total population. This brings us to a consideration of the entire situation with respect to labor in the country: wages, working conditions, organization, legislation, and control. The government policies on population control often are responsible in many countries for con- siderable shifts in population. The development of new industries or the exploitation of newly discovered resources can also cause internal move- ments of large numbers of people, and will require reassessment of population distribution. Characteristics of the People In studying a nation's people, the intelligence officer must identify and evaluate those racial, ethnic, and cultural characteristics which are sources of national strength or weakness. He must determine the sociological forces which cause dis- sension among them, resentment against the gov- ernment, or susceptibility to psychological in- fluence from abroad. The latter will be discussed fully in the section of this text entitled Psycho- logical Operations. Race and nationality are not synonymous terms. There is no German race or French race or Chinese race. The anthropological classification of race is in three main divisions: Caucasian, Mongolian, and Negro. These are further divided into sub- races characterized by such physical characteristics as shape of skull, color of hair or complexion, stat- ure, facial structure, and physical vigor. Few nations of the world have a population of only one race. Most are a mixture; for example, the white population of the United States and European nations comprises a mixture of three of the Cau- casian subraces, and there are many Mongolian subraces in the Chinese nation. If a country's population is composed of more than one main race, there is always a possibility of internal strife and racial discrimination. Hitler, for example, effectively used the idea of an "Aryan" super-race to develop a feeling of racial superiority among the Germans. The tragic consequences of this doctrine are a blot on the history of Europe. Ethnic groups, another important consideration in sociological intelligence, are people bound to- gether by ties and traits of both race and nationality. In the United States, for example, there are large communities in various sections of the country composed of such ethnic groups as Czechs, Poles, Irish, Swedes, and Finns. Ethnic groups often maintain, at least for two or three generations even in America, the customs, tradi- tions, religion, and language of their forefathers, and assimilation into the nation to which they have migrated is completed only after several centuries. The countries of Europe provide similar examples: the Germans of Alsace-Lorraine, the Swedish eth- nic group in Finland, and the Serbs of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire. In Asia the Parsees of India are a striking example of how a people, originally Persian, have become a force in the com- mercial and industrial development of the country of their chosen residence. The presence of such groups in a nation may weaken national solidarity, or make a nation vul- nerable to psychological warfare. It may also re- sult in violent hatred and prejudice. During World War I, for example, German-Americans in many communities were the innocent victims of slander and even mob violence. The cultural characteristics of a people are those derived from language, social structure, social values and patterns of living, artistic and intel- lectual expression. Differences in thinking and acting occur to the extent to which such forces control or influence collective behavior. The presence in appreciable numbers of aristocrat and peasant, clergy of strongly opposed religious sects, intellectuals, artists, and illiterates in a nation's population are significant subjects for sociological intelligence. Careful examination of these ele- ments yields greater understanding of a people's history, customs, and traditions and is essential to evaluation of public opinion, attitudes toward foreigners, and national morale. Religion Religion has always been a potent force in the history of the world, and religious differences have caused much war and strife. "There is no God but Allah, and Mohammed is his prophet" became the war-cry of Moslem hosts, the bloody Thirty Years War between Catholic and Protestant arm- ies in 17th century Europe, and in our own time the Moslem-Jewish struggle for the control of 185 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS Palestine, as well as the Moslem-Hindu riots in India and the formation of Pakistan attest to the influence religion has upon the actions of men. In many countries the constitution establishes a state religion, and religious sects are powerful political parties. The intelligence researcher often finds the an- swer to problems of national attitudes by analyz- ing the tenets of the religion of dominant or minority groups. Religion can determine the moral fiber of a nation or it can produce social handicaps which become strategic vulnerabilities. Often a well organized church or religious group supports numerous schools at all educational levels, and makes a valuable contribution to the improve- ment of social conditions and the rehabilitation of social unfortunates. Education Education has always been a measure of prog- ress. The strategic significance of education has become even more pronounced in this modern age of scientific and technical achievement. A na- tion's technical capabilities will be governed by the extent to which it can produce men and women with technical skill, and the cultural level of its people will be determined by the extent to which a spirit of scientific inquiry and academic freedom are fostered by its government and society. Intelligence on education must be specific in order to be usable: the number of schools at all levels of education; the number enrolled and the number graduated; the curricula and teaching methods; the qualifications of faculties; the con- trolling and accrediting agencies; and in the field of higher education, the distribution of graduates by subject of specialization. It is important to know, for example, that a given country is produc- ing engineers and physicists at an accelerated rate, or that there is a shortage of trained teachers in the secondary schools. Adult education by exten- sion courses and evening trade schools must also be evaluated. The number of students engaged in graduate study at institutions in other countries and the use which is made of them upon their return may be of great significance in a sociological estimate of a nation. This is of special interest to America, CONFIDENTIAL 136 since we have increasing numbers of foreign stu- dents attending our colleges and universities. The question is: What happens to them when they go home? Will their experience influence the thought of their fellow countrymen? Public Information and Opinion Intelligence interest here centers in the methods of disseminating news and the influence upon na- tional attitudes exercised by newspapers, maga- zines, radio programs, and motion pictures. Are the people left free to form their opinions on what they see, hear, and read or are true facts withheld through rigid government control of the press and other avenues of public information? Do foreign publications have a wide circulation and what is the extent of any foreign propaganda in the country? The answers to all these and similar questions are invaluable to the sociological analyst. Cer- tainly in this field he must be constantly aware of current trends and possess sufficient background to assess them in the light of the people's history and traditions. Health Information for intelligence on health condi- tions in a foreign country is concerned not only with the health of the indigenous population but also with the effect of health and sanitation con- ditions upon foreign troops which may operate in the area. Environmental factors such as to- pography and climate, nutrition and dietary hab- its, plant and animal life, and the food supply situation all pose problems for the military analyst. Can an invading force live off the land? Is there an abundance of potable water? Will special installations be necessary for garbage and waste disposal or are existing utilities adaptable? Medical intelligence has an important role to play in determining the prevalence of disease, par- ticularly those to which an invading army would be exposed. Will extensive malarial control be necessary? Are there certain health regulations, quarantine measures, or sanitary precautions to consider? The country's medical resources must be also evaluated in terms of the number of doc- tors and nurses, the quantity of medical supplies, Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R00010021700.02zR COMPONENTS OF INTELLIGENCE KNOWLEDGE UNFluENTIAL hospitals, and medical training, research, and development. Public Welfare The status of public welfare in a country is an important element in sociological intelligence be- cause it so directly affects the happiness and mental attitudes of the people. The standard of living, housing, and opportunities for gainful employ- ment are factors which must be considered. Sweden, for example, has no slum areas in her large cities, and her government's achievement in providing clean and comfortable housing for the worker is notable. It has been attained, however/ only through high taxation, and many a Swede is unhappy because of the tax drain on his pocket- book. As a result, it may be easy for him to forget the great benefits to himself and to the nation which accrue from high standards of public health and sanitation. The evaluation of a standard of living is no easy task for the analyst, for the peoples of different countries do not place the same value upon certain human comforts and possession of certain advan- tages. The average American family needs an automobile; many Europeans consider the posses- sion of one not only unnecessary, but even a great nuisance. We put ice in our drinking water and keep our beer in the refrigerator. The average Britisher does not like either water or beer that cold. Comparison of wages in different countries has meaning only when such wages are expressed in terms of their buying power within each coun- try. A dozen eggs in one country may represent 5 hours of work by a machinist, while in another country a machinist would have to work only 1 hour to earn enough to buy 3 dozen eggs. Other commodities, however, may be so much more expen- sive in the latter country that the machinist may not enjoy as high a standard of living as he would in the country where eggs are dear. Assessment of living standards, therefore, cannot be based on limited observations, but must be made from aver- ages over periods of years, and evaluated in rela- tion to the entire socio-economic situation of the nation. Unemployment will always create problems for a nation. Crime has a higher incidence, and dis- satisfaction with the existing government grows with the misery of the unemployed. Communism feeds upon such conditions. Employment, of course, brings prosperity and its attendant com- fort and happiness. The manner in which a foreign country has met its public welfare problems is an indication to the analyst of strength, vulnerability, and morale. A people who enjoy social security and a happy daily life are not good subjects for propaganda influence from without, and they will combat any effort to change their satisfactory status, even to the point of armed resistance. Sociological intelligence is a fascinating field, and deserves more than the summary treatment it has received above. The intelligence officer should consider the aspects so briefly discussed as an introduction and inspiration for more intensive reading and study. The philosopher's observation that "the most interesting thing to man is man" has real significance in intelligence, and the study of foreign peoples in relation to one's own socio- logical heritage has its reward in furthering the cause of international understanding and peace. 137 POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE Political intelligence on a foreign country is an evaluation of the effectiveness of its government in achieving the national objectives of its people, both domestically and in foreign relations. It is an assessment of the political strength and inter- national influence of the nation in respect to unity, stability, and efficiency, as well as the determina- tion of the degree to which its government repre- sents the will of the people. The political com- ponent of strategic intelligence is closely associ- ated with the sociological and economic, for government exercises a profound influence on the economic and social life of a people, and con- versely its nature is to a large extent established by economic and social forces. The purpose of this section is to delineate the elements essential to a political estimate of any foreign country: the constitutional system, gov- ernmental structure, political dynamics, national policies, and the way in which its government pro- vides for public order, safety, and security, con- trols subversive activity, obtains intelligence, and disseminates information. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS The Constitutional System Governments derive their powers from consti- tutions or codes of laws which set up the basic framework and describe the rights and privileges of the individual citizen. A constitution is not necessarily a single written document. The Brit- ish "constitution," for example, is largely an un- written code built upon custom and usage. A consideration of the constitutional system of a country begins with a study of its origin and devel- opment. What political, economic, or social groups dominated political thought at the time of its adoption? To what extent does it reflect the public opinion of that time? Oftentimes the circumstances under which a constitution was for- mulated endow it with lasting respect and author- ity. The principles of a constitution in theory are often quite different from its principles in practice. Attention must be given to its flexibility and the ease with which it can be amended. Have there been disagreements as to its interpretation? What economic and social provisions does it con- tain? Are there any unusual provisions? The American Constitution, which establishes execu- tive, legislative, and judicial branches of govern- ment, has served as a model for constitutional systems of later origin in all parts of the world, but in various countries, the powers granted to the different branches and the rights of citizens will vary widely. In some republics the chief executive may be a mere figurehead; in others he may have dictatorial power. Prime ministers often exercise much more leadership and have greater responsi- bilities than kings. The office of prime minister can be most precarious for it is usually dependent upon the support of a majority in the legislature and failure is followed by the resignation of the prime minister and his cabinet. Legislatures will vary in composition and effec- tiveness. When two houses are provided for by the constitution, one may be more advisory than legislative in function, and it may have a history of gradual weakness, such as the House of Lords in Great Britain. The Senate of the United States, on the other hand, has always had more power and prestige than the House of Representatives, but the Speaker of the House can succeed to the Presidency. A strong judicial branch of an established gov- CONFIDENTIAL 138 ernment will exercise tremendous influence in maintaining the spirit of the constitution, even though its interpretations will reflect the coun- try's economic and social changes. The strength of the judiciary will usually be determined by its independence of thought and action insofar as it can resist political pressure and the lobbying of special interest groups. The confidence of the people in government is largely controlled by the judgments of the courts when their powers are exercised in a way that is an effective check on both executive and legislative branches. The civil and religious rights of citizens guaran- teed by the constitution are important considera- tions in a political estimate, not only in theory but in practice. Freedom of speech, press, religion, and the rights of assembly and trial by jury so dear to the American citizen do not find exact counter- parts in the constitutions of all other countries. Important also are the rights and privileges ex- tended to foreigners in the country. Can they move about freely, and engage in business enter- prises with the same protection accorded to nationals? The Americans are very jealous of their "constitutional rights" and justly proud of their political heritage. The analyst must make an assessment of the presence or absence of similar feelings among foreign peoples and the extent to which they would tolerate any abrogation of par- ticular political rights. Structure of the Government The consideration here is of organization and procedure in central, regional, and local govern- ment. It is an evaluation of the government in operation. Are there any conditions or situations which have required special organizations or oper- ations by the government and are practices at vari- ance with the provisions of the constitution? What are the major agencies of each branch of the government and how do they operate? What are the significant features of regional and local gov- ernment organization? Often an understanding of the political forces of local government is essen- tial to the evaluation of the government as a whole. Many countries have colonies or dependencies which must also be examined in their relations to the mother country, including their own govern- mental structure. International relationships Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 COMPONENTS OF INTELLIGENCE KNOWLEDGE CONFIDENTIAL such as participation and membership in the United Nations Organization or any regional pacts may have important influences on a political sys- tem through the creation of special commissions. The operations of such agencies can have a decided impact upon internal affairs as well as formulate national attitudes toward other countries and in- crease support for cooperative endeavors. Political Dynamics The extent to which the people participate in political activity, their fitness for political respon- sibility, the sources of political power, the electoral and political party systems are some of the main factors to assess in a political estimate of a foreign country. The major political parties must be eval- uated, taking into consideration their membership, program or special interests, organization, and methods of propaganda. Throughout his study of these aspects of politi- cal life, the analyst will find that comparisons with American counterparts will give meaning and perspective. He cannot merely ascertain the constitutional framework which sets up the party system, but must note actual practices, both his- torical and current. Pressure groups within par- ties, lobbying tactics, the amount of money avail- able and expended for promotional purposes, and the manner in which the objectives of such pres- sure groups affect American interests are essential considerations. The biographic component of strategic intelli- gence is here effectively applied. The personali- ties, qualities of leadership, and motivations of prominent politicians will provide the answer to many problems of changing political influence. National Policies The intelligence significance of knowledge of a country's domestic and foreign policies will be made apparent in succeeding chapters in their dis- cussion of the economic, sociological, and political factors which determine a country's position in the community of nations. The interplay of these factors will be shown in the examination of United States foreign policy and the relationship of party and government in the U. S. S. R. Detailed treat- ment of important elements of national policy is therefore superfluous here. 139 Suffice to say, military intelligence is particu- larly concerned with those policies pertaining to national defense and their influence on domestic and foreign policies. Are the military establish- ment and civilian lawmaking bodies in agreement on what defense policies should be? To what ex- tent do the various branches of government in- fluence or decide defense policies? What is the popular reaction to defense policies? Do the people accept rearmament programs, conscription, food rationing, and production controls with forti- tude or do such defense measures result in much grumbling, support of black markets, or actual rebellion? Again the influence of individual leaders, both within their own party and on the populace as a whole, can be studied with profit. Public Order and Safety Within the scope of political intelligence are those organizations which maintain public order and safety, that is, the police and penal systems. Is the police system adequate in size, well-organ- ized at all levels of government, and effective in protecting citizens against lawless elements of so.. ciety ? The strategic analyst would also be con- cerned with the morale of the police force, the in- tegrity of law-enforcement officers, and the extent to which the system is susceptible to political in- fluence. If the police of a large city, for example, are controlled by a certain politician and used for furthering his political ambitions, the fact should be carefully noted. The attitude of the average citizen towards law enforcement is also significant. Consideration of the penal system would in- clude not only its organization and operation, but also criminal codes, trial procedures, incidence of crime, conditions in prisons and reformatories, and the effort made by social forces in the country to rehabilitate felons and juvenile delinquents. In this respect there is considerable overlapping of the political and sociological components. Subversive Activity Active or latent subversive groups in a country are exceedingly important factors in the assess- ment of weaknesses in its political system. The presence of subversive activity in political parties, CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS labor organizations, or government agencies can profoundly affect the operation of the political, economic, and social forces of the nation. In recent years we have seen the results achieved by Com- munist subversive activity in Poland, Czechoslo- vakia, Hungary, and Rumania. We have also seen in the case of Italy, how a people aroused to its menace can keep Communists from obtaining con- trol by defeating them at the polls. The extent to which subversive elements have penetrated or in- filtrated a country is thus the analyst's concern. He must identify the subversive groups and show how they operate. An innocuous appearing society for the improvement of cultural relations with the U. S. S. R., with a membership of several thousand students, may well be the front organi- zation of a growing Communist Party, the ulti- mate objective of which is the overthrow of the existing political system. The peoples' attitude, their traditions, and the economic and social conditions which foster sub- versive groups must be taken into account. If, like the Gallic tribes of Julius Caesar's time, they are "conspiring among themselves and eager for revolution," intelligence upon the nature, poten- tial strength, and leadership of such groups is es- sential. Finally, an estimate must be made of how subversive activity of any kind may affect the policies of the United States and other world powers towards that country. Intelligence System The United States intelligence system and the development of intelligence activity in other coun- tries of the world have been fully treated in pre- ceding chapters of this text, and are indicative of the scope of the information required. What is the mission of each intelligence agency? Are funds available for effective operations? What is the public attitude towards intelligence activities? What is the relationship of the various agencies, their methods of operation, and who are the key figures in their personnel? Propaganda Political propaganda may be defined as the dis- semination of information or ideas designed to in- fluence the political behavior of the people of a country by affecting their beliefs or attitudes con- CONFIDENTIAL 140 cerning facts or values. It may be either direct or indirect in approach. The source of control may be located in the country itself, such as at the permanent headquarters of a political party, or it may be directed from outside the country, as for example, in the case of Kremlin control of propa- ganda in a satellite country. For strategic intelligence purposes the assess- ment of political propaganda emphasizes an evalu- ation of its effectiveness. How much distortion of fact will the people accept? It will depend, of course, on the degree to which they have op- portunity for becoming aware of the true facts. In a country where the party in power maintains rigid control of press and radio the people may be kept completely in the dark. If freedom of speech is a jealously guarded national heritage, the people will be more enlightened and better educated politically. Propaganda may then be recognized for what it is and may have to be disseminated through more subtle media and by more indirect means. Political propaganda is never more clearly evi- dent than in an election campaign. The analyst can learn much from a careful study of the cam- paign speeches of leading candidates of opposing parties. Often a clever slogan or sobriquet has a tremendous psychological effect. The effectiveness of the propaganda factor in political intelligence can only be evaluated by consideration of certain sociological aspects of the nation, particularly those discussed in the preced- ing section entitled "Characteristics of the People." Good propaganda will always exploit the racial, ethnic, and cultural elements of which national character is composed. The principles and techniques of propaganda will be treated more fully in a later section dealing with psychological warfare. Political Factors in Strategy The ultimate purpose of strategy is to make it possible for a nation to approximate its basic goals. Its intentions, which are derived from these goals, are influenced by a variety of political factors. Inevitably, therefore, strategy is affected by the same political considerations. Initially, of course, those responsible for formulating na- tional strategy must choose objectives which are Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 COMPONENTS OF INTELLIGENCE KNOWLEDGE CONFIDENTIAL in accord with the basic goals of their own nation and with those of its allies. Thereafter, political factors must be considered in such matters as esti- mating the dimensions and timing of war prepara- tions by a nation and its allies, considering the extent of possible losses by the military forces which might be acceptable at any given time, and selecting instruments of war and the use to be made of them. Conversely, in connection with the capabilities of the enemy, consideration must be given to the effect of political factors on his own strategic planning and how these factors may cause him to react to a state of war or measures short of war. Mr. Chester Wilmot, eminent Australian jour- nalist, has advanced the thesis that much of the tension following World War II might be at- tributed to a failure to take political factors into account in strategic planning. He has suggested that military strategy is affected both by political factors as they develop and by long term political objectives. By way of illustrating the influence of political factors he has cited the Mediterranean campaign of 1943 and the strategic decision of the allies to invade Italy. A decision to land troops on the Italian coast appeared advantageous be- cause of the enemy's inferior military strength. In addition, however, such a decision was made more attractive because Mussolini's political strength had become seriously impaired by 1943 and represented a real weakness in the Axis partnership. Thus developing political factors, when combined with the military situation, mate- rially supported the decision made. In illustrating the importance of considering long term political objectives in the planning of strategy, Mr. Wilmot has suggested that a great political advantage could have accrued to the western allies in the post-World War II period had they, rather than the Soviets, liberated Ber- lin, Prague, and Vienna. A significant power ad- vantage might have been retained in Germany, even if Berlin had been given up later as a result of zonal agreements. The effect in Czechoslovakia might have been even greater. The mere presence of the Red Army in Prague became a source of material strength to the Czech Communists and undoubtedly affected the negotiations conducted between the Benes government and the Soviet 141 leaders in Moscow in June 1945. Mr. Wilmot's point is that the decisions which resulted in the halting of the allied advance into Germany and Central Europe might well have taken into greater consideration the possible progress of events after the war was over. These illustrations suggest the importance of political intelligence and the variety of tasks which must be performed in connection with it. Since military strategy and politics are insepara- ble, the naval intelligence officer must understand the significance of politics in military decision. ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE Economics, simply defined, is the study of how people make their living and satisfy their mate- rial wants. Economics thus represents a very sizable part of total activity, for most people are destined to spend the majority of their waking hours either earning their living or spending what they have received. Economics in practice is much broader in application than the definition first suggests because we live in organized societies, and therefore as a social science, economics is con- cerned with group behavior. As a discipline, eco- nomics attempts to explain and interpret this behavior and predict its consequences. Economic laws, like other social laws, are tendencies and trends, and thus the precise answers and controlled experiments common to the physical sciences are lacking in economics because of the difficulty in measuring all significant variables. The result is that the applications of economics in the field of intelligence may be ineffective or even dangerous in the hands of one who is not well grounded in its principles and who is unaware of the pitfalls in the use of data and concepts. Economic intelligence is concerned with the col- lection and processing of information relating to the extent and utilization of natural and human resources and the industrial potential of nations. Economic military intelligence is not a delimited part of the larger field; rather it is a viewpoint that gives full regard to the military implications of economic events. Specifically, this means that we want to know how strong other countries are? the limits to their economic capabilities for mak- ing war; also whether they are preparing for war and the extent of such preparation; and, finally, CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS their economic vulnerabilities. When the need arises, such weaknesses may be attacked by mili- tary means or by the techniques of economic warfare. Sources of Economic Intelligence The Department of Commerce, Office of Inter- national Trade, receives reports from commercial attaches and consular agents all over the world. Its commodity and area specialists review large numbers of foreign periodicals and other reports in order that both private individuals or concerns and government agencies may have the best pos- sible information on conditions abroad for con- ducting business affairs. The State Department also has extensive interests in economic intelli- gence since its consuls do so much of the collecting, but some of its direct collection responsibilities have been reassigned to other agencies, particu- larly special types. The Tariff Commission is in- terested in foreign costs of production, foreign tariffs, and trade restrictions. The Treasury and the Federal Reserve Board are concerned with monetary and fiscal developments. The Depart- ments of Agriculture and Labor are active in their respective fields and have some representatives in our diplomatic missions overseas. Private agen- cies also have specialized interests in particular fields of economic intelligence and prepare reports used by business men. For example, some are con- cerned with petroleum, mining, construction, elec- tric power, foreign trade, manufacturing and, of course, transportation and communications which have been treated separately. Some of these private concerns do a very thorough job within their own fields. Even such popular magazines as Fortune and the London Economist make nota,- ble contributions in the reporting of foreign de- velopments. The military services have the responsibility for filling any gaps in the economic intelligence they need for their own planning, and the task of tap- ping what is already available in order to apply it to their own ends. Primary Military Interests in Economic Intelligence Military intelligence has the responsibility of keeping track of any change in economic factors that affect a country's ability to wage war. These CONFIDENTIAL 142 include new discoveries of mineral deposits, new crops and changing methods in agriculture, new industrial processes that affect the demands for labor and material and affect output and costs, changes in business, labor, and government that react on efficiency and allocation of resources, trends in capital investment, new depreciation and tax policies, trends in the price level, bank reserves, and inventory levels. Preparations for war become important to watch in an age when a sudden attack can be so crippling. Economic intelligence may well give warning of such action, for industry must also be mobilized for war. Clues may be provided by the stockpiling of critical materials, the develop- ment of higher cost substitutes and synthetics for what normally is imported, and conversion of civilian industry to the production of war goods. Such clues need coordination with political in- telligence to determine motivation. Since some economies are at all times regulated by the gov- ernment and "mobilized," the detailed study of all changes in their regulations, priorities, and al- locations may produce important leads in judging modifications of plans or timetables for military actions. Study of economic vulnerabilities is continuous also, for a dynamic economy is faced with chang- ing pressures and shortages. Especially when a war becomes hot, and military action and economic warfare are modifying the enemy's economy, a close watch is essential so that counteractions will have maximum effect. Considering the wartime hazards to collection, such an assessment will be possible only if a prior basic analysis was prepared when there was time to gather and assess the origi- nal set of facts. Analytical Criteria Assessment of economic data must include the application of many different criteria, all of which are important, such as the study of particular in- dustries with their problems of production and pricing; the whole fiscal and monetary system with questions of the price level, savings, investment, and employment; the problems of ownership and income distribution; the problems of consumption and of institutions. Micro-economics with its attention to supply and demand of particular Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 COMPONENTS OF INTELLIGENCE KNOWLEDGE CONFIDENTIAL commodities and its concern with competition, monopoly, and monopolistic or monoposonistic competition is best known to the beginning student. Macro-economics is more recent, but offers some singularly effective analytical tools for intelli- gence purposes. The approach is in terms of the interactions of particular events on the economy as a whole. Some of the most useful results are ap- parent in the national income accounting analysis done by the Department of Commerce. In effect it is the old "Tableau Economique" of Quesnay brought up to date to combine modern accounting procedures with present economic thinking into a large number of mutually supporting tables. The intelligence significance is that even if a foreign country tries to hide its activities almost anything that it does in the economic sphere will have reper- cussions that will leave telltale signs. If it tries to hide much basic information, such data may be derived anyway by analytical techniques that have been developed so fully in the last decade or so in the United States. Some of them are highly com- plex and lie beyond the scope of this study, but their importance is not to be minimized. This sug- gests that the requests for certain types of eco- nomic data which may mean little to the layman frequently include keys to very big secrets. There- fore, the economic data collected by naval attach& or observers abroad may be ultimately as impor- tant as information on strictly naval subjects. European Illustrations Hitler's Mein Kampf made clear his political views and intentions long before he came to power, although its significance was not seen by the public at large. Once the Nazis came to power, however, economic intelligence disclosed German prepara- tions for war. Economic regimentation began as early as 1933, with many telltale signs. State- directed planning was the rule, and heavy arms orders were fed to industry. Labor was mobilized through the Deutsche Arbeitsfront and the pro- duction of civilian goods was progessively reduced. The conquest of Czechoslovakia was an important addition to German economic potential because of the acquisition of the Skoda works and an addi- tional labor supply. German ingenuity went to work on developing substitute materials for those that would be cut off by war. All of these de- 143 velopments pointed to a growing capability of carrying on a major war effort. The success of German preparations was indicated by the length of time they were able to fight against a coalition of nations numerically and industrially stronger. One of the most interesting exploits of economic intelligence involved the German oil industry. Especially after the dissolution of her friendship pact with the Soviet Union, Germany had only the Rumanian Ploesti fields and minor wells in Hun- gary and Poland as sources of petroleum. To take the place of natural petroleum, German chemists had developed new processes for extracting oil and gasoline from coal, which brought costs down to a fairly reasonable level. It was natural that the strategic nature of these German automotive fuels prompted special attention by allied intelligence and target specialists and it became most impor- tant that attacks be centered on all facilities of the industry to paralyze German transport and aviation. Planners remembered well that in World War I German transport came to a halt be- cause of a shortage of lubricants. Some excellent intelligence on German oil facilities came from secret sources, but the most accurate and com- plete was obtained from the Germans themselves. German rail tariffs, like our own, include not only class rates but specific commodity rates on a place to place basis. In order to subsidize the vitally needed synthetic oil industry, special commodity rates were set up for each oil refinery. Just as in America, German law required that these rates had to be published, and the Germans methodically printed such information in rate bulletins and in an obscure technical traffic magazine. Allied in- telligence subscribed to this magazine through a Swiss address, and regularly found each new secret oil refinery listed with information as to the open- ing date for the new rates,. It was then a simple matter to pinpoint the facility on the map and de- stroy it by bombing. Before the war was over, German aircraft were grounded in considerable de- gree by the shortage of fuel. Less successful were Allied attempts to cripple Germany's ball-bearing industry which was being augmented by supplies from neutral Sweden. The British, too, were getting considerable quan- tities of Swedish ball bearings, but attempts to buy up the entire production were unsuccessful. The CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS Swedish SKF concern had expanded facilities, and deliveries were being made to Germany in return for safe conduct to Swedish ships bringing in es- sential imports to the homeland. Some of the most spectacular and costly Allied air attacks deep in Germany were aimed at destroying ball-bearing plants, notably at Schweinfurt, but the chief ob- jective was not gained. Germany restored pro- duction much more rapidly than anticipated and redesigned her war equipment to require fewer bearings. The war was almost over before the Swedes were persuaded to cut off further ship- ments, and by that time ball bearings were no longer a determining factor in the German war effort. The whole experience illustrated the im- portance of correct assessment of economic intelli- gence as well as its collection. German economic intelligence about the Allies was fairly good, notably in the data collected on Allied ocean convoys. Due to censorship leaks, secret radio broadcasts, and marine insurance re- insured in neutral countries, German U-boats were frequently able to pick off the most critical ships in our convoys with disastrous results. It took con- siderable effort to minimize these leaks. Pacific Illustrations Japan's military ambitions were made clear not only through the controversial "Tanaka Memo- rial," the activities of the Black Dragon Society, and the attacks on China, but also from economic intelligence. Some fundamental changes in the Japanese economy were noted and set forth in a Harvard University study by Mrs. E. B. Schum- peter (et al.), The Inclust2-ialization of Japan and Maneh,ukuo, that appeared just before the war. Although this was a study based on overt sources for public purposes, it revealed for the first time considerable detail on changes in the Japanese economy. In 1937, as a war measure, the Japa- nese had banned the publication of all economic data; they were aware of its great significance. A great void developed in year books, trade re- turns, periodicals, and industry publications. In fact, they were so successful in hiding informa- tion that their own planning was hampered, and postwar search of Japanese government records indicates that many vital economic records were not even maintained, and thus represent gaps that CONFIDENTIAL 144 interfere with analyses of Japan's position. The Schumpeter study did reveal, despite the incom- pleteness of data, that the Japanese economy was switching from primary dependence on export production of such items as textiles and ceramics to heavy industry, chemicals, and instruments, all needed for war purposes. Further, the study re- vealed that Japan had been converted during the late 1930's from an island kingdom to a conti- nental power, for much of the new industry was located in Korea and Manchuria. In passing, the pitfalls of jumping at too easy conclusions are evident in connection with postwar Japan. That defeated nation, hard hit by war and with shrunken boundaries, has faced major dilemmas. Some people have advocated concen- tration on light industries that use labor rather than imported raw materials, and thus minimize balance of payment difficulties. Unfortunately, however, from the Japanese point of view, these are the very industries being developed by the nations which are the chief potential markets for Japanese goods, so a weakened Japan, unlikely to be a military threat, is developing heavy indus- tries whose production will outstrip that achieved during the peak of her militaristic period. This has American encouragement. The military in- telligence assessment cannot be based upon eco- nomic data alone, as these economic facts of the new Japan must be linked to political and geo- graphic changes both in Japan and in the world as a whole before they attain real meaning. Current Problems Some details of the Soviet economy will be pre- sented later. Economic intelligence today from that area must be based on careful analysis of open Soviet broadcasts of information, statements in the Soviet press, study of Soviet foreign purchases, "Wringer" reports from all kinds of persons who have been behind the Iron Curtain, and such lim- ited observations as diplomatic personnel are al- lowed to make. What of Soviet activities here? We know that for a long time Soviet purchasing agents were able to tour our factories and buy our patents. The volume of economic data published by both government and private concerns is so tremendous that little is hidden, and that fact itself may give us partial protection because it Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 COMPONENTS OF INTELLIGENCE KNOWLEDGE CONFIDENTIAL places a heavy burden of analysis on the Russians. Could we hide information from them? Un- doubtedly, there are many particulars easy for them to collect, but it should be emphasized that analytical techniques today are such that the hid- ing of the broad facts of our economy from the enemy would require repressive measures incom- patible with the efficient operation of a private enterprise economy. Hiding facts from ourselves could seriously cripple the planning and pricing activities of American businessmen. A competi- tive system is presupposed in economic analysis to be one with freedom of information. In conclu- sion, then, short of radical security measures, the United States must be reconciled to losing more information to totalitarian enemies than it gains, but much can be gained through intensive exploi- tation of available sources and careful analysis. TECHNICAL AND SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE The developments in military science which have been produced in recent years by science and tech- nology constitute but one aspect of the profound change which the industrial revolution has caused in the environment of modern man. B. H. Lid- dell-Hart, the British military expert, analyzes the subject in his book, The Revolution in Warfare: Science and technology have produced a greater transformation of the physical condi- tions and apparatus of life in the past two hundred years than had taken place in the previous two thousand years. Yet when men turn these tremendous new powers to a war purpose, they employ them as recklessly as their ancestors employed the primitive means of the past, and they pursue the same tradi- tional ends without regard to the difference of effect. Indeed, the governments of modern nations at war have largely ceased to think of the postwar effects which earlier statesmen were wise enough to bear in mind?a consid- eration which led in the eighteenth century to a self-imposed limitation of methods. Mod- ern nations have reverted to a more primitive extreme?akin to the practices of warfare be- tween barbaric hordes that were armed with spear and sword?at the same time as they have become possessed of science-given in- struments for multiple destruction at long range. The revolution in warfare has thus been two-sided?on the one side, in the instruments, 145 the technique of warfare; on the other side, in the character of warfare. Technical and scientific intelligence are directly concerned with the "instruments and techniques" in which so profound a change has taken place. Consideration of a new instrument, or weapon, is meaningless without taking into account the con- ditions under which it is to be used and the method of its employment. To match the increased speed and scope of war, scientific research and development were, during World War II, expedited as never before, and in this postwar period of world tension they con- tinue to be pressed with the greatest possible ur- gency, particularly in the fields of atomic energy, jet propulsion, and guided missiles. Technical and scientific progress continue to force the revi- sion of ancient and time-tested military concepts, and to dictate even more revolutionary changes in the design of ships, planes, and tanks which for- merly embodied those concepts. Intelligence of a new weapon originated by an enemy perforce leads to feverish efforts to develop a counterweapon, in which the enemy in turn is vitally inter- ested. Tactical surprise, which in earlier wars had been achieved by novel dispositions of armies and fleets, was in World War II gained also by the unleashing of new weapons such as the atomic bomb, and by improvisation, such as skip bomb- ing, in the employment of weapons already de- veloped. Never before have the twin qualities of flexibility of mind and the ability to gaze in- telligently into the crystal ball of the future been so vital to military men and to the political leaders to whom the security of the nation is jointly entrusted. Science and technology were placed at the dis- posal of the ground, sea, and air forces of the United States during World War II, and in many cases new weapons and items of equipment de- signed for one specific branch of the armed forces were adopted by the others as well, or were fitted to the needs of more than one service. For ex- ample, new aircraft went to both Army and Navy to be used for different tactical purposes, and the principle of rocket power was used by the infan- try in the form of the bazooka, and by the Navy for antisubmarine warfare and for strafing enemy positions by LC (R) s; both Army and Navy em- CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS ployed rocket-equipped aircraft. The VT fuze was utilized as an antipersonnel weapon by the Army and as an antiaircraft weapon by the Navy. Therefore, it is advisable not to consider the tech- nical and scientific category of strategic intelli- gence from the specialized viewpoint of but one branch of the armed forces. Although we are concerned primarily with naval strategic intelli- gence, the technical and scientific component em- braces the contributions of research and develop- ment to land, sea, and air power. Definitions The official Navy definition of the technical and scientific category of strategic intelligence is suffi- ciently broad to permit a general discussion. In terms of Naval Intelligence, technical and scien- tific intelligence is defined as: "Disclosing the development of new materials, techniques, and munitions of war." The words "technology," "science," "research," and "development" are too well known to require definition, as are the adjectives derived therefrom. However, it is advisable at this point to break down the term "scientific research" into three parts, and to define each of them. 'These three parts are: 1. Pure research. 2. Background research. 3. Applied research and development. For definition of these phrases we turn to appen- dix 3 of Science: The Endless Frontier, a report to the President, dated July 1945, by Vannevar Bush, wartime Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development: 1. Pure research,.?Pure research is re- search without specific practical ends. It results in general knowledge and understand- ing of nature and its laws. This general knowledge provides the means of answering a large number of important practical prob- lems, though it may not give a specific solu- tion to any one of them. * * * The unpre- dictable nature of pure science makes desirable the provision of rather special cir- cumstances for its pursuit. Pure research de- mands from its followers the freedom of mind to look at familiar facts from unfamiliar points of view. It does not always lend itself to organized efforts and is refractory to direc- tion from above, in fact, nowhere else is the CONFIDENTIAL 146 principle of freedom more important for sig- nificant achievement. . . . 2. Background research,.?The preparation of accurate topographic and geologic maps, the collection of meteorological data, the de- termination of physical and chemical con- stants, the description of species of animals, plants, and minerals, the establishment of standards for hormones, drugs, and X-ray therapy; these and similar types of scientific work are here grouped together under the term background. research. Such background knowledge provides essential data for ad- vances in both pure and applied science. It is also widely used by the engineer, the physi- cian, and the public at large. In contrast to pure science, the objectives of this type of re- search and the methods to be used are reason- ably clear before an investigation is under- taken. Thus, comprehensive programs may be mapped out and the work carried on by relatively large numbers of trained personnel as a coordinated effort. . . . 3. Applied research, and development.? Applied research and development differs in several important respects from pure science. Since the objective can often be definitely mapped out beforehand, the work lends itself to organized effort. If successful, the results of applied research are of a definitely practi- cal or commercial value. The very heavy ex- penses of such work are, therefore, undertaken by private organizations only in the hope of ultimately recovering the funds invested. . . . The distinction between applied and pure re- search is not a hard and fast one, and indus- trial scientists may tackle specific problems from broad fundamental viewpoints. But it is important to emphasize that there is a per- verse law governing research: Under the pressure for immediate results, and unless de- liberate policies are set up to guard against this, applied research invariably drives out pure. The moral is clear: It is pure research which deserves and requires special protec- tion and specially assured support. The Time Element in Research and Development The importance of scientific progress, which de- pends on basic scientific research, to our Nation in time of peace and war is summed up by Dr. Bush in his report as follows: Progress in the war against disease depends upon a flow of new scientific knowledge. New products, new industries, and more jobs re- quire continuous additions to knowledge of the laws of nature, and the application of that Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 COMPONENTS OF INTELLIGENCE KNOWLEDGE CONFIDENTIAL knowledge to practical purposes. Similarly, our defense against aggression demands new knowledge so that we can, develop new and improved weapons. This essential new knowledge can be obtained only through basic scientific research. Science can be effective in the national wel- fare only as a member of a team, whether the condition be peace or war. But without sci- entific progress no amount of achievement in other directions can insure our health, pros- perity, and security as a nation in the modern world. Dr. Bush, in the above quotation, states that a form of warfare, war against disease, continues, in peacetime, and that our security against aggres- sion by other powers is intimately bound up with our prosperity and our national health. Research specialists in the medical field may be said to be intelligence officers of a certain kind, to whom the qualities of alertness, thoroughness, patience, and imagination are as essential as they are to mili- tary intelligence specialists. Now more than ever must scientific research specialists coordinate their effort with military intelligence specialists, in view, of the susceptibility of all nations to sudden attack directed against centers of population and industry. Developments in aircraft and guided missiles have increased the range and speed of de- livery of atomic bombs and toxic warfare agents. Thus scientists as well as specialists in strategic intelligence may be said to be today in our first line of defense. Not only must the state of our own scientific research and development be of interest to us, but we must also disclose, as promptly and completely as possible, the trends and achievements of sci- entific research and development in potential enemy nations. In his report, Dr. Bush empha- sizes the time element in modern war, and the necessity for peacetime scientific preparedness: The bitter and dangerous battle against the U-boat was a battle of scientific techniques? and our margin of success was dangerously small. The new eyes which radar has sup- plied can sometimes be blinded by new sci- entific developments. V-2 was countered only by capture of the launching sites. We cannot again rely on our Allies to hold off the enemy while we struggle to catch up. There must be more?and more adequate? military research in peacetime. It is essen- 147 tial that the civilian scientists continue in peacetime some portion of those contributions to national security which they have made so effectively during the war. This can best be done through a civilian controlled organiza- tion with close liaison with the Army and Navy, but with funds direct from Congress, and the clear power to initiate military re- search which will supplement and strengthen that carried on directly under the control of the Army and Navy. During peace, the time element in our own sci- entific research and development is closely related to the time element in obtaining strategic intelli- gence of scientific progress in other countries, in precisely the same way that the two were related during the war recently concluded. Furthermore, internal security and counterintelligence, as ap- plied to technology and science, are of continued importance. In World War II the deliberate and planned violation of security which took place in connec- tion with the atomic bomb was the disclosure to the world of the fact that it existed and that it worked. Security was also relaxed in connection with the VT fuze, one of the important new weap- ons produced by the Office of Scientific Research and Development. As in the case of the atomic bomb, a significant factor was the time element. Originally, the VT fuze had been allocated only to the Navy because of the possibility that the enemy might learn the secret if VT fuzed shells were fired over land. However, in the autumn of 1943, it became necessary to use VT fuzed shells for the protection of London and port areas in southern England which were eventually to serve as major staging areas for the Normandy invasion. The details of this situation are described by Dr. James P. Baxter III in his book, Scientists Against Time. Highly secret information re- ceived by the Allies indicated that the Germans intended to employ robot bombs against England. Some months before any were used, however, a detailed description of the new buzz bomb became available to OSRD. With this information, it was possible to construct a duplicate of the new German bomb and to conduct intensive tests. These tests revealed that the buzz bombs would activate the VT fuzes and that certain models of these fuzes could be effectively employed against the bombs. As a result of this new information CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Aoproved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS developed by careful research, a high level deci- sion was made to utilize VT fuzes as a means of aiding in the protection of the threatened areas of England. This emergency decision made available a helpful countermeasure which was ready for use in ample time. The urgency of the situation and the time element dictated the decision. The importance of the time element in the grand strategy of the Allied Nations in 1942, and the reasons for selecting Germany as the main target for attack instead of Japan, were explained by Secretary of War Patterson in an address before the American Chemical Society, 8 April 1946. In his speech the Secretary gave the following rea- sons for assigning priority to the European War: One was to take advantage of the concen- tration of forces. Russia was fighting Ger- many, but not Japan. Another was the shorter distance to Germany; the shorter dis- tance meant shorter time in getting into ac- tion. But the reason that seemed to me as compelling as any was the danger of the Ger- man scientists, the risk that they would come up with new weapons of devastating de- structiveness. There was no time to lose in eliminating German science from the war. There was no comparable peril from Japanese science. The wisdom of this decision is seen now in retrospect when we ponder the remarkable ad- vances made by German research and development in the latter half of World War II, particularly with respect to rockets, jet propulsion, and guided missiles. The race for new weapons and counter- weapons was ultimately won by the Allies, largely because of better mobilization and organization of scientific brainpower and because of greater armed might and industrial capacity, but the margin was close. The secret of our success in developing many new and improved types of weapons and equip- ment during World War II, and producing them in quantity and delivering them in time to be effectively employed against the enemy, lies in the coordination of our scientific and industrial po- tential, in close cooperation with the armed serv- ices. Our top strategic planners allocated mate- rials, scientific brainpower, and industrial compe- tence in accordance with priorities dictated by the overall grand strategy, and, by means of technical and scientific intelligence, kept abreast of scientific CONFIDENTIAL 148 research and development in enemy countries, and assessed the performance of our new weapons in action as they were developed. The Technical Intelligence Center and Missions The vital interest of the Office of Naval Intelli- gence in technological and scientific fields led to the establishment of the Technical Intelligence Center to deal with foreign technical subjects, in- cluding ordnance in all its phases, electronics, naval vessels and merchant ships and their char- acteristics and equipment, chemicals, synthetics, medicines, and aircraft (in collaboration with the Technical Air Intelligence Center). During World War II the Technical Intelli- gence Center had a dual purpose: 1. To keep the strategic and operations planners and the Navy at sea and in forward areas informed at all times of such technical de- velopments on the part of the enemy as might affect operations, tactics, or planning in any phase of the war. 2. To make available to bureaus of the Navy and other interested technical and scientific activities any information on foreign tech- nology which might lead to development of effective countermeasures on our part, the perfection of Allied weapons, or the evolu- tion of new materials and techniques. The Technical Intelligence Center profited by constant use of all the normal sources of intelli- gence within and outside the country. Of unusual significance was the detailed interrogation of cap- tured personnel, particularly those with scientific or technical background, with the Center itself conducting an examination of some of the most important prisoners. In maintaining liaison with other technical ac- tivities, the Technical Intelligence Center was responsible for directing the collection of specific items in fields of intelligence of extraordinary importance to American scientific research and development. To this end, the center coordinated the activities of our naval representatives abroad, particularly those of naval technical missions eventually established first in Europe and later in Japan. With the successful invasion of the European continent on 6 June 1944, and the advance of Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 COMPONENTS OF INTELLIGENCE KNOWLEDGE CONFIDENTIAL Allied forces into the German homeland, the ex- ploitation of German technical developments for possible use against Japan became a project of urgent importance in the final phase of the Euro- pean conflict. The determination of the nature and extent of German technical aid to Japan was in itself a project of vast significance. Strategic planners recognized that the rapid exploitation of this project, with correspondingly efficient development of countermeasures, might affect to a marked degree the duration of the war. There, the naval technical mission in Europe, working from lists of intelligence targets of prime impor- tance, was assigned the job of investigating and reporting on German technology; the Technical Intelligence Center in Washington coordinated the activities of the mission and assured proper distribution of its discoveries and reports. The detailed operation of NavTecMisEu teams in the European theater was an interesting and exciting chapter in the history of Naval Intelligence. The successful examination of German industrial plants, the painstaking and difficult search for records and files which were often partially de- stroyed or buried in cellars, and the continual and often dangerous hunt for key personnel by teams which travelled by air, train, jeep, and even on foot, resulted in an exceedingly valuable and com- prehensive record of German technological efforts. While the Japanese war ended too quickly thereafter for the United States to put into effect the countermeasures which resulted from this thoroughgoing investigation, the advantages ac- cruing to the American military and to private enterprise from a careful digest of German re- search, developments, and techniques can hardly be overestimated. An organization similar to NavTeeMisEu was created under the title, Naval Technical Mission Japan, with much the same ends in view. A brief account of the establish- ment, purpose and accomplishments of this group is contained in the following quotations from Summary Report, United States Naval Technical Mission to Japan: In the summer of 1945 . . . the United States Navy established a mission to deter- mine the position of the Japanese in the field of naval technology. How did the design and construction of their warships compare with ours ? What 149 range and power had their guns? How heavy was their armor and what was its metallurgy ? Were they ahead of us in electronics develop- ment ? The Navy wanted the answers to these and a thousand other technical questions. To obtain the desired information, investi- gators had to enter Japan with the occupation forces, before manufacturing plants, equip- ment, materials, and records could be de- stroyed and experienced personnel dispersed. NavTechJap, which became the abbreviated designation for the United States Naval Tech- nical Mission to Japan, was established on 14 August 1945 by directive of Commander in Chief and the Chief of Naval Operations . . . The purpose of the Mission was to survey all Japanese scientific and technological de- velopments of interest to the Navy and Marine Corps in the Japanese islands of Kyushu, Shikoku, Honshu, Hokkaido; in China; and in Korea south of latitude 38? N. This involved the seizure of intelligence mate- rial, its examination and study, the interroga- tion of personnel, and, finally, the preparation of reports which would appraise the techno- logical status of the Japanese Navy and Japa- nese industry. The mission remained in existence from 1 Sep- tember 1945 until 1 November 1946; its accom- plishments were stated to be as follows: A total of 185 separate reports comprising ap- proximately 10,000 printed pages were prepared and 500 copies of each were printed. Approximately 3,500 documents were seized and shipped to the Washington Document Center and the technical bureaus of the Navy Department. Approximately 15,000 pieces of equipment were seized and shipped to the United States for labora- tory investigation. The largest items were two 18.1-inch guns shipped from Kure, each 75 feet long and weighing 180 tons. The shipment to the United States of the 15,000 pieces of enemy equipment by the mission was but a continuation on a far larger scale of a pro- cedure established during the war, under which items of equipment captured in the field were for- warded to designated laboratories or test centers in the United States for detailed analysis and testing. In this phase of technical intelligence, the center served as a clearing house for items sent in, and for requests from Washington to forward areas for specific 'articles. By this means, the connection between reports of new weapons and CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS the pieces themselves was maintained, and ade- quate exploitation of the information assured. Another responsibility assigned to the Techni- cal Intelligence Center was that of evaluating and processing information on naval and merchant ships and their characteristics. All possible sources of information were continually scanned for data, comprehensive or fragmentary, on the existence or characteristics of new ships, or for alterations in existing vessels. The collation of this kind of intelligence with a detailed analysis of all types of photographs, including aerial and surface shots, during the war resulted in far greater knowledge of enemy ships than had ever been available before. The size, probable per- formance, equipment, and appearance of the bat- tleships Tomato and Musash,i, secrets so closely guarded in Japan that even men who had worked aboard the vessels knew little about them, were revealed with amazing accuracy by this method. Another instance of the detailed processing of ship data occurred in connection with the conver- sion of the Japanese battleships Ise and Hyuga to carry aircraft on a "flight deck" abaft the main- mast. Prisoner-of-war reports were carefully checked with the Preliminary Design Section of the Bureau of Ships, and, without benefit of photo- graphs or sketches, a drawing was prepared of the possible appearance of the two vessels. The close similarity of the drawing to the ships them- selves, as revealed in the second battle of the Philippine Sea, is testimony to both the possibili- ties and value of expert processing of ship in- formation. Throughout the war the Technical Intelligence Center made available to strategic planners and to the fleet the latest information on the enemy's naval vessels, including such important factors as the speed, armament, armor, and specialized equip- ment of each enemy unit. As a means of assuring the distribution of in- formation on naval and merchant vessels, the Tech- nical Intelligence Center took over the basic work accomplished by the Identification and Charac- teristics Section in the publication field, and pre- pared standard reference manuals on the fleets of the world, together with a comprehensive volume on merchant vessels. The ONI 22 series on the naval vessels of Japan, Russia, Britain, and the CONFIDENTIAL 150 United States and other countries contains all available information on dimensions, armament, protection, and propulsion of each ship, as well as carefully prepared plan and profile drawings and detailed photographs. These publications serve innumerable uses as basic reference manuals and provide source material for recognition train- ing, naval staff work, and study at the Naval War College. ONI 209, A Manual of Merchant Ships, includes statistical information on over 13,000 vessels now afloat, in a convenient, readily avail- able index, and profiles of approximately 8,000 of these ships. Included also is a section originally designed to assist in the recognition of German raiders and blockade runners in the Atlantic, South Pacific, and Indian Oceans. In addition to these standard works, the center distributed other information on weapons and equipment through the medium of special publications, and also in articles in The ONI -Weekly and its suc- cessor, The ONI Review. As a result of the flood of information from the European theater subsequent to the Allied pene- tration of Germany, an expeditious method had to be promulgated to assure adequate distribution of vital intelligence data to those technical activi- ties best qualified to analyze the information and develop any latent value it might contain. At the same time it was apparent that much of the tech- nical data from abroad was of interest and im- portance concurrently to a number of widely scattered organizations, and, as mentioned above, to private industry. A technical library of all reports and related data was therefore established in the Technical In- telligence Center which permitted immediate ref- erence by subjects to all available information. A staff of experts was assigned the task of analyzing and briefing each incoming item of information. Members of the staff were required to know the needs of various technical organizations and to be familiar with projects being carried on by them, in order to make immediate distribution of needed data. At the same time accession lists were dis- seminated, containing brief abstracts of the con- tents of incoming documents, by means of which interested activities were apprised of the existence of these reports. Processing this type of informa- tion, translating, duplicating, and disseminating Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : COMPONENTS OF INTELL CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 IGENCE KNOWLEDGE CONFIDENTIAL was a tremendous task, and one in which the entire Office of Naval Intelligence participated, and of which it can be justifiably proud. ARMED FORCES INTELLIGENCE Even though nonmilitary methods of warfare? political, economic, and psychological ? have grown in use and importance, their ultimate suc- cess will be largely conditioned by physical force or the threat of fts use. Military strength has his- torically been the basis of national power, the hard core of all the elements through which a nation realizes its strategic objectives in peace and war. Armed forces intelligence is therefore derived from timely and accurate information of military strength, both in being and potential. It is an evaluation of the aggregate power of all the armed services, as well as a detailed analysis of each serv- ice. As a component of intelligence knowledge it has a particularly strong relationship to the other components, for armed forces are definitely influenced by a nation's geographic position, the adequacy of its transport and communications systems, its sociological, political, and economic structure, its scientific capabilities, and the per- sonalities of leaders in each arm of the military establishment. Because of these relationships; armed forces intelligence is most complex, and in order to make valid deductions the intelligence officer or strategic analyst must have not only pro- fessional competence in military matters, but also a wealth of background knowledge in those aspects of national life which govern military affairs. In an age of amphibious landings, combined operations, and "tri-elemental" warfare, Naval In- telligence is concerned with all the elements of land and air as well as sea power. Coastal zones may be dominated by either ground or naval forces, or by carrier-based or land-based air forces. Ex- tensive sea areas may also be controlled from the adjacent land. World War II provided striking examples of the effectiveness of close coordination of armies, fleets, and aircraft in achieving victory. The naval intelligence officer will often be as- signed to a joint or combined staff where he will be closely associated with his opposite numbers in the Army and Air Force. It is incumbent upon him, therefore, to become familiar with the mis- sion, organization, and professional nomenclature 151 of the other services. He should be a keen ob- server of their operations, learn the capabilities of their weapons, and appreciate their problems. The ensuing discussion of the armed forces will point out the various elements which must be con- sidered in the development of this component of intelligence knowledge. THE ARMED FORCES IN GENERAL Control Political, administrative, and command control must be clearly distinguished. They may be vested in the same officials or be separated by an elaborate system of checks and balances. In most countries a semblance of civilian control of the armed forces is preserved, but actual control is not always the same as that prescribed by the consti- tution. Usually in democracies a single cabinet member of the executive branch, a civilian, is in charge of all military affairs. In Latin American democracies, however, it is often true that civilian control over the army exists only in theory, for the military may have acquired control over the executive branch by force of arms. Civilian control of the military sometimes takes fantastic forms. During the past several years the Soviet Government has been trying to intro- duce a certain amount of "culture" into the officer corps of its armed services. It appears that "cul- ture" does not require an officer to become a con- noisseur of the arts but relates to neatness in dress and better table manners. The official officers' guide contains the following directives: Don't comb your hair during meals; don't stretch your legs out; and don't open your col- lar . . . The fork is held in the left hand, the knife in the right hand, and not vertically but horizontally . . . To eat with the knife alone is quite indecent. . . . Don't exhale into the faces of others. Any important change in the top control struc- ture effected in time of war must be carefully noted. If such a change involves the formulation of a joint general staff or other unified control, its composition and the methods whereby coordina- tion is achieved and differences resolved become significant. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS Composition and Size The armed forces of a nation may include in addition to army, navy, and air, certain compo- nents with police and border security functions, which are integrated into the armed forces in time of war or emergency. The United States Coast Guard, for example, under the Treasury Depart- ment in peacetime becomes a part of the Navy in time of war. In East Germany the B ereit- sehaf ten or "Alert Police" constitutes the nucleus for an army, and the "Sea Police" can become a navy. An estimate of the armed forces of the U. S. S. R. will include consideration of the se- curity forces of the M. V. D. Data on the size of the armed forces consists of more than figures on the total personnel strength of each service. The relationship of the strength of the armed forces to total population must be shown, and significant trends in size and propor- tion indicated. Comparative figures over a pe- riod of years are essential. Position in the Nation The chief factors to consider in determining the position of the armed forces in the nation are the legal or constitutional basis for their existence and organization, the traditions responsible for popu- lar attitudes toward them, their role in political life, and the fiscal support they receive. When- ever the prestige and power of the armed forces appears to be due in part to foreign influences, the development of such influences should be care- fully traced. Knowledge of these matters will provide the researcher with the proper perspective for detailed study of individual arms and services. In many countries the size of the armed forces and the proportion of the total military budget allotted to each arm are specifically restricted by law. An examination of such laws will help to ascertain whether the present government pre- serves their letter and spirit or whether the armed forces have come to their present status without regard for legal basis. Public law may also pro- vide for organizational structure; for example, in the United States, the National Security Act of 1947 represented a fundamental change toward unification of the American military establish- ment. An understanding of our present military structure can only be gained through familiarity CONFIDENTIAL 152 with the provisions of this law and its amend- ments. The attitude of the people toward the armed forces is important in determining the position of the military as a whole or the prestige of an in- dividual arm. In Great Britain, for example, the Royal Navy is the senior service, the result, of course, of the place of sea power in British history and traditions. In America, the Army has been the senior service since the time oithe Revolution- ary War when national objectiv"& were achieved through effective use of ground forces. Reverence for military leaders and popular approval of stern military discipline have been important elements in the willingness of the German people to go to war. The victories or defeats of past wars may have contributed to the present attitude of the people of a nation toward war and military or naval affairs. National emergencies can likewise change the people's attitudes. In the United States, for example, popular enthusiasm for mili- tary matters and the prestige of military men have always been greater in wartime than in pe- riods between wars. In countries where conscrip- tion is resented the armed forces will not enjoy popular esteem, civilian control is apt to be more firmly established, and the efficiency of national defense may even be impaired. The morale and accomplishments of the military establishment or of an individual service may instill admiration and respect in the popular mind, and become an incentive for the most capable citizens to seek military service. In countries where citizen soldiers far outnumber professionals, the public attitude will be conditioned by the treatment ac- corded reservists while on active duty. The political influence of military men must also be assessed. Does the party in power take particu- lar steps to keep popular military figures removed from the political scene? Do political leaders re- quire military support to further their objectives? Associated with such considerations are the ex- istence of political factions within the services and the extent of political intrigue. Measures taken to insure the loyalty of members of the mili- tary establishment and the manner of dealing with subversive elements are important in respect to some countries. For example, in the U. S. S. R., political reliability is a requirement for promotion Approved For Release 2003/12/09: CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 COMPONENTS OF INTELLIGENCE KNOWLEDGE CONFIDENTIAL in the officers corps, and a special organization within the military services is charged with the political indoctrination of enlisted personnel. In determining the national position of the armed forces the manner of allocation and control of appropriated funds are just as important as the amount of the appropriations themselves. What proportion of the total national budget is allotted to the armed services? Are any items for military purposes concealed in the budget figures as published? Often the executive branch of the government will have considerable funds available for expenditure without public accounting. The Manhattan project, for example, which developed the A-bomb during World War II, cost over two billion dollars, but the expenditures were never published as items in a military budget for secu- rity reasons. The national objectives of a country will be re- flected in its military budget. A striking example can be found in the present tremendous rise of United States military expenditures to meet the threat of aggression in Korea. It also reflects the growing realization that America can no longer rely on her ocean barriers. New problems of na- tional security require extensive funds for research to improve existing weapons and equipment. Manpower Analysis of a nation's manpower was initially treated in the preceding discussion of the sociologi- cal component. The same principles apply here, but more attention is given to manpower from the military point of view, differentiating between manpower as a whole and that section of it which is drawn upon for the armed forces. Statistics must be presented showing availability and quality of men fit for military service. How many young men annually reach military age, and what is the average number inducted? The basic military service laws and the general conscription system should be studied. What are the actual practices in granting deferments, and what proportion of the number available is affected by such reg- ulations? In estimating the quality of military manpower, attention must be given to physique, intelligence, education, amenability to hardship, aptitude for handling and maintaining technical or complex 269196-54--11 153 equipment, and general attitudes, such as accept- ance of discipline, esprit de corps, and loyalty. The discussion to this point has concerned armed forces as a whole. The balance of this section will deal with ground, naval, and air forces separately, and the detailed information regarding each which is needed in the production of accurate armed forces intelligence. GROUND FORCES Administration of the Army The best way to present overall organization is by a chart showing the main subdivisions of the War Ministry, or the Department of the Army, and the chain of command to territorial headquar- ters and field forces. The structure of the High Command should be included and comments made on the functions of main bureaus and staff divi- sions. Maps showing the boundaries of military districts and the location of headquarters are essential. The various arms and services of the Army must be accurately described, using nomenclature in the language of the country. Any distinctive insig- nia worn by certain troop units should be described or illustrated. Tactical Organization The overall organization of the Army into tacti- cal commands can also be presented in chart form, supplemented by a description of basic tactical units and field staffs. If there are any differences between the tactical organization in time of war and that of the peacetime Army, note should be made of them. Additional charts can be prepared to show the detailed organization of divisions and smaller independent combat units, including strengths and allotment of weapons and vehicles. Comparison with similar organizations in the United States Army is always helpful. Descrip- tions should be carried down to the smallest ele- ments, such as rifle squad or tank platoon. The organization of service units, engineers, signal, transportation, etc., should be given in the same detail as that of combat units. Nomencla- ture should be carefully recorded, for it varies considerably in armies of the world. American equivalents again serve as good standards of corn- CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS parison. Therefore, for background purposes, the following brief discussion of United States Army divisions is appropriate. The Infantry Division An infantry division is typically composed of three regiments of infantry, a medium tank bat- talion, a combat engineer battalion, an antiaircraft artillery automatic weapons battalion, and four field artillery battalions. It is designed to hit hard, maneuver over any terrain, absorb reinforc- ing units easily, and show considerable staying power. In specific situations it may require addi- tional artillery, armor, engineers, or service units. It gives close support to armored units, seizes, holds, or envelops objectives, and engages in neces- sary close combat. The ratio of combat to service troops is 1 to 1. In its present composition it is a more powerful striking force than its World War II counterpart, for each regiment also has a medium tank company. The combat engineers can build roads, bridges, ferries; lay mine fields and obstacles; build shelters, landing strips, water- works; and in emergency fight as infantry. Infantry weapons include rifles, bayonets, auto- matic rifles, machine guns, mortars, carbines, pis- tols, grenades, light antitank weapons, recoilless rifles, flamethrowers, and tanks. Infantry has the advantage of being able to move inconspicuously in small groups, taking full advantage of terrain. Battle effectiveness over a period of time requires rotation of units, proper supply, and medical service. When Army infantry is used in amphibious operations, the battalion landing team is the basic organization. Necessary boats and amphibious vehicles take the place of much of the motor equipment. The Armored Division The armored division is the basic large armored unit, a balanced force of ground arms designed to be tactically and administratively self-sufficient for missions requiring great mobility and. fire- power. Typically, it is composed of 15 battalions: 4 tank, 4 armored infantry, 4 armored field artillery, 1 antiaircraft automatic weapon, 1 reconnais- sance, and 1 armored engineer. In addition, there are the necessary headquarters and service troops, including combat commands as required. It is very flexible in organization and employment. An armored division is especially suited for deep penetration and seizure operations, mobile defense, and destruction of hostile armor. If it cannot lead an assault, it can attack through an infantry division after obstacles have been breached or bridged. Maintaining its momentum is important to full effectiveness. CONFIDENTIAL 154 The Airborne Division Just as amphibious operations require special techniques and equipment, so too do airborne as- saults. All equipment must be transportable by air. The ground units depend upon the Air Force for airlift just as amphibious units depend on the Navy. Airborne divisions frequently are or- ganized in three combat teams, each with an in- fantry regiment, an artillery battalion, an engineer company, and a medical detachment. Other per- sonnel include a parachute maintenance company, antitank and pathfinder platoons. The airborne division enters combat in three echelons: an assault group, either parachuted or landed from assault transports; a followup group, landed in the air head either by assault or regular transports; and a rear echelon of maintenance and administrative personnel. The division is no more mobile than any other without its airlift. Its radius of action is deter- mined by the aircraft it uses. Typically, it re- quires 751 Fairchild Packets (C-119), 161 Chase Avitrucks (C--123) , and 16 Douglas Globemasters (0-421). Because of dependence on airlift, which in turn depends on good weather, airborne operations are usually limited to short duration strikes against key targets in the enemy rear where opposing forces will be weak or scattered. Operations are usually intended for early joining with other ground forces, raid and withdrawal, or special aid to guerrillas. An independent operation, such as the seizure and expansion of an air head, is possi- ble, but requires a major effort since medium tanks and heavy artillery are not available to an airborne unit. Sufficient air superiority must be main- tained to prevent the enemy from taking effective counteraction over a period of time. Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002 9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 COMPONENTS OF INTELLIGENCE KNOWLEDGE The strategic mobility of airborne forces, sub- ject to the command of the theater headquarters, is a threat to the enemy by its very presence in the theater of operations. At present the radius of action for large-scale airborne operations is about 730 miles; it could be extended to 1,000 miles with the aid of carrier-based aircraft. Order of Battle In time of war, a large part of the total military intelligence effort is devoted to enemy order of battle: specific information on the strength and disposition of opposing forces. Strength is meas- ured in terms of personnel, units, and armament. Disposition refers to the locations of identified units, their headquarters, and movements. For the operational commander such information on the enemy is imperative, and he must also try to keep from the enemy corresponding information on his own forces. This denial to the enemy of order of battle intelligence was well illustrated early in the Korean War when General Douglas MacArthur's headquarters asked correspondents to refrain from identifying military units in the Korean operations and reporting the whereabouts of headquarters or troop movements. Order of battle intelligence is expanded to in- clude tactical doctrines and methods, combat value of troops, records of performance of identified units, and personal data on unit commanders. If the information gathered by the intelligence re- searcher in peacetime is painstaking in attention to details, the task of the combat intelligence offi- cer in the field will be made easier. The need for including data on weapons and equipment in order of battle information is well illustrated by an experience of the United States Marines in Korea. The First Marine Division had made contact with an enemy unit. By inter- rogating a prisoner, the Marine Intelligence officer learned that this unit was a full North Korean di- vision. Consulting his order of battle file, he further learned that an artillery battalion is at- tached to each North Korean division and that its armament consists of 18 76-mm. guns and 18 122-mm. howitzers. Thus he was able to supply his commander with valuable combat intelligence on the firepower of the enemy. Order of battle data can be effectively recorded 155 CONFIDENTIAL on a situation plot for a given area of operations by pins and symbols as far as identifications and locations are concerned. A card file giving de- tails on individual units is an indispensable reference. Strategy and Tactics Since the strategic military problems of a nation are influenced by such factors as geographical position, nature of terrain, economic capabilities, and political system, the analyst's task is to study the land fortifications and costal defenses in the light of the nation's strategic concepts. Detailed information must be gathered on the location, pur- pose, characteristics, and manning of defense in- stallations. Presentation on a map will give a good graphic picture. Whenever possible, sketches or ground plans of individual fortifications should be included. The basic tactical doctrines of the Army offen- sively and defensively must be carefully studied in comparison with those of the United States Army. How is artillery used in support of ground forces? Cavalry? Tanks? Are there any pre- ferred types of field fortifications or ground ob- stacles? What use is made of reconnaissance? What tactics are employed in close combat? The doctrines established in special operations must also be included, such as amphibious landings, air- borne operations, and guerrilla warfare. Opera- tions in desert, jungle, or mountain terrain require special tactics. Similarities and differences with respect to United States doctrine should be pointed out. Personnel and Training The rank structure and system of pay and al- lowances of a foreign army can be presented in tabular form, with the United States equivalent providing a basis for comparison. Any particu- lar differences may require a descriptive explana- tion. When pay is given in the terms of the country's monetary system, the equivalent in dol- lars at a stated rate of exchange is necessary. Military pay should also be evaluated according to the standard of living in the country. Additional considerations with respect to per- sonnel are the methods of procurement, terms of service, and any quality factors not covered under manpower. An assessment of military leadership CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS against a background of the military history and traditions of the nation is valuable in a strategic estimate. Details on the ground forces training program should include training of the individual soldier as well as that of all types of units. The army school system for officers and enlisted men, regular and reserve, the character of training maneuvers, and the overall effectiveness of instruction are pertinent considerations. Closely allied to training are the reserve and mobilization systems. The total number of trained reserves should be presented by age groups. In regard to mobilization plans an estimate should be made of the actual numbers which could be called up and ready for field service on M-day, M plus 30, M plus 60, etc. Logistics Logistics enters into every phase of military activity: production, procurement, storage and issue, transport of supplies, maintenance and re- pair on the field, and evacuation of both equipment and personnel. Many a battle or war has been lost through logistics failures and contrariwise superb logistics support made victory possible for Ameri- can armies in the farflung campaigns of World War II. More recently the failure of Chinese Communist Forces in Korea to sustain offensives for long periods of time has been due to their in- ability to maintain the nesessary amount of ma- teriel at the front to support their operations. The better logistics of the United Nations, on the other hand, has enabled a numerically smaller force to contain the enemy attacks. The analyst or researcher thus considers all the factors of logistics in preparing an estimate of a foreign army. He very quickly finds that he needs accurate knowledge of industrial production and economic affairs in order to make his analysis complete. Army logistics are of particular concern to the Navy because the transport of men and supplies for any overseas operation is a naval responsi- bility. Logistic planning in the United States Army is based on the "division slice," that is, the total number of men in both combat and com- munications zones. For example, a theater di- vision slice totals 40,000 men: 30,000 in the combat CONFIDENTIAL 156 zone (20,000 in the division area, 10,000 in corps and army service areas) and 10,000 in the com- munications zone. H. G. Martin in Brassey's Annual for 1951 makes some interesting comparisons between the division slice of American and Soviet Armies: Within two months of the outbreak of war the Soviet Army could probably mobilize about 300 divisions; at the peak of its effort in the late war its total of divisions amounted to about 600. The Soviet Army achieves this multiplicity of divisions by a process of streamlining vigorously applied. Marshal Vasilevski believes that it is the men in the firing line who win battles. He sees to it, therefore, that in the Soviet Army there shall be as many men as possible in the firing line? at the expense of the rearward services?and that the ratio of weapons to men shall be higher than in Western armies. He has be- gun right down at rifle company level. Whereas in a rifle company in the United States Army there are thirty-seven men whose primary jobs are cooking, signalling, M. T. driving, or clerking, in a Soviet rifle company all but two are there for one purpose only? to shoot at the enemy . . . Clearly the West has something here to learn from Marshal Vasilevski's methods. Russia, with a plethora of cheap manpower, has given us, with our manpower shortage, a striking lesson in economy of administra- tive overheads. Clerical staffs, cooks, or- derlies, M. T. drivers, signals, engineering and medical services?Marshal Vasilevski prunes the lot ruthlessly. Of course, his is a comparatively simple problem. He can afford to cut overheads because he is dealing with men accustomed to conditions that more civilized Westerners would find intolerable. For instance, in the Soviet Army there is no personal documen- tation of soldiers below the rank of major; the medical battalion of a division is only eighty strong. Moreover, Vasirevski is faced by the fact that in Russia there is no educated class of minor technicians. Thus with the best will in the world he could not have provided the Soviet artillery with the men to do the sur- vey, work out the computations, and man the ? observation posts on a western scale. Per- force, he must there cut overheads at the sacrifice of some flexibility of fire of his ar- tillery. Finally, he has a comparatively small zone of communications to deal with. If war ? 41. ? V ? ? V I I 111 I Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 COMPONENTS OF INTELLIGENCE KNOWLEDGE CONFIDENTIAL should come, the Soviet Army would advance from its bases in Occupied Eastern Europe in an attempt to overrun the western fringe. Throughout, Vasilevski would be fighting al- most on his own doorstep; but not so the United States or even the British armies? theirs would be an overseas campaign, fought through a zone of communications that must add greatly to the magnitude of the divisional slice. Nonetheless, when we have made all these allowances we still are left with our lesson to learn. The West cannot afford to put so few of its soldiers into battle.?Bras- my's Annual, The Armed Forces Yearbook, 1951, pp. 261-2. Materiel Intelligence on ground forces materiel is gained through detailed information on ordnance, signal, and engineer equipment, quartermaster, chemical, and medical supplies. Tables of characteristics must be prepared for specific items in each cate- gory of ordnance and quality as well as quantity described. Quartermaster supplies include uni- form, insignia, decorations, individual and unit equipment. Any experimentation with new items of materiel should be noted. Often the Quarter- master Corps is currently engaged in a number of research projects to determine the adaptability of such things as clothing for certain weather con- ditions, and the Engineers may be testing a new type of portable bridge. Information on medical supplies, facilities, and equipment are important in evaluating the combat effectiveness of the army in the field. The existence, for example, of a national blood bank for military use should not escape the analyst's notice. Obviously every nut and bolt cannot be de- scribed, and so the problem becomes one of se- lection of significant items representative of type and class. Photographs or sketches are always helpful. It is in this subdivision of armed forces intelligence that technical intelligence makes its greatest contribution. Conclusions reached by the technical evaluator often have far wider im- plications than those apparent from the examina- tion of an individual piece of equipment. NAVAL FORCES To make an appraisal of the naval forces of a foreign country the factors considered are in prin- ciple much the same as those for the ground forces. Organization, strength and disposition, strategic and tactical doctrine, personnel, training, logistics, and materiel have a similar bearing on the deter- mination of strengths and weaknesses. Com- parisons with the U. S. Navy and American equivalents of nomenclature will give proper per- spective to the study of foreign navies. Organization In addition to diagrams showing the overall command and administration of the navy, maps outlining the naval districts, and discussion of the functions of the more important department and staff components of the naval establishment, spe- cial attention should be given to naval communi- cations. The organization of naval communica- tions networks, and the various existing naval communications facilities can also be graphically presented on charts and maps. Tactical and administrative organization of the forces afloat should include shipboard organiza- tion of typical units. Shore support activities, and their relation to the fleet should be described. If quasi-naval organizations, such as Coast Guard, Coast Artillery, Coast Watchers, and Ma- rine Corps are not adequately covered in the pre- ceding sections on the armed forces as a whole, these should be properly included here. Strength and Disposition The disposition of ships into fleets and forces, names, types, and status of individual units can be presented in tabular form. Such information is never static, so the analyst should keep a card file on each naval vessel on which entries can be made to keep location and status up-to-date. The number of vessels in "mothballs," those used for reserve training, and those undergoing extensive repairs or alterations in shipyards should be clearly indicated. The total number of naval personnel should be broken down according to rank and rate, regular and reserve. The proportion serving in ships and at the shore activities of the naval establishment should be shown. Policy and Doctrine The capabilities of the navy in fulfilling its mis- sion with the forces available are fundamental con- 167 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR siderations in a strategic estimate. What factors influence naval thinking and strategic concepts? Are naval problems of real national concern, or must the navy wage annual battles with the legis- lature to obtain an adequate operating budget? How is naval doctrine formulated? Is it in- fluenced particularly by war experiences? Has the navy developed independent of foreign influ- ences? What are the naval traditions of the country? Every country which has a navy will also have a naval construction and development program. The political and economic factors bearing upon such plans must be noted. The Scandinavian countries, for example, are developing navies suit- able for coast defense and operation in restricted waters. The U. S. S. R. has been concentrating on submarines, destroyers, and light cruisers. Any foreign alliances the country may have will also influence naval policy and planning. Personnel The considerations which applied to army per- sonnel can serve as a guide to examination of the personnel of the navy: corps and services, rank and rate structure, procurement, conditions of serv- ice for both officers and enlisted men, uniforms and insignia. United States Navy equivalents of rank are important items of information in ob- serving naval honors when United States naval vessels are visiting foreign ports or when a foreign naval vessel comes to our shores. Reserve, Mobilization, and Training The recommissioning of ships in time of war, the naval reserve organization, the extent to which the merchant marine can augment the navy, and the adequacy of the mobilization system are major considerations. The effectiveness of the training system for officers and men must be assessed, in basic and specialist schools ashore, on shipboard, and in maneuvers of fleets and forces. Any spe- cial methods of instruction should be described; for example, the extent to which visual aids are employed, the realistic nature of exercises, or the use of educational facilities outside the navy. Logistics In addition to a description of the system of procurement and supply of naval materiel, the CONFIDENTIAL NAVAL OFFICERS policy in the construction, repair, and maintenance of naval vessels should be noted. Are naval or private shipyards in the country capable of doing all kinds of such work? Must the navy rely on foreign sources for any essential items? Where are the main naval depots located? Does the navy have fuel supply problems? Ship Design and Characteristics Of interest for strategic intelligence purposes is the adequacy of ship design for operations in certain areas. A ship designed for use in the waters of the North Sea may be entirely unsuited for tropical waters due to lack of an air condition- ing system. Arctic operations also require special ship design features. If amphibious operations are included in the navy's capabilities, careful at- tention should be given to the charactertistics of landing ships and craft. If there are aircraft carriers in the fleet, their strategic characteristics must be assessed in relation to the capabilities or vulnerablities of naval air forces. 158 Materiel Tabular summaries of the characteristics of all types of naval materiel are required: guns and ammunition, torpedoes, mines, antisubmarine weapons, electronic and communications equip- ment. Any deficiencies in quality or supply of particular items which affect the capabilities of certain ships, or of the navy as a whole, are significant considerations in strategic intelligence. AIR FORCE A strategic estimate of a nation's air forces must give consideration to the same factors as previously applied to the army and navy. The naval air arm, if such exists, can either be included with land-based air or discussed in connection with the navy. The analyst must take care to emphasize salient points of strength and weakness. In the light of the mission of the air forces, a careful study should be made of their capabilities, both as regards aircraft and personnel. Doctri- nal concepts in the utilization of available aircraft in time of war must be studied. Tactical Air Support Two types of tactical air support, close and general, must be considered. In close air sup- Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 COMPONENTS OF INTELLIGENCE KNOWLEDGE CONFIDENTIAL port, air action is integrated with the fire and movement of friendly ground forces against hos- tile targets or objectives. General air support comprises air operations against enemy air activi- ties, ground elements, installations, and lines of communication which assist the supported ground forces but are not in such proximity that inte- gration with their fire and movements is required. The capabilities of the air force in respect to both types of support, must be determined. The maxi- mum number and types of aircraft that can be assigned to such missions initially and on a sus- tained basis are important factors. Evaluation criteria will be performance in past wars and the emphasis given tactical air support in cur- rent training programs. The air forces doctrine in tactical air operations must be compared to that of the USAF and the USMC. Strategic Air Capabilities Here the analyst is concerned with the maxi- mum number and types of bombers available ini- tially and on a sustained basis. Range, bomb- load, maintenance of aircraft, availability of pilots and crews, location of bases, and many technical matters enter into such an estimate. The country's air defense system, that is, its ability to resist foreign air operations, is closely allied to offensive capabilities. Interest will cen- ter on the air defense organization, warning and intercept systems, including electronic equipment, types and deployment of aircraft defense units, and the effectiveness of antiaircraft artillery. De- tails will include types of radar, antiaircraft guns and fire control equipment, guided missiles, bal- loon barrage, searchlights, airborne electronic equipment, and techniques in electronic counter- measures. The average analysts will require a great deal of expert technical assistance in the compilation of such data. Another capability to which attention should be given is related to strategic air reconnaissance. With what types of planes is reconnaissance con- ducted? What types of cameras are used? How skillful are the nation's photographic technicians and photo interpreters? Air Order of Battle Air Order of Battle, similar to that of the army, provides data on identification, strength, and gen- 159 eral disposition of the units, personnel, and equip- ment of the air forces. Units are described by types, mission, and location, with comments on ex- tent of training, experience, and combat readiness. Aircraft and equipment are identified according to the numbering system, special markings, and insignia. Source and number of aircraft acqui- sitions are included. The background for order of battle data is a thorough study of the organizational relationship of major and subordinate commands and units, general control, and administrative and staff func- tions at all echelons. Again as a standard of com- parison it is helpful to have an understanding of the organizational components of the United States Air Force, the types of aircraft included in the complement of each, how service and supply functions are administered, and what facilities are needed for effective operation. Training The training program of a nation's air force is most significant for the strategic analyst. He must evaluate its effectiveness in meeting the cur- rent requirements of the air forces, its capability for wartime expansion, and the adequacy of train- ing equipment and facilities. Primary, basic, and advanced flight training are each considered with respect to duration in months, location of schools, curriculum content, number of trainees admitted annually, types of aircraft used, special training aids, and quality of instruction. A consideration of operational training will include such aspects as gunnery, rocketry, bombing, navigation, instru- ment training, night flying, and combat tactics for each type of aircraft. The training of ground offi- cers and airmen in such key specialties as opera- tions, weather, engineering, supply, communica- tions, and radar must not be overlooked. Many foreign countries have sent air forces per- sonnel to the United States for training or obser- vation. The analyst should attempt to determine the effect this contact with American training methods has had upon training policy and doctrine in the country from which the visitors have come. Often their experiences have strongly influenced relations between the two nations in areas other than military. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL Air Facilities INTELLIGENCE FOR Strategic intelligence regarding a foreign air force includes a complete description and assess- ment of the air facilities of the nation. Each fa- cility must be analyzed to determine its suitabil- ity for combat air operations and capability for airlift activity in support of combat operations. Maps, diagrams, and photos are necessary ad- juncts to a thorough appraisal. Current and pro- jected construction should be included, and special attention given to possibilities for extension of runways and general expansion of installations. Climate and topography are often controlling fac- tors in a nation's development of air facilities. Any limitations caused by these factors in certain areas should be ascertained. The meteorological services of the country and the use the air forces make of them are pertinent in this connection. Other Considerations The study and evaluation of personnel, reserve and mobilization systems, logistics, and materiel of foreign air forces will embody the same gen- eral considerations as were previously outlined for the army and navy, with variations in details as applicable. BIOGRAPHICAL INTELLIGENCE Biographical intelligence has the important function of providing information on individual persons in foreign countries and, as has been pre- viously suggested, this component of intelligence is essential to all of the others. Knowledge about leaders in government, politics, science, education, military services, and business will not only be helpful in evaluating aspects of these general fields, but also may provide valuable clues to prob- able courses of action. The background, person- ality, enthusiasms, and prejudices of such indi- viduals constitute vital considerations in an eval- uation of national strengths and weaknesses. In the sociological component the people are consid- ered collectively and characteristics common to groups are ascertained; biographic intelligence re- fines this study, centering interest on the dominant figures within the groups. Obviously the intelligence researcher cannot keep extensive data on all individuals. His pri- CONFIDENTIAL 160 NAVAL OFFICERS mary task is therefore one of selection, but he can- not be limited to only those prominent in the con- temporary scene. He should always be conscious of the fact that leaders of tomorrow may now be in relative obscurity, but there may be signs point- ing to rising eminence or power. The sources of biographical information are many. In a great number of countries volumes similar to the American "Who's Who" are pub- lished at regular intervals, and official registers list persons in government service. The daily newspapers and a great variety of periodicals will always contain additional information. Most valuable of all are character and personality esti- mates from those who know or have known the individual professionally and socially. The paragraphs below will serve as a guide to the content of the ideal biographical file. It will not always be possible to obtain all the data for every individual but the goal is defined. Vital Statistics The items to include are those usual for identi- fication purposes: full name, nationality, reli- gion, residence address, date and place of birth, general appearance, parents, etc. Uniformity in spelling geographical names and in trans-literat- ing from foreign languages which do not use the Latin alphabet is essential to a good biographical file. Valuable aids in this respect are standard gazeteers such as that published by the Board of Geographic Names of the Department of the In- terior, and the Style Manual of the United States Government Printing Office. Education The data here should include schools attended, degrees conferred, and academic honors. Extra- curricular activities can also be significant. If the individual became the disciple of a certain professor at an early age it may be reflected in his later thought and attitudes. His foreign language proficiency is another important consideration. Personality Thus far the biographical file has merely com- piled a vita for the selected individual. When we come to personality, intelligence begins to be produced. An evaluation must be made of the Approved For Release 2003/12/09: CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 ApprovedFeapoliqms,229,3ipietickeepe59g125R0001 0021 Quaza uunnuENTIAL personality traits which govern his behavior: moral force and character, intelligence, personal characteristics, opinions, and loyalty. Does he have marked qualities of leadership? Is he a man of strong convictions or are his opinions easily changed by others? Are his ideas of right and wrong well defined? Is he honest? Those who have associated with the individual can supply the best answers to questions concern- ing his mental abilities, but much can be derived also from any books or articles he has written or his published utterances. Does he quickly compre- hend new ideas and can he rise to the occasion when he meets the unusual? Is he well educated in the sense that he has a broad understanding of local and international affairs? Has his perspec- tive been enhanced by travel abroad and contacts with a great variety of people? Does he have cer- tain distinct prejudices? Is he pro- or anti- American? Personal characteristics comprise another con- sideration. Is he energetic or lazy? What are his drinking and eating habits? What are his usual forms of recreation? In what social circles does he move? Is he bold or cautious? What is the state of his health and does it affect his activity? Is he loyal to his country and his superiors? Does he inspire loyalty in others? Family Family position or influence must not be over- looked. Often an ambitious wife is "the power behind the throne." Family ties are important 269196-54 12 161 influences in the lives of men, and are often mir- rored in their careers. Is he a family man? Has he used family connections in any way to achieve certain goals or ambitions? Does he have children whom he is encouraging to follow in his footsteps? Relationship of Factors Only a final consideration of all the above fac- tors in the aggregate will give a complete picture of the individual's administrative ability, profes- sional competence, disposition, tact, sobriety, inter- national sympathies and attitudes. Biographical intelligence thus can be used to great advantage in strategic estimates. It is intimately related to any field where names make news. The objective of the foregoing discussion has been to outline broadly the logical division of in- telligence knowledge into component parts, and to indicate to a degree their nature, comprehen- siveness, interrelationships, importance, uses, and sources. The applicability and utility of this great body of knowledge in relation to current world problems is suggested by the following three chapters which are, in effect, topical summaries in the field of international relations: elements of world power, factors in the foreign relationships of the United States, and salient features of World Communism and the U. S. S. R. These chapters will also contribute to the development of the naval officer's perspective in his approach to mat- ters of intelligence concern. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002:9_ uuNFIDENTIAL CHAPTER 6 ELEMENTS OF WORLD POWER In approaching a study of international rela- tions a naval officer assigned to intelligence duties should keep in mind three basic points. First, a nation's power position in relation to other nations of the world is determined by its comparative strength in various of the categories described in the previous chapter as the components of intelli- gence knowledge. Second, a nation's strategy to- ward other nations is influenced directly or indirectly by its own relative standing in one or more of these categories. Third, in the exercise of national power there have developed in the course of modern history certain recognized procedural patterns which apply to relationships between nations. A valuable aid to such a study is an understanding of the elements of world power and their effect on the behavior of nations. For many years, problems of international power relations were viewed in a somewhat de- tached manner by the United States, and its peoples tended to adopt an idealistic approach. World War II and subsequent events had a tre- mendous impact on that point of view and ap- proach; the United States found itself directly involved in problems of world dimension and its idealism attacked. However, as an aid to finding solutions, America's idealism is a vital factor, a very real force that must be preserved, for it repre- sents the symbol of personal freedom and justice in a chaotic and frustrated world. But idealism is not to be confused with a denial of realities or of the basic facts relating to them. Perhaps for the first time in American and world history there is much more at stake than the survival of present political institutions. The very structure of our social life is threatened. Modern technology makes all parts of the world accessible to every other, and philosophies opposed to our own are for the first time organized and regimented on a world scale. Therefore, a sober concentration on solu- tions to problems of international relations is essential, not only for our own survival, but also for the survival of those peoples with whom we have kinship of spirit and tradition. 163 STRATEGIC GEOGRAPHY AND RESOURCE POTENTIAL Consideration of a nation's total power potential involves all elements of its national power and especially those of geography, resources, industrial capacity, manpower, and technology. In study- ing these elements separately, the intelligence offi- cer, whatever his individual role, must have an appreciation of the whole, an understanding of how the particular facts he collects and assesses ultimately compose the total estimate of a nation's power. It will be helpful to discuss the elements of world power from the point of view of the United States. Geographical Environment Let us begin with a consideration of our geo- graphical environment. In this world, man lives principally on the large scattered islands known as continents, and on lesser archipelagos. He has made his greatest progress and shows the greatest ambition in the temperate, lowland, regions. His growing numbers and changing technology have brought new stresses in the age-old fight for con- trol of resources. In ancient times, the struggle was for hunting, grazing, and agricultural lands. Historically speaking, as a newcomer on the planet, man has only recently developed written languages and a real technology. The industrial revolution and modern economic society date only from the time of our most immediate ancestors, within the last two centuries. Snowballing prog- ress and new ambitions have centered major rival- ries on control of natural resources, manpower, transport routes, strategic positions, and mass markets. We in America find ourselves occupying a rich continent newly settled in large numbers, with a culture largely western European, which was earlier subject to the civilizing influenced of Rome, Greece and the Middle East. Our continent, North America, in one sense is isolated by two great oceans from the principal land mass of the CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 FOR NAVAL OFFICERS world: Eurasia-Africa. In another sense, our iso- lation is quite ephemeral when our map is not the traditional Mercator but a globe or polar projec- tion. In an age when jet aircraft, even following the traditional routes, cross the ocean in a few hours, and guided missiles on the drawing boards will cross it in a few minutes, any vestigial ideas of geographic isolation must be discarded. Our technology is now so complex that what- ever our military isolation or defenses at home may be, full exploitation of our industry and our acquired consumption habits require access to re- sources far from our own frontiers. Possibly only the United States and the Soviet Union would be capable of maintaining their present living pat- terns from the resources within their own bound- aries. Even then our own high standard of living would definitely be cut, and higher production costs would be accompanied by plaguing short- ages of key materials for which only inferior sub- stitutes would be available. Economic isolation is only one aspect of the problem, for should we retreat within our own walls, the smaller nations of the world, if organ- ized or dominated by an aggressive power, would in time far surpass even our own great industrial and military potential, and today's new weapons would banish any possibility of real defense in depth. War in devastating form would come to our own hearths. Geographical Patterns Let us then consider what are the geographic patterns that govern what we and other nations must defend for survival, and what are the routes of attack, for these patterns should be basic keys to conflict and strategy in the world, without re- gard to political organization or to ideology so long as mankind wars with his own species. We are concerned with the position, the terrain, the climate, the vegetation, the shape and size of land, the resources, and the population of each area or sovereign state. The power position of each nation will be affected in some degree by each of those elements. Power depends on mate- rial factors, such as resources, capital goods, tech- nology, and manpower; it also depends on in- tangible factors that are harder to measure objec- tively, such as the energy and central driving pur- CONFIDENTIAL 164 pose, the steadfastness and traditions of a nation. Some peoples, who by every objective test should have disappeared long ago from the earth, have a staying power that has helped them to survive oc- cupation, dismemberment, and deportation. Our first concern is with the tangible factors, the physical patterns. The reader should refer to a globe, if possible, and also to a good atlas, in- cluding maps of physical relief, climate, and re- sources distribution. Space here will not permit particular study, region by region, but the ap- proach and viewpoint can be delineated. Think- ing of the military and political and economic aspects, study your maps to observe the land and the water pattern of the world. Where are the land bridges that armies use? Where are water trade routes channelized for contending naval powers to dispute control? The patterns of mountain ranges, and of deserts are important, as well as the vegetation lines that indicate the shifts from tropical rain forest to savannahs to desert to steppe to temperate forest, and so on until the tree line and the various crop lines mark the polar or high central Asian regions. These changes give clues to the significance of regions in their poten- tial for supporting man and his crops and ani- mals, and for their effects on military movement. Throughout history military barriers to traffic- ability and movement have dominated campaigns and their outcome. Changing technology has modified this only in part, for as men have in- vented devices to overcome these barriers, so have they frequently found other tools to neutralize these advances. Deserts are of prime importance as barriers, whether they be dry deserts of the temperate and tropic areas or the frozen wastes where survival is always a problem. Mountains serve as great defense lines against military move- ment, though, of course, the test of the barrier lies in the passes through it, not in the individual peaks of the main ramparts. Even open plains are a major obstacle when by season they alter- nate between soft mud and windswept snow or cold. In some degree, swamps and marshes, jungles and rain forests, oceans and rivers chan- nelize and restrict military movement, unless the means to bridge them are at hand. Invading forces from the sea find that coasts are not uni- form in nature, and that only a few beaches and Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 ELEMENTS OF WORLD POWER ports lend themselves to mass invasion. Of course, there are man-made obstacles to military movement, but in contrast with nature's, they de- serve scant attention here. With these general clues to factors affecting military movement, both history and the contem- porary scene can be viewed in a new light as one studies problems of military and naval campaigns. A good grasp of the general position of countries, the barriers of terrain, vegetation, und climate that aid or hinder them, is basic to an understand- ing of their power position. Clear recognition of the difference between oceanic and continental climates may give clues to the success or failure of campaigns. As a further uid to full under- standing, one should study maps from several approaches. The geographic position of coun- tries takes on new meaning when maps are turned in unconventional directions. It is only custom and convenience that makes us consider north as "up.,, Controlling Resources Historians theorize that modern civilization be- gan as the last ice age receded, allowing the two keys of geography and resources to open the door to progress. In the ancient world of Egypt and Mesopotamia in the west, and in the protected val- leys of Sinkiang and Kokonor in the east, simple communal living rapidly blossomed into complex civilizations. In the Middle East, rich alluvial plains with wild rice in abundance led to settled farming and the further domestication of animals which had begun in nomadic days on the grass lands of Asia. Sedentary living led to building cities, codifying laws, and written communica- tion. In time, smelting metals, farming, and trade became widespread. Today the controlling resources include more than plentiful food, for the age of reason, ex- perimentation, and exploration brought mechani- cal inventions that depend on a wide range of natural resources. The key to national power today is not alone food, but energy derived from coal, oil, and, to a lesser extent, water power, and iron, which is still the chief metal, since the bronze age was left behind thousands of years ago. These are then the major elements of real power, but there are a host of others, strategic in nature, 165 CONFIDENTIAL whose particular properties support the alloys and specialties of metallurgy, the growing chemi- cal, plastics, and electronic industries, newly dis- covered methods in agriculture, and, of course, that new key to power, the development of nuclear energy. Food patterns are still important, for indus- trialization and modern transport have developed dense concentrations of population which depend for survival upon orderly flow of their sustenance. Wheat, rice, corn, barley, sugar, fats and oils, fruits, beans, fish, meat and dairy products fill thousands of ships on the ocean highways of the world, and load the great rail networks across the continents. Shipments of tea, coffee, tobacco, and chocolate may also be considered essential, for they contribute to morale, one of the intangibles in national power. Industrial Location Modern economics has given importance to the theory of location of industrial activity. In simple terms, it recognizes that locations of raw materials, power, labor supply, and markets all interact with transport costs and material char- acteristics to determine where industry is to be found. Changing technology alters the force of the various elements in the equation, but generally speaking, industry is drawn to the source of the materials it uses (if they are weight-losing in processing) , to save transport costs. Thus the modern dependence on mechanical power derived from coal, oil, or hydro-electricity tends to draw industry to these materials. Pittsburgh, the Ruhr, Manchuria, the English Midlands all dem- onstrate this tendency. Some countries by strenuous efforts have tried to overcome their natural deficiencies, but they face a losing battle. Italy's large industrial popu- lation tries to earn enough through trade to pay for imported coal. Japan, now restricted to her home islands, also depends heavily on imported materials. Even the United States, though well supplied with fuel, must consider the full military implications of replacing the ore from the nearly exhausted Mesabi range with ores from abroad, thus losing the advantage of cheap haul through the Great Lakes. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS Coal is still the dominant fuel of the world and must be ranked highest among essential mate- rials for economic, and consequently military, strength. It generates steam to provide electric- ity, has a major role in metallurgy, and can be used to make a host of chemical products including gasoline. Oil is a second important source, as a principal source of fuel for millions of internal combustion engines, and also as a raw material for the chemical industry which, among other things, supplies rubber substitutes. Iron and steel follow closely after fuel as major essentials, but the dominance of these particular resources should not make us disregard the vital though smaller role of copper, lead, manganese, sulphur, zinc, aluminum, nickel, and tin. Modern industry is built upon a great number of major and minor materials. Salt, phosphate, potash, mica, asbestos, industrial diamonds, graphite, nitrates, mercury?all are essentials. The metals that alloy with iron must be available if tools are to keep their cutting edges, if armor plate is to stop projectiles, or if springs are to keep their resilience. Likewise tungsten, antimony, chromium, palladium, and molybdenum must be added to manganese and nickel to expand the list of essential alloys. From our fields and plantations, in addition to food, come cotton, flax, and other hard and bast fibres?jute, abaca, sisal, ramie, and hemp. We also depend on wool, leather, hides, and bone. Rubber, though increasingly available in syn- thetic form, is provided from the tropics. Our temperate area forests, wastefully cut until re- cently, provide us with principal building mate- rials, with paper, a modern-day essential, with raw materials for plastics, with distillates, and naval stores. Even water is an important resource, not only to quench our thirst and to water- our crops, but also for industry which consumes it in enormous quantities. It provides transport routes and hy- dro-electric power, the latter of which can create nitrates for fertilizer and explosives directly from the atmosphere. Our electric power system, draw- ing upon the energy of water, coal, oil, and gas, is a prime target for any enemy, and its growing size is an index of our strength. CONFIDENTIAL 166 Our resources are of two types: replaceable and irreplaceable. To date, modern technology and field exploration have kept our standard of living rising despite a profligate waste of irreplaceable resources. Perhaps the sea can be made to yield what can no longer be found on dry land, but defi- nite dangers to our economic and military strength loom not far ahead. Strategic Materials We define strategic materials as those critically short in relation to our need for them. One of the prices of World War II was that it greatly ex- panded the list of strategic materials the United States should stockpile or protect overseas, if our security is to be maintained. The appearance of an item on the strategic list should immediately set in motion measures to offset the potential dan- ger of shortage. What steps are taken depend upon circumstances at the time, but among the possibilities are new searches at home for these materials, production controls and consumption restrictions, measures to assure overseas supply sources, creation of import stimulants and export quotas, assignment of necessary manpower to ex- ploit sources of these materials, initiation of con- servation and recovery measures, the adoption of special measures to prevent crippling sabotage of our limited supply, and the development of sub- stitutes. Actually, in the case of many materials which are running short in usable form, there may be marginal and submarginal deposits that can be exploited, but the cost may well be inordi- nate in time, manpower, and capital equipment. Resources in the ground or in the forest do not of themselves make for strength. Many richly potential stores of materials lie in undeveloped and weak countries. It is only with capital ac- cumulation, know-how, manpower, and transport, that these resources are translated into power through production and delivery for use. Capacity To Produce 0 ur assessment of a country's power must there- fore measure not only its stores of materials but also its actual capacity to produce. Quantitative data of major semimanufactures and finished products give a part of the answer. These data in turn must be linked to plant capacity indices. Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 ELEMENTS OF WORLD POWER Are all plants operating at full capacity ? Are trained manpower, raw materials, power, and transport available to work more shifts? Next, we ask, can any of these plants readily be converted to the production of war goods? Tractor plants may make tanks. Automobile plants may switch to aircraft engines or subassemblies, or it may be that plant expansion will provide the answer to real military strength. If the building materials and machine tools can be set aside for use in new factories, rather than go directly into war produc- tion, the eventual output of war goods may be very high. All of these matters are interrelated and very complex. Knowledge is still too inadequate concerning the relative effectiveness of price and tax incentives, or of government orders and con- trols, to give categorical answers in all situations. It should be stressed that military power is not measured alone by the production indices of out- put, capacity, conversion, and expansion, for civilian consumption may compete with military requirements. Thirty million tons of steel in one country may count for more militarily than one hundred million in another, if the latter country uses virtually all of its steel for civilian consump- tion, as against heavy military use in the first. On the other hand, given a big enough crisis, the rich consumer country has a bigger cushion that can be diverted to military ends, or may at least launch a great program of plant expansion. These are imponderables that are solved only by careful and qualified analysis, not by catch phrases and popu- lar fancy. For the length of the war, the sud- denness of its coming, the temper of the people, the dispersion of facilities as protection against surprise air attack, are all variables that affect the answer. There have been numerous examples of the complexity of a partial mobilization in the time since the Korean War began. How far can taxes be pushed to curb inflation without drying up needed capital for expansion or reducing tra- ditional incentives? Will controls aid fair dis- tribution at low prices, or will they create a huge bureaucracy and reduce total supply? Well- informed and patriotic Americans find themselves arriving at different answers. A number of agencies and offices of the executive branch of the United States Government, assisted by private research groups and congressional staff 167 CONFIDENTIAL studies, are involved in guiding the planning for war mobilization. From their work come the plans that direct stockpiling of essential materials, the mobilization manufacturing and control plans, and the assessments of national strength. A com- plete assessment of our power must be compared step by step with that of our allies and our rivals to draw up the balance sheet that will indicate where there is need to expand, to divert, and to contract for national security essential to survival, but at the same time saving the mainsprings of long-range progress and traditional patterns of living. These agencies study agriculture, giving consideration to the methods used, manpower and materials demands, regularity and quantity of various crops, and availability of additional lands for expansion. The extractive industries of min- ing, forestry, and fisheries yield data on output per worker, capital requirements, availability of re- serves, and new processes becoming available. The basic metallurgical and chemical industries have indices of production, changing methods, and varying efficiencies; for example, blast furnaces serve as an index of productive capacity, yet one country may run them harder and faster than another to increase current yield of pig iron even at the expense of destruction of capital equipment. Study of the permanent munitions industries is important to the total picture, too. The shipyards, the explosives manufacturers and arsenals, and the atomic plants, are typical cases. Certain civil- ian goods industries are particularly susceptible to military conversion. The television industry of America may have given civilians home receivers instead of those same resources going into a com- plete air defense radar net, but at the same time, the existence of a huge electronics industry will supply the conversion capacity in war for radar on an immense scale, and the coaxial cables and microwave relay networks may speed military communications. The engineering and machine tool industries are important, because their ability to produce will determine ability to turn out novel weapons of war in time to use on a mass basis. Economic Vulnerability Once such broad, general studies have been made of our own resources, and, with the aid of intelli- gence, of those of other countries, there are spe- CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS cific studies and individual conclusions which must next be undertaken. One area of concern is that of vulnerabilities, both here and in foreign countries. Is the flow of raw material subject to interruption, as, for example, the Soo Locks or the TAP line? Are there technological bottle- necks in such industries as ball bearings or avia- tion gas? Is capacity limited by poor transport facilities; for example, the Baku oil fields and Ven- ezuelan iron ore? Is a specialized labor force available? Can watchmakers work on precision instruments? Do we have sufficient oil well rig- gers? In what degree are different industries in- terdependent or are they competing for a common labor or power supply? Is steel available for final products or for steel plant expansion? National power, too, is linked with defenses, for a great industrial machine unguarded is an invi- tation to attack. Defenses may be active, made up of radar nets, jet fighters, balloon barrages, and AA guns, or they may be passive and equally effective, such as duplication of facilities, region- ally decentralized into far reaches of the country, or locally dispersed from the center of urban areas to offer targets of lower density and therefore less attractiveness. In some cases facilities may re- treat to hilly country or even underground. Transport Assessment Increasingly, transport is being subjected to analysis and study, for it is a major factor in power. Britain's plan for agricultural develop- ment in Tanganyika, many other "backward" area development plans, and Soviet strength all have suffered from poor transport. Even the United States must consider the repercussions in the long run of low railway earnings, and of inadequate highway modernization. Assessments must there- fore be made of facilities, as to capacity, efficiency in ton-miles per day, and per worker, repair and fuel needs, the bottlenecks in marshalling yards, bridges, tunnels, and steep grades. It is difficult to measure foreign progress ade- quately due to incomplete statistics. Figures are rarely comparable, frequently are withheld, and often lack meaning due to inadequate qualification and definition. If only a few figures are to be chosen, the key ones for national power should in- clude electric energy production, steel production, CONFIDENTIAL 168 and transport data such as car loadings, and ton- miles hauled. Manpower Assessment Manpower has already been mentioned; it rep- resents a significant measure of power both for the present and for the future of a country, when coupled with information on geography, raw ma- terials, and industry. Mere numbers alone, or even the military age numbers, are only the begin- ning for a power analysis. The data on numbers must be supplemented by detailed breakdowns on distribution by geographical location, and by den- sity in relation to developed resources. Trends are important. Is the population stationary, ris- ing, or falling? If it is rising, what is the rate of increase? At what height and when will the population level off? The sex-age group distri- bution or pyramid will tell what the labor force and the military supply will be now, 10 years from now, and even farther in the future. The supply of females of child-bearing age, related to other data, will forecast shifts in the population. Quali- tative population analysis will help to assess some of the intangibles of national power. The break- downs by education, cultural background, and technical skill are important. Tables on national origin, political parties, and religion may give important leads to questions of national cohe- sion. Economic groupings, tied to national and personal income statistics or land holdings, may answer questions on the appeal of communism or land redistribution. Although social scientists may quarrel with the statistical validity of mass personality traits, from a purely pragmatic view there seems to be definite value in studying typical traits of national character, for they may give clues to determination, objectives, subjectivity to hysteria or impatience, and other elements that influence an assessment of foreign nations' behavior. In the long run, national population trends will have their effects on the power position and foreign policies of countries. Medical, economic, intel- lectual, and religious environment factors affect birth rates and death rates as well. A shift in either rate will affect population growth. Al- though we have come a long way from the pessi- mism of Malthus, the growth of the total world Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 ELEMENTS OF WORLD POWER CONFIDENTIAL population can be a subject of grave concern. Density data as such are meaningless in isolation, for Australia will never catch up with the United States, despite her area, and China has nothing like the overall density of the Netherlands, yet is prob- ably more "overcrowded." Net reproduction rates, adjusted for migration and possible life span changes, are key data to power calculations. Total Power Potential These elements reviewed in the foregoing sec- tion, then, are the basis for estimating the total power potential of a nation. No one element is dominant, neither industry, nor resources, nor manpower, but all are considered jointly with questions of geographical location, climate, and topography. Also important are the questions of vulnerability, of trends as well as of present situa- tion, or capacity to produce munitions as well as total industrial capacity. By no means can the intangibles of national spirit and determination be ignored, and in this day and age the ability to adapt national life to so-called "Cold War" may rival in importance the strictly conventional mo- bilization of the nation. This brings us to the next topic, the bridge between the assessment of national resources, in the broad sense, and politi- cal relations among nations, namely, geopolitics. GEOPOLITICS AND STRATEGY The formal study of all the aforementioned power factors in relation to geography and na- tional strategy is called geopolitics, a term that has been made unsavory only because of its mis- application by Nazi theorists. The scientific study of geopolitics is not only proper, but es- sential to our national well-being. It is of par- ticular interest to intelligence analysts because of its possible influence on the thinking of foreign political leaders and, hence, on the strategic plan- ning of various nations. A knowledge of geo- political concepts may give clues, therefore, to esti- mates of national behavior. Treatment of this subject here can only be cursory. Mackinder and Mahan In 1904, an Englishman, Mackinder, introduced the concept of the world island with its heartland, safe from assault by seapower. The heartland is 169 described as the territory encompassing much of the Soviet Union and the suzerainties under nomi- nal Chinese control, such as Sinkiang, Mongolia, and Tibet. The lands around the edge of the world island, which can be dominated by seapower, are referred to as the marginal crescent. The Americas are regarded as an outer island. Of course, such concepts are meaningful only in a limited sense, for new map projections, air travel and guided missiles rob the heartland concept of considerable meaning. The concepts are impor- tant, however, because they have influenced the thinking and policies of many leaders since Mack- inder's time. The idea "whoever controls the heartland controls the world island; whoever con- trols the world island controls the world" is an oversimplification, and although it has an ele- ment of truth, it is not a substitute for the careful and detailed analysis of national power previously recommended. Mahan of the United States Navy was the great exponent of sea power. His voluminous writings do not precisely delineate seapower, but general concepts can be derived from them. Seapower is related to the control of the commercial arteries of the world. It is the outgrowth of proper access to the sea coupled with the industry necessary to sup- port merchant ships and navies. The right bal- ance of fleets, control of strategic bases and fuel supplies, good training and morale, all combine to create sea power. Mahan felt that no nation has the ability and capital to be both a great sea power and a great land power, either one resulting in a serious drain on resources. Although in some way a comforting doctrine, it may not be com- pletely valid. Other influential writers in this field were Ratzel in Germany, Semple in the United States, and Kjellen in Sweden. Ratzel believed that geog- raphy dominated history, and he considered the state as a living organism. Coordinating his theories of selection and survival with those of Darwin, he attributed a spatial aggrandizement instinct to states? a theory somewhat difficult to support as a universal law. Semple was a disciple of Ratzel. Kjellen considered the state as not just a legal entity but as a living being. It was he who coined the expression "geopolitics," and in- fluenced the pan-German movement, believing that CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR one German state should spread from Scandinavia to the Near East. The American, Spykman, instead of opposing seapower to land power, envisioned seapower as joining with land power in one part of the world to fight similar combinations elsewhere. Consid- ering interior communications to be poor, he put stress on control of the rimland rather than the heartland and believed that the United States must oppose any attempt to dominate the rimland or crescent. German Interpretations Under the aegis of Hitler, Germany adapted Mahan's and Mackincler's doctrines to her own ends, with General Haushofer as the chief prophet. The Auslands organization and Geo- politic Institute combined studies of geopolitics with an intelligence collection program for plan- ning Germany's strategy. Haushofer considered that a Soviet-Japanese combination of land and sea power would be dan- gerous. Because of improved land transport, he tended to discount seapower and thought that if Germany could move to dominate Eurasia, its position as world leader would be assured. Spe- cifically, he favored a number of policies which markedly influenced Hitlerite Germany. These included autarchy, (national economic self-suffi- ciency), "lebensraum" (enough space for a vigo- rous, growing people), and a three-way split of the world, in which the United States would domi- nate pan-America, Germany would dominate Europe including Russia, the Middle East, and Africa, and Japan would dominate Asia and the South Pacific. He saw German control of the marginal crescent as a means to add seapower to her land power. Also he believed that a nation's frontier should be along a natural boundary, for any other frontier represented no more than a temporary truce line in time of peace. Peacetime, further, was viewed just as a breathing spell be- tween wars, a time to out-flank and encircle the enemy. International agreements were to build balance of power, not world security. All the great powers in considerable degree have operated geopolitically, whether they recog- nized the fact or not. Their use of geopolitics may have been more or less benevolent, or it may have CONFIDENTIAL 170 NAVAL OFFICERS been aggressive. The Truman Plan of contain- ment represents an application of Mackinder's theories. Although unable or unwilling to strike at the heartland, the United States has been de- termined to prevent the heartland leaders from seizing all of the marginal crescent that might allow them to add seapower to their land power, and thus dominate the world. Many of these geopolitical concepts need re- finement and modification in the light of the changing conditions. Atomic concepts of war- fare and power may well modify accessibility in the military sense. The Arctic no longer repre- sents a dead space, but rather a crucial direct air route between the power centers of the world. The concept of imperial domination has been re- placed by that of consultation as a guiding rule in the relationships between many world states. Airpower Concepts To Mahan's doctrine of seapower and the Ger- man-Soviet doctrines of land power have been added the doctrine of air power, first formulated by General Billy Mitchell and Douhet, and later vigorously presented to the public by Major de Seversky, an ardent enthusiast. While this doc- trine has given rise to heated debates involving the concepts of a dominant arm versus balanced military forces of approximately equal strength, it may be concluded that sea power, land power, and air power each have their potentialities and limitations in the determination of national power. To summarize, it must be admitted that history has been strongly influenced by geography, that defense in depth is a valid and compelling mili- tary doctrine. Though the heartland and rim- land ideas have strong elements of truth, how- ever, modern world power is based not only on location and size and shape, but also on resources, demography, technology, and transport. Power Politics The United States in its public conscience has disparaged power politics as an unworthy force, and as a poor approach to world relations. Yet the existence and use of power politics is ines- capable, whatever this doctrine is called. We are concerned with power to control the minds and actions of men, particularly men organized to do jointly what individuals could not do. Power is Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 ELEMENTS OF WORLD POWER not force in its actual exercise, but it does imply fear of force. United States power has been in- creased by possession of the A-Bomb, even though its use is potential. This power would be reduced if controls were placed on its use, such as prior approval by the United Nations or even by Con- gress, since speed of reprisal may be the most potent deterrent to a would-be aggressor. Eco- nomic power can also be used for national power purposes. Control over exports of finished goods and raw materials needed by other countries is an enormous source of power. There will be power politics so long as nations keep their sovereignty. If a few "enlightened" nations eschew its use, they will be destroyed by the unenlightened. Power politics may be used merely to hold exist- ing positions, the status quo, to improve position through expansionism or imperialism, or to main- tain prestige by demonstrating that power. INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL RELATIONS It is very hard to be entirely objective in dis- cussing international political relations. Each nation tends to view its own conduct as above criticism and the conduct of others as frequently reprehensible. Even more, nations may often be unjustly charged with responsibility for an in- ternational situation because of the great difficulty in accurately and correctly identifying the events which led to the particular situation. Any assessment for intelligence purposes must be impartial and analytical: motivations both of the nation and its leaders must be carefully stud- ied. Certain general guides which may be help- ful in making any evaluations involving interna- tional relations are presented in this section. The "Status Quo" There is nothing especially sacrosanct about the status quo, though this is a pretension of those who are satisfied with it. The Congress of Vi- enna, the Versailles Treaty, and the United Na- tions have all had some part in maintaining things as they were. It should be pointed out that status quo does not refer to freezing of existing boun- daries, though on occasion it may take that form, but rather to maintaining an existing balance of power. Those who maintain existing situations, even though unfair, may have the weight of inter- CONFIDENTIAL national law behind them and be the upholders of "peace." All challengers, of course, are called "war mongers," regardless of the cause for which they struggle. Certainly, those who would resort to force carry the burden of justification for their acts, and their propaganda is rarely adequate, or accurate. Imperialism As opposed to the status quo, imperialism repre- sents an attempt to bring about a favorable duinge in a current world power situation. It refers to a nation's policy aimed at an extension of power over another area with or without the approval of the peoples concerned. The motives, and the means, for gaining this additional power may be economic, political, military, or ideological, or a combination thereof. Any analysis of this phe- nomenon of national behavior will result in the conclusion that it is exceedingly complex. For many years, the term imperialism has been in disrepute as the result, partly at least, of its association with the policies of colonialism and territorial aggrandizement carried on by various European nations during the latter nineteenth century at the expense of backward areas. Dur- ing that time, a predominant motive was eco- nomic competition, coupled with the search for larger markets and sources of food and raw ma- terials. However, there were other motives, such as the desire for expanded political power and prestige which might exert a dominating influence in world affairs, the real or assumed need for pro- viding greater guarantees for national security, and the search for sources of potential military manpower as well as areas of expansion for sur- plus population. There are curious inconsistencies in the inter- pretation of this term. Mussolini found it an expression of a nation's vitality. Marx and Lenin explained it as entirely a product of capitalism, a "dying" stage in which there was an inevitable struggle between national monopolies in the inter- national arena. They reasoned that by definition communism could not be imperialistic because it did not have the same need for new markets and trade. In popular fancy, imperialism has been associated with the "machinations" of Wall Street and the munitions makers, the Japanese Zaibatsu 171 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS emperor-worship, or the exploitation of colonial subjects. But these interpretations are inade- quate, since imperialism predates modern capital- ism by thousands of years and, from the American viewpoint, communist and socialist states have demonstrated positive imperialistic tendencies, re- gardless of the labels used. The policy of imperialism has been considered one of the causes of war. Wars actually arise for many reasons which are usually composite and complex in nature. There are so called "defen- sive" wars, designed to keep the status quo, but which often seek a permanent change in power to prevent effective challenge to present positions. Other wars are deliberately designed to expand the power position of a country, even when it is not threatened. The power vacuum theory applies in some cases, too, when the strong powers, rush- ing to dominate a newly weakened or discovered area, clash in their efforts for supremacy. This situation has been more recently demonstrated in Greece and Korea. A few aggressive nations, either for supposedly lofty or for very base rea- sons, have also set out deliberately to conquer the world by one means or another. Can compromise be considered a solution to the ambitions of such aggressive states? Repeated examples from history, some quite recent, seem to suggest that, at best, compromise may only shift the time table for further aggression. This may not be wholly bad for the compromiser, providing he can use this time to good advantage. Rearm- ing and defense pacts, important and inescapable as they may be, are not in themselves an absolute guarantee of peace, for they may create a vicious circle of counter moves by the opponents, with no solution short of military, economic, and psycho- logical conflict. Many excuses have been given for imperialism? the "white man's burden," a "sacred trust," "leb- ensraum," "ethnic unity," "defense against en- circlement," and others more idealistic, such as "liberty, equality, fraternity." We considered both world wars anti-imperialist, and of course for opposite reasons they were so regarded by many Germans and Japanese fighting against us. The Monroe Doctrine could be considered either status quo or imperialist, depending on the view- point and circumstances of assessment. How- CONFIDENTIAL 172 ever, from an objective point of view, it should be understood that these terms, the status quo and imperialism, are intrinsically and morally neither good nor bad. What these terms actually mean when applied in international relations depend upon the objectives, motivation, and circumstances of particular national policies. World Powers World powers today can be grouped into three general classes. The great powers are the United States and the Soviet Union. The United King- dom may still be considered a great power, too, although now less able to stand alone in the world. The regional powers, which wield considerable influence in particular parts of the world, include such countries as France, Argentina, Brazil, China, and India. In a third category are the client powers, such independent states as Uruguay, Costa Rica, Luxembourg, and Egypt. Even though their independence may be important to their citizens and even to mankind, their continued independence is at the sufferance of the larger powers, and their conduct is largely conditioned by external events. Under international law each sovereign state is equal, and American policies in considerable measure have aimed toward support of this doctrine; however, law cannot hide the fact that states are not equal in power and never will be. A country like India, with hundreds of mil- lions of people, cannot be equated in all circum- stances with a state like Liechtenstein, even though each is sovereign. This has been recog- nized by the United Nations by its system of per- manent seats in the Security Council, and the veto system, which is not wrong in itself, but only in its abuse. The tests of a great power, behind all the polite words and agreements are (1) to be able to threaten force, (2) to have the ability to pay the price in a showdown of force against force, (3) to have the capacity to wage active, autono- mous war with its own resources. This realistic approach to power is not meant to show cynicism for the efforts which certain coun- tries, including our own, have made to achieve a better world for all on the basis of soverign equality; far from it. It is merely intended as an examination of the basic forces of existence and survival that lie behind our best efforts. Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Reltima.93/12/09,. CIA-RDP85G00105R00010021INF-R 6 OF WORLD POWER wENTIAL Nationalism The armed forces of any nation, if they are to carry out their assigned missions, must have a sense of nationalism, to know why they are fight- ing for their country. Extreme nationalism may be unworthy in a world that considers itself civil- ized, when the brotherhood of man, in the best Christian sense, is a worthy goal. But national- ism of itself is not bad. It may be the only means of attaining worthwhile goals. We love our rich and beautiful America; we want to raise our fam- ilies in peace and happiness; we believe in the American heritage of freedom and individual dignity. The willingness of military men to sacrifice their lives for such goals is, in effect, an expression of nationalism. Nationalism has its basis in the demand of par- ticular groups for complete sovereignty. Inter- nationalism on the other hand admits the sur- render of some aspects of sovereignty to a broader control. Each has its proper place, and the United States for valid reasons orients its policies both ways. No nation is willing to surrender all sovereignty until there are guarantees that what is held most sacred will not be harmed. But in countless fields, from the assignment of radio fre- quencies to the control of drugs, we willingly sub- ordinate our complete control in the interests of world order. Nationalism, in many ways an intangible force, grows out of race, religion, language, or historical and geographical circumstances. Small countries, lacking real power, sometimes substitute an exag- gerated feeling of nationalism. In some ways nationalism, as we know it today, is a relatively new development. In both ancient and medieval times, loyalty was shared between local people and local rulers, as a matter of mutual protection in the unsettled times in which they lived. In the Western world, a broader spiritual and cultural community was effected through the Christian church in its struggle for survival and growth. The development of a money economy, the end of serfdom, and the Renaissance brought larger states and a gradual transfer of loyalties to the symbol of the monarch and the state. An expanding interest in philosophy and many other multiple forces combined to help the concepts of democracy and self-determination emerge. A new liberal 173 nationalism gave the chief loyalty to the state, and the ruler became at most a symbol. But some- times the forces of nationalism, instead of leading to liberalism which recognizes the rights of minor- ities, leads to totalitarianism and more strongly authoritarian states. Democracy, as we know it, is a very fragile thing, even though it has a con- siderable will to live among those who understand it. Nationalism and individualism, therefore, are frequently in conflict, but nationalism per se is not to blame, but rather the use that is made of it, for nationalism may be the champion of freedom. The United States, therefore, needs nationalism, internationalism, and individualism; all three are inherent in its traditional political and social heritage. Some countries, including our own, also face the problem of national minorities. The major group, united by race, religion, or language, may not be the sole occupants of a political state. National minorities, people bonded together in varying de- gree by different forces, may be no problem at all, or they may constitute a threat to the solidarity and power of the dominant group. In the United States, for example, there are a great many sec- tional differences, social and political, -which appear more serious to foreign observers and critics, than they really are. India, for example, has religious minorities that continue to hamper complete national solidarity. Balance of Power So the world is organized into multitudinous groups, sometimes working together, sometimes at cross purposes, gathered politically into larger units known as sovereign states or dependencies. These units in turn settle their differences by war? military, economic, and psychological, or by sub- stitute devices which will be examined in the pages ahead. One means of avoiding war, or of jockey- ing for position to be at the best advantage, is through power politics, as already mentioned. Another means is through balance of power ma- neuvers, by which nations may achieve an equaliz- ing of forces to avoid or postpone war. This equalization may be achieved without destroying the individuality of the separate states. However, balance of power entails many devices and, in some degree, each affects the policies of all states. One CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 coNFIDEViireved For Release 2003/12/09 CIA-RDP85G00105B000100210002-9 INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFIU.L11 device is the familiar "divide and rule ;" another is to prevent unions of competitive states. It is often stated that British policy in the past has been to seek a balance of power in Europe with Britain as the strategic key to the balance. When Napoleon was rampant in Europe, Britain was allied with other states against France. When the Kaiser and Hitler threatened, Britain was arrayed with the French and others opposed to German expansionism. In connection with the balance of power approach, it must be remembered that situa- tions constantly arise requiring vigorous remedial steps which may or may not be successful. The National Interest What constitutes the "national interest" by which states always claim to be guided? Perhaps its origin was in the personal interest of the ruler, and with the change to nationalism, the idea of national honor developed. Some wars have been fought for reasons of national honor. Honor alone may be too idealistic or Quixotic for some; the jailing of a citizen for the pulling down of a flag may not be considered excuse enough to plunge nations into war with great cost in lives and resources. National interest, however, if accu- rately assessed, is a realistic, practical considera- tion of events from the viewpoint of national welfare, both present and future. American na- tional policies in earlier years were largely inter- nally oriented, due to the farm interests in domes- tic land expansion. Industrial growth had its political and national consequences when a new interest in raw materials and markets dictated naval expansion. Tremendous responsibility for interpreting the national interest?economic, mili- tary, and "war of life"?rests with the President, as well as the Congress. For example, U. S. par- ticipation in the Korean War was interpreted as essential for reasons of national interest. It is because events in far away places like Korea and Iran and Germany are cumulative in their effects toward a buildup of destructive force that they cannot be ignored. America's national interest is and must be the determining factor in American reaction to any world events. National Character This discussion raises a related question, that of "national character." Is there such a thing? CONFIDENTIAL 174 America has attempted major reforms in Germany and Japan through political, economic, military, and educational changes. Will these changes be permanent? The answer is not simple. It may be that class characteristics are more valid in defi- nition than net characteristics, and particu- lar groups or classes may dominate policies and national viewpoint. Militarism, or communism, or idealism may dominate in different situations. Cultural patterns do affect the definition of "na- tional character." It was suggested earlier that national character may be susceptible to analysis, but it is important to remember that it is com- plex and not wholly predictable. Sovereignty Sovereignty has been referred to earlier as a characteristic of states. It grew out of a combi- nation of two doctrines, that of the divine right of kings, and that of the free will. Combined and transferred to the state, it has been the out- come of the necessity for an unchallengeable and supreme power to make and enforce the rules that bind society together. Such centralized power is the essence of government. Further, there can be no international law with real meaning unless there is sovereignty to consent to it. Perhaps the corollary doctrine is that one sovereign state should not interfere with another, though this is more difficult of accomplishment. Sovereignty does imply an equality among states, but only le- gally speaking, since this is a practical impossi- bility. A state can voluntarily accept restraints on its affairs without destroying sovereignty. Though states are legally equal, they may not have equal rights in all respects, and their independence of action may be more ephemeral than real. With the passage of time some states have lost their sovereignty and ceased to exist. This happens when, voluntarily or involuntarily, the final au- thority over their actions passes to another state. International Law International law is subject to considerable abuse and even more misunderstanding, yet it holds together the fabric of international society. Its elements of administration, enforcement, and adjudication have come from many sources. Do- mestic legal concepts throughout the world are not uniform enough for international law to be Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For ReleawAighls2/99 :vrichk-FIRM900105R00010021000.2n9 FIDENTIAL complete. Some law is based on common law, on precedents; other law is administrative and ad hoc, with judicial decisions playing a smaller role. International law comprises both kinds, drawing on evidence in the form of direct treaties, confer- ence agreements, treaties of third parties, deci- sions of international and national courts, state papers, opinions of unofficial bodies and individual scholars, and even upon the "general principles of justice." Some of the earliest recognized international law relates to the sea, which is one reason why the Navy has always been so interested in this field. The commerce of the Hanseatic League led to the foundation of international rules of conduct, and Grotius is credited as the father of formal study of international law. At an early period inter- national law also dealt with the rules of war. It deals with conduct both on public and private levels, and also becomes a part of the domestic law of most states. Its limitations are that it is appli- cable only in certain situations, that it is some- what uncertain and slow to develop, and that it cannot be legislated or executed in the ordinary sense. But it is developing and should grow in- creasingly important. Now criminal law is being added to international law, and the theory of non- intervention is undergoing change, while the rights of neutrals are being reduced. There is general condemnation of genocide, and support of a bill of rights for individuals. Even if these rights are not yet universally accepted, they are on their way to inclusion in the law. Genocide in- cludes not only actual killing of ethnic groups, but also sterilization, breakup of families, or submer- sion of culture. The international bill of rights includes the concept of due process of law, denies involuntary servitude except in wars or emergen- cies, and allows no arbitrary restrictions on free- dom of movement, public trial, religion and press, assembly, and similar elements familiar to Anglo- Saxon jurisprudence. International law holds that jurisdiction over particular cases may hinge upon the territorial principle ( where the act occurred) , the nationality principle (that of the guilty party) , the protection principle (through national interest) , the princi- ple of universality (as concerning pirates) , or the passive principle (that of the injured party). 175 The principle of territorial jurisdiction is most firmly established. Where individual parties sub- ject to one jurisdiction are required to appear be- fore another jurisdiction, their possible extradition is a matter of treaty. Recognition of one state by another under inter- national law may be either de facto or de jure. De facto means that although no formal treaty is signed and representatives are not exchanged, for all practical purposes the one state admits to the sovereignty and authority of the other over a par- ticular territory and people. This may have its naval application, when our government does not choose to recognize a foreign government. Naval commanders must be very careful that they take no action that could be interpreted as de facto recognition. De jure recognition, of course, is that granted by formal treaty and exchange of envoys. The Laws of War One of the chief concerns of international law is war, for in its modern form war invades every aspect of life. Early writers could not agree on a definition of war. It obviously refers to the use of force between states, but not all such cases con- stitute war. War, from the point of view of in- ternational law, is not per se bad, for the law deals only with its conduct, how it was begun, the be- havior of neutrals and belligerents, and its ending. The legal recognition of a state of war affects mat- ters of contraband, blockade, and censorship. Domestically it affects contracts and government controls. Such questions arise as to whether a state of war can only be declared by Congress, or whether a Presidential declaration of an "emer- gency" which requires action by armed forces is legally war. Under international law, the formal declaration is not necessary. Only one of the par- ties needs to intend war. However, police actions and armed intervention are not necessarily war. There is the presumption of intent to make war by certain overt acts, especially if so regarded by the victim, but even now there is no sharp definition. The question of defensive versus aggressive war also arises. These are equally difficult of defini- tion; it is not so simple as who fired the first shot, for some self-defensive acts and proper exercise of sanctions would then be ruled out. In practice, CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTiiirroved For ReleaiRACIRV,Ipp iciAompqrppinit?R000100210002-9 regretfully it must be said, the winner was the "defender," the loser the "aggressor." In sum- mary, then, war, as such, is not illegal; it is the prerogative of the state. Causes of War Much has been written about the causes of war, and such studies should be of concern to the in- telligence officer, because he has a continuing in- terest in studying cause and effect patterns, par- ticularly in the field of war. However, the causes of war are not easy to find, although many have been suggested. An "instinct of pugnacity" in man, hate, military general staffs, munitions mak- ers, and many others that do not stand the tests of universality, have been suggested. War usu- ally is not an end in itself, but serves as a final means of settling disputes, preserving rights, and remedying wrongs. Granted that it is a profligate means, increasingly so as it threatens the survival of the race, mere recognition of this fact does not solve the problem. Wars will continue to occur until a substitute is found, and other means to en- sure security, defense, and justice must be pro- vided before weapons will be surrendered. Dis- armament, limitation of weapons, education, treaties outlawing war all have great merit, but they do not solve the basic problems of war, which are most complex. Psychologically, war springs out of fear, sus- picion, greed, lust for power, hate, revenge, jeal- ousy, and envy. When great tension has been built up, war represents a release from pressure. There are also economic causes: aggressive im- perialism, both territorial and economic, and com- petition for markets, energy sources, or essential raw materials. Wars may start from government protection of private interests abroad, without par- ticular reference to the general welfare. On the other hand, failure to protect citizens and prop- erty abroad with decisive action may also lead to war. Disregard for the rights of "backward peo- ple" and population pressure, at least in its indi- rect effects, are additional causes. Political causes include balance of power maneuvers, secret treaties, violations of unjust treaties, disregard for minority rights, deliberate organization for war, and even ineptness in government. There are many others: exaggerated nationalism, competi- CONFIDENTIAL 176 tive armaments, religious and racial differences, general ignorance, and even war psychology, in- duced by press, radio, motion pictures, text books, family influences, social inequalities, social sanc- tions, and a lack of spiritual ideals. If all the above causes could be removed, would war then disappear? The possibilities are poor according to some theorists who believe that war is cyclical, that it is related to survival of the fittest, that heredity and environment cause it, that it is a culture trait, an instinct, an institution, and part of the stepladder of evolution. These theories are far from encouraging. Accordingly, preventive devices, such as a world state, have been suggested. Critics of this plan, however, have pointed out that super-sovereignty might largely result in a shift from international wars to "domestic rivalry" just as difficult of solution. It is obvious that great difficulties are involved in determining the causes for war and that there is as yet no general agreement as to either causes or effective solutions. Until such a time, the grim realities of modern total war must be faced. Prevention of War The prevention of war is a major task of the larger nations of the world, although it should be stressed that prevention is by no means their only task nor does the word imply a philosophy of "peace at any price." Since the prevention of war is aided by any limitation of warlike tenden- cies, the means available to do so must be em- ployed to the maximum degree. There are sev- eral means. One is negotiation, the use of diplo- macy and conferences. Actually hundreds of minor incidents are settled by diplomacy, and thus do not become causes for war. A third country frequently offers its "good offices" in a dispute, or even goes so far as to mediate the quarrel. Com- missions of inquiry may be established to aid the settlement. Conciliation may move on to arbi- tration, voluntary or compulsory, but even arbi- tration does not necessarily force acceptance of decision. Such measures seem to work best on problems of private law and economic matters, rather than on strictly political matters. Concili- ation is on the borderline between straight nego- tiation and the compromise of arbitration. A Approved For Release 2003/12/09: CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 ELEMENTS OF WORLD POWER CONFIDENTIAL third general approach is through the use of judi- cial means, but in the international sphere accept- ance of a court decision is dependent on the will- ingness of the parties. Major political issues, therefore, have seldom been solved in world courts. When diplomacy fails to solve problems of war, security measures may be of help. These take many forms. Disarmament and arms limitation have had United States support but with limited success, because few countries are willing to co- operate whole-heartedly. Unilateral disarma- ment coupled with neutrality laws has met with no more success. Ratios of limitation, or stand- ards of allocation, are most difficult to establish. Security through education alone is illusory, for even if we are progressive and educate against war, will our enemies do the same? Passive re- sistance has been proposed and even used, as by Gandhi's followers, but they were opposing the British who have a conscience and are responsive to public opinion. Aggressors generally do not have scruples, and then passivity only hastens slavery. The Kellogg-Briand pact made a novel approach to war: it outlawed "aggressive war," 177 but not "defensive war," and of course each sover- eign state reserved to itself the decision as to the nature of the war it fought. The issues of iso- lationism as an approach to peace have been de- bated in the United States and elsewhere. Still another approach to peace is through collective security, which may mean alliances or even a world body and world police force. Peace between nations is a long-sought goal; the dimensions of the problems involved are best realized perhaps by those who first attempt to define war itself, isolate its causes, and find its cures. The purposes of this chapter have been much less ambitious, and limited to a considera- tion of the basic elements of power and the general prerogatives and behavior of states in their power environment. However, since war is expressive of a particular power relationship between world states, a better understanding of the elements of world power should lead to a fuller appreciation of problems of war. Other power relationships between nations, such as those expressed in terms of foreign policies, are the general subject of the following chapter. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL CHAPTER 7 THE UNITED STATES AND THE WORLD While the preceding chapter on Elements of World Power dealt largely with concepts and principles, this chapter will review more specific developments in foreign policy, in international organization, and in economic relations that are of particular intelligence concern. All facets of the problems presented by the topics of this chap- ter obviously cannot be discussed because of space limitations, but it is hoped that those mentioned will stimulate further thinking and study. It is also appropriate to suggest here that the solutions of problems arising out of relationships between states can seldom be considered in terms of ab- solutes: good or bad, white or black. The com- plexities of these relationships give rise to a va- riety of alternative choices which often have rela- tive values. It is for this reason that good in- telligence must reflect shades of meaning in order that all potentialities may be fully recognized. AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY The creation of the foreign policy of the United States is the role of both the executive and legis- lative branches of government. Indirectly, of course, it is affected by every kind of individual and group reaction. Its abstract nature makes it difficult of analysis, but it is the product of certain major fields of common concern. One is national security, which relates to our geographic loca- tion, military strength, industrial power, and man- power, as described earlier, and which is changing due to new forces at work in the world. A sec- ond major concern is related to our economic situ- ation, namely, the degree of industrialization we possess, our world trade interests, our raw ma- terial needs, our problems of unemployment and price levels, the availability of funds for invest- ment, and related phenomena. A third major con- cern is peace, and all that it implies, for peace is a predominant desire of the American people. Formulation and Execution of Foreign Policy The constitution of the United States reserves matters of foreign policy to the Federal Govern- ment, a concept which has been upheld in many court decisions. The Federal Government can negotiate treaties, legally "declare" war, receive foreign diplomats, appoint ambassadors, and regu- late foreign commerce. States, of course, can make lesser arrangements with foreign countries, if Congress approves. The President, as head of the executive branch of the government, is chiefly responsible for foreign policy, for through the Secretary of State he handles official communica- tions with other governments, decides upon their recognition, and determines states of belligerency and neutrality. The actual declaration of war is a congressional right, effected by the two houses meeting in joint session. Congress can strongly influence foreign policy through its legislative acts, such as the tariff, and the House of Repre- sentatives has a special power through its initiation of appropriations. The President and the Senate share the right to make treaties and appoint en- voys. Senate ratification of a treaty negotiated by the executive branch requires a two-thirds majority vote of those present. A device increas- ingly popular is the "executive agreement in place of the treaty. Its ratification requires a simple majority of the members of both houses, which is often politically more expedient than the standard treaty. Congressional interest in for- eign policy is illustrated by the large number of Congressmen traveling abroad to investigate a great variety of subjects and conditions. For- eign policy usually cuts across political party lines, and the party platforms in recent years have not differed materially in this respect. In matters of foreign policy, while the American people re- spond readily to moral and ethical principles, as mentioned previously, they, as any national group, react most rapidly to the needs of self-defense. A brief historical survey of the development and dominant features of American foreign policy will provide a useful background for the better under- standing of its current operations in connection with other world governments. 179 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS Isolationism and Expansionism The exact meaning of George Washington's injunction against entangling foreign alliances has been long debated. It has been generally agreed, however, that his concern was in perma- nent alliances with foreign nations, and that he did not mean to impose a ban on all close relations to meet temporary situations. If a recommended policy of isolationism is to be implied from his remarks, certainly at the time it was a suitable policy for a weak country far removed from the European scene and well occupied with an inland frontier. But even though in the past the United States has avoided close political contacts, its trade and economic relations have always been tied in with the rest of the world. While true that the Monroe Doctrine, for example, was iso- lationist in one sense, in another it was interven- tionist because it was unilaterally proclaimed by the United States in sympathy with the Spanish rebels in Latin America. Nor can it be forgotten also that this doctrine for many years relied for support on the strength of the British Royal Navy. Internal expansion across the North American continent was followed before the end of the nine- teenth century by expansion into Alaska and over- seas into the Caribbean and the far reaches of the Pacific. The reasons for expansion beyond the continental limits of the United States are many and certainly cannot be blamed on the economic lobbyists alone. For example, many sugar inter- ests were actually opposed to intervention in Cuba and, in the Philippines, the United States might have withdrawn from there as readily as it did from Cuba had it not been for the postwar revolt. Our difficulties with Colombia over the Canal Zone were restricted to control over a narrow strip of land, coupled with handsome remuneration to the injured party, an unheard of act in that day. Our interests in Nicaragua, Haiti, Santo Domingo, and other nearby countries never led to actual coloniza- tion, although a later approach to inter-American relations has been that of mutual consultation rather than unilateral action. The Open Door in China In China, United States policy was long that of the open door; self-interested, yes, but at the same time it may have saved China from being carved CONFIDENTIAL 180 up into colonies like most of the rest of Asia. America's interest in China dates back to the days when our clipper ships traded at Canton for tea and silks. In the middle of the nineteenth cen- tury, China was forced to open additional treaty ports to foreign commerce, with concessions granted to a number of countries including our own. China had gradually lost many outlying territories and suzerainties. The French had taken Indo-China and dominated Yunnan, Kwangsi, and Kwantung together with the leased port of Kwangchowwan. Russia had taken the Amur Valley, had railway concessions in Man- churia, and dominated Outer Mongolia. Ger- many had Kiaochow and dominated Shangtung. The British held Hong Kong, Kowloon, and Weihaiwei, and controlled the Yangtze Valley. Earlier they had taken Burma, and had a degree of control over Tibet. Italy attempted to obtain Sanmen Bay in Chekiang, but was not successful. Japan, as is well known, persistently pressed for territory and privileges, acquiring the Ryukyus, Formosa, Korea, and later Manchuria. In 1899 Secretary John Hay proclaimed our open door policy to put an end to further territorial seizures. We never really backed it with force until 1941, and since then the progress of events has swept away the opportunity for its application. It was a generally favorable factor in our relations with China for many years. The First World War and Its Aftermath First trying to be neutral, we finally entered World War I as a crusade for democracy, with the issue of freedom of the seas a major considera- tion. After the war we found ourselves at odds with our allies and facing new and unfamiliar problems. Reparations, war debts, financial boom at home, then worldwide economic collapse were aftermaths of the war. Economic nationalism and autarchy, foreign aggression and dictatorships of right and left followed. The deterioration of world affairs in the 1930's brought us back to war again. The Second World War With much of the world in flames our neutrality acts were quickly shown to be no guarantee of peace. We transferred our ships to neutral flags to rush supplies to Europe. The sudden collapse Approved For Release 20 03/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 THE UNITED STATES AND THE WORLD CONFIDENTIAL of western Europe under the German onslaught brought a vast rearmament program, and overage destroyers, preserved from the first war, were ex- changed with Great Britain for bases. By the summer of 1941 the Navy was in effect at war to protect the western half of the Atlantic, despite the doubtful legal status of such protection. Our policy stiffened in the Far East as well, although we were woefully unprepared for major action. Many Americans had to revise their thinking dur- ing that period, though the full shock of discover- ing that we were arrayed against strong antago- nists in a worldwide struggle was not felt until the attack on Pearl Harbor. Moves for Security Our international relations after 1940 under- went successive policy changes as our leaders and people began to assess the meaning of events as they unfolded. Our primary concern was with our security. In the summer of 1941 off Argentia, Newfoundland, Churchill, and Roosevelt met to agree on common principles and war aims. We emphasized that we were not interested in terri- torial gains, and recognized the right of people to choose their own form of government. We agreed upon a postwar cooperative order that called for free access to raw materials and mar- kets, subject to existing commitments. We called for disarming aggressors, pending the arrange- ment of a general security system. We cham- pioned freedom of the seas, and expressed the famous four freedoms of the Atlantic Charter, freedom from want, freedom from fear, freedom of speech, and freedom of religion. Most of the successive important international conferences dealt largely with the prosecution of the war, but several important doctrines related to the present world order were enunciated and agreed upon during that period. At Casablanca, in 1943, Britain and the United States announced the "unconditional surrender" doctrine. 'Whether right or wrong, this stand may well have had a permanent effect on the war and its aftermath. Although Stalin was invited to attend the next meeting held in Quebec City, he failed to come. China participated in the negotiations of Novem- ber 1943 at Cairo where the Atlantic Charter was reaffirmed, and where it was agreed to strip Japan 181 of all territories outside the four main islands, with minor exceptions. The Teheran meeting later that month? was the first time Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin actually met in person. Be- cause of Soviet neutrality in the Pacific, Chiang Kai-shek was not invited. The broad strategy of the war in Europe was planned, and the demand for a "second front" was renewed. The Russians, of course, had a second front on the European continent in 1939-40, but at that time they chose to be neutral. Antagonisms and differences of opinion were evident even in this first meeting. Churchill favored an attack into the Balkans through the Vardar Valley, while Roosevelt called for a frontal assault on Western Europe because of military and political considerations including recognition of Soviet interests in a second front in Europe. While this may represent an over-sim- plification of the strategic views held, it suggests the nature of the differences that developed. Idealism Meetings nearly a year later at Dumbarton Oaks considered proposals for the postwar international peace machinery. Continuing differences over policy caused President Roosevelt to agree to a trip to Yalta to try to reach a better understand- ing with the Soviets, for as allies they were in no sense as reciprocal of plans, men, and supplies as were our British partners. The Yalta conferences dealt with the treatment to be accorded Germany, and the difficult task of forming a workable United Nations Organization. Representation in the organization was the first problem. The United States modestly requested only one vote, but since the independent members of the British Commonwealth wanted one vote each, the Russians demanded seventeen, one for each constituent re- public. The U. S. S. R. finally settled for three, technically taking one for the Ukraine, and another for Byelo-Russia, in addition to one for the U. S. S. R. There was agreement that in the present state of the world the major powers should retain a veto over substantive decisions of the Se- curity Council. We thought also that we had won the promise of free elections and independent states in eastern Europe. This proved illusory, to say the least. In an effort to shorten the Pa- cific war and thus save American lives, we reacted CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS favorably to a Soviet promise to declare war on Japan, and tentatively accepted Russian domina- tion of the Kuriles, Southern Sakhalin, Dairen, and the Manchurian railways. The assessments of this meeting, with its secret agreements, remain highly controversial. In the spring of 1945 the meetings in San Fran- cisco established the United Nations Organization. President Roosevelt died in April and Germany's final collapse came in May. At the time of the Potsdam meeting in August, of the original Big Three only Stalin was still in office, for Attlee had replaced Churchill. The Soviets were ready to enter the war against Japan, and did so soon after the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Naga- saki. A completely demoralized Japan facing in- vasion of her home islands, surrendered in re- sponse to the Potsdam Declaration. At Potsdam, general plans for the former German satellite states were formulated and the zones of military occupation for Germany and Austria were estab- lished. A Council of Foreign Ministers to repre- sent the Big Three, plus France and China, was created. Realism In reviewing the record of these wartime con- ferences, it is interesting to note the shifts of position that occurred. Our first concern was that of security, for we were engaged in a struggle for survival, but as the end of the war came in sight, we entered a phase of idealism. With the benefit of hindsight it is now easy to see that the Soviets carefully adhered to the long-term policies which have placed them in opposition to ourselves. Any lingering doubts about the Soviet's real intentions were quickly dispelled in the months following the war. Countless efforts to show good will and to go more than halfway were met with no response from the Soviet delegates, who continued an atti- tude of suspicion and distrust. The record shows that we wanted peace and were willing to make any reasonable concessions, but no agreement proved better than the Soviet intentions of living up to it. New problems arose to plague the foreign min- isters and their deputies faster than the old ones could be solved or shelved. Satellite treaties, in- terference with elections, atomic energy, the CONFIDENTIAL 182 Italian treaty, and control of the Danube were debated at great length. Only the strongest of protests through the United Nations brought about the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran, thus averting what might have developed into a Soviet military penetration of the Middle East. The Morgenthau Plan for Germany and repara- tions on the scale demanded by the Soviets were finally abandoned. The position of the United States toward Germany gradually shifted when it was realized that Germany's deficits would even- tually be paid by the American taxpayer, and that a prostrate Germany meant an impoverished Eu- rope. Gradually the United States passed beyond the idealism stage and began to see the shape of the Soviet menace. Cold War Various aspects of the cold war further accen- tuated this menace. In a major test of strength the Soviets imposed a land blockade of Berlin in 1948. Controversial issues leading to this action included the quantity and kind of West Zone rep- arations to the Soviet Union, the currency reform which started West Germany toward economic re- covery, and the action taken to unify the Ameri- can, British, and French zones of occupation. Another factor was the Soviet desire to eliminate a Western Island in East Germany. The Soviet blockade was met with counter blockade action by the western allies and an arduous though success- ful airlift. Although the blockade was finally lifted, a few false moves on either side might have led to war. Steps taken by the United States to strengthen the economies of western European countries and later their military forces, as mentioned previ- ously, were all part of the cold war which in- creased in intensity with the outbreak of armed conflict in Korea in 1950. Trouble spots in Indo- China, Malaya, Iran, and the Arab world only served to accentuate the dimensions of this smol- dering menace. Relations With Latin America Any discussion of United States foreign policy must include developing relationships with the Latin American countries to the south. Pan- American relations have improved greatly since Approved For Release 20 03/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 THE UNITED STATES AND THE WORLD CONFIDENTIAL the time of the enunciation of the Monroe Doc- trine, the end of our territorial expansion, and our difficulties with Spain over Cuba. The for- mation of the Pan American Union in 1890 led the way to better relations with the Latin-Ameri- can republics, culminating in the well-publicised "good neighbor" policy in 1933. We eschewed unilateral intervention among all the American states. Our policies have now centered on pre- serving the independence of republican govern- ments, recognizing the equality of each country, maintaining their territorial integrity, and urging the observance of existing treaties and the peace- ful settlement of disputes. Continental solidarity has been the goal, coupled with nonintervention in internal affairs, but with extensive cooperation in all other matters. The degree of success has been fairly high. Eventually, all the American republics entered World War II and a number shared in lend-lease, and made available antisub- marine air bases as required for convoy protec- tion. The treaty of Chapultepec, ratified at Rio de Janeiro in 1947, binds all states on a two-thirds vote to come to the aid of any member state that is attacked. One of our more persistent remain- ing problems has been sporadic disagreement with ambitious and energetic Argentina. Far Eastern Relations United States foreign policy in China since World War II has been more controversial and the facts involved may be slow to emerge with any clarity. It is clear, however, that the former "open door" policy of equal access by any nation to China has been swept away during the course of the twentieth century by world events. Chi- nese nationalism flared up as early as the Boxer rebellion when there were demands for the expul- sion of foreigners. In 1911 came the revolution headed by Sun Yat-sen that destroyed the Manchu Empire. His Kuomintang party has favored ex- pulsion of foreigners and political tutelage of the people until a proper, constitutional government can ultimately function. Sun Yat-sen's revolu- tionary techniques were studied and adapted by Lenin, for in the early 1920's Soviet and Kuomin- tang relations were quite close. After Chiang Kai-shek made his successful march north from Canton in 1927, he tossed out his Russian advisers 183 and broke relations with Communist Chinese forces which withdrew into the interior, finally making Yenan their headquarters for many years. General Mao Tse-tung was the leader of this dis- sident group. In 1931 the Japanese made new advances into Manchuria, establishing a puppet state; in 1937 the war moved south of the Great Wall to extend Japanese control to all the major rail arteries and port cities of northern and cen- tral China. During World War II the Chinese fought a desultory war against the Japanese, for all their normal supply routes and most of their industry were in Japanese hands. Nationalist and Communist forces were united in an uneasy truce against a common enemy. At the end of the war the United States helped to ferry large numbers of Nationalist divisions to the coastal cities, north China, and Manchuria, together with supplying considerable amounts of war surplus equipment. The Communists were equally determined to control these territories, and swept out of the back country to lay waste the railways of the area. With Japanese equipment, probably turned over by the Soviets, they proved a strong opponent to the Nationalists. General Marshall's mission failed to find a solution to this problem acceptable to the parties concerned. Truce violations, attrition, inflation, and armies changing sides brought disaster. Before it was over, all China was Communist, aside from Formosa and mainland guerrilla forces of mixed allegiance. FOREIGN POLICIES OF OTHER NATIONS It is not possible here to discuss the guiding foreign policies of all other nations, but a few ab- breviated examples will at least illustrate the com- plex and shifting nature of policy manifestations, usually in support of some fairly persistent basic national drives. France France was long the problem child of Europe. Arrayed against the Hapsburgs and the Holy Roman Empire, she aimed at territorial expansion and predominant continental power which re- quired conquest and the sponsoring of "independ- ent" German states. Louis XIV also looked to French-Spanish union, and control of the Low- CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR lands, but was opposed by the British. Napoleon, in the name of the French revolution, though with somewhat modified objectives, did sweep much of Europe. But after his defeat, French policy in Europe largely abandoned expansionism in favor of secure frontiers. French expansionism was later to be active again overseas. It as only at the turn of the nineteenth century, some years after Germany had united into a strong nation, that 400 years of British-French rivalry in Europe came to an end, and certain colonial difficulties were settled by giving Britain dominance over Egypt and France control in Morocco. Follow- ing the second invasion of their homeland by the Germans in World War I, security became almost an obsession for the French. They favored a breakup of Germany, the demilitarization of the Rhine, and defense in depth. The withdrawal of the United States from European affairs may have been a factor in the French sponsoring of the "cordon sanitaire," consisting of alliances of the States bordering Germany to prevent any resur- gence of military power. Italy, following World War I, felt that not all wartime promises had been kept and withdrew from her former allies. The French occupation of the Rhineland in 1923 was- an attempt in part to force Britain into a position of greater support, but the British were not too amenable, and gave some support instead to the Germans. Government changes in France and Germany brought closer cooperation between the two countries temporarily, and the French withdrew from the Rhineland. Growing German nationalism was clearly re- vealed by the 1936 remilitarization of the Rhine- land in violation of the Versailles treaty, which collapsed much of the French defense plan. This change made it difficult for France to offer any real military support to Eastern and Central Europe in the event of German aggressions. While France worked harder to build up the Maginot defense tine, she left her frontiers with Belgium and Luxemburg unprotected. French and Italian re- lationships were very confused: rivalry was strong in places like Tunisia, yet a partial understand- ing gave Italy a free hand in Ethiopia. War came to Spain. It was a proving ground for Com- munist and Fascist armies, with a few misguided liberals on the fringes, and the common people CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 20 184 NAVAL OFFICERS were the victims. The Polish corridor question was boiling. Buying time, or doing wishful thinking, Britain and France, though rearming, watched Austria, Czechoslovakia and Memel go to Germany. The Low Countries still thought in terms of neutrality. The sudden shock of the German-Soviet agreement of 1939 was the last step before the partition of Poland and the beginning of World War II. France, still feeling the heavy cost of the first war, subjected to the divided pol- icies of unstable governments and the weakening influence of the Front Populaire, was ill-equipped for war. What had been the greatest army in Europe fell before the Germans, destroyed partly by the politicians behind its back, partly by poor strategy, partly by fatalistic apathy. United Kingdom British policies are famous for their thorough relation to long-range British needs. Well-suited to an island people close offshore from a ferment- ing Europe, they are naturally keyed to British self-interest and have opposed entanglements on the mainland. The British have aimed at a bal- ance of power on the continent, to prevent its domination by any one group which could then threaten British security. For the last four cen- turies the British have had no European terri- torial ambitions, although they have been active overseas. They have taken what steps were neces- sary to protect their islands, to keep world trade routes free, and to assure the security of their overseas holdings. These aims have naturally enough made seapower a prime weapon. The British usually make short-term alliances in Eu- rope as required, though they have long continued close relations with Portugal, a remnant of earlier needs to counter Spain. Whenever the Rhine es- tuary and the Scheldt River are threatened, the British always fight. They have long felt Russian rivalry overseas, since the Russians have long sought access to the Indian Ocean and the Medi- terranean, both intimately related to Britain's im- perial lifeline. Postwar concentration of power in the hands of the Soviet Union and the United States has re- quired some British adjustments. As a result, Great Britain has associated closely with the United States in such common undertakings as the 03/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 THE UNITED STATES AND THE WORLD CONFIDENTIAL United Nations and NATO. In areas such as the Middle East and the Far East, however, British and American interests have not always been co- ordinated. In Europe the British have been con- sistent with their basic policies in delaying on the Schuman steel plan. The purpose of this quick review of various for- eign policies has been to emphasize that in the world, as it actually is, any nation that is to sur- vive as a great power is motivated by self-interest and will do whatever is necessary for survival. Aware of these facts, the intelligence officer is better able to understand and interpret the foreign policies of nations. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION From the philosophical and even the practical outlook, men have long recognized the existence of a world community. The western world, for ex- ample, is joined in common spiritual values. Transport improvements and trade needs have also made materialistic interdependence very great, which in itself has demanded a degree of world organization. We have progressed from bi- lateral treaties to the partial recognition of in- ternational law, and increasing reliance is being placed on multilateral agreements and the creation of permanent international bodies with many powers. The achievements of international co- operation have been many. Examples are the In- ternational Red Cross, control of telecommunica- tions, control of rivers for international use, standard weights and measures, weather report- ing, hydrographic services, copyright rules, health regulations, and controls over slavery and nar- cotics. The failure has been at the political level and as a result, when states go to war, many of these cooperative and successful economic or tech- nical arrangements are jeopardized. The League of Nations There were many early attempts at multilateral international settlements, typified by the Congress of Vienna in 1815. At the end of the 19th century and in the years prior to World War I, the Hague Conferences attempted to set up an international order, but the first comprehensive attempt, spon- 269196-54----13 185 sored by President Wilson, was the creation of the League of Nations in conjunction with the Ver- sailles Treaty. The League was effective in the economic and social fields. It failed on the key question of secu- rity and power because of an unwillingness of its members to make it really work, to implement in full what it could do. The League could impose sanctions on aggressors, but being a pioneer effort, it was not designed to have unlimited power. Al- though the Covenant established the League, the interpretation of responsibilities rested with the individual states. It was largely a body of war victors, their friends, and their self-governing former colonies. Later other powers joined, with the exception of the United States which alone of the major powers remained aloof. America's un- willingness to participate directly in the League was based in part on its unfortunate experience in power politics and unpaid war debts. We did, however, remain interested in the League during the years it functioned, and always had an observer present at its meetings, occasionally considering the idea of entering, with reservations, to protect our position. When it finally suited their con- venience, Germany, Italy, and Japan withdrew from the League to pursue their courses of con- quest. The Soviets were expelled for their attack on Finland. The League was paralled by the World Court whose judges were able to settle many disputes in those cases where countries voluntarily submitted to its jurisdiction. The League was also closely allied to such bodies as the International Labor Organization, which in their specific field of con- cern, were able to do good work. The importance and success of all of these supplementary activities were dwarfed, if not lost to the public eye, by the magnitude and seriousness of world security prob- lems which the League failed to solve thereby dooming itself by inaction. Italy bombed Corfu in 1925, and the League failed to act decisively. The Lytton Commission did study the war in Manchuria in 1932, but had no way to enforce its recommendations. The Paraguay-Bolivia Gran Chaco War was not settled by the League. In the Ethiopian War sanctions were ordered against Italy, but not all members carried them out. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS The United Nations Organization Some of the same basic elements which made up the League are to be found in the United Nations organization. It has a General Assembly of all member states, a Security Council with the big powers and regionally representative members, a Secretariat, an International Court of Justice, ECOSOC (the Economic and Social Council), and finally the Trusteeship Council. The ECOSOC is made up of a large group of activities including: ILO (International Labor Organization), FAO (Food and Agricultural Or- ganization), UNESCO (United Nations Educa- tional, Scientific, and Cultural Organization), ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organiza- tion), the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Monetary Fund, WHO (World Health Organization), IRO (International Refugee Organization), ITO (In- ternational Trade Organization) , UPU (Univer- sal Postal Union) , ITU (International Telecom- munications Union), WMO (World Meteorologi- cal Organization) , and IMCO (Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization). ECOSOC concerns itself with matters of economics and em- ployment, transportation and communications. statistics, fiscal affairs, population, social prob- lems, human rights, the status of women, and narcotic drugs. It has as suborganizations the Economic Council for Europe, the Economic Council for Latin America, and the Economic Council for Asia and the Far East. ECOSOC by its very nature does some of the less spectacular and more successful work of the UN. Officially it has 18 members, appointed to 3-year terms, but it operates with many ad hoc committees and nongovernmental organizations. It has no ex- clusive jurisdiction, no permanent members, no veto problem, no coercive power; it is largely fact-finding and coordinating. Those recommen- dations bordering on domestic matters require do- mestic enactment to become effective. In a prac- tical sense, it is at work on the causes of war 'aside from those which are political or military. Ac- tually the ECOSOC fights communist objectives; while the communists are trying to destroy eco- nomic order to hasten world revolution, ECOSOC is attempting to restore order. Despite this, the CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 20 Soviet Union has joined several of the ECOSOC activities when it has been advantageous to do so. The General Assembly represents all member nations, each with one vote, though any size of delegation may be sent. This body discusses any matter it chooses and may pass recommendations to the Security Council. A two-thirds vote of the General Assembly, plus the approval of the big five in the Security Council, can amend the charter of the organization. The Security Council has 11 members, includ- ing the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, China and France (all with the veto power) and 6 other members for 2-year terms "elected" by the General Assembly on a regional basis. For example, a typical distribu- tion is 1 British Commonwealth member, 2 Latin American members including 1 from the ABC powers (Argentina, Brazil, Chile), and one mem- ber each from a Soviet satellite, a West European state, and an Arab League state. The Security Council deals with major political disputes and can impose sanctions. It has a military staff to aid in this duty. It also has an armed forces committee and an atomic energy committee. The Secretariat, of course, provides administra- tive and research services while the Trusteeship Council is responsible to the General Assembly for the mandates and trusts administered by mem- bers. Some of these are former German colonies, others, the former Japanese holdings now under UN control. Regional Organizations The United Nations has attempted to avoid the failures of the League of Nations. Certainly it cannot be blamed for failure to end the cold war, because its success depends upon the honest in- tentions of its more powerful members. Merely having the machinery for peace does not solve the problems of the world communist movement and Soviet ambitions; in fact, the UN organization was not originally designed to fight this kind of battle. For this reason many types of regional international organizations have been created with definite functions to perform. The development of some of these organizations, patterned after the relatively successful Pan American Union, was stimulated by such events as the fall of Czechoslo- 186 03/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 THE UNITED STATES AND THE WORLD CONFIDENTIAL vakia to "internal" forces. For example, Bel- gium and Luxembourg have long had a customs union. With the addition of the Netherlands to this combination, and an extension of purposes, these countries established "Benelux," an economic union, sensibly designed to overcome some of the handicaps of small size. Such a merger is com- plex, for it not only removes tariff walls, but re- quires agreement on fiscal and monetary policies, the same regulation of prices and business, and a single legal code. Such changes do not come over- night. Benelux attempts at economic unity were paralleled by the grouping of the Brussels Pow- ers, namely, the Low Countries, Britain, and France, into a military alliance with increasing standardization of weapons and organization. In like manner the U. S. Marshall Plan on the eco- nomic level was matched by NATO, wherein the United States joined with the Brussels Pact coun- tries plus Canada, Portugal, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Greece, and Turkey to form a mili- tary alliance. This movement was given signifi- cant support by the United States Military Aid Program and the assignment of General Eisen- hower to the top command. The Schuman Plan, aimed at the integration of coal and steel industries in western Europe, has been a significant effort toward economic unification of the participating countries, notably France and Germany. Still another regional development has been the Council of Europe, not unlike a miniature Gen- eral Assembly of the UN. It has only consulta- tive powers, but conceivably could result in Euro- pean federation. Although Winston Churchill was one of its early proponents, the British posi- tion is affected by triple interests, European, British Commonwealth, and United States co- operation. The growth of these various original organiza- tions has been stimulated by the unwillingness of the Soviet Union to cooperate within the UN. Examples of this unwillingness are many. Prior to the outbreak of the Korean War the UN had tried for several years to solve the problem of this divided country, but the Soviets would not allow UN observers in North Korea. Even though the UN had demonstrated its ability to aid in the settlement of problems in such areas as Palestine and Indonesia, it could not even gain access to Czechoslovakia. Early attempts to create a permanent UN police force remained com- pletely deadlocked. The United States offered to supply two divisions, ten to fifteen air groups, and two naval task groups; the United Kingdom was willing to commit half the Royal Air Force; all told, some two million men were offered. But the question of the veto power deadlocked fur- ther discussion. The questions of disarmament and atomic energy met with similar difficulties, since both conventional and mass destruction weapons must be considered in any real disarma- ment plan. The United States' position on atomic weapons was a generous offer to share its knowledge with the world, including world ownership of materials and facilities and complete inspection to prevent secret violation of rules. However, there could be no veto of swift punishment for all offenders. Even though such a plan is realistic if atomic con- trols are to be workable, they strike at the heart of the Soviet system of secrecy and isolation. Ac- cordingly, the Soviets, with a vast land power strength in conventional weapons, made the counterproposal that the United States destroy its atomic weapons, which constituted a vital source of military power, and that the veto power be retained by the five major powers. In the light of Soviet previous conduct such an arrangement did not seem to be consistent with survival. Of course, subsequent to the UN debates on the con- t1-01 of atomic power, it was learned that the Soviet Union was making rapid atomic progress herself by combining espionage with the best scientific brains at her disposal. The issue of veto is one of the most crucial in the UN. The United States, like the Soviet Union, believes in the veto, but recognizes it must be used in moderation if the organization is to function at all. Actually, the charter of the UN does not discuss the veto. It calls for 7 of 11 votes affirmative to pass motions, except that motions which are substantive in nature, not just proce- dural, require affirmative votes of the big 5 among the 7 or more votes. A state which is a member of the Security Council can be deprived of its vote when it is a party to a dispute, unless the issue involves a threat to the peace which is then called a "situation." Actually the veto power is abso- 187 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS lute, for the question of whether an issue is a "situation" or a "dispute" has been considered a substantive one, and no power will vote itself out of a veto on a crucial issue. By vetoing any at- tempt to declare an issue to be procedural, a big nation never loses its decisive power. This is com- monly referred to as the double veto. A state can veto a decision to make a question procedural, then veto it again as being a substantive matter. In exasperation many national leaders watching the record of mounting Soviet vetoes in the post- war period have turned to regional plans, or have recommended expulsion of the Soviets, or have talked of a new UN designed to be a real world government. The UN obviously is not perfect, but many of its functions are very useful. INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS As a basis for reviewing economic relations be- tween world states it is well to remember, first, that states depend on various resources for their power, and second, that economic interdependence and political ambitions have brought them into continuous contact with each other. It has already been pointed out that the greatest progress in in- ternational organization has been in the economic sphere. This is natural because economics, like intelligence, is largely a matter of hard-headed realism, and economic interdependence is fre- quently dictated by compelling economic reasons. The United States and the Soviet Union continue to trade, even if on a reduced scale, because there are sound reasons for each to do so. In varying degree, trade is carried on indirectly even by bel- ligerents in most wars. This is of itself neither good nor bad, and is hardly different from other measures dealing with the conduct of war, such as the Geneva Convention for the treatment of prisoners. However, from the viewpoint of the individual state, it is bad when individual citizens secretly trade with the enemy in contravention of national policy. Economic Systems Economic relations are, of course, directly af- fected by some of the main forces at work in the economic world expressed in terms of economic systems. Perhaps the two extremes of these sys- tems are "free enterprise," on the one hand, where CONFIDENTIAL economic decisions are made by individuals, and communism" on the other, where the state is the source of all decisions. There are other varia- tions, of course, but these are the two major ex- tremes of present-day concern. In between are state socialism, as practiced in Scandinavia, and systems which in general support free enterprise but impose certain controls. The British Labor Government, for example, attempted public owner- ship of the basic industries, allowing "freedom" elsewhere. In general, the United States has kept private ownership, but has increasingly added cen- tral controls. A brief summary of the historical development of this Anglo-American economic system is illus- trative of the complex forces which shape such systems. The modern era of economics began when the rigidities of society inherent in a system of "status" gave way to business by "contract." The new money economies and trade were coupled with royal grants of monopolies of all possible va- riety. The 18th century brought strong new phil- osophies of individualism, and the beginnings of the industrial revolution. It was Adam Smith's Wealth, of Nation8 in 1776 that called for an eco- nomic revolution that would match the political revolution in America. No simple pattern of orderly development followed, for many of the old restrictions were only partially removed, but in considerable degree free competition and au- tomatic forces were the rule. The pressure of competition encouraged the exploitation of new inventions, and material progress was very real. The inefficient and obsolescent plants went bank- rupt. New enterprises, or those able to adjust to changing conditions, reaped profits that were plowed back into new machinery and other capital equipment. The corporation, an artificial legal being, became dominant in many fields over the partnership or individual enterprise. Very early, however, the need for regulation of monopolies was recognized, not as a contradiction to free enterprise, but as a necessary policing step to maintain it. In the United States the Granger laws and the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 were typical of these controls. The Sherman Antitrust Act was of broader applicability. In the years that have followed, the American system has become increasingly more hybrid, and govern- 188 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 THE UNITED STATES AND THE WORLD CONFIDENTIAL ment has a voice in almost every phase of eco- nomic life including labor laws, security regula- tion, and agricultural supports. Increasingly, too, the power of government has been expanded by the emergency use of price controls and alloca- tions, and taxing power and spending power have enormous indirect effect on the direction of eco- nomic life. Social security and direct public in- vestment in electric power and atomic energy rep- resent further departures from abstract "free enterprise." Trade Relations The effect of economic systems on international relations is often to be found in the circumstances of trade between nations. Since current trade re- lations reflect those of the past, a brief resume will be helpful to general understanding. The world of Adam Smith was dominated by mercantilist concepts. The preceding centuries had seen national states established and the switch from feudal barter to money economies. Spain had poured gold and silver from the New World into Europe, but for countries without a supply of gold and silver for their expanding economies, the only way it could be obtained was through priva- teering ( a polite word for legalized piracy) or through the regulation of international trade to keep exports greater than imports in order that this difference could be received in bullion. This intense interest in the acquisition of gold and silver was a primary feature of mercantilism. There is not space here to expose all its economic fallacies, but any elementary text on the subject will make clear, as did Adam Smith, that real wealth lies in resources and labor, not in gold or silver, from the national point of view. It is no compliment to present-day thinking that most of the false concepts of the mercantilists are still with us in one form or another and still accepted by many people. The pressure of mercantilist theories had its effect in the struggle for colonies with supplies of precious metals, and in restrictive regulations to hamper freedom of shipping and of commerce, thus adding to the tensions and pressures that bring war. After Adam Smith, the following period of the classical economists was reflected in governmental 189 policies leading to a breakdown of many tariff barriers and trade restrictions. England in par- ticular became the champion of free trade, though actually the greatest free-trade area in the world is the United States itself, where no real tariffs are in force among the 48 States. In no small sense, United States world leadership in economic progress can be attributed to its continent-wide free trade. Moderate tariffs during the 19th century were coupled with the use of the automatic gold stand- ard for exchange. The gold content of the coinage of each country set the par of exchange, while free market fluctuations of the exchange rate were held to narrow limits by the ability of traders to ship gold to pay trade balances as an alternative to buy- ing bills of exchange. A continued imbalance of imports against exports of a particular country, including "invisible" trade (such things as ship- ping services and immigrant remittances), if not corrected rapidly by shipments of gold and ad- justment of the price level, was caused by the processes of international investment. A coun- try borrowing capital from abroad in effect re- ceives that loan in goods, and this is reflected in a so-called "unfavorable" balance of trade; namely, more imports than exports. When the interest payments come due and when the principal is re- paid, then exports exceed imports. The details of the mechanism are of no concern here, although it may be noted that the terms "favorable" and "un- favorable" balance are in themselves rather mean- ingless carry-overs from mercantilist days. World War I severely altered international economic relations. It had marked effects on the finances and money systems of the world, and new trade patterns developed. Impoverished by war, attacked by inflation at home, in heavy debt through reparations demands or borrowings, many countries sought to redress their position by ex- change controls and tariff barriers. Many had abandoned the gold standard during the war period, and now were on paper standards. Post- war unemployment was frequently countered by import restrictions and "buy at home" campaigns. Although intelligent people could see the ultimate damage to export sales of such restrictions, it was the easy course to take countermeasures and add more restrictions, even though the gains would be CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS temporary. Facing the political dangers of un- employment, in some cases even revolutionary danger, it was easiest to sacrifice long-range stand- ards of living in some degree in order to maintain employment through autarchy. This analysis, of course, is greatly oversimplified, but the facts of spiraling trade controls, quotas, and exchange manipulations are the important ones to remem- ber. The dangers of war inherent in policies which deny some countries equal access to markets and resources have been expressly recognized by American leaders from the time of the Atlantic Charter. However, at subsequent similar meet- ings, corrective action on an international scale has lagged behind recognition because of the many intricate problems involved. Attempts to free international trade have been vastly complicated by domestic economic controls in all parts of the world. State socialism is likely to lead to state buying in place of individual trade, as is the case in Britain's dealings with Argentina, and price supports at home mean drastic trade regulation, as is the case with agricultural imports in the United States. So-called normal trade patterns have also been strongly affected by world events since 1939. On a scale undreamed of before in world history the United States through lend-lease poured out a tremendous flow of munitions, foods, and indus- trial materials to its allies, to save the world from German-Japanese fascism. As a practical meas- ure it provided a means for arming the allies in a common cause and obviated many of the debt difficulties of World War I. It was based on the stated premise that free nations must stand to- gether in the face of a great common danger. Trade Agreements The particulars of recent trade policy include names and doctrines with which the naval intelli- gence officer should have at least a limited acquaintance. Although there are some multi- lateral international trade agreements, especially on certain commodities, most trading arrange- ments are bilateral in nature. The particular treaty devices adopted by the United States have led, however, to many multilateral effects. When CONFIDENTIAL 190 two countries sign a treaty of friendship and com- merce, opening their ports to each other's ships, they frequently promise "national" treatment to each other's businessmen and citizens. This means they guarantee foreigners equal treatment before the courts, and usually the right to engage in busi- ness on the same basis as nationals, though there may be a few exclusions. For example, we re- serve coastwise shipping, domestic air service, and fishing in American coastal waters to our own nationals. Our treaties are also usually made on a bilateral "most-favored-nation" basis, which really means "equally favored." The net effect is that if new tariff concessions are extended by either party to a third country, the signatories agree to extend the same privilege to each other. There are minor exceptions, such as the British Commonwealth preference agreements, and special American con- cessions to Cuba and, for a time, to the Philip- pines. Furthermore, we usually extend "most- favored-nation" treatment on an unconditional basis, which means that no new quid pro quo is required because agreement as to what constitutes equivalent concession is very hard to reach. Our aim is to minimize the restrictions on trade, al- though some of the most ardent free-enterprise businessmen often favor high tariffs and small quotas. In 1934, the United States returned to a form of additional trade negotiation it had used in earlier years, the now well-known Reciprocal Trade Treaties. In exchange for additional con- cessions on selected items that were most impor- tant in trade with a particular country the United States, by executive agreement, lowered its im- port tariffs (still on a "most-favored-nation" basis) even more. While these concessions are less subject to direct pressures by protectionist interests, the most elaborate safeguards are pro- vided by means of public hearings to give full voice to affected American industries. We do not grant concessions on items we have in surplus We have special penalties on "dumping," and even we use the "quota," a weapon more powerful than the tariff. In addition, when changed conditions require new protection for an American industry, these agreements have escape clauses. Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09: CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210QQ2.2 THE UNITED STATES AND THE WORLD utnInDENTIAL Multilateral Agreements Multilateral agreements in the control of trade are best exemplified by the activities of the Food and Agricultural Organization, which establishes international quotas and price controls on certain agricultural commodities. Further, the Interna- tional Trade Organization of the United Nations establishes the fundamental machinery to collect trade data and takes corrective action to remove trade inequities that might lead to war. This or- ganization, which the United States has cham- pioned as a companion to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, is a beginning, but so far has demonstrated little concrete accom- plishment, since the obstacles it must overcome are tremendous. Of course, so long as the world is fundamentally divided in objectives, most of these agreements can have only limited success. The present ITO agreements give lip service to free- dom of trade and no discrimination, but are so hedged with escape clauses that their practical ef- fect is very limited. The choice has been to have the machinery established, or to have nothing, since the policy of free trade has not as yet been made possible. The milieu in which our trade policy is applied is not entirely of our own making, but results from events in all parts of the world. When immedi- ate post World War I restrictions had eased slightly, and several of the major powers returned to the gold standard in the late 1920's, the New York stock market collapsed and we stopped in- vesting in Germany. Those investments had given Germany the apparent power to pay repara- tions, and thus in turn enabled Britain and France to pay war debts. The collapse of the Kreditan- stalt bank in Austria spread financial panic in Central Europe, and the flight of short-term capi- tal began, eventually leading to a heavy gold in- flow into the United States. This threatened. ex- change stability abroad, and eventually forced most nations off the gold standard. In 1930 our passage of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, as an answer to mounting unemployment at home, was soon matched by British abandonment of their traditional free trade policies, which had already been weakened. "Buy British" and Empire pref- erence became the rule. A special British trad- ing arrangement was made with Argentina in 191 1933, the first of many, due to the close commercial relations between the two countries. The United States and Britain did not join in a reciprocal trade agreement until 1938. World War It brought virtual free trade between the two coun- tries, for after the British exhausted most of their foreign investments paying for munitions during our "cash and carry neutrality" days, lend-lease and the postwar loans became major trade factors. Postwar Britain has been heavily engaged in state trading. The Soviets, since their seizure of power in 1918, have used state trading exclusively, though during the temporary N. E. P. period they did grant some private licenses for trade. The Min- istry of Foreign Trade controls all Soviet trade today, setting up foreign corporations abroad to do its buying. Special commodity trade combines under the Ministry set their quotas in accordance with an overall economic plan. In the United States, Antorg, a New York corporation, is the sole Soviet representative Amtorg's more sinis- ter espionage activities have already been men- tioned. Foreign Investment Many trade difficulties have been linked directly with problems of international investment or capi- tal flows, both long-term and short-term, from one country to another. It should be pointed out that long term private investment takes two forms, di- rect and portfolio. Direct investment is illus- trated by the great activity of United States firms in establishing branch plants in the Western Hemisphere countries. Portfolio investment re- fers to the purchase of securities in foreign con- cerns without the direct responsibilities of con- struction and management. The United States government has encouraged private investment abroad as a necessary measure to improve interna- tional economic good health. One of the economic problems is that the heavy American export flow, which has materially aided many countries and also maintained high employment at home, must be paid for in one or more of several ways: (a) by taxpayers helping to pay the costs; (b) by govern- ment or priVate citizens making investments abroad; (c) by an equal flow of imports. The fourth alternative, that of ending this export CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENflaEroved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS trade, has not been seriously considered in the present world situation. Since imports either have not been available or have come in competi- tion with domestic goods, they have not been of major assistance. According to various econo- mists, the best answer is investment now, with two- way trade as soon as possible. Our interest in private enterprise naturally favors private invest- ment, even though the problem is political in many respects, because outward movements of capital cannot really be considered investments unless there is a strong possibility of later dividends and repayment. Private investors are more likely to be influenced by such factors, and to place their money soundly, since they have no reason to weigh political considerations. One great trouble has been that private investors have frequently lacked incentive for foreign investment. Political in- stability and chaos, fluctuating exchanges, heavy taxes, and confiscation have all meant loss to previ- ous investors. Consequently, the trickle of such private funds abroad since the world depression has been quite small, except in a few "safe" areas. Government loans have had to replace such private flows. War Debts Financial adjustments growing out of the two world wars, as has been indicated, have been dom- inant forces in world economic relations. In the first war the United States loaned enormous sums which actually went abroad in the form of goods. There was not enough gold abroad to pay for them, yet we were unwilling to accept repayment in kind; namely, more goods. We felt that the con- tractual obligation was separate and apart from the question of reparations receipts by our debtors. Consequently, there was extreme bitterness of both sides, and payments with minor exceptions were halted. Germany surrendered at the end of World War I on the condition that no punitive damages other than war losses, were to be collected. But the Al- lied estimates of losses were astronomical. Of course, they were not completely paid, but in the process of trying, Germany experienced the com- plete inflationary destruction of her money system, and the accompanying despair has been identified as a factor in the rise of Hitler. The policy after CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 20 192 World War II was quite different. The United States kept title to lend-lease goods. Perishables were written off as one of the costs of the war. Durables were either returned, or transferred after the war at the best figure we could negotiate. Some of these mark-downs were tremendous. Of course, the significance of the mark-down has meant little in most cases, since our policy has in considerable measure been one of underwriting the foreign exchange deficits of those countries important to our defense which followed prudent fiscal and monetary policies. Following World War II some war debt settle- ments were made. In the case of a few countries, reverse lend-lease had been sufficiently great to cancel out direct lend-lease. Great Britain agreed to settle a lend-lease "debt" of $24 billion for $650 million to be paid over a 52-year period at 2-percent interest. Also, in various countries some settle- ment funds were made available under the Ful- bright plan for the interchange of scholars, when such funds were otherwise blocked because of ex- change difficulties. However, no agreements were ever reached with the Soviet Union which re- ceived 500,000 vehicles, 14,000 planes, 7,000 tanks, 2,000 locomotives, 11,000 freight cars, and 600,000 tons of ships. Reparations The end of the war brought with it the problem of reparations. The Soviet Union had suggested that it should receiVe twenty billion dollars worth of German reparations, separate and apart from any "war booty," which was a flexible term that could well include any property in territories oc- cupied by the Red Army. At the time, the United States was not demanding reparations but, under the influence of the Morgenthau Plan concept, was thinking in terms of converting Germany from an industrialized nation to an agricultural state which could never again threaten the world with serious aggression. There were many astute ob- servers who had misgivings about such a plan because of its economic consequences, not only for Germany but for all of Europe. While we did recognize that Germany had no export surplus with which to pay reparations, we envisioned that the dismantling of German war and heavy indus- tries could supply capital goods reparations re- 03/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R00010021M.F8. THE UNITED STATES AND THE WORLD ruENTIAL quired for the rebuilding of wrecked factories in a number of countries. By one way and another, several countries did collect some actual reparations. Poland was com- pensated by receiving important German terri- tories. The Soviet Union stripped much from the territories occupied by Russian troops, and appropriated German external assets in Eastern Europe even when they represented goods or se- curities stolen by the Germans. At fictitious prices the Soviets also bought control of most industry within their zones. The United States picked up portfolio German assets in Switzerland and Latin America. Dismantled plants in West- ern Germany were moved to Russia, partly as rep- arations, partly to pay for food imports from Eastern Zone. Economic Recovery Within a short time, the United States finally recognized in official policy that German economic recovery was essential both to European economic recovery and to avert chaos and communism. However, this required such sizable money grants from the United States that any reparations passed to other countries became actually equivalent to grants in aid from the United States. Therefore, the first charge on German exports was considered payment for imports, which substantially ended any large shipments of goods to the East. Be- cause of initial confusion, the three Western Zones ultimately set up unified economic controls, but some dismantling continued for a time, even after the official view had swung to the point where it was felt a halt should be called. The failure of the Soviets to receive all that they demanded be- came an additional factor in East-West tension. In the case of Japan, the Potsdam Declaration set forth general conditions for postwar treat- ment. War industries were to be destroyed, but a viable economy was to be left. External assets were taken over, and, for a period, considerable amounts of capital goods were shipped to the victims of Japanese aggression. The Soviet Union regarded its enormous prize of Manchuria, acquired in less an a week of war, as "booty," not a part of reparations. This was very costly to China, destroying for years to come any real hope of economic advance. In time the United States 269196-54 14 193 came to the position of making up Japanese trade deficits, first for relief purposes, then for economic recovery. This ended further reparations, and the Peace Treaty of 1952 fairly well closed the matter, despite the reservations held by the Philip- pines, Indonesia, and a few others. In the interests of an economically and polit- ically stable world, the United States felt obliged to extend economic aid not only to Germany and to Japan, but also to our allies, since they lacked the recuperative powers that we possessed. Their heavy purchases of food, industrial materials, and increasing amounts of capital goods in this coun- try, caused the so-called "dollar shortage." Therefore, lend-lease military aid was followed first by UNRRA food and clothing, and then by a series of other measures. We sponsored the European Payments plan to try to restore multi- lateral trade in Europe, and then the European Recovery Program, a combination of self-help, American technical guidance, and Marshall plan goods, with stress on permanent improvements of output rather than current consumables. The Economic Cooperation Agency was the American governmental body set up to administer these functions. The Marshall Plan and Military Aid The Marshall plan was an astute and states- manlike offer to the world, although the Soviet Union condemned it as an effort on our part to achieve world economic domination. Because of the Soviet position, their satellites had to with- draw acceptance of invitations to Paris to discuss the plan, and the further division of the world into East and West continued American aid and European response raised the physical indices of European production well above prewar levels, but still left Europe woefully weak militarily against the threat from the East. The Truman plan of containment with military aid for Greece and Turkey became necessary in order to save the West's strategic position in the Mediterranean. The Soviet answer to the Marshall plan was not only invective, but also the creation of the Molotov plan, which tied the satellites even closer to the U. S. S. R. The Cominform, the latest manifesta- tion of the supposedly dead Comintern, was also brought into the open. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09: CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDEtnai oved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS Scarcely had the phenomenal and substantial economic recovery of a number of countries seemed to justify the Marshall plan and point toward its termination when new problems arose. The growth of the Soviet military menace to Western Europe, and indeed to the whole free world, indi- cated a new and general need for accelerated re- armament. However, military demands on the budget and material of the Marshall plan countries threatened to undo much of the progress that had been made. Vigorous measures by the countries concerned were hampered by both internal polit- ical problems and public apathy toward defense. United States military aid was a response to the economic and political problems faced. Both Britain and France were experiencing particular economic difficulties because of additional burdens imposed by the wars in Malaya and Indo-China. In the opinion of many government leaders, the important economic fact of military aid was that the issue of arms shipments versus more economic aid was one of expediency, not of fundamentals. Economic aid, if reflected in arms manufacture in Europe, might be cheaper than arms shipments; but if the latter meant arms sooner, the higher cost might be justified. The Allies had recognized even before World War II ended that strong economic measures of international cooperation were needed to provide the basis for a working world community. The prewar arrangements for bringing stability to ex- change rates were studied and strengthened at Bretton Woods in 1944. The International Mone- tary Fund to stabilize exchanges (short-term capi- tal movement) , and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development to ease long- term capital movement problems were created. However, these measures alone, important as they were, could not provide enough support to restore the world economy. That is why the European recovery plan and "Point Four," a world-wide plan for development of backward areas, came into being. The military aid program was harder to foresee, for the cold war was not of our making. International Transport Without transport there would be neither in- ternational relations of importance, nor modern war machines. Consequently, the intelligence of- CONFIDENTIAL 194 ficer should know something of the workings of transport?the devices used, the control and man- agement, and the regulation, both national and international. Some of the most complete inter- national controls have developed in Europe, where modern technology with high speed and cheap movement contrasts most sharply with the small political units crowded into a compact geographic area. Modern economic life is closely linked with railways, the chief form of land transport throughout the world. They acquire significance because of their combination of a fixed right-of- way and mechanical power, forming networks that allow the delivery of freight and passengers without transshipment and at low ton-mile costs anywhere in a, big territory. Such networks re- quire a standardization of track gage, clearances, couplers, and brakes. We have developed a great North American net with a track gage of 4 feet 81/2 inches, covering Canada, the United States, and Mexico. A second great network of the same gage covers most of Europe outside of the Soviet Union and Iberia, though there are many Euro- pean local feeder lines of narrow gage. There are smaller networks in Manchuria-China, Argen- tina, and India-Pakistan, though some of the latter systems are more handicapped by a variety of gages. The standard being developed in Africa is 3 feet 6 inches. Australia hopes to convert her state systems to the American-European stand- ard. The Soviet standard on their extensive sys- tem is 5 feet. Europe's railway controls include international agreements on technical standards, car interchange, rates, timetables, and accounts. Many of these arrangements go back to the last century. The commerce of international rivers and some connecting canals are also subject to joint regu- lation. The Danube and the Rhine are outstand- ing examples, although under German and then Soviet domination, international control of the Danube in particular is illusory. A more general- ized type of treaty usually regulates the use of rivers flowing through or on the borders of more than one state in all parts of the world. Roads are more local in nature, although this characteristic is changing as long-distance truck- ing develops abroad as it has in America. How ? Approved For Release 20 03/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Rel_e_ase 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Ti-it UNITED STATES AND THE WORLD CONFIDENTIAL ever, there are agreements as to licensing, liability, and traffic signals. Roads still remain mostly feeders to railways in many foreign lands. Pipelines, except by bilateral treaty, have not figured as directly in international agreements, although a few, such as those from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean, are of very great politi- cal and strategic concern. International regulation of ocean shipping has been somewhat different from that of land trans- port, for international law has recognized the high seas as free to all users, with questions remaining only about the limits of territorial waters, use of oceanic canals and straits, and the rights of bellig- erents and neutrals. Just as railways have been very important to economic advance, so too has cheap ocean transport been made reliable by large steel steam or diesel vessels. The role of the merchant marine and its problems should require no explanation for any naval officer. Only re- cently has specific international regulation be- come more extensive. Conferences on safety at sea and rules of the road are being supplemented by discussions of wage rates, subsidies, and work- ing conditions. In the future, the regulations set by international agreement might increase. Regulations governing air transport among countries are very complex, an inevitable develop- ment, since aircraft have such great military and political implications and, unlike ships, are not obliged to stop at the frontier of a country, but can fly to any place on the globe irrespective of bound- aries. Early discussions of air law matured in 1919 into the first detailed set of rules. Public and private air law were merged under a single body, 195 the International Civil Aviation Organization, after the Chicago meetings in 1944. Regulations govern the licensing, inspection, registration, and technical standards of aircraft, communications, statistics, routes, and rates are all controlled either through the ICAO, the International Air Trans- port Association, or by bilateral agreements. Communications, too, bind together the whole world and consequently are internationally con- trolled. These controls include not only the Uni- versal Postal Union, but also the International Telecommunications Union, which assigns radio frequencies, establishes rules on telegraph and radio codes, and controls access to and use of these facilities. Within this chapter have been presented some of the major geographic, economic, and political forces that shape the environment of the world of which the United States is a part and in which the Navy must do its job?fields of concern which must inevitably affect the thinking and action of in- telligence officers. Obviously this review is not a substitute for the years of background reading and study and the constant day by day interest in fol- lowing current developments that are required for proper analytical assessment of events for in- telligence purposes. The only aim has been to re- fresh the thinking of the naval officer, to stimulate him to do further reading in areas beyond his ac- quaintance, and thus to improve his intelligence perspective. The following chapter will outline the problem the United States and the free nations of the world face in the menace of communism and its chief exponent, Soviet Russia. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 20 03/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL CHAPTER 8 WORLD COMMUNISM AND THE U. S. S. R. The reality of the menace of communism as a militant political force is evidenced by the fact that Communist dictatorships now control one- third of the population and almost one-quarter of the inhabited areas of the world. In many non- Communist states, organized groups propound the doctrines of communism and exercise considerable political influence. But communism is not only a political force. Supported and directed by Soviet Russia, world communism has become the most extensive mass movement based on philosophical teachings since the advent of Christianity, and more disturbing, it is a tremendously powerful force subversive to the democratic way of life as enjoyed by the United States and other freedom- loving peoples of the world. Thus it constitutes the greatest problem we face today. However, for the citizenry of the United States, and for the naval officer, this problem must not only be iden- tified; it must also be understood if adequate so- lutions are to be found. It is therefore appropri- ate to review briefly the doctrines of communism, their historical development and utilization, and, finally, some of the elements of power of the So- viet State which is the chief advocate of Com- munist doctrine. THE BACKGROUND OF COMMUNISM Communism, in theory, is far from new. Ex- pressions of it are found in Plato's writings and in literature even before his time. From time to time in various areas, efforts were made to put certain fragments of this theory into practice. Marxist "Scientific" Socialism, or modern com- munism, as a social philosophy evolved out of conditions which existed in 19th century Europe and drew extensively upon the intellectual think- ing of the 18th century philosophers. The Age of Reason in 18th century Europe brought an awakened interest in philosophy, economics, and politics, a questioning of old beliefs, and a search for new approaches to the problems caused by social and economic change. Although the indus- 197 trial revolution eventually led to a higher standard of living, it also brought unusually harsh condi- tions of labor for many people. The individual initiative and healthful environment of an agri- cultural life and the simplicity of handicraft man- ufacture were increasingly replaced by the regi- mentation of the factory, the unhealthful conditions of the mine, and the complexity of highly organized industry. In trying to adjust to life in this new order, so- cial philosophers of the period began to consider once again the age-old question of how the com- mon man can improve his standard of living. At the same time, economic conditions were being analyzed and economic principles were being for- mulated into a broad body of doctrine by the so-called classical economists. Some of their doc- trines, with considerable elaboration, form the skeleton of modern economics, but many of their explanations of economic functions were based on very artificial or even false assumptions. Other writers not only tried to explain the world as it was, but sought solutions to some of the inequities of existence. Variant forms of cooperative life and socialism were suggested as replacements for the laissez-faire capitalism of the day. Some short-lived experiments in cooperative societies were made on a small scale, but most of these were abandoned when it was found that new problems replaced the ones they were trying to solve, or that all failings could not be attributed to capital- ism alone. One of the intellectual theorists of this period, Karl Marx, was to exert an influence on Western civilization out of all proportion to the signifi- cance of his teachings, which have been thoroughly discredited. Very much a product of his age, Marx conceived of himself as a prophet, a realist, a materialist, and a social scientist utilizing "scien- tific" methods. This unique mixture of mis- sionary fervor and spurious scientific theory was to be translated into action to an amazing degree by a small band of devoted followers. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR THE THEORY OF COMMUNISM The Communists rely heavily on their body of theory. Since they regard Marxism as "scien- tific," they derive from his theories both their long-range plans and day-to-day action, utilizing what they believe to be strictly logical deductive methods. Both Lenin and Stalin emphasized the importance of theory when they wrote, respec- tively: "Without a revolutionary theory, there cannot be a revolutionary movement," and, "Only a party guided by an advanced theory can act as a vanguard in the fight." The Communists' pro- grams of action are, in effect, applications of their theories. It is for this reason that an understand- ing of the theory is essential. Communism presents an interpretation of man and his history, a reason for cause and effect, a guidepost for goals, and a justification for the means of attaining them. Its doctrines have been closely integrated to embrace all of man's activi- ties: social, economic, political, and philosophical. For the confirmed Communist, they alone provide the satisfactory ? "scientific" ? explanation of man's being, the solution to his many puzzling and conflicting problems, and the opportunity for a realizable better life on earth. For the Com- munist, the only alternatives are to accept his doc- trines or to oppose them?a middle ground is impossible. Although rejecting all religions as "opiates" of the people, communism in the eyes of its adherents has become a substitute religion; even more, it has given them a sense of purpose, a symbol for per- sonal dedication. While Communistic writings are voluminous and complex, they are all built upon a series of basic concepts which might be called the creed of communism. The first is the concept that all life is material in a state of con- stant change; hence, there is no immortal soul and no God. The only moral code is that which serves the cause of communism. The second is the belief that all history is the result of the laws of economic determinism which were discovered by Marx; the basic conflict has always been and continues to be the struggle between social classes. The third concept is that capitalism is an instrument of op- pression and the primary source of opposition which must be destroyed, together with the State which of necessity supports it. Destruction can CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 20 198 NAVAL OFFICERS only be brought about by violent revolutionary methods because the ruling class will never relin- quish its autocratic power voluntarily. There- fore, such methods are essential and acceptable for the liberation of the oppressed classes by the van-- guard which is, of course, the Communist Party, considered in a collective sense. In the minds of the Communists it follows logically that true com- munism can only be realized in the world when all opposition has been eliminated eveywhere. The Marxist Philosophy The theory of communism is built on the philo- sophical teachings of Marx which have three pri- mary features. The first is Dialectical Material- ism which, simply stated, is a theory of reality, a philosophical explanation of the universe and man. While borrowing heavily from the thinking of the German philosopher Hegel, Marx substi- tuted materialism for Hegel's idealism, and at- tempted to demonstrate that the universe and man originated from material forces in a state of con- stant motion. Therefore, to Marx, matter was all-important, mind was of secondary value, and consequently the soul, immortality, and God could not exist. He explained development as the re- sult of the action of opposing forces. The first force was called the "thesis ;" the second force, the "antithesis;" and the result of their opposing ac- tion, the "synthesis." The "synthesis" became a new "thesis" and the whole process repeated itself ad infinitum. The historical application of this theory of reality was most ingenious. For their "thesis," the Marxists took the point of view that primitive society was classless, with tribal owner- ship of property. The "antithesis" was class so- ciety, with capitalism as its most extreme form. The "synthesis," of course, was true communism which would combine all the advantages of man's progress with the idyllic simplicity of primitive society. In addition to his theories of reality and de- velopment, Marx set forth three fundamental prin- ciples which he called the "unity of opposites," the "negation of the negation," and the change of quantity into quality. While abstruse if not ab- surd, these principles have been applied most in- geniously. The first justifies the combination of oppression and freedom within a country in the 03/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 WORLD COMMUNISM AND THE U. S. S. R. ? CONFIDENTIAL sense that the enemies of communism are oppressed while its adherents are free to enjoy its benefits. The second justifies Communist warfare against the capitalistic state because it produces freedom for the masses. The third proposes that the trans- formation of one thing into another is qualitative and extreme; therefore, a violent revolution is required to change society from capitalism to com- munism. Reform is purely a quantitative matter and no fundamental change ever occurs. The historical application of Marxist dialectical materialism also involved the division of society into classes and an explanation of history on the basis of class struggle. By its very nature, this struggle was identified as the means for the even- tual and inevitable transformation of society. In- terestingly enough, Marx never took the trouble to define his term, "class." The second feature of the philosophy of Marx is his doctrine of the economic processes, includ- ing production and distribution. Two aspects of this doctrine are his labor theory of value and his theory of surplus value. While not only in- accurate but also false, his theory is that the value of commodities is a result solely of labor and, further, that profit represents nothing more than unpaid labor. In essence, this economic doc- trine is a theory of increasing exploitation of labor with the lot of the workers becoming progressively worse until they inevitably rise in revolt. In ap- plying this doctrine, the Communists regard the economic processes as the base for the entire so- cial structure of capitalism, including government and law, science, religion, art, and philosophy. The arena of the class struggle is the economic base. Since the theory suggests that the economic processes of capitalism must inevitably be de- stroyed, it follows logically, in the minds of the Communists, that the balance of the social struc- ture must also be destroyed because it would no longer have a foundation upon which to rest. The third feature of Marx's teachings is his theory of the State and of the revolutionary proc- ess. Since he believed the apparatus of the State to be nothing more than "a machine for the op- pression of one class by another," he was convinced that it would "wither away" when the true Com- munist society came into being. However, ac- cording to his concept of the revolutionary process, this transformation of human society was not to be accomplished in one step, but rather in several. In the first, the bourgeoisie would assume power; in the second, the proletariat would take control. This second, transitionary period he labeled the "Dictatorship of the Proletariat," during which time the State would be continued, but as an arm of the masses. Only later, at some future time which was never defined, would all semblance of the State disappear and the true Communist society emerge based upon the philosophy: "from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs." It is this theory of the State and of the revolutionary process which has been particu- larly subjected to interpretation and manipulation by Communist leaders who followed Marx. Communism and Socialism Any discussion of communism must also include socialism which was already a well-known term in the time of Marx. While space does not permit a detailed consideration of socialism as a system of thought and a course of social action, four points regarding it should be mentioned. First, socialism is revolutionary by its very nature be- cause it seeks a basic change in social institutions by a number of methods. This question of method is one point of difference between present day Socialists and Communists. Second, there are many kinds of socialism, of which Marxist social- ism or communism is only one. Third, as a social philosophy, socialism includes doctrines which are not only economic in nature but also political, edu- cational, cultural, and sociological. Fourth, to the Communists, socialism is a means, not an end? a tool with which to build a world Communist society. This Communist viewpoint that social- ism is a lower phase of communism is one reason why some scholars conclude that any movement toward socialism will ultimately redound to the advantage of communism. The Development of the Theory The total body of Communist theory which has evolved during the past 100 years is the product of the thinking and the writings of 4 men: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, Vladimir Lenin, and 199 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL ? INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS Joseph Stalin. Marx has been described as the "originator" of modern communism, contributing its basic concepts. Called the "collaborator," Engels worked closely with Marx to systematize these basic concepts; his contributions included organizational ability and aggressive leadership. Lenin and Stalin made practical application of the Marxist theories to the social conditions of their own times. Communist historians regard Lenin as the "de- veloper." Enlarging upon the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat, he was able to apply it successfully in Russia. Since he believed that the proletariat was not as yet capable of ad- ministering the State, he advanced the theory of the Communist Party as the core and "the van- guard of the proletariat, the general staff of the revolution." Interestingly enough, he did not con- ceive of the party as proletarian by nature; in fact, many of its leaders have been and are intel- lectuals and of middle-class origin. Nonetheless, the party "expresses the interests of the proletar- iat." Lenin expanded upon the theory of im- perialism as the final stage of capitalistic develop- ment. He also enlarged upon the strategy and tactics of world revolution and played a major part in the organization of the Third Interna- tional. In effect, he restated the Marxist philos- ophy in order to apply it more effectively to the Russian State. Stalin's place in Communist history is that of the "continuer." His particular contribution to theory is the concept of consolidating socialism in one country first (Soviet Russia). He converted the party into a strong administrative bureaucracy and further defined its functions within the dicta- torship of the proletariat. In rejecting the "withering of the state" theory, he modified the Marxist philosophy. At the same time, he ampli- fied it by introducing the concept of State plan- ning and emphasizing the industrialization of the country and the collectivizing of agriculture. Just as the theory of communism is the product of the work of these four men, so likewise is the growth and expansion of communism into its pres- ent position as a world political force attributable to their influences. CONFIDENTIAL 200 THE GROWTH OF COMMUNISM Karl Marx A German philosopher and economic historian who had settled in London, Karl Marx was among the more unconventional writers of the mid-19th century period. His massive work entitled Daa Kapital includes some remarkably well docu- mented and detailed descriptions of the objection-- able working conditions in the coal mines, the mills, and the factories, as they existed in his time. Radical as it was at the time, his analysis was an outgrowth and a perversion of some of the theories of the classical economists who are today often regarded as conservative. In the light of present day economics, many of his analytical conclusions are easily proven false. Marx is also well-knovvnL for his economic interpretation of history, even though he was not the sole originator of this con- cept. While this concept becomes absurd by ex- cessive application, it is important enough as an analytical approach to history to have made a contribution to the thinking of non-Marxist historians. Marx was definitely a materialist; for him all reality was autodynamic. He viewed life as a struggle for material goods, without a question of the hereafter. For Marx, there was nothing out- side, above, or below nature. All was nature in a state of eternal, dialectical flux. From his ideas emerged the doctrine of the class struggle between the oppressed who were the workers and the op- pressors who were the bourgeoisie. Because he believed the false doctrine of surplus value, Marx saw wealth being concentrated more and more in the hands of the few, with the wage earners unable to buy what they themselves produced. Such a situation, according to Marxist doctrine, leads to overproduction and unemployment, to imperial- ism in finding new markets, and to war. On the basis of his economic interpretation of history, Marx also expected that in time the desperate proletariat would rise in violent revolution to de- stroy the bourgeois oppressors and create a strong dictatorship which would exist only until the last traces of the old society had disappeared. In the new society, when the workers owned the means of production and no profits were paid, the need for a dominant organized State to regulate the work- Approved For Release 20 03/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 WORLD COMMUNISM AND THE U. S. S. R. CONFIDENTIAL ers would disappear, and a new classless, stateless, and happy society would result. To a degree, Marx was a frustrated personality rebelling against the social conditions of his age, and, originally at least, quite willing for violent death to be the fate of the "enemies" of the work- ing class. But his false assumptions and incom- plete analyses led him to false conclusions. His materialistic approach to life is rejected by all who recognize that life also has spiritual values which transcend its material benefits. Men live by bread, but not by bread alone. The Marxist doctrines had a curious appeal, at- tracting a varied but limited group of followers in the beginning. Among these were some dis- contented intellectuals who imagined themselves in the vanguard of bold new thought; those who philosophically favored the destruction of existing institutions and moral values; those just too gulli- ble and ignorant to see the ultimate results of a social system that promised peace and plenty in exchange for a violent revolutionary struggle; and, finally, the unscrupulous opportunists who would support any movement that promised per- sonal rewards at the expense of society. In connection with the "inevitable" aspect of the social and economic doctrines advanced by Marx, it should be noted that the American social struc- ture has been a particular puzzle to the strictly Marxian analysts, because its development has con- futed their basic assumptions. Despite the growth of capitalism in the United States and the appearance of huge corporations, the standard of living has steadily improved and the ownership base has remained very broad. Public acceptance of sound regulation has produced a pattern of life far different from the dire prophecies of the Marx- ists, although many of the present-day adherents of Marxist philosophy refuse to recognize Ameri- can accomplishments. The First International The age of Marx has been described as a time of tumult and trouble. In 1848 Marx and Engels published the Communist Manifesto, marking a true turning point from the many Utopian social- ist plans to a world revolutionary movement. They called upon the workers of the world to arise, since they had "nothing to lose but their chains." 201 Revolution broke out in Paris just a few days after this document was printed, but it, as well as its counterparts all over Europe, was short-lived. Many of the German participants fled to America and England. In the years that followed, Eng- lish, French, German, Italian, and other working- men met, and eventually in 1864 formed the In- ternational Workingmen's Association, commonly known as the First International. Marx was a leading figure in the organization. Its purpose was to unite and advance the workingmen's move- ments in all European countries, but it eventually fell to pieces because, for one reason, many of the participants had paramount interest in their own national objectives. In the Franco-Prussian War, with the Germans at the gates of Paris, French workers rose to create the Paris Commune, whose bloody suppression was another factor in the de- struction of the First International. In 1872 the headquarters were transferred to New York, but in a short time the organization dwindled away and was finally disbanded in 1876. The Second International Formed in 1889, on the 100th anniversary of the French Revolution by delegates from 17 countries meeting in Paris, the Second International existed until World War I as a rather loose federation of socialist parties and a society of professional revo- lutionaries. It had liaison and information- gathering functions and pressure was exerted to unite divisive socialist groups. The organization is difficult to describe in general terms because of its diverse elements, ranging from Marxists to those who favored gradual reform within the framework of existing institutions. The con- servative elements largely supported the Allied war cause in World War I, while the Russian mem- bers favored a policy of revolution. It was this split that led to the creation of the Third Inter- national in 1919, often known as the Comintern or Communist International. Those parties who refused to affiliate with the Comintern, and who had left the Second Inter- national, formed their own organization. In 1923 they joined with the remnants of the Second In- ternational to establish the Labor and Socialist International (LSI). The national character of the socialist movements affiliated in its large mem- CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS bership weakened its international effectiveness, and it finally ceased to exist. The Russian Revolution While the intellectuals debated and the revolu- tionaries climbed soap boxes or plotted coups in cellars, events of significance were transpiring in the land of the tzars. This vast and predomi- nantly agricultural nation had remained in rela- tive isolation from the economic and political changes in Europe and America, and the despotic power of the tzars had preserved aspects of the feudal system long after they had been destroyed in the rest of Europe. Marx never went to Russia nor did he envision that his doctrines would be applied there. However, the combination of many circumstances in that ultraconservative empire was to bring about a violent change. Russia experienced an aborted revolution in 1905. Some of the surviving revolutionary lead- ers who were not exiled to Siberia escaped to Ger- any, France, and Switzerland; others stayed "underground" in European Russia. Marxist philosophies were strongest among certain groups in Germany. When the intelectual theories of Marx were combined with the practical revolu- tionary techniques of Lenin, in part influenced by Sun Yat-Sen, a potentially dangerous force had come into existence. The terrible attrition of World War I, the misery of the lower classes under the cumulative oppression of the Tzarist regime, and some German conniving brought civil war to Russia again. The overthrow of the Tzar was followed first by the relatively moderate socialistic government of Kerensky, and then by the skillful seizure of power by the Bolsheviki under Lenin. Their ruthless methods, and the dissension among opposing groups, led to eventual consolidation of power in the hands of the Communist Party. COMMUNIST RUSSIA It should be pointed out that the resulting gov- ernment in Russia, for all its lip service to Marx, has yet to create a true Marxist state. The ideal of the classless society with its common ownership, no exploitation, no government, and "from each according to his ability to each according to his need" has not materialized, nor are there any signs CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 20 that it will. From a detached intellectual point of view, true Marxism, shorn of revolution, might have a certain appeal to those who are willing to overlook practical problems of human behavior and who are unaware of the serious scientific and philosophic errors in the Marxist analysis. But Marxism in practice, as sponsored by the Soviet Union and its international following, is quite an- other matter, which should be ample proof of the fallacies of its theory. Even the communists will admit that Soviet Russia is in the transitional stage of Socialism, or public ownership of the means of production. But what has developed is State Capitalism with a ruthless exercise of total power by a dictatorship. Thus a doctrine, orig- inally philosophical, has developed into a force seeking world domination. Reshaping Society The Russian communist leaders have been emi- nently practical men, willing to compromise or adapt their principles to accomplish their goal of consolidation of power. They have expertly carried out the techniques of revolution by seizure, of power following infiltration. They haw worked hard to reshape mankind to their type of society. Institutions and ideas that conflicted with their own have been ruthlessly destroyed. Religious activities, with their emphasis on moral values, have been stifled, except when for tactical reasons temporary concessions have seemed advis- able. Those who had a stake in the older society, such as property owners, officials, and community leaders, have been liquidated or shipped to slave camps. The flexible doctrine that any means are justified by the end has opened the door to a complete new code of behavior in individual and collective life. The individual is no longer dig- nified as such, but subordinate to the party goals. An important feature of the Soviet state is cen- tral planning. Some may think that the differ- ences in planning by Communist and non-Commu- nist states are only differences of degree, but such a conclusion is not only an oversimplification, but precludes correct analysis of the problem. The Soviets plan production, confiscate resources with- out compensation, and then exercise rigid control of practically all human activity to conform to the plan. Of course, a degree of central planning 202 03/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 WORLD COMMUNISM AND THE U. S. S. R. CONFIDENTIAL is essential for any State; for example, all coun- tries collect data on price levels, credit needs, and similar items of national concern. A number of States have also created central banks to control money supply and price levels for the minimum purpose of stabilizing their economy. Some non- Communist countries use degrees of planning and control to meet their own needs that are less gen- erally accepted in the United States. However, there can be no question that what we know as democracy is not compatible with the Soviet pat- tern of life. The Soviets have combined the doc- trines of Marx, which embody Hegel's dialectics, Darwin's survival of the fittest, Ricardo's economic materialism, and the economic interpretation of history with the revolutionary techniques of Lenin and Stalin's Communist Party dictatorship. This is the antithesis of democracy. Forwarding the Revolution Lenin believed that the approach to revolution should vary with the type of country involved. In major nations it should begin with the ballot and then be followed by violent revolution. The client powers were to be oriented toward the Soviet Union and then finally absorbed. Dependent peoples could be taken over by directly sponsor- ing revolution, while backward people could be absorbed when convenient. Once Russia had become a Soviet state, though still weak, there arose the question of what was to be the next step. This resulted in a struggle for power among the Bolshevist leaders. Trotsky was ready to go ahead with revolution on a world scale. On the other hand, having already experi- enced foreign intervention in the invasion of Rus- sia and Siberia by the Allies after World War I, other Soviet leaders thought that an issue should not be made of world communism until it was strong enough to be assured of success. Stalin, although no less interested than Trotsky in world revolution, wanted to attain undisputed leadership in Russia first. Also, he firmly believed that an adaptation of Marxism was necessary to permit the establishment of a party composed of workers and peasants. In a double maneuver to strengthen the party and increase agricultural output, he instituted the bloody and ruthless collectivization of farms. Less than a century before, the peas- 203 ants had won their freedom from serfdom, and now they were deprived of their land again. In- dustry was also nationalized. A succession of police organizations enforced compliance and stamped out opposition. Party Control Party members, as well as passively resisting Russian citizens have faced execution and Siberian exile, for successive power struggles within the party have tolerated no division of leadership or dissent. The principle of government is the "in- terlocking directorate ;" that is, officials wear two hats, one as heads of government ministries re- sponsible for management and administration, and the other as members of the Praesidium where policy is formulated and control exercised. For almost 30 years Stalin was the dominant figure in both government and party; he was chairman of the Bureau of the Council of Ministers, the executive organ of the Supreme Soviet, and also General Secretary of the Communist Party, in which role he presided over meetings of the Prae- sidium, a powerful combination of the former Politburo and Orgburo effected by a party reor- ganization in 1951. Thus party control was made absolute, and party loyalty became a paramount virtue, the stepping-stone to prestige and influence. Russian Traditionalism Stalin was not only an improviser and believer in expediency, but a natural product of his en- vironment. Consequently, under him, many pol- icies and views of tzarist times continued to shape the behavior of the U. S. S. R. The traditional Russian obsession with security has made "perni- cious foreign influence" a major concern of both propaganda and actual policy. Many geopoliti- cal ideas have found expression in Soviet Russia. The central cores of power are Moscow and the area east of the Urals, both of which are partly shielded by the Ukrainian food circle and by the Arctic wastes. The next lines of defense are the border S. S. R.'s : Karelo-Finnish, Byelo-Russian, Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Ukrainian, Mol- davian, the three Transcaucasian, the Kirghiz, Uzbek, Turkmen, Tadzikh, and Kazakh. Next comes a belt of protecting satellites : Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, East CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09: CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS Austria, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, Outer Mon- golia, Sinkiang, China, and North Korea. Rus- sia has evidenced interest in adding Finland, Yugoslovia, Greece, Turkey, and Iran to the list. The Russian policies of imperialism have found new expression in many forms. By party activity and strikes, the Soviet Communists have engi- neered trouble in France and Italy. By support- ing Communist military forces they have attempted to further their designs in Korea, Indo-China, and Malaya. Through intrigue, espi- onage, subversion, and sabotage their influence has been felt in every part of the world. While the young Bolshevik government was struggling to establish itself, it emphasized con- solidation at home so long as separate Ukrainian, Byelo-Russian, Transcaucasian, and Central Asian governments followed parallel and friendly courses. However, as soon as the time was ripe, all these territories were reabsorbed into the new Soviet-pattern Russian empire. The Soviet Union has seemed quite intent on regaining all former tzarist territories. This it has largely ac- complished, except for the Finnish defiance and the United States ownership of Alaska. Another feature of Soviet policy has been to make strategic moves to further traditional Rus- sian objectives. Among these are domination of the Baltic and Black Seas, including eventual con- trol of their entrances, the acquisition of warm water ports on the Pacific, Atlantic, and Indian Oceans, sponsorship of the Pan-Slavic movement, and the attainment of economic self-sufficiency. To these have been added two special Soviet ideas: overcoming capitalist encirclement, and hastening the day of world revolution. Soviet World Objectives Soviet moves seem calculated to assure that the Soviet Union itself will survive, and beyond that point, will expand its territories as far as possible. This requires early consolidation of power in the countries of eastern Europe, leading to possible political merger into the U. S. S. R. Other pos- sible objectives are to retard and weaken such blocks of power as may develop, particularly in western Europe and the Near East; to destroy Anglo-American friendship; to undermine French cooperation in the Anglo-American alliance; to CONFIDENTIAL 204 keep Japan, Red China, and Germany sufficiently weak until Soviet control is complete; to absorb Austria; and to establish a dominating influence over the Dardanelles, the Suez Canal, and the Middle East oil fields. Further objectives include stirring up trouble in colonies and former colonies, taking over or destroying the socialist movement, infiltrating trade unions especially in key indus- tries, and using international organizations for propaganda purposes to strengthen the Soviet Union and its satellites. All of these plans are self-evident from the record of recent years. Building Power at Home Meanwhile at home the Soviet Communists are exerting strenuous efforts to industrialize the country, with heavy industry and armament com- ing first, and consumer goods being produced only in the amount necessary to prevent uncontrollable unrest. To meet the production goals, labor is moved by the millions to new industrial sites, to mines, and to railway and road construction areas. This at the same time disposes of dissident groups or ethnic minorities and keeps costs low, since slaves under the bayonet and whip need only min- imum material rewards. THE THIRD INTERNATIONAL From the apparent scope of Soviet activities it should be quite evident why they are of concern to the free countries of the world. As much as we may deplore the absence of all the democratic advantages in certain parts of the world, we be- lieve that foreign peoples must live their own lives according to the pattern they choose. We have hoped that normal social evolution in time would correct and improve conditions abroad. But when a powerful State not only aggressively disseminates economic, political, and social doc- trines diametrically opposed to our own, but also develops great military power in a determination to dominate an ever increasing part of the world, the problem becomes quite different. Peaceful co- existence with a Communist Russia, just as with Nazi Germany, presupposes not only an isolation- ist tendency on our part, but a basic change in Soviet objectives. Since the U. S. S. R. has openly and avowedly embarked on a course of world Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09: cbtooespc,poAp5R000loom WORLD COMMUNISM AND T . . . IIIONFiDENTIAL conquest, there is little to indicate such a while the war with Nazi Germany was in prog- possibility. The issue is more complicated than simply one of imperialism versus the status quo. Some people mistakenly believe that our quarrel is not with communism but with Russian imperialism. The two are inseparable, for a basic aim of communism is world-wide destruction of noncommunistic in- stitutions and society through violent revolution. Such an ideological struggle involves more than military forces; it affects every aspect of life. The Utilization of Theory The consummate skill and cunning with which the Communists translate theory into action has been demonstrated by the use made of the Third International, or Communist International (Corn- intern) , as an instrument for world revolution and conquest. Unlike the earlier Internationals, this later world organization has emphasized rigid party discipline. National parties are not separate sections to be loosely federated, but rather tightly integrated units of one world movement. The ap- plication of Communist principles in the Russian State has not only given reality to the theory but also has made available tremendous physical resources. With the Soviet Union as the "Father- land," the Communist state in being, Communists the world over have had a tangible object to which to transfer their loyalties. At the same time, the Comintern has provided a means for close inter- national ties. The resilient strength of this world- wide organization has been indicated by its ready adaptability to the sudden shifts and changes in Soviet policy. On numerous occasions the various national Communists have revealed their point of view that what is advantageous for the Soviet Union is advantageous for them. Thus it has become exceedingly clear that international Com- munism is an integral part of Soviet global strategy. In the period between World Wars I and II, the Comintern openly held a series of world con- gresses to formulate Communist policy which was admittedly linked closely with the interests of the Soviet fatherland. However, in 1943, to allay the suspicions of the western powers, this organization was dissolved as a gesture to show that subversive activity in Capitalist countries had been suspended 205 ress?but not for long. In 1947, the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) was created as a result of an international meeting of Communists held in Poland. It was not supposed to represent a revival of the Comintern, but to serve only as a European bureau for the exchange of ideas and in- formation, and to bring a degree of coordination to "democratic" movements. These descriptions of the Comintern and Cominform are what the Communists themselves admit publicly. Actually, this is a small part of the story, for the evidence is overwhelming that the Comintern was almost ex- clusively the instrument of the Soviet Union. Al- though this organization was officially dissolved in 1943, its principles were not: they merely assumed new modes. The Qominform, even more rigidly subservient to Moscow, appears to be an apparatus for world propaganda, subversion, and espionage. Subsidiary Applications of Theory As has been already indicated, communism in various countries is the tool of international com- munism controlled from the Soviet Union. There- fore it is a domestic enemy to be combatted. by the police, the courts, and the educational system, as well as the armed forces. Few can doubt that the United States itself is under attack by unorthodox weapons that cannot be challenged alone by the battleship, the tank, or the bomber. Required is a joint effort of all social forces in the nation. No Communist Party in any country should be confused with ordinary political parties, because it is essentially an underground movement. True, it may have a conventional organization which nomi- nates candidates for political office, and many fel- low travelers vote for these candidates and take part in the overt activities of the party. But it has been thoroughly documented in recent years, in the United States at least, that the core of the Communist Party is made up of disciplined people who operate at a conspiratorial level. As set forth in published evidence, the Com- munist Party of the United States openly em- braces the principles of Marxism-Leninism and advocates the overthrow and destruction of the United States Government by force and violence. Its pattern of action clearly indicates guidance and CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09: CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENntroved For Releasq:ANyaa9gE: RitiorDA8L5?)911::?10E1000100210002-9 direction of a foreign origin, as well as close as- sociation with the international Communist move- ment. Its methods also reflect its relationships with the Soviet Union and the Cominform. As do other Communists, those in the United States fol- low the "hard core" principle, which discourages large numbers and favors fewer members who are active and intensely loyal. Such party members associate themselves with worthy public causes, adopt misleading party names and alliances, en- courage labor strikes and disturbances, and at- tempt to infiltrate into government, the armed forces, and police agencies. Espionage is a com- mon feature, aimed at the transmission of vital information to the Soviet Union to serve Com- munist aims and objectives. Likewise, in its fanatical loyalty to Communist principles, the American Communist Party has a sabotage poten- tial which can be directed against the United States at any time. In depreciating the seriousness of the Commu- nist menace, some Americans have expressed the opinion that Trotsky was a dangerous Bolshevist type because he wanted to hasten world revolu- tion, but that Stalin was interested only in Rus- sia's domestic progress, although he used drastic measures to save time. Others regard Trotsky as an idealist betrayed by the heartless tyrant Stalin. It seems clear that both of these men were dedi- cated to the principle of world revolution. Stalin, supposedly concerned solely with internal develop- ment, was just more patient and thorough in his plans. He built his world organization in dupli- cating and parallel form. There are the overt organizations whose mission is to do as much as possible to create dissent, to recruit, to propa- gandize. There are also the covert organizations for the collection of information, for sabotage, and for infiltration of every type of social group. All represent powerful weapons whose capabilities will not become apparent unless widespread mili- tary war breaks out, and even then will be difficult of assessment. Obviously many of these organizations are par.. ticularly potent against a democracy such as the United States. Already the Bill of Rights has been used as a defense by those who seek to destroy its principles. Patriotic Americans sometimes propose measures to "smoke out subversives" that CONFIDENTIAL 206 as a cure may be as bad as the disease. Certainly the problem cannot be solved by strict censorship measures or disregard for the rights of citizenship or due process of law. Yet there are times when national survival may require stringent measures, applied with intelligence and discernment. Factors in the Growth of Communism The significant growth of world communism, especially in the post-World War II period, is the result of many factors, among them being: effec- tive organization and organized deception, world conditions which favored the acceptance of Com- munist theory, and the war prestige of the Soviet Union. As already shown, the Communists, even before the end of the war, had developed active organi- zations which were both international and domes- tic in nature. Armed with theory translated into organized action, they were prepared to move into national vacuums created by the disorganization of social structures in the aftermath of war and Nazi tyranny. The preparatory efforts of Lenin and Stalin, who had stressed the importance of organization, made possible the maximum utiliza- tion of every opportunity which presented itself. The operations of the Communist Parties of Italy and France are notable examples of the Soviet effort to influence political activities within non- Communist states. The underlying technique in all instances was carefully calculated organized deception. The terrible destruction of World War II, its dislocation of national economies and political structures, and its imposition of widespread hard- ships and untold suffering on large segments of the world's population all combined to create re- ceptive attention in many areas to the glittering Communist promises of security and a better life. The situation for many people was such that they felt they had nothing to lose, and everything to gain. As a result, some succumbed, unaware of the harsh, ugly realities of Communist rule. Not to be underestimated, therefore, is the appeal of theory as a factor in the rapid growth of the Com- munist movement. Backing up the organizations and the theory have been the Soviet Armies which gained great prestige during the war. In the postwar period, Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved FvoMpt,macqqpgri ql&RRP?.5Q0litl05R0001002100NEDENTIAL the threat of their power, to say nothing of their proximity, has introduced the factor of uncer- tainty if not of intimidation, particularly for the nations of Europe. In addition, the wartime in- trusion of Communists, openly devoted to their "cause," into places of leadership within under- ground resistance movements in Europe and else- where has proved to be an additional source of strength. Since the Soviet state is a motivating force for world communism, it is appropriate to consider certain of its elements of power. THE SOVIET STATE Historical Background As stated in chapter 5, the assessment of a state is more than a description of its strategic position, its resources, and its industry. It is also essential to study its people and their background. The historical beginnings of Russia are lost in vague antiquity. Geographically, Russia was considered the dividing line between the races and cultures of Europe and those of Asia. To the east in Asia were nomadic tribes of Mongolians, Tatars, and Turks. Perhaps by the sixth century A. D., Slavic tribes from northeast of the Carpathians began to move into the wooded areas of western Russia and to spread along the river valleys to the Baltic. In the ninth century the Vikings es- tablished trading posts at Novgorod in the west, and also at Kiev in the east. Both became im- portant centers of government and culture. Satel- lite colonies and subject territories spread across much of European Russia. Novgorod became a merchant city in the Hanseatic League of the Mid- dle Ages. Kiev established contact with the East- ern Roman Church at Constantinople, and thus became Christian, also receiving the Cyrillic al- phabet, and many features of art and architecture. The power of Kiev declined under increasing tribal attacks from the east, and Muscovy, because of its more sheltered position in the upper Volga basin, became the new center of power. During the 13th century all European Russia except Novgorod was conquered by the Mongols of Genghis Khan and his successors, who dominated the country for 21/2 centuries and em- planted many of their own racial and cultural 207 characteristics. During the 13th century Russia was also invaded from the west by the Swedes, who conquered Finland and attacked Novgorod, and by the Teutonic Knights, who invaded the Baltic coast and established such cities as Riga. In the 14th century Lithuania and Poland, joined through royal marriage, dominated territories from the Baltic nearly to the Black Sea. The Lithuanian part is now Byelo-Russia, and the Polish part is now the Ukraine. The princes at Moscow gradually Odned power and finally won freedom from Tatar control. At this time the Ottoman Turks overran the Middle East and took Constantinople, forcing the Eastern church to move its headquarters to Mos- cow. Ivan III assumed the title of Tzar (Caesar) when he married the niece of the last Byzantine emperor in 1472. Then began a period of expan- sion of power. Traders and settlers pushed out- ward all the way to the Arctic shores and in 1648 reached the Pacific. During the following 200 years there were recurrent conflicts with the Turks, Tatars, Poles, Swedes, Lithuanians, and the Teu- tonic Knights. Peter the Great, in the late 17th and early 18th centuries, tried to westernize his country. Forcing out the Swedes, he moved into the Baltic states and established St. Petersburg as a great Russian seaport. Catherine the Great, 1762-96, won back the territories occupied by Poland, and her armies also pushed to the shores of the Black Sea. Later the Caucasus and Finland were conquered. Rus- sian explorers pushed far afield, establishing set- tlements not only in Pacific Siberia but along the Alaskan shores. By 1812 a colony was established just north of San Francisco at Fort Ross. To some degree Russia was involved in intrigue in California and Mexico even after the Fort Ross post was sold. The problem was finally eliminated by our purchase of Alaska in 1867. Meanwhile in Europe Russia had been at war with Napoleon, and after his famous winter re- treat, the Russian armies marched across Europe to France, hailed as liberators from the tyrant. In the years that ensued, Russia held a dominant position in Central and Eastern Europe, helping to suppress revolts in Austria and Prussia, but aiding the Balkan states to win freedom from the Turks. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDERIFINVved For Release 2410g09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 NCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS In the Crimean War of the 1850's the British and French joined with Turkey to block Russian expansion into the Mediterranean. Again in 1877-8, Britain, Austria, and Germany aided Turkey to prevent Russian conquest of the Darda- nelles. Thwarted in this direction, Russia wrested control of the lower Amur basin from China, and just before the end of the century laid railway lines through Manchuria and took Port Arthur. Rivalries with Japan in Korea brought a war that the new trans-Siberian railway could not sustain logistically. This led to Japanese domination in southern Manchuria, Korea, and south Sakhalin. Participation in the first world conflict came when Russia declared war in behalf of Serbia against Austria. Germany was able eventually to overrun much of White Russia, the Ukraine, and Finland; Rumania took Bessarabia; and the Turks entered the Caucasus. With internal revolution and chaos rife in Russia, the western Allies in- vaded Murmansk, Archangel, Far Eastern Siberia, and Baku. At the end of the war, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Finland, Poland, and Bessarabia were all separated from Russia, and the Ukraine gained autonomy. Revolt in Turkestan lasted until 1923. Marshal Pilsudski in 1920 mounted fresh attacks from Poland which led to the capture of Kiev, and his forces reached Odessa. Russian counter- attacks would have destroyed Poland again but for British and French intervention. Russia made a few overt moves, aside from re- absorbing the Ukraine, Turkestan, and Trans- caucasia, until 1939 when her pact with Hilter led to the repartition of Poland, the absorption of the Baltic states, and war with Finland. German armies in 1941 began Operation Barbarosa that laid waste territories extending from the Arctic to the gates of Moscow and down to the Caucasus. An awakening patriotism and ruthless govern- mental measures supported by American lend-lease aid, enabled the Russians to turn the tide after the defense of Stalingrad, and to sweep west into central and eastern Europe. In the Far East their last minute entry into the Pacific War gave them the Kuriles, the rest of Sakhalin, and, eventual domination of the Asiatic mainland, through the Chinese Reds, all the way to Southeast Asia. The wars, hot and cold, of recent years are all too CONFIDENTIAL 208 familiar for elaboration here. So much for the bare outlines of military and political change. Military .Geography Geographically the U. S. S. R. is a vast conti- nental territory, sweeping some 6,000 miles east and west and 3,000 miles north and south. Much of it is a great plain that reaches from Poland across Eurasia to the Yenesei River, interrupted only by the moderate Ural Mountains. The mili- tary approaches to this territory are few. The Arctic, frozen much of the year, has few transport routes across it, and the soil is swampy and the area insect-ridden during the brief season when it is not frozen and wind-swept. The Soviet Union is protected in most of its other approaches by high mountains and by great deserts. In the west, the Pripet Marshes are a barrier; the Balkan frontier has the Carpathians; the Caucasus ranges are very high. Formidable, too, are the great mountain belts near Iran, Afghanistan, Sinkiang, and Mongolia. The Pa- cific flanks are also mountainous. Mongolia and much of the Turkestan area are deserts. The principal surface approaches are in the Mur- mansk area, through the Baltic to Leningrad, from Germany on either side of the Pripet Marshes, or from the Black Sea. Entry is also possible, geo- graphically speaking, along each shore of the Caspian from Iran, through the Dzungarian Gap from Sinkiang, or at the Pacific end of the country via Dairen, Vladivostok, or the Amur River. These military approaches, of course, are not wide open, since Soviet defenses are strong and the Red Army is likely to occupy most of them before any outside force could come near. Fur- ther, mere entry into Soviet territory is not the same as occupying the seat of Soviet power. Key regions of greatest strategic significande include: (1) Moscow, (2) Leningrad, (3) the Donbas, (4) the Caucasus, (5) the Urals, (6) Tashkent, (7) the Kuzbas, (8) Lake Baikal, (9) Chita, and (10) Khabarovsk. These include the major industries and sources of raw materials. Two additional fuel sources that feed the industrial areas must be added : the Pechora and the Karaganda coal fields. The areas listed above are so widely distributed that the power of the Soviet Union, like that of a hydra-headed monster, cannot be destroyed by the occupation of any single one of them. Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 WORLD COMMUNISM AND THE U. S. S. R. CONFIDENTIAL What are some other strengths and weaknesses inherent in Russia's geographic position? It has already been pointed out that the country is vast, well protected on most frontiers, and with widely scattered centers of industry. The vastness is a defense, but it also poses grave problems of trans- port. Given advance preparations, the Soviet Union from its interior position can strike out- ward at adjacent Alaska and at Japan, strengthen its position in China, overrun the Middle East to reach the Indian Ocean and the Suez region, send forces throughout Scandinavia, and of course, re- inforce the Balkans and move its heaviest forces westward beyond Poland to sweep Europe as far as the Pyrenees. It is hoped that NATO strength in time will minimize this likelihood. It may be that concentrated attacks upon the Soviet Union at unexpected points would create exceedingly dif- ficult problems for the Russians in moving troops and supplies. This possibility has been antic- ipated by the Russians, for large forces are main- tained at all points where attack might come, a policy which only a country with a large man- power pool can carry out. It has also been met by the virtually autonomous nature of many of the scattered industrial complexes. Munitions need not be moved from one end of the country to the other in all cases, for sources of supply are usually duplicated. Economic Development One of the significant features of economic de- velopment has been the percentage shift of indus- try to the area east of the Urals, although recon- struction and even new construction in the area overrun by the Germans has also been very sub- stantial. The major installations of the steel in- dustry are in the Donbas of the Ukraine, in the Urals, and in the Far East. Iron ore is found in each of these regions. Coal is currently mined in large quantities in the Donbas, the Kuzbas, and in the Karaganda and Pechora regions. Iron ore and coal move in opposite directions between the Urals area and the Kuzbas, equalizing rail traffic, while Karaganda coal moves both to the Urals and to the Tashkent area. Pechora coal moves both to the Leningrad and Urals areas. These bulk movements will be vastly improved in the years ahead as lagging transport facilities, both 209 rail and water, are improved. Already double tracking and electrification are improving many of the railways. New short-cut routes will carry coal to Tashkent from Karaganda and to the Urals from the Pechora. New dams on rivers and canals will bring water transport to supplement the railways. The machinery and other complex industries have long been associated with western centers such as Moscow, Leningrad, and Gorky, but now new plants, plus plants moved in the face of Ger- man invasion, turn out these products at widely scattered points all the way east to the Pacific. Tanks, aircraft, and railway equipment cannot be associated with a few areas alone. The Soviet Union is richly endowed with vir- tually the whole range of materials needed for modern industry and war. Perhaps the major shortcomings are in molybdenum, and to some ex- tent tungsten, though Communist China can sup- ply the latter. Although they have enough to meet minimum war needs, they have need of more bauxite, bismuth, cadmium, zinc, uranium, abra- sives, quartz, and talc. Petroleum shortages are frequently mentioned, but refining and transport capacity are probably more immediate problems than reserves. The country is also rich in other respects. It contains perhaps one-quarter of the timber stand of the world, enormous hydroelectric potentialities, and very considerable agricultural possibilities. Manpower The people themselves as a resource deserve mention. They are hardy and accustomed to Spartan living. Their numbers are not definitely known, but probably exceed 200 million. Al- though divided into many races, they showed con- siderable unity in the war against Germany before it was over. The population growth is such as to provide a high military manpower potential. Technology The Soviet Government has been very conscious of the need for catching up with the industrial development in Western Europe and America. Through 5-year plans, and frequently, ruthless measures, rapid progress has been made in heavy industry, the basis for both further expansion and CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09: CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS for munitions. Although their total capacity lags far below ours, direct statistical comparisons are dangerously misleading. Since consumer indus- tries receive a very low priority, only enough to prevent overall lowered production or revolt, by far the greatest effort is in further expansion of heavy and munitions industries. In contrast, our own so-called minimum civilian needs even in war- time swallow up very large quantities of labor and materials. The rugged simplicity of Soviet weapons is in striking contrast to the frequently indifferent re- sults in consumer goods. Basic research and tech- nical progress are given every encouragement, and have resulted in such outstanding achievements as some of the world's best tanks, artillery pieces, and jet fighter aircraft. Their emphasis on subma- rines is of special interest to the United States Navy. Their achievement in atomic weapons has been reached by much more than highly skilled espionage; it represents technical skill and organ- ized industrial effort. They have found a number of sources of uranium and are now carrying on a major atomic effort in several parts of their vast domain. Perhaps their two major industrial weaknesses are an inadequate transport system and the pres- sure that would be felt in the oil industry during a sustained all-out war. Natural Resources Food supply has long been a matter of concern for the Soviet government. In the past the coun- try was chiefly agricultural, and it still is in con- siderable degree, despite the strenuous efforts to industralize. The key area agriculturally is a long belt of steppe land reaching across the Ukraine and out east of the Volga. Although much of it has the rich Chernozem type black soil, rainfall is scanty and uncertain. This limited and unreliable ability to produce food for a rap- idly expanding population has serious implica- tions. Even if new areas were brought under cultivation, less than 10 percent of the total land in Russia is arable, and much of this is marginal. Conquest of eastern Europe therefore represents an important strengthening of the food position. The Soviets have worked hard to develop new cold-resistant fast-maturing crops to expand pro- CONFIDENTIAL 210 duction into the subarctic. The principal crops are wheat, rye, barley, potatoes, and sugar beets. Flax is raised in considerable quantities, and in- creased production of cotton in Turkestan, and near the Black and Caspian Seas, is bringing self- sufficiency. Meat has been in short supply for many years. The Soviet Union may well be the richest coun- try in the world in mineral resources. Not; all of it has been thoroughly prospected, but vast resources of petroleum, coal, iron, manganese, chromium, magnesium, aluminum, gold, platinum, potash, and phosphate have already been found. There are very considerable amounts of copper, nickel, lead, zinc, graphite, mica, asbestos, fluor- spar, quartz crystals, sulphur, and some titanium, tungsten, molybdenum, tin, and corundum. Co- balt, cadmium, and vanadium may be available as byproducts from ores known to exist in Russia. Where a few of these materials are in short supply for industry, the satellites make up most defi- ciencies. Molybdenum comes from East Germany, antimony from Czechoslovakia and China, tung- sten from China, and mercury for a time came from Yugoslavia. It is harder to assess the actual position in uranium production, but in addition to the old pitchblende mines in the Czechoslovakia- East Germany area, which have been thoroughly exploited, there are additional deposits in Poland and Bulgaria. More may be available in Man- churia, and it is rumored in several public reports that vast amounts can be exploited in western Tibet. Within the Soviet Union there are known uranium deposits at Ukhta in northern Russia, in the Caucasus, southeastern Turkestan, the Altai Mountains, Tannu Tuva, and near Lake Baikal. Undoubtedly, exploration has revealed more. Their chief need for mineral exploitation is more engineers, more production and refining equip- ment, and better railway transport. Soviet oil production has not kept pace fully with potential needs, but there are multiple sources under exploitation. The Caucasus area still leads in production, centering at Baku, Maikop, and Grosny. The trans-Volga and Emba River fields are being expanded. Other smaller fields are in the Gergana Valley of Turkestan, at Nebit Dag east of the Caspian, in the Kama River Valley, on Northern Sakhalin, and in Kamchatka. Still Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 WORLD COMMUNISM AND THE U. S. S. R. CONFIDENTIAL other newer fields are in the Pechora, the Yenesei, and Maya Valleys, and the Tamir Peninsula. The Lvov fields in former Poland are now within the Soviet Union. In addition, satellite Rumania has the Ploesti fields. Production is conceivably only one-tenth that of the United States, but consump- tion by civilian motor vehicles and railways in the Soviet Union is negligible compared to ours. The Russians have made considerable improve- ments in electric power production. The greatest dam in Europe before the war was the 900,000 kilowatts-capacity Dnepr plant, comparable to Hoover Dam in power output. Since the war it has been restored, and a whole series of dams are either completed or projected along the Don and Volga. Potentially, there are large numbers of additional sites. Hydroelectric power is also de- veloped in the Kola Peninsula, the Caucasus, and in southeastern Turkestan. Today output may be about one quarter that of the United States. Sociological Characteristics What manner of people have the Russians be- come ? The question is difficult to answer in a few words. Representing a mixture of many cultures, they seem in many ways mystical, fond of phil- osophizing, perhaps too willing to shrug off mis- fortune, but able to endure discomfort and incon- venience. Because of ignorance and poverty, only strong methods have been able to change the masses in their habitual ways. The people as a whole have never lived in a western democratic society, and their present government is certainly not con- cerned with human rights or individual dignity. Although this is not meant to be an indictment of the Russian people, there is now a question of whether or not the people themselves, in their own society, may net be changing for the worse by our standards. The Russian nobility, prosper- ous farmers, and business classes of the past were killed or driven from the country. The peasants, used to a simple and hardy life, bound by a love for their soil, have been uprooted by the millions to go into industry or to collective farms. The years of revolution, war, famine, and repression have affected family life and individual outlook. The present generation has known nothing else; only the old people remember an earlier life. The Soviet government has tried in this generation to 211 reshape attitudes and behavior, using any means regardless of the cost to individuals. It has speeded modern improvements and corrected some former shortcomings, but only at a terrible price in human suffering and damage to the finer sen- sibilities of the people. The Soviet totalitarian state has not only brought planning to the econ- omy, but police terror, spying, and regulation into every aspect of life. The social and political con- sequences of communism are just as great and as serious as the economic. Communist minorities in the early days of revo- lution manipulated themselves into power and in a conspiratorial manner have ruthlessly maintained their hold. Division of authority is not tolerated, and when rivals have appeared, they have been purged by standards so extreme that their fam- ilies and associates, regardless of individual guilt, have also faced execution or imprisonment. Ter- ror is the weapon used. There is no voice other than the voice of the Party, whether it be in the press, the school, or the political forum. The de- tailed regulation of life with millions of informers makes anticommunist intrigue exceedingly diffi- cult. Children are praised for testifying against their parents. Education and politics become the ritualistic repetition of Party dogmas, with devia- tion a major sin. Yet despite a generation of re- education and suppression, there are still stresses in Soviet society. Minorities to some degree still have Nationalist aspirations. Normal human feelings cannot be so suppressed that some do not rebel at cruelty. The years of sacrifice, always with the promise of a better future, have not brought an easier life to the masses, instead a new privileged class, the Party members, has arisen. Only a few others are also favored: scientists, artists, and military leaders. The top leaders seem to combine a very real devotion to the Party with an apparently considerable degree of cyni- cism about some of the outward symbols used. In any event, extremes of privilege are very great, ranging according to rank within the Party, the military, and down through the intelligentsia to ordinary workers and peasants, finally reaching the "untouchables" of Soviet society, those out of favor with the Party and the slave laborers. No- body knows how many laborers are in penal servi- tude, but the number may be twenty or thirty mil- CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09: CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS lion, representing ordinary criminals, political minorities, the indiscreet, kulaks and petty bour- geoisie, or just people unfortunate enough to be within reach when more labor 'was required. The new generation takes this society for granted. Children old enough to go to school join the Young Pioneers, and if found worthy, are then graduated with suitable ritual to the Kom- somols. In time, by rigid selection, a few join the elite Communist Party. Its numbers, kept to hard core strength by constant self-examination, are subjected to rigid tests and tasks in order to increase their usefulness to the Party. Political Institutions A facade of legal government, a written consti- tution, and even elections exist, but it is the Party that rules through the Central Committee and the Party Presidium. It may be that there is freedom of expression and debate within the Party Presidium, but it is also likely that, in consider- able degree, while Stalin was dictator, the mem- bers waited for his nod. It is also possible that if some got illusions of grandeur, Stalin played them off against each other, or they suddenly died and enjoyed elaborate state funerals. The Party leaders live in country villas in the suburbs of Moscow, and ride to the Kremlin in limousines with police escort; but they also work very long hours. During Stalin's regime, late night conferences were customary. It is not yet possible to assess the consequences of the poli tical realignment which followed Stalin's death. How- ever, there seems to be no reason for anticipating major changes in fundamental policy or in the basic organizational structure of the Party or the Government. Evolutionary Prospects As has been pointed out, a better standard of liv- ing for the masses has been sacrificed to capital expansion and military strength. The Red Army, largest in the world, represents abstractly a counter force to the Communist Party. But precaution- ary measures, undertaken to prevent this eventu- ality, have been intensified, especially following the great purges of 1937 that uncovered treachery, imaginary or real, to Stalin. Every military unit CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 20 nowl includes a political officer and, in addition, there are secret informers throughout the ranks that watch for any dissidence. Also the security forces, under the MVD, have their own elite mili- tary units designed to deal with insurrection. It cannot be emphasized too strongly that those are most optimistic who hope for internal reform in the Soviet Union which will? change its world outlook. Although there may be some guerrilla bands, some dissident elements, and undoubtedly a host of unhappy citizens, the odds are against any upset short of major war and upheaval. Party control of all propaganda, education, and social activity, even including the Orthodox Church, makes the odds very great indeed. As has been suggested earlier, we do not have just a Soviet problem, one of ambitious State albeit with a different philosophy. We have a world Communist movement which draws men of many races and many classes into a world struggle for domination, and which receives strength and suc- cor from the Soviet homeland. The people of some countries have been won over more easily, perhaps, because by comparison Soviet domination seemed to represent an improved way of life. The Communists have also learned to take the legiti- mate grievance, set up a coalition or popular front, and then after infiltration of key posts to unmask their complete power and win control of the new government. Soviet Armed Forces The Red Army is the most powerful land force in the world. Its strength is usually quoted as 175 divisions, not including powerful satellite and security forces. Increasingly, the heavy arms production of the Soviet Union is being reflected in higher firepower and more armor and vehicles for this army. Amenities for troops are kept at a minimum. Under combat conditions they largely live off the land, and advance in every kind of vehicle, mechanically and animal powered. The haphazard aspects of their military behavior are not necessarily weaknesses: some are strengths, for they are free from the high logistics costs that we bear. Their willingness to take casualties makes them formidable adversaries. If a minefield blocks the way, hostages, labor forces, or their own troops simply march through and detonate 212 03/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09: CIA-RDP85G00105R00010021QQ02-9 WORLD COMMUNISM AND THE U. S. S. R. cunt. luENTIAL the mines to allow more combat troops to pass. Although large numbers defected or were demoral- ized in the earlier stages of the German onslaught, extreme repressive measures, plus patriotism, plus personal indifference to death, created a powerful force that swept across Europe. The Red Air Force has specialized in tactical air support, and has long been known for its good quality fighters. The Korean War demonstrated that the MIG-15 jet fighter was one of the finest interceptors in the world. Creation of a strategic air force has been suggested by the copies of United States B-29's that have been seen in in- creasing numbers by foreign observers. This development, which probably includes more modern types, takes time, but fits logically with their presumed atomic capabilities. The Red Navy in the past has been largely a coastal defense force scattered among the several widely separated coasts of the Soviet Union. However, it is no mean force, for its submarine strength is the greatest in the world, and although reports are scanty, the same German technical knowledge in this field has been available to them as to us. The Soviet Navy's performance is largely unknown, since its exploits in World War II were limited, but there have been frequently reported stories of new surface vessel construc- tion that reflect Soviet interest in building an ef- fective fleet. A chief difference between these Red forces and our own is their use of political officers and also of 213 large para-military security forces. Unlike our doctrine, every Soviet military unit not only has a military commander but a political officer who can influence a commander's decision by making him accountable to the Party. The political officer has additional duties in insuring loyalty and in carrying out an intensive indoctrination program at all levels. The security forces are so organized as virtually to guarantee that the Red Army itself cannot rise against the government. These security forces also have major responsi- bilities for guarding the frontiers against any- thing other than major attack, and also for ad- ministering the slave labor camps with their estimated twenty million victims. In summation, the armed forces of the Soviet Union and the closely integrated satellite forces collectively represent the greatest military power in being in the world. They are famous for their artillery, their tanks, their rockets, and their fighter planes. They are politically oriented to a fanatical degree. They are hardened by their normal living conditions and by the most rigorous training. However, they are not invincible, nor is their political training a perfect shield, if the record of World War II gives any guide for the future. With full recognition of their strengths, the naval officer should study them with a view toward possible exploitation of their weaknesses, both in conventional military warfare and in those areas where intelligence can also aid so greatly: the economic, the political, and the psychological. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CHAPTER 9 THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE: COLLECTION Intelligence as activity is embodied in the steps or phases of a perpetual cycle consisting of collec- tion, processing, and dissemination kept in motion and continually reactivated by use on the part of strategic planners and operational commanders. Any item of collected information becomes intel- ligence through processing and reaches its poten- tial consumer through dissemination. A cycle which comprises these functions is not peculiar to intelligence; the steps are common to any activity or industry which produces a finished product from raw materials. In the automotive industry, for example, the process of manufacture begins with the acquisition of raw materials, the ores from which the necessary metals are made. The metals are then fashioned into the component parts of engine, chassis, and body, which are as- sembled into a finished product, an automobile. The next step puts the product in the hands of distributors or dealers who sell it to the ultimate user, the individual motorist. The phases of such an industrial cycle, procurement, manufacture, distribution and sales are analogous to those of all intelligence activity. First, information must be collected; second, this information must be sub- jected to certain evaluative processes by which it becomes intelligence; and third, the intelligence must be put in the hands of potential users Finally, its use, either in planning or in operations, will uncover needs for additional information which will reactivate the cycle. Let us relate the operation of the intelligence cycle to the commander and his mission. In pre- liminary staff planning, the commander's needs and responsibilities in respect to intelligence will require answers to the following questions: 1. Is my information on the enemy and the area of operations complete, accurate, and timely? 2. What collecting agencies or units do I have available for filling in the gaps in my infor- mation? 3. What is the correct interpretation of this information in the light of my mission? CONFIDENTIAL 4. To which of my subordinates or superiors will certain items of intelligence be useful? In supplying the answers to the commander's questions, the supporting duties and functions of his intelligence officer are clearly prescribed as they relate to the three steps of the cycle, for collec- tion, processing, and dissemination are indicated. The matter of use requires more explanation. It has been stated above that use reactivates the cycle. Returning to our industrial analogy, we find the user, the man who bought the car, in the same position as the commander who "bought" the intelligence. The owner of the car reports that its performance in general is quite satisfactory, but that improvement in driving comfort would be effected with the addition of foam rubber seat cushions. Satisfied owners are essential to sales, so the company acts on the complaint by procuring additional raw materials, in this case foam rubber, and later models of the car have better seat cush- ions. Thus user experience results in a better product. Suppost now that the commander in the midst of his planning finds that his information on Blue Beach may not be completely up-to-date because of enemy activity in that particular area. Have beach defenses been improved? A collection task arises and his question can be answered best by amphibious reconnaissance of the beach. The re- port of the amphibious patrol will then be evalu- ated and the new intelligence considered in the commander's plan. The cycle was reactivated by the need for additional information in the plan- ning stage of the operation. Likewise, the opera- tion itself will cause the reactivation of the cycle when in retrospect it is realized that information was incomplete on the range of a certain type of mortar used by the enemy. The capabilities of this mortar must be reassessed in the light of com- bat experience: a job for his intelligence officer. Again the experience of the user results in a better product, which in this case is intelligence of value to the commander in making sound military decisions. 215 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS The steps of the intelligence cycle do not always follow in the logical sequence of collection, proc- essing, and dissemination, although this order is normal procedure in the flow of raw information from producer to consumer. Circumstances may influence the sequence; certain information re- quires no processing, since it is finished intelligence at the time of collection. This would be true in the case of a single indisputable fact required by a user. Information required by a user can be supplied on many occasions from the files of ONI without the need for the assignment of an ad- ditional collection task to a field unit. The individual steps in the cycle likewise do not represent treatment by different intelligence activities at distinctly different times. The same activity may be collector, evaluator, and dissemi- nator of a certain item of information. Collect- ing agencies themselves normally subject the in- formation collected to a certain degree of processing, and those who determine the final interpretation of an item of information are often best qualified to determine its potential user. The cycle is flexible, therefore, in its application to specific subjects and intelligence tasks. Collection, processing, and dissemination and the work of the intelligence officer in each will be discussed more fully in the three chapters which follow. REQUIREMENTS IN COLLECTION Information for intelligence comprises docu- ments, facts, and observations which throw light on any of the varied aspects of a subject under study. In form, information may consist of written articles or reports, messages, oral presen- tations or briefings, maps, photographs, graphic visual aids, and physical objects. In nature, in- formation may be general or specific; detailed or fragmentary; true or false. Only when this raw undigested accumulation of material is subjected to the processes leading to final interpretation does it become intelligence to be disseminated to ap- propriate users. There are four basic requirements in the collec- tion of information for intelligence: (1) GUID- ANCE, the direction of the collection effort by means of collection plans at all levels of command; (2) COVERAGE, the availability of suitable collecting CONFIDENTIAL activities to fulfill the tasks imposed by the col- lection plan; (3) REPORTING, the form and means of forwarding information from the collecting activity to the processing agency; (4) RECORDING, making information readily available for present and future processing by proper cataloging, filing, and indexing, Guidance Collection requires specific guidance and control to make it efficient and valuable. Collectors must know what information is needed, and how soon it is needed, in order to expend their efforts effec- tively. Since collection of information for intel- ligence is a responsibility of a naval commander, it is from him that direction of the collection effort must come. The commander's function in this respect will be more fully discussed in chapter 12, ? Intelligence Staff Procedures. The guidance of collection throughout the naval establishment is effected through certain basic requirements set forth at the highest command level by the Chief of Naval Operations. They are expressed in broad terms for the general guidance of all the Navy's collecting agencies and activities and constitute a basic collection plan from which are derived the collection plans of subordinate commands. The Director of Naval Intelligence, for example, as CNO's Intelligence Officer, bases his collection plan upon the requirements listed by CNO, but DNI expresses them in much more detail and as- signs specific collection tasks to the agencies and activities which can best obtain the required in- formation. The field activities, such as the Oper- ating Forces, the Attache System, and the Naval District and River Commands, formulate their own collection plans, based in turn on the require- ments of DNI, but again expressing in detail the specific items that can be obtained through the exploitation of sources peculiar or particularly available to each. Thus the general intelligence requirements become more itemized and specific as they are incorporated into the collection plans of lower echelons of command. Some intelligence tasks are long-range and continuing, others are initiated by immediate needs. The collector must be aware of the purpose, nature, and urgency of these tasks, and he must work within the frame- 216 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE: COLLECTION CONFIDENTIAL work of an organized plan in accordance with local conditions. Collection directives are subject to such periodic revision as may be demanded by the world situa- tion and the needs of the Navy. Emphasis will vary, interest will rise and wane, and objectives will differ in various parts of the world. Intel- ligence producing units, such as a geographic desk in the Office of Naval Intelligence, should have the closest possible contact with the field activity which is best qualified to collect the particular kind of information required for sound estimates or careful planning. The relations between col- lector and processor should always be as intimate as possible. Each report's value should be ap- praised and the reporting officer notified. Much welcome guidance can be given by suggestions through personal conferences, official inspections at stated intervals, and official evaluations and commentaries of field reports. Praise for indus- trious collection and good reporting are mutually rewarding for both collectors and processors. Coverage Coverage is achieved when the collecting agency, through conscientious exploitation of all sources of information, fulfils its assigned mission. Thor- ough coverage depends upon a carefully formu- lated collection plan, one which completely realizes the collecting potential of the area or target in question. Through the collection plan, potential sources for information of significance are most likely to be discovered and exploited; thus, it may be possible to anticipate and fulfil requirements for particular data. In connection with coverage, the utilization of operational collection units will be discussed in chapters 12 and 13. Collection Agencies As was noted in the previous sections on the organization of Naval Intelligence, the respon- sibility for the collection of all types of informa- tion for intelligence required within the Naval establishment rests with the Chief of Naval Op- erations. Under him, the Director of Naval In- telligence, as head of the Naval Intelligence organ- ization, is responsible for the exploitation of all sources in the collection of information of naval interest, guided by such pertinent policies, pro- 269196-54-15 217 cedures, and objectives as are set forth by the National Security Council. The broad scope of naval interest has been presented in the first chap- ter, and needs no further elaboration. Any infor- mation or intelligence that might support the Navy in carrying out the missions assigned to it or to its component parts, including naval aviation, amphibious forces, and the Marine Corps, is con- sidered to be of naval interest. The collecting activities available to the Director of Naval Intelligence are (1) the Office of Naval Intelligence, the "home office"; (2) the field activ- ities consisting of the Operating Forces, the Naval Attach?ystem, Naval District and River Com- mands, including Sea Frontiers; and (3) the naval sections of intelligence activities sponsored jointly by Navy with other military services. The Collector, Ashore and Afloat Every person in the Navy is a potential collec- tor of information of value to intelligence. A seaman on liberty in foreign or United States ports, a lieutenant unexpectedly invited aboard a foreign naval vessel, a welder in a naval shipyard, or a clerk in the office of a District Intelligence Officer, may be in position to supply a missing bit of information. Just as the intelligence required by staff planners differs from that required by sub- ordinate commanders only in scope, point of view, and level of employment, so do collectors of information differ only in the orbit of their move- ment, their background of education and experi- ence, and their position in the naval establish- ment. The collector, like the newspaper reporter, is concerned with the five W's and the H: who, what, when, where, why, and how, but he is more than an inquiring reporter, for he must be city editor and editorial writer as well, combining the discrimination of a city editor in determining what is "fit to print" with the editorial writer's perspec- tive in interpreting events of the contemporary scene. In collection activities, the intelligence officer must have the personal qualities possessed by the successful reporter. It is difficult to give a rela- tive order of importance to these qualities, for their significance will be determined by the aspects of the collection task, and they will vary with assignments. Answers come from questions, so CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS first of all, the intelligence officer as a collector must have an inquiring mind, an insatiable intel- lectual curiosity about the world in which he lives. In order to give direction to these qualities, he must have a thorough grasp of the object, nature, and scope of the intelligence operations in which he is engaged. In this respect intelligence is knowledge?knowledge gained by the intelligence officer through study and experience. The better his background of information is on a given sub- ject, the more valuable and discriminating will be his effort in collecting additional information. He, must be thoroughly familiar with his agency's existing file of information so that he will not waste time in collecting what is already available. It is on the gaps of information that he should expend time and energy. He must ever be an avid student, with a discerning awareness of the significance of what he sees, hears, and reads. In addition to mental alertness, the intelligence officer must have physical energy. He cannot sit at a desk and expect information to come to him. Collecting normally requires a certain amount of "leg-work": things to see and people to interview. Here the qualities of initiative, tact, and resource- fulness are paramount. If a source of information dries up, replacement must be found; if efforts in one direction are futile, leads must be discovered and pursued in other directions with perseverance and patience. Emotional stability is yet another quality de- sirable in a good intelligence collector. The busi- ness of tracking down information may be tedious and unexciting; the collector may meet with re- buffs and closed doors. He must be able to cope with these frustrations and devise ways to over- come them, subduing any momentary pique that initial difficulties might engender. Moreover, his ability to judge facts objectively must not be impaired by personal attitudes. Sometimes the collector in the field will receive spot requests for information which to him appear to be insignificant and purposeless, devoid of back- ground and meaning. In such cases he must comply without questioning the reason for the re- quest. Normally, the collector will be informed of the purpose, but sometimes urgency or com- munications security will not permit thorough briefing, and message requests preclude lengthy CONFIDENTIAL 218 explanations. To someone in the intelligence organization, this bit of information is of vital importance, and the collector must seek to obtain it with the same zeal he would use in performing intelligence tasks which seem to have more meaning. Intelligence agencies do not wish to stifle indi- vidual characteristics, for interplay of personali- ties in an intelligence organization is highly de- sirable, but the qualifications discussed above are basic. Some are innate, others can be acquired. It is the collector's responsibility to strive for the ideal through self-examination and improvement. The Office of Naval Intelligence The organizational structure of the Office of Naval Intelligence was presented in chapter 2. It is the "home office" into which all information reports flow and where they are processed and dis- seminated for use. Here collection programs are established which are translated into positive col- lection guidance for field activities. ONI also provides the liaison with other government de- partments and agencies which insures a full fund of knowledge and eliminates duplication of col- lection efforts. Although ONI fits into the intel- ligence cycle most appropriately in the processing phase, it must not be overlooked that the research activity carried on by analysts is in a large sense a collection activity as well, for evaluation requires the patient gathering of a mass of related materials. OPERATIONAL COLLECTION OF INTELLIGENCE Articles 0504 and 0506 of Navy Regulations state that "a commander shall maintain an effec- tive intelligence organization and keep himself informed of the political and military aspects of the national and international situation" and that CCa commander shall keep his immediate supe- rior appropriately informed of intelligence in- formation that may be of value." These two articles make each commander re- sponsible for the collection, processing, and dis- semination of intelligence within his own com- mand and the dissemination of intelligence to higher echelons. Without good intelligence it would be impossible to conduct a successful naval operation, unless there was an overwhelming supe- Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE : COLLECTION CONFIDENTIAL riority of forces, and even then much time, money, and many lives would be wasted unnecessarily. The commander must be assured of continuing reliable intelligence as to the disposition, strength, composition, and movement of enemy forces, as well as intelligence on the weather and other factors of the area of operations. He must use every means at his disposal to gain information of the enemy forces opposing him, and of enemy forces in other areas, which may affect the prepara- tion and execution of his plans. A failure to ex- ploit every source of information may deny important information of enemy dispositions, movements and operations, and consequently make impossible a decisive exploitation of enemy weaknesses. The difficulties involved in obtaining adequate information and in arriving at reliable conclusions are many. These difficulties are due principally to the enemy's efforts to foil attempts made to gain information. In concealing his movements he will make use of camouflage, darkness, and weather. He will resort to any tactical measures that offer a reasonable chance of obtaining secrecy or sur- prise. He will enforce both strict censorship and communication security measures to prevent leaks of information. He may distribute false informa- tion and institute other measures to deceive the collecting agencies of the opposition. He will sometimes adopt a course of action that may ap- pear illogical. Thus in planning and operations, the designs of the enemy are more or less unknown factors. Combat operations during wartime constitute one of the primary sources of information about the enemy. The observations and experience of personnel involved, when properly evaluated, are immensely valuable in furnishing intelligence con- cerning enemy strength, disposition, materiel, tac- tics and capabilities, to say nothing of valuable target information and geographical detail. Collection by the Fleet The Fleet has at its disposal certain units that are ideally constituted to provide the means of collecting certain types of information. It is im- possible to list them in order of importance, for in certain conditions and at a particular time each may be of prime importance in a vital collection 219 task. The discussion here will be of a more gen- eral nature, since details of such employment of operational units will be presented in chapter 13 against a background of certain naval operations of World War II. Collection by Surface Vessels In both peace and war the surface vessels of the Navy are collectors of intelligence. Most na- tions send their vessels on cruises in peacetime, not only for training personnel and testing equipment, but also to collect a great variety of intelligence. Reports can be made on such subjects as weather observations, channel soundings, sonar conditions, port and harbor installations, radio and radar transmissions, and many items of political, eco- nomic, and sociological interest. It will also be possible to enhance the value of these reports with appropriate photographs. Collection by ship's personnel underway or in foreign ports requires vision in guidance and diligence on the part of the collectors. In actual war conditions, the emphasis in col- lection may shift to more current information of a tactical nature for which there is immediate need. There will always be gaps in our basic encyclopedic intelligence which must be filled as opportunity presents itself. For example, naval operations in World War II took place in parts of the world far from the beaten track, and the oper- ating forces not only had to find the enemy and observe the weather, but also had to take many soundings and do other jobs that unfortunately had not been done before the war. Even so, op- erations could not be wholly successful without the encyclopedic type of information as a frame of reference within which to study current enemy behavior. One of the tasks performed by surface vessels in collection is hydrographic survey. This infor- mation is needed by the Hydrographic Office to revise and improve the navigation charts used by merchant and naval ships alike. In many parts of the world navigation charts date back into the last century, and only the most obvious corrections have been made since. Subsequently, islands have been found to be mislocated and soundings in- adequate over reefs and other obstructions. There are geological changes, sometimes of great vio- lence, that require resurvey. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR In World War II, existing charts were found to be so inadequate that additional survey ships were commissioned and given elaborate photo- graphic and printing equipment to prepare new charts in the field for direct dissemination to the operating forces. The nature of hydrographic needs has changed with naval warfare itself, put- ting new demands on collectors. For example, amphibious intelligence poses information require- ments in surf and swell conditions, tides and cur- rents. Successful submarine operations require not only data on depths and currents, but also on temperature and salinity. Electronic Reconnaissance The appearance of radar in World War II and the subsequent advancement in the development of electronic devices have provided our fleets and forces with a new and important capability in the collection of information by means of electronic reconnaissance. Much of this capability rests with communications intelligence which will be dis- cussed in a later section, but reconnaissance by des- ignated ships and aircraft of the Fleet, within range of enemy radar or radio installations, pro- vides a means for the collection of data concerning their identification and location, as well as trans- mission frequencies, characteristics, and employ- ment. The devices and techniques of such collection require technical explanations beyond the scope of, this volume. Obviously, this is a job for elec- tronics experts, but the intelligence officer who finds himself associated with electronic collection activities can be of great assistance in on the spot guidance and preliminary interpretation of the collection effort. In an age when science and technology are constantly changing concepts of warfare, electronics represents a field of which the intelligence officer can ill afford to be ignorant. Collection by Submarines Submarines are especially suited for collection of information through reconnaissance because they can remain concealed and unsupported for long periods in enemy waters. Thus they can reconnoiter successfully and return safely and secretly in situations where other collection agen- cies could either not obtain the desired information CONFIDENTIAL 220 NAVAL OFFICERS at all, or could only do so at great cost and with the risk of giving the enemy an indication of intentions. One limitation of the submarine in reconnais- sance work is the necessity of relatively deep water. In order to remain submerged, and therefore con- cealed, the submarine must confine its movements to waters of ten or preferably twenty fathoms. Close approach to the area to be reconnoitered may thus be limited by bottom topography. In plan- ning any submarine reconnaissance, the depth of water must be given special consideration. Submarines are capable of several different types of reconnaissance: 1. Periscope reconnaissance. ( a) Visual. Best results are obtained from the shortest possible range. Binocular viewing by two or more observers at a time is recom- mended; for this purpose, an auxiliary viewer may be used, which projects the periscope field on a ground-glass screen. It is also advisable to use a voice recorder at the time of observations, and to make sketches of significant details. (b) Photographic. Makes a complete record of observations; allows photo-interpretation if a photo-reconnaissance strip can be made. All major amphibious operations in the Pacific dur- ing World War II were preceded by submarine photographic reconnaissance. 2. Radar or radio reconnaissance. Obtains in- formation of the locations and characteristics of enemy transmitters on shore, ships or aircraft. Special search receivers and associated equipment are required. The intelligence officer should brief submarine personnel in advance on the known loca- tions and characteristics of all enemy transmitters in the reconnaissance area. 3. Sonar reconnaissance. (a) Listening. With the use of special equip- ment, this type of reconnaissance can provide sonar information, similar to that of radar and radio. It not only contributes to scientific and technical intelligence, but may be of value in future undersea operations against the enemy. (b) Echo-ranging. Obtains information of the locations of minefields and other underwater obstacles. Special sonar equipment is required. The intelligence officer should provide charts of known or suspected mines and other obstacles Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE: COLLECTION CONFIDENTIAL and should recommend search tracks, course lines, and radar contact points. Minefield re- connaissance by submarine is hazardous, and re- quires a high degree of training. 4. Meteorological reconnaissance. With spe- cialized personnel and equipment, submarines can gather weather data in enemy waters. They may, for example, remain on station for long periods as mobile weather stations. 5. Hydrographie reconnaissance. Submarines are excellent collectors of data on thermal gradi- ents and landmarks such as fixes, profiles, and orientation points. They are also able to deter- mine current and tide conditions and verify depths through soundings. Periscope photography, discussed above, is par- ticularly promising as a reconnaissance technique. Its chief advantage is that it supplies a complete and permanent record, which in certain cases lends itself admirably to photo-interpretation. The subjects of periscope observation, both vis- ual and photographic, are mainly enemy shipping, harbors, coastal areas, and beaches. Periscope photography of such subjects is preferable to aerial photography, especially for the production of am- phibious intelligence. It often reveals areas and details, such as profiles and orientation points, not normally obtained from aerial views. It is able to penetrate camouflage, which is usually designed to give protection from aerial observation. The side view which it affords is better for certain purposes than a vertical view, for example, in determining the gradient of a beach. Further- more, certain objects notably offshore obstacles, boat lanes, beach exits, and natural or man-made means of cover and concealment, are more readily and plainly visible to submarines than from the air. Periscope photography can also be useful for verifying the results of aerial photography. A disadvantage of individual periscope photo- graphs is their narrow angle of view?only eight degrees at high power, which is generally used. Because of the scale desired?not less than 1: 5000, preferably 1: 2500?the range cannot exceed a mile or two with certain types of cameras. For various reasons, including bottom topography, so close an approach is not always possible. Cameras of greater focal length would of course permit 221 photographs of suitable scale to be taken at longer range. In spite of these disadvantages, individual peri- scope photographs can provide information of great intelligence value. Those of the following types present data of particular intelligence value: 1. Broadside shots of naval and merchant ships, including the ship's entire length, supple- mented by close-ups showing the names, num- bers, and unusual features. In wartime, pre- attack and post-attack photographs of enemy shipping are useful for damage assessment and verification of sinkings. 2. Port and harbor facilities, such as docks, cranes, warehouses, and shipways. 3. Landmarks and orientation points. By taking a series of overlapping photographs, a submarine can make a so.-called "strip" or "pano- rama". If the true bearing of the periscope is changed between photographs, the result is a sweep panorama, which cannot be used for photo- interpretation but can be grouped to make com- posites for general information. Sweep pano- ramas can be taken in a short time, in areas of limited sea-room, and without much preparation. Thus they are often used, especially for coverage of harbors, coastal areas and beaches, when condi- tions are not favorable for stereo-photography. Photo-reconnaissance strips, also called "under- way panoramas", are made by taking a series of overlapping photographs (the extent of overlap being approximately 60 percent), with the peri- scope trained to the same true bearing while the submarine holds a constant course. Objects ap- pearing in two successive photographs can be viewed and interpreted in stereo. This is the most useful type of submarine pho- tography for intelligence purposes. However, it requires planning and preparation, takes time ( which may expose the submarine to discovery by the enemy) , and requires sufficient sea-room for the submarine to follow a continuous track while making photographs. Amphibious Patrols When certain essential information is lacking or it becomes necessary to confirm and amplify information received from other sources, amphib- ious patrons can be employed to gather hydro- CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved CONFIDENTIAL For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS graphic data, report meteorological conditions, ex- amine beaches and terrain, locate enemy installa- tions, determine enemy strength, capture enemy prisoners, and make demonstrations to effect de- ceptions. As a general rule, amphibious patrols confine their activities to the covert acquisition of information and fight only in self-defense. Amphibious patrol personnel must be specially selected and trained to do their job in all types of terrain, such as mountain, jungle, and arctic. The elements and principles of scouting and patrolling must be sufficiently instilled in them to become instinctive. The aggressive type of action in- volved, combined with the strain of maintaining a high degree of security, necessitates exceptional physical condition and agility. All individuals must have confidence in their ability to handle themselves with ease in water. Additional training is required in the technique of entering hostile territory from the sea, in rec- ognizing unusual characteristics of terrain and hydrography, and in special communications methods and procedures. All patrol personnel must be able to handle small boats on the sea at night and to estimate such factors as current, wind, speed, and direction without difficulty. Accurate recognition, sketching, map and aerial photograph reading, and the ability to write objective factual reports are also essential in the successful opera- tions of an amphibious patrol. Underwater Demolition Teams During World War II one of the most useful sources of information in the hours just prior to amphibious landings was the result of the labors of the underwater demolition teams (UDT's). In early Pacific operations they proved their effective- ness in carrying out their assigned mission of beach clearance and they were able to operate success- fully even in daylight provided there was adequate fire support. After the Marianas operation, when an intel- ligence section was added to the staff of ComUDTs- Pac, the mission of the UDTs was enlarged to include reconnaissance as well as demolition. Two intelligence officers were assigned by ComPhibPac to the staff of ComUDTsPac and close liaison was established. This activity expanded considerably as operations grew larger and more complex, and CONFIDENTIAL by the end of the war, several intelligence officers were on duty with ComUDTsPac. All were given special instructions to prepare them for UDT in- telligence work, and some were assigned to teams for specific operations. UDTs can obtain detailed beach information on topography, soils and trafficability, location and nature of obstacles, hydrographic data, location and type of mines in beach approaches, the nature of the shore line, defenses, visible exits, and prom- inent landmarks along the beaches that can be used for guiding in landing craft. If the teams are launched in rubber boats from submarines at night, they may be able to obtain considerable hydro- graphic data without disclosing their presence. If launched from submarine or surface vessels in day- light, fire support may be necessary. Reconnoitering enemy shores, along with demo- lition of underwater obstacles, are important con- tributions of the Navy's underwater demolition teams, and the success of any amphibious opera- tion may well hinge upon them. 222 THE NAVAL ATTACHE SYSTEM Naval officers on duty in foreign posts provide a large part of the information needed by the Navy for planning purposes in war and peace. There- fore it is desirable to deal in some detail with the organization and function of the Naval Attach? system. The paramount duty of Naval Attaches is that of intelligence collection, in the performance of which they are an integral part of Naval Intel- ligence and are under the cognizance of the Direc- tor of Naval Intelligence. At the same time, they are under the military command of the minister or ambassador who heads the diplomatic mission to which they are assigned. Although the attache is not recognized under the law as a Foreign Serv- ice Officer, he carries a diplomatic passport and has diplomatic immunity. Thus, he is a member of the official staff of the diplomatic mission of the United States in the country to which that mission is accredited and is the direct representative of the Navy Department in that mission. The naval attache in general defers to the wishes of the ambassador or minister. Normally the chief of the mission will not be concerned with the attach? reports of classified technical and Approved For Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP85G00105R000100210002-9 Approved For ReleanaklginL:ECl/'6612RFONA00105R000100200NORMITIAL THE INTEL tactical naval information, particularly if they are of no international political significance. The attach? reports are forwarded directly to CNO (DNI) , and if desired, copies are furnished to the chief of mission. The controlling factor in the assignment of at- taches is the procurement of information of in- terest to the Navy Department. The assignment, as assistant attaches, of officers who have special- ized in various technical or professional subjects is usually limited to those stations which oiler special opportunities to procure technical infor- mation. Consultation with the State Department in the assignment of attaches is limited, in general, to assuring that the officer selected for the post is persona grata to the State Department, which then takes the necessary steps to ascertain that the selec- tion is acceptable to the country to which the diplomatic mission is accredited. When attaches and assistant attaches are accredited to more than one country, only countries whose mutual political relationships are good are included in the same group. The number and stations of naval attaches vary according to current requirements. In the cap- itals of major powers, such as London and Paris, a large complement is usually maintained, while in Latin America, a single attache may be accred- ited to several adjoining countries. Primary re- sponsibility is usually the country of the attach? residence; he will have secondary responsibilities as required by naval interest or the current situation. The duties of the naval attache may be described only in general terms, for the methods and tech- niques to be followed depend almost entirely on the good judgment and tactful discretion of the attache himself. The opportunities and situations which confront an attache vary so greatly in dif- ferent parts of the world that uniform procedures cannot be prescribed. He must be constantly on the alert for every kind of information of possible naval interest, using all his imagination, ingenuity, and resourcefulness to uncover it and all his knowl- edge of the country and of general naval subjects to interpret it. He cannot neglect an item simply because he has not received a specific request for it and has no labeled folder for it in his file. Naval attaches deal directly with the Admiralty or Ministry of Marine, and, where the military, naval, and air departments are combined, with the Ministry of Defense. Official dealings with any other ministry must be conducted through the chief of the diplomatic mission to which the attache is assigned. Ordinarily, naval matters will be re- ferred to the attache by the chief of mission. The attache can expect little official information from a government on the real spirit which per- vades its Navy, its concepts of strategy and tactics, the extent and results of maneuvers, the charac- teristics of its naval commanders, or the efficiency of personnel and materiel. This information can be obtained only through intimate personal and social relationships with foreign nationals, par- ticularly foreign naval and army officers. Outside the Iron Curtain, the attache often has many semi and unofficial sources of information