INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Release Decision: RIPPUB
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• Document Page Count: 413
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 2, 2003
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 1, 1954
• Content Type: IS

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INTELLIGENCE FOR
NAVAL OFFICERS
Prepared by
U. S. NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SCHOOL
For
BUREAU OF NAVAL PERSONNEL
NAVY Declassification/Release Instructions on File
NAVPERS 10889
Approved For IlafAigekibg93/
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INTELLIGENCE FOR
NAVAL OFFICERS
Prepared by
U. S. NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SCHOOL
For
BUREAU OF NAVAL PERSONNEL
1954
0002-9
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The following material is reproduced by permission of the copyright owners:
Chapter
Page
Author(s)
Publication
Publishers
1
2
J. F. C. Fuller
"The Pattern of Future War,"
Brassey's Annual, The Armed
The Macmillan Co., New York,
N.Y.
Forces Yearbook, 1951.
1
2
"The Living Thoughts of Clause-
wits," Infantry Journal.
David McKay Co., Inc., New
York, N. Y.
1
4
Editor, Thomas R. Phillips
Roots of Strategy
Military Service Publishing Co.,
Harrisburg, Pa.
1
11
Omar N. Bradley
A Soldier's Story
Henry Holt & Co., New York,
N.Y.
1
12
Sherman Kent
Strategic Intelligence
Princeton University Press, Prince-
ton, N. J.
1
16
"The Living Thoughts of Clause-
wits," Infantry Journal.
David McKay Co., Inc., New York,
N.Y.
2
19
Editor, Thomas R. Phillips_ _
Roots of Strategy
Military Service Publishing Co.,
Harrisburg, Pa.
2
23
Flavius Vegetius Renatres__ _
The Military Institutions of the
Do.
Romans.
2
36
Corey Ford and Alastair Mac-
Cloak and Dagger
Random House, New York, N. Y.
Bain.
2
44
Ian Colvin
Master Spy
McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., New
York, N. Y.
2
46
Ralph Ingersoll
Top Secret
Harcourt, Brace & Co., New York,
N.Y.
2
49
Corey Ford and Alastair Mac-
Cloak and Dagger
Random House, New York, N. Y.
Bain.
2
58
Donald Robinson
"They Fight the Cold War Under
Cover," Saturday Evening Post.
Curtis Publishing Co., Philadelphia,
Pa.
4
99
George F. Kennan
American Diplomacy, 1900-1950_
The University of Chicago Press,
Chicago, Ill.
4
100
B. H. Liddell-Hart
"Strategy", 14th edition, vol. 21__
Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., Chi-
cago, Ill.
4
103
Hugh Gibson
The Road to Foreign Policy
Doubleday, Doran & Co., Inc.,
Garden City, N. Y.
4
105
Hugo Fernandez Artucio__ _ _
The Nazi Underground in South
America.
Farrar & Rinehart, Inc., New York,
N.Y.
4
112
John R. Deane
The Strange Alliance
The Viking Press, New York, N. Y.
4
114
Walter Lippmann
In his column, of the New York New York Herald Tribune, Inc.,
Herald Tribune of Mar. 29,1947. New York, N. Y.
4
121
Roger Hilsman, Jr
"Intelligence and Policy-Making
in Foreign Affairs," World Poli-
tics, vol. 5, No. 1, October 1952.
Princeton University Press, Prince-
ton, N. J.
5
126
Dwight D. Eisenhower
Crusade in Europe
Doubleday, Doran & Co., Inc.,
Garden City, N. Y.
5
145
B. H. Liddell-Hart
The Revolution in Warfare
Yale University Press, New Haven,
Conn.
5
156
H. G. Thursfield
"Brassey's Annual: The Armed The Macmillan Co., New York,
Forces Yearbook, 1951." N.Y.
10
260
John McDonald
"The War of Wits," Fortune,
March 1951.
Time, Inc., New York, N. Y.
10
260
do
"A Theory of Strategy," Fortune,
June 1949.
Do.
10
260
do
"The War of Wits," Fortune,
March 1951.
Do.
111
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Chapter Page
Author)
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Publication
Publishers
13
323
Dispatch datelined Dayton, Ohio,
Nov. 3, 1951.
Associated Press, New York, N. Y.
14
350
Hans Speier
"Psychological Warfare Reconsid-
ered," in the book "Propaganda
in War and Crisis," edited by
George W. Stewart Publishers,
New York, N. Y.
Daniel Lerner.
14
351
Harold D. Lasswell
"Political and Psychological War-
fare," in the book Propaganda
in War and Crisis, edited by
Do.
Daniel Lerner.
14
354
Daniel Lerner
Sykewar
Do.
14
356
Article, "Daily Crop of Annoy-
ances," New York Times, Nov.
New York Times, New York, N. Y.
17, 1952.
14
358
Ellsworth Huntington
Mainsprings of Civilization
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New
York, N. Y.
14
359
Alex Inkeles
Public Opinion in Soviet Russia__
Harvard University Press, Cam-
bridge, Mass.
14
360
Daniel Lerner
"Effective Propaganda Conditions
and Evaluation," in the book
George W. Stewart Publishers,
New York, N. Y.
Propaganda in War and Crisis,
edited by Daniel Lerner.
14
361
do
Sy kewar
Do.
15
374
Nathaniel Weyl
The Battle Against Disloyalty _ _ _
Thomas Y. Crowell Co., New York,
N.Y.
15
374
Philip Selznick
The Organizational Weapon: A
McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., New
Study of Bolshevik Strategy and
York ,N. Y.
Tactics.
15
376,
do
The Organizational Weapon: A McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., New
377
Study of Bolshevik Strategy and York, N. Y.
Tactics.
15
379
Louis Francis Budenz
Men Without Faces_
Harper & Bros., New York, N. Y.
15
379
Eugene Lyons
The Red Decade
The Bobbs-Merrill Co., New York,
N.Y.
15
380
Philip Selznick
The Organizational Weapon: A
McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., New
Study of Bolshevik Strategy and
York, N. Y.
Tactics.
15
388
J. Edgar Hoover
"How to Fight Communism," Newsweek, New York, N. Y.
Newsweek, June 9, 1947.
15
389
"Don't Be Duped by the Commu-
nists," Redbook Magazine, June
Redbook Magazine, New York,
N.Y.
1948.
15
393
Harry Soderman and John J.
O'Connell.
Modern Criminal Investigation__ _
Funk & Wagnalls Co., New York,
N.Y.
15
393
Jacob Fisher
The Art of Detection
Sterling Publishing Co., Inc., New
York, N. Y.
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PREFACE
Intelligence is an indispensable element in the successful operation of any
modern navy.
World War II and the subsequent hostilities in Korea have more than
demonstrated the value to planning and executing naval operations of sound,
properly interpreted information about the character of the enemy?the product
of naval intelligence. This value is even greater in periods of peace or in the
twilight zone between war and peace such as we have experienced since the end
of World War II. The extent, direction, and timing of our naval preparedness
in these years depend directly on the depth and accuracy of our understanding
of the hostile or potentially hostile forces that confront us.
Accordingly the training of capable intelligence officers is one of the Navy's
primary tasks. A good intelligence officer must first be a good naval officer;
but, in addition, he must have spent long hours learning and perfecting the
specialized skills that make it possible for him to penetrate the curtain of
secrecy that enshrouds an enemy. Naturally these skills cannot be acquired
simply by reading this or any other single book. At the postgraduate level the
Navy trains its intelligence officers at the Naval Intelligence School.
This text, which covers in a general way the major aspects of naval intelli-
gence and their relationships to the other functions of our naval establishment,
meets two significant needs. First, for those officers assigned to intelligence
duties for the first time, or with prior experience in one or another of the various
components of naval intelligence, it provides a greater understanding of intelli-
gence as a whole. Second, to the general line officer preparing himself for more
responsible operational commands, it gives an intimate acquaintance with the
capabilities and limitations of one of the most important supporting elements
in successful operational command, with the result that he will find himself
better equipped to make use of the services which intelligence is qualified to
perform for him.
This text makes no claim to being an exhaustive treatise. Neither is it
a book of rules and regulations, since that particular need is covered by the
Naval Intelligence Manual and the Naval Intelligence Directives issued by the
Office of Naval Intelligence. This is a textbook issued by the Standards and
Curriculum Branch of the Training Division of the Bureau of Naval Personnel
to bring to the officers and men of the Navy and the Naval Reserve such infor-
mation about the functions of Naval Intelligence as can appropriately be
disseminated through the medium of a training text.
This is the second revision of the original text, NavPers 16047, published
in February 1946 and reissued in 1948. It was prepared by the staff of the
United States Naval School (Naval Intelligence), Washington, D. C., and
reviewed by the Office of Naval Intelligence.
Suggestions, comments and criticisms are invited.
CARL F. ESPE,
Rear Admiral, USN,
Director of Naval Intelligence.
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CONTENTS
Chapter
Page
1. Intelligence: A General Orientation
1
2. The Development of Intelligence
19
3. U. S. Organizations for National Security.
63
4. An Intelligence Perspective in a Changing World_
97
5. Components of Intelligence Knowledge
123
6. Elements of World Power_.
163
7. The United States and the World
179
8. World Communism and the U. S. S. R
197
9. The Intelligence Cycle: Collection
215
10. The Intelligence Cycle: Processing
247
11. The Intelligence Cycle: Dissemination
263
12. Intelligence Staff Procedures
273
13. Intelligence in Support of Operational Command
301
14. Intelligence in Support of Special Activities
335
15. Counterintelligence
363
Summary and Conclusions
404
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CHAPTER 1
INTELLIGENCE: A GENERAL ORIENTATION
INTRODUCTION
The word "intelligence" has a long history in
the English language. In the sixteenth century,
in addition to its primary meanings denoting the
power, capacity, and product of the intellect, it
began to signify "information, news, or advice,"
and this secondary meaning implied that such in-
formation was secret, obtained through the clan-
destine efforts of spies employed by rulers or gov-
ernments. These agents were called intelligen-
cers, a word now obsolete, and the organization
in which they operated came to be known as the
Intelligence of the directing authority. In mod-
ern professional usage the word in its secondary
sense has come to have three connotations: first,
a body of knowledge; second, the formal organi-
zations engaged in producing this knowledge; and
third, the activity or processes by which the knowl-
edge is produced by the organizations. When re-
ferring to a formal organization the word is
usually capitalized.
The popular concept of intelligence as a mys-
terious, glamorous, and hazardous activity has in
part been derived from fictional accounts of in-
ternational intrigue on the Riviera, as described
in the novels of E. Phillips Oppenheim, or from
the published "cloak and dagger" exploits of two
World Wars, both truth and fiction. Indeed, in-
telligence cannot be denuded of all mystery,
glamor, and hazard for they are inherent to some
degree in the work of all intelligence organiza-
tions. However, the aura of mystery is caused
in greater part by the fact that the nature and
purpose of intelligence activity are always
guarded from public scrutiny by stringent se-
curity measures. In general, Intelligence is sim-
ilar to any other military staff section or govern-
mental agency performing tasks in the national
interest.
Because of the essential security of its opera-
tions, and the somewhat sinister quality attributed
to it by popular literature, intelligence has long
26910e-54 2
1
been considered an activity foreign to American
custom and procedure. Not until World War II
was there a real national interest in intelligence
and a universal appreciation of its functions in
military command and civil leadership. Even in
the postwar period there has not always been com-
plete general agreement as to what intelligence
means and what it can or should do. When prop-
erly forged, intelligence is a potent weapon, and
its efficient use is based on certain indispensable
principles and procedures. It is an exciting ad-
venture in forecasting what men and nations might
do; in both offensive and defensive actions it is a
sword and a shield.
Under the stimulus of world events, America
has become "intelligence-conscious," for experi-
ences of the past two decades have demonstrated
that intelligence is essential, not only to military
command, but also to the government of any na-
tion with worldwide interests and responsibilities.
The phenomenal success of Nazi and Fascist dic-
tators in the years preceding World War II, the
disaster at Pearl Harbor, and the forward march
of Soviet communism in the postwar period have
indicated the need for coordinated intelligence
upon which to base policy and decision to insure
the national welfare. There has been a growing
realization that America cannot afford to be
caught off guard or be forced into an unfavorable
defensive position in the world scene.
This new appreciation and support of its en-
deavors has given the intelligence profession more
stature, and increasing use has been found for its
products in solving a greater variety of problems.
Intelligence has also acquired a technical vocabu-
lary to explain its processes and concepts, and
for the first time in American history qualified
persons, civilian and military, are being encour-
aged to make it a lifetime career.
This study will describe the milieu in which
intelligence operates, the concepts and principles
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CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS
that govern its employment, and the professional
tools which modern science and technology have
made available to its personnel. To the profes-
sional intelligence officer, it can be no more than
a review of what he has learned through training
and experience; to the uninitiated it can serve only
as an introduction. But to all concerned it will
show the inseparable intermeshing of the activities
of Naval Intelligence with those of other military
and national intelligence organizations, and the
corresponding interaction and cooperation that
continually links intelligence with planning,
policymaking, and operations at every level?
from the White House to the foxhole. Naval
Intelligence represents only one part of the na-
tional intelligence effort. To see the activity of
his own service in proper perspective the naval
officer must understand and appreciate the vast
body of intelligence knowledge, the agencies which
produce it, and the methods by which it is made
usable.
Our first consideration is the significance of
intelligence today, its total meaning, and the scope
of its interests, activities, and responsibilities.
THE CHANGING NATURE OF WAR
The changing nature of war itself has created
an increased need for intelligence. Men and
weapons within the area of conflict have always
been primary considerations, but by the 20th cen-
tury nations began to give attention to achieving
their aims through influencing the minds of other
men. By the written and spoken word nations now
strive to affect the opinions, emotions, attitudes,
and behaviors of the peoples of other nations, both
friendly and hostile. During World War I, three
theories of warfare were developed, all of which
emphasized the psychological rather than the
physical objective, and which were made practical
by the development of the aircraft and the radio.
The first theory shifted the purpose of the attack
from physical destruction to demoralization of
the opposing force by paralyzing its command.
The second, "strategic bombing," not only was
directed against the enemy's economic capabilities,
but also aimed to overthrow the political govern-
ment by destroying the morale of the civilian
population behind the battle lines. The third was
based on a delay in physical attack until the moral
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disintegration and internal decay of the enemy
had been accomplished by propaganda and other
means of psychological operations.
In World War II these theories were put to use
and greatly refined. The mobility of tanks and
aircraft was utilized to overwhelm enemy com-
mand. Aircraft and aircraft carriers turned
space into speedways of conquest. Guerrilla war-
fare and the submarine were utilized to exploit
enemy weakness. Amphibious warfare developed
a new means of invasion. Radio propaganda was
employed to confuse and to demoralize. The new
strategy, or large-scale planning and directing of
operations, used political, economic, and psycho-
logical as well as military warfare against entire
enemy populations to accomplish ultimate
objectives.
In the modern era, as trade in finished indus-
trial products and raw materials was extended to
all parts of the world, so likewise military con-
flict assumed world dimensions. War became
total, directed against total populations and all
human activities. Both Nazis and Communists
have demonstrated consummate skill in using eco-
nomic, psychological, and subversive, rather than
military weapons, to accomplish their basic objec-
tives. War by conventional military weapons has
become only one aspect of total war; while so-
called "peace" has become a period when the other
weapons have been used with devastating results.
Though the war of shot and shell was over,
the war of words and ideas was rigorously
continued by Russia and directed against all
noncommunist countries, and in particular
(those of) her wartime allies. Within 5
years this bloodless war enabled the Soviet
Union to establish an ideological empire cov-
ering nearly a third of the land surface of the
globe and including 40 percent of its inhabit-
ants, a conquest unequalled in history (J.
F. C. Fuller, Brassey's 1951 Annual, p. 138) .
By the middle of the 20th century, the well-
known Clausewitz definition that "war is the con-
tinuation of state policy by other means" had been
reversed by the Soviet Communist Party. Soviet
state policy had become the continuation of war
by other means. A more appropriate definition at
the current stage of history might be: "War is
the imposition of one State's policy on another in
such a manner that freedom of group will is lost."
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INTELLIGENCE: A GENERAL ORIENTATION
The key to the definition of any period as war or
peace may well be found in the means employed
and the effect of those means.
In considering the changing nature of war it is
significant to note that the strategy of total war
differs completely in its fundamental premise
from the old strategy of limited or battlefield war-
fare. As Fletcher Pratt points out in his book
America and Total War, the old strategy was to
attack the enemy where his strength lay. When
his strongest force was defeated, the remainder
fell with it. The new concept is to concentrate on
weakness and not to encounter the enemy's
strength, if at all possible. The point of view of
the Soviet Union is indicated by Lenin's statement
that "the soundest strategy of war is to postpone
operations until the moral disintegration of the
enemy renders the delivery of the mortal blow
both possible and easy." As a result, the Soviets
have employed political, psychological, economic,
and technical means to achieve warlike objectives,
wholly or in part, without the more expensive re-
sort to military force. By utilizing these means
as part of a total subversive effort, the interna-
tional communists have fatally weakened certain
of their target states, notably Czechoslovakia.
Subversion, therefore, has been demonstrated as
a new instrumentality for making war. The
strategy of total war makes it increasingly diffi-
cult for any state to remain neutral in the struggle
for power between dominant groups of nations.
In the post-World War II period, world com-
munism has continued to emphasize the weapon of
ideas in preference to, although supported by, the
traditional weapon of physical force. Just when
or if there may be a shift in emphasis, and how
the United States should conduct its national poli-
cies to meet and thwart any means employed by its
adversaries, are vital questions we face today.
A survey of current international conditions, to-
gether with a clear understanding of the pattern
and methods of total war, gives unmistakable
meaning to the popular term, "cold war." In this
situation at least two factors, other than the nature
of total war, have given emphasis to the funda-
mental importance of intelligence and the need for
its use: the increased scope and speed of war and
the world commitments of the United States.
3
Increased Scope and Speed of War
No longer is space itself a conclusive element
for defense, nor are geographic features of the
earth's surface impassable barriers to enemy at-
tack. The awesome technical improvements with
which scientists are transforming the aircraft and
the radio of World War II have given the speed
of sound to the initiation of military attack. In
World War II the German Blitzkrieg combined
the use of planes and tanks to conquer France in
35 days, while in the Pacific, the aircraft carrier
brought naval forces separated by hundreds of sea
miles into decisive conflict. At the same time de-
velopments in submarine and amphibious war-
fare withered the extended sea power of Japan and
brought men, guns, and supplies over thousands
of miles of ocean to overwhelm her vital defenses
within a relatively short period.
Strategic bombing, guerrilla, submarine, and
psychological warfare carried the war far behind
the battlefronts to entire civilian populations,
vital industries, sources of the raw materials of
war, and communications systems. The master
plan of the two major Axis partners, Germany
and Japan, encompassed the globe. To meet this
threat, the United States fought in the far reaches
of the Atlantic and the Pacific and sent forces to
distant continents. All parts of the world felt
the direct or indirect impact of a world at war.
World Commitments of the United States
In the interests of its own security and national
welfare, the United States has assumed world-
wide commitments, both military and economic.
The decisions which must be made are funda-
mental, far-reaching, and exceedingly complex.
The problems involve such intricately related
questions as economics, finance, national politics,
raw materials, industrial capacities, communica-
tions, manpower, weapons, and scientific and tech-
nological developments. The growing interrela-
tion of political and military decisions has made
it impossible for the responsible leaders in either
field to take action without the closest coordina-
tion of effort, based on a full and mutual under-
standing. The decisions of the military com-
mander are no longer so directly circumscribed by
the elements involved in a tactical field of action.
The factors of total war, the increased scope and
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INTELLIGENCE FOR
speed of war, and interlocking world commitments
have added to the complexity of both staff and
field decisions. Obviously, the effect of these fac-
tors on the commander varies in degree with the
echelon of his command. But at any echelon in-
telligence has become a necessity.
Intelligence?An Essential Function
More than 2,400 years ago a Chinese general
named Sun Tzu is reported to have said: "Hostile
armies may face each other for years striving for
victory which is decided in a single day. This
being so, to remain in ignorance of the enemy's
condition . . . is the height of inhumanity. One
who acts thus is no leader of men, no present help
to his sovereign, no master of victory. Thus, what
enables the wise sovereign and the good general
to strike and to conquer, and achieve things be-
yond the reach of ordinary men, is foreknowl-
edge."
Intelligence, properly performed, can provide
foreknowledge both for government and for mili-
tary commanders. It can reduce the possibilities
of surprise, give estimates regarding both the po-
tential enemy and the area in which he might op-
erate, and so aid in reaching sound decisions which
are vital not only to the security and welfare of
the nation but also to success in combat. Intelli-
gence, properly used, has its place not only in war
or preparation for war, but also in peace and keep-
ing the peace.
INTELLIGENCE AS KNOWLEDGE
"Intelligence regarding the loyalty of the aver-
age indigenous peasant to the present hostile gov-
ernment of . . . is important (1) to an evalua-
tion of the stability of that government and its
capacity to extend its influence and (2) to the
selection of an area along its coast for the landing
of amphibious forces."
By this hypothetical statement, the following
charactertistics of intelligence are illustrated: (1)
it is a body of knowledge; (2) it deals with a pos-
sible enemy state; (3) it affects a possible area of
operations; (4) it can be used by top-level plan-
ners in government and on military staffs; and
(5) it can aid the military commander in the
planning of a specific operation.
Knowledge regarding the "average indigenous
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4
NAVAL OFFICERS
peasant" is much more than the sum of bits of
information regarding few or many peasants,
gathered from every conceivable source. Some of
these bits of information may be true or false;
some may be detailed or fragmentary; some may
be general or factual in nature; some may come
from sources which are accurate and reliable, some
from sources which are inaccurate and unreliable.
At any rate, many bits of information regarding
the "indigenous peasant" must be gathered to-
gether and evaluated; they must be carefully
analyzed and compared to see that they are plaus-
ible; and, after having been boiled down to an
essence most closely approximating probable truth,
they will provide a conclusion which is meaning-
ful. From the facts or information comes some-
thing new, called knowledge or intelligence.
Information, then, includes such things as facts,
documents, and observations, but is not intelli-
gence until it has been carefully screened and
digested to provide accurate meaning.
Intelligence, however, does not include the total
substance of human knowledge, but only that
which military and civilian leaders must have to
make the vital decisions for today and tomorrow.
It is the basis for a country's foreign relations, and,
as a function of command, it is also essential for
the planning and execution of military operations.
In either case, it is knowledge upon which a suc-
cessful course of action can be based. It has been
aptly stated that intelligence ideally is that knowl-
edge which a potential enemy has about himself.
The scope of American national intelligence is
exceedingly broad because the United States in
the interests of its own welfare must know a
great deal concerning the attitudes, activities, in-
terests, and long-range plans of all other states in
the world. The concentration of interest, of
course, will depend upon the conditions of inter-
national relations at any given time. Since it is
impossible for any nation to attain the ideal of
having all pertinent knowledge about potential
enemies, certain gaps always exist. Intelligence,
therefore, resembles a vast collection of jigsaw
puzzle pieces. Some pieces belong to different
puzzles, some will not fit any apparent gap in the
picture, and some obviously belong but must be
patiently fitted into the picture in order to solve
the puzzle.
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INTELLIGENCE : A GENERAL ORIENTATION CONFIDENTIAL
Component Parts
In assembling this comprehensive knowledge it
is essential to break it down into component parts
for better understanding and ease in handling. A
systematic classification is achieved by a detailed
compilation of, first, all the factors of physical
environment and, second, of the characteristics
that govern human behavior in a given country.
Eight major divisions are generally used: military
geography, transportation and telecommunica-
tions, sociological, political, economic, armed
forces, technical and scientific, and biographical.
Each of these components, discussed in detail in
chapter 5, are indicative of the tremendous range
of intelligence subject matter. All components
are closely interrelated; no one can be considered
separately. A valid estimate can be reached only
by considering each in relation to the others.
For the intelligence officer a similar comprehen-
sive knowledge about his own country is a neces-
sary tool, since only with this accurate and more
familiar yardstick can he make valid comparisons
and relative estimates.
The Factor of Time
The components listed above represent a divi-
sion of the subject matter of intelligence into broad
fields of knowledge. A consideration of the fac-
tor of time produces a further breakdown into
relative elements, labelled as follows: Basic, which
is descriptive of the more permanent and signifi-
cant past; Current, which deals with the present;
and Estimative, which concerns future develop-
ments. The truly significant element of intelli-
gence is, of course, the Estimative which projects
situations and trends into the future. This fore-
casting, however, must be built up accu-
rately and painstakingly from both past and cur-
rent knowledge.
The basic element is encyclopedic in nature and
includes geographical and historical data. It
provides the broad background against which to
interpret the present and predict the future. It
is a part of all the components already mentioned,
but especially of those which cover the area of
operations and the sociological, political, and eco-
nomic background of a people. As in the pre-
vious example of the "average indigenous
peasant," in order to predict his reactions at some
future time, the analyst must have a comprehen-
sive knowledge of the peasant's past attitudes,
group habits, environment, and responses. Also,
in deciding on possible landing beaches on the
coast of the country in question, the intelligence
officer must present to his commander a complete
description of the beaches along the entire coast.
The geographic knowledge must include soil; exits
from beaches, topography behind the beaches; ac-
cessibility to roads, rail-lines, towns, water, build-
ing materials; recognizable features of the coast-
line; the slope of the beach, the sea bottom off
the beaches, the surf, currents, tide, underwater ob-
stacles, sea approaches, and so forth. When it
is realized that there may be a number of possible
beaches along the coastline of a given country,
the quantity of knowledge required becomes
apparent.
During World War II, the monographs and area
studies prepared by Naval Intelligence provided
detailed background knowledge of an encyclopedic
nature which was indispensable to the planning
of operations all over the world. The Joint
Army-Navy Intelligence Studies (JANIS) were
also developed to provide background knowledge
of areas about which little was previously known.
The extensive encyclopedic documentation on
heavy industry within Germany, for example, en-
abled intelligence personnel to note change or ex-
pansion, and to estimate the effectiveness of
strategic bombing. The experience gained and
lessons learned from these wartime studies have
emphasized the need for continued coordinated
efforts on the part of all intelligence activities
in developing and maintaining a fund of basic
knowledge in order that the day-to-day situation
can be better interpreted. The National Intelli-
gence Survey program is a more recent step to-
ward meeting that need.
The current element records the changes con-
tinually occurring among all groups of peoples,
as well as those which may occur in the physical
geography of the world. Knowledge about the
past must be brought up to date. The significance
of change lies in the possibilities not only of
progress but also of decay. For example, in con-
sidering any other state, friendly or unfriendly,
our military and civilian leaders are vitally in-
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terested in knowing whether its steel production
has increased or decreased to a significant degree;
what changes have occurred in population, espe-
cially in the distribution of age groups;
or whether there is a decided swing in popular
support from one political doctrine to another.
In considering financial aid to the Nationalist
Chinese Government after World War II, United
States leaders needed to know details about such
matters as current economic conditions in China,
and how they were affected by government poli-
cies; the needs of the people for food, clothing
and shelter; the morale and status of equipment
of the military forces; and the effectiveness of
military and political opposition forces. From
an infinitely complex situation an accurate esti-
mate was required in order to determine if finan-
cial aid would be of assistance and, if so, in what
manner it should be given.
Even the most limited description of the basic
and current elements of intelligence indicates the
enormous quantity and variety of details involved.
It becomes readily apparent that there is a physi-
cal limit to the production of such a volume of
knowledge. The question quickly arises: Since it
is impossible to achieve the ideal, how should the
effort be distributed? The only possible answer
is to concentrate on those areas which are most
directly related to the present and future deci-
sions of military commanders and civilian leaders.
In any event, the basic and current elements of
intelligence must be formulated so as to provide
an accurate basis for the estimative.
The estimative element deals with the future.
It is knowledge of what a state or a military force
of that state can or might do. In respect to in-
ternational politics, it includes the influence which
any state can exert in the world and what forms
that influence may take. In respect to a military
force, it considers the effectiveness of that force
at a given place and time and the objectives that
force is capable of gaining, or might try to gain.
In effect, this element of intelligence represents
inferences from past and current knowledge
which may or may not be complete.
Involved in the estimative element are four pri-
mary factors: situations which exist or may
eventually exist; vulnerabilities or specific weak-
nesses which may be exploited; capabilities; and
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probable courses of action. An intelligence esti-
mate, to have real meaning, must relate to a situa-
tion, that is, to a possible enemy, to a possible
place, to a possible time, and to the probable
means which may be employed. No estimative
knowledge can have meaning in a vacuum.
Given the concept of total war, the vulnerabili-
ties of another state are particularly significant.
Weaknesses may exist in any aspect of its national
life?political, sociological, or economic. They
may be found in its military forces or in its geo-
graphic position. The skillful exploitation of
weaknesses may produce results out of all propor-
tion to the means employed. Conversely, failure
to exploit them because of lack of knowledge can
be costly to a disastrous degree. In both World
Wars, Great Britain's insularity was a vulnera-
bility upon which Germany concentrated by
means of its submarine force. Extremely serious
situations resulted from this underwater warfare
directed against the shipping which carried food
to Britain's population and raw materials to her
industries. In World War II, one of Hitler's
blunders was his failure to invade England after
the withdrawal from Dunkerque, an admirable
illustration of failure to take advantage of a mili-
tary vulnerability because of lack of knowledge
and planning. In the case of France, on the other
hand, the moral weakening of her political struc-
ture, and internal dissension and corruption
helped to create a vulnerability which the Ger-
mans exploited to the full.
The capabilities of a state relate to its qualities
of strength. The fundamental?and ultimate?
capability is that of military power, expressed in
time and force, which includes not only men and
guns, but also economic and industrial strength.
Other strength factors include: geographical po-
sition; population, especially of military age; raw
materials and industrial plants; transportation
facilities; the stability of political structure; and
the moral fibre of the people. During World
War II, the German and Japanese Governments
underestimated both the industrial capability of
the United States and the strength and determi-
nation of the American people.
In planning military operations, the following
additional factors of strength or weakness are con-
sidered: numerical military strength, effect of
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time and distance, efficiency of personnel, quality
of equipment, special weapons, and logistic sup-
port and reinforcement.
Given the situation, together with the enemy's
vulnerabilities and capabilities, the estimative ele-
ment of intelligence takes the form of probable
courses of action. It may be deduced, therefore,
that this element of intelligence represents guesses
or opinions rather than verifiable facts and hence
is of doubtful value. It is true that estimative
knowledge is not absolute nor as exact as basic and
current. However, if based on accurate informa-
tion carefully analyzed, it constitutes an educated
guess and a carefully considered opinion of a much
more valid nature than that derived from an in-
dividual "hunch" or snap judgment.
Intelligence, then, is a body of knowledge which
encompasses in greater or less degree, all world
states, and all possible areas of operation. Its ele-
ments and component parts are interrelated and
intermeshed. Its infinite volume of detail re-
quires emphasis only on those portions of knowl-
edge which are or will be needed by military com-
manders and civilian leaders. It is knowledge
for a purpose. The only justification for its col-
lection and interpretation is to assist those who
will use it in reaching vital decisions. Those who
produce intelligence must keep this purpose fore-
most in mind.
Use for Strategic Purposes
Military commanders at all echelons of com-
mand draw upon the body of intelligence knowl-
edge in solving particular problems and in reach-
ing command decisions. Those in top echelons
of command, and top-level leaders in government,
use areas of this knowledge in formulating plans
and policies and reaching decisions affecting the
security and welfare of the entire nation. In time
of peace, top-level commanders determine how best
to dispose and utilize available military forces for
the national security and assist the top-level ci-
vilian leaders who formulate the national policy
toward other nations of the world. In addition,
in time of war, these military commanders are re-
sponsible for the conduct of total military opera-
tions. This employment of intelligence is called
Strategic Use. Strategic Use furthers the master
plan of the nation's world relationships in both
7
war and peace?its grand strategy, which encom-
passes both military planning and foreign policy,
and has an inevitable impact on domestic policy
as well.
From the military point of view, strategy does
two things: it determines and assigns objectives
which, if achieved, will aid in winning a war and
strengthening the peace; and it allocates and gets
to the right place at the right time an adequate
and suitable force to accomplish each objective
against enemy resistance. In respect to national
policy, strategy is positive when it aims to im-
prove a current situation in world affairs; it is
defensive when it strives to prevent a situation
from becoming more unfavorable. When the na-
tion has a choice of several favorable policies, it
then has the strategic initiative.
In the restricted military sense, strategy con-
notes the application of armed force or the threat
of that force; in a broader military-political
sense, it includes the use of economic-political-
psychological activities to gain diplomatic or
trade advantages or to influence the group think-
ing of another nation in a manner which will
promote the welfare of our own Nation. The
strategic role of intelligence when there is no
armed conflict is to aid the chiefs of state in
formulating grand strategy and to enable military
leaders to plan in such a way as to support the
decisions of the chiefs of state.
An example of the use of intelligence for the
purposes of grand strategy is afforded by Hitler's
early development of a world-wide system for
gathering information which was scientifically
analyzed and evaluated. With this weapon he
was able to implement his revolutionary methods
of warfare, which took economic, political, and
psychological forms during the years from 1938
to 1940. It made possible his "fifth-column" ac-
tivities, his "war of nerves," and the corruption
of high public officials. It was the basis for a
succession of historic events: the annexation of
Austria, the occupation of Czechoslovakia, Nor-
way, the Netherlands, and Belgium, the diplo-
matic isolation of the Balkan countries, and the
fall of France.
Through intelligence activities the Nazis probed
the defenses of the Maginot Line, and through a
skillful "war of nerves," followed by the ultimate
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"blitzkrieg," 200,000 men were enabled to defeat
a nation with 5,000,000 men under arms.
In modern war, strategic bombing has increased
the requirements for intelligence knowledge upon
which military planners are dependent for target
selection. In World War II the bombing of Ger-
man industrial targets required information
about basic war industries and the thousands of
industrial plants involved. For example, a great
deal of study preceded the Allied decision. to
bomb plants producing aircraft and their compo-
nent parts, ball bearings, synthetic rubber and
oil, and thus to cripple a most important segment
of German war production.
The term, "Strategic Intelligence," then, is de-
scriptive of one use of intelligence knowledge.
Other terms, commonly employed, relate not only
to a use of this knowledge but also to the user.
"National Intelligence" describes the knowledge
used as a basis for reaching comprehe:asive deci-
sions regarding national policy, welfare, and se-
curity. It also identifies the users as top-level
governmental groups whose interests are broader
than those of any one department or agency.
"Departmental Intelligence" identifies the user as
a department of the federal government and re-
fers to the knowledge used in the carrying out of
its mission and assigned responsibilities. "Naval
Intelligence," for example, is one kind of
"departmental intelligence." "Interdepartmental
Intelligence," which lacks the scope of "National
Intelligence," describes knowledge of. common
concern to more than one department. Finally,
other terms are employed to describe many of the
component parts of intelligence knowledge ac-
cording to their content: such as "political intelli-
gence," "economic intelligence," and "technical
intelligence."
A. problem in the use of terms such as these has
been the resulting erroneous impression that each
represents a kind of intelligence that is different
from all others. While these various terms are
quite acceptable for convenient reference, the point
to remember is that they do not describe separate,
distinct or compartmented kinds of intelligence.
All kinds are irrevocably interrelated; the mean-
ing of each, as well as the meaning of the total, is
complete only when all are considered together.
Regardless of terminology, intelligence can be only
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one body of knowledge with component parts and
elements which are drawn upon according to the
needs of the user.
Use for Operational Purposes
While toplevel military commanders use intelli-
gence for broad planning purposes, they can never
lose sight of the fact that their policies and deci-
sions must be translated into action by the lower
echelons of command. Hence the knowledge used
by all echelons is both broad and specific. The
only difference is one of emphasis, which stems
from the problem to be solved by the user. For
example, the knowledge used becomes less broad
and more specific as the toplevel decision is trans-
ferred for action to the theater commander, down
to the task force commander, and so on to the com-
manders of the operatng fleet units. Thus intel-
ligence is used specifically for operational pur-
poses when it is a basis for decisions involving the
physical employment of particular men and mate-
riel against a particular adversary. Here the
current element of intelligence plays a most im-
portant part.
As one illustration, in the latter days of World
War II, the decision to drop an atomic bomb on
Hiroshima was made at the highest policy and
command levels on the basis of the most compre-
hensive available intelligence in view of the stra-
tegic implications for the entire Pacific war. At
the same time, potential Japanese air opposition
required the use of intelligence for specific opera-
tional considerations in determining whether or
not such a mission could be successfuly carried out.
It has often been said that intelligence is used
for strategic purposes in time of peace and for
operational purposes in time of war. Such a
statement might have been approximately correct
prior to World War I, when periods of war and
of peace could be more accurately labeled. How-
ever, just as the pattern of total war has materially
reduced the distinction between strategy and
tactics so likewise has it resulted in a merging of
the uses of intelligence for strategic and opera-
tional purposes.
In time of peace, or when widespread military
conflict is not involved, intelligence may be
used for operational purposes, as well as stra-
tegic. The ideological war waged by the Soviet
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Union against many nonCommunist countries, in-
cluding the United States since 1945, is illustra-
tive. The weapon of ideas has been employed in
an effort to incite unrest among labor and racial
groups, and to capture the minds of men with false
words. To take action against this weapon, radio
programs, such as those produced by the Voice of
America, have been instituted as a means of pre-
senting a true picture of American life and aims.
Intelligence has an operational use when it serves
as a basis for decisions regarding such matters as
audience targets.
In times of armed conflict, intelligence has many
varied and vital operational uses. In planning
and executing a large amphibious operation, such
as that at Okinawa, the responsible commanders
required the most detailed and comprehensive
knowledge concerning the Japanese forces and de-
fenses on those islands, the physical area of opera-
tions, and enemy forces in adjacent areas which
would be capable of interference. In a smaller
specific combat situation, such as a submarine mis-
sion in the Formosa straits, the submarine com-
mander required specific knowledge as to when
and where Japanese naval and merchant ships
could be expected and which were the best targets.
If a merchant ship carrying rice from Saigon to
Tokyo was given first priority, that selection
might well have represented a strategic as well as
an operational use of intelligence. The knowl-
edge required as a basis for operations involving
aircraft carriers separated by hundreds of miles
may be both operational and strategic.
For operational purposes, then, there is a need
for the most detailed and specific knowledge about
the enemy and the anticipated area of conflict.
This is true for all types of military operations,
amphibious, submarine, antisubmarine, mining,
air, fleet, and reconnaissance patrols, to mention
only a few. Similar knowledge is also required
for the action phase of other types of modern war-
fare such as economic, political, and psychological.
For convenience of reference in operational ac-
tivities, the knowledge involved has been labelled
according to its use and its user. For example, the
following terms are common: operational intelli-
gence, amphibious intelligence, air intelligence,
and fleet intelligence. During World War II the
term "operational intelligence" was defined as "in-
9
telligence needed by naval commanders in plan-
ning and executing operations, including battle,"
and referred to operations of an extensive and
time-consuming nature. A second term, "combat
intelligence" was used to describe that part of
naval operational intelligence required by naval
commanders actually engaging enemy forces dur-
ing the comparatively short time of a naval battle.
As in the case of the various terms applied to the
strategic use of intelligence, it must be pointed out
again that no separate or distinctive kinds of in-
telligence are involved. The parts or elements of
the total body of knowledge are simply being used
for a particular purpose which, in this instance, is
operational.
In connection with military operations, it must
be emphasized that intelligence has one primary
function: to aid the commander in resolving his
mission and supervising the planned action
against the enemy. This function, together with
the role of the intelligence officer on an operational
staff, will be discussed in chapter 12.
Use for Countering Purposes
A third major use of intelligence arises from the
need for countering the positive efforts of poten-
tial enemies to carry out against a nation certain
inimical activities known as espionage, sabotage,
and subversion. In general, these activities have
the common objectives of weakening or destroying
any or all elements of a nation's total power and
warmaking potential, thereby increasing the
power advantage of the nation initiating them.
Simply stated, espionage is the clandestine collec-
tion of information about a foreign country. To
a degree, it is the art of spying. However, it may
also be any unobserved or unapproved collection
of information which, when gained, is used to the
disadvantage of the subject nation. The target of
espionage is particular information which will aid
in determining a nation's capabilities and inten-
tions, its strengths and weaknesses.
Sabotage is activity directed toward the damage
or destruction of physical facilities vital to a na-
tion's total power, such as its industrial system and
military establishment. Sabotage, however, is
not only physical. It may be nonphysical, though
just as effective, if its objective is the weakening
or destruction of a program or a policy, domestic
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or foreign, related to a nation's strength, security,
and general welfare. This type of sabotage in-
cludes enemy activities which have as their result
the creating of terror, panic, and civil disorders.
Subversion may be described as activity aimed
at attacking men's minds for such purposes as
destroying primary loyalties and faith in consti-
tuted authority, encouraging continued dissension
between social and racial groups, or causing in-
dividuals and groups to act consistently contrary
to the best interests of a nation's government. As
an ultimate objective, subversive activities are di-
rected toward transforming social institutions and
eventually altering a form of government through
unconstitutional means. While it is often difficult
to differentiate between the activities of nonphysi-
cal sabotage and subversion, one point of distinc-
tion is the fact that subversion involves a com-
plete change in attitudes and points of view, a
permanent transfer of loyalties and faith. A dif-
ference, then, is to be found in the degree of
finality of the results achieved. Because of the
common objective and related methods of espio-
nage, sabotage, and subversion, the term "subver-
sion" is sometimes used to include all of these
detrimental activities.
Quite naturally, every nation actively endeavors
to prevent any other from carrying out success-
fully such activities. These opposing efforts are
called counterespionage, camtersabotage, and
countersubversion.
Since it is apparent that some nations of the
world have organizations trained to carry out
espionage, sabotage, and subversion, the United
States Government and its military services must
be prepared to counter them in at least two ways.
First, adequate security control measures must be
established and maintained to safeguard informa-
tion, personnel, equipment, and installations
against these inimical activities of foreign nations
and of disaffected or dissident groups or individ-
uals which constitute a threat to the national se-
curity; and second, both the foreign organizations
and the groups or individuals involved must be
actively opposed and prevented from accomplish-
ing their objectives. In order to achieve maxi-
mum success, our responsible departments and
agencies require both comprehensive and detailed
knowledge regarding the objectives, plans, and
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10
NAVAL OFFICERS
methods of the enemy, and particularly the or-
ganizations, groups, and individuals trained in
and assigned to the specialized activities described
above. The knowledge used to counter these ac-
tivities may be called counterintelligence. How-
ever, it must be noted immediately that the term
"counterintelligence" means much more than
"knowledge"; it encompasses both organization
and activity. In its comprehensive sense, there-
fore, counterintelligence is a specialized phase of
intelligence related specifically to security control
measures applied against the enemy's activities of
espionage, sabotage, and subversion. A more com-
plete discussion of this subject will be given in
chapter 15.
The use of counterintelligence knowledge is
closely and continuously related to the uses of in-
telligence for strategic and operational purposes.
Regardless of the purpose, information concern-
ing it must be denied to the enemy, and his efforts
to interfere by means of espionage, sabotage, or
subversion must be opposed. This is essential in
both peace and war. In time of peace for example,
information regarding the grand strategy of the
United States must be most carefully guarded.
In time of war, the military commander usually
includes a counterintelligence plan with his opera-
tions plan or order. Hence, while intelligence is
being used for other purposes, it is being used
concurrently to protect those purposes. The na-
ture and form of security control measures depend
upon knowledge of the enemy and of the particu-
lar activities to be countered.
The vital part which counterintelligence must
play in time of peace is well illustrated by the
Gouzenko incident in Canada in 1945. Through
the voluntary confession of a cipher clerk in the
Soviet Embassy at Ottawa, evidence was revealed
that a Soviet spy ring had obtained much vital
technical information regarding the atomic bomb.
Subsequent additional evidence pointed to the
probability that the Soviet Union, profiting from
extensive espionage activities, was much further
advanced in its atomic research program than had
been considered possible. An immediate result of
this information was a reduction in the world
power advantage of the United States and her
allies, maintained as long as she was in exclusive
possession of the secrets of the atomic bomb. In
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view of this newly determined Soviet capability,
both our national and military planning and poli-
cies became subject to revision. The deficiencies
of counterintelligence in this instance had ob-
viously significant effects on a worldwide scale.
Preparatory to the Allied invasion of Nor-
mandy counterintelligence was needed by appro-
priate authority to formulate protective, decep-
tive, and aggressive measures in the United States,
the United Kingdom, and in enemy-occupied'
France in order to thwart Nazi efforts to gain vital
information regarding invasion plans. It may be
assumed that the enemy concentrated his espio-
nage activities on finding out the time and place of
the Allied landings, and the numbers and disposi-
tions of ground, air, and naval units involved; fur-
ther, that every effort was made by means of
sabotage and subversion to disrupt the imple-
mentation of Allied plans. The responsibilities
of counterintelligence were tremendous and its
contributions substantially effective.
These illustrations indicate that knowledge
prior to enemy action is of inestimable value.
Even more, they imply that positive action in ad-
vance which will deny to an enemy the opportunity
to commit the act is of even greater value. This
action feature of counterintelligence sets it some-
what apart from the uses of knowledge already
mentioned.
As was true of the other two major uses of in-
telligence knowledge, various descriptive terms
have been applied to counterintelligence in order
to define it. For example, it has been labelled as
"domestic intelligence," "negative intelligence,"
"security intelligence," or "passive intelligence."
Since these terms are not entirely accurate or com-
plete they should be noted only for reference pur-
poses. To be remembered is the fact that knowl-
edge used for countering purposes is still a part
of the total body of knowledge, deriving its full
meaning only when considered in the light of the
whole.
Other Uses
There is frequent need for specific items of
knowledge; in some cases, merely factual data or
information .from which is derived the encyclo-
pedic or basic element of knowledge. For ex-
ample, in the formulation of a new policy or in the
solution of a military problem, an agency or a
commander may need to know the cargo unloading
capacity of a certain port, the depth of water
alongside a particular pier, the source of water
for a town, or the lowest recorded temperature at
the South Pole. Various departments or agen-
cies concentrate on specific areas of knowledge and
must be prepared to provide reference service to
organizations working on related problems. When
knowledge or information is used for this purpose
it is known as Spot Intelligence or Spot Informa-
tion. It is usually obtained by intelligence agen-
cies or collection units in response to a specific re-
quest. Important as this use is, care must be taken
to ensure that concentration on the requirements
of Spot Intelligence does not result in a neglect
of the overall requirements of the intelligence
mission.
Other uses of intelligence may well arise in
years to come. Since 1945 a concept of world
state communities has been growing out of the
activities of the United Nations and its associated
regional pacts. As the United States increases its
participation in these activities it is quite possible
that there will be new uses for intelligence in such
joint enterprises. But regardless of any new uses,
or special terms to describe them, the knowledge
involved will still remain a part of the total body
of intelligence as far as the United States is
concerned.
In discussing various uses of intelligence, the
users have been described in general terms. They
include not only civilian leaders within the federal
government and military leaders in all echelons
of command, but also individual military person-
nel with specialized jobs?such as pilots, boat-
swain's mates, and tank drivers. Even those who
produce intelligence must use it in order to con-
tinue the orderly expansion of the total body of
knowledge. It is the organization of these pro-
ducers that gives a second connotation to the word
intelligence.
INTELLIGENCE AS ORGANIZATION
In his book, A Soldier's Story, General of the
Army Omar N. Bradley makes the following com-
ment: "Later in the War, I often explained to
my Staff that 0-2 (Intelligence) existed to tell
me what should be done on the basis of his in-
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INTELLIGENCE FOR
formation concerning the enemy." In this
statement, General Bradley is referring to the or-
ganiZation which produces the knowledge he, as a
commander, must have for his use. When spelled
with a capital "I," Intelligence means organi-
zation.
The historical development of intelligence or-
ganizations, and characteristics of the United
States intelligence system are more fully discussed
in chapters 2 and 3, but it is pertinent here to
stress the impact of the pattern of total war on
all intelligence organizations. Not only has to-
tal war caused a tremendous expansion of the total
body of knowledge needed by civil government
and military command, but it has also forced an
intensive development of organizations specializ-
ing in many fields to gather and to produce that
knowledge. Some nations, having maintained
intelligence organizations for hundreds of years,
have a substantial background upon which to
draw. The United States, however, has a much
more limited background; and only in recent
years has it endeavored to stabilize the structure
of its national intelligence system. The poten-
tialities of this system, in peace and in war, are
great indeed; its youth is a limiting factor which
will be overcome only by inspired leadership,
hard work, and continuous years of experience.
Prior to, during, and even after World War I,
intelligence production was handled on an indi-
vidual basis, with little coordination of effort.
Total war, however, has brought about require-
ments for knowledge based on information of such
complexity and pervasiveness throughout the
total of man's activities that it cannot be encom-
passed by individuals working singly. Meaning-
ful intelligence requires the group effort of many
individuals whose activities must be carefully
directed and coordinated. Therefore, efficient
organization and skillful production have as-
sumed great importance.
Sherman Kent has aptly stated that good in-
telligence organizations must possess certain char-
acteristics of a large university faculty, a great
metropolitan newspaper, and a good commercial
business organization. First, management must
appreciate and tolerate broad individual freedom
in the search for truth by personnel selected for
their abilities in research and analysis. Second,
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NAVAL OFFICERS
organizational doctrine must emphasize rigid ad-
herence to the time requirements for completion
of assignments, an observance of editorial policy,
and an individual responsibility for accuracy,
completeness, and clarity of meaning And third,
the producers must be sure that the product is
prepared and packaged in accordance with the
needs and wishes of the consumer. They must
also consider its value in relation to its cost. Like
'a good business, Intelligence must stress plan-
ning; it must study the market, consumer reaction
to its product, and new consumer problems which
will require the development of new products.
Intelligence must be a carefully defined, smoothly
operating organization which remains sufficiently
flexible to permit adjustment to emergencies.
Continued application of the principles of mod-
ern management will aid in streamlining intelli-
gence organizations to reduce duplication of
effort, without sacrificing complete coverage.
Special efforts of management must be directed
toward the development of a sense of purpose for
each organization, an understanding of the over-
all intelligence production problems, and an ap-
preciation of the interdependence of the various
producing organizations. Close coordination of
the intelligence production of the various serv-
ices, departments and agencies, together with the
greatest care in selection and training of person-
nel, can do much to develop smoothly operating
organizations.
Many problems of United States intelligence
organizations stem from inexperience and from
the inevitable fact that much information collected
is incomplete and imperfect. Still others arise
from the techniques employed to refine the infor-
mation. It should be clearly understood that,
since this information relates substantially to the
variables of human behavior, its processing into
intelligence cannot apply fully the techniques of
scientific research and laboratory method used by
the exact sciences. An appreciation of various
basic reasons for some of the problems of intelli-
gence organization can, in itself, benefit both the
producers and the consumers of intelligence.
Of necessity, intelligence work has become a
profession, deriving its substance from other pro-
fessional fields, especially from the exact sciences
and the social studies, but also requiring the con-
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tributions of the historian, economist, lawyer, and
linguist. No longer is it desirable for individuals
to be impressed into Intelligence service with the
hope that they can "pick it up." The require-
ments for each worker include an accurate fund
of knowledge which is not only broad, but also
specific (in at least one field) . In addition, cer-
tain basic personal qualities are indispensable.
Basic Attributes of Personnel
Intelligence is an organization made up of peo-
ple; its effectiveness and success rest upon them.
What then should be some. of their personal qual-
ities? First of all is flexibility of mind, which
may be defined as the ability to meet new situa-
tions effectively as they arise. One who possesses
this quality is capable of bold and original
thought, and he does not hesitate when the need
arises to depart from traditional procedure.
A second quality is the ability to assimilate
quickly a large and perhaps diverse number of
facts into a comprehensive whole, from which sig-
nificant meanings may be drawn. This quality
obviously implies others, such as a faculty for ab-
sorption and retention of background information,
a natural curiosity, well-ordered mental processes,
and imagination tempered by common sense.
The ability to speak and write clearly, concisely,
and accurately is essential if the information or
intelligence is to be successfully transmitted to
those who need to know.
Personal enthusiasm, a strong sense of balance
and proportion, and a wholehearted spirit of co-
operation rank high on the list. Because intelli-
gence work represents group effort, no one person
should depreciate the work of others and magnify
his own; he must recognize that there is much he
can give and much he can receive in the total pro-
duction effort. He should never lose sight of the
fact that he is contributing to overall objectives
and meanings which may be vital for his country-
men's survival. Loyalty, then, is also basic.
Intellectual honesty is that quality which will
compel the intelligence work& to transmit the true
meaning of his knowledge as he sees it, and not as
the potential user would like to hear it. Emo-
tional stability is essential to continued good judg-
ment as well as to the indispensable quality of re-
liability. The significance of these qualities is
well illustrated by the case of Col. Alfred Redl,
head of all Austrian espionage during the days
of the Old Austro-Hungarian Empire prior to
World War I. Because of his homosexuality, he
was successfully blackmailed by a Russian agent
who obtained Austrian secret war plans, military
codes, and a list of Austrian agents in Russia. The
appalling defeats suffered by the Austrians in
Galicia early in World War I were partly attrib-
utable to Redl's vulnerability.
Other qualities and abilities are required in in-
telligence work, varying in degree according to
the particular duties assigned. They will be dis-
cussed as appropriate in later sections of this text.
The intelligence officer must possess qualities of
leadership commensurate with the responsibilities
of his billet. In general, he must have a minimum
amount of knowledge in all fields relating to his
work so that he may recognize the existence and
general nature of any problem. For example, he
must know enough about an area of operations to
appreciate any conditions which might give rise
to problems of health for a landing force. He
must be able to coordinate the precise technical
knowledge of the staff expert with his own general
knowledge about the enemy in order to evaluate
the full implications correctly. Finally, he must
be able to integrate subsidiary conclusions in order
to reach the essential overall estimate.
It becomes apparent that the requirements for
the intelligence officer are highly exacting. The
body of knowledge with which he must concern
himself is both comprehensive and widely varied.
The question immediately arises as to where such
personnel may be found and how they should be
selected.
Selection of Personnel
In the case of officers for Naval Intelligence bil-
lets, a basic knowledge regarding the United
States Navy is a first requirement. This knowl-
edge can best be obtained from active naval serv-
ice, although good training at naval schools can be
an emergency substitute. The importance of this
requirement has been indicated previously, when
it was noted that the production of knowledge
about the enemy and the area of operations is often
facilitated by knowledge of our own forces and
our methods in comparable operations. In addi-
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tion to naval knowledge and training, officers must
be carefully selected on the basis of the personal
attributes described above and the particular re-
quirements of the billet for which they are being
considered. Specialized intelligence training is
also essential.
In general, intelligence personnel should be se-
lected from those who have specialized in fields of
knowledge to which intelligence is related, such as
architecture, archeology, engineering, geology,
cartology, hydrography, photogrammetry, law,
transportation and shipping, languages, the nat-
ural and physical sciencies, and the social studies.
Valuable experience includes extensive foreign
travel, investigative work with federal and state
agencies, research and analysis, executive and ad-
ministrative. While it is true that the selected
specialists are well versed in their own fields, they
are entering a new field, and must learn to perform
their assigned duties in Intelligence in accordance
with new techniques. Training of all personnel is
imperative.
The Value of Training
At least two facts emphasize the necessity for
the most exacting training: First, the production
of intelligence involves an intricate developmental
process for which all pertinent material is seldom
available; and second, the finished product may be
vital to the welfare and security of the Nation
and to the very lives of fellow countrymen.
In order to contribute effectively to this produc-
tion, intelligence personnel must fully explore all
possible sources for information; they must know
when and how to explore; they must thoroughly
understand the process for refining this informa-
tion: the adding, subtracting, tempering, and test-
ing which go into the forging of intelligence. In
this refining process, they need experience to ap-
preciate the degree of improvising possible when
essential items are missing, and the logical se-
quence to be followed in interpretation of informa-
tion. Above all, they must never forget that the
product has no value unless it can be used. The
critical factors of time and space in modern war-
fare subject them to a great amount of production
under pressure.
To say that intelligence workers are made, not
born, implies that there are no substitutes for
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14
training, continuous study, conscientious effort,
and years of experience. As in other fields, the
mechanics of training are not enough; the motiva-
tion must come from the worker himself. No out-
side assistance can be of real value without a
determination on the part of the individual to
become not just another intelligence worker but
the very best.
Although he may be a specialist in a particular
field, the intelligence officer must develop an ap-
preciation of the other fields which comprise the
sum total of intelligence knowledge. With this
appreciation, he can more effectively direct his
own efforts. Training must encourage that har-
mony of effort so important for the success of
any organization.
Learning through doing is another important
training requirement. Painstaking, detailed work
is part of the routine, a necessary preliminary to
exciting accomplishment. A continuous training
program can help to define the goals and objec-
tives. Such a program must also include Reserve
personnel.
Indoctrination in security measures for han-
dling classified material is an essential part of
training. The intelligence officer must not only
be thoroughly familiar with the regulations as set
forth in the Navy's Security Manual for Classified
Matter, but he must also have a real appreciation
of their guiding principle, that classified material
is made available only on a "need to know" basis.
Intelligence personnel can provide accurate knowl-
edge regarding a problem only if they have access
to all data bearing on that problem. If the clas-
sification of certain data restricts availability,
knowledge will be incomplete and false conclu-
sions may be drawn. Intelligence officers, there-
fore, rank high on the list of those who need to
know.
There seems to be no question but that training,
and continued training, is of inestimable value for
developing the highest caliber of personnel to
produce the highest caliber of intelligence. A
program of training for reserve military person-
nel in peacetime has assumed more importance
because of the rapidity with which the military
services must expand in the event of total war.
If military intelligence organizations are to be
sufficiently flexible to continue adequate and effi-
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cient production of intelligence under wartime con-
ditions, there must be a substantial reserve force,
well trained, which can be activated in a minimum
time interval. Since World War II, the develop-
ment of a permanent intelligence corps in each
branch of the Armed Forces represents a step
toward improving this situation. While the ac-
complishments of reserve personnel in World War
II were phenomenal, considering the fact that
their training was carried out "on the job," mis-
takes were made. Modern warfare has reduced
materially the available time to recover from mis-
takes. Only training can maintain reserve mili-
tary personnel at a degree of efficiency which will
permit them when called upon to contribute ef-
fectively to the production of intelligence.
Undoubtedly, one of the most difficult aspects of
training is that of method in intelligence produc-
tion. This term, production, brings our discus-
sion to the third connotation of the word
"intelligence."
INTELLIGENCE AS PRODUCTION
"Intelligence involves the collecting of infor-
mation, its processing, and the disseminating of
the resultant knowledge to those who need it."
In this illustrative statement, intelligence means
production. The production effort, known as the
intelligence cycle, includes collection, processing,
and dissemination. Since the cycle is the subject
of later chapters, only certain general comments
need to be made here. A technical intelligence
vocabulary has been developed to apply to the
various phases of production. Different terms
are sometimes used by different organizations to
describe the same working tools, working proce-
dures, and mental processes, but if the basic proc-
esses involved are kept clearly in mind, confusion
over definitions can easily be avoided.
If the intelligence cycle is to be effective, there
must be careful planning and firm direction to the
production effort. Priorities in collection must
be established, and a continuing program of
guidance instituted for economic and efficient op-
eration throughout all phases of the cycle. Intel-
ligence organizations must be kept informed of
overall plans and policies so that everything they
do will have meaning and value.
15
Emphasis on the collection phase of intelligence
production has resulted in the use of special terms
to describe sources of information. For example,
covert intelligence refers to information obtained
by secret means, through spies or undercover
agents, without the consent of the country in-
volved. While it is this type of collection which
has given intelligence activity the flavor of ad-
venture and mystery, by far the greater amount
of information is derived from sources available
to anyone who knows how and where to look.
Such sources include the newspapers, periodicals,
governmental and business reports, radio broad-
casts, and diplomatic representatives. Informa-
tion gained from such sources is often called overt
intelligence.
Intelligence Collection in Time of Peace
It is readily apparent that the collection of in-
formation and the production of intelligence in
peacetime is facilitated because information is
customarily more easily available than in war-
time. With the exception of some areas con-
trolled by totalitarian states, data can be collected
the world over to provide the encyclopedic knowl-
edge which forms the broad base of intelligence.
It is in such periods that Intelligence can make
its greatest contribution to the nation by pro-
ducing knowledge which can be used to thwart
the nonmilitary aggression of other states, to pre-
vent surprise, and to avoid devastating military
conflict.
In preparing for total war and avoiding sur-
prise, collecting information, and developing
knowledge regarding the scientific and technical
advances of other nations assume particular sig-
nificance. Science has always been applied to the
perfecting of weapons of war. The improvement
of old weapons and the invention of new ones
have progressed rapidly since World War II.
Never before has the fate of nations been sus-
pended so precariously in the balance or depended
so completely on the efforts of scientists racing
against time. The increasing range of weapons
and new tactics in their employment have brought
home to the United States the awesome prospect
of being caught by surprise. Ignorance might be
a deciding factor in total war; intelligence is the
weapon which must combat it.
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The importance of intelligence in peacetime is
well known to the French. The Prussian collec-
tion effort, prior to the Franco-Prussian War of
1870, was so thorough that Bismarck's armies
practically walked into Paris. The Nazi suc-
cesses prior to World War II provide more recent
and equally appropriate examples.
Intelligence Collection in Time of War
The collection of information in time of war is
accomplished by methods which are usually more
costly in terms of men, money, and materiel. The
enemy, once identified, expends even greater efforts
to deny information regarding himself or to con-
trovert this information for the purposes of
deception.
Clausewitz pointed out the difficulties of war-
time collection when he said: "A great part of
the information obtained in war is contradictory,
a still greater part is false, and by far the greatest
part is somewhat doubtful. What is required of
an officer in this case is a certain power of dis-
crimination, which only knowledge of men and
things and good judgment can give. The law of
probability must be his guide."
In time of war, collection is aided by such opera-
tional means as aircraft, submarines, reconnais-
sance patrols, ships, and by the interrogation of
prisoners. Photography then becomes an indis-
pensable means of collection, and a source of
knowledge for both strategic and operational pur-
poses. The accurate interpretation of photo-
graphs reveals both the activities of the enemy and
the terrain characteristics of the area of opera-
tions. Because the factor of time has assumed
such importance, continuing efforts are being made
to develop techniques which will speed the trans-
mission of photographic information from its
source to those who can interpret and dissem-
inate it.
The numerical requirements for trained intelli-
gence personnel rise sharply in wartime. In the
case of the Navy alone, hundreds of additional
officers and enlisted men must be assigned to the
expanded fleet organization, flag staffs, motor tor-
pedo boat, and air squadrons; to intelligence cen-
ters and advanced base units; to sea frontiers and
naval districts; to naval attache posts; and to
joint or combined military staffs. Rapid expan-
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16
sion can be accomplished only if there are sub-
stantial well trained reserve groups which can be
quickly activated. To insure the continuous flow
of intelligence production, however, adequate
numbers must be employed at all times, in peace
as well as war. The curtailment of this produc-
tion can be as disastrous to the nation as the
failure to keep pace with the development of
physical weapons.
Processing Information
The collection of information is a time-consum-
ing and expensive operation. It can be an almost
futile effort unless its results can be converted into
usable knowledge. This conversion phase is much
more than the physical handling or rearrangement
of information received; it involves original think-
ing as well as logical thought processes. Ob-
viously, many difficulties arise in large organi-
zations where volumes of factual material must
be so catalogued and disposed that interrelation-
ships can be studied and new meanings derived.
Processing data may be compared to refining
crude oil. The oil is subjected to many stages of
cracking; at each stage a different substance is
developed; until, at the final stage, a new product
is created. So it is with the processing of in-
formation. When received, the original informa-
tion is studied. From this study, first conclusions
are drawn. These conclusions are then studied in
connection with those supplied by other basic data.
At each stage of study, the subject material is
transformed into a new conclusion. As in the oil
cracking process, each stage must follow a logi-
cal sequence. For ready reference at each stage
of production, a complete and systematic filing
system is essential. At no point, however, can
any study or solution be considered as irrevocably
definitive, in view of the fact that it concerns the
activities of men in which there is constant
change. Therefore, no conclusion may be said to
be final; each is subject to possible change. Of
course, material dealing with certain physical con-
ditions, such as terrain, are the least subject to
change.
A basic problem of production is that the in-
formation received may be incomplete and con-
tradictory, requiring the application of the most
searching standards of proof for all conclusions.
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The processing phase itself is a delicate operation
and subject to errors resulting from the omission
of necessary comparisons, the inclusion of false
data, or failure to follow a logical sequence. The
problems of processing and the application of
scientific methods in intelligence production will
be discussed at more length in a later chapter.
Intelligence Action
In the military services, intelligence is a staff
function operating as an adjunct of the com-
mander. Intelligence takes a vigorous part in
helping to formulate the action which will be
taken by or in the name of the commander. In-
telligence, therefore, is not an action agency, if
by the term is meant chain of command authority.
However, action, and plenty of it, is involved
constantly in the collection of information and in
the prompt dissemination of intelligence to those
who need it. Skillful action also is required in
countering the intelligence efforts of potential ene-
mies, as exemplified by the activities of the Army's
Counter Intelligence Corps.
To be stressed is the fact that Intelligence must
maintain a positive and aggressive point of view,
together with a keen sense of responsibility for its
part in any action which will be taken. Intel-
ligence personnel can never retire from the scene
of decision after presenting their recommenda-
tions; they continue to function after decisions are
made and often become a part of action taken.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this chapter has been to acquaint
the naval officer with the meaning and significance
of intelligence. It has been emphasized that in-
telligence is one great body of knowledge, used
for a variety of vital purposes. It is the result
of skillful production by organizations composed
of carefully trained personnel, and in the right
hands at the right time, it provides a sound basis
for diplomatic and military decisions affecting the
welfare and security of the nation. Such intel-
ligence, coordinated at the highest governmental
level, is of common concern to more than one or-
ganization and transcends the exclusive com-
petence of any one part of the total system.
It must not be assumed, however, that Intel-
ligence is infallible or that it can provide all neces-
sary knowledge. The most desirable situation
would be the presentation of the precise intentions
of potential enemies: when and where and with
what means they plan to strike. Because such
precise knowledge is seldom obtainable, Intelli-
gence strives to provide the closest approximation.
Limitations of Intelligence
Intelligence is not without its limitations, the
first being that information regarding potential
enemies is often incomplete and inaccurate. While
a vast amount of information is available for col-
lection, the most vital is obviously concealed to
the greatest degree possible. Often, incorrect in-
formation is made available for purposes of de-
ception, and its true identification requires both
skill and experience. Since he seldom knows the
enemy's specific objectives, the collector of infor-
mation does not always grasp the significance of
what he gathers, and his reports become meaning-
ful only when collated with other data by the
intelligence producing unit.
A second limitation arises from incomplete un-
derstanding of our own plans and objectives. In
the field of national affairs, this limitation is
caused by the fact that the United States is still
trying to interpret its own position of world lead-
ership and to formulate specific objectives which
can aid the world today in the struggle against
the threat of global conflict. In the field of mili-
tary command, Intelligence will be limited by the
extent of its knowledge of the commanders' plans
and problems.
A third limitation is that of personnel with suffi-
cient skills and experience. Only in recent years
has Intelligence been considered as a professional
field, and its personnel in general require more
training and more practical experience. Its doc-
trines of method and procedure are still in the de-
velopmental stage. In the military services, there
has been additional limitation of numbers, for in
the past, Intelligence has been manned almost ex-
clusively by reservists called to duty in time of
actual conflict. In time of so-called peace, it has
been skeletonized to the degree that production has
been critically limited.
A fourth limitation of intelligence lies in the
research process itself. An error in basic data, if
not recognized, can become magnified progres-
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sively to produce entirely false conclusions. In
intelligence work the cost of such errors may be
measured in human life. Recognizing this limi-
tation, intelligence workers must exercise every
effort to avoid the use of incorrect data and to re-
view most carefully the conclusions reached at
each stage of the production effort.
Other more specific limitations, such as those
of the physical equipment sometimes used in the
collection of information, will be noted in other
sections of this text. In connection with the gen-
eral limitations indicated above, it is apparent that
several can be reduced to a minimum and perhaps
eliminated. The controlling factors include time,
with its accumulation of experience, and an in-
creased understanding of the problems involved
in intelligence production.
The Place of Naval Intelligence
The comprehensive body of intelligence knowl-
edge may be compared to a large pyramid, at the
top of which are placed the most highly refined
estimates needed for national policy decisions.
Each contributing organization is represented by
a cross section of the pyramid. Into these sec-
tions is channeled the raw data acquired from
thousands of sources at home and abroad. There
is a descending as well as an ascending flow of
knowledge within this pyramid, as specific re-
quests for estimates are passed from the top down.
The same holds true even within the organiza-
tional levels. There is also movement horizon-
tally between organizations on the same level.
The speed with which the knowledge flows within
and to the top of the pyramid depends upon the
efficiency of the various organizations which make
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18
up the pyramid. Because of the changing nature
of war itself there can no longer be watertight
compartments of knowledge nor can any one of
these organizations be considered self-sufficient.
Each contributes to and receives from the total
body of knowledge.
Naval Intelligence is an integral part of this
pyramid. It produces what is known as depart-
mental intelligence. It contributes to the total
body of knowledge through the use of the pro-
fessional naval training and experience of its per-
sonnel in interpreting and evaluating data con-
cerning an enemy. It provides specialized naval
agencies particularly adaptable for the collection
of certain types of information. It gives guid-
ance to the collection effort to assure that the in-
formation procured is relevant to the needs of
naval planners and policy makers. It produces
intelligence which will directly serve naval com-
manders in the solutions of their problems and
the reaching of decisions both for overall plan-
ning and specific operations.
While Naval Intelligence must therefore con-
tribute to the total body of knowledge, it must
also utilize those parts of the total body of
knowledge which directly or indirectly affect the
successful accomplishment of its assigned respon-
sibilities. The same applies to all other organi-
zations of our national intelligence system. The
only difference is one of emphasis.
For these reasons, the scope of this text is neces-
sarily large, in order that it may serve at least
two purposes: to indicate to the naval officer the
broad body of knowledge with which he must be
familiar, and to point out the specific naval uses
of this knowledge.
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CHAPTER 2
THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTELLIGENCE
INTRODUCTION
Intelligence is neither new nor peculiar to mod-
ern times, whether it be interpreted as knowledge,
as organization, or as production. While the em-
phasis on its many aspects has varied from time
to time, intelligence has always existed in one form
or another. Ever since men organized themselves
into community groups they have sought for var-
ious reasons to dominate other groups, by means
of military force or by political or economic
measures backed by military force. Whatever the
means employed, advance information about the
enemy, when collected and processed, has been used
to advantage from time to time throughout re-
corded history.
The story of armed combat is fundamentally a
record of the historical evolution of military or-
ganization: from primitive men who fought as
independent individuals with stones and clubs to
modern men who fight as part of an intricate mass
machine. As the organizations grew in size, so
did the battles fought, requiring more and more
the use of military staffs to assist the commanders
in planning and carrying out their decisions. The
history of this military growth has been divided
into three periods: the first, from the beginning
of written records to the fall of the Roman Em-
pire, a period when military methods evolved from
mob action into a recognized art, including prac-
tically all of the modern principles of war; the
second, the Middle Ages, when there was almost
no progressive military thought; and the third,
from about 1632, the time of Gustavus Adolphus,
to the 20th century, when modern military ma-
chines emerged. As military organization has de-
veloped, so has Intelligence.
Thus Intelligence has a military origin. Full
knowledge has always been essential for the suc-
cessful general. The French Marshal Maurice de
Saxe, in recording his experiences, commented:
"You cannot give too much attention to spies and
guides . . . They are as useful as the eyes in your
head and, to a general, are quite as indispensable."
To be found in one form or another in the ancient
writings about war is the maxim: "Other things
being equal, victory goes to the commander with
the latest and the best information." Political
leaders and the governments of nations have also
made use of intelligence since the beginning of
recorded history.
While both military and political leaders have
long recognized the importance of gaining ad-
vance information, there have been times when
they either failed to obtain it or neglected to make
use of it. A study of military history reveals that
many defeats in battle have resulted from failures
to use intelligence. Indeed, there are indications
that intelligence has had a marked effect on the
shaping of world events.
Illustrative of a failure to use intelligence, and
the effect on later events, is the case of the British
Admiral De Robeck whose Anglo-French fleet won
a complete victory in the Dardenelles during
World War I. As a result the Turkish Govern-
ment began the evacuation of Constantinople, and
the Allies might have taken the city, had De Ro-
beck made any effort to obtain information about
the enemy. In ignorance he withdrew, and con-
sequently the ill-fated and disastrous Gallipoli
campaign was undertaken.
A striking feature of the historical development
of intelligence is its slow progress, shown by the
similarity of ancient and modern methods. There
is little difference between the instructions of
Moses to his 12 spies who were to go into the land
of Canaan and those of Stieber, Bismarck's In-
telligence Chief, to his agents who were to infil-
trate France. The difference is merely in the
numbers involved. In fact, modern intelligence
seems to have little that is really new, although
the character of intelligence has changed from
time to time. Before the rise of nationalism, the
collecting of information was a trade carried on
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by those whose services were at the disposal of the
highest bidder. With the upsurge of the modern
states, patriotism gave new motivation to the ac-
tivities of the collector. In recent times, some of
those engaged in intelligence activities are moti-
vated solely by an ideological fanaticism which
recognizes no national boundaries.
It is obviously quite difficult to trace the his-
torical development of intelligence. It is seldom
exposed to the public eye, and for reasons of se-
curity, those making use of intelligence cannot
disclose methods, sources of information, and ex-
tent of knowledge. Available records, therefore,
are relatively few and incomplete.
It is clear, however, that intelligence has not
only been the first line of any nation's defense, but
also the springboard of offensive action aimed at
surprise and deception. At times it has taken the
form of a shadowy undercover war of world-wide
proportions. As a result, the outcome of great
battles involving armies, navies, and air forces,
has depended upon the result of conflicts between
intelligence organizations. These have often
taken place long before a declaration of war, and
have continued after the signing of an armistice.
The intensity of the total intelligence effort be-
fore and after World War II indicates that intelli-
gence activity is of a long range and continuing
nature.
Intelligence has served many purposes. From
earliest times tyrants have subverted intelligence
organizations into repressive systems of political
police, thus placing exaggerated emphasis upon
domestic espionage and counterespionage. Free
people, too, have used intelligence to advantage
in promoting and maintaining their national inter-
ests. Historically speaking, Intelligence has not
been the exclusive tool of armies and governments,
for it has also been used by revolutionaries, church-
men, bankers, trade unions, and criminals.
In this historical review, the intelligence activi-
ties of armies and governments are of primary
interest. Much can be learned from past experi-
ences for contemporary application.
EARLY HISTORY
The desire for advance information about a
prospective adversary is an instinctive character-
istic of man. Even primitive tribes, with only
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the crudest weapons and no appreciable sense of
group discipline, carried out reconnaissance of
their enemies. For example, before a band of
forest Indians set forth on the warpath, their
chiefs sent the most able warriors to learn about
the trails and streams in the area of attack and
to discover the numbers, disposition, and state of
preparedness of the enemy. The early successes
of the American Indians against numerically su-
perior and better armed white men were often the
result of the Indians' superior, though primitive,
system of intelligence.
20
Intelligence in Antiquity
Intelligence activity is as old as war. One of
the earliest and best known records may be found
in the Bible. Moses selected men from each of the
twelve tribes and sent them into Canaan with these
instructions: "See the land, what it is; and the
people that dwelleth therein, whether they be
strong or weak, few or many; And what the land
is that they dwell in, whether it be good or bad;
and what cities they be that they dwell in, whether
in tents, or in strongholds; And what the land is,
whether it be fat or lean, whether there be
wood therein or not." It is to be noted that he
chose leading men to do the job, and that their
instructions included both the characteristics of
the enemy and the area of potential operations.
But long before Moses, the Pharaohs of Egypt
were receiving regular intelligence reports from
their agents scattered beyond the valley of the
Nile. The Egyptian army had a rudimentary
staff organization which included an intelligence
function, that of receiving reports from recon-
naissance units. With the Assyrian armies as
models, the Persians under Darius made further
advances in military organization and planning.
Herodotus' account of their invasion of Greece
describes the extensive preparation that preceded
their military campaigns. A system of staff or-
ganization was developed, and there is evidence
of the functional existence, at least, of intelligence
officers. The soldier kings, apparently, did not
delegate any operational functions, but kept them
inherent in command and so they have remained
ever since. It is also most likely that the so-called
"intelligence officers" were primarily collectors,
and that the early military commanders who led
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their followers into battle solved their own intelli-
gence problems and did not rely on intermediaries
to digest information reports. However, they did
develop extensive courier services for the rapid
transmittal of intelligence and administrative
reports.
Alexander the Great inherited an efficient mili-
tary machine from his father and for thirteen
years carried on continuous campaigns throughout
the then-known world. While the basis for a
military staff existed in the form of several officers
under his personal direction, Alexander appears
to have been his own intelligence and operations
officer. He relied heavily on reconnaissance,
which was essentially on operational function.
Military postal censorship is reported to have orig-
inated with this Greek conqueror. During one of
his expeditions into Asia he heard rumors of dis-
affection among his allies and mercenaries. In
order to determine the true situation, he announced
that he was writing home and encouraged his
officers to do likewise. When all the messages had
been collected, he examined them and proceeded to
correct such conditions as appeared to have been
justly criticized.
Intelligence in Ancient India
At about the same time that Alexander was ex-
tending his conquests, the famous Brahman,
Kautilya, is reputed to have overthrown the
Nanda dynasty and established the first Mauryan
king on the throne of India. Kautilya is known
not only as a kingmaker but also as the greatest
Indian exponent of the art of government, the
duties of kings, ministers, and officials, and the
methods of diplomacy. A Sanskrit book of ad-
vice to rulers, attributed to him, reads in part
almost as a modern manual on military and polit-
ical intelligence. It emphasizes the fact that a
highly organized intelligence service is essential
to the state and of first consideration in both peace
and war. In discussing the expansion and se-
curity of the state Kautilya says, " . . . he who
has the eye of knowledge . . . can, with little ef-
fort, make use of his skill for intrigue, and can
succeed by means of conciliation and other strate-
gic means and by spies . . . in overreaching even
those kings who are possessed of enthusiasm and
power."
OF INTELLIGENCE
21
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Kautilya recommends that his ruler should first
strike the enemy at his weak points by means of
spies. In describing the means to conquer an en-
emy's stronghold, he lists first "intrigue, spies,"
and "winning over the enemy's people." "Siege
and assault" are last on the list. Although his
terminology is a bit obscure, he accurately de-
scribes the modern fifth column and Soviet sub-
versive activities when he says: "The arrow shot
by the archer may or may not kill a single man;
but skillful intrigue devised by wise men can kill
even those as yet unborn." Distrust and suspi-
cion are powerful weapons when forged within
an enemy country.
Before beginning a military operation, Kautilya
advises: "The conqueror should know the compar-
ative strength and weakness of himself and his
enemy" and no war should be undertaken without
a careful examination of all the factors as reported
by the king's spies. These factors could well serve
as an outline for an estimate of the situation pre-
pared by a modern military staff. "Having ascer-
tained the power, place, time, the time of march-
ing and of recruiting the army, the consequences,
the loss of men and money, and profits and dan-
ger," the conqueror "should march with his full
force." Kautilya divides the king's army into
five parts: elephants, chariots, horsemen, archers,
and spies and of these he considers the spies the
most important.
The spy system of the Mauryans apparently
rivaled that of the modern Soviets. It included
many classes, both military and political, operat-
ing within India and in adjoining countries. One
class shadowed the king's ministers and officials
and attempted to determine their very thoughts.
Another, drawn from the merchants and farmers,
reported on the wrongdoings of the people. A
third, whose sons and wives were kept at home
as hostages, operated secretly in foreign countries,
spreading unrest, committing acts of sabotage, and
even assassinating political and military leaders.
Official envoys to foreign kings were instructed
to make friends with officials of the enemy, to con-
trast military stations, war material and enemy
strongholds with those of their master, to deter-
mine the size and location of forts, to identify local
intrigues, to sow dissension, and to determine en-
emy intentions.
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Counterspies and watchmen were employed;
there were border guards to check on all who
attempted to enter or to leave; and travelers had
to have passes. In order to dispose of seditious
persons who opposed the king, these persons were
secretly incited to reckless action and then con-
demned. Kautilya reminded his king that he
would be able to know all things through his spy
system, and that his information should be con-
sidered reliable if received from three different
sources in exactly the same version. He also em-
phasized the importance of the speedy transmis-
sion of information. The Mauryan Empire of
India appears to have been a police state in the
most modern sense.
Kautilya's book seems to have been a standard
manual for the Mauryan rulers, and to have been
based on experience. A study of the methods of
this ancient dynasty, which was able to conquer
and hold a greater part of India, sheds consider-
able light on the intelligence operations of any
despotic state.
Intelligence and War in Ancient China
It is indicative of the early development of
civilization in Asia that outstanding military and
political leaders were recording their experiences
and knowledge long before the same was done in
Europe. About Kautilya's time in India, a
Chinese General named Sun Tzu wrote a treatise
on the Art of War which was so sound that its
principles may be easily adapted to modern war-
fare. Sun Tzu discussed the fundamentals of
war and the influence of politics and human na-
ture on military operations. His writings indi-
cate, in a striking manner, how unchanging these
fundamentals are.
Writing as a field commander on the subject of
strategy and tactics, Sun Tzu emphasized the im-
portance of terrain study and accurate informa-
tion about enemy strength and intentions. He
stressed maneuver and deception and the attain-
ment of victory by indirect methods. Like
Kautilya, he recommended battle only as a final
resort and placed primary importance on a good
intelligence service: "A hundred ounces of silver
spent for information may save ten thousand
spent on war." His formula for victory aptly
states the basic reason for maintaining an intelli-
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22
gence service: "If you know the enemy and know
yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred
battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy,
for every victory gained you will also suffer a
defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor your-
self, you will succumb in every battle."
Sun Tzu warns against information derived
from appearances alone, and accepts only that
which is obtained from intelligence agents. Most
effective are those who have penetrated the high
councils of the enemy and the operators whom
we now term "double-agents." In addition, it is
profitable to employ inhabitants of an enemy
country to act as local spies, and to have other
agents spreading false rumors for purposes of de-
ception. Finally, there must be spies in the
enemy forces to be firsthand sources of informa-
tion. In selecting intelligence personnel Sun
Tzu would employ only those with natural abil-
ity and of high mental caliber. He continues
with the observation that if military warfare be-
comes necessary, "spies are a most important ele-
ment, because on them depends an army's ability
to move." Another Sun Tzu maxim has been
heeded by both Nazi and Soviet leaders of recent
years: "To fight and conquer in all your battles
is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence
consists in breaking the enemy's resistance with-
out fighting."
Developments by the Romans
Quite independent of the Oriental generals, but
about the same time, the Romans were developing
their own military organization and doctrine in
Europe. By the time of Julius Caesar the staff
of each legion included ten "speculatores" who
served as an information collecting agency.
Caesar's successful campaign against the Helve-
tians was aided materially by advance information
he acquired about their strength, movements, and
plans. The "speculatores" are the first intel-
ligence personnel to appear definitely in a military
staff organization, and there is evidence that the
Romans differentiated between the staff functions
of intelligence and operations. This early dis-
tinction was not "re-discovered" by military com-
manders until relatively modern times.
The military success of the Romans was also
aided by their communications system. Frontinus
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and Lipsius, in their writings, describe the train-
ing of swallows as long distance messengers and
the use of carrier pigeons, which explains the
amazing speed with which the intelligence of Im-
perial Rome was transmitted. An efficient intel-
ligence organization was thus able to give warning
of an impending surprise offensive by Hannibal
and Antiochus in Asia Minor in time to enable
Lucius Scipio to regroup his forces and administer
a crushing defeat at Lydia. The Romans also em-
ployed ciphers to ensure the secrecy of communica-
tions.
Skillful covert operations were of positive mili-
tary value. Scipio Africanus used his officers dis-
guised as menials and servants to secure reliable
data on the strength of the opposing Numidian
army. His methods have a peculiarly modern
flavor since, in order to gain time for accurate ob-
servations, he entered into negotiations with the
Numidians, presumably to arrange a treaty.
In the following centuries of Roman imperial-
ism, intelligence continued to be fostered by the
emperors, and covert activities were practised to
an unscrupulous and vicious degree in palace cir-
cles. Vegetius, in his advice to the Emperor Vu-
lentinian, states that a general may avoid defeat
if he employs spies on whose intelligence he can
depend. Like the military writers of Asia, he em-
phasized the importance of trying to sow dis-
sension among enemy peoples, and comments that
no enemy nation, regardless of how weak, can
be completely ruined "unless its fall be facilitated
by its own distraction."
The professional army of the Byzantine Empire
also had a well organized intelligence service.
Much more colorful, however, was the elaborate
spy system of the Empress Theodora which per-
meated the entire governmental structure of the
Empire. It should be noted that the oriental mind
has always appeared to stress political over mili-
tary intelligence.
The Middle Ages
Military intelligence in this period of chivalry
was of little consequence to warriors for whom
fighting was an individual sport. On the other
hand, the Mongol conquerors who swept into east-
ern Europe from Asia during the 13th century
made use of not only an efficient intelligence sys-
tem but also of an effective propaganda machine.
Agents of the Mongol commanders ranged far in
front of the invading hordes spreading rumors
of Mongol terrors and collecting information on
the weaknesses and rivalries of Europe. Local
citizens were used to advantage. The Venetians,
for example, striving to gain superiority over their
rivals, supplied information to the Mongols in
return for help in ousting Genoese traders from
the Crimea.
In addition to agents disguised as merchants,
the Mongol commanders maintained a screen of
scouts in front of each column of soldiers. They
appreciated the need for the rapid transmission of
information, and established a pony post system
across the whole of eastern Europe. The code of
laws set up by Genghis Khan instructed his gen-
erals to send out spies and to bring in prisoners
who would be forced to give information which
could be checked against the reports of the spies.
The Mongols provided for Western Europe an un-
heeded example of an effective military intelli-
gence and staff communication system. They
greatly influenced the Mogul Emperors of India
who perfected an amazing political intelligence
service. Among the personnel of this service were
spies who visited houses twice daily for the osten-
sible purpose of removing refuse and trash.
Although the knights of medieval Europe
scorned the advance collection of information
about their enemies, the churchmen had no such
scruples. They not only utilized already known
intelligence collection methods but contributed
variations of their own. De Torquemada, head
of the Spanish Inquisition, developed a political
intelligence system which has scarcely been
equalled. Thousands of intimidated men, women,
and children were encouraged to give information
which would incriminate their own relatives and
acquaintances. Large groups of spies were care-
fully trained, and a manual of instructions was
prepared for their guidance.
The Renaissance of Intelligence
With the rise of nationalism and the develop-
ment of modern armies the need for intelligence
became apparent to the larger states. Following
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an Italian lead, the principal courts of Europe be-
gan to exchange resident ambassadors, one of
whose functions was to collect information on the
political and diplomatic activities, the plans, and
the military strength of potential enemies. As
time progressed an increasing volume of political
and military intelligence, collected by covert as
well as overt means, flowed into the various capi-
tals of Europe to be processed and filed for use
in making important strategic decisions.
As early as the 15th century French and German
military organizations known as "Landsknechts,"
meaning "men of the country" as opposed to for-
eign mercenary troops, were developed. The
staffs of these armies embodied the principal char-
acteristics of the modern regimental staff. Be-
cause the quartermaster general had to precede
the troops on the march in order to arrange for
quartering and feeding, he also became responsible
for reconnaissance. This functional development
exerted considerable influence on the German and
English staff systems. Gustavus Adolphus of
Sweden created a "Chief of Scouts" on his Su-
preme Staff, indicating both his awareness of the
importance of intelligence and his realization that
intelligence as a staff function should be separate
from operations and logistics. It is generally
agreed that the military organization developed
by Gustavus served as a pattern in Europe until
the 20th century. With him, therefore, modern
military history began.
While there are records of intelligence activities
throughout English history and especially from
the time of Cromwell and Henry VII, it was Sir
Francis Walsingham, under Elizabeth, who gave
England its first national intelligence service.
His crowning achievement was the employment of
a spy on the staff of the Admiral in command of
the Spanish Armada. Thus he was able to ob-
tain the most detailed information regarding the
state of readiness of the Armada, its ships, equip-
ment, forces, and stores. In addition, under Wal-
singham's guidance, the English Government per-
suaded the bankers of Genoa to withhold certain
loans to Philip of Spain which delayed his naval
offensive against the English.
In France, the crafty Cardinal Richelieu de-
veloped an effective intelligence organization. It
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04
included a network of covert collectors who trans-
mitted prompt and accurate information to Paris
regarding the activities of the many rebellious
and dissident elements of the kingdom. An ex-
pert in political intrigue and diplomatic maneuver,
Richelieu used his intelligence forces to strengthen
the central government of France. After him,
Louis XIV consolidated his personal power by
means of a systematized political police, continu-
ous surveillance, postal censorship, and a peace-
time military intelligence organization. The
famous French general, Maurice de Saxe, organ-
ized an intelligence service which represented a
considerable improvement over others of his time.
Unlike the Germans, the French based their mili-
tary staff organization on Roman theories. As
a result, the French staff included officers charged
with the separate functions of supply, administra-
tion, operations, and intelligence. By 1700 the
pattern was set for the French staff system of
World War I, and consequently for the system
used by the United States Army. The French
military writers of this early period appreciated
the value of reconnaissance in major military plan-
ning and stressed professional knowledge as in-
dispensable to national military power.
Intelligence activity appeared in other coun-
tries during the 18th century. In Russia it took
the form of a political police system under the
personal supervision of the Tzar. The forerunner
of the dreaded Ochrana was the "Special Office,"
later called the "Secret Office," which was used
extensively by Peter the Great. In colonial Amer-
ica, Baron von Steuben served as an intelligence
and operations officer on Washington's staff. His
recorded intelligence activities include an analysis
of British and American capabilities and limita-
tions and a personal reconnaissance of General
Clinton's forces before the battle of Monmouth.
All of the great European military leaders, in-
cluding Marlborough, Prince Eugene, Maurice de
Saxe, and Frederick the Great, appear to have
recognized the importance of intelligence and used
it. Each, in his own way, contributed to its de-
velopment. Frederick the Great, for example,
established four classes of agents for the collec-
tion of information and set up careful rules for
selecting and training them.
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Expansion of Intelligence Activities Under
Napoleon
Napoleon once said: "One spy in the right place
is worth 20,000 men in the field." The truth of
his remark was amply substantiated by one of his
own agents, a man named Schulmeister, who man-
aged to become the Chief of Intelligence for the
Austrian general in command of armies opposing
the French. Every Austrian plan and move was
carefully reported to Napoleon, while false infor-
mation was supplied to the Austrians. Undoubt-
edly the clever machinations of Schulmeister
contributed materially to the brilliant French vic-
tories at Ulm and Austerlitz, which led to the sur-
render of Austria. It is of interest to speculate
on what might have been the historical results had
Napoleon's agent failed in his efforts.
Napoleon's personal staff included two bureaus
of interest. The first, and most important, was
the Bureau of Intelligence, staffed by two officers
and an unknown number of agents. Its function
was to consolidate all incoming information re-
garding the enemy for presentation to the Em-
peror, and to obtain such special information as
he desired. The second, closely related to the first,
was called the Topographic Bureau. Here was
maintained a large situation map covering the
latest information regarding both enemy and
friendly forces. In the field the French Head-
quarters Staff was divided into four sections, one
of which was responsible for reconnaissance, op-
erational planning, communications, postal serv-
ice, and the employment of guide companies.
It was at the beginning of the 19th century that
large conscript armies came into general use, and
with them large scale military maneuvers.
Napoleon's genius for efficient military organiza-
tion brought him resounding successes and tre-
mendously influenced modern military theory and
tactics. His military staff system was much more
effective than that of the Prussians, and Intelli-
gence served him well during a part of his spec-
tacular career. It should be noted that during
the wars between the French and the Germans, in
1806 and again in 1870, victory came to the side
which had the superior staff system. It may also
be said that victory at Waterloo came to the gen-
eral who had advance information concerning the
enemy and the area of operations.
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25
In addition to his military intelligence organi-
zation, Napoleon maintained an effective secret
political police service over all of Europe. Under
the shrewd and remorseless direction of Joseph
Fouche, and later of Savary, this service was held
in fear and terror. It was during this period that
the system of spying upon spies reached such pro-
portions that the term "counterespionage" came
into popular usage.
Like England, France has had a governmental
intelligence system almost continuously since the
15th century. But only during the time of Napo-
leon, and during and after the First World War,
did the French system achieve the international
scope of the English.
The Status of Intelligence in the United States
As already mentioned there is evidence that
General Washington made some use of intelli-
gence methods; however, there was no organiza-
tional development in the United States until the
late 19th century. At the beginning of the Civil
War the Federal forces had no intelligence organi-
zation, and Gen. George B. McClellan relied al-
most entirely on the Pinkerton Detective Agency
to collect and evaluate information for him.
Pinkerton himself served as a staff Intelligence
Officer to McClellan, although he proved to be a
poor substitute for a trained military observer.
For example, in July 1862, McClellan based his
military plans on Pinkerton's inaccurate estimate
of Lee's strength at more than 200,000, while the
actual opposing strength was less than 90,000.
During the Civil War both the North and the
South made use of spies. The tapping of tele-
graphic wires was employed for the first time.
One writer of this period, while acknowledging
the importance of intelligence and listing a num-
ber of recognized collection methods, felt it neces-
sary to justify them as "honorable means of secur-
ing victory over the foe." It was during the Civil
War that the United States Secret Service was or-
ganized, first as a military activity, and later as a
Federal Government function.
Wilhelm Stieber and Modern Intelligence Systems
Together with the Frenchman Schulmeister,
Stieber, who served as Prussian Minister of Police
under Bismarck, developed the pattern for mod-
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ern intelligence systems. His claim to fame in
this field is based both on the quality and the ex-
tensiveness of his organization. His influence
throughout Europe was tremendous, especially in
France and Russia. With Stieber's assistance
Bismarck was able with lightning speed to over-
whelm Denmark in 1861, Austria in 1866, and
France in 1870. Even the great German General
Moltke was amazed at the vast amount of perti-
nent military information supplied by Stieber for
facilitating the rapid advance of the German
armies, to the extent of making possible an accu-
rate timetable for the victorious march into
Austria.
Stieber's activities in Austria for the 2 years
prior to the invasion are an early modern example
of the German fifth column technique. Methodi-
cally he gathered information on fortifications,
troop concentrations, and supply capacities, and
recruited agents and saboteurs. By the time of
the Franco-Prussian War he had an estimated
12,000 spies scattered throughout Europe, and
boasted that some 85 writers on French news-
papers were under his control, not to mention paid
sympathizers among Italian, Austrian, and Eng-
lish journalists. He set up a system of military
censorship and organized a Central Information
Bureau for propaganda purposes. He concen-
trated on developing statistical and biographical
knowledge, including the industrial potentials of
possible enemy states and detailed data regarding
their politicians, diplomats, and higher civil em-
ployees. In addition to gathering information
about roads, bridges, arsenals, fortifications, and
lines of communication, he was interested in data
on population, commerce and agriculture, local
politics, and patriotism. Imitating Napoleon, he
established the first formal system of German
counterespionage.
As one of Bismarck's most trusted advisers,
Stieber organized an effective secret police system.
He was also adept in the field of political intelli-
gence. His work in alienating Russia and France
prior to the war with France in 1870 was highly
effective. In 1867 he arranged for an attempt to
be made on the life of Alexander of Russia who
was on a diplomatic mission to Paris, but he also
arranged to frustrate and capture the assassin.
To cap it all, at the trial he bribed the French
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NAVAL OFFICERS
jury and obtained an acquittal. The ultimate ef-
fect was that the Russians were antagonized and
canceled further efforts to form an alliance with
France.
Stieber created for Germany a superior intelli-
gence system which was feared and respected
throughout the continent of Europe. Because of
his influence, however, the German intelligence
system always retained some of the characteristics
of a police organization.
Beginnings of Japanese Intelligence
The Japanese early applied their imitative tal-
ents to the organization of up-to-date intelligence
systems for both their Army and Navy. As a re-
sult, they were able to use Intelligence as an effec-
tive offensive instrument in the Russo-Japanese
War of 1904-5 and to overwhelm its Russian coun-
terpart. The Japanese victory in this war has
been attributed in large measure to the effective-
ness of their intelligence activities. For example,
at Port Arthur advance information was obtained
regarding the Russian minefields and the power
station, transmission lines, and powerful search-
lights designed to blind the attackers. With this
knowledge, the Japanese fleet captured the port
with minimum losses in a remarkably short time.
The Japanese were particularly successful in the
speed with which they collected and transmitted
information.
During the 18th and 19th centuries, intelligence
was centralized and systematized primarily at the
highest governmental levels. It therefore had a
political emphasis and often a secret police bias.
In the military field, each general often served as
his own intelligence officer and directed his own
intelligence system. With the increasing com-
plexity of modern warfare, together with the
added burdens imposed by larger, more diverse
armies, greater logistical support and expanding
areas of operations, commanders came to require
better staff organizations, including adequate in-
telligence sections. The impact of the striking
Prussian victories of 1867 and 1870 had a tremen-
dous effect on European military thinking and
gave credence to the writings of such theorists as
Berthier and Clausewitz. By 1900 the major
European powers had developed modern staff sys-
tems and had placed intelligence on the same level
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with personnel, operations, and logistics, designed
to function in times of peace and war.
The Development of the United States Intelligence
Organization?Navy
The improvements and expansion of the world's
navies during the latter years of the 19th century
caused the Navy Department to realize its need
for information from abroad. The building of
new ships of steel instead of wood had begun, and
the best available technical data were required in
order that these ships might incorporate the latest
methods of construction and the most up-to-date
equipment. Accordingly, in March 1882 the Sec-
retary of the Navy established by General Order
an Office of Intelligence under the Bureau of Navi-
gation for the purpose of "systematizing the collec-
tion and classification of information for the use of
the department, in relation to the strength and
resources of foreign navies." The following year
the Secretary emphasized two functions for the
Office of Intelligence: the collection of informa-
tion regarding the progress of naval science and
the dissemination of that information. Not only
commanders, but all other officers, were directed
to collect and submit appropriate professional ma-
terial to Intelligence. From the beginning, there-
fore, Intelligence was given the primary mission
of collecting, interpreting, and disseminating in-
formation of value to the Navy. Commanders in
chief were also directed to appoint an officer, pref-
erably of their personal staffs, to perform the
duties of fleet intelligence officer; and com-
manders of ships were to appoint an officer of their
command for similar duties. The emphasis was
on positive foreign intelligence and on technical
information such as ship construction and ord-
nance. There was some initial opposition to the
new intelligence office from some of the Bureaus,
but the office was soon accepted.
Lt. T. B. B. Mason was selected to head the
new office and was designated as the "Chief In-
telligence Officer." To him is due much credit for
the early organization of the Office of Naval In-
telligence. He was assisted by two other officers
in Washington, with one naval attache in London.
In view of the fact that the office was not estab-
lished by congressional action, there were no ap-
propriations for maintenance; accordingly, clerks
27
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and equipment were borrowed from other offices
and bureaus. This situation existed until after
the Spanish-American War.
The activities of Naval Intelligence during the
Spanish-American War are of particular interest.
There was a broadening of responsibilities, with
a shift in emphasis to intelligence for strategic
and operational use. The Office of Intelligence
prepared data on the strength of the Spanish Navy
and the condition of Spanish home and colonial
ports. At the same time, the attaches were au-
thorized to negotiate abroad for the purchase of
ships and munitions of war, and six cruisers were
purchased in this manner. In order to strengthen
the position of attaches in collecting information
abroad, requests for information by official for-
eign representatives in Washington were chan-
neled through the office.
After 17 years of operation, the Office of Intelli-
gence was established on a permanent basis by
Congress in 1899, with regular appropriations for
carrying on its work. It was charged with ob-
taining information concerning the latest con-
struction and equipment of warships during
peacetime, and producing knowledge of the
strength and disposition of enemy forces in time
of war. It was to assist in maintaining the Navy
in a proper state of readiness for naval operations
and in providing knowledge to aid in the conduct
of hostilities.
The administrative responsibility for the Of-
fice of Intelligence was shifted a number of times
during the first 30 years of its existence: from the
Bureau of Navigation, to the Office of the Secre-
tary, to the Office of the Assistant Secretary, back
to the Bureau of Navigation, and to the Office of
the Aide for Operations. Finally, in 1915, when
a Chief of Naval Operations was created by law,
the Office of Naval Intelligence was established
permanently as one of the divisions under Naval
Operations.
During its formative years the Office of Naval
Intelligence was organized on the basis of the sub-
ject matter with which it was concerned: there
were desks devoted to ships, ordnance, personnel,
communications, and steam engineering and elec-
tricity. At this time technical information took
precedence. One early Intelligence publication
was entitled "Coal, Docking and Repair Facilities
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of the Ports of the World: With Analysis of Dif-
ferent Kinds of Coal."
At various times prior to 1900 the Chief Intel-
ligence Officer had additional responsibilities, such
as: translation of foreign documents, preparation
of the War Plans of the Navy and the Auxiliary
Naval Force. Intelligence also prepared various
kinds of information reports for the Naval Bu-
reaus and for the Naval committees of Congress.
In 1889 the regular report of the Secretary of the
Navy included the following comment regarding
Intelligence: "Its value to naval legislation and
to naval administration is now fully recognized."
Prior to World War I the development of a com-
prehensive intelligence organization was slow, and
serious problems arose in connection with the
availability of trained officer personnel. As a re-
sult civilian employees were used as much as pos-
sible to permit continuity of effort.
Since collection was a basic responsibility of
Naval Intelligence, the collectors assumed an early
importance. The United States Navy sent its first
attache to London in 1882, the year the Office of
Intelligence was established. One additional at-
tache was later accredited to France, Russia, and
Germany. As late as World War I, the Director
of Naval Intelligence expressed the opinion that
his office existed largely for the support of the at-
tache system. As official agents for collection
purposes, the naval attaches were cautioned to use
reputable business methods. Adequate financial
support was a major problem, and officers volun-
teered for attache duty with full knowledge that
their expenses would exceed their pay and allow-
ances. This situation soon created a prejudice
against these posts and rendered difficult the as-
signment of qualified officers.
The Development of the United States Intelligence
Organization?Army
The Army's Attache System dates from 1889.
However, prior to World War I, the military at-
taches received little guidance or support; nor is
it certain that the information they collected was
properly disseminated. As in the case of the
Navy, financial support was a serious problem and
the selection of officers as attaches was often a
haphazard matter governed either by personal ac-
quaintance or by the availability of an officer with
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28
a personal income which would enable him to
meet the expenses of diplomatic life in a foreign
capital.
The importance of intelligence to the Army was
emphasized by Mr. Elihu Root when in 1902, as
Secretary of War, he argued for the creation of an
Army General Staff. In this connection he said:
The Commanding Officer "must determine at what
points and by what routes the place shall be ap-
proached, and at what points his troops shall
land . . . ; and for this purpose he must be in-
formed about the various harbors of the island
and the depth of their channels; what classes of
vessels can enter them; what the facilities for
landing are; how they are to be attacked; the
character of the intervening country; how far it
is healthful or unhealthful; what the climate is
likely to be at the season of the proposed move-
ment; the temper and sympathies of the inhabit-
ants . . ."
Primarily as a result of Mr. Root's efforts, the
Congress created in 1903 an Army General Staff
with three major divisions: Administration, Mili-
tary Information, and War College and Military
Studies. In subsequent years new divisions were
established and Intelligence was placed under the
War College. The few officers assigned to Intel-
ligence before World War I had a constant strug-
gle against prejudice, a half-hostile tradition, and
inadequacies of operating facilities. Such intel-
ligence effort as was possible was confined to col-
lection, with little processing or dissemination.
As late as April 1917 the Army's Intelligence Sec-
tion consisted of only 2 officers and 2 clerks.
Such was the status of military intelligence in
the United States just prior to the First World
War. By contrast, the major European powers
at the same time had military intelligence organi-
zations operating as general staff divisions.
WORLD WAR I
The many tensions which had been building up
for 50 years finally exploded in World War I.
Perhaps some of them were observed by various
intelligence groups, especially during the fateful
year of 1913. Some writers have suggested that
certain situations, such as the Austro-Balkan con-
flicts, might have been averted had intelligence
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knowledge and organization been properly ex-
ploited.
In any event, the various military intelligence
services of Europe all believed themselves to be
prepared to handle any situation, but they were
not prepared for a long general war. Suddenly
they found themselves short of trained personnel,
and without sufficient funds. Their peace-time
efforts had not been adequate. The German sys-
tem was coasting on its past reputation, while the
Russians had never developed a modern or ef-
ficient system. Although British Intelligence was
small, it had a nucleus of organization and a back-
ground of experience capable of rapid expansion.
French Intelligence, in the first critical days of the
war, failed in its estimate of enemy strength. It
did not anticipate the possibility of early German
use of reserves, which put twice as many troops
against the French armies as had been estimated.
General Joffre's battle plan was based on this
erroneous estimate and had to be completely re-
vised, practically at the time of actual conflict.
Belgian Intelligence, activated as late as 1912,
collected vital information on the new German
siege guns, the capabilities of which indicated
serious weaknesses in the Belgian defenses at Ant-
werp, Liege, and Namur. However, the General
Staff considered the reconstruction of these de-
fenses too expensive and too time-consuming to
be worth the effort. In addition, it was believed
inadvisable to disturb their popular King with
such bad news. The high command was also in-
formed by Intelligence of the presence near the
Belgian border of a German force of six brigades
with a mass of artillery. The German tactical
surprise at Liege, therefore, cannot be credited as
much as a German success as an Allied failure to
take proper countermeasures. Failures attributed
to Intelligence have often been failures of a high
command to utilize the intelligence available to it.
As an additional example, at the Battle of St.
Quentin the British Army suffered its most shat-
tering defeat of World War I. At the same time,
it had available the most elaborate collection sys-
tem to be found in an area of combat.
The nature of this war, of course, determined
the pattern of intelligence activities. Develop-
ments in transportation?the railroad and the
motor truck?made possible the use of large ar-
29
mies and permitted the movement of sufficient
ammunition and supplies to support the great ar-
tillery battles and the masses of men engaged in
trench warfare. This tactical situation, in which
the defensive position was stronger than the of-
fensive, resulted in the static kind of warfare
characteristic of World War I. Discipline, train-
ing, and tactics were important factors in deter-
mining victory. Intelligence, therefore, concen-
trated on information about the armed forces of
the enemy and their capabilities.
The introduction of aircraft as implements of
war added a new method of collection: aerial
reconnaissance. Both the area of operations and
the activities of the enemy behind the battlelines
were brought into focus for observation, report-
ing, and use.
A Cryptographers' War
The employment of great armies over broad
areas increased the requirements of communica-
tions. These were met by the perfection of wire-
less telegraphy. Codes and ciphers assumed a
new significance and intelligence found an ex-
panded field of operations. In fact, from the
intelligence standpoint, World War I has been
described as a cryptographers' war. At times the
outcome of land and sea battles was determined
in advance of actual conflict by those who inter-
cepted and broke the enciphered operational mes-
sages of the enemy.
Several examples will be given in a later dis-
cussion of communications intelligence, but two
can be mentioned here because of their particular
impact on the course of the war. At an early
stage of hostilities two Russian armies, the First
and the Second, were advancing separately against
East Prussia, with the objective of joining forces
for an attack against Hindenburg's army which
was numerically superior to each, but inferior to
their combined strength. The First Army failed
to receive the field communications code which
both were to use and was forced to send in plain
language a message advising that it would be
delayed three days in joining the Second. On the
basis of this intercepted information, Hinden-
burg attacked and massacred the Second Army in
the famous Battle of Tannenberg; then crushed
the First Army 3 weeks later. Russia never re-
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INTELLIGENCE FOR
covered from this action and gradually slid into
ruin and revolution.
Early in 1917 the German ambassador to Mexico
was given secret instructions to negotiate an al-
liance with Japan in order to promote an attack
by that country on the United States, with the aid
of Mexico. As her reward Mexico was to receive
three of the American States. This secret mess-
age known as the Zimmerman note, was intercepted
and broken by the British who gave it to the Amer-
icans. This incident had much to do with bring-
ing the United States into the war.
A War of Spies and Agents
Many tales have been told of the colorful per-
sonalities in World War I who worked secretly to
obtain information or to protect it. The story
of Mata Hari, the exotic dancer and condemned
spy, has come to epitomize the romantic and ad-
venturous secret operative and to give the general
public its strongest impression of those associated
with intelligence activity. In spite of this fact,
her actual effectiveness as an agent is considered
questionable. There were agents, however, whose
work was of considerable importance.
One of the better known was Capt. Franz von
Rintelen, a German agent who contributed in no
small measure to impeding the flow of American
supplies to the British prior to the entry of the
United States into the war. With a talent for or-
ganization, he promoted pro-German and anti-
British sentiment in this country. His efforts on
the New York waterfront were particularly suc-
cessful. There his ingenious sabotage caused
ships bound for England to blow up or catch fire.
Labor unions were goaded into crippling strikes
against production and war shipping. A phoney
supply firm was organized which took several
million dollars of Russian money for war material
which was subsequently destroyed at sea.
The Middle East was the scene of widespread
and significant underground activity, German ver-
sus British. In Persia a German agent named
Wassmuss was so effective that four B ritish war-
ships and several thousand troops were eventually
dispatched to curtail his efforts. On the other
hand, Lawrence of Arabia organized and con-
trolled local tribes so effectively that he had more
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A?r-yrifilekr 79/1
30
I?? ro*: is I rill is III _?
NAVAL OFFICERS
value to the British than many thousands of
soldiers.
According to Gen. Maximilian Ronge, director
of the Austrian Intelligence Service, secret agents
were able to advise the enemy well in advance
of every major attack that was projected in World
War I. However, military high commands re-
peatedly failed to take advantage of this vital in-
formation. One interesting example is the Battle
of Caporetto which the Austrians mounted against
the Itrilians in October 1917. From the Austrian
point of view, this battle was their most successful
surprise attack of the entire war. It combined
sound military judgment and thorough prepara-
tions with a skillful offensive use of intelligence.
Weeks in advance of the battle information was
gathered regarding critical adverse political con-
ditions existing within the civilian population in
northern Italy. This information was dissemi-
nated to the Italian front line troops just before
the battle by means of carefully initiated Italian
newspapers. Espionage, counterespionage, cen-
sorship, and propaganda were all employed in this
operation. The effect was devastating and the
Italians lost 600,000 men as casualties and pris-
oners. The success of this engagement, however
was not the result of surprise. The Italian gen-
eral had been fully warned of the intentions of the
Austrians from several sources, including Ameri-
can Military Intelligence. It was successful be-
cause the Italians failed to act.
The Myth of German Intelligence
In 1914 German Intelligence still enjoyed a high
reputation for offensive effectiveness throughout
Europe. However, in the absence of strong lead-
ership supported by the government in power, the
formidable organization created by Steiber under
Bismarck had deteriorated badly. In addition,
the German Imperial Staff was so confident of a
quick victory that it could see no need for
Intelligence.
Actually, at the outset of the war the German
military intelligence system broke down. From
1906 it had concentrated its collection efforts in
Russia and France. Its work was seriously handi-
capped by inadequate financial support, lack of
trained personnel, and active opposition from the
diplomatic corps and other groups within the gov-
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTELLIGENCE
ernment. When Col. Walther Nicolai was ap-
pointed Chief of the Intelligence Service for the
High Command in 1913, he found that there was
no top level guidance for military intelligence.
As a result, his organization did not understand
the political and economic factors involved in its
work. Apparently Naval Intelligence was more
effective, but liaison was poor and there was no
coordination.
When war began, unlimited funds were allo-
cated to Intelligence; but, Nicolai commented
afterward, "money alone will not build up an In-
telligence Service." The German collection effort
in the British Isles had been neglected because the
High Command did not believe Britain would
enter the war. In addition, British counterintel-
ligence was quickly able to apprehend the few
German agents who were operating in the home
islands. German Intelligence immediately suf-
fered a black-out of information and had no ad-
vance knowledge of the arrival in France of the
British Expeditionary Force which joined with
the French Army to defeat the Germans at the
First Battle of the Marne.
Nicolai found it necessary to reorganize military
intelligence under the most adverse conditions.
When appointed to his post he held the rank of
major, and he soon found that his junior status
was a real handicap. When war started his best
officers were transferred to staff duty with the vari-
ous armies. The commanding general of the army
marching through Belgium considered his intel-
ligence officers so unnecessary that he left them
behind at Liege.
Reasons for the initial failures of German Intel-
ligence included lack of preparedness, general
neglect of overall responsibilities, and lack of
foresight. Military and political leaders failed
to recognize the importance of developing a good
intelligence service at the right time and over-
looked the vital necessity for coordination of ef-
fort. Counterintelligence was also understaffed
and handicapped at the start of the war, with no
central direction, especially within Germany
itself.
In spite of its weaknesses and initial failures,
German Intelligence improved materially as the
war progressed. It achieved considerable success
in its espionage and sabotage activities in the
31
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United States under the direction of von Rintelen,
and completely disrupted the French Intelligence
Service prior to the Battle of Verdun. It aided
the Russian revolutionary movement by transport-
ing Lenin across Germany into Russia.
After the war was over, Nicolai wrote a de-
tailed account of the wartime problems of German
Intelligence and the conditions under which it
operated, stating: "Its character and methods
. . . should be generally known if it is ever to
succeed both in carrying out its own tasks and in
thwarting the activities of the opposing Intelli-
gence Services. This applies also to States which
possess no Intelligence Service, have no adequate
idea of its importance, and do not realize how their
people and their political freedom are threatened
. . ." On the basis of subsequent developments,
there is reason to believe that Adolf Hitler read
Nicolai's book most carefully.
French Intelligence
The influence of Stieber in France was tremen-
dous. By 1900 the Deuxieme Bureau had been
established as part of the General Staff System
and made responsible for all enemy information
and the topographical service of the command.
The staff was composed of the following divisions:
administration, intelligence, operations, and sup-
ply. This French system was to exert a strong
influence on the development of the United States
Army Staff during World War I. French naval
attaches, unlike the British, were given direct con-
trol of the Naval Secret Service operating in their
areas.
A Civil Intelligence Service operated under the
chiefs of police of the various larger cities, with
headquarters at Paris. This service was based on
the organization established under Napoleon III.
Nicolai considered France as the "perfect master"
in the field of political and military intelligence,
"directed by a strong and deliberate power
policy."
Russian Intelligence
Under the Tzars, Russian military intelligence
had no centralized administration and suffered be-
cause of an inadequate number of personnel and
no system for training. Full use was made of
military attaches in the collection of information,
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although some were compromised by disclosure of
their undercover activities. The incompetence of
the General Staff had a direct effect on the work
of Intelligence which was far from consistent in
performance. It failed in Germany, while it suc-
ceeded in Austro-Hungary. By means of black-
mail, the Russians obtained from the Chief of
Austrian Intelligence, prior to the war, a list of
Austrian agents operating in Russia and, more im-
portant, the complete Austrian battle plans.
However, the Russian High Command, relying on
this accurate information, failed to anticipate the
probability of any changes in plans by the Aus-
trians when they learned of the treachery of their
Chief of Intelligence. As a result the Russians al-
most lost the Battle of Lemberg in Galicia.
Spying has always been a specialty of the Rus-
sians and they have been adept in the arts of
counterintelligence. Using the informer system
established in France under Napoleon as a model,
the Ochrana perfected the employment of the
"agent provocateur" for purposes of internal se-
curity and political repression. Some of the most
active Russian revolutionaries were trained by the
Ochrana. In addition, the so-called Black Cab-
inet served as a private censorship office of the
Tzar and for a time brought under its cognizance
even officials of the Ochrana.
British Intelligence
The statement has been made that the British
entered World War I with the worst intelligence
system in Europe and ended with the best.
Whether the first part of the statement is true or
not, it is apparent that the initial organization was
small, with limited funds available. At the be-
ginning of 1914 there was a total staff of 14 to
handle the counterintelligence section of military
intelligence. Only 2 years earlier military staff
doctrine had been formalized to include operations
and intelligence functions within the same branch.
Still earlier, the modern British Secret Service
Department had been founded in more or less its
present form. At the outset, however, the British
were able to capitalize on the weaknesses of their
opponents and to counter successfully the intelli-
gence activities of the Germans. In an amazingly
short time sources of vital information were being
exploited with significant results. It is quite pos-
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32
sible that the economic and financial organizations
of the far-flung British Empire were helpful in
developing many of these sources.
Naval Intelligence expanded rapidly along with
the total British Intelligence Service, achieving
its greatest successes by means of censorship and
its code room, the celebrated Room 40 0. B. With
these means were combined a skillful use of covert
agents. For example, an agent was placed in the
German Admiralty where he had access to secret
codes. On this agent's initiative, Admiral von
Spec was ordered to attack the Falkland Islands.
When the German squadron arrived it was met and
destroyed by the waiting British. Illustrative of
the work of the code room was an intercepted
message which warned the British of an impend-
ing German naval attack on the eastern coast of
England. The result was the Battle of Jutland
which forestalled the coastal attack and crippled
the German Grand Fleet to the extent that it re-
mained in its home ports for the balance of the
war. The unfailing ability of Room 40 0. B. to
break the enemy's codes aided immeasurably in
the war against German submarines.
By early 1918 the British Intelligence Service
had reached a new peak of efficiency in the col-
lection of information and the production of in-
telligence. Nicolai, commenting later on British
Intelligence, expressed the opinion that its work
was unique and unsurpassed. The American
Forces in Europe, which depended greatly on
British Intelligence, regarded it as the best service
in the world. The amazing accuracy of British
information may be attributed in part to the ex-
treme care with which all reports were checked.
The reporting records of all agents were kept in
great detail in order to determine their degree
of accuracy and reliability over long periods of
time. Some agents, known to be employed by the
enemy, were left at large in order that the British
might know what the enemy wanted them to
believe. Another basis for the strength of the
British Service may have been its reported corps
of covert agents scattered throughout Europe,
quite independent of its recognized attache system.
The British record in World War I was not
without blemish. One failure occurred at the
Battle of Jutland when vital information failed to
reach the commanding officer in time to be of use.
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As a result the German fleet managed to escape
destruction. In retrospect, the British com-
mander commented that the shore intelligence or-
ganization and the command afloat must be more
closely linked "to insure mutual confidence and
service." The problem, in this case, appeared to
be one of coordination and communications.
United States Naval Intelligence
When war broke out in Europe the Office of
Naval Intelligence was an organization inadequate
for war purposes. Its personnel included 8 offi-
cers, 10 civilians, and 6 attache's. In an effort to
keep abreast of rapidly changing conditions, Naval
Intelligence, in 1915, established a War Informa-
tion Service to obtain military, political, and eco-
nomic information regarding potential enemies.
At the same time, the office was reorganized on a
functional rather than a subject matter basis.
Four major sections were created. Section A was
given administrative responsibilities and the con-
trol of the collection of confidential information
at home and abroad. Section B included crypto-
graphic activities and a clipping service. Section
C acted as a processing agency, while section D
handled dissemination, archives, and a reference
center. There were other sections concerned with
translation, disbursing, filming, printing, and
mail. For the first time, funds to carry on confi-
dential work were provided by the Congress.
Immediately upon the entry of the United
States into the war there was a great expansion
in the organization and activity of Naval Intel-
ligence. The number of officers on duty jumped
from 8 to 300, and the number of attaches was
doubled. Since it was apparent that the intel-
ligence services of the Allies could supply full
information regarding the enemy in the European
theater, domestic counterintelligence became a
principal activity.
This work was delegated to Aides for Infor-
mation, now known as District Intelligence Of-
ficers, who were assigned to each of the Naval
Districts. Their responsibilities included investi-
gations, plant protection, ship inspection, and
naval personnel, both military and civilian.
Branch Intelligence Offices were established as
undercover agencies in large seaports and manu-
facturing centers. These offices grew to consider-
269196 54- 4
33
able size and accomplished much useful work. As
an indication of the extent of naval counterintel-
ligence in the United States, over 3,000 individuals
were actively engaged in its various activities at
the peak of the war. Although cable and radio
censorship was under the cognizance of Naval
Communications, Intelligence provided consider-
able assistance. In the domestic field there was
some conflict of interests between Naval Intel-
ligence and such other Government agencies as
Military Intelligence, the Departments of Justice
and Treasury, the Emergency Fleet Corporation,
and the War Industries Board.
Abroad, the naval attaches continued to have as
their primary responsibility the collection of in-
formation. The quality of their work during the
war was subject to considerable criticism, espe-
cially by staff officers assigned to United States
Naval Forces, Europe, with headquarters in Lon-
don. Adm. W. S. Sims, in command of this force,
was also critical of the evaluation of initial reports
by Intelligence headquarters in Washington. At
the same time, he fully recognized the importance
of intelligence and stated that the "efficient and
intelligent exercise of command is entirely de-
pendent upon information." It was his expressed
point of view that there should be an entirely sepa-
rate Intelligence Section on a naval staff which
would work in the closest cooperation with the
other staff sections. He stressed the opinion that
Intelligence should be prepared to be the first in the
field in the event of war. Some of the criticism
of the work of the naval attaches can undoubtedly
be attributed to the fact that the number of per-
sonnel was inadequate to permit the satisfactory
performance of their assigned responsibilities. It
was also found that the personalities of officers per-
forming attache duties and their ability to work
easily with representatives of foreign intelligence
services were of great importance.
United States Military Intelligence
Col. Ralph H. van Deman, called the "father of
American Military Intelligence," played an im-
portant role in the postwar recognition of Intel-
ligence as a separate function of the Army's Gen-
eral Staff. He was materially aided by the Sec-
retary of War, the Army's Chief of Staff, and Gen-
eral Pershing himself. The latter made Intel-
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ligence a coordinate section of his staff even before
his forces landed in England in June 1917. The
British, and especially the French staff systems
influenced the staff organization of the American
Expeditionary Forces in Europe, with the result
that Intelligence sections were created at both
higher and intermediate echelons. When America
entered the war, Army Intelligence was rapidly
expanded.
The central office in Washington was organized
into three branches. The positive branch was as-
signed the functions of collection, evaluation, and
dissemination. Its responsibilities included prep-
aration of situation estimates and translation of
documents. The negative branch carried out
counterintelligence functions, including investi-
gations regarding disloyalty and sedition, enemy
activities, and graft and fraud in organizations
under the control of the War Department.
Thousands of officers and men were engaged in
this field. The Geographic Branch was concerned
with the production of maps, photographs, and
terrain studies. In addition there were sections
for administration, collection of information by
attaches and troops, and codes and ciphers.
In connection with MIS, the code and cipher
section, it should be noted that this type of work
was almost unknown to the War Department
prior to World War I. Its activities were many
and varied and have been recorded in some detail
by II. 0. Yardley in his book, The American Black
Chamber. However, this section was regarded
only as a wartime agency by the Director of Mili-
tary Intelligence and high Government officials,
and was discontinued shortly after the war was
over. During its relatively short existence, it
demonstrated the importance of cryptography as
an intelligence procedure essential to the success-
ful prosecution of war.
In the European Theater there are interesting
examples of the effectiveness of Army Intelli-
gence. One concerns the discovery of vital in-
formation on German submarine operations in the
North Sea and around the British Isles. In Oc-
tober 1917, after a successful raid over England,
the German zeppelin L-49 was forced down in
France. Scraps of an operational map were ob-
tained through the persistent efforts of an Ameri-
can colonel who waded through a swamp over
CONFIDENTIAL
34
which the zeppelin had traveled. The map con-
tained a code covering the North Sea and British
Isles area. It meant little, however, until a code
book was recovered from two American souvenir
hunters who had rifled the cabin of the L-49 prior
to the arrival of Intelligence representatives.
With the map and the code book, the Allies gained
complete data on German submarine operations
and were able to surprise and destroy a large num-
ber of U-boats at their designated rendezvous.
The activities of the military attaches in Eu-
rope and the military observers attached to the
European armies during the first part of the war
appear to have been handicapped by organiza-
tional deficiencies. In the War Department's
Annual Report for the year 1919, the Chief of
Staff commented that the valuable information
gathered by these military observers was never
properly used. During this period, the attaches
were involved in counterintelligence work which
proved both difficult and delicate.
It was not until August 1918 that the Military
Intelligence Division was established officially as
coequal with the other Divisions of the Army
General Staff. In commenting upon this devel-
opment, the Director of Military Intelligence
stated that correct military information can be
obtained only as the result of correct staff organi-
zation. He added: "Our Army now has its eyes
open. It is the duty of every officer to study and
support our intelligence organization in order
that our Army eyes may never again be closed."
At the height of its activity, near the close of the
war, the Division in Washington was staffed by
more than 1,200 highly specialized persons, of
whom the majority were civilian employees. The
field force was enlarged and improved, with rep-
resentatives in all important foreign countries,
in the major cities of the United States, and in
each military unit at home and overseas. Army
Intelligence personnel were utilized by the Ameri-
can Commission during the peace negotiations in
Paris.
By the end of this war, there was apparent rec-
ognition of the close relationships which should
exist between intelligence and national strategy
and between intelligence and war planning. Brig.
Gen. Marlborough Churchill, Director of Military
Intelligence, wrote that national policy is based
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on accurate predictions regarding the interna-
tional future and that war plans must be grounded
on correct detailed information. "There is hardly
an officer who does not realize that at a G. H. Q.
and at the headquarters of every army, corps, di-
vision, and similar unit, G-3 cannot make good
plans unless G-2 furnishes good information." A
strikingly similar statement was to be made more
than 30 years later by the Army's Chief of Staff,
Gen. Omar Bradley, in relating his personal ex-
periences in World War II.
Perhaps the most important single contribution
made by the United States to the development of
offensive intelligence method was the employment
of aircraft to transport covert agents over the
battlelines to and from areas under enemy control.
In this connection, however, it should be noted
that the head of Army Intelligence, at the end of
the war, believed that covert agents could not be
justified by the military in time of peace. In this
belief he appears to have reflected the thinking then
current among Washington officials.
THE INTERWAR PERIOD
In the period between World Wars I and II,
political developments in each of the major na-
tions distinctively shaped the emphasis on and
therefore the results of intelligence. Having
fought a war to end all wars, the United States
sharply curtailed its military expenditures and em-
barked upon a program of world peace. Public
opinion was such that there was a necessary and
rapid demobilization of both civilian and tempo-
rarily commissioned personnel. A similar situa-
tion existed in Great Britain, where a conservative
government sought a return to the status quo.
In France, Intelligence suffered increasingly from
growing political corruption. On the other hand,
restrictive political police systems became the
foundation and support of autocratic govern-
ments in Germany, Italy, and Soviet Russia, not
to mention other smaller countries in central and
eastern Europe.
The Neglect of Intelligence in the United States
The intelligence organization which had begun
to assume some form by the close of World War I
deteriorated rapidly. Military Intelligence, such
as it was, suffered from insufficient funds, lack of
35
CONFIDENTIAL
appreciation or sense of responsibility on the part
of the State, War, and Navy Departments, and,
most of all, from a feeling by most officers that
an Intelligence assignment was undesirable. For
the most part, Intelligence billets were filled by
officers awaiting retirement. Such capable officers
as were assigned found little opportunity or en-
couragement to improve the situation. There was
no successful effort to recruit or train new
personnel.
The organization of Naval Intelligence prac-
tically fell to pieces. Contributing factors were
the general desire to return to "normalcy," and
a feeling of antagonism toward any organization
involving classified activities. In 1920 the Secre-
tary of the Navy assured the Congress that the
activities of Naval Intelligence in the collection
of information at home had been restricted and
the office reduced to its prewar status. At the
same time, the Director of Naval Intelligence was
constrained to state that the activities of his of-
fice were now the same as they had been in 1882.
The number of attaches abroad was cut dras-
tically.
By 1938 world political conditions had stimu-
lated an increase in the number of naval attaches.
However, the collection of information was in-
adequate and there were too few trained persons
to process what was collected. By late 1941 the
organization of Naval Intelligence had been ex-
panded in Washington, in the naval districts, and
overseas. The volume of incoming information
increased correspondingly, but the years of neg-
lect and inactivity could not be overcome so
quickly.
The Condition of British Intelligence
The published records of expenditures ap-
proved by Parliament for governmental intelli-
gence organizations indicate roughly their status
during the period from 1919 to 1939. More than
$5,000,000 were appropriated in 1919. The fol-
lowing year operating funds were cut to about
one fifth of that amount, and during succeeding
years there were still further reductions. Al-
though the British had developed the best intelli-
gence organization in Europe during World
War I, they soon found themselves with little
more than a skeleton force, incapable of much
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productive action. Fortunately, however, the
vital nucleus was retained upon which to build
again.
By 1935 there were indications that British Na-
val Intelligence was active once more in the
Mediterranean area. One of its self-revealed
agents, Dod Orsborne, has given an interesting ac-
count of his own assignment. His purpose was
to obtain and to transmit information about Mus-
solini's activities in Ethiopia and about the prog-
ress of events in Spain. He was disguised as the
skipper of a boat whose appearance could be
radically altered from sailing vessel to steam
trawler to diesel-driven fishing boat. He landed
agents in Spain, the Balearic Islands, Morocco,
Algeria, and Libya and brought back vital infor-
mation to his contact at Gibraltar. His story is
not only colorful, but also indicative of one type
of intelligence operations in the Mediterranean
during the period of increasing tension some years
before the outbreak of war.
By 1939 the funds reported as available to Brit-
ish Intelligence had been increased to more than
$2,000,000. Once again the British were to de-
velop the most efficient intelligence organization in
the world. Two of their initial and basic problems
were those of personnel and training. For the im-
pending war, therefore, their early intelligence
efforts were necessarily defensive. Their success
has been attributed, in part at least, to qualities of
discipline, imagination, and improvisation.
The Decline of French Intelligence
At the close of World War I, France had one
of the most efficient and extensive intelligence sys-
tems in Europe. The head of Military Intelli-
gence, through his membership on one of the
important Allied commissions, was able to expand
his organization of covert agents throughout Eu-
rope during the early postwar period. As the
newly created national states of central and east-
ern Europe developed their own governmental
structures, their intelligence systems were closely
coordinated with that of France. By this in-
genious method France was able to advance and to
protect its national interests and to maintain an
intricate network of agents and informers. The
resulting organization was superior to that of
Stieber and the equal, at least, of that of Napoleon.
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36
In the decade before the Second World War,
this organization was fatally weakened by the
germs of internal corruption which spread
throughout the nation, and which eventually aided
the Germans in infiltrating both the political and
military structure of France, thus further weak-
ening the French intelligence system.
The Expansion of German Intelligence
As early as 1924 the Chief of German Military
Intelligence, Nicolai, declared: "Now that inten-
sive military, political, and economic espionage,
after its successes in the World War, has become
an official organ of the state, it is time that the
public should recognize the fact." While the
United States and Great Britain sought peace
through the reduction Of their wartime organiza-
tions, the Germans strove to profit by their mis-
takes and to forge invincible weapons for military
victory. The growth of a dictatorship under
Adolph Hitler and the National Socialist Party
encouraged, promoted, and soon absorbed this ef-
fort of the German militarists.
The militarists, including Ludendorff, were con-
vinced that World War I had been lost because
of a failure to organize the country for total war,
behind the battlelines as well as at the front.
Acutely aware that this war had shifted the em-
phasis of attack to the minds and emotions of
both soldiers and civilians, they recognized the
great importance of propaganda. Lenin had
enunciated the idea of an initial moral disintegra-
tion of the enemy before attempting physical at-
tack; and Hitler was in complete agreement. In
Nein Kampf, he wrote, "In the future, the place
of the artillery barrage as preparation for an in-
fantry attack will be taken by revolutionary propa-
ganda, designed to break down the enemy psy-
chologically before the armies begin to function
at all."
To carry out this new type of warfare a new
armament of knowledge was required. As soon
as Hitler assumed power he gave high priority to
the organization necessary to produce that knowl-
edge. By 1937 the new German intelligence sys-
tem was operating at peak efficiency with all of
its many branches carefully coordinated by a Liai-
son Staff, of which Rudolph Hess was the chair-
man and Nicolai a permanent member. Included
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in this system were: the Intelligence Service of
the War ministry, under the direction of Nicolai ;
the Abwehr, or Military Intelligence, under Ad-
miral Canaris ; the Auslands Organization (AO),
or Organization of Germans Living Abroad,
headed by Ernst Bohle ; the Special Service of
the Foreign Office, headed by von Ribbentrop;
the Foreign Department of the Propaganda Min-
istry, under Goebbels; Rosenberg's Foreign Polit-
ical Office; the Foreign Department of the Min-
istry of Economics and Finance; the Reich
Colonial Office; and the Foreign Department of
the Gestapo, under Himmler and Heydrich.
Hitler's personal plan for world conquest was
based upon means which were not only military,
but also economic, political, and psychological.
To make it effective, full information and accurate
estimates were required concerning the entire re-
sistance capability, both actual and potential, of
prospective enemies. Knowledge of actual re-
armament was not as important as rearmament
potential; the capacity of an enemy's war industry
was not as significant as the total industrial po-
tential which could be geared to war purposes.
Prof. Karl Haushofer's Geopolitical Institute at
the University of Munich thus became an ad-
ditional important branch of the German system
devoted to the collection of information and the
production of intelligence. With unlimited funds
available, Haushofer employed more than a thou-
sand research workers at home and abroad, in-
cluding historians and economic statisticians. De-
tailed analyses of the more important countries of
the world were prepared from the point of view of
their political, economic, and sociological struc-
tures. Both geographic vulnerabilities and mi-
nority group problems were included in these
studies.
Such was the comprehensive and complex Ger-
man intelligence system. It was a worldwide or-
ganization for the gathering of vast quantities of
information, with elaborate facilities for classify-
ing, evaluating, and converting that information
into intelligence. Under the Nazis, intelligence
as an activity was a huge enterprise, operating
with the precision of a modern machine. No
longer was intelligence a matter of individual ac-
complishment but rather the combined achieve-
ment of many groups. The dimensions of the new
organization were drawn to accommodate the re-
quirements of global war, fought by many means.
It was a system new to the modern world.
In developing this organization the Nazis were
influenced considerably by Soviet methods. For
example, the machinery of diplomacy was care-
fully geared to intelligence operations. Special
agents were attached to embassies, legations, and
consulates throughout the world under the guise
of military, naval, air, commercial, and press at-
taches. Networks of covert agents were tied in
with these special groups. The worldwide or-
ganization of German-born men and women was
exploited wherever possible. Its potentialities
were great, as indicated by the size of its mem-
bership which was officially reported in 1937 to be
3 million, and an additional 100,000 sailors serving
on German ships. Special organizations in Ger-
many were utilized, such as the Students' Bureau,
the Bureau for Educators and Teachers, and var-
ious labor and cultural groups. Even the Ger-
man youth were carefully organized and trained
to believe that sabotage, murder, and spying were
natural expressions of loyalty to the State and
Per Filehrer.
Every conceivable method was employed to gain
information. One of the more technical was the
breaking of diplomatic codes. A clever device of
the German Foreign Ministry was the delivery of
an important note to foreign embassies on a quiet
weekend which would require the embassy to re-
quest instructions from its government. When
such enciphered messages were presented to the
Reichspost for transmittal, German cryptanalysts
would attempt to break the codes used, capitaliz-
ing on the possibility that the message had not
been paraphrased and would contain the German
note verbatim. Whether or not this particular
device was used against the Belgians, it is true
that their diplomatic code was known to German
Intelligence before the outbreak of World War II.
Initially at least, within the War Ministry,
Nicolai was able to coordinate all Military Intel-
ligence activities?army, navy and air?and to
achieve an overall political guidance through liai-
son with the Foreign Office. Under Hitler, there-
fore, Nicolai's theories became practice for a lim-
ited period of time. In addition, he was able to
expand the field of military intelligence interest
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to include not only fortifications, military person-
nel, and materiel, but also such behind-the-line
matters as communications systems, public utili-
ties, and scientific and technical developments.
Careful and early planning was a key feature
of the German system. For example, the Abwehr,
under Admiral Canaris, had selected its foreign
listening posts and personnel with the greatest of
care years before war came. There are indications
that even the isolation of Germany by its enemies
was given consideration, and well-laid plans were
prepared by the Abwehr to permit the continued
flow of information into Berlin from various areas
outside of Europe.
Intensive advance planning, in which Intelli-
gence played a vital part, found its most startling
expression in Hitler's development of the modern
offensive weapon which came to be known, after the
Spanish Civil War, as the fifth column. Highly
effective in a number of foreign countries, this
weapon consisted of corrupt, politically dissatis-
fied, self-interested people who were won to the
Nazi cause by means of propaganda and master-
race doctrines. Many of these people remained in-
active and unknown, to be used for special pur-
poses when military conflict began. Then bridges
were seized and road blocks formed by men in
civilian clothes or local uniforms; and planned
sabotage threw into confusion local defenses, sup-
ply systems, and transportation and telecommuni-
cations.
German Intelligence operations abroad were
many and met with varying degrees of success.
In France the political and moral disintegration
provided the Nazis with a most rewarding oppor-
tunity for fifth-column activities. A number of
Frenchmen whose loyalties were bought by Ger-
man gold and promises held important positions in
government and came from some of the first fami-
lies of the land. The frequency of trials for trea-
son in the prewar period revealed the gravity of
the situation. Involved in some of these trials
was betrayal to the Germans of secrets of the
Maginot Line, the Belfort fortifications, and plans
of the Metz fortress and the Toulon Naval Base.
In other countries of Europe the appearance of
the quislings after war began revealed the success
of earlier German operations.
Fully aware of the failure of German Intelli-
CONFIDENTIAL 38
gence in Great Britain in 1914, the Nazis were
determined that it should not fail again. Accord-
ingly, large numbers of agents were sent into Eng-
land years before Poland was invaded. The
extensiveness of their activities is indicated by the
number of espionage cases which were uncovered
during the years from 1935 to 1939. Not all were
caught, however. One successful agent who went
by the name of Van Schullermann first arrived in
England in 1927. By 1932 he had become a natu-
ralized citizen, well established in a modest busi-
ness near the naval base at Scapa Flow. Over a
considerable period of time he seems to have gath-
ered accurate information about the antisubmarine
defenses for this base. At any rate, to his efforts
is attributed the German success in penetrating
Scapa Flow and sinking H. M. S. Royal Oak early
in the war. At the outset of their intelligence
efforts in Britain the Germans were able to take
advantage of the fact that the British were in no
way prepared for hostilities, either in fact or in.
spirit. But again, in 1939 as in 1914, the Germans
were unable to cope successfully with British
counterintelligence. Emphasis on quantity rather
than quality of effort, and stereotyped methods,
again were important factors in the German
failure.
Nazi intelligence activities in the United States
began in 1933, soon after Hitler came to power.
German shipping was utilized to introduce covert
agents into the country and to transmit informa-
tion back to Berlin. By 1938 vital defense secrets
were reaching German Intelligence files. Among
them were blueprints for new bombers and
fighters, stolen from aircraft plants in New York
and Pennsylvania; key designs of naval ships, re-
vealing possible weaknesses; and certain codes of
the Army Air Force. On the west coast German
agents were relaying information to the Japanese;
and members of the German-American Bund were
striving to obtain classified maps of fortifications
in the Panama Canal Zone.
Within Germany itself, Hitler's intelligence sys-
tem was equally comprehensive. The Nazi leaders
fully realized that they must- establish absolute
control over the German people if they were to
control the world. Accordingly, even before
Hitler came to power his henchmen had laid plans
for a secret police system. In 1932 there were
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138,000 German police; a year and a half later
there were 437,000, of whom almost half were
members of the Nazi Elite Guard, called the
Schutz-Staffel, or SS. By 1940 the SS alone
totaled 432,000 men, organized into 36 divisions of
12,000 men each. During war this army was des-
ignated to hold the inner front. A significant
part of the SS was the secret police force called
the Gestapo, a name which came to strike fear and
terror into the minds of men. The Gestapo was
not only inquisitive in nature; it was an inquisi-
tion. Its purpose was to hunt out, repress, and
destroy all enemies of the Nazi State. Its meth-
ods were characterized by brutality, if not bestial-
ity. Its eyes and ears gradually penetrated all
phases of German life.
It must have seemed to the Nazis that they had
indeed forged an invincible weapon for their com-
plete success. It was well made; and Hitler soon
put it to triumphant use in Austria, Czechoslo-
vakia, and other areas of Europe. However, the
Nazis failed to control the inevitable human factor
which eventually led to the serious weakening of
their entire Intelligence apparatus. Distrust arose
and increased between the leaders of the Gestapo
and those of the Abwehr of the Army General
Staff. There were conflicts between the secret
police and military intelligence, especially as to
spheres of authority and responsibility. Rivalries
became intense, with much personal jealousy and
animosity. By 1938 Hitler found it expedient to
form a high command of the armed forces and to
relieve the general staff of any responsibility for
the interpretation of intelligence. The political
direction, urged by Nicolai, became political
domination.
Italian Intelligence
Mussolini's major military intelligence effort
was demonstrated briefly during his campaign
into Ethiopia in 1935. It took the form of sub-
version of the Coptic priests in order to render
even easier the overthrow of their government.
The principal Italian Intelligence organization
was the Fascist Secret Police, known as the OVRA,
established officially in 1926 as a direct result of
the insecurity of the Fascist government and a
succession of attempts to assassinate Mussolini
himself. Its weapons, applied with liberality
against the Italian people, were fear, terror, and
absolute power over life and death. The OVRA,
as part of the state militia, devoted itself to ob-
taining information about all enemies of the state,
both within Italy and abroad. Agents provoca-
teurs were active in Europe and in North and
South America, where they attempted to hunt
down and destroy Italian antifascists. One of
their effective weapons against those who managed
to escape from the country was holding as hostages
families who had been left behind.
In 1938, when Mussolini entrusted his political
fortunes to Hitler, the German Gestapo entered
Italy in force and rapidly replaced OVRA with
its own organization.
The Rapid Growth of Japanese Intelligence
Even before Hitler began to implement his con-
cept of total war in Europe, the Japanese were
putting many of the same theories to use in Asia.
For example, the political and moral disintegra-
tion within Manchuria?an early objective for ag-
gression?provided an excellent opportunity for
the use of the fifth column technique.
For many years the head of the Army's Bureau
of Military Information, Colonel Doihara, had
been active in China. Using many disguises,
from peddlar to priest, he had traveled about the
country, gathering information and enlisting the
services of dissident elements and criminal groups.
He was particularly successful in utilizing agents
provocateurs to create incidents which would jus-
tify interference in China by Japanese military
forces. In the summer of 1931, for example, he
arranged for the kidnapping of the commander of
the Manchurian Infantry. Several days later, a
group of men dressed in uniforms of the Man-
churian Infantry provoked an argument with a
Japanese officer on the streets of Mukden and bru-
tally killed him before a crowd of onlookers.
Taken into custody, these men stated that they
had acted under the direct orders of their com-
mander. When an explanation was demanded by
the Japanese Government, the commander, of
course, could not be found. Immediately the
Manchurian Government was accused of protect-
ing this officer and encouraging atrocities against
the Japanese. After diplomatic denials were pre-
sented, the officer in question reappeared. Hay-
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ing been well treated, he was unable to support
his story of kidnapping and was completely
discredited.
In addition to this type of direct pressure, the
Japanese employed more subtle, though equally
effective, methods. The Chinese opium industry
was exploited and the sale of its product promoted
among the people, with the double-edged result
of further destroying their moral fiber and at the
same time providing financial support for the
whole operation.
As Japanese plans for expansion in Asia devel-
oped, so did her requirements for information to
be used to support conquest by military, economic,
political, and psychological means. The alloca-
tion of more than $3,000,000 to official Japanese in-
telligence services for the fiscal year 1934-35 is
indicative of the attention given to their develop-
ment. Listening posts and personnel were gradu-
ally established in Malaya, Singapore, Burma,
Java, the Philippines, Morotai, French In do-
China, and India. After the "China Incident" of
1937 the activities of military intelligence mate-
rially increased. With Manchuria and Korea as
bases for operation, the collection effort against
Soviet Siberia was intensified. Long before their
attack against Pearl Harbor, the Japanese had ex-
tended their intelligence network throughout the
world, utilizing agents of many types.
Trained agents were provided in part by the
Army General Staff. As the demand for personnel
increased, it became necessary to establish secretly
in 1938 a Rear Area Service Personnel Training
Center, which was soon expanded into an Army
Intelligence School. Officers trained at this school
were sent abroad as military attach4s, diplomats,
newspaper reporters, businessmen, or special
agents. Their activities included: the collection
of information and liaison work; the organiza-
tion of small guerrilla groups, especially in China,
for scouting and undercover operations; and sab-
otage and subversion, which was concentrated in
southeast Asia and the islands of the Pacific.
These officers were the vanguard for Japanese mil-
itary action, paving the way for the occupation
of various areas by Japanese troops.
Naval officers also acted as special intelligence
agents and were distributed throughout the mer-
chant marine and fishing fleets disguised as wire-
CONFIDENTIAL
40
less operators, crew members, and ships' officers,
especially in the Pacific. Thus training maneu-
vers of the United States Fleet, for example, were
watched by expert eyes from nearby Japanese
cargo ships or fishing craft. There were, of
course, many situations in which Japanese person-
nel could not be used because of their oriental
appearance. As a result, Caucasians were often
employed, particularly Germans, in such areas as
Hawaii, the United States, and South America.
In addition to their trained personnel, the In-
telligence services had available literally thousands
of amateur collectors of information, for one char-
acteristic of the Japanese is careful and conscien-
tious observation. More important, they feel
impelled to report their observations to proper
authorities. As a result, great quantities of in-
formation were channeled into Tokyo from trav-
elers, tourists, Japanese living abroad, and
business firms operating in foreign countries.
These amateurs usually had cameras and made the
most of their opportunities to photograph war-
ships, naval bases, and other subjects of possible
military interest. Reports and photographs were
turned over to military authorities, either directly
or through consulates, special messengers, or rep-
resentatives of the merchant marine. While
much of this information was inaccurate or with-
out value, it was all carefully classified and proc-
essed by the Intelligence agencies of the Army
and Navy and the Information Bureau of the For-
eign Office. This technique of capitalizing on the
mass collection of information is a Japanese con-
tribution to the modern development of intelli-
gence activity.
The collection procedures of the Japanese in
the prewar period also indicate their appreciation
of the importance of peacetime planning and
preparation, years in advance of actual conflict.
An excellent illustration is provided by one of
their agents, a Dr. Kuehn and his family, who
came to Oahu, T. H., from Germany in 1935. Dr.
Kuehn posed as a scientist interested in the an-
cient history of the islands. About 1939 his
daughter, Ruth, opened a beauty shop, which
served as an excellent source of information gath-
ered from its patrons who were the wives of United
States Navy personnel. As Japanese require-
ments for information became more definite, Dr.
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Kuehn began to forward through the Japanese
and German consulates specific information re-
garding naval ships at Pearl Harbor. On De-
cember 2, 1941, a complete report on the number,
types, and exact locations of United States naval
ships in the Hawaiian area was prepared for the
Japanese consul who transmitted it by short-wave
radio to Japanese Naval Intelligence Headquar-
ters. At the appropriate time, the Kuehns were
to be evacuated to Tokyo by submarine; but this
plan failed to materialize because they were appre-
hended and taken into custody as the result of
action by the United States Naval Intelligence.
The Trend of Soviet Intelligence
During the early years between the two World
Wars, the development and consolidation of power
within Russia consumed much of the attention and
energies of the revolutionists who had seized con-
trol of the government in 1917. For this reason
Soviet Intelligence was, first of all, a security po-
lice system, with military intelligence occupying
a position of secondary importance. Conditioned
to an atmosphere of distrust and suspicion while
they were revolutionary conspirators, the Soviet
leaders fully appreciated the need for a highly
organized and pervasive Intelligence system to
maintain rigid controls over the actions and even
the thoughts of the Russian people. Within 3
weeks after the revolution had become an accom-
plished fact, they established the Cheka which con-
tinued not only the tradition but also the methods
of the Tzarist Oehrana.
The Ch,eka was given great independence of ac-
tion, with the power to carry out searches, arrests,
and executions. Its ruthless and brutal methods
inspired such fear and terror that it became the
object of widespread opposition within a few
short years. As a result, in 1922, when the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics was established, the
Ch,eka was abolished. It was quickly replaced,
however, by the 0. G. P. U., which had its head-
quarters in Moscow, with branches known as
G. P. U. in each of the member republics. The
purposes, powers, and methods of this new or-
ganization were substantially the same as those of
the Ckeka, but its jurisdiction was expanded.
The border and internal security troops were
placed under its control, and a military section
was created to insure the political allegiance of
the Army and the Navy. In 1934, the 0. G. P. U.
was replaced by the N. K. V. D. At this time
there was further centralization of authority and
a reorganization to include all police and firemen
engaged in overt security duties. New sections
were added to direct the surveillance of the civil-
ian population and of foreign espionage agents.
Soviet Intelligence had now become a full-scale
commissariat of the government, far more com-
prehensive and powerful than anything ever en-
visioned by the Tzars. Its stability and deadly
influence were fully demonstrated by its bloody
purge of Red Army personnel in 1937.
The record of Soviet Intelligence within Russia
during the period from 1917 to 1939 is one of
steady expansion and increasing influence in every
aspect of Russian society. Abroad it became
more and more active, developing networks of
agents and informers by many means. The inter-
national organization of Communists, the Comin-
tern, provided excellent opportunities for
intelligence activities in many countries. Diplo-
matic and trade channels were exploited for the
collection of information by carefully placed in-
telligence agents. For example, more extensive
Soviet intelligence activities in the United States
are believed to date from 1933 when diplomatic
relations were reestablished between the two coun-
tries. In fact, every conceivable situation was
skillfully turned to the advantage of intelligence
operations. In 1929 when Stalin expelled Trot-
sky from the Soviet Union, the N. K. V. D. made
use of this situation to send abroad a number of
covert agents posing as escaped sympathizers.
Some legitimate sympathizers were permitted to
leave the U. S. S. R. only after they had agreed to
serve the N. K. V. D. The double result of this
procedure was to provide a good cover for intelli-
gence personnel and to confuse and discredit anti-
Soviet groups outside the country.
The Spanish Civil War was also used to good
advantage for intelligence purposes. Not only
did Soviet personnel receive excellent practical
training, but also valuable information was
gained regarding the capabilities of other coun-
tries involved. One seemingly insignificant, but
important, procedure initiated by the Soviets in
this war was the careful collection of the pass-
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ports of volunteers who came from many coun-
tries to fight in Spain. The passports of those
killed were saved for later use by Soviet agents
in other parts of the world. This procedure pro-
vides a good illustration of long-range planning.
There are indications that Soviet Intelligence,
or the use of intelligence, was not always success-
ful in the pre-World War II period. At the out-
set of the Russo-Finnish War of 1939, Soviet
forces suffered some amazing defeats at the hands
of inferior Finnish armies. There was subse-
quent speculation that the Kremlin may well have
been led by Finnish Communists to believe that
their country's armies would not materially resist
Soviet military maneuvers. If this was true, then
Soviet Intelligence may have suffered from a
tendency to place too much reliance upon infor-
mation derived from affiliated foreign Communist
organizations.
During the early part of World War II, a fur-
ther reorganization of the Soviet Intelligence
System resulted in the establishment of the Peo-
ple's Commissariat of State Security, called the
N. K. G. B. This new agency relieved the
N. K. V. D. of its functions in internal surveil-
lance and the collection of information abroad.
WORLD WAR II
The Second World War has been described as
one of unparalleled mobility, tremendous destruc-
tiveness, and intense savagery. The technologi-
cal improvements in tanks and aircraft, when used
in combination, made possible the lightning war,
or "Blitzkrieg," so successfully employed by Hit-
ler. Poland was conquered in 18 days and France
fell in 35. The French General Staff, complacent
and unprepared, was paralyzed by this new war-
fare of fluid movement. The techniques de-
veloped by the Germans were later used with equal
success by General Patton in his drive on Paris.
Other methods of warfare were developed with
notable effectiveness. Strategic bombing brought
destruction behind the battlelines to all parts of
enemy countries, while transport aircraft carried
conquering airborne forces across geographical
barriers. Amphibious craft made possible the
launching of land attacks from the sea which had
been considered too difficult in previous wars. In-
ventions in the field of electronics produced such
CONFIDENTIAL
42
weapons as radar and guided missiles for long-
range battle use. The aircraft carrier replaced
the battleship as the capital ship and made pos-
sible the waging of sea battles across hundreds of
miles. Guerrilla warfare sprang out of internal
resistance movements and was exploited on a wide
scale. The submarine harassed lines of communi-
cations and committed sizable organized forces
to its pursuit. The radio permitted an intensifi-
cation of propaganda and the waging of psycho-
logical warfare in all parts of the world, a type
of "strategic bombing" of equal effectiveness in
peace or war.
World War II was much more than a series of
battles between armies and navies; it was a gi-
gantic struggle between peoples for survival and
for the perpetuation of their economies and ways
of life. Hitler's intelligence weapon had to be
improved upon and surpassed by the opposing
nations. The variety of the modern methods of
warfare imposed even greater demands upon In-
telligence, for it had to cover not only the armed
forces of the enemy, their discipline, training, and
tactics; in addition, it had to be conversant with
industrial capacity, technological abili ties, trans-
portation and communication facilities, internal
political situations, and the will of the people to
resist. The speed of this war placed a premium
on the time factor in the collection of information
and the dissemination of intelligence. The com-
plexity and scope of military action increased the
problems of preparing accurate intelligence esti-
mates which in turn led to the demand for more
highly trained personnel. The sheer volume of
advance knowledge required for success in battle
forced the expansion of organizations to a size
adequate for its production. The resistance move-
ments in occupied and enemy countries aided ma-
terially in the collection of information. The un-
precedented number of covert agents stepped up
the work of both intelligence and counterintel-
ligence. Radio and aircraft facilitated the trans-
mission of information. The total impact of all
of this intelligence activity rendered doubly im-
portant the most stringent security measures.
At the beginning of World War II, the pre-
ponderance of land and air military strength was
in the hands of Germany, Japan, and the Soviet
Union. Likewise, the offensive intelligence
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strength of Germany and Japan was superior. On
the other hand, for over 2 years the Western Al-
lies were harassed, driven back, and on the de-
fensive, while they took time to prepare a counter-
offensive.
The Effectiveness of German Intelligence
The Nazis began the war with the world's best
organized intelligence service. Without detract-
ing from the effectiveness of the German military
forces, it is generally agreed that their early rapid
progress was greatly facilitated by the advance
preparations of Intelligence, which preceded and
accompanied troop movements. Polish resistance
was paralyzed by the Nazi fifth column which
spread false rumors, issued conflicting orders, and
transmitted vital operational information to the
German General Staff. France, from the military
point of view, was potentially much more power-
ful than Poland, yet fifth column activities had
fatally weakened her ability to fight and, even
worse, her will to resist.
Greece and Yugoslavia were able to prolong
their resistance to German covert penetration.
Time and the examples of Poland and France were
of some assistance to them. In addition, the
Italian OVRA, which had assumed some responsi-
bilities to prepare these countries for invasion,
failed miserably. In Greece, for example, Ger-
man forces were required to save Mussolini from
being thrown back into the Adriatic.
The German intelligence service had available
unlimited funds, an army of agents, and a net-
work of collection centers. At the beginning of
the war $200,000,000 were reportedly being
spent annually on intelligence organization and
propaganda. In 1943 the Abwehr was allocated
$11,700,000 and had a personnel strength of 30,000
including 7,000 officers. In Denmark alone there
were 750 Nazi agents. The four major Intelli-
gence centers established by the Abwehr for the
collection of world information were located at
Konigsberg, Munich, Cologne, and Hamburg.
Madrid, Lisbon, Berne, Ankara, Stockholm, Buda-
pest, and the Vatican were centers for the collec-
tion of information on a long-range basis.
Brussels, Warsaw, Sofia, Bucharest, The Hague,
and Paris were considered short-term centers.
One network of agents was distributed among the
43
various diplomatic, consular, and commercial posts
in these capitals. A second network worked inde-
pendently in the collecting and transmitting of in-
formation for strategic and tactical use. One of
the specialized types of collectors was a group of
deaf-mutes who were skilled in the reading of lips
and the recording of conversations seen but not
heard.
In Great Britain, during the early months of the
war, the Germans achieved some successes. The
transmittal of vital information regarding war
factories in Birmingham and Coventry aided in
the bombing of those areas. The German lega-
tion at Dublin served as one collection center;
while Lisbon and Oslo were relay points between
England and Berlin. However, British counter-
intelligence soon proved more than a match for
German Intelligence, whose effectiveness rapidly
dwindled in the British Isles. In fact the British
success in forwarding inaccurate information,
ostensibly from German agents who had actually
been taken into custody, confused and bewildered
headquarters in Berlin.
The entire Middle East was the scene of inten-
sive intelligence activities by German agents lo-
cated in Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and
Afghanistan. The total organization extended
from the Mediterranean coast of North Africa to
the Indian Ocean. The objectives were to under-
mine British influence among the Arab peoples
and to prepare them for German domination by
means of corruption and subversion. In these ef-
forts the Germans had the active assistance of the
Grand Mufti of Jerusalem. The German com-
mercial attache at Ankara was instrumental in
fomenting an unsuccessful rebellion against the
pro-British government of Iraq. The German
ambassador at Ankara, Franz von Papen, was pro-
vided with more than $4,000,000 in gold to finance
his work in the Middle East. But in spite of this
well-organized and numerically superior machine,
German Intelligence failed in its efforts. It also
failed to forecast the Allied invasion of North
Africa.
Of particular interest is the "Cicero" affair
which took place in Turkey during late 1943 and
early 1944. "Cicero" was the code name of an
employee in the British Embassy at Ankara. He
became a German spy, motivated by a desire for
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money and possibly an old hatred of the British.
As a result of his efforts the Germans were pro-
vided with highly classified material of incredible
value: a record of official messages passing be-
tween the British Ambassador and the Foreign
Office in London. In this manner it is believed
that the German Government was fully informed
of the latest figures of American lend-lease
deliveries and anticipated shipments; the minutes
of the Allied Casablanca Conference; a resume of
Allied conversations at Moscow between Stalin,
Anthony Eden, and Cordell Hull, including a re-
port of the Russian demand for a second front in.
Europe; decisions reached between Roosevelt,
Churchill, and Chiang Kai-shek at Cairo; and,
finally, the conclusions of the Teheran Conference,
including decisions of the military staffs of the
Big Three. But even more incredible than the
nature of the information itself is the apparent
fact that the German military and political lead-
ers failed to make use of it. Von Ribbentrop
seems to have questioned the accuracy of the in-
formation and the source remained suspect. The
only real value to the Germans of "Cicero's" work
was the breaking of the British diplomatic code.
In South American countries, German Intelli-
gence exploited important sources of information.
The German Ambassador to Argentina, Baron
von Thermann, coordinated the collection effort
in this part of the world. For transmittal pur-
poses he had available 12 powerful secret radio
stations, operating with the knowledge of Argen-
tine authorities. As of 1942, over $2,000,000 were
being spent annually in Argentina to subsidize
German cultural organizations. There can be little
doubt that information derived from Buenos Aires
and various other ports in South America aided the
operations of German submarine warfare in the
Atlantic.
Weaknesses in the German intelligence service
rapidly diminished its overall effectiveness. Its
elaborate mass training of agents resulted in a
standardized type of operation and response which
facilitated detection, and overcentralization of or-
ganization tended to reduce individual initiative.
Political considerations were an increasingly lim-
iting factor. Tension and distrust grew between
political and military leaders on the one hand and
Army General Staff Intelligence personnel on the
CONFIDENTIAL
44
other. As the war progressed actual leadership
was concentrated in the hands of political leaders
and military men chosen and influenced by them.
Vital decisions were reached more and more by
Hitler himself on the basis of intuition, rather
than intelligence. This was particularly true in
the campaign against the Soviet Union. Hitler
and his henchmen often refused to accept unfavor-
able reports, even though well documented. As a
result, intelligence personnel on all echelons came
to color their reports, emphasizing the favorable
factors and withholding or mitigating the
unfavorable.
There is some evidence to support the conten-
tion that Admiral Canaris, Chief of the Army
Intelligence Section, was in active sympathy with
those German military leaders whose opposition
to the Hitler regime resulted in an abortive at-
tempt to assassinate Der Fuehrer in 1944. At the
Nurnberg trials following the war, Ernst Kalten-
brunner, the head of the German Security Police,
stated: "I had to accept this post (the Reich Se-
curity Office) at a time when suspicion fell on
Admiral Canaris of having collaborated with the
enemy for years . . . In a short time I ascer-
tained the treason of Canaris to a most frightful
extent." Whether or not the individual involved
was Canaris himself will probably never be de-
termined. It is known, however, that the British
gained possession of information which could
have come from very few other sources. For ex-
ample, all German plans for aggressive action
prior to the invasion of France were reported to
the British. They were warned of the impending
attack on Norway in 1940. Winston Churchill
had some knowledge of the plans for the invasion
of England at a time when only a few highly
placed officers of the German General Staff had
similar information. It is of interest to note
that much of this information gained by the Brit-
ish was disregarded, perhaps for lack of con-
firmation.
Suspicion against Canaris reached such propor-
tions that he was relieved of command of the
Abwehr in 1941 when Hitler established a unified
secret intelligence service more directly under his
personal control.
German military intelligence was weakened by
the attitude of the officer group toward it. In the
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German staff organization, Intelligence was sub-
ordinated to Operations. While intelligence of-
ficers were expected to have a clear understanding
of tactical situations, no particular specialization
of knowledge or training was considered essen-
tial. German officers did not regard an intelli-
gence assignment worthy of a soldier and, conse-
quently, endeavored to avoid it whenever possible.
However, the performance of military intelli-
gence must not be underrated. It remained a
formidable weapon during World War II. The
relationship of Intelligence to Operations kept
the study of the enemy situation on an immedi-
ately applicable basis. All officers had been care-
fully trained to develop qualities of thoroughness,
sense of duty, logical approach to problems, and
accuracy. In spite of no special training, they
became competent in these assignments as a re-
sult of hard work and careful study. Their abil-
ity to gather facts and piece together an accurate
picture of the enemy situation was often amaz-
ing. They were most successful in the interroga-
tion of captured enemy personnel. Their radio
intercept work was of a high order and a profit-
able source of information, especially after the
Germans lost their air superiority. It was un-
fortunate for military intelligence that those
officers who had trained themselves in intelligence
were transferred in due time to other assignments
more to their liking and ambition. But, as far
as results were concerned, German military in-
telligence, which had been only mediocre in
World War I, performed rather successfully in
World War II, especially when permitted to func-
tion without the blight of political interference.
The Errors of Japanese Intelligence
The remarkable mass collection system of the
Japanese provided Tokyo with a wealth of vital
information prior to the outbreak of war. For
example, when it was ready to move troops into
Southeast Asia, the Imperial High Command had
complete and accurate models of the defenses of
Hong Kong down to the last gun position. Its
detailed information regarding ship positions and
movements in and around Pearl Harbor was used
with devastating effect. However, the Japanese
intelligence organization was not provided with
a sufficient number of trained personnel at the
higher echelons to assemble and evaluate the mass
of material which had been collected.
At the time of Pearl Harbor the Intelligence
Section of the Army General Staff included only
17 officers. Its growth was negligible until early
in 1945 when 40 additional officers were assigned
to be trained for duty with the armies organized
for the defense of the Japanese islands. The de-
velopment of Naval Intelligence was equally slow.
Beginning with 29 officers attached to the Naval
General Staff, the total number was increased to
97 by early 1945. The Kempeitai, or secret police,
was primarily responsible for counterintelligence
and was well organized, with trained personnel
to carry out this function. It achieved a reputa-
tion similar to that of the German Gestapo, and
many of its methods were comparable.
The slow and limited development of Japanese
Intelligence appears to have resulted from the
high command's concept of a short war, defensive
in nature, following the initial conquests. Based
on the possibilities of an early German victory in
Europe and the rapid consolidation of her own
newly won territories, Japan believed that the
United States would settle for an advantageous
compromise peace. As a result, neither the Army
nor the Navy expanded their intelligence organi-
zations to make possible the production of intel-
ligence for dissemination throughout all levels of
command. At the headquarters level, intelligence
for both the Army and the Navy was subordinated
to the war plans sections and responsible prima-
rily for the production of background intelligence.
There was apparently little coordination between
the intelligence effort at headquarters and at the
operational levels.
In the field, intelligence units were utilized by
military commanders for such purposes as the
collection of tactical information, penetration and
subversion of native peoples, and the exploitation
of economic sabotage. These units often worked
with the military governments established for con-
quered territories. The unit attached to the Nan-
king Government Military Affairs Committee, for
example, was particularly active in the prepara-
tion of surveys and statistics and in attempting
to influence and control the activities of the local
Chinese. In general, however, these units were
not effective, for a variety of reasons. In the first
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place they were not organized in sufficient time
to permit the accomplishment of their responsibil-
ities. One unit, created for the battle of the
Pacific islands, became operational just 2 months
before hostilities began. Another reason was the
Japanese failure to appreciate the customs and
habits of other peoples and an attempt to impose
their own, without change. They alienated those
whom they sought to control, and operated by
means of intimidation and threats. There was
continuous conflict over responsibility and author-
ity between military commanders, intelligence
units, and representatives of the secret police.
Finally, many operational commanders had no
appreciation of the potential value or use of the
intelligence units assigned to them, particularly
from a long-range point of view.
When Japan's diplomatic relations with many
countries were broken, her primary sources of in-
formation were reduced to Allied communications
transmissions, short wave and medium wave radio
broadcasts, and newspapers and magazines pro-
cured through neutral sources.
Special agents planted in the Western Hemi-
sphere continued to supply some information, with
diminishing degrees of success as the war pro-
gressed. The case of one American citizen who
served as an agent is illustrative of the use made
of the nationals of various countries for espio-
nage purposes and, incidentally, of the devious
means employed for the transmittal of informa-
tion. Mrs. Velvalee Dickinson, owner of an ex-
clusive doll shop in New York City, made use
of her occupation and clientele to transmit infor-
mation regarding the movement of United States
Navy ships. Various kinds of dolls provided an
ingenious code. Her messages were transmitted
via a contact in Buenos Aires. The suspicion
which led to her discovery was aroused when one
of her letters to Argentina was returned to the
United States, addressee unknown. The Japanese
had failed to notify her that her contact had
moved. This incident has been popularized as
"The Case of the Talking Dolls."
These, then, were some of the errors of Japanese
Intelligence, which were in turn errors of the
Japanese High Command. They contributed to
heavy losses in Japanese manpower and materiel
and were factors in Japan's eventual defeat.
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46
The Resiliency of British Intelligence
Although decidedly inferior to that of the Ger-
mans in numbers and resources at the beginning
of the war, British Intelligence made maximum
use of its available strength and centuries of ex-
perience. Much of the German Intelligence ac-
tivity in Britain had been carefully followed and
its organization penetrated. When the Germans
marched into Poland, therefore, it was compara-
tively easy, by means of extensive raids and ar-
rests, to destroy the overall effectiveness of Ger-
man Intelligence in Britain in much the same way
as it had been accomplished early in World
War I.
After Dunkirk, when the British faced one of
the most precarious and dangerous situations of
their history, Intelligence proved to be a bul-
wark of defense. Appalling weaknesses were suc-
cessfully concealed from the Germans and accu-
rate information made possible the skillful use of
inferior military forces. In his book, Top Secret,
Robert Ingersoll has aptly commented: "Intelli-
gence was always the Empire's ace in the hole.
When British fortunes were at the lowest ebb, it
was their Intelligence organization which saved
them."
Once the country was on a war basis, ample
funds and personnel became available, but the
training of personnel required considerable time.
It was not until several years had passed that Brit-
ish Intelligence was able to develop its outstand-
ing organization, again conceded to be the "world's
best." By that time many covert agents of Brit-
ish, French, and German nationality were active
within Germany itself. Innumerable bits of in-
formation, often irrelevant in themselves, flowed
regularly into London for analysis by various in-
telligence agencies. Through the European gov-
ernments-in-exile, in London, encouragement was
given to the underground resistance movements
which sprang up against the Germans all over
Europe. The time came when British Intelli-
gence was able to operate fifth columns in many
countries of Europe as effective as those of Hitler.
The British had many assets upon which their
intelligence organization could draw. In addi-
tion to comprehensive experience, internationally
educated, politically informed soldiers and civil-
ians were available who were adept in dealing
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with foreign peoples. Their basic research and
available source material were tangible assets.
Their military and political leaders had a real
and full appreciation not only of the value of
intelligence, but also of long-range planning.
Typical of British Intelligence personnel was
a young man named Rankin who had lived all of
his life in the inaccessible Chin hills of Burma.
He knew the Burmese, Chin, and Manipur lan-
guages, dressed and lived like the natives, and had
a sincere affection for them. Even though the na-
tives in these hills were anti-British, Rankin was
able to influence them to support the Allied cause.
A more intangible asset was the ability of the
British to improvise. When their armies were
driven off the continent and their channels of in-
formation blocked, they devised a means of ex-
tracting military information from photographs
taken over enemy-held territory. In a relatively
short time the results obtained were successful to
a spectacular degree. The development of photo-
graphic interpretation as a technique for the col-
lection of information was a significant British
contribution to intelligence in World War II.
A further asset was the control of the informa-
tion upon which military decisions were made.
This control, as well as effectiveness of presenta-
tion, was well demonstrated at the major political
and military conferences held by the Allies during
the war. In the European theater, for example,
their intelligence organization was so complete
that they were given primary responsibility for
enemy intelligence in that theater. In the Middle
East, British agents, experienced in local customs
and traditions, surpassed the Germans in winning
the support of those peoples. As is often true in
the Orient, the bribe was the key to support, and
it was often a case of outbidding the Germans.
One of the real achievements of Intelligence was
a delay in the German use of V-bombs against
Britain. Preliminary reports about German de-
velopment of V-weapons were received as early as
1942, and a female special agent was able to trans-
mit vital information concerning the activities and
installations of the main research station at Peene-
muende. As a result of her work, one of the most
effective Allied air raids of the war was carried
out against this area at a time when some of Ger-
many's key scientists were there. Over 200 per-
47
sons were killed during this raid, including the
director of the station and the Chief of Staff of
the Luftwaffe. The raid substantially retarded
the production of these new weapons.
British Intelligence, however, was not always
successful. One of its failures contributed to the
defeat of General Montgomery's forces at Am-
helm. Just prior to this engagement Intelligence
lost track of one German Panzer corps and was
unable to determine its location, which unfortu-
nately was Arnheim. The well-guarded move-
ment of this corps is reported to have resulted
from a betrayal of Montgomery's plans by a
Dutch traitor. In any event, British losses were
heavy. Some of the troops who managed to es-
cape were aided by British agents in that area.
Throughout the war, Intelligence continued to
underestimate German production capabilities, re-
cuperative powers, and capacity to wage war.
Basing its decisions on such estimates, the British
General Staff discouraged an invasion of the con-
tinent from the west, believing that Germany's
surrender could be brought about by aerial bomb-
ing. Opposition to invasion plans was further
strengthened as a result of overestimating the
strength of German fortifications along the chan-
nel coast. Captured German generals later
pointed out that this overestimate had been caused
by effective propaganda. A much earlier failure
of Intelligence was its incorrect appraisal of Ger-
man intentions in Norway, just prior to the occu-
pation of that country.
For a short period during the war there was
intense rivalry between the Intelligence and Oper-
ations staffs, which temporarily blocked the inter-
change of important information. As a result,
on one occasion, both groups put agents ashore at
the same place on the coast of Norway within an
interval of 3 days. The agents from Operations
destroyed vital targets in the area and withdrew.
When the Intelligence agents arrived they re-
ceived a warm welcome from the German field
police.
In the field of counterintelligence the British
were of considerable assistance to the Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation in both North and South
America, and this mutual cooperation was of real
value in smashing the Nazi espionage activities
there.
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The Rapid Growth of a United States Intelligence
Organization
Surprised and dismayed by the progress of
world events leading up to World War II, the
United States gradually became aware of the in-
adequacy of its intelligence agencies which it had
so pointedly neglected. The success of the Jap-
anese attack at Pearl Harbor disclosed the tragic
results of this neglect. Even more, it revealed a
lack of coordination of effort in the collection of
information, interdepartmental jealousies which
stymied effective exchange of information, and in-
correct estimates of the war capabilities of the
enemy.
As a result, the older intelligence agencies were
expanded and strengthened, and new agencies
were created to develop sources of information and
new techniques. Among these agencies were: a
foreign propaganda agency, an economic warfare
agency, a war production agency, the Office of
Strategic Services, a branch of the foreign eco-
nomic administration, and special units in the De-
partments of Justice, Interior, and Agriculture.
Founded in 1908 and reorganized in 1924, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation was officially
given responsibilities for counterintelligence in
1939. After the war began its personnel expanded
to more than 15,000. It had a tremendous task
in weeding out potentially dangerous aliens, as
is indicated by the fact that over 7,000 Germans
and 5,000 Japanese were detained or imprisoned
after war was declared. The size of the job can
be estimated somewhat from a partial list of ma-
terial collected from the hiding places of enemy
agents: 4,626 firearms, including modern auto-
matics and submachine guns; 307,506 rounds of
ammunition, 2,340 sticks of dynamite, 2,800 dyna-
mite caps, 3,787 feet of fuse, 1,700 items such as
time bombs, teller mines and boohytraps ; over
3,000 illegal radio receivers and shortwave trans-
mitters; 4,000 cameras, navigational instruments,
naval charts, aeronautical maps, tens of thousands
of detailed photographs of coastlines, ports, in-
dustrial plants; and thousands of feet of micro-
film containing vital records prepared by covert
agents. Aided by Naval and Army Intelligence,
the Federal Bureau of Investigation was emi-
nently successful in thwarting sabotage efforts.
Although the sabotage of American factories was
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a part of the Nazi plan, there is no definite evi-
dence that organized German sabotage achieved
any major destruction.
One of the most clever counterintelligence feats
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation was made
possible by a German-born American citizen
named Wilhelm Sebold, who was employed as an
engineer by the Consolidated Aircraft Co. In
1939 Sebold made a trip to Germany to visit his
parents and relatives. While there he was de-
tained by the Gestapo and "persuaded" to become
an undercover agent in the United States, with his
family held as hostages in Germany. After train-
ing in espionage and radio transmission at a Nazi
spy school, he was permitted to return to America
with instructions to gather detailed statistics on
aircraft and poison-gas production. He had been
able to advise the FBI of his predicament through
the American consul in Germany. Upon his re-
turn, Sebold was established by the FBI at Center-
port, Long Island, where the most modern short-
wave transmitter equipment was made available
for his use. For a period of 16 months both fake
and genuine information was transmitted to the
unsuspecting Germans. By means of Sebold and
his shortwave transmitters, the Nazis were thor-
oughly deceived as to the number of aircraft avail-
able to the British for the Battle of Britain and
the FBI was able to round up over 30 Nazi agents
in the United States and to gain information about
others located in Cuba, Brazil, Argentina, and
Chile.
48
The Office of Strategic Services
The establishment of the Office of Strategic
Services in 1941 under Maj. Gen. William J. Dono-
van was an unprecedented act on the part of the
United States Government. Its early functions
included research and analysis of military, politi-
cal, and economic information us it affected the
security of the country. After Pearl Harbor it
was placed under the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Its
mission was twofold: to act in support of the Army
and Navy in the collection and analysis of strategic
information; and to be responsible for the plan-
ning and operating of special services. These
special services involved covert operations which
would not normally be carried on by the armed
forces. Personnel were selected for this work only
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after the most intensive screening and psychologi-
cal testing for mental aptitude and emotional sta-
bility. Their training in subversive warfare was
rigorous, extensive, and carried on under condi-
tions of the greatest secrecy. Altogether, during
the war, thousands of OSS operators made their
way into enemy countries to engage in black war
fare, a term applied to the often unrecorded yet
decisive struggle between spies and counterspies.
Their weapons were bribery, treachery, and sub-
version. Although inexperience resulted in some
mistakes, the agents of the OSS were able to
achieve considerable success and to measure up
favorably to the professional agents of the
European powers.
Early success marked the efforts of the OSS
agents who helped to pave the way for the invasion
of North Africa. A total of 15 men were in North
Africa for almost a year before the actual invasion,
operating 5 secret radio stations, transmitting vital
information which facilitated the movement of
troops ashore, and arranging the contacts between
representatives of the Allies and friendly elements
in that area. The Jedburgh Mission, developed
in 1943 by the OSS and its British opposite num-
ber, proved most successful in integrating the ac-
tivities of friendly European underground resist-
ance groups with the overall plans of the Allied
Command. The program of this mission was to
parachute scores of three-men teams into France,
Belgium, and Holland on D-day ahead of ad-
vancing Allied armies, to provide resistance
groups with military supplies, and to lead them
in coordinated guerrilla activities designed to
create confusion and havoc behind the German
lines. In commenting on the success of the Jed-
burgh Mission, General Eisenhower said: "In no
previous war, and in no other theater of this war,
have resistance forces been so closely harnessed to
the main military effort."
OSS agents encouraged the labor resistance
movement in the occupied countries of Europe,
while in Germany itself 80 separate contacts were
established and workers were organized even in
the factories of the Ruhr. When Allied troops
reached the Rhine German bargemen were avail-
able to help them cross the river. In the Balkan
countries the OSS helped to set up successful
escape and evasion operations. Shortly after the
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OF INTELLIGENCE CONFIDENTIAL
surrender of Rumania a total of 1,050 airmen were
rescued from prison camps around Bucharest.
The extraordinary heroism and bravery of one
OSS agent, Corp. Frederic A. Mayer, resulted in
the declaration of Innsbruk, Austria, as an open
city and its capture by American troops without a
fight. In Burma, OSS personnel helped to organ-
ize a guerrilla warfare campaign against the Japa-
nese. The intelligence they gathered provided
the basis for almost all of the combat missions
flown in that area by the 19th Air Force. In 2i/2
years of operations, the Kachin guerrilla forces in
Burma killed over 5,000 Japanese troops, dis-
rupted their lines of communications, and spear-
headed the advances of the Allies under the com-
mand of Gen. Stillwell.
Further American Expansion
In addition to the establishment of new intelli-
gence agencies, there was a tremendous expansion
of the older military intelligence organizations.
For example, at the peak of its wartime effort the
Office of Naval Intelligence had a sizable number
of officers, enlisted men, and civilian personnel in
the United States and scattered throughout the
world. After the Battle of Midway, naval com-
manders came to appreciate more fully the value
of Intelligence officers attached to their staffs for
operational purposes. Accordingly, the demand
quickly exceeded the supply available. A more
detailed discussion of the development of naval
operational intelligence will be found in chapter
13. However, it should be noted here that intelli-
gence was recognized as an essential function of
the staffs of the operating forces afloat.
The surface naval forces themselves were often
valuable sources of information. For example,
in June 1944 the aircraft carrier, Guadcalanal,
captured a German submarine undamaged off
Cape Blanco, French West Africa, and obtained
five German acoustic torpedoes, submarine code
books and the key to their changes, and every
chart, publication, and general order that an oper-
ating German submarine carried. These items
were, of course, of great value to Intelligence.
One of the greatest contributions of the United
States to the general development of intelligence
was in the field of amphibious warfare, where the
closest coordination of many types of intelligence
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activities was required to provide adequate knowl-
edge upon which to base the successful operation
of a complex military force transported over water
with the objective of establishing itself on an
enemy-held shore against opposition. The mere
fact that such an operation involved Army, Navy,
and Air Forces required the greatest ingenuity
and diligence on the part of Intelligence to coordi-
nate and to consolidate all the diversified knowl-
edge into a package which was comprehensible,
usable, and effective.
The successes of United States Intelligence in
World War II were particularly notable because
they were achieved primarily by personnel drawn
from the civilian population: business and profes-
sional men and women with an infinite variety of
vocations. At the outset urgent personnel re-
quirements permitted only cursory initial train-
ing; it had to be done on the job. Therefore mis-
takes were made, not through lack of industry and
devotion, but because of inexperience. In the
winter of 1944, for example, Intelligence failed to
interpret correctly the movements of von Rund-
stedt's troops on the western front, and the Ger-
mans broke through the Allied defenses in the
Battle of the Bulge to inflict heavy losses of men
and materiel.
Despite its failures and frustrations, Intelli-
gence gained recognition from military and politi-
cal leaders in the United States to a degree never
before attained.
The Contribution of Chinese Intelligence
At the beginning of war in the Pacific, United
States Navy planners recognized the importance
of cooperation from the Nationalist Government
of China for ultimate victory over Japan. In
March 1942 Comdr. Milton E. Miles, now Rear
Admiral, left for Chungking to solicit the assist-
ance of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek in obtain-
ing information regarding weather and other
matters of vital intelligence value to the United
States Pacific Fleet. The result of Miles' mis-
sion was the formation of the Sino-American
Cooperative Organization (SACO) , of which he
was Deputy Director.
The Director of SACO was Lt. Gen. Tai Li,
Chief of the Bureau of Investigation and Statis-
tics (BIS) of the National Military Council of
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50
China, an intimate friend and adviser of the Gen-
eralissimo. Tai Li, known for many years as a
mystery man of Asia, had tremendous power and
a reputation which inspired more fear and hatred
than admiration. As early as 1926 he had asso-
ciated himself with Chiang when the latter took
command of the Nationalist Armies at Canton.
During the march into North China Tai Li acted
as an advance agent, collecting information about
popular sentiment, military and political devel-
opments, and advantageous routes of approach.
The intelligence he produced was an important
factor in the successive victories which led to the
unification of China under the Nationalist Gov-
ernment. When Chiang was captured by the
Communists, Tai Li aided in his rescue. In 1937,
as commander of the loyal patriotic army, Tai Li
held Shanghai for 3 months in the face of over-
whelmingly superior Japanese forces. He had
almost unlimited energy and stamina and acted
with a directness that was more western than
Oriental. Because he had escaped death so often
he was considered invulnerable, and his avoidance
of all personal publicity added to the aura of
mystery which surrounded him.
Tai Li organized China's secret police, the BIS,
in 1932, and directed its activities until his death
in 1946. During this period he established a
complex network of covert agents not only
throughout China but also in Indo-China, Burma,
India, Bali, Borneo, Formosa, and the Philip-
pines. He controlled the uniformed police in
Free and Occupied China, as well as the Chinese
puppets of the Japanese. Smuggling and anti-
smuggling activities came under his jurisdiction.
He was Director of the Bureau of Communica-
tions and Transportation and Head of the Office
of Freight Transportation Control. Thus he
wore many different hats which gave him a power
not only far-reaching but even paradoxical.
A major function of the BIS was espionage and
counterespionage directed against Japanese spies
and Chinese Communists. Some of its agents
were high ranking officers, well educated and well
trained. Others were peasants, recruited from
Chinese families which had suffered from Japa-
nese mistreatment. Representatives were located
in the smallest villages and largest cities of China.
The BIS formed the nucleus of an effective guer-
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rilla army aimed at driving the Japanese out of
China and combatting subversive elements.
As the Director of SACO, Tai Li contributed to
it the full support of the Chinese Intelligence Or-
ganization, which made possible the activities of
almost 3,000 Americans (Navy, Army, Marine
Corps, and Coast Guard) assigned to SACO,
known as Naval Group, China. Their responsi-
bilities included weather reporting, coastwatch-
ing, guerrilla training, and combat operations.
Their activities were made effective by the estab-
lishment of a radio communications network.
Weather data supplied by SACO was of signif-
icant value to the first air attacks on the Japanese
home islands and to the attacks on Iwo Jima and
Okinawa. Information provided by SACO
coastwatchers on Japanese naval and merchant
shipping was the basis for the successful sweep of
the South China Sea and its ports in January
1945 by the United States Fleet. SACO also
made possible the sensational destruction of Japa-
nese ships by the United States submarine Barb,
as well as the sinking of thousands of tons of
Japanese shipping by other American submarines.
Tai Li and his organization made a significant
contribution to the successful prosecution of the
Pacific war. His untimely death shortly after
the war was a serious blow not only to Chinese
Intelligence but to the Nationalist Government
itself.
The Expansion of Soviet Intelligence
Occupied as they were with military and politi-
cal developments in western Europe prior to the
outbreak of the war, the leaders of Soviet In-
telligence in no way neglected the situation in
the Far East. The clever and adroit activities
of their spy ring in China and Japan during the
period from 1937 to 1941 give some indication of
Soviet operating techniques. The principal figure
was Dr. Richard Sorge, a German national who
was sent as a covert agent by German Intelligence
to the Far East in 1933 posing as a foreign news-
paper correspondent. Among his close friends
and associates were the German Ambassador to
Tokyo and Ozaki Hozumi, a Japanese newspaper
man prominent in government circles and a friend
of various members of the Imperial Cabinet.
Together, Sorge and Hozumi cultivated a num-
51
ber of important sources of information, includ-
ing the German, British, American, and French
Embassies, the Dutch Legation, the Japanese War
Ministry, and the Japanese cabinet itself. From
them they gathered invaluable data including esti-
mates and opinions at the highest official levels,
which they evaluated and forwarded not to Berlin
but to Moscow by means of radio, by courier
through Shanghai, or through the Soviet Em-
bassy in Tokyo. The significance of their efforts
is revealed by some of the reports transmitted to
the Kremlin. In 1937, when the Japanese attacked
China, Sorge reported that there would be no
attack against the U. S. S. R. in Siberia. In May
1941, Moscow was warned that the Germans would
attack the U. S. S. R. along the entire western
frontier on 20 June with a force of from 170 to
190 divisions, the major objective being Moscow.
The actual attack came on 22 June. In October
1941, Sorge forwarded his well-documented con-
clusion that the Japanese would attack to the south
in Asia and that there was no serious danger of
any attack along the Siberian frontier. On the
basis of this information the Soviets were able to
transfer large units of their forces in eastern Si-
beria to the western front to strengthen their de-
fenses against the Nazi invasion. It is somewhat
ironic that Sorge's activities were revealed by a
Japanese Communist.
A tendency of the Soviet leaders to permit the
reports of their Communist friends in foreign
countries to override the reports of other units in
their intelligence system is shown by their initial
reaction to indications of Hitler's decision to attack
the U. S. S. R. The Communists inside Germany
are believed to have reported that the Germans
would refuse to march into the Soviet Union.
When the attack actually came, the Soviets were
taken by surprise.
As the war progressed, the Soviets were able
to take full advantage of association with their
wartime partners in the expansion and extension
of their intelligence activities. In the United
States since 1924 there had been an organization
known as Amtorg, created for the purpose of pur-
chasing all kinds of material for the Soviet Union.
During the war the activities of this organization
were intensified, together with those of the Soviet
Purchasing Commission which worked closely with
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Amtorg. In addition to the procurement of mate-
rial, the collection of detailed information con-
cerning American industry was stepped up.
Factory techniques, production statistics and labor
relations were all matters of great interest, in
addition to any fact which might have future in-
telligence value. As one example, all of the Amer-
ican patents concerned with carbon compounds
were purchased?a total of about 30,000 in this
field alone. By 1946 a comprehensive catalogue
had been compiled of every mill, factory, refinery,
and engineering plant in the United States. The
Four Continent Book Corporation in New York
City was developed as an agency for the purchase
and transmittal of American technical publica-
tions, trade papers, and patents. In addition, it
handled Communist propaganda literature in
English and Spanish, forwarding the latter to
various Latin American countries.
By 1944 Soviet intelligence and propaganda ac-
tivities were expanded in Latin American coun-
tries through Soviet diplomatic representatives.
In Mexico an extensive organization was devel-
oped for the purpose of destroying American in-
fluence first in Mexico and later in other countries
of South America. As a part of this process, the
Soviets aimed at the elimination of American busi-
ness interests and the eventual domination of the
economies of these countries. Various cultural
organizations were fostered, such as the Russian-
Mexican Clubs, to serve as propaganda media and
sources of information.
In Europe, during the war, a new counterintelli-
gence agency was created. It was known as
"Smersh"?from the Russian words: "death to
spies." It seems to have been organized originally
in connection with the administration of the Soviet
occupied areas of Europe, and was concerned with
disaffection among Soviet troops and anticommu-
nism in any form. By painstaking processes it
attempted to liquidate all individuals who were
not proCommunist, including those active in any
democratic-type parties, throughout Poland,
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, and the
Carpatho-Ukraine. Its carefully selected person-
nel, intensely loyal to the Soviet State, showed no
mercy or compassion in their work.
While positive information is not available,
"Smersh" appears to have been organized into five
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52
major departments: administration, operations,
investigations, prosecution, and personnel. With
central headquarters in Moscow, there were sub-
divisions established for each military district in
Russia, as well as in Europe. Agents were at-
tached to all units of the Soviet Army, and net-
works of spies and informers were set up in the
occupied countries, to make particular note of
trends in political thought. The investigations
department developed the science of interrogation
to a high degree of perfection, while the prosecu-
tion department utilized three men courts to dis-
pose of those found guilty.
Prior to World War II many improvements had
been made in the functional organization of the
Soviet military staff. One of these was an in-
creased emphasis on intelligence, notable because
this function was weak in the staff organizations
of both the Tzarist and early Soviet armies. Re-
vised military doctrine now included a reconnais-
sance, or intelligence, section at the division level,
headed by a chief of section. He was responsible
for the preparation of the reconnaissance plan,
including air reconnaissance; the assignment of
missions to subordinate agencies; the maintenance
of the enemy situation map; the collection and
analysis of information; keeping the commander
and chief of staff informed of all intelligence in-
formation; and the dissemination of information
to higher, coordinate, and subordinate units. Dur-
ing the war the intelligence organizations of the
Army and the Navy apparently functioned sep-
arately; however, by 1946, there was some evidence
that they had been combined.
The pattern of Soviet Intelligence operations
which seemed to emerge during the war period
was that of comprehensive, overlapping informer
networks within all countries under Soviet rule
and of burrowing, multiplying systems of sym-
pathizers and agents within foreign countries of
exploitable interest. The extensiveness of its op-
erations abroad was to be clearly demonstrated in
the postwar period.
THE POSTWAR PERIOD
Great enthusiasm throughout most of the world
greeted the unconditional surrender of Germany
and Japan, the inauguration of the United Na-
tions Organization, and prospects for world peace.
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Amidst the glow of military victories the wartime
Allies frequently met to chart a new world of
freedom and prosperity. But many boldly pro-
jected plans failed to materialize, diametrically
opposed points of view were bared, and even peace
treaties were delayed interminably by disagree-
ments or failed completely of final approval by
all concerned, as in the cases of Germany, Austria,
and Japan. Two contrary concepts of world re-
lationships became more clearly defined in the
opposing policies of the United States and the
U. S. S. R. Gradually the peoples of the western
world, especially in the United States, became
aware of a new threat to their political and social
institutions and their way of life.
The aggressive ideology and world power ob-
jectives of the Soviet Government found expres-
sion in the absorption of the countries of Eastern
Europe, a closely knit alliance with Communist
China, and the encouragement of Communist or-
ganizations throughout the rest of the world. In
an effort to counter these activities, the United
States assumed world leadership to aid in reestab-
lishing the economic stability of those countries
ravaged by the war but as yet free of Communist
domination. Economic stability was considered
to be fundamental to political and military sta-
bility, and through the improvement of standards
of living the United States sought to destroy the
conditions of poverty upon which Soviet propa-
ganda most effectively feeds. The Truman Doc-
trine of 1947 brought economic and military
assistance to Greece and Turkey threatened by
Soviet penetration. The European Recovery
Program of 1948, popularly known as the Mar-
shall Plan, had as its objective the restoration of
the economic productivity of Europe and the
healthy employment of all its peoples. This am-
bitious program was gradually extended in a les-
ser degree to other parts of the world. In 1951
the United States frankly embarked on a Mutual
Security Program which tied together economic
assistance and military cooperation.
The outbreak of the war in Korea in June 1950
brought into clearer focus the grim realities of
the so-called "cold war," a term descriptive of
various forms of the conflict between Communist
and non-Communist countries which had been un-
derway for a number of years but which became
58
more apparent after World War II. In the light
of postwar experience, some earlier events as-
sumed even greater significance than they did at
the time. In 1943, for example, a group of young
physicists working in the radiation laboratory of
the University of California turned over to a
Communist agent technical data for transmittal to
a Soviet Vice-Consul. In 1944 Soviet representa-
tives in South and Central America were ordered
back to Moscow for retraining. By that time the
military defeat of Germany was assured, so that
Soviet emphasis could again be directed toward
bringing about the political and economic collapse
of the non-Communist countries of the west.
To achieve this ultimate objective, the Soviet
Government has employed, initially at least,
methods other than the force of arms. Penetra-
tion and subversion, propaganda and detailed
organization have proved to be highly effective in
various countries. The use of nationals as agents
within their own countries has presented a most
difficult problem for the counterintelligence agen-
cies of those countries. The Soviets have imple-
mented a plan to collect great quantities of
information about non-Communist countries, ob-
viously in order to determine strengths and weak-
nesses. During this "cold war" Intelligence has
assumed even greater importance than during
World War II. The scope and methods of Soviet
Intelligence in the postwar period have been indi-
cated by the disclosure of some of its activities in
various parts of the world.
Soviet Intelligence in Canada
In September 1945 Igor Gouzenko, a cipher
clerk in the Soviet Embassy at Ottawa, deter-
mined to expose the activities of Soviet agents
and sympathizers in Canada. The documented
information which he was able to furnish to the
Royal Commission finally appointed to conduct a
full investigation was a startling revelation of the
extensiveness of the Soviet intelligence system in
Canada, the type of individuals who were in-
volved, and the nature of the information which
was being transmitted to Moscow. The impor-
tance attached by the Soviet Embassy to Gou-
zenko's testimony and substantiating documents
was indicated by the strenuous efforts made to re-
gain custody of both.
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INTELLIGENCE FOR
The evidence uncovered by the Royal Commis-
sion definitely revealed the existence in Canada of
a fifth column, organized and directed by Soviet
agents. Within this fifth column were a number
of spy rings, possibly as many as five, of which de-
tailed information was available only on the one
headed by Col. Nicolai Zabotin, Soviet Military
Attache in Ottawa. Additional rings appeared to
be operated by the MVD, the Naval Attache, the
commercial and political representatives, and the
Embassy itself. Each of these rings was com-
pletely independent of the others, using separate
codes and agents, and was apparently organized
rather simply into various cells composed of
agents working on similar tasks. Only one agent
in each cell had contact with a Soviet representa-
tive and each made use of a "cover" name. The
Royal Commission concluded that the Soviet or-
ganization in Canada was the product of careful
and detailed preparation by trained men. Of sig-
nificance were the indications that the Canadian
organizations were associated with similar ones
in other countries, notably Great Britain and the
United States.
In Zabotin's ring only two individuals were Rus-
sian-born, and these had become naturalized Ca-
nadian citizens: Sam Carr, the Organizing Sec-
retary of the Canadian Communist Party, and
Fred Rose, a member of Parliament. The re-
mainder were Canadian or British by birth and
were motivated by Communist sympathies. Money
was apparently of only incidental concern.
Scientists and civil servants were especially cul-
tivated by Zabotin who approached them through
local Communists, fellow travellers, and sym-
pathizers attending study-groups and special lec-
tures. The care with which prospective agents
were selected is indicated by the positions held by
those found guilty of turning over classified in-
formation to Soviet representatives: a senior
worker with the National Research Council; two
additional members of this Council who supplied
information regarding explosives, atomic energy,
and aircraft development; an employee in the Of-
fice of the High Commissioner of the United King-
dom; an employee in the Department of Muni-
tions and Supply; and a staff member of the cipher
division of the Canadian Department of External
Affairs. The most prominent individual involved
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54
NAVAL OFFICERS
was Dr. Allan Nunn May, a nuclear scientist em-
ployed in research for the Canadian Atomic En-
ergy project at Montreal. The investigation dis-
closed that he had been a Communist before coming
to Canada. The Royal Commission was particu-
larly astounded by the success of the Soviets in
enlisting Canadians in positions of responsibility
and trust who were willing to betray their country.
Since the activities of Soviet Intelligence had
been going on for some years, it was difficult to
determine the amount of information which the
Soviets had managed to accumulate. The evi-
dence indicated, however, that a considerable
quantity of classified information had been trans-
mitted with regularity from various Government
departments and agencies. Specific information
included samples of uranium ore; data about
atomic plants and processes; 'details of Asdic, a
submarine detection device; formula of new ex-
plosives and blueprints of fuzes, such as the V. T.
fuze; economic reports; and political reports, in-
cluding diplomatic messages exchanged with Great
Britain and the United States. Of particular
significance was the fact that much of the infor-
mation sought was technical and concerned the
postwar defenses of Canada, Great Britain, and
the United States.
Two interesting Soviet Intelligence procedures
were revealed by Gouzenko. The first was Zabo-
tin's plan to arrange for the entry into Canada of
additional agents under the guise of personnel
attached to a proposed Soviet Trade Mission. The
second was the use of forged passports to permit
the entry of agents into other countries from
Canada.
Soviet Intelligence in the United States
The Report of the Canadian Royal Commission,
published in June 1946, excited worldwide atten-
tion and particularly, attention was given to it in
the United States where the evidence indicated
that similar Soviet organizations were operating.
Several Congressional committees found new
sources of information regarding un-American
activities and accumulated volumes of data.
These committees were aided materially by a few
repentant American Communists who, like Gou-
zenko, found themselves completely disillusioned
by the wide gulf between Communist promises and
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practices. Louis F. Budenz, editor of the official
newspaper of the American Communist Party,
the Daily Worker, was one such person. His testi-
mony, given in November 1946, disclosed the close
relationship between American and Soviet Com-
munists. Further, it gave clues to the activities
of Soviet agents operating in the United States.
Gerhart Eisler, for example, was pointed out
as the representative of International Communism
in the United States and, as such, the boss of all
American Communists. His true position could
not be determined, but his status as a representa-
tive was substantiated. Eisler, a professional
revolutionist, was active in the United States dur-
ing the 1930's, speaking before many groups, help-
ing to organize Communists and Communist sym-
pathizers, and identifying those who might be en-
couraged to aid the Communist cause. During
the war years he may well have headed a Soviet
spy network. In the late 1940's he evidently con-
centrated on artists, writers, and intellectuals. He
was reported to have said that New York City
would become the center of International Com-
munism outside of Russia. Because of the dis-
closures before the House Un-American Activities
Committee in early 1947, Eisler was no longer use-
ful to the Soviet effort in this country. He es-
caped to Europe and later turned up as an official
for the East German Government, operating under
direct Soviet control.
In July 1948 Elizabeth Bentley testified on her
activities as a courier for a Soviet espionage system
in the United States during the war. She col-
lected information from various Government em-
ployees in Washington, and turned it over to
Soviet representatives in New York for transmit-
tal to Moscow. Her contacts in Washington were
individuals employed by such Federal Depart-
ments as State, Treasury, Army, the War Produc-
tion Board, and the Office of Strategic Services.
Among those she incriminated was William W.
Remington who was first employed by the War
Production Board and later by the Department of
Commerce. In both these positions he had access
to secret information, and in Commerce he headed
a committee responsible for the clearance of mate-
rials for export to the Soviet Union. Unlike
Gouzenko in Canada, Bentley was unable to docu-
ment her testimony.
55
CONFIDENTIAL
During the summer of 1948 Whittaker Cham-
bers, reformed American Communist and a senior
editor of Time magazine, appeared before the
House Un-American Activities Committee in
Washington. He described in detail his activities
as a Communist from 1924 until 1938, when, dis-
illusioned and embittered, he renounced com-
munism and determined to expose the Soviet ac-
tivities of which he had been a part. Of primary
interest was his work as an underground courier
for a Communist cell, from 1934 to 1938, collecting
classified information in Washington and carrying
it to a Soviet agent named Colonel Bykoff in New
York City. The purpose of this cell was the col-
lection of military and political information from
the State Department. The sensational aspect of
Chambers' testimony was his ability to produce
documentary evidence which included copies and
photographs of highly important British naval
papers and extremely confidential reports from
China, Yugoslavia, and Poland. The keys to cer-
tain secret American diplomatic codes were also
involved. These substantiating documents proved
beyond question that in 1938 some individual in
the State Department had made important classi-
fied information available to him. That individ-
ual, according to Chambers, was Alger Hiss, a
brilliant young man in the State Department, a
prominent figure in the creation of the United
Nations, and president of the Carnegie Endow-
ment for International Peace. Volumes of evi-
dence were accumulated in the succeeding sensa-
tional Hiss-Chambers legal actions which finally
resulted in the conviction of Alger Hiss for per-
jury and a sentence of 5 years imprisonment.
Additional cases involving suspected Soviet es-
pionage and Communist activities continued to be
brought to light in the United States. In the
spring of 1949 the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation released evidence against Judith Coplon,
first employed by the Justice Department in its
economic warfare section and later assigned to its
internal security section as a political analyst.
She was accused on two counts: taking unlawful
possession of Government documents and spying
for a foreign power. Her contact was a Soviet
engineer employed by the United Nations secre-
tariat in New York. Her sensationalized trial on
the first count in Washington resulted in convic-
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tion, although subsequent trials on the second
count in New York City failed of conviction be-
cause of certain legal technicalities.
During 1949 and 1950, while the Justice De-
partment was prosecuting the leaders of the
American Communist Party for conspiracy
against the United States Government, the FBI
was accumulating evidence against other individ-
uals suspected of treason in connection with the
atomic bomb and military uses of atomic energy.
In May 1950 Harry Gold confessed that, in 1944
and 1945, he had acted as a courier in relaying
atomic information to a Soviet agent for transmis-
sion to the U. S. S. R. His motives appeared to be
basically ideological. His confession involved Al-
fred Dean Slack, a chemist, and David Greenglass,
a New York machinist. The former was charged
with revealing details of the manufacture of
RDX, a secret high explosive developed during
the war, and supplying a sample. The latter con-
fessed to turning over sketches and descriptions
of the atomic bomb while he was employed at Los
Alamos, N. Mex., working on the top secret Man-
hattan project. These men in turn incriminated
other individuals including Ethel and Julius
Rosenberg and Martin Sobell. These were accused
of complicity in espionage work for Soviet Intel-
ligence, transmitting information concerning the
atomic bomb.
The evidence presented during these trials was
startling. It became apparent that the Soviet
Union had gained considerable information about
the Manhattan project and the work of some of
its scientists during the latter months of 1941; fur-
ther, that the schedule for the explosion of the
first atomic bomb at Alamagordo was known at
least a month in advance. Months before the first
bomb was dropped on Hiroshima the Soviets had
learned the principles of its construction. Rosen-
berg stated that he had procured information per-
taining to the use of atomic energy for aircraft.
The series of shocking disclosures in the postwar
period clearly indicated that Soviet Intelligence
had developed intricate systems of covert agents
in the United States for the purpose of channeling
vital information of a political, military and scien-
tific nature to Moscow through both official and
unofficial representatives.
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56
NAVAL OFFICERS
Soviet Intelligence in Great Britain
The Canadian Spy Case and the disclosures in
the United States had eventual repercussions in
Great Britain. Tipped off by the FBI, Scotland
Yard initiated investigations which resulted in
1950 in the apprehension of Dr. Emil Julius Klaus
Fuchs, head of the Ministry of Supply's Theo-
retical Physics Division and the deputy chief
scientific officer at Harwell, England's principal
atomic installation. Fuchs was accused of releas-
ing American atomic secrets to Soviet representa-
tives in 1945 and British secrets in 1947. His con-
fession left no doubt as to his guilt. While the
amount of information he had given was not pub-
licly announced for security reasons, it was appar-
ent that Fuchs had detailed knowledge of the con-
struction of atomic bombs and, further, that he
was conversant with the initial studies for the hy-
drogen bomb. The tremendous advantages accru-
ing to the Soviets from this information are diffi-
cult to estimate, although it is obvious that their
atomic program was greatly advanced. At the
same time irreparable harm was done to the na-
tional security of both Great Britain and the
United States.
The investigations of Fuchs revealed that he
had been a Communist for many years and that
his motivation, like so many others already men-
tioned, was ideological. He was the scientist from
whom Harry Gold had received his information,
and his confession was of material assistance in
the prosecution of Gold, Greenglass, and others.
Soviet Intelligence in Sweden
In September 1951 the long suspected activities
of Soviet espionage in Sweden were dramatically
exposed. A 42-year-old petty officer in the Royal
Swedish Navy, Ernst Hilding Andersson, was
accused of betraying military secrets to a foreign
power, found guilty of treason, and sentenced to
life imprisonment. From 1949 to 1951 he had pre-
pared and transmitted reports and maps of the
defenses of naval bases at Stockholm and Karls-
krona, and of an air base, naval station, and the
Boden fortress in northern Sweden. His three
contact men were: a former Soviet Embassy sec-
retary, a former Tass news-agency correspondent,
and an assistant to the Soviet Naval Attach6.
While small money payments were made for in-
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formation delivered, Andersson's motivation was
to aid communism. Investigation showed that
he had become a Communist in 1928, but that his
first assignment in espionage was not made until
1949.
According to the Swedish Chief of Staff, incal-
culable damage to Sweden's security had been
caused by Andersson's activities. Even more
harmful, perhaps, were the similar efforts of
Fritiof Enborn, a Swedish journalist, discovered.
in February 1952. Sweden faced a new threat to
her security and national defense system.
Soviet Activities in South America
In Mexico the Communist group appeared to
fall into three categories: the professional agents,
carefully trained in the art of collecting informa-
tion and spreading Soviet propaganda; the ideal-
ists, motivated by the propaganda; and the
fellow travelers, inspired by their own liberalism.
The Soviet Embassy in Mexico City made use of
each category to promote its primary objectives
of propaganda, penetration, and the destruction
of the economic position of the United States and
its favorable pan-American relationships.
The Mexican pattern was apparent in other
countries. In Guatemala in 1951 there were
charges that the Communists were infiltrating both
the government and labor. A primary target was
the United Fruit Co. which was harassed by
strikes and one-sided labor laws. In Chile the
large and active Communist Party encouraged a
series of strikes in the copper mines which helped
precipitate a copper shortage crisis in the rearma-
ment program of the United States. In Panama
the Communists attempted to capitalize on the po-
litical unrest in the country.
In the postwar period, there were other positive
indications and significant disclosures of Soviet
Intelligence activities in various trouble spots of
the world. The United States and her Allies
found themselves faced with the necessity of com-
batting diverse problems of major proportions.
The Readjustment of the United States Intelligence
Effort
At the end of World War II the demobilization
of the Armed Forces was accelerated almost to a
point of disintegration, at least from the point of
269190-54----5
view of ready effectiveness. The drastic reduction
in personnel seriously affected all military activi-
ties and especially those of Intelligence. For ex-
ample, by 1946 the strength of Naval Intelligence
had dropped sharply from its wartime peak. Pre-
war problems of Intelligence, such as personnel
and production, once again developed, though to a
lesser degree because of what appeared to be a
positive if gradual change in both the popular and
official point of view towards Intelligence.
Even before the end of the war, top level plan-
ners had become convinced of the need for a perma-
nent well coordinated national Intelligence system.
The result was the passage of the National Se-
curity Act of 1947 which for the first time in
the history of the Nation, outlined the structure
of such a system to operate in times of war and
peace.
The deterioration of the international political
situation created urgent demands upon all intelli-
gence agencies. Moving into Greece to aid in the
defense of that country, the United States Army
was immediately involved in problems arising
from guerrilla warfare and the infiltration
of communist groups from the Sovietized Balkan
countries. In Western Europe, advance informa-
tion concerning the trends of Soviet activities was
essential to the formulation of any military or
foreign policies which would effectively protect
the interests of the United States in that area.
Months in advance information was obtained
regarding Soviet plans to blockade Berlin. The
communist coup in Czechoslovakia was anticipated
by 3 months. Evidence was accumulated to show
that the Soviet Union was supplying arms and am-
munition to Communist groups in France and
Italy. In the spring of 1948 events in Europe gave
rise to serious misgivings that the Soviet Union
might be contemplating offensive military action.
Under terrific pressure, the Central Intelligence
Agency produced an estimate that such action
would not take place within the next 2 months
and, in all probability, not within a year.
With the outbreak of war in Korea the Navy,
Army, and Air Force were faced with many se-
rious problems, including an acute shortage of
Intelligence personnel and data. Drawing sub-
stantially upon their reserve organizations, the
military services overcame these shortages and
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rapidly increased the production of intelligence
for operational purposes. Once again the need
for intelligence was clearly demonstrated.
POSTWAR INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS
The impact of the cold war in the postwar
period is shown by the emphasis given to intelli-
gence organizations and activities by both larger
and smaller nations of the world.
The United States intelligence system is dis-
cussed in detail in chapter 3 of this text, but
certain general developments in military intelli-
gence should be mentioned here. Intelligence ac-
tivities have been expanded in order to provide
the intelligence required for strategic planning.
Broad programs involving research and special
studies of foreign powers have been undertaken.
Increasing importance has been placed on person-
nel training through the encouragement of reserve
intelligence units and an emphasis on training
schools for both regular and reserve officers. There
has been some indication of a trend in the Army
and the Navy to encourage officer personnel to spe-
cialize in intelligence work. Gen. Omar N. Brad-
ley, Army Chief of Staff, has been quoted as say-
ing: "I am recommending to the General Staff
that the Army establish an Intelligence Corps in
which personnel can specialize in Intelligence just
as artillery men concentrate on guns, and armored
corps men on tanks." The training of personnel
assigned to attache posts has been improved. The
work of counterintelligence has received more and
more attention.
As a newcomer to the field of intelligence, the
United States has learned much in a relatively
short period of time. Intelligence organizations
have improved the quality of their product, and
despite "growing-pains" have accomplished a
great deal.
The British Intelligence Service
The British intelligence service is composed of
several intelligence agencies. Of special impor-
tance is the British secret service whose operations
and organization are closely guarded secrets. For
budgetary purposes it is sponsored in Parliament
by the British foreign office. Appropriations for
the secret service are usually passed without com-
ment, and if a question is ever raised, the foreign
CONFIDENTIAL
58
secretary replies that the matter is a secret of state
which, if revealed, would no longer be secret. The
British secret service corresponds, in many of its
functions, to the United States Central Intelligence
Agency.
The war office, the admiralty and the air minis-
tries have separate intelligence agencies which co-
operate closely with the British secret service and
other agencies. The military intelligence division
(MID) is divided into some 20 different depart-
ments. In addition to purely military matters,
sections of MID deal with the problems of spies
at home, in the dominions and British possessions,
and in foreign countries. The naval intelligence
division is also divided into several departments
for specialized work, as is the air intelligence
division.
Another organization of the British intelligence
service is generally referred to as MI 5. This
organization is devoted to counterespionage and
security. It has jurisdiction in the British Isles
and in the British possessions overseas. Many of
its functions are similar to those of the United
States Federal Bureau of Investigation. MI 5
cooperates closely with the special branch of Scot-
land Yard as well as with the British secret service
and the military intelligence agencies.
The special branch of Scotland Yard, which
may be included as a part of the British intelli-
gence service, is charged with guarding the Royal
Family and important British officials and visiting
foreign dignitaries. It is also concerned with
counterespionage and problems of national secu-
rity. Some of its functions are similar to those
of the United States Secret Service and the United
States Federal Bureau of Investigation.
There are several British joint intelligence com-
mittees and boards which include representatives
from the major British intelligence agencies, mil-
itary and civilian. These joint committees and
boards are subordinate to the British military
chiefs of staff, though they contain civilian repre-
sentation. These committees and boards prepare
estimates of all kinds and serve all interested min-
istries of the British Government.
The French Intelligence System
The principal French intelligence organization
is the Service de Documentation Exterieure et de
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Contre Espionenage (SDECE.). It was established
under this name in December 1945 and is a devel-
opment of intelligence organizations which oper-
ated under General de Gaulle from 1940 to 1945.
General de Gaulle set up the Bureau Central de
1?enseignements et d'Action (BCRA) in London
in 1940. This was an expansion of the Service de
Renseignements (SR) , a part of the old Deuxieme
Bureau of the French General Staff. After Gen-
eral de Gaulle left London and went to Algiers, he
combined the BCRA with an intelligence organi-
zation of General Giraud and created a new intel-
ligence organization called the Direction Generale
des Services Speciaux (DGSS) . The DGSS was
replaced shortly after the liberation of most of
France by an intelligence organization called the
Direction Generale des Etudes et de Recherches
(DGER), out of which SDECE directly evolved.
Historically, the Deuxieme Bureau of the
French general staff has been the most important
French intelligence organization. In the post
World War II organization of French Intelli-
gence, the SDECE appears to have taken over
most of the functions of the traditional general
staff Deuxieme Bureau, leaving to the Deuxiemes
Bureaux of the armed services responsibility
mainly for operational military intelligence. The
SDECE is subordinate to the French national de-
fense ministry and is divided into two main sec-
tions (called by the French, Offensive and Defen-
sive) which are concerned respectively with stra-
tegic intelligence and counterintelligence. The
Surete Nationale, under the French interior min-
istry, is also a part of the French Intelligence
system. The Surete is similar in some respects to
the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation
and the British Scotland Yard.
The Soviet Intelligence System
Often described as omnipotent and omnipresent,
the Soviet intelligence system is in many respects
unique in the postwar world. It is a vast, intri-
cate organization with an incredible amount of
duplication and involving literally millions of
people. With its two-pronged objective of inter-
nal security and external espionage, it maintains
agents in every village of the U. S. S. R. and
agents or potential agents in all countries of the
59
world where there are Soviet diplomats, trade rep-
resentatives or Communist Party groups.
Within the U. S. S. R., the intelligence-security
system is the cornerstone of the police state, re-
sponsible for insuring rigid political and eco-
nomic controls and rooting out all dissident ele-
ments. It can be assumed that the average So-
viet citizen is aware of the secret police to the ex-
tent that he knows he must remain where he is
registered, perform his work satisfactorily, and
refrain from any criticism of the government.
He must also hope that his relatives and friends
will do likewise. Should there be any deviation
from the established pattern, he can anticipate
severe punishment including death or hard labor
in a penal camp. Within the borders of the coun-
try, the closest observation is maintained not only
over all citizens but also over all visitors.
Abroad, the strength of Soviet Intelligence lies
basically in the worldwide organization of the
Communist Party. As already indicated, the So-
viets have emphasized the use of agents who are
citizens of the country in which they are to oper-
ate. These prospective collectors of information,
recruited by the regular Communist Party organ-
ization, are fellow travellers and sympathizers not
known as Communists. Either they are already
in an exploitable position or possess the necessary
qualifications. Sold on the basic doctrines of com-
munism, these individuals transfer their loyalties
from their own country to the U. S. S. R. They
are given small sums of money for "expenses" and
so become subject to blackmail. Each new recruit
becomes the member of an independent cell, but
only the leader of the cell has a direct Soviet con-
tact. Thus this system is capable of almost in-
definite expansion and, of even greater impor-
tance, is subject to a minimum risk of exposure.
In connection with this recruitment program, So-
viet Intelligence has an amazingly complete dos-
sier coverage of individuals all over the world:
their appearance, interests, weaknesses, and politi-
cal inclinations.
The counterintelligence activity of the Soviets
is particularly noteworthy. Its defensive effec-
tiveness makes the term "Iron Curtain" most ap-
propriate. No one may cross the borders of the
U. S. S. R. without great hazards of detection.
All means of communications are rigidly con-
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trolled, and the gathering of any information in-
side the country by foreign agents is notoriously
difficult. The offensive aspects of Soviet counter-
intelligence are even more unique and constitute
a Russian contribution to modern intelligence.
The objective is the dissemination of false infor-
mation designed to mislead and confuse opponents
and prospective victims. Seemingly "anti-Com-
munist" propaganda and individuals are skillfully
utilized in a cleverly organized program.
The controls of this tremendous organization
were further overhauled and centralized at the top
level in 1946. As a result, the major agencies pri-
marily concerned with intelligence activities from
1946 to 1953 were: Military Intelligence, and the
Ministry of State Security, or MG-B, formerly
known as NKGB. During this period the MVD,
Ministry of Internal Affairs (the former NKVD),
appeared to have lost most of its police and intel-
ligence functions.
Currently, the Military Intelligence organiza-
tion, known as GRU, is a part of the Soviet gen-
eral staff. From the military point of view, it
is interested in political events and economic con-
ditions abroad and so collects information for in-
telligence purposes all over the world, It also di-
rects foreign sabotage. It maintains networks of
agents, directed both by military attaches and by
special agents assigned cover positions in Soviet
diplomatic and consular posts.
From 1946 to 1953 MGB had broad responsi-
bilities for political espionage and propaganda
abroad and for the control of espionage activities
of foreign Communist Parties. Its foreign de-
partment, known as INO, maintained an agent in
every Soviet diplomatic, consular, and trading
mission abroad. KRU, another department, had
the objective of countering foreign political es-
pionage in the Soviet Union and the activities of
anti-Soviet groups abroad. EKU, the economic
department, was organized originally to control
foreign economic activity within the U. S. S. R.
Later it was composed of two sections: the first
exercised political control over the domestic econ-
omy by means of secret police; the second directed
external economic espionage and encouraged class
warfare, industrial crises, and strikes. Two other
departments, SPU and DTU, had responsibilities
within the U. S. S. R. and were charged, respec-
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60
tively, with purging counterrevolutionary activi-
ties and suppressing espionage or sabotage activi-
ties directed against transportation. The careful
correlation of all foreign intelligence at the top
level was accomplished to formulate or to revise
Soviet foreign policies.
The personnel of MGB included: border guards
and internal troops; specially trained spies and
covert agents; highly placed Soviet citizens, who
were not only specialists in such fields as econom-
ics, foreign trade, education and cultural activi-
ties, but also were well-trained in the work of in-
telligence; unofficial Soviet citizens who were na-
tionals of various satellite governments; and for-
eign Communist Party members. The Soviet
Union has maintained the largest diplomatic corps
of any country in the world, and the size of indi-
vidual missions has been far in excess of normal
requirements. For example, in Ottawa the
U. S. S. R. has maintained a diplomatic staff of
70, as compared with maximums of 12 to 24 main-
tained by other countries. In Cairo the Soviet
Ambassador has had a staff of more than 300;
while the Egyptian Ambassador in Moscow has
had fewer than 12. In London the U. S. S. R. has
had more than 250 persons representing various
agencies; while in Washington it has had approxi-
mately 1,100 official representatives. At the same
time, in Moscow Great Britain was limited to 32
representatives and the United States to about 175.
The MVD cooperated with the MGB and con-
trolled the administration of the slave labor
camps. It had its own troops, politically reliable
and ready to crush any armed revolt within the
country. Its activities were primarily internal.
However, shortly after the dramatic announce-
ments of Stalin's serious illness and death in
March 1953, news releases from Moscow revealed
an important administrative reorganization of the
Soviet Intelligence System. The MGB and the
MVD were combined as the Ministry of Internal
Affairs.
There are several possible weaknesses of Soviet
Intelligence. The most vital may be that of inter-
nal suspicion. In striving for the greatest possi-
ble efficiency, Soviet leaders place little trust in
their operatives, whom they keep under careful
surveillance, including even their diplomatic rep-
resentatives. Complete thoroughness may, in it-
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self, become a weakness. A second possible weak-
ness, similar to that of the Nazi Germans, is an
emphasis on intensive training for their agents
which has led to standardized methods and reac-
tions. While there is no way to determine the
degree of success of Soviet agents, the fact that
some of them have been discovered, especially in
the United States, indicates that they are not com-
pletely successful.
Since it must answer to only a small group of
Communist leaders, Soviet Intelligence has almost
absolute power. It acts as the eyes, ears, and
punishing arm of the government in authority.
Fear is one of its most effective weapons. There
are, however, indications of an underground op-
position movement, especially in satellite areas, en-
gaged in sabotage and propaganda warfare on a
considerable scale.
The organization of Soviet Intelligence is fur-
ther strengthened by the intelligence agencies of
the various satellite countries, including Poland,
Hungary, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia. Each
of these countries is engaged in intelligence activi-
ties which seem to be geared to those of the Soviet
Union. The extent of these activities is illus-
trated by Hungary, for example, which has an or-
ganization out of all proportion to its size, inter-
est, and national income.
The Rebirth of German Intelligence
The political and economic conditions in post-
war Germany, divided as it has been into eastern
and western zones, have led to underground re-
sistance movements with several intelligence or-
ganizations, each active in espionage, sabotage,
and propaganda. The "Fighters Against Inhu-
manity" and the "Investigating Committee of
Free Jurists in the Soviet Zone" are two such
groups directing their activities against the Soviet
occupation forces and the Soviet-sponsored Com-
munist Government in East Germany. The "Red
Gestapo" is a security service organized by the
East German Government to combat the covert
activities of the West German groups.
CONCLUSIONS
A review of the development of the intelligence
activities and organizations of various countries
of the world throughout recorded history points
CONFIDENTIAL
up certain general principles and significant les-
sons. First of all, intelligence as activity is a
product of war and the fear of war. In one form
or another, it has always been an inevitable ad-
junct of military activity and command. Its de-
velopment, therefore, has been associated with that
of military forces. History has shown that no
major military endeavor has been better than the
staff responsible for its direction. At the same
time, the degree of the success of any major staff
effort has often been proportionate to the knowl-
edge, or intelligence, upon which that effort was
based.
Intelligence has been used for other purposes as
well. Wisely employed, it has given direction and
meaning to the foreign policies of nations.
Basely subverted, it has supported and maintained
the autocratic power and authority of police
states.
There are many lessons of importance to be
learned from the history of intelligence. Of these
there are six which seem to have particular sig-
nificance. The first is the demonstrated need for
continuity of performance. No successful organi-
zation can be improvised overnight: years of ad-
vance planning and preparation are required.
Collection and production are effective only on a
longterm basis. This means that intelligence ac-
tivity must be continuous in times of peace and
times of war. The closest possible relationship
exists between intelligence operations in peace-
time and their effectiveness in wartime. History
has demonstrated time and again that adequate
peacetime preparations have given a significant
offensive advantage when military operations be-
gan. Associated with this lesson of history are
two others: trained personnel are essential to in-
telligence organization; and adequate funds must
be made available to maintain the personnel and
the organization. The lavish outlay of funds for
intelligence in times of crisis is not sufficient.
Only longterm support, regardless of the apparent
requirements of the moment, can assure continued
success.
A fourth lesson is the importance of unified di-
rection to coordinate and to concentrate the total
intelligence effort of a nation. The failures of
German Intelligence in World Wars I and II give
particular emphasis to this point.
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Fifth, the effectiveness of intelligence rests upon
the speed of its dissemination and the adequacy of
the communications systems upon which it must
rely.
Finally, intelligence must be used. Its func-
tions must be understood and its value appreciated
by potential consumers. Time and again in mili-
tary and political history failures of intelligence
have actually been failures to make use of it.
The development of intelligence has been grad-
ual, almost imperceptible at times, and paced by
the historical trends of nations and peoples. It
would be difficult to determine with any finality
the extent of its influence on historical events.
There seems to be evidence, however, that intelli-
gence activity has had a marked effect upon the
outcome of specific situations which have influ-
enced significant world events. In the broadest
CONFIDENTIAL
sense, therefore, the lessons to be learned from a
study of the history of intelligence merit the most
attentive consideration of those military and po-
litical leaders of any nation who bear in large
measure responsibility for its security, its well-
being, and its destiny.
Since this chapter has dealt with development,
there has been an emphasis on intelligence in re-
lation to both military and political history. The
illustrations of covert operations may have excited
the particular interest of the reader, but the pur-
pose of this chapter has not been to give an exag-
gerated build-up for intelligence, nor to suggest
that it is the answer to all military and political
problems. In considering its importance the
reader must see it in proper perspective. He must
also recognize clearly that covert operations are
but one aspect of its total activity.
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CHAPTER 3
UNITED STATES ORGANIZATIONS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
INTRODUCTION
A study of its historical development has re-
vealed how and why, by the middle of the 20th
century, intelligence has become exceedingly im-
portant to government and its supporting armed
forces in their mutual objective of promoting and
maintaining the security and welfare of any na-
tion in its relations with other nations. Foreign
policies, to be sound and constructive, must be
based on realism and fact. Military policies, as
part of foreign policies, are subject to the same
requirements. Since foreign and military policies
are a product of the world environment interact-
ing with national aspirations and objectives, they
are affected necessarily by the increasing complex-
ities of international relations.
In recent years as a part of its foreign policy,
the United States has assumed additional respon-
sibilities under various treaty and pact arrange-
ments with other nations on a world, regional, or
bilateral basis. Thus special organizations have
been required to carry out these new international
tasks and new missions and responsibilities have
been created for the armed forces. For these rea-
sons, the United States has found it imperative
to reorganize and expand the agencies responsible
for the formulation and direction of plans and
policies relating to the national security. The
organizations which produce the intelligence re-
quired by these agencies have likewise been sub-
jected to frequent change in order to carry out the
tasks of new responsibilities.
This chapter will review the organization of the
various United States agencies which have respon-
sibilities in connection with foreign policy and
will show how Intelligence is related to them.
Two concepts must be kept in mind: first, that
Intelligence is a service organization, not an end
in itself; and second, that Intelligence is a unity
and is not the exclusive province of any one agen-
cy. By tracing the interrelationships of these
agencies and their Intelligence subdivisions, these
63
concepts should become clear and the intelligence
officer should better understand his own position
and functions. By reason of the frequency of
joint operations, he must also be informed of the
detailed organization of the army and air force.
NATIONAL SECURITY ORGANIZATION
The National Security Act of 1947, and the leg-
islation supplementing or amending it in 1949,
produced fundamental and far-reaching changes
in the organization and relationships of the armed
forces of the United States.
The pumpose of the Act was stated as being:
To promote the national security by pro-
viding for a Secretary of Defense; for a -De-
partment of Defense, for a Department of the
Army, a Department of the Navy, and a De-
partment of the Air Force; and for the co-
ordination of the activities of the Department
of Defense with other departments and agen-
cies of the Government concerned with the
national security.
The policy expressed in the Act and its subse-
quent amendments was stated by the Congress as
follows:
In enacting this legislation, it is the intent
of Congress to provide a comprehensive pro-
gram for the future security of the United
States:
to provide for the establishment on integrated
policies and procedures for the departments,
agencies, and functions of the government re-
lating to the national security;
to provide three military departments, sep-
arately administered, for the operation and
administration of the Army, the Navy (in-
cluding naval aviation and the United States
Marine Corps), and the Air Force, with their
assigned combat and service components;
to provide for their authoritative coordina-
tion and unified direction under civilian con- ..
trol of the Secretary of Defense, but not to
merge them;
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to provide for the effective strategic direc-
tion of the armed forces and for their opera-
tion under unified control and for their
integration into an efficient team of land, naval
and air forces;
but not to establish a single Chief of Staff
over the Armed Forces nor an Armed Forces
general staff (but this is not to be interpreted
as applying to the Joint Chiefs of Staff or
Joint Staff) .
Major Features of the National Security Legislation
The major features of the Act were the establish-
ment of: (a) the National Security Council, the
National Security Resources Board, and the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency; (b) a Department and
a Secretary of Defense to provide unified control
over the Armed Forces; (c) the Department of
the Air Force as a separate command under the
Department of Defense; ( d) the following agen-
cies under the Department of Defense (in addi-
tion to the three military departments) : the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, the Munitions
Board, the Research and Development Board, and
the Armed Forces Policy Council.
The 1949 Amendments to the Act increased the
authority previously granted to the Secretary of
Defense to exercise further centralized control of
the military departments, and created the posi-
tions of Deputy and Assistant Secretaries of De-
fense, and the position of Chairman, Joint Chiefs
of Staff.
The Air Force Organization Act of 1951 further
clarified the organization and command structure
of the Department of the Air Force, the Chief of
Staff and the Air Staff, and the United States Air
Force.
By mid-1953, various Presidential Reorganiza-
tion plans had resulted in a number of changes in
some of the agencies and offices created by the
National Security Act of 1947. It also resulted in
the redistribution of some functions originally as-
signed them. For example; Reorganization Plan
No. 3 of 1953 abolished the National Security Re-
sources Board and transferred its responsibilities
to the Office of Defense Mobilization. Within the
Department of Defense there was a reorganization
of some of its subordinate agencies and offices as the
? result of Presidential Reorganization Plan No. 6
of 1953.
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64
Continuing efforts are made within the executive
branch of the Government to increase efficiency of
operations and to insure the greatest coordination
of its widely varied activities, particularly as re-
lated to problems of national security.
The National Security Council (NSC)
The NSC is composed of officials specifically
designated by statute. Among these are: the
President of the United States; the Vice Presi-
dent; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of De-
fense; the Director of Defense Mobilization; and
the Secretary of the Treasury. The President acts
as chairman.
In addition to the foregoing officials, the Presi-
dent is given authority to appoint (subject to the
advice and consent of the Senate) as additional
members of the Council other administrative gov-
ernment officials, including the Secretaries and
Under Secretaries of other Executive Departments
and of the Military Departments.
The law provides that it shall have a staff headed
by a civilian executive secretary.
The function of the NSC is stated as follows:
to advise the President with respect to the
integration of domestic, foreign and military
policies relating to the national security so as
to enable the military services and the other
departments and agencies of the Government
to cooperate more effectively in matters in-
volving the national security.
In addition to performing such other func-
tions as the President may direct, for the pur-
pose of more effectively coordinating the poli-
cies and functions of the departments and
agencies of the Government relating to the
national security, it shall, subject to the direc-
tion of the President, be the duty of the
Council?
(1) to assess and appraise the objectives,
commitments, and risks of the United States
in relation to our actual and potential military
power, in the interest of national security,
for the purpose of making recommendations
to the President in connection therewith; and
(2) to consider policies on matters of com-
mon interest to the departments and agencies
of the Government concerned with the na-
tional security, and to make recommendations
to the President in connection therewith.
The NSC is concerned with the ultimate correla-
tion of the Government's best military and diplo-
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matic thought on problems relating to the position
of the United States in the world society of na-
tions, and has the additional responsibility of
making sure that our commitments do not exceed
our abilities to carry theM out. The Secretary of
State and his Department continue to exercise
leadership in charting our foreign policy, but other
branches of Government, including the military,
have a chance to state their views before decisions
are made.
The NSC does not seek publicity but works
quietly and secretly. When the President or one
of the members of the NSC asks for advice on a
particular situation, the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency has a summary of the situation
prepared, which includes an appraisal of world
reactions to it. A working group made up of
representatives from each department recommends
a course of action which may be acted upon with
dispatch by the NSC itself. Disagreements not
resolved are settled by Presidential decision. The
long range purpose of the NSC is to provide a
thoughtfully developed and clearly stated foreign
policy in balance with military strength so as to
give continuity to policies even as administrations
change. The NS C also specifically guides the ac-
tivities of the Central Intelligence Agency.
THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
The National Security Act of 1947 created the
"National Military Establishment" under the Sec-
retary of Defense; the 1949 amendments changed
the organizational title to the "Department of De-
fense." The latter statute also made the Depart-
ment of Defense one of the "executive" depart-
ments of the Government equal to the other
departments headed by cabinet officers; the De-
partments of the Army, the Navy, and the Air
Force became "military" rather than "executive"
departments, the Secretaries no longer being cabi-
net members.
The current organization of the Department of
Defense is indicated in figure 1.
Office of the Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of Defense is the principal as-
sistant to the President in all matters relating to
the Department of Defense. He is normally a
269196-54 6
65
civilian and cannot have been a regular commis-
sioned officer within 10 years of appointment to
the Secretary's post. A special congressional act
waived this restriction in the case of General of
the Army George C. Marshall.
Congress has restricted the Secretary's powers
to change through administrative acts the func-
tions of any of the military services that have
been fixed by legislation. Further, each of the
three military departments is separately admin-
istered, and their respective Secretaries as well
as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have the
right, after informing the Secretary of Defense,
to express freely their recommendations on defense
needs to the Congress.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the Joint Staff
Although a body bearing the title Joint Chiefs
of Staff has operated since 1942, the official per-
manent organization was not established until
1917. At that time the position of Chief of Staff
to the President was replaced by that of the Chair-
man, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the other members
being the Chief of Staff of the United States
Army, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief
of Staff of the United States Air Force, and the
Commandant of the United States Marine Corps.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff, frequently termed
the JCS, are the "principal military advisers" of
the President, the NSC, and the Secretary of De-
fense. Their duties specifically include:
(1) preparation of strategic plans and provision
for the strategic direction of the military
forces;
preparation of joint plans and assignment
to the military services of logistic respon-
sibilities in accordance with such plans;
establishment of unified commands in stra-
tegic areas;
review of major material and personnel re-
quirements of the military forces in accord-
ance with strategic and logistic plans;
formulation of policies for joint training of
the military forces;
formulation of policies for coordinating the
military education of members of the mili-
tary forces; and
providing United States representation on
the Military Staff Committee of the United
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
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I
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66
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RTMENT OF THE N
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
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Nations in accordance with the provisions
of the Charter of the United Nations.
The chairman, selected from among regular of-
ficers by the President, has no vote and exercises
no command over the JCS or any service. He
serves as presiding officer, provides the agenda for
meetings, and informs the Secretary of Defense
or President when the JCS has been unable to
reach agreement on issues. He is appointed for
a 2-year term renewable only once, unless a state
of war would make change unwise.
The Joint Chiefs have a Joint Staff not to ex-
ceed 210 officers drawn from the three services and
headed by a Director appointed by the JCS. This
relatively small, compact body in no way usurps
the direct operational functioning of the individ-
ual armed services, but plans and coordinates. If
the JCS must undertake operational functions, the
service Chief most directly concerned acts as "Ex-
ecutive Agent" to control field and other agencies.
The JCS exercise command authority as a body;
they do not decide questions by majority rule.
Most questions are satisfactorily resolved, but re-
maining differences of opinion are decided by
higher authority.
The Joint Staff is divided into three groups: the
Joint Strategic Plans Group, the Joint Logistics
Plans Group and the Joint Intelligence Group.
Of necessity most studies involve intergroup col-
laboration. The Staff works full time for the JCS,
and its members are not responsible to their own
services. Since considerable amounts of JCS work
involve detail that must be provided by the in-
dividual services, a number of Joint Committees
have been established to work with the Joint Staff.
The principal ones are the Joint Strategic Survey
Committee, Joint Strategic Plans Committee,
Joint Intelligence Committee, and Joint Logistics
Plans Committee.
The first of these committees is the senior policy
planning and advisory group for the JCS, dealing
with broad political-military problems from a mil-
itary viewpoint. The other three committees are
part-time, staffed by officers with regular duties in
their own departments closely related to their com-
mittee assignments. Plans prepared by any of
the groups are reviewed by the appropriate com-
mittee before submission to the JCS and com-
mittee members are able to call upon their respec-
67
tive services for advice. Thus the particular
requirements and problems of the various services
are coordinated in the planning of the Joint Staff.
There are of course, still other specialized com-
mittees as depicted in figure 2. And ad hoc com-
mittees are also created to meet specific additional
needs.
The responsibilities of the JCS have been de-
lineated in the excerpt from the law given earlier
in this section. The JCS contribute to the estab-
lishment of priorities to insure the meeting of
military needs. Increasingly, too, they are work-
ing on budget allocations of the three services to
be sure they match the strategic and logistics plans
agreed upon. Specific questions come to them
from the Services, cabinet secretaries, other Gov-
ernment departments, or from one of their own
joint staff groups.
The complexity of the problems of the JCS can
be quite readily illustrated. For example, they
have to consider the problem of stockpiling: How
much will we require of certain specific materials?
Other typical problems might be: How great is
the threat of submarine warfare? How much oil
and gas will be required in war and how long will
the war last? Are reserves adequate? Is ration-
ing feasible? What is the availability of men and
weapons? In planning the need for bases they
must evaluate requirements in relation to avail-
ability, defense, and cost of acquisition. Of great
importance are intelligence estimates regarding
both enemies and allies, what they may or can do.
Since planning can never be on the basis of un-
limited strength, the JCS must decide what risks
can be accepted, what ones are unavoidable, and
how these policies or positions interact upon each
other. Future weapons planning is also an un-
certain and complex problem with tremendous
consequences at stake. Many of these weighty
problems hinge upon estimates of future interna-
tional developments, a matter of good intelligence
assessment. All of the planning must be done
within the limits of available money appropria-
tions.
When the JCS finally prepare a strategic plan,
it consists of four essentials: (1) a statement of
national war objectives; (2) a statement of enemy
capabilities; (3) a broad general concept of op-
erations; and (4) a statement of a number of time-
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71111113010103
NOTE:
BOXES INCLOSED BY BROKEN UNE
INDICATE THE JOINT STAFF
JOINT STRATEGIC
SURVEY COMMITTEE
CHAIRMAN'S
STAFF GROUP
REPRESENTATIVE OF J.C.S.
ON SENIOR STAFF OF N.S.C.
SECRETARIAT
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN
UNITED STATES DELEGATION
UNITED NATIONS MILITARY
STAFF COMMITTEE
1........
UNITED STATES DELEGATION
INTER-AMERICAN DEFENSE BD.
HISTORICAL
SECTION
}--
JOINT MIUTARY TRANS-
PORTATION COMMITTEE
HUNITED STATES MIUTARY
COOPERATION COMMITTEE
JOINT METEOROLOGICAL
COMMITTEE
JOINT MUNITIONS
ALLOCATIONS COMMITTEE
JOINT COMMUNICATIONS-
ELECTRONICS COMMITTEE
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF
COMMUNICATIONS ELECTRONICS
JOINT INTELLIGENCE
OBJECTIVES AGENCY
JOINT MATERIEL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
JOINT
STAFF
????1
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
JOINT STAFF
JOINT STRATEGIC
PLANS COMMITTEE
JOINT STRATEGIC
PLANS GROUP
JOINT INTELLIGENCE
COMMITTEE
JOINT INTELLIGENCE
GROUP
JOINT LOGISTICS
PLANS COMMITTEE
JOINT ADVANCED
STUDY COMMITTEE
JOINT LOGISTICS
PLANS GROUP
L
- J
Figure 2.?Organization Chart?Joint Chiefs of Staff.
September 1952
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phased military tasks to be undertaken by the
military forces, including the major tactical units
to perform the tasks. The importance of the
intelligence function in such planning is evident.
THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY.
An understanding of the organization of the
Navy Department is important to the intelligence
officer for at least two reasons. In the first place,
since Intelligence must supply many kinds of in-
formation required by the planners and command-
ers, its ability to supply meaningful information
in no small measure depends upon its understand-
ing of the organization it serves. Secondly, In-
telligence is dependent upon its whole parent
organization for most of the raw material which
it is to process into finished intelligence. Like-
wise, since the same information may be of use to
all three services, and any part of another service
may be a source of intelligence useful to the Navy,
an understanding of the other national security
agencies is also important.
The National Security Act of 1947 describes the
functional organization of the Department of the
Navy as follows:
The term "Department of the Navy" as
used in this Act shall be construed to mean
the Department of the Navy at the seat of
government; the headquarters, United States
Marine Corps; the entire operating forces of
the United States Navy, including naval avia-
tion, and of the United States Marine Corps,
including the reserve components of such
forces; all field activities, headquarters, forces,
bases, installations, activities, and functions
under the control or supervision of the De-
partment of the Navy; and the United States
Coast Guard when operating as a part of the
Navy pursuant to law.
In general the United States Navy, within
the Department of the Navy, shall include
naval combat and service forces and such avia-
tion as may be organic therein. It shall be
organized, trained, and equipped primarily
for prompt and sustained combat incident to
operations at sea. It shall be responsible for
the preparation of naval forces necessary for
the effective prosecution of war except as
otherwise assigned, and, in accordance with
integrated joint mobilization plans, for the
expansion of the peacetime components of the
Navy to meet the needs of war.
All naval aviation shall be integrated with
the naval service as part thereof within the
Department of the Navy. Naval aviation
shall consist of combat and service and train-
ing forces, and shall include land-based naval
aviation, air transport essential for naval
operations, all air weapons and air techniques
involved ,in the operations and activities of
the United States Navy, and the entire re-
mainder of the aeronautical organization of
the United States Navy, together with the
personnel necessary therefore.
The Navy shall be generally responsible for
naval reconnaissance, anti-submarine warfare,
and protection of shipping.
The Navy shall develop aircraft, weapons,
tactics, technique, organization and equipment
of naval combat and service elements; matters
of joint concern as to these functions shall be
coordinated between the Army, the Air Force,
and the Navy.
It also describes the organization and functions of
the Marine Corps:
The United States Marine Corps, within the
Department of the Navy, shall include land
combat and service forces and such aviation as
may be organic therein. The Marine Corps
shall be organized, trained and equipped to
provide fleet marine forces of combined arms,
together with supporting air components, for
service with the fleet in the seizure or defense
of advanced naval bases and for the conduct
of such land operations as may be essential to
the prosecution of a naval campaign. It shall
be the duty of the Marine Corps to develop,
in coordination with the Army and the Air
Force, those phases of amphibious operations
which pertain to the tactics, technique, and
equipment employed by landing forces. In
addition, the Marine Corps shall provide de-
tachments and organizations for service on
armed vessels of the Navy, shall provide
security detachments for the protection of
naval property at naval stations and bases,
and shall perform such other duties as the
President may direct: Provided, That such
additional duties shall not detract from or
interfere with the operations for which the
Marine Corps is primarily organized. The
Marine Corps shall be responsible, in accord-
ance with integrated joint mobilization plans,
for the expansion of peacetime components of
the Marine Corps to meet the needs of war.
Historical Development
On April 30, 1798, Congress established the De-
partment of the Navy and the Office of the Score-
69 CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
INTELLIGENCE FOR
tary. Before that time the Secretary of War was
responsible for naval affairs. After 1815 the or-
ganization was modified to include a board of
three naval officers to serve as professional assist-
ants to the Secretary. Then in 1842 this board of
Navy commissioners was abolished, and the system
of technical bureaus was established. By the time
of World War I, the post of Chief of Naval Opera-
tions was established, and between the two world
wars an Assistant Secretary for Air was also ap-
pointed. The immense new responsibilities de-
veloped during World War II were formalized in
the legislation now governing Navy organization.
Present-Day Navy Organization and Functions
Although the National Security Act of 1947 set
forth basic Navy responsibilities, later amplifica-
tions have been promulgated. The President and
the JCS issued a paper on April 21, 1948, entitled
"Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff." It specifies four purposes com-
mon to all three services for military operations:
(1) to support and defend the Constitution of the
United States against all enemies, foreign or
domestic; (2) to maintain, by timely and effective
military action, the security of the United States,
its possessions, and areas vital to its interest; (3)
to uphold and advance the national policies and
interests of the United States; and (4) to safe-
guard the internal security of the United States.
Among the more specific functions this document
describes is that of providing adequate, timely,
and reliable intelligence for use within the Na-
tional military establishment.
Using this 1948 document as an authority, the
Department of the Navy, in General Order No. 5,
established three principal organizational com-
ponents and enumerated four principal tasks.
The principal components are:
1. The Operating Forces: the several fleets,
seagoing forces, sea frontier forces, district
forces, and such of the shore establishments of
the Navy and other forces and activities as may
be assigned to the operating forces by the Presi-
dent or Secretary of the Navy.
2. The Navy Department: the executive part
of the naval establishment located at the seat
of the government, which comprises the bureaus,
boards and offices of the Navy Department; the
Headquarters of the Marine Corps; and the
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70
NAVAL OFFICERS
Headquarters of the Coast Guard (when as-
signed to the Navy).
3. The Shore Establishment: all other activi-
ties of the naval establishment including all
shore activities not assigned to the operating
forces.
It is fundamental naval policy to "maintain the
Navy as a thoroughly integrated entity in suffi-
cient strength on the sea and in the air to uphold,
in conjunction with our other Armed Forces, our
national policies and interests, to support our com-
merce and our international obligations, and to
guard the United States including its overseas
possessions and dependencies." The implementa-
tion of this policy imposes upon the administra-
tion of the naval establishment four principal
tasks:
1. First, to interpret, apply and uphold the
national policies and interests in the develop-
ment and use of the naval establishment. This
task may be described as the "policy control" of
the naval establishment.
2. Second, to command the operating forces,
and to maintain them in a state of readiness to
conduct war; and to promulgate to the naval
establishment directives embracing matters of
operations, security, intelligence, discipline,
naval communications, and similar matters of
naval administration. This task may be de-
scribed as the "naval command" of the naval
establishment.
3. Third, to coordinate and direct the effort
of the Navy Department and the shore establish-
ment in order to assure the development, pro-
curement, production and distribution of mate-
rial, facilities and personnel to the operating
forces. This task may be described as the "logis-
tics administration and control" of the naval
establishment.
4. Fourth, to develop and maintain efficiency
and economy in the operation of the naval estab-
lishment with particular regard to matters of
organization, staffing, administrative proce-
dures, the utilization of personnel, materials and
facilities, and the budgeting and expenditure
of funds. This task may be described as the
"business administration" of the naval establish-
ment.
The first and third tasks require additional com-
ment. Policy control includes guidance of the
Navy as a whole, appraisal of its overall perform-
ance, and public relations in the broadest sense.
Logistics is further described in General Order
No. 5 as having two phases: consumer logistics,
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UNITED STATES ORGANIZATIONS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY CONFIDENTIAL
and producer logistics. The former involves the
planning and forecasting of requirements on the
basis of operational plans, a responsibility of the
Chief of Naval Operations. The latter involves
the developing and procuring of these require-
ments. Consumer logistics is intimately asso-
ciated with naval command while producer
logistics is a matter of business adminstration,
although, of course, the two are intimately related.
Distribution of Executive Responsibilities
Figure 3 outlines the principal subdivisions of
the Department of the Navy. It will be noted
that the secretary has 4 civilian executive assist-
ants and a larger number of naval professional
assistants, including the naval command assistant
(Chief of Naval Operations) and up to 12 naval
technical assistants (counting the Chief of Naval
Reserve, Chief of Naval Material, and, when so as-
signed, the commandant of the Coast Guard).
The Secretary directs and controls the entire
naval establishment and retains immediate respon-
sibility for policy control, public relations, morale,
and budget. The civilian executive assistants
handle business administration and producer
logistics, exercising top management coordination
of the work of the many bureaus and offices in
the Navy Department. Bureau heads, however,
have direct liaison with the Secretary, although
routinely most of their business is transacted
either through the Chief of Naval Operations or
one of the civilian executive assistants. The bal-
ancing of military with civilian authority and
responsibility within the Navy is shown by the
division between the naval command assistant with
his subordinates and the civilian executive assist-
ants with their staffs.
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO)
The Chief of Naval Operations is the highest
ranking officer in the Department of the Navy.
As such he is a member of the JCS and is the prin-
cipal naval adviser to the President, Secretary of
Defense, and Secretary of the Navy. He is in
command of the operating forces and includes
among his responsibilities their training, readi-
ness, and war planning. He is required to deter-
mine the personnel and material requirements of
the operating forces and to this end coordinates
71
and directs the efforts of the various bureaus and
offices of the Navy Department.
His Vice Chief of Naval Operations (VCNO)
supervises the General Planning Group and the
work of the five Deputy Chiefs of Naval Opera-
tions (DCNO) : Personnel, Administration, Op-
erations, Logistics, and Air. There is also an
Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Naval Re-
serve) advanced from his former position under
the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Person-
nel). The General Planning Group prepares
broad strategic plans and aids in developing logis-
tics requirements in support of such plans. These
naval plans are based on overall plans received
from the JCS. Another more recent change is the
Progress Analysis Group to report on Navywide
progress and readiness for war. Both the Com-
mandant of the Marine Corps and the Comman-
dant of the Coast Guard (in wartime) deal di-
rectly with the Chief of Naval Operations on
matters of common interest.
The office of the Chief of Naval Operations is or-
ganized along the same lines as the general staff
of the Army, although different titles are used
and there are some variations. For example, per-
sonnel and administration are separate sections.
The latter directs United States naval missions,
Navy participation in pan-American affairs, naval
records and history, the Naval Observatory, the
Naval Hydrographic Office, and the Naval Com-
munications Service. Air also has its separate
organization to develop aircraft and guided mis-
siles, to organize aviation logistics, and to develop
air warfare operating plans. The DCNO (Opera-
tions) Division includes intelligence and plans, so
that the Director of Naval Intelligence is subordi-
nate to the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations.
This same subordination exists in the Air Force.
Training responsibilities are allocated as fol-
lows: individual training to the Chief of Naval
Personnel, group training to the Deputy Chief of
Naval Operations (operations) , and aviation to the
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air). By
general policy either the Chief or the Vice Chief of
Naval Operations must be a naval aviator to insure
full representation of aviation needs. The Vice
and Deputy Chiefs derive their authority solely
from the Chief of Naval Operations, in the same
manner as with staffs afloat. Although not in-
CONFIDENTIAL
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1VIIN3011N00
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
I TIE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
SUM= OF AIL NAVAL MORS
NAVAL COMMAND ASSISTANT
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CIVRIAN EXECUTIVE ASSISTANTS
OWN SECRETARY OF 1111 NAVY
MIAMI SE011TARY
ASSISUMT SECRETARY FOR MN
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Figure 3.?Organization Chart?Department of the Navy.
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INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS
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UNITED STATES ORGANIZATIONS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
flexible or fixed by formal regulations, the most
frequent relationships between CNO and the Bu-
reaus are found as follows: DCNO (Logistics)
with Yards and Docks, Ordnance, Supplies and
Accounts, Ships, Medicine and Surgery; DCNO
(Personnel) with Personnel; and DCNO (Air)
with Aeronautics.
The Naval Inspector General reports both to
the Chief of Naval Operations and to the Secre-
tary of the Navy. He investigates and reports on
all matters affecting the discipline and military
efficiency of the Navy, making such recommenda-
tions as are required. In his work he has great
latitude, and every part of the service is open to
his scrutiny. His investigations are not to be
confused with those made by the Office of Naval
Intelligence which relate to security and are made
only on request of competent authority.
The Operating Forces
Since World War II, all United States forces
outside the continental limits have been organized
under unified area commands. Each is under a
commander-in-chief who has control over all
United States forces?Army, Navy, and Air Force
in his area?as assigned by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. Under the Executive Agent concept men-
tioned earlier, the Chief of Naval Operations holds
that JCS position for the Pacific, Atlantic, and
Eastern Atlantic-Mediterranean commands. The
Chief of Staff, United States Army, is the Execu-
tive Agent for the Far East (FEC) , Caribbean,
and European (EuCom) commands as well as
United States Forces in Austria. The Chief of
Staff, United States Air Force, is the Executive
Agent for the Alaskan and Northeast commands,
the United States Air Force Europe, and the Stra-
tegic Air Command (SAC).
The Chief of Naval Operations has under his
direct control the Pacific Fleet, Atlantic Fleet,
and Naval Forces Eastern Atlantic and Mediter-
ranean. Each fleet has type components: Am-
phibious, Fleet Marine, Air, Battleships and
Cruisers, Destroyers and Destroyer Escorts, Mine,
Submarine, Service Force, and Training Com-
mands.
Under Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet (Cin-
CPac) is the First Fleet, operating in the Eastern
Pacific, and the Seventh Fleet, in the Western
73
CONFIDENTIAL
Pacific. However, during the Korean fighting
operational control of the latter fleet has been held
by the Commander-in-Chief, Far East (Army)
exercised through Commander Naval Forces, Far
East (ComNavFE). The Commander-in-Chief,
Atlantic Fleet ( CinCLant) , has the Second Fleet,
and the Operational Development Force for evalu-
ation tests. Commander-in-Chief Eastern At-
lantic and Mediterranean (CinCNELM) has the
Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, receiving logis-
tic support from CinCLantFlt. Each of these
fleets is composed of appropriate ships tempo-
rarily assigned from type commands, and each is
a purely operational command, the administration
remaining under the type commander.
Naval Forces, Germany (NavForGer) is under
Commander-in-Chief, Europe (Army) . The Mili-
tary Sea Transportation Service (MSTS) is under
the Chief of Naval Operations. In addition there
are Pacific and Atlantic Reserve Fleets made up
of the "moth-ball" ships. The Commanders of
the Western and Eastern Sea Frontiers respec-
tively command these fleets as additional duty.
Sea Frontiers
Sea Frontier forces are part of the Operating
Forces of the Navy. Geographically there are five
such forces. The Eastern Sea Frontier (East-
SeaFron) includes waters off the Atlantic and
Gulf Coasts and the 1st, 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th, 8th,
and 9th Naval Districts, plus Naval Commands
of the Potomac and Severn Rivers. This sea
frontier command is under CinCLant. The
Caribbean Sea Frontier, under the Commander-
in-Chief, Caribbean (Army), includes the 10th
and 15th Naval Districts, plus adjacent waters in
the Caribbean and nearby Pacific. The Western
Sea Frontier (WesSeaFron) under CinCPac in-
cludes the 11th, 12th, and 13th Naval Districts, as
well as eastern Pacific waters. The Hawaiian Sea
Frontier also under CinCPac includes the 14th
Naval District and central Pacific waters. The
Alaskan Sea Frontier is under Commander-in-
Chief Alaska (Air Force) and includes the 17th
Naval District and north Pacific waters.
These command relationships are in the field of
military operations. Sea Frontier commanders
are responsible for maintaining adequate plans for
the defense of their respective areas, both of a
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CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS
naval and a joint nature. They also must be
ready to expedite and protect merchant shipping
in their areas. Naval participation in search and
rescue operations is under their control.
In addition to operational duties, Sea Frontier
commanders are administratively in the chain of
command between the Chief of Naval Operations
and the District Commandants. This is military
command and coordination control in the interests
of uniformity of action and avoidance of duplica-
tion among the districts. District Commandants
still can deal directly with the Navy Department
on matters not involving coordination or the mili-
tary readiness of their forces.
The Shore Establishment
The shore establishment includes the field ac-
tivities of the bureaus and offices of the Navy De-
partment and all shore activities not assigned to
the operating forces. These activities are largely
involved in producer logistics for the support of
the operating forces. Although located princi-
pally in coastal areas, they may be scattered any-
where throughout the United States and its terri-
tories.
It is appropriate at this point to provide an ex-
planation of the formal command relationships
which apply specifically to the Shore Establish-
ment, based on General Order No. 19 which gives
the official definitions.
Command is the authoritative direction exer-
cised over a unit or individual of the Naval Estab-
lishment in all matters pertaining to the conduct
of naval affairs not specifically expected by higher
authority and is commensurate with the responsi-
bility imposed. Inherent in command are prec-
edence over all personnel serving with the com-
mand, the responsibility for coordinating the ef-
forts of the units or individuals commanded, the
power to enforce the official will of the commander
through the exercise of the necessary military di-
rections, the authority to make inspections to in-
sure compliance with such directions, and the
initiation or application of authorized discipli-
nary measures incident thereto. A commander,
within his discretion, may delegate the execution
of the details to be performed by his authority to
appropriate subordinates, but such delegation does
not relieve him of the overall responsibility for
CONFIDENTIAL
74
the performance of the personnel or units under
his command.
In General Order No. 19 "command" is subdi-
vided into four components which are defined as
follows:
Military Command is the authoritative di-
rection exercised over activities of the Naval
Establishment in military matters together
with the power to exercise authoritative direc-
tion in all matters when circumstances
dictate.
Military command stems from the Chief of Naval
Operations, and is exercised over activities of the
shore establishment through the Sea Frontier Com-
manders and the District Commandants, the
Chief of Naval Air Training, and the Comman-
dant of the Marine Corps. It includes matters
characteristic of a military organization, as con-
trasted to matters of the type provided for under
Management Control in industry or business.
Coordination Control is that necessary di-
rection of separate units of the naval estab-
lishment to insure adequately integrated
relationships between all of these units.
Coordination Control is a responsibility of the
Chief of Naval Operations, exercised through the
Sea Frontier Commanders and the District Com-
mandants, over shore activities located within the
several districts. It fulfills the twofold purpose
of providing for orderly and complete service in
support of the operating forces and coordination
between shore activities under different commands.
Management Control is the direction exer-
cised, in other than military matters, by an
authority of the Naval Establishment over a
unit of the naval shore establishment in the
administration of its local operating func-
tions.
Management Control is exercised by the desig-
nated bureau or office of the Navy Department
over a field activity in the non-military adminis-
tration of its functions. Bureau management re-
flects the policies and procedures of the Civilian
Executive Assistants in the fields of Business Ad-
ministration and Producer Logistics, and includes
overall responsibility for the work performed.
It is to be noted that in the operating forces Man-
agement Control is included in "Command" and
is always the responsibility of the Chief of Naval
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UNITED STATES ORGANIZATIONS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
Operations. Command in the operating forces is
not divided into the four components specified in
General Order No. 19; however, commands of the
operating forces which control activities of the
Shore Establishment exercise that control in ac-
cordance with these four components.
Technical Control is the specialized or pro-
fessional guidance or direction exercised by
an authority of the naval establishment in
technical matters.
Technical Control is exercised by the bureaus and
offices of the Navy Department according to their
specialized technical responsibilities. This con-
trol extends throughout the naval establishment.
The shore establishment consists of district ac-
tivities, fleet activities based ashore, Marine Corps
supporting activities, and the Naval Air Training
Command. Their relationships with the districts,
sea frontiers, fleet commands, and bureaus, are
governed by the regulations indicated above.
A District Commandant is an officer of the line
qualified for command at sea. In his naval dis-
trict he acts as the representative of the Secretary
of the Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, Sea
Frontier Commander, and the various bureaus of
the Navy Department. His responsibilities in-
clude support of the operating forces, defense of
the district, control of public relations, mainte-
nance of industrial mobilization plans, control of
naval reserve matters, and maintenance of an ef-
ficient intelligence service both for security and
operational purposes. Additional duties include
operation of naval communications, collaboration
with other Government authorities, supervision of
legal matters, public works, and transportation.
Each major harbor or operating area within a
district has a Naval Base Commander, with pri-
mary responsibility to support the operating
forces. A Naval Shipyard is but one component
of a Naval Base. There are also Naval Air Base
Commands with appropriate subordinate oom-
mands, including all aviation activities within a
district with the exception of training commands,
Marine Air commands, and weather centrals.
The United States Marine Corps
The Marine Corps, whose mission has been stated
earlier, is divided like the Navy into three com-
ponents: the headquarters, the operating forces,
CONFIDENTIAL
and the supporting establishment. Headquarters
include the Offices of the Commandant, the Supply
Department, and the Personnel Department. In
the Offices of the Commandant, the Division of
Plans and Policies formulates intelligence plans.
The major commands of the operating forces
are Fleet Marine Forces, Atlantic, and Fleet Ma-
rine Forces, Pacific, each under a Commanding
General, located respectively at Norfolk, Va., and
at Honolulu. These forces contain balanced land,
air, and service elements. The Marine Corps Se-
curity Forces guard naval shore activities, with
a Marine Barracks established at each. Ship de-
tachments, actually a part of the security force,
serve as gun crews and small-sized landing parties.
The supporting establishment includes the quar-
termaster depots and other facilities required to
service the Operating Forces.
OTHER DEFENSE DEPARTMENTS
The Department of the Army and Department
of the Air Force resemble the Department of the
Navy in structure, but different histories and mis-
sions have brought about somewhat different solu-
tions to their organizational problems.
The Department of the Army
This title refers both to the whole Army estab-
lishment and to the executive offices in Washington.
The Department of War, created in 1789, became
the Department of the Army in 1947 at which time
the Department of the Air Force was established.
The Secretary of the Army has responsibilities
and an organization similar to those of the Secre-
tary of the Navy. His department includes a
Chief of Staff, a General Staff, a Special Staff,
various administrative and technical staffs and
services, the Office of the Chief of Army Field
Forces, the continental armies, and the overseas
commands.
The mission of the Army places its primary
interest in all operations on land, but its forces
include also such aviation and water transporta-
tion as may be organic to its land combat and
service forces.
Figure 4 shows the Washington offices of the
Department of the Army. Most of the titles are
self-explanatory. The chiefs of the technical serv-
ices, however, have a dual role. They not only
75 CONFIDENTIAL
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ADMINISTRATIVE
ASSISTANT
1
DEPARTMENT
COUNSELOR
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF THE ARMY
(General Management)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF THE ARMY
(Manpower & Res Forces)
UNDER SECRETARY
OF THE ARMY
CHIEF OF STAFF
VICE CHIEF OF STAFF
SECRETARY OF THE GENERAL STAFF
COMPTROLLER OF THE ARMY
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR OPERATIONS & ADMINISTRATION
GENERAL STAFF COMMITTEE ON
NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVE POLICY
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR PLANS
ACCOUNTING 8, FINANCIAL
POLICY DIVISION
AUDIT
DIVISION
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF
G-1, PERSONNEL
BUDGET
DIVISION
MANAGEMENT
DIVISION
PROGRAM REVIEW &
ANALYSIS DIVISION
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF
G-2, INTELLIGENCE
GENERAL
SPECIAL
CHIEF OF INFORMATION
STAFF
STAFF
CHIEF OF LEGISLATIVE LIAISON
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF
G.3, OPERATIONS
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF
G.4, LOGISTICS
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE
CHIEF OF FINANCE
INSPECTOR GENERAL
CHIEF OF AtILJTARY HISTORY
ADMINISTRATIVE STAFFS AND SERVICES
THE ADJUTANT
GENERAL
PROVOST MARSHAL
GENERAL
CHIEF OF CHAPLAINS
THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL
CHIEF NATIONAL
GUARD BUREAU
TECHNICAL STAFFS AND SERVICES
OFFICE OF THE EXEC
FOR RES & ROTC
AFFAIRS
1
SURGEON
GENERAL
CHIEF OF
ORDNANCE
CHIEF OF
ENGINEERS
QUARTERMASTER
GENERAL
Figure 4.?Organization Chart?Department of the Army
CHIEF OF
TRANSPORTATION
CHIEF SIGNAL I
OFFICER
CHIEF CHEMICAL
OFFICER
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serve in the manner of the chiefs of technical bu-
reaus in the Navy in determination of require-
ments, procurement, and storage of supplies, under
the direction of the Assistant Chief of Staff 0-1
Logistics, but they also command their technical
branches and certain installations. For example,
the Chief of Transportation commands Ports of
Embarkation, Railway Repair Depots, and other
Transportation Corps facilities.
The Army organization provides for each mili-
tary commander a staff to aid him in his work.
Divisions and larger units have a Chief of Staff
to direct and coordinate a General Staff which in
its four divisions, G-1 Personnel, G-2 Intelligence,
G-3 Operations, and 0-4 Logistics, includes all
functions of command. Under the coordinating
General Staff is such Special Staff organization as
may be required, including all other staff officers in
a headquarters not specifically part of the General
Staff. In brigades or smaller units the director
and coordinator for the commander is called the.
Executive, and there is no special staff, but there
is an equivalent of the General Staff, known as S-1
Adjutant, S-2 Intelligence, S-3 Operations and
Training, S-4 Supply, and such other staff officers
as may be required.
Since the same pattern of organization appears
at every level of the Army, there is no loss of
efficiency when officers are transferred from one
unit to another or between levels, for their respon-
sibilities are clearly defined and understood. The
American General Staff system has one interesting
variation from that of other countries, such as
Germany. The United States Army rotates offi-
cers between staff and command assignments; the
Germans built a preferential elite corps ear-
marked almost solely for staff assignment.
The Office, Chief of Army Field Forces, is the
field operating agency of the Department of the
Army for the continental United States and is
located at Fort Monroe, Va. The Army Field
Forces are responsible for training, development
of doctrine, and equipment. Its responsibility
for overseas forces is limited to setting training
standards and doctrine, and determining opera-
tional readiness. Orders to overseas commands
are issued through the Department of the Army.
The United States is divided geographically
into six Army Areas and a Military District of
Washington. The Commanding General of each
area, or district, commands all units and activities
within his area except those specifically com-
manded by one of the Technical Services or other
agencies of the Department of the Army.
Army Territorial and Troop Organization
The Army refers to any land, sea, and air masses
involved in the conduct of war as theaters of war.
A theater of operations refers to an area where
actual tactical operations are or can be conducted,"
and it may be subdivided into a combat zone and
a communications zone. The combat zone may
include division areas at the front, behind them
corps service areas, and behind those in turn army
service areas. The communications zone relieves
combat commanders of responsibility for logistics
and security operations not concerned with their
primary combat missions. It is divided into an
advance section, an intermediate section, and a
base section.
That part of the theater of war not included in
the theater of operations is called the zone of the
interior?a term usually applied to the United
States, but on occasion also to foreign territory
whether allied, neutral, or hostile.
Army troop organizations range from the army
group down to the rifle squad. An army group
is primarily a tactical command made up of sev-
eral field armies. A field army includes a head-
quarters, certain organic troops, and a variable
number of corps and divisions. The army is both
administrative and tactical. A corps also includes
a headquarters and certain organic troops plus a
variable number of divisions. It is primarily a
tactical unit but can be administrative. A divi-
sion is the basic unit of combined arms, includ-
ing headquarters, infantry, armored or airborne
units, artillery, and other units as required. It
is both administrative and tactical.
There are smaller units such as the brigade, a
tactical unit of two or more regiments, headquar-
ters and other small units; a group, a flexible
organization with various attached units to ac-
complish a particular mission; a regiment, with
headquarters, service company, and two or more
battalions, or other smaller units; a battalion, the
basic tactical unit; a company or battery, the basic
administrative unit; a rifle platoon; a weapons
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section; and a squad. An army rifle squad has 9
men; in contrast, the Marines divide their 13-man
squads into three 4-man fire teams. The rifle pla-
toon is the smallest infantry unit commanded by
a commissioned officer. Such personnel and equip-
ment as are not required consistently by a particu-
lar unit are pooled and assigned to a higher unit.
When particular tactical groupings are re-
quired, special task forces are created, preserv-
ing as much as possible the integrity of compo-
nent units. Armored divisions sometimes have
combat commands with their own headquarters
companies to direct temporary tactical groupings.
The infantry division frequently uses a combat
team consisting of an infantry regiment, support-
ing artillery, and engineers, or possibly also a
signal detachment, medical battalion, and so forth.
This is called a regimental combat team (RCT) .
The Army classifies as "arms": the Infantry,
Armored Cavalry, Field Artillery, Coast Artil-
lery, Corps of Engineers, and Signal Corps. It
classes as "administrative services": the Adjutant
General's Department, the Chaplains, the Corps
of Military Police, the Inspector General's De-
partment, the Judge Advocate General's Depart-
ment, and the Finance Department. It classes as
"technical services": the Chemical Corps, the
Corps of Engineers, the Quartermaster Corps,
the Transportation Corps, the Ordnance Depart-
ment, the Signal Corps, and the Medical Depart-
ment.
Department of the Air Force
From a modest beginning in 1907 as the aero-
nautical division in the Office of the Chief Signal
Officer, the United States air arm has developed
tremendously under the impetus of two world
wars. In World War I the Army Air Corps was
used in combat operations, and during World
War II the Army Air Forces expanded to nearly
21/2 million men operating 80,000 aircraft. After
the war there was a reduction in size, but by 1950
the objective was a total of 143 wings as a result
of the Korean War and the world situation.
The National Security Act of 1947 and its sub-
sequent amendments created an Air Force Estab-
lishment, a Department of the Air Force, and the
United States Air Force. The civilian Secretary
and his assistants have functions comparable to
CONFIDENTIAL
78
their counterparts in the Department of the Navy
and Army. The Chief of Staff, United States Air
Force, is the principal military adviser to the Sec-
retary and exercises command over the Air Force.
His Air Staff includes a Vice Chief and Deputy
Chiefs as shown in figure 5. The five deputies
are for Comptrolling, Personnel, Development,
Operations, and Materiel. As was pointed out
earlier, Intelligence is under Operations, together
with Plans, Communications, Manpower, and
Organization.
The Air Force is charged with the responsi-
bility of being "organized, trained, and equipped
primarily for prompt and sustained offensive and
defensive air operations." Its missions as for-
mally defined include (1) defense of the United
States against air attack; (2) the defeat of enemy
air forces and the control of vital air areas; (3) the
interdiction of enemy land power and communi-
cations; (4) the furnishing of combat and logisti-
cal air support to the Army, including air lift and
resupply of airborne operations, close combat air
support, aerial photography, tactical reconnais-
sance, etc.; (5) the carrying out of a campaign
of progressive planned destruction of the enemy's
war-making capacity; and (6) the providing of
air transport for the Armed Forces. There are
also the collateral duties of interdiction of enemy
sea power, antisubmarine warfare, protection of
shipping, and aerial minelaying. The latter are
closely coordinated with naval efforts.
Major Air Commands
There are 13 major commands in the United
States and 5 overseas, all under the Chief of Staff,
United States Air Force. Those in the United
States are grouped functionally as follows: (a)
operational: Strategic Air Command, Tactical
Air Command, Air Defense Command; (b) sup-
portive operational: Military Air Transport Serv-
ice, USAF Security Service, Headquarters Com-
mand; (c) training: Air University, Air Training
Command, Continental Air Command; (d) de-
velopmental and logistic: Research and Develop-
ment Command, Air Materiel Command, Air
Proving Ground Command, Special Weapons
Command.
The Strategic Air Command (SAC) includes
heavy and medium bombers, long and medium
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SURGEON GENERAL
THE
INSPECTOR GENERAL
THE
JUDGE ADVOCATE
GENERAL
CHIEF OF STAFF
VICE CHIEF OF STAFF
ASS'T VICE CHIEF OF STAFF
AIR
ADJUTANT GENERAL
SCIENTIFIC
ADVISORY BOARD
SECRETARY OF
THE AIR STAFF
SPECIAL ASST
FOR RESERVE FORCES
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF
COMPTROLLER
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF
PERSONNEL
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF
DEVELOPMENT
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF
OPERATIONS
DEPUTY CHIEF Or 5TAFF
MATERIEL
ASSISTANT FOR PLANS
AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
ASSISTANT FOR
GROUND SAFETY
SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR
AIR FORCE ACADEMY MATTERS
ASSISTANT FOR
DEVELOPMENT PLANNING
ASSISTANT FOR
ATOMIC ENERGY
ASSISTANT FOR
PROGRAMMING
ASSISTANT FOR
MATERIEL PROGRAM CONTROL
ASSISTANT FOR
LOGISTICS PLANS
AUDITOR GENERAL
DIRECTOR, WAN
CHIEF OF
AF CHAPLAINS
ASSISTANT FOR
- DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMING
ASSISTANT FOR
MUTUAL SECURITY
DIRECTOR
OF
ACCOUNTING
DIRECTOR
OF
PERSONNEL
PLANNING
DIRECTOR
OF
REQUIREMENTS
DIRECTOR
OF
INSTALLATIONS
DIRECTOR
OF
MAINTENANCE
ENGINEERING
DIRECTOR
OF
STATISTICAL
SERVICES
DIRECTOR
OF
RESEARCH &
DEVELOPMENT
DIRECTOR
OF
INTELLIGENCE
DIRECTOR
OF
SUPPLY &
SERVICES
DIRECTOR
OF
MILITARY
PERSONNEL
DIRECTOR
OF
PLANS
DIRECTOR
OF
BUDGET
DIRECTOR
OF
INDUSTRIAL
RESOURCES
DIRECTOR
OF
COMMUNICATIONS
DIRECTOR
OF
MANAGEMENT
ANALYSIS
SERVICE
DIRECTOR
OF
CIVILIAN
PERSONNEL
DIRECTOR
OF
TRANSPORTATION
DIRECTOR
OF
MAVOWER
AND
ORGANIZATION
'1
DIRECTOR
OF
'PROCUREMENT
AND
PRODUCTION
ENGINEERING
DIRECTOR
OF
FINANCE
DIRECTOR
OF
TRAINING
DIRECTOR
OF
OPERATIONS
Figure 5.?Organization Chart?Department of the Air Force.
Approvefh,h90,91?(*gg gpfaigtgpokcikgzig,gglip 002100Q2a-
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range reconnaissance aircraft, transports, and jet
fighters. Organizationally it includes the 2d, 8th,
and 15th Air Forces, each with several air divi-
sions; overseas it maintains the 5th and 7th Air
Divisions. Its missions may carry it to any part
of the globe.
The Tactical Air Command includes fighter-
bombers, light bombers, reconnaissance aircraft,
and troop carriers. Organizationally it includes
the 9th and 18th Air Forces. It works closely
with the Army Field Forces in developing tactical
air support doctrines.
The Air Defense Command (ADC) controls
fighter-interceptor units, air bases, and radar sta-
tions along the possible air attack routes in this
country. It consists of three regional forces, the
Eastern, Central, and Western, each made up of
several air divisions, supplemented by Air Na-
tional Guard wings. Their operations are closely
integrated with the Navy Sea Frontier system and
the respective Army Anti-Aircraft Artillery com-
mands. Elements of ADC may be assigned to
commands outside the United States by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff.
The Military Air Transport Service (MATS)
combines the former Air Transport Command and
Naval Air Transport Service. Its routes extend
around the world, and it can provide military air
lift as required. It provides supplementary serv-
ices such as airways communications, weather
reporting, air and sea rescue. It includes person-
nel of the Navy as well as of the Air -.Force. A
special operation of MATS is the Air Resupply
and Communication Service (ARCS) which trains
Air Force units in the preparations and dropping
of psychological warfare pamphlets.
The USAF Security Service produces and dis-
seminates communications intelligence and main-
tains communications security within the Air
Force. The Headquarters Command is primarily
an administrative adjunct of the Headquarters,
United States Air Force, and operates the base for
the heavy traffic in and out of Washington. The
Air University includes a variety of schools and
institutes ranging from the Air War College to
the Extension Course Institute. The Air Train-
ing Command is responsible for all training below
the Air University level from recruit to flying offi-
cer, and for this purpose uses the Flying Training
CONFIDENTIAL
80
Air Force and the Technical Training Air Force.
The Continental Air Command constructs and
maintains air bases and other facilities within the
United States, using as subcommands the 1st, 4th,
10th, and 14th Air Forces.
The six research centers of the Research and
Development Command work on aircraft, mis-
siles, and armament. The Air Materiel Command
buys, supplies, and maintains Air Force equip-
ment throughout the world. The Air Proving
Ground Command develops operational tech-
niques and makes recommendations on require-
ments for equipment. The Special Weapons Com-
mand is part of the joint Army-Navy-Air Force
atomic weapons organization.
Overseas there are five air commands. The gen-
erals of the Alaskan and Northeast Commands are
also theater commanders over all three services in
their areas. The Caribbean Air Command and
Far Eastern Air Force (FEAF) are under Army
theater commanders and the United States Air
Force in Europe (USAFE) operates under the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
Although the preceding discussion of organi-
zations for United States security is relatively
brief, it provides a necessary background in
nomenclature and functions. The balance of this
chapter will deal with supporting intelligence
subdivisions, emphasizing those within the De-
partment of Defense, but including others which
are of interest.
NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
Naval Intelligence includes all the organizations
that carry out the intelligence and counterintelli-
gence missions of the naval establishment. The
responsibilities of the Director of Naval Intelli-
gence are: (1) to provide the naval elements re-
quired in the production of national intelligence;
(2) to produce for naval commanders adequate
and timely intelligence needed both for planning
and conducting operations, and for estimating the
capabilities, vulnerabilities, and proper courses of
action of foreign nations; (3) to warn naval com-
manders of threats to the security of their
commands.
The components of Naval Intelligence are: (a)
the Office of Naval Intelligence; (b) Intelligence
foreign posts (Attaches, Observers, and Liaison
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UNITED STATES ORGANIZATIONS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY CONFIDENTIAL
Officers) ; (c) Naval District and River Command
Intelligence organizations; (d) Intelligence sec-
tions and units of the operating forces including
outlying bases; and (e) joint and combined In-
telligence and liaison activities. Each of these
components will be discussed in turn.
It will clarify our point of view to think of all
naval intelligence officers as serving on the intelli-
gence section of some commander's staff, the size
and organization of the section depending on the
needs of the command. On lower echelons, the
intelligence section may consist of a single officer
who also performs other duties, such as that of
assistant operations officer; and the commander?
for example, the captain of a ship or an air squad-
ron?may not be normally thought of as having
an organized staff at all. On higher echelons, in-
telligence duties may require the full time services
of many officers. The higher the echelon of com-
mand, the more extensive the staff organization,
and the larger and more complex the intelligence
section.
The highest echelon of the United States Naval
Command is that of the Chief of Naval Operations
(CNO) . CNO's Intelligence Officer is the Direc-
tor of Naval Intelligence (DNI) , and his intelli-
gence section is the Office of Naval Intelligence
(ONI) .
Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI)
Under the Director and Assistant Director of
Naval Intelligence, ONI (0P-32) is divided into
three branches which carry out the various objec-
tives necessary for the accomplishment of the gen-
eral mission of Naval Intelligence. Each branch
of ONI is subdivided into sections, which are fur-
ther divided into units and desks. Figure 6 indi-
cates the current ONI organization.
As the counterintelligence arm of the Navy, the
Security Branch (OP 321) is charged with the
safeguarding and security of naval information,
personnel, equipment, and naval installations. Its
five sections are: Investigations; Sabotage, Es-
pionage and Counter-Subversion (SEC) ; Secu-
rity Control; Commerce and Travel; and
Censorship.
Of particular interest are the Investigations
Section and the SEC Section. The Investigations
Section conducts investigations as required to pro-
81
tect the Naval Establishment against espionage,
sabotage, subversion and unauthorized disclosure
of classified information. It also conducts other
types of investigations upon request by competent
authority?for example, investigations of appli-
cants for naval employment. The SEC Section
functions as a research and evaluation unit, co-
ordinating and disseminating intelligence relating
to sabotage, espionage, and counter-subversion.
These two sections work as a team. The SEC Sec-
tion keeps track of the danger spots; its work is
primarily a desk job. The Investigations Section
acts as the hands and feet of the SEC Section.
The Intelligence Branch (OP 322) is responsible
for strategic and operational intelligence, specifi-
cally including air intelligence, and for the coordi-
nation of naval intelligence activities on foreign
posts. It is required to collect and process infor-
mation, and to disseminate intelligence produced
or received; to maintain liaison with other Federal
intelligence agencies; and to direct and coordinate
the preparation of intelligence directives, plans,
and manuals.
Its five sections are Estimates, Collection and
Dissemination, Foreign, Operational, and Air.
The Collection and Dissemination Section main-
tains official intelligence liaison with the Army,
Air Force, State Department, and the Central In-
telligence Agency. This Section also discharges
the responsibility of the Intelligence Branch for
the collection of information by Naval Intelli-
gence foreign posts. One of its subsections main-
tains the CNO Chart Room; another provides
maps, charts, photographs, and related material
for intelligence purposes. The Foreign Section
is responsible for supplying intelligence on foreign
powers to the policy, planning, operational, and
logistics agencies of the Navy. The Operational
Section insures that timely intelligence, both basic
and current, is disseminated within ONI and to
the operating forces. The Air Section provides
intelligence on foreign air power and coordinates
the naval aspects of the joint air production intel-
ligence activities of ONI and the Air Force.
The Administrative Branch (OP 323) super-
vises all management activities within and for
ONI. Its five sections are: Field Activities, Gen-
eral Services, Personnel, Fiscal, and Training.
General services include such matters as: publica-
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Co
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
DIRECTOR OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
ASSISTANT
DIRECTOR OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
POLICY AND PLANS I
COORoINATION
FOREIGN LIAISON
HEAD OF SECURITY BRANCH
ADMINISTRATIVE
ASSISTANT
HEAD OF INTELLIGENCE BRANCH
ASSISTANT TO
BRANCH HEAD
SECURITY POLICY
HEAD OF ADMINISTRATIVE BRANCH
1
ASSISTANT TO
BRANCH HEAD
FOREIGN
SECT! ON
COLLECTION &
DISSEMINATION
SECTI ON
CENSORSHI P
SECTI ON
INVESTI GATI OHS
SECTI ON
SEC
SECTION
____L____
(OMIERCE &
TRAVEL
SECT! ON
ESTIMATES
SECTI ON
AIR
SECTION
OPERATIONAL
iNTELLIGENCE
" SECTION
SECUR I TY
CONTROL
SECTION
ASSISTANT TO
BRANCH HEAD
FIELD
ACTIVITIES
SECTION
GENERAL
SERVICES
SECTION
Figure 6.?Organization chart?Office of Naval Intelligence,
PERSONNEL
SECTION
FISCAL
SECTION
TRAINING
SECTION
INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS
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tions, editorial review, reproduction, mail, files,
and translation. The Personnel Section is re-
sponsible for the Naval Intelligence Reserve
Program.
Included within ONI are also offices responsible
for Plans and Policies, Foreign Liaison, and Sec-
retariat. The Plans and Policies office prepares
and coordinates Naval Intelligence plans. The
Foreign Liaison office maintains official liaison be-
tween? ONI and foreign attaches, missions, and
distinguished visitors. It also advises United
States Naval officers in matters of protocol. The
Secretariat reviews correspondence, reports and
messages and otherwise relieves DNI of admin-
istrative details.
Intelligence Foreign Posts (Attaches, Observers and
Liaison Officers)
Naval Attaches and their staffs who reside
abroad are officially a part of ONI and thus under
the cognizance of DNI. At the same time, at-
taches and assistant attaches have diplomatic
status and report for duty to the ambassador or
minister who is the chief of the diplomatic mis-
sion to which they are assigned.
Naval Attaches are in command of naval attache
offices whose size is determined by ONI in accord-
ance with the importance of the area controlled
by the governments to which the attaches are
accredited. The primary function of Naval In-
telligence officers stationed abroad is to collect
information in accordance with the official delimi-
tation of topical material between the Navy, Army,
Air Force, and State Department, and to forward
it, after preliminary evaluation, to the Collection
and Dissemination Section of ONI. Foreign
Posts are supported by the Intelligence Branch.
Naval District and River Command Intelligence
Organizations
General Order No. 19 states in part: ". . . The
Commandant shall maintain within the district
an efficient intelligence service, including such in-
telligence matters as affect the security of naval
activities within the district, and such operational
intelligence matters as are required by the com-
mander of the sea frontier in which the district is
located . . ."
Accordingly, in each District and River com-
mand, a District Intelligence Officer (DIO) serves
on the staff of the Commandant, just as DNI serves
on the staff of CNO. In certain designated dis-
tricts, the DIO has additional duty on the staff
of the Sea Frontier Commander. The District
Intelligence Office under the DIO is thus the
Intelligence Section of the commandant's staff.
While each District Intelligence Office is under
the military command of the Commandant, its
activities are coordinated by ONI which provides
administrative support. Each District Intelli-
gence Office is organized in a manner similar to
ONI although its primary mission is in the field
of counterintelligence. Just as the Intelligence
Branch of ONI supports naval attaches and other
naval intelligence officers on foreign duty, the
Security Branch supports the DIOs and their or-
ganizations. The relationships and responsibili-
ties of the DIO to DNI and to the Commandant
are comparable to those of the naval attache to
DNI and to the Chief of Mission.
The District Intelligence organization consists
of a headquarters office, zone and subordinate of-
fices as required, and intelligence units at naval
stations and other naval activities as designated
by the Commandant. The personnel of zone and
subordinate offices are directly under the DIO.
Intelligence officers assigned to naval stations and
other naval activities are members of the staffs of
those commands.
Under the technical guidance of the DI0s, the
various naval districts and river commands con-
duct specialized intelligence training programs
for officers of the Naval Intelligence Reserve.
Intelligence Sections and Units of the Operating
Forces, Including Outlying Bases
In the fleet, as in the district and river com-
mands, the basic pattern of the intelligence or-
ganization is that of the staff section. On the staff
of each area, fleet, type, and task force commander,
and on the staffs of all flag officers exercising com-
mand, there is an intelligence section headed by a
flag Intelligence Officer.
Sections 0504 (4) and 0506 (1), Navy Regula-
tions, 1948, provide, respectively, that a com-
mander in Chief, or commander of any other or-
ganization or unit of the Operating Forces shall
"maintain an effective intelligence organization
and keep himself informed of the political and
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INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS
military aspects of the national and international
situation" and shall "keep his immediate superior
appropriately informed of . . . intelligence infor-
mation which may be of value."
These two articles make each commander re-
sponsible for the collection, processing, and dis-
semination of intelligence within his own com-
mand, and the dissemination of intelligence to
higher echelons. Because of the complexity of
present-day naval operations, and the consequent
need for a steady and voluminous flow of intelli-
gence, a commander must rely on his staff to carry
out most of his intelligence responsibilities.
Wartime intelligence organization in the oper-
ating forces was by no means uniform. This di-
versity was due in part to the relative independ-
ence of the various commands, and in part to their
widely differing needs. Late in World War II,
considerable progress was made toward uniform-
ity. Nevertheless, the exigencies of any future
war are likely to result in intelligence organiza-
tions quite different from those of peacetime, since
each commander must bear the responsibility for
organizing his intelligence section to meet his par-
ticular needs. But no future development will
alter the responsibility incumbent upon intelli-
gence officers with the operating forces--as upon
all members of Naval Intelligence?to see that all
intelligence received or produced flows upward to
the higher echelons where it can be properly evalu-
ated and disseminated and so, ultimately, reaches
the Office of Naval Intelligence.
For background purposes, the organization of
fleet intelligence during World War II need be
only summarized. In general, the area command-
ers were served by large intelligence centers, which
later set up offices in forward sectors for more
rapid collection and dissemination. These intelli-
gence centers proved their usefulness, and counter-
parts of them are likely to be established in any
future war. They were intelligence agencies, usu-
ally large, which served the commander and all
subordinate units of his command, but were sep-
arate from the relatively small intelligence section
of the staff itself. So far as practicable, they were
joint activities of the Navy and the other armed
forces. Their normal work included photog-
raphy, photo-interpretation, hydrography, car-
tography, target and flak analysis, interrogation
CONFIDENTIAL
84
and translation. On the lower echelons of the
area command, an intelligence officer?sometimes
with one or more assistants?was assigned to each
flag afloat, including fleet air wings. Intelligence
officers were also assigned to battleships, cruisers,
destroyer and motor torpedo boat squadrons, all
major amphibious units and all carriers, air
groups and air squadrons.
Since World War II, ONI and the Bureau of
Naval Personnel have had the objective of plac-
ing trained intelligence officers in all echelons of
command. In practice, however, on many staffs,
no trained intelligence officer is available, and a
staff officer is given additional duty in intelligence.
Shipboard intelligence organizations also have
suffered from a lack of personnel. Article 0916,
Navy Regulations, 1948, provides that the opera-
tions officer of a ship, under the commanding offi-
cer, shall be responsible for the collection and
analysis of intelligence information. Accord-
ingly an intelligence officer, when available, is as-
signed to the operations department of every
capital ship and of other ships as conditions
warrant.
The primary responsibility of intelligence offi-
cers assigned to the operating forces is to meet
the intelligence requirements of their immediate
commander. However, they have an added re-
sponsibility, through their commander to ONI,
in collecting information for not only their im-
mediate command but also the Naval Establish-
ment as a whole. Intelligence Sections and units
of the operating forces are supported by the In-
telligence Branch of ONI.
Joint and Combined Intelligence and Liaison
Activities
During World War II the scope and diversity
of the fighting required an unprecedented degree
of joint and combined activity and hence joint
and combined intelligence. United States naval
intelligence officers served as observers with the
British Fleet. British personnel were attached
to American armed forces. Amphibious opera-
tions in both the Pacific and the European theaters
were planned and supervised jointly by sea,
ground, and air specialists.
Naval Intelligence participated in joint intelli-
gence activities on all echelons during World War
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II, from the Joint Intelligence Committee, the in-
telligence agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
down to small field units engaged in such tasks as
the exploitation of captured documents and the
interrogation of prisoners of war. Less than a
dozen of these joint intelligence activities sur-
vived the peace.
Several trends initiated in wartime have con-
tinued in the postwar period?namely, the trends
toward joint and combined scientific research and
development, joint and combined intelligence pro-
duction, and joint and combined staff training.
All commanders of naval operating forces are
authorized and directed, subject to the prior ap-
proval of DNI, to conduct or participate in joint
intelligence activities which they believe are re-
quired for successful execution of their missions.
Among the assignments open to naval intelligence
officers are participation in the work of the Joint
Staff, under the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and duty in
the Central Intelligence Agency.
MARINE CORPS INTELLIGENCE
While the United States Marine Corps draws its
intelligence information from the Navy, it pat-
terns its Intelligence organization after the Army.
The Commandant of the Marine Corps has a staff
Intelligence Officer (G-2) and a headquarters in-
telligence section which produces intelligence of
interest to the Corps on such subjects as foreign
coasts, landing beaches, and associated subjects.
Most strategic intelligence is obtained directly
from ONI. During joint operations the Marine
Corps also obtains intelligence from the Army.
Intelligence Officers are assigned to all Marine
operating units of battalion level and higher. The
size of the intelligence section varies with the size
and needs of the unit. For example, a battalion
has but one intelligence officer, while a division
may have five officers in its intelligence section.
Marine intelligence officers are also assigned to
duty in ONI, in Naval Attache billets, on naval
operating staffs and with the Central Intelligence
Agency.
ARMY INTELLIGENCE
The Army intelligence organization is officially
called the "Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff,
85
0-2, Intelligence, General Staff, United States
Army." The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, is a
member of the General Staff, United States Army,
and is coequal with the heads of the other General
Staff divisions. He is thus an echelon higher than
his naval counterpart, the Director of Naval In-
telligence, but his responsibilities are substantially
the same.
As shown in figure 7, there are five operating di-
visions in the Army's 0-2 organization: Adminis-
trative, Collection and Dissemination, Production,
Security, and Training. Each consists of several
branches. The Administrative Division contains
the following Branches: Attache, Fiscal, Message
Center (communications), Personnel, and Service
(including records and translation). The Collec-
tion and Dissemination Division operates the War
Room, is responsible for intelligence requirements
and publications, and maintains the 0-2 Docu-
ment Library. The Production Division is com-
posed of the Estimates Branch, three geographic
branches?Eastern, Western, and Eurasian?the
Technical and Special Research Branches, Area
Resources Branch, and the Air Intelligence Com-
ponent which works with the Air Force. In the
Security Division are the three branches respon-
sible for censorship, personnel security, and the
security of military information. The Training
Division is concerned with regular and reserve in-
telligence training, and also operates the Map and
Photo Branch.
The Army Security Agency (ASA) and the
Counter-Intelligence Corps (CIC) are specialized
organizations of importance. ASA is responsible
for communications intelligence and security.
CIC is the counterintelligence agency of the
Army; it makes all investigations for which the
Army is responsible under the Delimitation Agree-
ment, and also investigates compromises of mili-
tary information and cases involving foreign na-
tionals both in the United States and abroad.
Each of these agencies takes care of its own ad-
ministration, including the procurement, training
and assignment of personnel, and the development
of equipment and doctrine. Their work, however,
comes within the purview of G-2, and close liaison
and coordination is maintained.
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STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE
SCHOOL
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2
DEPUTY for Intelligence
DEPUTY for Operations
EXECUTIVE
SPECIAL
ASSISTANT
LIAISON OFFICERS
(Army Security Agency)
(Counter Intel. Corps)
MANAGEMENT
OFFICE
FOREIGN LIAISON
OFFICE
POLICY AND
COORDINATING
OFFICE
PRODUCTION
DIVISION
Branches:
Eastern
Estimates
Eurasian
Western
Technical
Special Research
Area Resources
AFOIN component
ADMINISTRATIVE
DIVISION
Branches:
Attache
Fiscal
Message Center
Personnel
Service
COLLECTION &
DISSEMINATION
Branches:
Requirements
Operations
Plans & Research
Document Library
Publications
SECURITY
DIVISION
Branches:
Censorship
Personnel
Security
S. M. I.
TRAINING
DIVISION
Branches:
Organisation &
Training'
Reserve
Components
Map & Photo
Figure 7.?Organization Chart?Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Intelligence, General Staff, U. S. Army.
APPr?v&M21; M??ReoiRAN
0 30200N il[A) oslocnosroyo 1 00210002-9
CONFIDENTIAL
AIR FORCE INTELLIGENCE
The Directorate of Intelligence under the Dep-
uty Chief of Staff for Operations, Headquarters,
USAF, is usually abbreviated "D/I" and desig-
nated AFOIN?literally Air Force Operations
/Ntelligence?a term corresponding to "Op 32"
in the Navy. In command structure, the Air
Force follows the Navy, rather than the Army, in
making Intelligence subordinate to Operations.
This Air Force organization deserves special com-
ment for several reasons. It differs from ONI and
0-2 in that it has no responsibility for counter-
intelligence; it formulates no policy for safeguard-
ing military information; and it specifically pro-
duces intelligence for the other military services.
The Navy and the Army provide approximately
one-third of the personnel in the intelligence pro-
ducing divisions of the Directorate in return for
processed air intelligence for the Army, Navy, and
Marine air arms.
Figure 8 indicates that Air Force Intelligence
is headed by a Director of Intelligence assisted
by three Deputy Directors: for Collection and
Dissemination, Estimates, and Targets. The Di-
rector also administers the Air Technical Intelli-
gence Center.
The Director's responsibilities include collect-
ing information on the air potential and air forces
of foreign countries; producing intelligence from
this information; and disseminating this material
not only within the Air Force, but also to the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Central Intelligence
Agency, and other departments and agencies as
appropriate. He directs and controls all USAF
intelligence activities, including the Air Attache
system. He sets up the air intelligence require-
ments for USAF photo reconnaissance, mapping
and charting and geodetic surveying programs.
He is further responsible for meeting the intelli-
gence requirements of the continental and over-
seas air commands, and the air administrative
and technical services. The Director also repre-
sents the Air Force on intelligence matters with
other departments and agencies of the United
States Government and with foreign governments.
The Office of the Director of Special Investiga-
tions, an agency under the USAF Inspector Gen-
eral, is the counterintelligence agency of the Air
Force. It is responsible for safeguarding military
87
information, and for investigating all cases of
espionage, sabotage, treason, subversion, etc.,
within the Air Force.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (FBI)
The FBI is the chief internal security agency
of the Federal Government. It is now responsible
for investigating violations of more than 100 Fed-
eral laws. Under some of these laws, such as
the Atomic Energy Act and the Federal Em-
ployees Loyalty Program, specific responsibility
has been given to the FBI by the law itself or
by Presidential Directive. Under others, the FBI
exercises its general investigative functions in all
cases where the United States is or may become a
party in interest. The FBI also promotes scien-
tific crime detection by means of its laboratory,
its fingerprint files, and the FBI National Acad-
emy for law-enforcement officers.
The FBI is organized in seven Divisions: (1)
Identification; (2) Training and Inspection; (3)
Administration; (4) Records and Communica-
tions; (5) General Investigations; (6) Labora-
tory; and (7) Security. The latter division is
of primary interest to Naval Intelligence because
of mutual counterintelligence responsibilities.
THE DELIMITATION AGREEMENT
The Delimitation Agreement originated in a
Presidential directive of 26 June 1939, which pro-
vided that investigations of all matters concerning
espionage, counterespionage, subversion, and sab-
otage (the "four categories") should be conducted
and controlled emclusively by Naval Intelligence,
Military Intelligence, and the FBI. The heads
of these three agencies were directed to form a
committee to pool information and coordinate ac-
tivities. This became the Interdepartmental In-
telligence Conference (IIC), which worked out
the Delimitation Agreement, prescribing the juris-
diction and investigative duties of each of the
three agencies. Under the original Agreement,
the Navy assumed responsibility for the investi-
gation and disposal of cases in the "four cate-
gories" involving (a) personnel of the Naval
Establishment, including civilians employed by
the Navy, and (b) personnel in areas under its
administrative control: Guam, Samoa, Palmyra,
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1V11N3OHNO0
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE
AIR TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE CENTER
(Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio)
Policy & Management Group
jDEPUTY DIRECTOR for
COLLECTION & DISSEMINATION
Policy & Mgmt Group
COLLECTION OPERATIONS
DIVISION
Branches:
Collection Control
Reconnaissance
Supplemental Research
Air Attache
DISSEMINATION CONTROL
DIVISION
Branches:
Processing
Dissemination
Documents
Foreign Liaison
DEPUTY DIRECTOR for
ESTIMATES
Policy & Mgmt Group
TOPICAL INTELLIGENCE
DIVISION
Branches:
Indications
Current Intelligence
Intel. Exploitation
Air Intel. Digest
INTEL INTEGRATION
DIVISION
Branches:
Analysis & Review
Military Services
National Estimates
Survey
Planning Estimates
MILITARY CAPABILITIES
DIVISION, WEST
Branches:
Analysis & Review
Western Establishments
Western Air Facilities
Western Support
MILITARY CAPABILITIES
DIVISION, EAST
Branches:
Analysis & Review
Eastern Establishments
Eastern Air Facilities
Eastern Support
Weapons Analysis
(World Wide)
DEPUTY DIRECTOR for
TARGETS
Policy & Mgmt Group
Special Studies Group
TARGET ANALYSIS DIV.
Branches:
Military Vulnerability
Industrial Vulnerability
General Vulnerability
PHYSICAL VULNERABILITY
DIVISION
Branches:
Weapons Application
Weapons Effects
Mathematical Analysis
TARGET MATERIALS DIV.
Branches:
Production
Target Integration
Radar Target Intel.
Figure 8.?Organization Chart?Directorate of Intelligence, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Headquarters, USAF
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UNITED STATES ORGANIZATIONS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY CONFIDENTIAL
Johnson, Wake, and Midway. In Japan, the
Navy and FBI had joint responsibility.
After the War, changes in the Delimitation
Agreement were necessitated by the Atomic En-
ergy Act of 1946, which provided that everyone
authorized to have access to "restricted" atomic
data should have been investigated by the FBI.
Some of the people for whom such authorization
was desired wore Army or Navy uniforms. Ac-
cordingly, the FBI was required to conduct in-
vestigations of all Armed Forces personnel for
"Q clearances" for access to "restricted" atomic
data. However, as a result of the Agreement of
February 1951, Armed Forces personnel are now
given access to "restricted" atomic data on the
strength of their military security clearances, ex-
cept in cases involving contractors with the Atomic
Energy Commission or their employees.
The Delimitation Agreement was also affected
by the Federal Employees Loyalty Program (Ex-
ecutive Order 9835 of March 21,1947). Although
this applied mainly to civilian employees in the
Executive Branch of the Government, it directed
the Armed Forces to take such steps as necessary
to ensure the loyalty of their own personnel. It
also directed the FBI to make all investigations.
Accordingly, the Navy is no longer responsible for
investigations in the "four categories" of civilians
whom it employs or over whom it has administra-
tive control. Nevertheless, in areas under Naval
Administrative control, the Navy in practice still
does the job for the FBI, and also investigates
all cases involving personnel of the Military Sea
Transportation Service. For purposes of the De-
limitation Agreement, Reserve personnel on in-
active duty are civilians.
To sum up, in the "four categories", the Navy
now restricted to investigations involving ac-
duty and retired naval and marine personnel,
the exceptions stated above. However, its
Iction to make general security investigations
the "four categories" is not restricted either
3 Delimitation Agreement or any other regu-
17 document; and it still makes many investi-
ions involving civilians, for example, in cases
Involving its own employees, applicants for naval
employment, and employees of naval contractors.
By provision of the National Security Act of
1947, the Director of Special Investigations,
269196-54----7
USAF, joined the Director, FBI, the Assistant
Chief of Staff, G-2, and the Director of Naval
Intelligence on the Interdepartmental Intelligence
Conference. Thus the Air Force is governed by
and participates in the provisions of the Delimita-
tion Agreement.
STATE DEPARTMENT INTELLIGENCE
The Special Assistant to the Secretary of State,
Intelligence, has the rank of Assistant Secretary
of State. His office provides the departmental
intelligence of the State Department. In the field
of national intelligence, it is primarily, though
not exclusively, responsible for political, cultural,
and sociological matters, by NSC directive. In
practice, it has also produced most economic in-
telligence and considerable scientific intelligence.
It has a special responsibility for coordinating
overt intelligence activities abroad, since, by NSC
directive, the Chiefs of Mission are the coordina-
tors of such activities.
As shown in figure 9, the State Department
Office of Intelligence has two major suboffices, each
of which has a number of divisions. The Office
of Intelligence Research (OIR) plans and de-
velops an intelligence research program along
regional and functional lines, and coordinates it
with that of other Federal agencies. In this
manner the Department is provided with the in-
telligence necessary for the formulation and exe-
cution of foreign policy. On the other hand,
information pertinent to national security is fur-
nished to the Security Council, the Central Intel-
ligence Agency, and the Department of Defense.
In addition to carrying on intelligence research,
OIR prepares or participates in the preparation
of studies and spot intelligence for authorized
recipients in the Department and other Federal
agencies. It continuously scrutinizes world situa-
tions and deals with intelligence problems sub-
mitted to it by the Secretary, Under Secretary,
Planning Adviser, and other State Department
officials, as well as the Central Intelligence Agency
and the Department of Defense. It directs De-
partment of State participation in the National
Intelligence Survey basic research program and
works in close cooperation with the Central In-
telligence Agency and other governmental agen-
89 CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS
OFFICE OF
SPECIAL ASSISTANT ? INTELLIGENCE
r--
ISPECIAL PROJECTS STAFF
EXECUTIVE STAFF
OFFICE OF
LIBRARIES & INTELLIGENCE
ACQUISITION (OLI)
DIRECTOR
ACQUISITION & DISTRIBUTION
BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION
LIBRARY &
REFERENCE SERVICES
OFFICE OF
INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH (01R)
DIRECTOR
FAR EAST
HWESTERN EUROPE
HNEAR EAST, SOUTH
ASIA & AFRICA
USSR 8, EASTERN EUROPE
AMERICAN REPUBLICS
FUNCTIONAL INTELLIGENCE
Figure 9,?Organization Chart?Office of Intelligence, Department of State.
cies engaged in the production of National
Intelligence Survey materials.
The Office of Libraries and Intelligence Ac-
quisition (OLI) has a collection responsibility and
also maintains a library program for the Depart-
ment, which includes policy guidance and assist-
ance to the libraries of the Foreign Service
establishments overseas. It collects and evaluates
biographic information on foreign individuals,
involving the preparation of analytical biographic
studies as well as the maintenance of the Depart-
ment's central collection of biographic and sem-
rity information of foreign persons, It collects,
processes, and evaluates security intelligence per-
taining to foreigners and organizations abroad.
The security program of the State Department
and the Foreign Service is supervised by the Office
of Security and Consular Affairs, in large part
through the Division of Security. The functions
of this Division include development of security
policy for the Department and the Foreign Service
CONFIDENTIAL
90
and provision for their personnel and physical
security by: (1) conducting investigations of ap-
plicants for employment in the Department and
Foreign Service; (2) directing those investiga-
tions requiring coverage overseas in connection
with the President's Loyalty Program; (3) evalu-
ating investigative reports and making recom-
mendations to the Loyalty and Security Board in
appropriate cases; (4) establishing and supervi'
ing control measures for documentary, commr
cations, and building security for the Depart,
in Washington; (5) directing, through appi
ate channels, the security program in
Service establishments.
Further, it furnishes additional investigt.
services for the Department with respect to:
passport, visa, munitions control, and other cases,
(2) individuals, organizations, situations, trends,
and developments constituting a threat to the
security of the United States; (3) other matters,
as requested.
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UNITED STATES ORGANIZATIONS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
The Security Division also provides security
protection for official guests of the United States
Government and other distinguished visitors, and
for international conferences in the United States.
It maintains official liaison with the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, the Treasury Depart-
ment, the Post Office Department, and other do-
mestic security and law enforcement agencies. It
cooperates with Department of Justice on ques-
tions of policy in connection with the Foreign
Agents Registration Act. No foreigner can get
a visa for entry into the United States unless he
has been cleared through the Visa Division. Such
clearance is effected or denied on the basis of
information gathered by the Department and
other governmental intelligence agencies with
which it maintains close liaison.
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION INTELLIGENCE
Because of the importance of intelligence con-
cerning the military applications of nuclear
power, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)
has an Office of Intelligence and a Division of
Security.
The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 first provided
four divisions, Research, Production, Engineer-
ing, and Military Applications, to aid the General
Manager in carrying out his duties. Other divi-
sions were needed, and in 1948 a Division of
Security and Intelligence was created. Shortly
thereafter, this division became the Division of
Security when a separate Office of Intelligence was
formed with a Director.
The Office of Intelligence has no collection
function, but it may request information from
other agencies. When information of atomic and
thermonuclear interest is received by any govern-
ment agency (including the non-intelligence agen-
cies such as Commerce), it is forwarded to the
AEC where a group of highly trained scientists
in the Office of Intelligence evaluates the incoming
information. The Director of Intelligence may
also call upon the leading scientists in the country
for consultation on the proper evaluation of in-
formation received. The resultant intelligence is
disseminated to the President, the National Se-
curity Council, the Department of Defense, CIA,
and others as appropriate. This evaluation is
AEC's important contribution to intelligence.
91
CONFIDENTIAL
A great and continuing concern of the Atomic
Energy Commission is the safeguarding of our
atomic program from espionage, sabotage, theft,
and destruction. This counterintelligence func-
tion is taken care of by the Division of Security.
In Washington, on the General Manager's staff,
the Division of Security has four sections: Physi-
cal Security, Personnel Security, Document Con-
trol, Violations and Visitor Control. The
functions of each section are essentially what the
names imply. The Division also supervises field
security offices at nine installations in the United
States. Internal security investigations are ini-
tiated by these offices, but if it appears that a
regulation of the Atomic Energy Act has been
violated, it becomes a case for the FBI.
INTERDEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES
There are many areas of activity and interest
where the intelligence requirements of two or
more government agencies or departments coin-
cide; therefore, in the interests of efficiency and
the coordination of effort interdepartmental in-
telligence agencies are established. If all the par-
ticipating departments are military, the agency is
called "joint."
Intelligence Organization for the Joint Chiefs of
Staff
The Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) , to-
gether with its full-time staff, the Joint Intelli-
gence Group (JIG) , is the intelligence agency of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As such, it is the high-
est-level intelligence agency within the Depart-
ment of Defense. Its members are: the Assistant
Chief of Staff, G-2, General Staff, U. S. Army;
the Director of Naval Intelligence; the Director
of Intelligence, USAF; and the Deputy Director
of the Joint Staff for Intelligence. In short, the
Joint Intelligence Committee is composed of the
intelligence chiefs of all the armed forces, plus a
fourth member who directs the Joint Intelligence
Group.
The JIC is charged with: (a) the preparation
of joint intelligence estimates for the Joint Chiefs
of Staff and their subordinate committees; (b)
the coordination of photographic, mapping, and
charting activities of the Department of Defense;
and (c) security matters within JCS jurisdiction.
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Since the three departmental committee mem-
bers devote only a part of their time to JIC mat-
ters, a full-time working staff is required to
prepare joint estimates, reports, plans and policies
for Committee approval. This staff is the Joint
Intelligence Group of the Joint Staff.
The JIC/JIG differs from other intelligence
organizations relating to the national security in
that it is neither a collecting nor a disseminating
agency. It does not duplicate the work of the
departmental agencies or the CIA, but merely uses
the intelligence material of those agencies to meet
the intelligence requirements of the JCS and their
supporting committees and groups.
Interdepartmental Coordinating Committees
Where the intelligence requirements of two or
more departments coincide, the necessary collec-
tion and production operations are brought into
common action by special-purpose committees.
There are a number of such coordinating commit-
tees, the most important being the Interdepart-
mental Intelligence Conference (TIC), discussed
in connection with the FBI, the Intelligence Ad-
visory Committee (IAC), which serves to coordi-
nate the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) with
the other Federal intelligence agencies concerned
with the national security, and the National In-
telligence Survey (NIS) Committee. The IAC
is composed of the intelligence directors of the
Justice Department (FBI) ,the State Department,
the Atomic Energy Commission, the Army, the
Navy, the Air Force and the Joint Staff, in addi-
tion to the Director of Central Intelligence, who
acts as chairman.
During World War II, the main source of basic
intelligence for the armed forces was a series of
handbooks known as Joint Army-Navy Intelli-
gence Studies (JANIS). The deficiencies of the
JANIS series emphasized the fact that basic in-
telligence must be produced on a much broader
scale, over a longer period, and, as far as possible,
in time of peace. Therefore, on 13 January 1948,
the NIS program was initiated.
The NIS Program represents the combined in-
telligence efforts of the CIA, the Army, the Navy,
the Air Force, and the State Department. It is
supervised by the NIS Committee, which consists
of representatives of all the contributing agencies,
CONFIDENTIAL
92
and is coordinated by the CIA. Its purpose is to
produce a concise digest of basic intelligence, such
as, encyclopedic knowledge of the geographic, eco-
nomic, socio-political and military characteristics
of every foreign country.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
During World War II, intelligence-coordinat-
ing agencies including the Office of -War Infor-
mation (0W1) and the Office of Strategic Serv-
ices (OSS) were created by Presidential directive
and a Joint Intelligence C ommittee (JIC) was es-
tablished under the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The
JIC soon recognized the need for, and proposed,
a national agency to coordinate intelligence
produced by the various Departments. Its pro-
posal resulted in the Presidential letter of 22 Jan-
uary 1946, which created the National Intelligence
Authority, and the Central Intelligence Group as
its operating agency. The Authority was di-
rected to plan, develop, and coordinate all Federal
intelligence activities "so as to assure the most
effective accomplishment of the intelligence mis-
sion related to the national security."
The National Security Act of 1947 established
the National Security Council (NSC) which took
the place of the National Intelligence Authority,
specifically abolished by the act. The Central In-
telligence Agency (CIA) was established under
the Council as the statutory successor of the Cen-
tral Intelligence Group.
The Director of CIA
The Act specifically provides for a Director of
Central Intelligence, appointed by the President
with the advice and consent of the Senate. The
Director may be either a civilian or an officer of
one of the armed forces. In the latter event, the
Act provides the safeguard that, during his tenure,
the Director shall be subject to no greater military
control than would any civilian; nor shall he have
or exercise any control, other than as Director,
over any component of the armed forces. Service
as Director is to have no effect, except as described
above, on the status, office or rank in the Armed
Forces of any military man so appointed.
One of the most important provisions of the Act
gives the Director the right in his discretion to
"terminate the employment of any officer or em-
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ployee of the Agency whenever he shall deem such
termination necessary or advisable in the interests
of the United States." This provision frees the
director from civil service restrictions. In an in-
telligence agency, where security is paramount,
freedom in dismissing employees is an obvious
necessity.
The duties of the CIA are set forth in section
102 of the Act, as follows:
(1) to advise the National Security Coun-
cil in matters concerning such intelligence
activities of the Government departments and
agencies as relate to the national security;
(2) to make recommendations to the Na-
tional Security Council for the coordination
of such intelligence activities of the depart-
ments and agencies of the Government as re-
late to the national security;
(3) to correlate and evaluate intelligence
relating to the national security, and provide
for the appropriate dissemination of such in-
formation within the Government using
where appropriate existing agencies and fa-
cilities: Provided, That the _Agency shall have
no police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers,
or internal security functions: Provided fur-
ther, That the departments and other agencies
of the Government shall continue to collect,
evaluate, correlate, and disseminate depart-
mental intelligence: And provided further,
That the Director of Central Intelligence
shall be responsible for protecting intelligence
sources and methods from unauthorized- dis-
closure;
(4) to perform, for the benefit of the exist-
ing intelligence agencies, such additional
services of common concern as the National
Security Council determines can be more effi-
ciently accomplished centrally;
(5) to perform such other functions and
duties related to intelligence affecting the na-
tional security as the National Security Coun-
cil may from time to time direct.
The first paragraph of Section 102 directs and
authorizes the CIA to serve as intelligence ad-
viser to the NSC on all matters relating to the
national security.
The second paragraph requires the CIA to make
recommendations to the NSC for coordinating
such intelligence activities of the Government as
relate to the national security. In performing its
duties under this paragraph the CIA has the coun-
sel of the Intelligence Advisory Committee de-
scribed in the preceding section. Through the
IAC, the CIA is able to maintain close contact
with all the departmental intelligence agencies
concerned with the national security; it can bene-
fit from their knowledge, experience and judg-
ment, and keep itself informed of their intelli-
gence requirements. Their views can serve as the
basis for recommendations made by the CIA to
the NSC. In particular, the IAC can help the
CIA determine the primary fields of intelligence
responsibility of the various departments and
agencies. Thus it can help in promoting efficiency
by the elimination of duplicate missions, func-
tions, and services.
The third paragraph of Section 102 provides for
the correlation and evaluation of intelligence re-
lating to the national security. This task involves
the production of national intelligence. Just as
the NSC integrates national policies that could
not be integrated by either the State or the De-
fense Department alone, so the CIA draws upon
the intelligence produced by the various depart-
ments, supplements it, and integrates it into a
product which is suitable in content and form for
national planning. However, the CIA does not
interfere with the production of departmental in-
telligence. Each department must still evaluate,
correlate, and interpret that intelligence which is
within its own exclusive competence and is needed
for its own use.
The CIA is further charged with the dissemi-
nation of national intelligence within the Gov-
ernment. Because of this responsibility, CIA
must at all times know the intelligence require-
ments of the various Government departments
and agencies. This function of disseminating na-
tional intelligence to the departments that need it
is clearly essential. Owing to the volume and
complexity of intelligence information available,
it should be a centralized function; and the proper
place for centralizing it is the focal point where
all the streams of incoming intelligence converge.
Thus the Act gives the CIA two major functions
of intelligence?production and dissemination. It
makes no explicit provision for the third major
function?collection. Nevertheless, the duties of
the CIA under the second paragraph of Section
102, with respect to the coordination of depart-
mental intelligence activities, entail the coordina-
tion of foreign intelligence collection. As to col-
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lection, then, the role of the CIA is at least to pre-
vent gaps, cross-purposes, and wasteful duplica-
tion among the various departments and agencies.
On the one hand, to give a fictitious example, some
department or agency should collect economic in-
telligence information. On the other hand, the
Air Force should not concern itself with the col-
lection of detailed sociological information about
Java.
The fourth paragraph of this Section gives the
CIA a further warrant for foreign intelligence
collection by authorizing it to perform "such addi-
tional services of common concern as the National
Security Council determines can be more efficiently
accomplished centrally." In eliminating waste-
ful duplication of collection functions, therefore,
the CIA can use either of two methods. It can
discontinue the overlapping collection efforts of
all but one of the departments, and arrange for
that one to serve all the others. In doing so, it
would merely be coordinating. Or, instead, it may
supplant the collection efforts of all the depart-
ments with its own collection effort, and perform
the collection function itself as a service of com-
mon concern to the existing intelligence agencies.
Which, if either, method is used in any given case
is of course determined by the NSO.
To sum up, then, the National Security Act rec-
ognized the need for departmental intelligence,
and in fact specifically provided for its continu-
ance; at the same time, the Act recognized the need
for the coordination of departmental intelligence,
and for the production and dissemination of na-
tional intelligence, and created the CIA to per-
form these functions; and, finally, the Act pro-
vided that certain unspecified intelligence func-
tions should be centralized in the interests of
efficiency.
OTHER UNITED STATES AGENCIES PRODUCING
INTELLIGENCE
Although it is not possible to trace in detail the
organizations of all agencies of government that
collect information and process it into intelli-
gence, it is most important for the naval officer
engaged in intelligence work to realize that his
sources are not limited to the national security
agencies alone. With proper liaison he will dis-
cover that there are available vast analytical and
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94
cataloguing resources in the federal government,
and also many operating agencies with functions
closely allied to security.
Department of the Treasury
A number of offices and bureaus within the
Treasury have intelligence functions. The Office
of International Finance studies foreign econ-
omies, international capital movements, gold
movements, and exchange controls. It can block
the movement of foreign assets under United
States jurisdiction. The Bureau of Customs not
only collects duties on imports but is concerned
with preventing smuggling, registering vessels,
and stopping the export of controlled materials.
The Bureau of Narcotics controls trade in nar-
cotic drugs and of necessity works closely with
some foreign governments. The Alcohol Tax
Unit may become involved in blocking illegal al-
cohol operations if of an international scope. The
United States Secret Service tries to prevent
counterfeiting, and provides various protective
services including guarding the President and his
family.
The United States Coast Guard, though a part
of the Department of the Navy in wartime, is nor-
mally under the Treasury. It not only saves lives
at sea, provides navigation aids, and sets safety
standards for merchant ships, but also has major
responsibility for port security and checking on
the loyalty of seamen.
Department of Commerce
This is another department of interest to In-
telligence. It contains the Bureau of Foreign and
Domestic Commerce with a subordinate Office of
International Trade, a major collector and proces-
sor of economic and commercial intelligence from
the whole world. The Federal Maritime Board
has to study foreign costs of ship construction and
operation, and approve any international rate
agreements that involve United States steamship
companies. The Civil Aeronautics Board makes
many studies of world aviation developments, and
works closely with the International Civil Avia-
tion Organization of the United Nations. The
Patent Office collects and analyzes the official jour-
nals of all foreign patent offices. The Weather
Bureau collects weather reports from all over the
world to add to its domestic analyses. The Coast
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and Geodetic Survey collects data on United States
territorial waters and on a number of overseas
areas that are important to naval operations. The
Bureau of the Census as a service agency manipu-
lates data fed to it by government offices, and these
include foreign trade statistics and international
statistics in general.
Other Agencies
There are additional agencies. Some of the
more obvious include: (1) the Office of Interna-
tional Labor Affairs in the Department of Labor,
which watches developments abroad in use and
behavior of labor and labor organizations; (2)
the Office of Alien Property in the Department
of Justice, which keeps track of foreign assets
under our jurisdiction and possible trading with
the enemy; (3) the Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service, also in the Department of Justice,
which watches for violations of immigration laws
and maintains border patrols; (4) the Depart-
ment of Agriculture's Office of Foreign Agricul-
tural Relations which has attaches abroad to
collect data and makes analyses of world-wide de-
velopments in agriculture; (5) the same De-
partment's Bureau of Entomology and Plant
Quarantine, which like the United States Public
Health Service may be in the forefront of detect-
ing biological warfare attacks upon the United
States; (6) the Post Office Department's Bureau
of the Chief Post Office Inspector, whose studies of
postal law violations may turn up much informa-
tion of intelligence interest; (7) the Department
of Interior's Office of Territories and many special
commissions and corporations which serve as
sources of intelligence on our own territories; (8)
the Federal Communications Commission, which
tracks down clandestine radio stations and keeps
95
track of use of frequencies by transmitters both
at home and abroad; (9) the Federal Reserve
Board, which makes studies of international fi-
nance; (10) the Tariff Commission, which studies
foreign costs, protective measures, and other re-
trictions ; (11) the Smithsonian Institution,
which collects and studies scientific data the world
over, and its subsidiary International Exchange
Service which trades scientific publications with
foreign countries; (12) the Library of Congress,
which also has exchange and collection functions;
(13) the Office of Civil Defense with its physical
security functions; and (14) such quasi-official or
private groups as the National Geographic Society,
which can send expeditions to remote places, and
prepare finished maps based upon data collected,
and the Bureau of Railway Economics, which also
has very wide collection and processing facilities.
The above list, by no means exhaustive, indicates
the variety of agencies that are in some way useful
to Intelligence, although they are not intelligence
agencies in the strict sense of the term.
In any review of United States Organizations
for National Security it must be kept in mind that,
in actuality, they are not inanimate spaces on a
formal chart but rather living vital composites of
many individuals each of whom is daily contribut-
ing his talents and energies toward the production
of a total coordinated product. The best finished
product is possible only when each individual con-
tributor has a clear perspective of the total field
of which he is a part so that his own efforts will
blend effectively and harmoniously. Therefore,
in order to aid the naval intelligence officer to
carry out his assigned duties and responsibilities
most effectively, the following chapter will be de-
voted to a consideration of the proper intelligence
perspective he must have.
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CHAPTER 4
AN INTELLIGENCE PERSPECTIVE IN A CHANGING WORLD
The iob of Intelligence is "to winnow the extraneous data from the vital facts and to set these facts
In proper perspective . . ."
This statement was made following World War
II by Rear Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter in
describing the function of intelligence to produce
usable knowledge. Its key words, "proper per-
spective" aptly describe the central theme of this
chapter.
Cause and effect, action and counter-action are
woven into an unending pattern of conditions and
situations which must be followed with infinite
care the world over. The relentless continuity
of events makes it impossible to consider them
singly or outside their frame of reference. Mili-
tary policies and international politics are inter-
dependent and neither can be effective without the
other. Similarly, the strategies of nations may
begin and end within a period of war, or they may
be conducted, with or without change, continuously
between wars. The intelligence officer must be
schooled in the field of international relations in
order that he may develop a broad sense of world
affairs and recognize the trends which will give the
fullest meaning to emerging situations. In de-
veloping this sensitivity he must keep in mind the
functions of intelligence, its past influence on
world events, and the purposes of the various agen-
cies which it supports.
In chapter lit was stated that Intelligence has
three primary functions: first, to give warning
of any hostile plans directed against a nation or
a military force; second, to provide the knowl-
edge upon which policies and plans can be based;
and third, to counter the intelligence efforts of
opposing nations. The very nature of military
warfare maximizes the opportunity of Intelligence
to predict the time and place of attack. The
greater variables in time of peace, however, re-
quire Intelligence to evaluate with care the par-
ticular factors which may produce specific
developments within certain periods of time. The
importance of such evaluations was stressed by
Maj. Gen. William J. Donovan when he said:
269196-54-8
97
"Government policy must be based upon a tested
knowledge of the facts. What facts? The capa-
bilities, the intentions, and the policies of other
nations . . (Intelligence is) just the careful
gathering and analysis and interpretation of many
bits of evidence."
The need for intelligence in time of war has
been generally recognized; its importance in time
of peace is still a topic of considerable argument
among some political leaders and students of
government. A British writer recently com-
mented that, prior to World War II, intelligence
seemed to have little purpose as long as the vital
interests of the nation did not appear to be threat-
ened. As late as August 1952, a well-known
American, in describing United States intelligence
organizations, remarked that they would be un-
necessary if American relations with the Soviet
Union were normal. This failure to understand
the need for continuity in intelligence activity
arises from a misconception of the terms "war"
and "peace." Certainly they are not exclusive
concepts. For example, it is almost impossible to
pin-point the causes of wars and the exact times
when each really began. Since basic national in-
terests remain relatively the same, the transition
from war to peace is merely a shift in emphasis
on the means employed to promote those interests.
Instead of military force, the means may be poli-
tical, economic, psychological, or a combination
of all three.
Likewise for intelligence the end of a war means
only a shift in major interests. Instead of the
numbers and movements of troops and ships, in-
terest centers on the capabilities of new weapons,
the acquisition of new strategic bases, and the
development of new areas of political influence.
Political machinations in the world's trouble spots,
exploitation of markets for manufactured goods,
and the control of strategic materials become sub-
jects of concern. Knowledge of these matters may
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INTELLIGENCE FOR
alter relationships and determine the attitudes of
one nation toward another at international confer-
ences or at meetings of the United Nations. In-
telligence has the responsibility not only to acquire
such positive information regarding other nations
of the world, but also to perform its equally im-
portant function of preventing the disclosures of
vital information and countering foreign es-
pionage.
Consideration of the historical development in
chapter 2 led to the conclusion that Intelligence
has often influenced the outcome of military and
political events which had world-wide repercus-
sions. The intelligence officer, therefore, must be
fully aware of the scope of his interests and the
implications of his activities. The guerrilla war-
fare carried on by Lawrence of Arabia in World
War I had a strategic significance out of all pro-
portion to the size, area of combat, and equipment
of his modest forces. The German agent, Wass-
muss, held southern Persia under his personal
influence and did much to prolong the British mili-
tary campaign in that area. Early in World War
II, a cipher clerk in the American Embassy at
London provided Germany with vital diplomatic
information passing between Washington and
London. When his treachery was finally discov-
ered, during the dark days of Dunkirk and the
fall of France, all classified communications of
the American State Department had to be sus-
pended until new codes were prepared and.
distributed. The impact of this failure of
counterintelligence was brought out at the Nurem-
berg trials when various Nazi leaders stated that
the information derived through the American
cipher clerk influenced their decision to curtail
military activity during the winter of 1939-40
while they prepared for the spring offensive
against France. The use of the Italian Embassy
in London for the transmittal of this information
may well have influenced Italy's decision to post-
pone her entry into the war for about ten months.
In the preceding chapter, the purpose of the
discussion was to review the various government
agencies responsible for planning and formulating
the foreign policies of the United States and to
describe their supporting Intelligence subdivi-
sions. The Office of Naval Intelligence, as one
of these subdivisions, contributes significantly to
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98
NAVAL OFFICERS
the production of the total knowledge used as the
basis for national policy decisions which guide
relationships with other nations in times of war
and peace. This knowledge is also a fundamental
source of support to the military commander in
the area of operations and to both military and
political agencies at all levels in their efforts to
oppose the intelligence activities of other nations.
When used at the national planning level, this
knowledge is called Strategic Intelligence; at the
naval planning level, it is called Naval Strategic
Intelligence, the importance of which to any na-
tion depends upon the extent of that nation's sea
power. At the operational level, this knowledge
is termed Operational Intelligence.
To be emphasized is the fact that, regardless
of the level or echelon by which intelligence is
used, those engaged in its activities, whether mili-
tary or civilian, cannot properly perform their
duties without a comprehensive understanding of
the world scene, from which is derived a clearer
view of relationships between events wherever and
whenever they occur.
As early as World. War I, Brigadier General
Marlborough Churchill, then Director of Military
Intelligence, made this pertinent comment
The reason why we have decided to study
the whole world is that we believe it to be
impossible correctly to predict the points
which are going to be sensitive in the future,
unless we take the trouble to find out the sit-
uation in all countries, and all the factors
which go to make up an international situa-
tion. . . . If it is remembered that the assas-
sination of an Austrian Prince in 1914 started
a conflagration which our Army was called
upon to play a major part in extinguishing,
it will be seen that MID is not doing its full
duty if it does not attempt correctly to re-
cord and promptly to bring to the attention
of the proper authority everything that is
going on in the world.
He also made the observation that, prior to World
War I, Regular Army officers tended to limit their
interest and training to matters of specific military
content.
We failed to realize that it is the duty of
every Army officer to follow the example set
so many years ago by the Navy, and make
himself not only a fighting man, but also a
well-informed man of the world.
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Important contributory elements which are the
basis for a clear and proper perspective for in-
telligence personnel include an understanding of
basic national interests and objectives, a knowl-
edge of the place and meaning of strategy and the
resulting foreign policy, and an appreciation of
the ultimate purposes of operational activities to
implement both strategy and policy. The intelli-
gence perspective cannot be static: it must be ca-
pable of rapid adjustment to changing conditions
and altered circumstances. It must always be
positive, with a clear and unbiased view of its own
purposes and responsibilities. The following dis-
cussion of these elements, although by no means
exhaustive, should serve to portray the perspective
which all intelligence personnel must acquire if
they are to perform their duties successfully. It
should also serve to indicate the necessity for
further reading and continuous study.
NATIONAL INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES
In view of the vast amount of knowledge about
the world and its peoples, guidance is essential if
intelligence activities are to be economically con-
centrated. Normally, specific guidance emanates
from higher authority, but it is important to rec-
ognize that ultimate guidance is provided by the
fundamental national interests and objectives
which must form the basis for national strategy
and policy.
Our own national interests have never been more
succinctly expressed than in the words of the Dec-
laration of Independence: "Life, Liberty, and the
Pursuit of Happiness"; other expressions repre-
sent only the means toward these ends. Over the
years these fundamental interests have gradually
been broadened to include the preservation of na-
tional independence, freedom from war and the
threat of war, improvement in standards of living
so that everyone may have the opportunity to earn
an even better and more secure livelihood, and the
maintenance of friendly relations with all peoples
of the world.
From such interests come national objectives
which include the protection of the American form
of government and way of life at any cost from
every challenge, the support of endeavors aimed at
the peaceful resolution of all international prob-
lems, the encouragement of a healthy world econ-
omy, and the championship of nations threatened
by any ruthless imperialistic aggressor. Em-
bodied in these objectives are certain definite social
values, such as those enunciated as the Four Free-
doms by Roosevelt and Churchill. Of particular
importance is the value of popular power which
emphasizes the orderly process of making decisions
through democratic participation.
Few can find fault with these interests and ob-
jectives; the problems lie in their interpretation
and implementation. For many complex reasons
interpretations vary between various social groups
within the nation and the power of one group may
permit it to dominate the expression of national
objectives at a given time. Historically, the popu-
lar power value when applied to foreign relations
has resulted in the implementation of the objective
of national security through international law and
organization, a sincere effort to deter aggressive
nations from their intentions by bargaining and
persuasion. In his book, American Diplomacy,
1900-1950, George F. Kennan has pointed out what
appear to be not only certain theoretical deficien-
cies in this approach, but also the serious implica-
tions of its resultant theory of "unconditional
surrender":
It is a curious thing . . . that the legalistic
approach to world affairs, rooted as it unques-
tionably is in a desire to do away with war
and violence, makes violence more enduring,
more terrible, and more destructive to politi-
cal stability than did the older motives of
national interest. A war fought in the name
of high moral principle finds no early end
short of some form of total domination.
If our national objectives as they relate to the
rest of the world imply a defense of free countries
of the world so that they may remain free, there
is the added implication of an ability to wage war
when necessary. However, atomic warfare of the
present and the future could well bring ruin to a
degree never before experienced and with it the
destruction of what the war was fought to pro-
tect. For this reason alone, national objectives
must transcend the mere winning of wars; they
must include the realization of the purposes for
which war is waged. These purposes, when de-
fined and understood, might well control the tac-
tics, targets, and even the weapons used; even
more, they might alter the concept of total victory.
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In the past, American objectives, expressed as
abstract moral principles, have led to some mis-
understanding and disappointment. In. the pres-
ent world crisis, there have been suggestions that
they be more concretely defined: what are our spe-
cific objectives, our capabilities for reaching them,
our plans for carrying them out? Various stu-
dents of government have raised the problem of
what they describe as an American tendency to-
ward a negative approach to objectives; that is,
expressing them in terms of opposition to those of
another nation. They recommend a positive ap-
proach to objectives which might provide greater
illumination and stimulation, not only to the
American people, but also to the rest of the world.
To point out the problems in connection with
the interpretation and implementation of national
objectives is easy; to solve them is a matter in-
finitely more difficult. Dr. William L. Langer,
long associated with government agencies con-
cerned with national planning, has suggested the
possibilities of a special staff, under the National
Security Council, specifically charged with the
long-range study of national objectives, together
with provisions for the close exchange of ideas and
coordination of action between the executive and
legislative branches of the government. It is his
belief that, by such means, greater unity of pur-
pose and action might be achieved. Without ques-
tion, clearly defined and well understood national
objectives are fundamental to a national grand
strategy aimed at encouraging our allies and dis-
couraging our adversaries.
GRAND STRATEGY
As a term, strategy has long been associated with
war as an art of military command, but as a result
of the modern complexities of war and of the-so-
ciety from which it stems, the strategy of today
has come to embrace many factors other than mili-
tary: political, economic, technological, moral,
and psychological. It has come to embrace activi-
ties of government and diplomacy aimed at the
control and utilization of a nation's total resources,
of which military forces is only one, for the pur-
pose of promoting and protecting national inter-
ests against actual or potential enemies. The di-
mensions of modern strategy become even more
profoundly impressive when groups of nations
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band together for the promotion and protection
of common interests. Simply defined, strategy is
the basic pattern for employing instruments of
power. In its broadest sense, therefore, it is
known as grand strategy.
In chapter 1 grand strategy was defined as the
master plan of a nation in both war and peace, in-
cluding not only military planning but domestic
and foreign policy as well. A more complete
definition by B. H. Liddell-Hart is given in the
Encyclopedia Britannica (14th edition) :
Grand Strategy should both calculate and
develop the economic resources and manpower
of the nation in order to sustain the fighting
services. So also with the moral resources?
for to foster and fortify the will to win, and to
endure, is as important as to possess the more
concrete forms of power. And it should reg-
ulate the distribution of power between the
several services, and between the services and
industry. Nor is that all, for fighting power
is but one of the instruments of grand strat-
egy. It should take account of and and apply
the power of financial pressure, diplomatic
pressure, commercial pressure, and, not least,
ethical pressure to weaken the opponent's will.
A good cause is a sword and a buckler. Fur-
thermore, while the horizon of strategy is
bounded by the war, grand strategy looks be-
yond the war to the subsequent peace. It
should not only combine the various instru-
ments, but so regulate their use as to avoid
damage to the future state of peacefulness, se-
cure and prosperous.
There are other terms with which the intelli-
gence officer should be familiar in order to under-
stand this element of the intelligence perspective
more thoroughly. Combined Strategy refers to
the common strategy of coalitions of nations. Na-
tional Strategy is used interchangeably with strat-
egy and grand strategy, while Military Strategy
is a more restrictive term, denoting the art and
science of employing the armed forces of a nation
to secure the objectives of national policy by the
application of force, or the threat of force. Naval
Strategy is the result of planning for the effective
employment of naval power in support of national
objectives. Other military terms have been found
useful in describing the activities of nations.
Strategic offensive, strategic defensive, and stra-
tegic initiative?all defined in chapter 1?apply
to nations as well as to combat units.
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Interrelationships of Military and Political Factors
The interchange of vocabulary is but one indi-
cation of how closely interwoven the military and
political factors of our Nation's strategy have be-
come. Another indication is the reliance placed
on the opinions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the
Chief Executive and by the National Security
Council, and the fact that the nation's military
leaders are included in consultations involving top-
level planning in many areas which are not di-
rectly of a military nature. As shown in the pre-
ceding chapter, Congress has officially recognized
the role of the military forces in connection with
national strategy.
World conditions, of course, have exerted a tre-
mendous influence in bringing about this situa-
uation in the United States. Specifically, the
emphasis on force and the threat of force in the
foreign policies of the Soviet Union has strongly
affected the international relationships of nations.
The problem of Korea provides a good illustration
of the interplay of military and political factors.
As early as 1947, $510,000,000 in military aid for
South Korea was proposed. When the Soviet
Union suggested a conference on Korean unity,
the United States State Department dropped the
military aid program. Later, when the U. S. S. R.
took the strategic offensive and formally withdrew
from Korea, leaving behind a trained North Ko-
rean Army, the United States had no alternative
but to withdraw also, leaving no comparable army
behind. When South Korea was invaded in the
summer of 1950, it was the State Department, not
the Department of Defense, which encouraged
military support of the South Koreans. Having
committed military units to Korea, the military
leaders found their planning sharply circum-
scribed by strategic political considerations.
Admiral Mahan set forth the proposition that
"The strategist is he who always keeps the ob-
jective of the war in sight and the objective of
the war is never military and is always political."
In the past, the leaders of American military forces
have tended to overlook this dictum, undoubtedly
because of the meritorious, long-established, and
deeply-rooted American conviction that overall
civilian control of the Nation's military forces
must be maintained at all costs.
The Military Point of View
The American military mind in the past has con-
centrated on the military factors involved in
achieving victory and avoiding defeat; it has not
associated itself officially with a consideration of
the political implications of victory or the political
situations which might lead to further conflict.
As a result, when called upon, it has tended to
concentrate on the use of direct, overpowering
force to accomplish its objectives, leaving to other
agencies the considerations of other means to carry
out strategic plans.
The developments following World War II,
however, have had a profound effect on the think-
ing of both military and political leaders in the
United States. It has become apparent that
throughout that war the Soviets were guided in
their strategic military planning by their postwar
political objectives. For example, it has been sug-
gested that Soviet insistence on committing Allied
forces in Italy to an invasion of southern France
was based primarily on an effort to keep them out
of the Balkan countries. As a result, there were
no substantial British or American military units
in Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary to retard the
extension of Soviet control over those countries in
the postwar period. The military objectives of
the Korean war from 1950 to 1952 were obviously
limited by broad political considerations.
The American system of government and way
of life will always assure civilian control of its
military forces. The military themselves will be
the first to reject any suggestion that they assume
leadership in formulating national strategy and
directing foreign policy. Since, however, our mil-
itary leaders are involved in national strategy, they
must be thoroughly conversant with all the politi-
cal factors in order to contribute effectively to
overall planning for the welfare and security of
our Nation.
Basic Considerations in the Formulation of Strategy
Four concepts should be basic in the thinking of
all those responsible for planning national strat-
egy. The first is that modern strategy is global.
The interdependence of all parts of the world has
increased to the extent that a changed condition
in one area is quickly felt in many others. The
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Soviet "war by satellite" strategy has made clear
the fact that many widely separated parts of the
world are vital to our national security; while
Stalin's comment that victory in Europe may first
be won in Asia gives added significance to the
drain on the military strength of France caused
by the situation in Indo-China. An appreciation
of this concept can serve as a constant warning
not to concentrate on the security of one area
without a full awareness of the possibilities of
weakening the security of another.
The second concept is that international rela-
tions are unstable; hence the strategic planner
must be prepared to adjust rapidly to the prob-
abilities of change, perhaps even radical change.
American relations with the Soviet Union, chang-
ing from allies in World War II to adversaries
in the postwar period, illustrate the validity of
this concept. It should be remembered also that
the United States and Great Britain have not
always been allies. The situation in postwar Eu-
rope demonstrates all too well the instability and
delicate balance of relations between countries: an
unfavorable resolution of internal conflicts within
Germany, France, and Italy might sharply alter
our relationships with those countries; and cer-
tainly the position of Yugoslavia has changed
radically in a few short years. The Communist
purges in the Soviet satellite countries during 1951
and 1952 might indicate that the Soviet Union has
not yet achieved complete stability in its relations
with its involuntary associates. The significance
of this concept is two-fold: fixation on a particu-
lar situation which exists at any given time can
distort the evaluation of developing events and
throw long-term planning off balance; strategic
planning must be dynamic, sensitive to indications
of change, and prepared to take the initiative as
changes occur.
The third concept is that of consistency to prin-
ciple. American goals and ideals have long been
a source of inspiration to all people of the world
who see in the United States a land of opportunity
and a haven from tyranny where freedom has real
meaning for the individual. Consistency in the
championship of human liberty, wherever it is
sought, is essential to any long-term success in
strategic planning; inconsistency contains the
seeds of self-destruction. In itself, this concept
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poses some exceedingly difficult problems in a
world where force is a constant threat. However,
simply stated, it means that those responsible for
national strategy must never lose sight of basic
national objectives.
The fourth concept is that the various means
available to strategy are employed in varying de-
grees at all times to strengthen the master plan of
one nation while restricting the plans of another.
The availability of military force is a factor which
constantly affects the formulation of strategies,
as is illustrated by the effect of the postwar ac-
tivities of the Soviet Union in Europe and in Asia.
Diplomacy, which pursues a more peaceful ap-
proach to the solution of world problems, endeav-
ors at all times to win friends and to create condi-
tions favorable to its own objectives. Economic
power is exerted to strengthen and to destroy. In
postwar Europe, the United States has used its
economic resources to restore war-ravaged coun-
tries; while at the same time, in China, it has em-
ployed this power to weaken the Communist con-
trolled government. Similarly, the sociological
instruments of emotion and culture are being ex-
ploited by opposing forces all over the world, on
the one hand to build and on the other to tear
down. In more recent years, science and tech-
nology have become powerful weapons; the atom
bomb alone has played a significant part in the
planning of world strategies.
The essential point of this concept is that war
and peace are relative terms and that no wise
strategist can consider them to be mutually exclu-
sive with particular instruments appropriate only
to one or the other. Such a point of view might
lead to the sacrifice of long-term objectives for
short-term advantages. A keen appreciation of
this concept can immeasurably strengthen a na-
tion's grand strategy by permitting the skillful
employment of all available instruments in the
right degree at the proper place and time.
All of these concepts can be reduced to the sim-
ple fact that strategy must be based on realities,
and hence requires the availability of all perti-
nent knowledge. The approach to this require-
ment involves: first, a continuous awareness of
the unknown. factors and an effort to uncover
them; second, a full appreciation of the known
factors and their realistic application to the solu-
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tion of the many problems of planning; and third,
the conscientious use of logical reasoning.
Success in the formulation of strategy is
achieved when the resultant policies are so inte-
grated with available instruments that war be-
comes either unnecessary or is undertaken with the
optimum assurance of victory.
POLICY IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS
The net product of grand strategy, which is
based on national interests and objectives, is called
"policy"; when that policy concerns relationships
with foreign countries it is called "foreign policy."
Obviously policy cannot be established in the best
interests of a nation without a great deal of care-
ful advance study and planning; thus it represents
the last step in a nation's strategic planning proc-
ess and gives expression to its master plan. For-
eign policy is that element of the total plan, devel-
oped from experience and knowledge, which aids
in the conduct of government business with other
governments.
In the postwar period there has been a notable
growth of popular interest in American foreign
policy, and much has been written on the subject.
There has been criticism of certain aspects, such
as the lack of realism, the absence of continuity,
and excessive improvisation. In his book, The
Road to Foreign Policy, Hugh Gibson, a long-
time career diplomat, refers to the "Open Door"
policy in China, "Dollar Diplomacy," and the
"Monroe Doctrine," among others, as "fragments
of foreign policy" and suggests that some Ameri-
can foreign policies "can be described not too un-
kindly as hobbies of successive secretaries of
state."
From such discussions and criticisms it may be
concluded that a real need exists for a better un-
derstanding of what foreign policies are, the proc-
esses from which they are derived, and an expres-
sion of the policies themselves in language
unmistakably clear, with no possibility for mis-
interpretation. Such an understanding is aided
by a recognition of the fundamental character-
istics and qualities which all policies should have.
Foreign policies are rooted in the historical
background of nations; they develop gradually,
are the result of objective thinking, and have qual-
ities of stability and permanence. They never
103
spring suddenly into being and can seldom arise
out of the emotional excitement of the moment.
George Washington, in his Farewell Address, was
encouraging the idea of objectivity when he
warned against "passionate attachments." In dis-
cussing basic policy in his book, Mr. Gibson com-
ments that, in the light of subsequent events the
post-World War II policy of the Allies to destroy
the power of Germany was not a true policy be-
cause it was emotionally conceived and lacked the
quality of Objectivity. The term "policy" should
be applied only to something that is fundamental
and of a long-range nature; it should not be con-
fused with tactical devices used to implement the
basic plan. The Marshall Plan, for example, has
been merely a device for implementing a basic
policy of denying the control of Europe to one
aggressor nation. However, it gives continuity to
that policy and should not be misunderstood as
an improvisation.
Obviously, a policy is never one-sided; it always
involves other nations and other peoples who have
much to do with its effectiveness or ineffectiveness.
The success of the balance of power policy in
Europe depends upon the whole-hearted response
and cooperation of various countries participating
in the Marshall Plan, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, and the European Defense Com-
munity. The success of any policy depends also
on the high caliber of those responsible for its ad-
ministration, their training, experience, and sen-
sitive perception of its many aspects and impli-
cations. The measure of success should never be
gauged by spectacular immediate results, because
the results achieved over a period of years are
often much more significant. Since a policy must
be judged on a long-term basis as it grows and
develops, it cannot always be evaluated at a given
time; rather, the degree of its effectiveness will be
demonstrated by the manner in which it influences
subsequent events.
Since a true basic policy grows out of national
objectives which are the common interest of all
groups within a nation, it does not represent a
partisan point of view. On the other hand, the
implementing tactics or devices may well origi-
nate from the elected representatives of the people
in control of the government at a given time.
Finally, all policies are not of equal importance.
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The defense of American policy in China, for ex-
ample, would not elicit the same immediate re-
sponse as the defense of our policy to protect the
Western Hemisphere from aggression.
A review of common characteristics should lead
to the conclusion that foreign policies are the re-
sult of long-range planning and that shifting re-
lationships between nations will affect their execu-
tion, so that adaptability is essential to successful
operation. An understanding of these character-
istics should do much to sharpen the intelligence
perspective in identifying the broad patterns of
policy, often obscured by tactical devices which
are no more than implementations. Even more,
it becomes apparent that the successful execution
of policy requires at every step a great amount of
knowledge and a full appreciation of cause and
effect relationships.
While the instruments of policy and strategy are
the same, it must be reemphasized that they are
the machinery through which policies operate and
that their effective use is necessary if any policy
is to have real meaning or ultimate value. Diplo-
macy and military forces are two basic instruments
whose significance merits further consideration.
Diplomacy is not a function limited to the diplo-
matic service. It is carried on through any official
or unofficial activities which affect foreign rela-
tionships such as: a restrictive tariff act or a gen-
erous foreign aid measure passed by Congress; the
movements of the 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean;
the behavior of American citizens, military or ci-
vilian, in a foreign capital; formal addresses or
off-the-cuff remarks by high Government officials.
It is true that the diplomatic service itself must be
a highly trained body of devoted men and women
capable of administering policy wisely in a con-
fused and troubled world. At the same time, pub-
lic opinion has much to do with diplomacy as an
instrument of policy; the more enlightened it is,
the more advantageously effective it can be. The
importance of this instrument is self-evident; its
failure results inevitably in war.
Military forces are not only an exceedingly im-
portant instrument of policy, but also affect policy
directly or indirectly. United States Army oc-
cupation and control in Germany, for example,
will have an effect on American policies in Europe
for many years, and likewise our occupation and
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NAVAL OFFICERS
subsequent retention of military bases in Japan
have given a definite pattern to American policies
in the Far East. Close coordination of military
and political policies, therefore, becomes essential
to the national interest. To be remembered also
is the fact that military power as an instrument of
policy must be adequate to support that policy;
further, that the knowledge required to determine
what constitutes adequacy must be supplied by
an effective intelligence service.
THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE
Since modern nations can scarcely afford to
maintain military forces sufficient to meet all even-
tualities, the production of knowledge from which
to determine adequacy becomes a contribution of
major consequence. Intelligence can also have
great value in helping to compensate for certain
deficiencies in military instruments available to
carry out strategy and policy. Prior to World
War II, one of the German military theorists,
Captain von Gadow, recognized this value in an
article prepared for Militaerevessenschaftliche
Rundschau
We must be far-sighted in our policies. The
next war will depend on the success or failure
of the great sea powers. Germany is not and
cannot become a great sea power. But we
can protect certain interests by erecting effi-
ciently working outposts which would have to
fulfill highly important tasks in the sphere of
naval strategy and may also often play a de-
cisive part in our foreign policy . . .
In evaluating the military factor, Intelligence
must inevitably assess the relevant political, eco-
nomic, psychological, moral, and technological
factors. In so doing, it produces knowledge which
can be used as the basis for the successful employ-
ment of these additional factors in total war.
The preceding discussion of the planning of
strategy and the formulation and execution of
policy has indicated the quantity and scope of
knowledge required. It has also suggested in
general terms the necessary breadth of the intelli-
gence perspective. A review of some of the strat-
egies, policies, and tactical operations of Germany,
Japan, and the Allied Nations before and during
World War II and of the Soviet Union after-
wards will more specifically illustrate the vital
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role played by Intelligence and the perspective its
personnel must have in support of that role. Dur-
ing this review it will be well to keep in mind the
intelligence organizations developed by these na-
tions as described in the latter sections of chap-
ter 2.
GERMAN STRATEGY BEFORE AND DURING
WORLD WAR II
The grand strategies of the Axis powers were
formulated separately in the 1920's and were im-
plemented and combined in the 1930's. Their
tenuous roots may be traced to Mussolini's march
on Rome and his establishment of the first dic-
tatorship; the Japanese fortification of their
newly acquired Mandated Islands in the Pacific;
and Hitler's dramatic presentation of himself and
his scheme for world conquest in Mein Kampf.
When Hitler became Chancellor of Germany in
1933, Nazism was established as a political and
military force and secret preparation for war was
begun. Germany, however, did not take the stra-
tegic offensive in the international arena until 7
March 1936, when she reoccupied the Rhineland.
A year earlier Italy had taken the strategic of-
fensive when she moved against helpless Ethiopia.
By 1936 Hitler had created the "Rome-Berlin
Axis" and, with Mussolini, had intervened in the
Spanish Civil War for the purpose of testing new
weapons and tactics, to say nothing of further
undermining the stability of that country. By
1936 he also had evolved and put into action the
new Nazi strategy, which utilized not only mili-
tary but also economic-political-psychological
means. Because he held the strategic initiative,
Hitler was able to a large extent to predict and
determine the course of events.
In the period from 1936 to 1940 it became in-
creasingly clear that the grand strategy of the
Nazi regime was territorial aggrandizement by
means short of war, and the forging of armed
might against the day when conflict with major
powers could no longer be avoided. During this
period Mussolini played second fiddle to Hitler;
his ambition was perhaps not so grandiose, and
certainly his resources were not comparable. He
basked, however, in the reflected glory of the Nazi
state as it gradually assumed hegemony over one
European country after another from 1938 to 1940.
105
Hitler's spectacular successes were in large meas-
ure due to his "combined strategy" which adapted
grand strategy to the purposes of a ruthless dic-
tatorship in which total mobilization could be en-
forced immediately for the waging of total war.
That the Nazi grand strategy was truly global
in scale, and was directed, among other objectives,
at gaining a foothold in Latin America, was rec-
ognized in 1942 by Hugo Fernandez Artucio, who
wrote in his "The Nazi Underground in South
America":
An undeclared war is being waged in Latin
America today against the democratic insti-
tutions and the independence of the New
World Republics. The war is being con-
ducted with fearful efficiency by the soldiers
of the Third German Empire, who have been
distributed by the thousands throughout the
political underground of this continent.
They are the agents of Adolph Hitler, whose
mission it is to put into practice here, as in
Holland and Belgium, Czechoslovakia and
Norway, Austria and France, the principles
of totalitarian warfare. In this concept of
war, actual armed invasion becomes merely a
link in a long chain of underground prepa-
ration . . .
A political scheme of international implica-
tions has been set afoot on the American con-
tinent . . . Its object is to set up a govern-
ment as nearly like the totalitarian regime
as possible, and the method employed is "the
war of nerves." Its creators know, with
Machiavellian cunning, the political function
of fear.
Nazi strategy was ably supported by the world-
wide German Intelligence Service, the concepts of
which were broadened in order to implement new
and revolutionary methods of warfare, such as
the "blitzkrieg," the "war of nerves," and the
"fifth column." The effectiveness of German In-
telligence in contributing to Nazi strategic pur-
poses in Spain is described by Hansjurgen Koehler
in his book Inside the Gestapo. The particular
device used was the Hagenbeck Circus which was
sent to Spain to roam the countryside for months.
Gestapo agents were included among the large
numbers of circus employees. With this excellent
"cover," these agents had little difficulty in obtain-
ing a great variety of important information.
This circus also provided a means whereby Nazi
propaganda could be distributed with little or no
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difficulty. As a result of the Nazi intelligence ef-
fort in Spain, anti-German elements were almost
completely eliminated, Germans residing in the
country were enlisted as collaborators, and vital
strategic data on Spain was collected.
Tremendous sums of money, estimated at $200,-
000,000 annually, were allocated for intelligence
purposes, including the creation of fifth columns
and the conduct of propaganda activities. Such
expenditures were possible because of the Nazi
planned economy in Germany, and, from their
point of view, it was money well spent--except in
England and the United States.
Although the ruthless aggressions of the Axis
powers were in open defiance of existing treaties
and international law, the western democracies
were impotent, and could only helplessly observe
the progress of events. For some time Hitler was
not taken seriously, certainly not by Ramsay Mac-
Donald and Stanley Baldwin, although as early
as 1934, Winston Churchill had begun to issue
solemn warnings of the new peril which was
taking shape beyond the Rhine. Thus England
remained on the strategic defensive, and Neville
Chamberlain's policy of appeasement did not im-
prove the situation. England was not alone, how-
ever, for the other democracies shared this
unfavorable position.
One problem was that England and France were
getting very little intelligence out of Germany,
because it was a part of the Nazi strategy to infest
the homeland with armies of counterspies, to pun-
ish betrayal of military or industrial secrets by
well-publicized beheading, and to employ torture
and execution to stamp out disaffection whenever
and wherever detected. But a greater problem
was lethargy in the British Government and cor-
ruption in the Government of France which pre-
vented the right kind of action from being taken
in response to such intelligence as was received
regarding the German rearmament.
As can be seen, the advantage of strategic ini-
tiative, and hence the advantage of surprise, lay
with the totalitarian states dedicated to world
conquest. Innumerable acts of aggression, almost
imperceptible at their inception and fully identi-
fied only after they were accomplished facts, were
carried out in times of ostensible peace by scores of
fanatical and capable agents. Powerful nations
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NAVAL OFFICERS
were lulled by skillful propaganda into a false
sense of security; while others, less powerful, were
threatened, coerced, and attacked. The Axis
powers sought to change the existing world situa-
tion to one more favorable to themselves and, up
to a certain point, each succeeded remarkably well.
Failures in German Strategy
The period up to and including the fall of
France was characterized by brilliant Nazi suc-
cesses; thereafter, when Hitler was forced into
war with both England and the United States
while still embroiled on the continent of Europe,
Nazi blunders were the order of the day. Of par-
ticular interest are the failures in strategy which
led to failures on the field of battle and on the
diplomatic front. The publication of war his-
tories, memoirs of key political and military fig-
ures, the texts of hitherto top secret international
agreements, and "post-mortems" obtained through
the interrogation of high-ranking prisoners of
war, all shed light on different facets of German
planning and strategy. The "post-mortems" are
very illuminating although compensation must be
made for personal bias.
There is evidence that no war with England or
the United States was contemplated by the Ger-
man High Command during the period of initial
Nazi successes. An essay by Admirals Schniewind
and Schuster includes this statement:
A war on such a tremendous scale?or even
with England?was in 1939 quite beyond the
range of the preparations and intentions of
the Government. But the policy of the Gov-
ernment and its political negotiations did not
make any provision for this idea, as subse-
quent developments showed. They completely
failed to realize the determination on the part
of those who were later to become her enemies
to declare war in the event that Germany car-
ried out any further activities similar to the
occupation of Austria, Sudetenland, or Czech-
oslovakia. Germany, her armed forces and
especially her navy, were thereafter taken un-
aware and had to enter the war inadequately
equipped.
Additional evidence is found in an article by Vice
Admiral Hellmuth Heye, entitled, "From Panzer-
schiffe to E-Boats :"
Foreign politics were of particular impor-
tance from the naval point of view. The re-
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lease of Germany from the Versailles Treaty
. . . was . . . a hopeful development. Ad-
miral Raeder, in common with all the best
naval opinion, held the view that the war of
1914-18 was lost as a result of Anglo-Ameri-
can sea power. The land decision was only a
result of Anglo-American superiority at sea.
The Navy therefore held the view that the
waging of modern warfare is only possible,
especially in the air age, when there is no de-
termining enemy superiority at sea. Natu-
rally all the necessary conditions appertaining
to the use of the sea in an essentially conti-
nental country like Germany were difficult
to achieve. From the to downward all im-
portant offices in the Ministry of War and in
the air arm were occupied by persons who
were essentially land-trained. The Navy
found it impossible to introduce qualified of-
ficers into either the Air Ministry or the War
Ministry.
Naturally this state of affairs could not but
have an influence on the decision taken on all
questions connected with the sea and sea war-
fare. Nevertheless, every effort was made on
the highest level to avoid under all circum-
stances hostilities with England. This hope,
as I see it, remained up to the very day of the
declaration of war by England. There is no
better evidence on this than the fact that until
close up to the outbreak of war, I believe 1938,
the Navy was expressly forbidden to study or
consider the problems presented by a war with
England.
This almost incredible failure in German basic
planning was to have costly results in 1940 when
the opportunity arose to invade the long-invulner-
able British Isles. Detailed plans for Operation
Sealion had been prepared and were ready to be
put into effect, but Nazi strategy had failed to
foresee and prepare for this opportunity, and Ger-
many lacked the necessary landing craft and other
naval units to carry out an invasion. Air power
and land armies had been highly developed while
sea power had been neglected. This crucial error
in strategy seems to have resulted in part from a
failure of German Intelligence to predict in ad-
vance the psychological factors which would make
England a belligerent. Even this error might
have been counterbalanced by a skillful diplomatic
effort directed toward gaining and preserving an
attitude of neutrality in England, but the Nazis
lacked this capability and Hitler's personal short-
comings were reflected in the conduct of his
foreign policy.
The first major error in strategy involved Hitler
in a land war and a sea war simultaneously and
prevented him from mounting an invasion of Eng-
land in her weakest hour. A second, equally se-
rious, resulted in an all-out offensive against the
U. S. S. R. in the winter of 1941-42. The land
war now had to be fought on two widely separated
fronts, a situation particularly dreaded by the
members of the German General Staff. From the
very first, Hitler underestimated Soviet strength
and miscalculated Soviet intentions. Interesting
comments on these failures in strategy were made
by Colonel Gottschling, Chief of Staff of the Ger-
man Air Staff in Italy, during interrogation:
Hitler's "idee fixe" was to wage war against
Russia. The failure to invade Great Britain,
the ever-increasing amount of aircraft Britain
was receiving from the United States and
Germany's ever-increasing number of aircraft
losses served to spur Hitler on and in his ob-
session drove him to attack Russia.
Luftwaffe fighter and bomber units needed
in western Europe were dispatched to Bul-
garia, Rumania, etc. FIitler overruled every
objection of the General Staff with his gift
of persuasion. . . .
I would summarize Germany's war mistakes
as follows:
a. Overestimation of England's ability to
resist invasion.
b. Underestimation of Russia.
c. Overestimation of Germany' s allies,
such as Italy.
d. Our failure to treat France as an equal
and obtain full use of the wealth and
resources of the French colonial em-
pire. This could have been a stepping
stone for the invasion of Great Britain.
e. Declaring war on America. The High
Command should and must have
known that America's entry into the
war meant Germany's defeat.
?Defeat, Headquarters Army Air Forces,
January 1946.
A theme which reappears time and again in the
various "post-mortems" is the disastrous result of
Hitler's personal and complete control over Ger-
man grand strategy, particularly after the war
began. Colonel Gottschling stated:
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I have seen the most brilliant and deter-
mined men of my acquaintance go before Hit-
ler, determined not to acquiesce to his whims.
These brainy and critical men returned fasci-
nated and for weeks remained under the spell
of Hitler's charms or hypnosis. Thus, Hit-
ler exercised his influence on his General Staff.
Vice Admiral Heye is quoted again in this
connection:
During the preparations for the operations
in Norway I was only once present at a con-
ference with Adolf Hitler. In the course of
this he emphasized the importance of the oc-
cupation of Norway for the whole conduct of
the war and said he was the only man who
could assume responsibility for such an opera-
tion. In the course of the war, as is well-
known, he on many occasions acted against the
advice of his military chiefs and sometimes
he met with successes. This fact may have
caused him and many officers to regard him
not only as a statesman but also as a superior
general in the field. His intervention in mil-
itary operations grew at all events noticeably
more pronounced.
The German High Command progressively lost its
freedom to reach military decisions of a strategic
nature; more and more these were made by Hit-
ler himself on the basis of "intuition." It would
appear that the major errors already listed, and
some of their far-reaching consequences, might
have been avoided if Hitler had been persuaded
from exercising complete control over German
grand strategy, and if more comprehensive and
more accurate intelligence had been available to
the High Command. Fortunately for the Allies,
much of the information collected by the Nazis
was unreliable and inadequately processed; even
more, either the resulting intelligence was not
disseminated to those who needed to know, or, if
disseminated, was not used. Strategy, when for-
mulated by one individual on the basis of intui-
tion rather than fact, cannot fail to reflect not
only the brilliance but also the faults of that in-
dividual. Further, when faulty intelligence is in-
volved, the errors are compounded and magnified.
Other errors in German strategy included the
failure to bring Spain into the Axis camp, a lack
of appreciation for the advantages of joint opera-
tions in battle, and miscalculation of the enemy's
total industrial capacity. Regarding the latter
two, General von Senger was most outspoken i
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NAVAL OFFICERS
The General Staff failed to understand the
modern idea of warfare. It still thought in
terms of Nineteenth century land battles,
whereas we should have had a combined staff
like Italy. Our General Staff was primarily
occupied with army strategy rather than co-
ordination with the navy and air force. . . .
The tragedy of the General Staff is historical
rather than military. It saw its enemy in the
Allied field soldier?whereas the real enemy
was Allied industrial capacity far beyond the
front, out of reach of bombs or the range of
artillery.
?Defeat, Headquarters Army Air Forces,
July 1945.
The turning of the tide against the Germans is
generally agreed to have occurred in the fall of
1942 when the Allies landed in North Africa and
went on to defeat Rommel and to invade Italy.
The Allied advantage lay in the important ele-
ment of surprise, not only in tactics, but also in
the employment of many new types of landing
craft and weapons. Initial military success led
to a major political triumph, the fall of Mussolini.
The way lay open to the "soft underbelly of Eu-
rope," but the Allied strategic initiative in the
Mediterranean theater, except for long-range
bombing of the Rumanian oil fields, dwindled in
the face of stubborn German resistance and diffi-
cult terrain. Elsewhere in Europe, however, the
success of air operations from bases in England,
and the advance of Soviet armies following the
defense of Stalingrad, gave the Allies the strate-
gic initiative on both western and eastern fronts.
Meanwhile, in the Atlantic, the strategic offen-
sive maintained by Nazi submarine warfare was
reduced to the defensive, and as the situation
became more desperate it should have been ap-
parent to Hitler that victory was beyond his grasp.
The landing in Normandy, the devastating sweep
through France, and the junction with Soviet
forces in Berlin were but the final stages of suc-
cessful Allied grand strategy in Europe.
Japanese Strategy Before and During World War II
Japan took the strategic initiative on the main-
land of Asia on 18 September 1931 when she ar-
ranged the Mukden Incident as a pretext for the
invasion of Manchuria. Thereafter, she became
deeply involved in a land war in China. How-
ever, unlike Hitler, who initially at least had a
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healthy respect for the military and industrial
potential of the United States, the Japanese com-
pletely underestimated America's war-making
capability and deliberately provoked a conflict.
The attack on Pearl Harbor exploited surprise,
the range of carrier task forces, and the power of
aircraft to sink surface vessels. Not only did it
surprise the United States but also Nazi Germany,
for it now appeared that Japan was determined to
fight her own war independently, without more
than a perfunctory liaison with the Third Reich.
Thus an early failure of the combined strategy
of the Axis powers was the lack of effective coor-
dination?a problem which continuously plagued
the German High Command.
The final decision of Japan to make war,
reached with the full concurrence and active con-
sent of Japanese military and civilian leaders, was
based upon the following evaluation which is very
well presented in the Summary Report (Pacific
War), published by the United States Strategic
Bombing Survey:
a. The threat of Russia on the Manchurian
flank had been neutralized by the decisive
victories of Germany in Europe which might
eventually lead to the complete collapse of the
Soviet Union.
b. Great Britain was in such an irretriev-
ably defensive position that, even if she sur-
vived, her entire war-making potential would
be spent in a desperate attempt to protect her
home islands.
c. The forces which the United States and
her Allies could immediately deploy in the
Pacific, particularly in the air, were insuffi-
cient to prevent the fully trained and mobil-
ized forces of Japan from occupying within
3 or 4 months the entire area enclosed within
a perimeter consisting of Burma, Sumatra,
Java northern New Guinea, the Bismarck
Archipelago, the Gilbert and Marshall
Islands, Wake, and from there north to the
Kuriles.
d. China, with the Burma Road severed,
would be isolated and forced to negotiate.
e. The United States_, committed to aiding
Great Britain, and weakened by the attack on
Pearl Harbor, would be unable to mobilize
sufficient strength to go on the offensive for
18 months to 2 years. During this time, the
perimeter could be fortified and the required
forward air fields and bases established.. So
strengthened, this perimeter would be backed
by a mobile carrier striking force based on
Truk.
f. While the stubborn defense of the cap-
tured perimeter was undermining American
determination to support the war, the Jap-
anese would speedily extract bauxite, oil, rub-
ber, and metals from Malaya, Burma, the
Philippines and the Dutch East Indies, and
ship these materials to Japan for processing,
to. sustain and strengthen her industrial and
military machine.
g. The weakness of the United States as a
democracy would make it impossible for her
to continue all-out offensive action in the face
of the losses which would be imposed by fa-
natically resisting Japanese soldiers, sailors,
and airmen, and the elimination of its Allies.
The United States in consequence would com-
promise and allow Japan to retain a substan-
tial portion of her initial territorial gains.
Most of this evaluation was incorrect, because it
was based on faulty intelligence.
At the very outset of the Pacific War, therefore,
the seeds for Japan's eventual defeat were sown.
She was unable to comprehend or to predict those
psychological and moral factors which bolstered
the Allied cause in a time of severe trial and mis-
fortune. Since the Japanese concept of the state
involved ruthless tyranny and the complete sub-
jugation of the individual, she was also unable to
appreciate the power potential of the Allies in
obtaining a supreme voluntary effort from the in-
dividual, whether on the field of battle or on the
production front. Individual response to a noble
cause is one of the great strengths of a democ-
racy. Before a democracy fights, however, the
enemy has usually gained the strategic offensive.
The magnitude of their early successes at Pearl
Harbor, in Malaya, in the Philippines, and at
Wake, Guam, and Rabaul, encouraged the Japa-
nese to commit an outstanding error in grand
strategy?expansion beyond the perimeter origi-
nally planned. The nature of this new plan and
its inherent weaknesses are also described in the
Summary Report (Pacific War) :
Accordingly, a new plan was approved, pro-
viding for (a) an advance into the Solomons
and Port Moresby., to be followed, if success-
ful, by a further advance into New Caledonia,
Samoa, and the Fiji Islands; (b) the capture
of Midway; and (c) the temporary occupa-
tion of the Aleutians. Accomplishment of
such a program would cut the line of com-
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INTELLIGENCE FOR
munication between Australia and the United
States, reduce the threat from Alaska, and
deny the United States all major staging areas
more advanced than Pearl Harbor.
By stretching and overextending her line of
advance, Japan was committed to an expen-
sive and exacting supply problem. She de-
layed the fortification of the perimeter origi-
nally decided upon, jeopardized her economic
program for exploiting the resources of the
area already captured, and laid herself open
to early counterattack in far advanced and,
as yet, weak positions.
It should be pointed out, however, that this new
plan was partially successful; for example, sig-
nificant strategic gains were achieved by the tem-
porary occupation of Kiska in the Aleutians. The
United States was immediately placed on the de-
fensive in an area from which it had planned to
take the offensive. The Japanese action denied to
the United States Fleet advance bases for opera-
tions in the northwest Pacific and the Bering Sea,
from which aerial reconnaissance could be main-
tained over the northernmost Japanese Islands.
Furthermore, it was a threat to the shipping routes
between the west coast of the United States and
the east coast of Siberia; it endangered sealing
and fishing in the Bering Sea, and imperilled the
northwestern area of Alaska. The influence of
Japanese technical intelligence on this decision to
move into the Aleutians is indicated by the fol-
lowing quotation from the United States Strategic
Bombing Survey (Pacific) :
In Commander Hashimoto's opinion the
Japanese move into the Aleutians was con-
ceived as a flanking operation to the occupa-
tion of Midway. Once Kiska and Attu were
occupied it was decided to hold them for the
purpose of blocking a United States amphibi-
ous advance toward the Empire via the Aleu-
tian Chain, and also to deny the use of the
western Aleutians as bases from which long-
range bombers might operate. He said that
the Japanese were aware in the latter part of
1942 that the United States had plans for a
high altitude, long-range bomber, and, in
about February 1943, had information con-
cerning the B-29. This information was later
confirmed in a radio broadcast by an Ameri-
can general. He went on to say that the
B-29 appeared in operation 8 months later
than the Japanese had estimated it might ap-
pear. When Attu was re-taken by the United
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NAVAL OFFICERS
States, the Japanese expected long-range
bomber operations from Massacre Bay.
?Interrogations of J a p anese Officials
(Vol. I)
The operation launched against Midway, also
a part of this new plan, was far from successful.
In fact, in the words of Captain Tsuda :
The Battle of Midway was the beginning of
the Japanese failure in the war, I do not mean
that this was the decisive battle of the war,
but the loss of our carriers and some of our
best pilots and officers affected us throughout
the war. It called for the reorganization of
the carrier divisions and the Naval Air Force
in general. Due to the loss of ships we were
unable to meet the Americans in force in the
Solomons.
?Interrogation of Jap an e se Officials
(Vol. I)
United. States Strategic Bombing Survey
(Pacific)
The explanation for this fatal error to expand
the original perimeter may be found in the com-
ments of Admiral Toyada, one of her top naval
leaders:
I think the decision to expand the area of
operations so widely might be attributed to a
feeling on the part of the Japanese authorities
at the time that the state of mind under which
you fought the war and the state of mind
under which we fought the war were very
different, in that to us this was the war for our
very national existence, whereas in your case
it was merely a case of national honor or per-
haps protection of your economic interests in
the Far East; and, because to you the war
under such conditions would be of relatively
slight significance compared with ours, there
might have been a feeling on the part of our
leaders that, should the war continue a little
longer, you would lose your will to fight, and
with that idea we might have continued
spreading the battleline.
?Interrogations of Jap an es e Officials
(vol. II)
United States Strategic Bombing Survey
(Pacific)
If this explanation can be accepted as authorita-
tive, the cause for such a fundamental error in
strategy was an incorrect understanding of the
psychology of the American people. Here again
inaccurate intelligence had repercussions of the
first magnitude.
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Although the United States had early been
placed on the strategic defensive, by the end of
1942 precarious footholds had been consolidated
and reinforced in the southwest Pacific, thus up-
setting the enemy's strategic plan. The Battle of
Midway dealt a heavy blow to the Imperial Fleet,
and the strategic initiative passed to the American
forces. Thereafter, having ousted the Japanese
from Attu and Kiska, the north Pacific units were
employed as a holding and diversionary force,
while the major Allied attacks were carried out
by carrier task force raids, amphibious operations,
and strategic long-range bombing always aimed
at the final target, the Japanese home islands.
ALLIED STRATEGY BEFORE AND DURING WORLD
WAR II
Allied strategy in its entirety during this par-
ticular period serves to illustrate two points: the
tremendous ultimate value in coordinating the
strategies of allied nations; and the long term
effectiveness of strategy formulated in times of
peace as well as war.
As has been mentioned, the grand strategy of
the Axis was sharply divided, so that effective
concentration of power against major objectives
was never possible. On the other hand, the war
effort of Great Britain and the United States was
most closely coordinated. Varying degrees of co-
ordination were achieved from time to time with
the U. S. S. R., and with other Allied nations.
Perhaps the outstanding feature of Allied grand
strategy was the early implementation of the prin-
ciple of combined British and American conduct
of the war. Gen. George C. Marshall has com-
mented on this feature as follows:
On December 23, 1941, Winston Churchill,
Prime Minister of Great Britain, accompanied
by the British Chiefs of Staff, arrived in
Washington to confer with the President and
the American Chiefs of Staff. Out of the
series of discussions which then followed re-
sulted an agreement, not only regarding the
immediate strategy of our combined conduct
of the war, but also for the organization of a
method for the strategical command and con-
trol of British and American military re-
sources. Probably no other Allied action, in
the field or otherwise, has exerted as power-
ful an effect on the conduct of the war as the
prompt establishment of a prescribed pro-
cedure for achieving unit of effort through
the medium of the Combined Chiefs of Staff
acting under the direction of the leaders of
their respective Governments.
?Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the
United States Army, July 1, 1939 to June
30, 1941.
The pooling of resources and ideas generated a
total power which swept the Axis countries into
defeat. This concentration of power also included
the use of Army, Navy, and Marine Corps in
joint operations, especially in the Pacific. Joint
and combined intelligence activities contributed
substantially to strategic planning. For example,
the results of British experiments in photographic
interpretation were made available to the United
States, while air intelligence methods, and operat-
ing procedures aboard United States carriers were
provided the British Fleet through special train-
ing and liaison arrangements. This mutual ex-
change at many echelons was invaluable to the
combined allied strategy.
It has already been suggested that grana strat-
egy is conducted in time of ostensible peace as well
as in wartime. This is well illustrated by the fact
that the United States began to cooperate with
Great Britain in her war effort more than 3 years
before Pearl Harbor, and was actually at war with
Germany long before formal declarations were
made. Arrangements for the exchange of de-
stroyers for bases under 99-year lease agreements,
the convoying of merchant shipping, and the
American Lend-Lease program were all early in-
dications of combined strategy and military
planning.
NATIONAL STRATEGIES IN THE POSTWAR
PERIOD
The events of the postwar period, which have
their roots in past decades, will continue to influ-
ence the events of the future. The fate of the
world, or of civilization as it is now known, con-
tinues to hang in the balance, years after the termi-
nation of World War II. Former enemies and
former allies have united into new combinations
in peacetime, striving to achieve their objectives.
New strategies are being implemented and new
pressures applied in support of them.
The confusion and turbulence in relationships
between nations, both large and small, all over
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the world, and the crises caused by many diver-
gent often delicate situations, tend to obscure a
clear view of national strategies. However, it is
apparent that a dominant influence upon them has
been the fact that only two nations emerged from
the war with the full stature of major powers--
the United States and the U. S. S. R. It is neither
possible nor practicable to consider current events
in detail, or to speculate on developments in the
immediate future, but there are indications now
which shed light on the postwar strategies of
these major powers.
United States Strategy
In his book, The Price of Power, Hanson W.
Baldwin presents an interesting discussion of
United States strategy. His thesis is that in con-
tinuing to strive for the fulfillment of her objec-
tives in support of democracy and a just and last-
ing peace for the world, the United States aims to
preserve the political integrity of the "fringe-
lands" of Europe and Asia in order to prevent
the extension of Communist influence either to the
Atlantic in Europe or to the East and South China
Seas in Asia. This implies the restoration of a
balance of power. There are, of course, many
subsidiary aspects to this strategic purpose. Bald-
win goes on to describe the United States as "home
base" for operations with additional advanced and
intermediate bases, both fixed and mobile, required
because of the limitations of even the latest weap-
ons of warfare. Okinawa is illustrative of a fixed
base, while the United States Navy provides stra-
tegic mobile bases. Such a system of widely dis-
persed military bases becomes fundamental to
strategic planning. Of equal importance is the
development of "positions-in-readiness," that is,
friendly and allied countries who can contribute
to strategic purposes, both military and political.
The necessity for advance military bases was dis-
cussed by Colonel Clifford J. Heflin in the Air
University Quarterly, Fall 1947:
The idea of operating from home bases,
without the burden of establishing and main-
taining advanced and intermediate bases,
would be welcomed by every Air Force officer,
if it could be realized without paying too pro-
hibitive a price. From the inherent character-
istics of the airplane as developed during the
last 40 years, however, it appears probable
CONFIDENTIAL
112
that the price of such a method of operating
will continue to be extremely high in the meas-
urable future. Even if aircraft had attained
the range necessary to launch bombing at-
tacks from a distance of 6,000 to 8,000 miles,
it would be likely to remain much more eco-
nomical in materiel, and therefore more effi-
cient, to operate from nearer bases, wherever
they could be obtained . . .
If the coastal areas of Europe and Asia are of
most importance in United States strategic plan-
ning, then the significance of both sea and air
power, becomes readily apparent. The Atlantic
and Pacific Oceans are American sea frontiers
which must be protected, for only across them can
the United States exert its strength, whether it be
military, economic, or cultural. Strategic air
power is expressed by planes, both land and car-
rier based, capable of transporting atomic weap-
ons. Logistic superiority involves not only the
American industrial system, but also the capacity
of the United States and her allies to move their
products throughout the world by means of su-
perior sea power and merchant marine. Other
aspects of United States strategic planning may
well include an ideological offensive and a highly
mobile military force capable of almost immediate
retaliation against any aggressive action.
The Strategy of the Soviet Union
In his book, The Strange Alliance, John R.
Deane, formerly a Brigadier General in charge of
the United States Military Mission to the
U. S. S. R., says:
In my opinion there can no longer be any
doubt that the Soviet leadership has always
been motivated by the belief that communism
and capitalism cannot coexist. Nor is there
any doubt in my mind that present-day Soviet
leaders have determined upon a program
pointed toward imposing communism on those
countries under their control, and, elsewhere,
creating conditions favorable to the triumph
of communism in the war against capitalism
which they consider to be inevitable . . .
The program of the Soviet leaders is being
carried out with equal aggressiveness in two
ways: First, by the introduction and compul-
sory acceptance of communism in those coun-
tries which the Soviet Union controls either
by force or by the threat of force; and second,
by the infiltration of Communist ideology into
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those countries which, for the moment, are
beyond the orbit of Soviet control. In be-
tween are some nations that are subject both
to Soviet threat of force and ideological in-
filtration. Among these are Greece, Turkey,
Iraq, and to some extent China. It is safe to
predict that these countries will be subjected
to a war of nerves which they will be able to
resist only by the firm support of the western
democracies . . . The program of infiltration
is world-wide. It is evident throughout Latin
America, Canada, the British Empire, Asia,
and not least?the United States.
In attempting to achieve world domination the
Soviet Union aims to exert pressures in many areas
by many means in order to extend her political
influence and to weaken her adversaries by causing
them to overextend and to dissipate their strength
and power. Subsidiary elements of her strategic
planning include substantial military forces in
being, the threat of attack with atomic weapons,
propaganda and subversion.
In propaganda and subversion the Soviets have
been highly successful. Their strategic purposes
have been well served by the widespread employ-
ment of radio broadcasts to disseminate the com-
munist point of view and to vilify the western
democracies. The Nazi techniques of the "war of
nerves" and the "fifth column" have been most
effectively employed. Intensive effort has been
directed toward the development of new weapons
and electronic equipment, the large scale produc-
tion of interceptor and long-range aircraft, and
the expansion of a submarine fleet.
In attempting to combat the logistic superiority
of the democracies, the Soviets have concentrated
the production of their heavy industry on arma-
ments. In addition, it is of vital interest to the
U. S. S. R. to prevent the translation of Ameri-
ca's tremendous war potential into actual strength.
The tortuous course of the Soviet "peace" offen-
sive seems to be directed toward this end. A po-
tentially much more dangerous approach has been
the suggestion of the availability of the Russian
market for the sale of the products of foreign
industry: a proposition particularly attractive to
the business interests of the western democracies
beset by economic problems and the urgent need
for expanding foreign trade.
CTIVE IN A CHANGING WORLD CONFIDENTIAL
The Atomic Bomb
The successful adaptation of the principle of
nuclear fission to war purposes has had a marked
effect on national strategies in the postwar period.
Just how marked the effect has been is a matter
of personal opinion. Some writers have felt that
the initial possession of the atomic bomb gave to
the United States a dominant world power posi-
tion. Winston Churchill, speaking before a Tory
party conference in Wales in 1948, solemnly
observed:
It is my belief?and I say it with deep sor-
row?that . . . the only sure foundation of
peace and of the prevention of actual war rests
upon strength. If it were not for the stocks
of atomic bombs now in the trusteeship of the
United States, there would be no means of
stopping the subjugation of Western Europe
. . . If the United States were to consent, in
reliance upon any paper agreement, to destroy
the stocks of atomic bombs . . . they would
be guilty of murdering human freedom . . .
In connection with the development of an atomic
bomb, the strategic initiative was first held by
Germany. It was the knowledge that the Nazis
were engaged in intensive atomic research that
prompted the United States to undertake its own
program and to expend nearly $2,000,000,000 in
order to gain the strategic initiative in atomic
power. Secretary of War Stimson considered the
success of this program to be a great historical
achievement attained through the integrated ef-
forts of scientists, industrialists, labor, and mili-
tary personnel. The fact that the United States
alone possessed the atomic bomb was a great, if
temporary, advantage and undoubtedly influenced
strategic planning.
The announcement in September 1949 that there
was evidence of a recent atomic explosion within
the U. S. S. R. and subsequent similar announce-
ments in 1951 have had a profound effect on na-
tional strategies and no longer does the United
States have its unique power advantage. The part
played by Soviet Intelligence in bringing about
this change has been described in chapter 2.
However, the development of tactical atomic
weapons for offensive use in war makes the concen-
tration of military forces or supplies extremely
hazardous, and what was once a capability be-
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comes a vulnerability. Thus, the Soviet capabil-
ity to mass large military forces is not now as
significant strategically as it was prior to 1952.
On the other hand, Soviet progress in the harness-
ing of atomic energy has been much more rapid
than was expected and, even if the United States
maintains its production lead, the time might
come when the Soviet Union would have enough
atomic weapons for an attempted knock-out blow
against American industry.
Progress in the development of the hydrogen
bomb represents a new factor in strategic plan-
ning, as do other scientific projects in related fields.
As a result, the most detailed knowledge possible
regarding scientific activities in the atomic age
becomes a matter of great importance to grand
strategy and represents a grave responsibility for
intelligence.
Indications of Strategies in the Postwar Period
After 1945, disturbing reports from Soviet zones
.of occupation revealed that these areas were being
drawn into the Soviet orbit along the typical lines
of Communist-operated countries. The guaran-
tees of free elections in the Balkan countries and
the promise of the ultimate unification of Korea
were brushed aside. Red Army garrisons were re-
duced or withdrawn only after communist dom-
ination and control of the various coalition
governments were assured.
The drive for extension of Soviet influence into
the eastern Mediterranean, a centuries-old Russian
objective, was renewed in several indirect ways.
Occupation forces in Iran were withdrawn only
in the face of stern threats of action by the United
Nations. The Soviet Foreign Minister advanced
the proposal of Soviet trusteeship of the former
Italian colony of Libya. Pressure was exerted on
Turkey to agree to joint control of the Turkish
Straits, and Communist guerrilla activities were
intensified in Greece, weakened by the Nazi occu-
pation, internal dissension, and admitted British
inability to provide a stabilizing influence. Amer-
ican planes, lost over Yugoslavia, were shot down.
It was apparent that Soviet strategy aimed at the
exploitation of political and military weaknesses
whenever and wherever they could be found.
In the light of Soviet intransigence and double-
dealing on many major issues throughout the
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114
world, the United States evaluation of this situa-
tion was that Soviet domination in the eastern
Mediterranean would threaten the independence
of other states in the Middle East, vital supply
routes through the Suez Canal, and important
sources of oil upon which the United States Navy
depends for a sizable proportion of its fuel sup-
ply. Accordingly, as a counterstrategic move, the
Truman Plan was promulgated to provide mili-
tary and economic aid to Turkey and Greece. The
strategic aspects of this plan were summarized
by Walter Lippmann in March 1947:
The reason for intervening in Greece and
Turkey is that of all places in the world they
are the best suited strategically for the em-
ployment of American military power to
check the expansion of Soviet military power.
The power of the Soviet Union is in its inex-
haustible reserves of infantry capable of
pressing upon its wide land frontiers in Eu-
rope and Asia. There is no other power or
group of powers capable of mobilizing the
troops to hold, much less push back, the
masses of the Red Army on land. The power
of the United States is on the sea and in the
air. This kind of power can be exerted to
check the Red Army only if it can be brought
within striking distance of the vital centers of
the Soviet Union.
The obvious and unique strategic approach,
as all history proves and the Russians are
most keenly aware, is across the Black Sea
to the Ukraine and the Caucasus. The en-
trance to the Black Sea is in the eastern Med-
iterranean through the Aegean Sea and the
Dardanelles, that is to say between Greece and
Turkey . . .
Insofar as we are able to exert American
sea and air power in the Black Sea, we have
the means of checking the advance of the Red
Army westward into Europe. We are on its
flank and in its rear, and we are able to main-
tain a balance of power, without which serious
diplomatic negotiation is impossible.
Since the sea and air power of the United States
Navy is intimately associated with the strategic
situation in the Mediterranean, it follows that
Naval Intelligence can and must make a signifi-
cant contribution to strategic planning.
American success in Greece, strengthened rela-
tionships with Turkey, and the deviation of Tito
from the Moscow orbit have all combined to serve
the strategic purposes of the United States. How-
ever, it should be pointed out that there is still
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little room for complacency or undue optimism.
The oil supply was cut off from Iran in 1951 and
the unstable government of that country is seri-
ously threatened by Soviet subversive efforts;
while, at the same time, the nationalistic aspira-
tions and racial prejudices of the Arab peoples
throughout the Mediterranean basin are being ex-
ploited as a means of weakening the position of
the United States, Great Britain, and France in
that area. This development has been particu-
larly serious in that it poses a threat to the chain
of United States strategic air bases located along
the North African coast. In the fall of 1952, the
purging of presumably dissident elements in
Czechoslovakia appeared to be serving the double
purpose of stabilizing Communist control in that
country and appealing to the anti-semitic preju-
dices of the Arab world. In view of the general
unrest, the United States Gth Fleet has played a
major strategic role in the Mediterranean, show-
ing its flag in ports from Trieste to Istanbul, thus
bolstering local confidence and deterring overt
Soviet action.
The Soviet land blockade of Berlin in 1948-49
represented a major test of strength. Although
the airlift was very costly to the western democ-
racies, its strategic significance was tremendous.
In the first place, it showed that the United States
was not ready to be driven out of Germany; and,
even more important, it strengthened the will of
the Germans and other peoples of western Europe
to resist Soviet aggression. Economic support to
the anti-Communist nations of western Europe
further aided United States interests, while influ-
ence was effectively applied in support of anti-
Communist political parties in a series of crucial
national elections in France and Italy.
In Asia, Communist control was gradually ex-
tended over all of China, with the exception of a
few offshore islands and Formosa. Even inacces-
sible Tibet fell under the domination of the Com-
munist government in Peking, thus posing a po-
tential threat to India. The control of China,
plus that of Sakhalin and the Kuriles, gave the
Soviet Union the strategic initiative in Asia. Not
only did it make possible the application of strong
pressures on the large resident Chinese popula-
tion in many areas of the Far East, but it also pro-
vided a strategic support base for guerrilla war-
115
fare and Communist encouraged nationalist re-
volts in Indo-China, Malaya, Burma, and Indo-
nesia. The strategic position of the United States
in the Philippines, Okinawa, and Japan was im-
mediately threatened. If Soviet influence were
extended to Southeast Asia and the Persian Gulf
area, India and Pakistan would be in a very pre-
carious position.
Faced with mounting commitments all over the
world and with Soviet pressures exerted at many
points from one extreme of the Eurasian continent
to the other, the United States did not have ade-
quate military or political strength to support its
commitments fully or summarily resist all pres-
sures. In Japan, for example, in June 1950, there
were only four inexperienced American divisions,
all understrength, engaged primarily in routine
occupation duties. When the military blow was
finally struck in Korea, the United States was un-
prepared to support the political integrity of that
country. However, its strategic significance re-
sulted in action by the United Nations.
The Korean war, from the strategic point of
view, has indicated on the one hand that World
Communism will resort to military force to
achieve its objectives when other means prove un-
successful. On the other hand, it has shown that
the United States will employ the most vigorous
defensive measures to halt Soviet penetration and
control of the coastal littorals of Asia. An exten-
sive rearmament program has been initiated in an
effort to attain military strength consonant with
world commitments and adequate to deter the mil-
itary power which the Soviets have maintained
and increased since World War II. In this re-
spect, the war in Korea may eventually prove to
be an event of tremendous consequence to the na-
tional welfare and security of the United States.
This brief review of postwar strategies shows
that planning and intelligence are closely linked,
for Intelligence must provide the knowledge for
the planners. It must aid in the assessment of
Soviet actions wherever they take place and pre-
pare realistic estimates. Timing and method are
of tremendous importance. Are the Soviets pre-
pared to exert military force in several areas, and,
if so, where and when? Will they continue to
hope for military, political, and economic decay
in the western democracies, or will they strike
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while their military strength is relatively sups.
nor? Do they feel that the extension of their
influence by nonmilitary means is fast enough, or
will they decide in favor of open war even at the
risk of the atomic destruction of their population
centers? A great number of diverse elements are
involved in finding answers to any of these ques-
tions: the progress of Soviet technology, the tem-
perament of individuals in the Kremlin, increased
exploitation of natural resources, the morale of the
peoples of western Europe, and economic problems
in all parts of the world. To find the right an-
swers, the resources and skills of the personnel of
all United States Intelligence agencies will be
taxed to the utmost.
IMPLEMENTATION OF STRATEGY
In an effort to prepare neat definitions, much
has been said and written on the subjects of strat-
egy and tactics, although the nature of modern
warfare has led to the inevitable conclusion that
the differences between the two cannot be drawn
as clearly today as they were formerly?just as
the distinctions between war and peace are no
longer clear-cut. Tactics, as a military term, re-
fers to the employment of units in combat and to
their ordered arrangement and maneuver in rela-
tion to each other or to the enemy. In connection
with the employment of the nonmilitary factors
of strategy, tactics is simply descriptive of the
various implementations of a nation's master plan.
Strategy and tactics are directly related to strate-
gic intelligence and operational intelligence,
the meanings of which have been discussed in
chapter 1.
In brief the intelligence officer, in his perspec-
tive of the world scene, must recognize that strat-
egy is the forest, tactics are the trees, and neither
has meaning without the other. He must not only
understand the relationships between world events
as they occur, but also be able to predict how an
enemy may react in a given situation. In con-
sidering the matter of tactics, he must realize that
although operations may vary in size and intensity,
they are always designed to further the strategic
plan and national objectives.
Thus far it has been emphasized that intelli-
gence materially serves strategy, and that it has
an important responsibility in assisting the im-
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plementation of strategy by non-military means.
In a tactical or operational military situation in-
telligence plays an equally significant part. Here,
the intelligence officer must have a professional
competence in matters relating to military opera-
tions and their component elements. This involves
knowledge of the characteristics, capabilities, and
new developments of ships, aircraft, weapons,
technical equipment, personnel, and materiel, to-
gether with procedures, methods of employment,
and techniques. His professional competence will
be further increased by study of the art, theories,
and history of warfare.
Principles of Warfare
The Principles of War, or general truths
adopted as guides for action, are based upon the
writings of theorists and the experiences of suc-
cessful military men from ancient to modern
times. The many books on this subject merit the
attention of intelligence officers, because they are
basic guides to the organization, maintenance, and
application of all types of military forces. These
principles influence tactics, and an understanding
of their application gives greater meaning to the
procedures involved in developing operational sit-
uations. They can serve as a check-list for analyti-
cal purposes, but it must be remembered that they
cannot be considered individually since they are
all closely interrelated.
The Principle of Objective emphasizes the need
for relating all tactical objectives to national ob-
jectives and has been mentioned in the preceding
discussion. The Principle of Offensive means
concentration of all possible effort toward obtain-
ing the objective by successful offensive action; it
is based on the truism that military victory can
only result from offensive action. An offensive
has the advantages of initiative and freedom of
action, and compels the enemy to disperse his
strength, thereby limiting concentration of forces
for effective action. Finally, an offensive raises
the morale and determination of both the fighting
force and the supporting civilian force; while, at
the same time, it may effectively lower the morale
of opposing forces. Defensive action is not con-
sidered a principle of war, because it is tolerated
only for purposes of security or for gaining ad-
vantages leading to ultimate offensive action.
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The Principle of Mass includes a concentration
of combat power, proper timing and placement, a
sufficient number of personnel who are carefully
trained and thoroughly indoctrinated for preci-
sion work, the availability of weapons and mate-
riel for fire power in adequate quantity and of
proper quality, and the facility to move both men
and materiel as required. Accumulative mass is
based on a systematic plan and timetable to re-
duce the enemy's power of resistance effectively.
To the physical shock effect of mass attack must
be added the psychological effect in creating anx-
iety and fear in the minds of both troops and
civilians. Related to this principle is that of the
Economy of Force which directs the distribution
and alignment of forces for combat to achieve de-
cisive results. This principle does not mean the
saving or non-commitment of military force.
Marshal Foch once made some pertinent com-
ments on this subject:
There is a proverb which says you cannot
hunt two hares at the same time. You would
catch neither of them. Efforts must be con-
centrated. Those who would say economy
means sparing one's own forces being careful
not to disperse one's own efforts would only
state part of the truth. Those would come
closer to the truth who could assimilate the
other art of knowing how to expend usefully
and profitably to make the best possible use
of all available resources.
The appropriate distribution of force reduces the
element of risk; forces are not committed to battle
before sufficient strength has been gained to in-
sure success. This principle acts as a check and
a balance on the others.
The Principle of Movement concerns the mobile
qualities of combat units and their proper and
prompt logistic support; it conditions and limits
the principles of offensive, mass, and economy of
force. Mobility involves not only the speed, range,
and maneuverability of equipment, but also the
ability to transport combat units as entities with
a minimum loss of time. The security of lines of
movement becomes a vital factor in a successful
operation. For example, in the North African
campaign of World War II, logistic support was
denied the Nazis by Allied naval and air forces
which sank German ships and shot down German
transports which were attempting to bring in addi-
tional troops and materiel. This principle largely
determines the possibility of Surprise which is an-
other principle of war. The employment of sur-
prise permits the more effective use of combat
forces when the enemy is unaware of the time and
place of their impending effort. Surprise is often
possible as a result of security, rapidity of move-
ment, deception, and the audacity of the com-
mander in striking under conditions which appear
unusually difficult and therefore unlikely. New
weapons and new or different methods of making
use of current weapons may also make surprise
possible. Obviously, surprise can magnify the
effects of an offensive or a mass attack. However,
advantageous as surprise may be, it must be kept
in mind that the enemy may employ it too, so that
all preparations must be taken to guard against
surprise.
The Principle of Security is applicable in times
of peace as well as war and is closely associated
with the warning function of intelligence and the
activities of counterintelligence. In an opera-
tional situation close attention must be given to
such matters as camouflage, dispersion, antiair-
craft weapons, radio and radar countermeasures,
early warning networks, and defensive armament.
The Principle of Simplicity recognizes the great
importance of clear-cut military organization and
easily understood administrative procedures in
order to obtain the greatest degree of cooperation
and coordination. Simplicity reduces to a min-
imum the possibilities of faulty execution through
misunderstanding and makes easier the handling
of an unexpected situation. Clarity in command
responsibilities and relationships and the publica-
tion of Standard Operating Procedures contribute
to the required simplicity of military operations.
Confidence, a minimum of confusion, and a max-
imum of efficiency are qualities which can be de-
rived from careful attention to this principle. The
Principle of Cooperation provides for unified ef-
fort toward a common goal; unified command,
joint training, economy of joint effort, and self-
lessness of interests are all contributory factors.
117
World War II Battles in the Pacific
The use of intelligence for operational purposes
is discussed in detail in later chapters, but in order
to assess the part played by intelligence in the im-
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plementation of strategy, a consideration of spe-
cific operations which took place in the Pacific
during World War II is most helpful. The suc-
cesses and the failures of the opposing forces were
directly related to the effectiveness of their re-
spective intelligence efforts.
For the attack on Pearl Harbor the Japanese
commanders were provided with intelligence
which was amazingly complete, accurate, and
usable. The contribution of intelligence to their
success is well summarized in the United States
Strategic Bombing Survey, Japanese Military and
Naval Intelligence Division:
The shocking success of the Japanese attack
on Pearl Harbor was due to careful planning
based upon nearly complete intelligence as to
the position, movements, and strength of
United States forces in the area . . .
The Japanese had a large amount of de-
tailed information concerning United States
fleet units, air strength, and other military in-
stallations at Pearl Harbor which was put to
effective use in the surprise attack. After the
raid, crashed Japanese planes and a beach
midget submarine yielded annotated charts
and other documents which set forth the
United States situation in fairly accurate
The midget submarine had on board a
United States Navy hydrographic chart
which had been used as a track chart for the
sub's intended transit of the harbor. It was
annotated with detailed navigational data,
with the names and positions of major units
expected to be in the harbor, and with the
berthing areas of minor units and auxiliaries.
Similar intelligence concerning ship anchor-
ages? charts for aircraft torpedo runs against
specified targets, and data on Honolulu radio
frequencies were found in crashed planes.
The leader of the first attacking flight, Cap-
tain Fuchida, has reported the careful prep-
arations which accounted for the effectiveness
of the attack. The attacking pilots were
briefed on 23 November, 3 December, 7 De-
cember, and at a final session two hours before
the attack on 8 December (Tokyo time). At
the briefing the day prior to the attack, the re-
vised estimate of the major units at Pearl was
announced as no carriers, 7 battleships and 7
cruisers. Actually there were 8 battleships
and 8 cruisers. At the final briefing, the pilots
were given mimeographed sheets indicating?
with names in most cases and with substan-
tial accuracy?the probable positions of the
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118
warships berthed around Ford Island and at
the Navy Yard.
Conditions affecting the United States Forces
during the period immediately following the at-
tack are discussed in the Report of the Joint Com,-
mittee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor
Attack :
While it appears that some planes under
Navy direction were assigned to search the
sector to the north of Oahu, generally re-
garded as the dangerous sector from the
standpoint of an air attack, they were diverted
to the southwest by reason of a false report
that the Japanese carriers were in that
direction.
Admiral Smith, Chief of Staff to Admiral
Kimmel, said he did not get the information
as to the probable location from which the
Japanese carriers launched the attack for
some 2 days. There is a great deal of con-
fusion including false civilian reports of troop
parachute landings and a false report from
one of our own planes concerning an enemy
carrier to the south. A chart showing the
position of the Japanese carriers was taken
from a Japanese plane by the Army on De-
cember 7 but was not shown the Navy until
the afternoon.
The deplorable feature of the action follow-
ing the attack was the failure of the Navy and
Army to coordinate their efforts through in-
telligence at hand. The same Army radar
unit that had tracked the Japanese force in,
plotted it back out to the north. Yet this
vital information, which would have made
possible an effective search, was employed by
neither service.
The situation in connection with the Japanese
occupation of the Philippine Islands was some-
what similar. Here again, accurate intelligence
regarding American forces on Luzon made pos-
sible effective operational planning, which was
coupled with the element of surprise. The Jap-
anese estimate of the situation in the Philippines
proved to be substantially correct and their forces
enjoyed early and economical success in spite of
the fact that the United States ground forces main-
tained organized resistance longer than had been
anticipated.
The basis of Japanese success in this operation
was the destruction within a week of American
air strength by the Japanese 11th Air Fleet based
in Formosa. According to information brought
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out by the interrogation of Vice Admiral Shirai-
chi, then Chief of Staff of the 2d Fleet, and of
Captain Takahashi, then on the 11th Air Fleet
Staff, the Japanese began their attacks on 8 De-
cember with almost exact information regarding
the strength and disposition of the American air
forces. Making use of surprise, the invaders were
able to destroy most of the American planes on the
ground. This vital information was obtained by
reconnaissance aircraft on 24-25 November which
reported 300 planes in the Luzon area?there were
actually 317.
Prior to the Battle of Midway in mid-1942 there
was a tremendous decline in the efficiency of Jap-
anese Intelligence, with the result that the Jap-
anese commanders entered into this battle with
an abysmal lack of anything approaching accurate
knowledge. The Japanese Estimate of the Situa-
tion, discussed in the ONI Review for May 1947,
included the following specific points: (1) Al-
though the U. S. Navy "lacks the will to fight,"
it will counterattack if Midway is occupied; (2)
"The enemy is not aware of our plans ;" (3) the
United States has no carrier force in the vicinity;
and (4) after attacking Midway by air and de-
stroying American shore-based strength, the Jap-
anese Striking Force will still have enough planes
"to destroy any enemy task force which may
choose to attack."
On the other hand, the United States forces had
available a rather accurate estimate of Japanese
plans and preparations drawn up by Intelligence
from various items of information derived from
many sources. One of the vital decisions of the
Pacific War was made by Admiral Nimitz when
he accepted the estimate of his intelligence section
that Midway and the Aleutians were primary ob-
jectives of the enemy. By 23 May, Rear Admiral
Bellinger, Naval Air Commander at Pearl, was
able to predict the Japanese plan of attack, the
composition, approximate routes, and timetable of
the forces which were threatening Midway. This
battle was a major success for U. S. Intelligence;
the "United States Strategic Bombing Survey"
comments:
The battle of Midway was a notable early
occasion where United States intelligence con-
cerning the enemy was superior to the enemy's
intelligence concerning the United States,
thus affording an opportunity to organize and
employ our forces effectively and achieve a
victory of decisive importance.
Just as the Battle of Midway is generally con-
sidered to have been a turning point in the war,
so it was also a turning point in the intelligence
effort. As the war progressed, American intelli-
gence increased in quality and quantity while that
of the Japanese decreased. The Imperial Staff
continued to underestimate United States strength
and capabilities and concluded that no major op-
erations could be attempted before the end of 1912
because of American naval losses at Pearl Harbor
and heavy shipping losses in the Atlantic.
These faulty estimates were partially responsi-
ble for the success of the Allied counterattack
through the Solomons area which marked a change
in pace from the defensive to the offensive. The
American landings in the Guadalcanal area in
August 1942 caught the Japanese completely by
surprise at the particular time when they were
not prepared to defend the area or to mount an
effective counteroffensive. Their difficulties were
compounded by two disastrous errors: the first
was an initial intelligence report that less than
1,000 American troops were involved in the land-
ings, while actually there were more than 19,000,
including the 1st Marine Division and two Army
battalions; the second was an underestimate of
troops required to recapture Guadalcanal, based
upon experience in China and in Malaya.
Using this inaccurate and incomplete informa-
tion, the Japanese made a number of attempts to
regain the island with insufficient forces which
were destroyed one after the other. In August, 1
battalion was committed and destroyed; in Sep-
tember, 3 battalions mounted an unsuccessful as-
sault; in October, after the extent of United States
strength was realized, a joint Army-Navy opera-
tion involving two divisions of 29,000 troops was
carried out which also failed. Further attempts
were equally ineffective and Guadalcanal was
finally abandoned in January 1943. By continu-
ing to underestimate the strength of the American
forces, the Japanese gave them the invaluable op-
portunity to strengthen their position gradually
so that each attack was successfully repulsed.
The glaring error of the Japanese during the
Solomons campaign in underestimating United
States strength resulted in a serious weakening of
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their air and naval power by piecemeal commit-
ment in a series of ineffective counterattacks.
Their best carrier air groups were decimated, and
their warship strength in all categories was ma-
terially reduced in the long series of naval actions.
At the same time, heavy transport shipping losses
progressively curtailed their offensive operations,
not only in the Solomons-New Guinea area, but
later in other areas as well. The effects of this
poorly conceived plan of operations in the Solo-
mons were far-reaching. Since the carrier air
groups had been drawn from the Combined Fleet
based at Truk, their destruction made it impossible
for the fleet to support Japanese positions in the
Gilbert and Marshall Islands either by surface or
air action. Before replacements were possible,
American forces were able to over-run those is-
lands. These persisting losses had a deteriorating
effect on Japan's total military strength from
which she was never able to recover.
At the battle for Leyte Gulf the Japanese naval
operation, carried out by means of a three-pronged
attack, was planned and executed with almost no
intelligence available. In numerous instances in-
dividual commanders could not employ their units
effectively because of the lack of knowledge re-
garding their opposition. The effect on the out-
come of the battle is summarized in the United
States Strategic Bombing Survey:
Investigation shows that a continuing basic
weakness in the Japanese position throughout
this action was the lack of adequate opera-
tional intelligence. This is seen to have con-
tributed to their other difficulties and to have
compounded them. They were unable to get
adequate timely information as to the
strength, location, and movements of the
United States forces, and as a consequence
were operating a large part of the time by
guess and chance. The chief cause of the lack
of adequate intelligence in this situation was
the recurring failure to maintain air recon-
naissance, which was admittedly a cardinal
weakness. There is no indication that there
was any effective Japanese submarine scout-
ing in these actions.
In this battle, as was later the case at Iwo Jima
and Okinawa, United States naval commanders
were able to base their operations on much better
intelligence regarding the strength, disposition,
and composition of opposing forces.
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It is true that in the latter stages of the Pacific
war the Japanese were able frequently to prepare
fairly accurate estimates of impending Allied op-
erations; but it is equally true that the number
of possible objectives was rapidly reduced as the
Allied forces approached their ultimate objective.
The campaigns at Midway, in the Solomons, and
in the Gilbert and Marshall Islands each reflected
progressively sharper drops in the quantity and
quality of intelligence available to the Japanese
operational commanders. As a result, they were
forced more and more to rely on professional spec-
ulation which contributed to defeat rather than
to victory. From a review of the various Pacific
campaigns, it is concluded that intelligence con-
tributed materially to successful military opera-
tions, while a severe and sometimes insurmount-
able handicap was imposed upon the commander
who did not have it, or who failed to use it.
DYNAMICS OF STRATEGY, TACTICS AND
INTELLIGENCE
Just as strategy and tactics are formulated in
part from the knowledge provided by Intelligence,
intelligence activities are likewise affected by de-
velopments arising from strategies and tactics.
The intelligence perspective, therefore, must have
flexibility and the capacity to adapt itself to
changing conditions and circumstances. Events
can and do take place in the world scene and in
operational situations which have a direct and
immediate impact on planning, so that Intelli-
gence must be prepared to react promptly if it is
to make its full contribution.
During the course of their long history, British
planners have shown a remarkable capacity to
make use of changing events, extracting the ad-
vantages presented and adapting their plans and
policies accordingly. Such a procedure at the
higher planning levels might be critically de-
scribed as improvisation and opportunism; how-
ever, since the British have not deviated from their
basic national objectives, its merit has been his-
torically demonstrated. In this connection,
Churchill has commented: "We assign a large
importance to opportunism and improvisation,
seeking rather to live and conquer in accordance
with the unfolding event than to aspire to domi-
nate it often by fundamental decisions."
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World War II is replete with examples of the
ability of American commanders in the field to
adapt themselves readily to changing circum-
stances; the ingenuity of the individual American
soldier, sailor, and airman has reflected a common
national characteristic. American top-level plan-
ning in the past has tended to differ from that of
the British. In noting this difference, Churchill
again has said that "in the military as in the com-
mercial or production spheres, the American mind
runs naturally to broad, sweeping logical conclu-
sions on the largest scale. . . . They feel that once
the foundation has been planned on true and com-
prehensive lines, all other stages will follow natu-
rally and almost inevitably." The approach of
American planners has been to prepare several
carefully analyzed plans each of which, if selected,
will lead to inevitable conclusions. The success of
this approach has also been amply demonstrated.
In view of the trends of modern warfare, however,
it is entirely possible that American planners may
now find it advantageous, if not necessary, to make
full use of developing situations. Whenever this
is true, Intelligence can make a substantial
contribution.
For the greatest success of their mutual effort,
the relationships between policy-makers and In-
telligence should be closely scrutinized at frequent
intervals. In his provocative article, Intelligence
and Policy-Making in Foreign Affairs, Roger
Hilsman, Jr., serving with the Joint Military Ad-
visory Group in Europe in 1952, has analyzed these
relationships and found a division of labor which,
in his opinion, may not be the best.
Intelligence on the one hand and policy-
making and action on the other are separated
physically, organizationally, chronologically,
functionally, and by skills?separated in every
possible way.
His suggestion, in part, is a reconsideration of or-
ganizational structure. Regardless of what sug-
gestions may be offered, it is true that the dy-
namics of strategy, tactics, and intelligence can
best operate under the most carefully coordinated
conditions in an atmosphere of mutual
understanding.
Attitudes for Intelligence
In assuming its share of responsibility, Intelli-
gence must maintain a perspective that is positive,
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clear, and keenly alert; it must never lose sight
of its own purposes and objectives as determined
by the requirements of those responsible for na-
tional strategy and its implementation. In Mr.
Hilsman's opinion,
. . . the important step for intelligence is
an intellectual reorientation designed to create
a new set of attitudes?a frame of mind which
is manipulative, instrumental, action-con-
scious, policy oriented. The major task
before the researchers is one of recasting their
thought to the context of action, and adapting
their tools to the needs of policy.
Ultimately, both operators and researchers
must move from hunch and intuition to an im-
proved capacity for explicit and disciplined
policy analysis. If at the same time the re-
searchers become policy-oriented, there may
develop a more effective integration of knowl-
edge and action . . ? The first problem is one
of attitudes and skills.
?World Politics, 0 ctober 1952.
Although critical, this statement serves a good
purpose in that it stimulates a thoughtful con.
sideration of appropriate attitudes.
Two things merit special attention. The first is
that planners must recognize that intelligence is a
continuous activity and that planning must be
grounded on fact rather than on conjecture. The
second, is that Intelligence personnel must con-
sider their work in time of peace as important as
in time of war, if not more so. General Donovan
has appropriately said:
It is much more difficult to prevent war than
to wage it. It is even more important in
peacetime, in a sense, to know what people are
up to, and what's going on, so that the peace
can be preserved. If you want to have peace
in the world, you've got to know the truth of
what is happening and not be forced to rely
on rumor. Rumor might make us act in one
way, and knowledge would compel us to act in
another.
Shortly after World War I, Colonel Nicolai, well-
known German intelligence officer, urged that the
peacetime functions of Intelligence be maintained
and said, "But if even today certain circles believe
that nations can cooperate, they ought to make
sure the way of cooperation is illuminated by a
good Intelligence Service . . ."
Nicolai also summarized the role of intelligence
in the world scene when he said: "The Intelligence
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Service moves ahead of developments into the dark
future, in order to discover what it will be and to
influence it."
This discussion has stressed the importance of
accurate, pertinent knowledge as it relates to the
fields of strategy and tactics. The tremendous
volume and scope of such knowledge require that
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it be reduced, for the sake of manageability, to
its logical component parts in order that it may
be efficiently collected, carefully evaluated, and
made available in usable form. The following
chapter will outline by component parts the con-
tent of intelligence used by strategic and opera-
tional planners.
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CHAPTER 5
COMPONENTS OF INTELLIGENCE KNOWLEDGE
Intelligence knowledge is generally divided into
eight component parts: geographic, transporta-
tion and telecommunications, sociological, politi-
cal, economic, technical and scientific, armed
forces, and biographical. Each part is then often
identified as a type of intelligence. While this
division is not completely standardized and varia-
tions can be debated, it is agreed that no one com-
ponent can stand alone. Each is interdependent
and interrelated with one or more of the others.
In order to gain a proper perspective when using
this knowledge, all parts must be integrated into
a well-balanced whole.
In connection with use, two points must be em-
phasized: first, for purposes of planning and
reaching decisions at almost any command level,
the user can seldom confine himself to only one
component; and second, depending upon the par-
ticular problem at hand, he will usually select
various items from different components in deter-
mining the best answer. In other words, point of
view and particular needs govern the use of in-
telligence knowledge and the parts thereof. In
estimating the capabilities of an opposing military
force, for example, the commander must know
more than its size and fire-power, as gained from
enemy order of battle reports. He must also be
informed of the enemy's economic and technical
resources and the personal characteristics of op-
posing commanders and personnel. Under some
circumstances, political and social forces govern-
ing enemy behavior may be important. Thus
knowledge not encompassed by the category of
Armed Forces Intelligence may be of inestimable
value to a subordinate command in carrying out
its assigned task and represent a vital saving in
time and lives. An Underwater Demolition Team
is greatly aided by advance geographic knowledge
regarding such matters as beach gradient; avia-
tors need meteorological data as well as target
information; and those responsible for logistics
require a wide range of intelligence knowledge in
128
order to perform their responsibilities efficiently
and economically.
Since these various components are mutually
supporting, the intelligence officer cannot wisely
confine his energies to the mastery of only one, as
will be pointed out in the ensuing discussion.
GEOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE
Geographic intelligence is the military evalua-
tion of all the geographic factors which may in
any way influence a military operation. Military
geography embraces all aspects of the physical en-
vironment of man, both natural and artificial: the
position, size, shape, boundaries, weather, climate,
water characteristics, land forms, drainage, vege-
tation, and surface materials of all parts of the
earth; also the cultural or man-made features such
as cities, transportation routes, industries, mines,
and farms.
Frontiers
The problems of location, size, shape, and fron-
tiers for a territory are largely strategic. Loca-
tion basically affects the economic, political, and
social nature of a country because of its relation
to markets, to agricultural and mineral resources,
to terrain and climate, and to transport. Military
problems grow out of the economic, political, and
social. Size and shape and frontiers have mili-
tary significance, for great size may afford an
opportunity to trade space for time. Air power
may shrink distances but size will still give min-
utes or hours of warning of conventional air at-
tack to centrally located industrial sites. On the
other hand, size is a weakness when there is waste
or undeveloped land that requires expensive long
hauls for industry and long military movements
of materiel and personnel from one frontier region
to another. The shape of a country, of course,
determines the relative amount of frontier to be
defended. Frontiers have multiple significance.
Strong natural frontiers as opposed to artificial
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ones may tend to isolate countries from other peo-
ples and ideas and hamper trade. Purely politi-
cal frontiers that shift with the fortunes of war
will affect the military and political views and
behaviors of nations. Sea frontiers will influence
the growth of seapower. The military study of
frontiers must consider man-made features such
as fortifications and bridges. In a time of cold
war, the fact that satellite frontiers have been de-
nuded of farms and villages, stripped bare of
vegetation at the boundary itself, and protected
by electrified wire, mine fields, and patrols with
dogs is no small intelligence consideration. In
the planning of conventional military campaigns,
frontiers may be studied for their tank traps,
dragons' teeth, bunkers, and access roads, as well
as for their natural physical elements.
Topography
Land forms, drainage, surface materials, and
vegetation, all elements related to topography, are
of more than army interest. The general char-
acter of continents and islands, even of plains,
mountains, and plateaus, are of strategic interest.
For example, the broad sweep of the North Ger-
man plain across Germany, Poland, and into
Russia, as well as the Pyrenees barrier, are of
importance in assessing the potentialities of Soviet
military advance in Europe. But whether col-
lected in strategic encyclopedias or observed in
field operations, military concern extends to in-
dividual valleys, basins, ridges, cliffs, hills, and
other features. In this age of joint operations,
all three services are concerned with these elements
of topography. Of special importance to the Navy
are the detailed characteristics of coasts and land-
ing beaches. All these topographic features affect
the movement and supply of forces, the types of
equipment that can be used, the methods of attack
and defense, the possibilities of concealment and
surprise, and many other operational matters.
Land forms and drainage conditions are so
closely related that it is almost impossible to con-
sider one to the exclusion of the other. Whether
an area is fully or partially drained, the number,
width, depth, and direction of rivers and streams,
and the condition of their banks and crossing-
places, are determining factors in the movements
of troops and the tactics employed in any given
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NAVAL OFFICERS
area. The number, size, and distribution of lakes,
ponds, lagoons, swamps, and marshes are elements
that may play an important part in military oper-
ations. Subsurface water is a principal source of
water supply, and in many areas constiutes a ma-
jor drainage problem in excavation and construc-
tion. In recent years rivers and swamps have
many times shaped military actions. Examples
are the causeway from Johore to Singapore's back
door, the Remagen bridge across the Rhine, the
Yalu river, which freezes over to allow troops to
cross without bridges, and the Rapido in Italy
which was a barrier for so long.
Military interest extends to soils analysis as well
as to land form. The materials of the surface of
the earth determine, among other things, what
kind of vehicles can move over it, whether it is
suitable for entrenchments, how quickly it will
drain, and the effect of frost. Surface materials
have a definite significance concerning the con-
struction and maintenance of roads, airdromes,
and other engineering problems. In addition, in
the broader picture, soils affect agriculture, min-
ing, and basic transportation routes. There are
many regions where seasonal weather changes re-
lated to local soils bar virtually all movement ex-
cept along established railways and better roads.
Japanese ability to honeycomb some of their war-
time positions proved to be a major factor in slow-
ing the reduction of their military power. This
was noted in such places as Iwo Jima and Okinawa
where soft rock allowed relatively rapid digging.
The coral of some south Pacific atolls proved to be
a superb construction material for airstrip run-
ways. The muck of Attu rendered inefficient much
of our artillery fire in the landing at Massacre
Bay.
Coasts and landing beach intelligence, of special
naval interest, is now becoming so specialized and
requires such development that its detailed discus-
sion is reserved for the amphibious section of
chapter 13. It involves a study of the sea ap-
proaches, the coastal terrain, the beaches them-
selves, the beach exits, and adjacent terrain.
The presence or absence of forests, brush, grass-
land, cultivated crops, and other forms of vegeta-
tion has a vital effect on military operations.
Vegetation may be in either the primeval state or
the result of cultivation. In any case, its charac-
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ter, distribution, and seasonal variation have im-
portant bearings on cross-country movements,
deployment, concealment, and visibility. Local
supplies of food, forage, and timber are also re-
lated to the nature of existing vegetation. Exten-
sive areas of dense vegetation, such as woods and
jungles, or the relative absence of vegetation, as
in the desert areas, may be a major consideration
in strategic and logistics planning. They may
result in a need for special types of organization,
equipment, and methods of supply. When these
areas are not too extensive, they are considered
primarily from the tactical point of view. How
different were the wars of the Burma jungle with
small units filing through the brush and the great
armored sweeps of the Afrika Korps and the
opposing "Desert Rats" between El Alamein and
Bizerte
Hydrography
Hydrography, and especially its subdivision,
oceanography, is of particular naval concern when
detailed information is required. Amphibious
operations are especially affected by hydrographic
considerations. Hydrography, of course, refers
to the measurement and charting of all bodies of
water; oceanography is concerned more specifi-
cally with phenomena of the oceans and seas, in-
cluding gulfs, bays, and estuaries. Naval con-
cern includes tides and currents, sea and swell, sea
water characteristics of salinity and temperature,
bottom topography, sediments, and marine life.
Knowledge of ocean currents, tides, sea, and swell
is important to all ships at sea, but particularly
to craft engaged in amphibious operations. The
significant and costly effect of a lack of such
knowledge is illustrated by the unhappy position
of landing craft stranded off Tarawa in the Pacific
during World War II when a change in the wind
varied the depth of water over offshore reefs and
the Marines had to wade ashore in the face of
withering enemy fire. The needs for detailed hy-
drographic data were again sharply demonstrated
prior to the Inchon landing in Korea in 1951,
when landing craft had to thread their way
through restricted waters to land in a harbor
where tides were all-important and the existence
of extensive mud flats directly affected the types
of landing equipment which could be used.
125
Studies of temperature, salinity, and density of
sea water are especially important to the use of
sonar in submarine and anti-submarine warfare.
Again, in the broader sphere, warm and cold cur-
rents strongly affect the habitability of many re-
gions of the world. The Gulf Stream makes
northwestern Europe important in one sense,
while the Labrador current has quite different ef-
fects across the Atlantic.
The configuration of the ocean bottom, depth
of water, type and distribution of bottom sedi-
ments are important elements in navigation in-
structions and in the location of anchorages.
These conditions together with information on
reefs, shoals, and other obstructions, help to deter-
mine the location of naval bases, and the planning
of naval and amphibious operations. Someday
when the means are found to exploit the seas for
more than fisheries and offshore oil wells, control
of marine resources may become a compelling stra-
tegic issue.
Even marine biology is of naval concern in a
variety of ways. Whales or other sea creatures
may be mistaken for submarines. Some forms of
marine life create enough noise to obscure more
significant sounds on the sensitive hydrophones
used in submarine and antisubmarine warfare. In
a number of parts of the world a ship or snorkel-
ing submarine may leave a tell-tale fiery wake be-
cause of the bioluminescence from the plankton
growing in the water. All military personnel,
whether sailing or flying over the seas, or wading
ashore in a landing, need some knowledge of the
habitat and habits of poisonous or savage marine
life. This applies to TJDT's who work in the
water and to those involuntarily brought into the
water due to aircraft failure or ship sinking.
There are stinging jellyfish and some nonedible
fish that may poison the unwary, as well as the
well-publicised sharks that infest many regions.
Aerology
Aerology or meteorology refers to the study of
the atmosphere, especially its variations of heat
and moisture, its winds, and so forth. Weather
refers to the meteorological conditions such as
wind, temperature, rain, snow, and cloud, that
affect an area at a given time or for a short period
of time. Climate, on the other hand, refers to the
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average and range of meteorological conditions
affecting an area over a long period of time. In
a sense climate is strategic in nature since it af-
fects the basic planning of military operations
and of course affects the economic and social life
of an area through the crops that can be raised
and the density of the population. Operations of
a military nature frequently must be planned in
the light of known seasonal changes of weather
based on climate studies. It is impossible to read
military history without an awareness of the im-
portance of weather to operations planning. The
Japanese carriers that hit Pearl Harbor came in
behind a cold front with heavy clouds and rain
that shielded their approach. General Eisen-
hower's Crusade in Europe makes constant ref-
erence to aerology and hydrography :
There was unusual operational hazard con-
nected with the Casablanca project. During
the late fall and winter the northwest African
coast is a forbidding one from the standpoint
of small boat landings. The long Atlantic
swells break up on the beaches in terrifying
fashion and even in relatively good autumn
weather this condition exists, on the average,
four days out of five. . . .
After the abandonment of the May target
date, the next combination of moon, tide, and
time of sunrise that we considered practicable
for the attack (on Normandie) occurred
June 5, 6, and 7. We wanted to cross the
channel with our convoys at night so that
darkness would conceal the strength and di-
rection of our several attacks. We wanted a
moon for our airborne assaults. We needed
approximately forty minutes of daylight pre-
ceding the ground assault to complete our
bombing and preparatory bombardment. We
had to attack on a relatively low tide because
of beach obstacles which had to be removed
while uncovered. These principal factors
dictated the general period; but the selection
of the actual day would depend upon weather
forecasts.
If none of the three days should prove sat-
isfactory from the standpoint of weather, con-
sequences would ensue that were almost terri-
fying to contemplate . . .
When the commanders assembled on the
morning of June 4 the report we received was
discouraging. Low clouds, high winds, and
formidable wave action were predicted to
make landing a most hazardous affair. The
meteorologists said that air support would
be impossible, naval gunfire would be ineffi-
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NAVAL OFFICERS
cient, and even the handling of small boats
would be rendered difficult . . .
When the conference started the first re-
ort given us by group Captain Staff and the
Meteorological Staff was that the bad condi-
tions predicted the day before for the coast
of France were actually prevailing then and
that if we had persisted in the attempt to
land on June 5 a major disaster would almost
certainly have resulted.
Aerology as a science is becoming much more
complex because of the heavier demands upon it.
Although a physical science, it has so many var-
iables that predictions on weather have some of
the indeterminate character of the social sciences.
We no longer are interested in the "weather" alone.
We need to know what conditions are at many
different altitudes. Close to the ground much
more detail is needed in order to prepare defenses
against use of toxic warfare. Aloft flying
weather, headwinds, and tailwinds are quite dif-
ferent at various altitudes and such reports are
routinely required for all flying operations. Now
research into weather is extending into the upper
atmosphere never before explored, in order to pre-
pare the way for turbojet and rocket flight of
aircraft and missiles.
Collection of weather data in war is so impor-
tant that very considerable efforts are made to
obtain it. German weather stations were set up
in Greenland to give advance warning of condi-
tions in the Atlantic and Europe, since weather
moves generally eastward. To support our own
carrier operations in the Pacific we had to estab-
lish stations in Siberia and also in China. Naval
Group, China, operated literally hundreds of se-
cret weather stations deep behind the Japanese
lines to report the weather that later would gov-
ern our carrier strikes in the Pacific. Today we
would face some difficulties in weather data col-
lection from the vast Soviet territories if war were
to come. One solution made public is a robot
weather station that can be dropped from an air-
craft. On parachuting down, it would automati-
cally rise on extensible legs, push out an antenna,
and broadcast coded radio signals on the weather
in the same way as telemetering missiles.
Weather reporting is now so technical that
trained meteorologists must make detailed fore-
casts. But the intelligence officer, being responsi-
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ble for reporting on the area of operations, must
have some familiarity with the subject. He must
at least be able to read weather maps, station
models, sequence reports, and to interpret their
meaning.
Urban Geography
A subdivision of military geography is con-
cerned with cities and other cultural factors. The
applications of this information are numerous.
Strategic targets of factories, transport, and hous-
ing need study. Tactics frequently involve seiz-
ure of a town, and require detailed information
on construction of buildings, possible strong-
points, main thoroughfares, power, water, and
communications facilities. Later there may be
questions of billeting space in what is left. Cer-
tainly vulnerabilq. to fire, high xplosive, or
atomic attack 9kiley consideration
Descriptive Analysis of Military Regions
In practically all nations except the very small-
est, sufficient variation in geographical character
exists to make it impractical to confine a study
to the geography of a nation as a whole. Conse-
quently, studies are often broken down into re-
gions having geographical characteristics which
would exert a definite influence on military oper-
ations. By definition, a military region is a re-
gion of any size in which the combination of
geographic conditions is relatively uniform, and,
as a result, permits the use of the same types of
equipment, organization, and mode of operations
throughout the region. These may be areas where
mountains, plains, river systems, deserts, indus-
trialized areas, or other factors are predominant
and thereby establish the nature of the region.
Local minor variations in geographical conditions
are treated as subregions. In preparing the de-
scriptive analysis of a military region, the area
is first considered from the over-all viewpoint and
then is broken down into appropriate subregions
for detailed consideration. This type of encyclo-
pedic information used for general military plan-
ning usually needs additional detailed analysis
and current reporting to meet tactical needs.
Preparing Geographic Intelligence
The importance of peacetime efforts in acquir-
ing the data needed for strategic studies has been
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emphasized, and this is certainly true of geo-
graphic intelligence. Compilation of good charts
and maps, painstaking analysis of soil surveys and
other data from a variety of sources, and the
matching of aerial photographs with existing
charts is time consuming work that should go on
continuously. Inevitably in war there are new
demands and many of these processes must be
speeded up. As potential areas of operations be-
come actual areas, the emphasis shifts from stra-
tegic to operational intelligence.
The strategic area studies and surveys prepared
by United States Armed Forces in World War II
merit special mention here. In ONI, in the Naval
Districts and River Commands, and at intelligence
centers and joint intelligence collection agencies
in operational areas, whole sections of specialists
devoted their entire time to the evaluation, com-
pilation, and distribution of reports. Often, like
the Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Studies
(JANIS) , these reports were the result of joint
effort.
The surveys drew upon many divergent sources
for their material. They contained data collected
by aerial photographs over enemy territory, often
supplemented by information gained from inter-
viewing engineers who had built or managed the
installations photographed. Beach gradients
were calculated from photographs taken from
warplanes and even from snapshots taken by tour-
ists and missionaries; these pictures were supple-
mented by the notes of American geologists, nat-
uralists, and conchologists who had worked in the
area, and by the reports of friendly natives or
guerrillas.
New Horizons of Geographic Intelligence
The horizons of geographic intelligence have
been pushed farther in several directions as a re-
sult of technological progress and political change.
This of course, as is amply demonstrated else-
where in this book, applies to all intelligence.
These geographic changes are easily illustrated by
reference both to the World Wars and to more re-
cent events. World War I was largely fought in
traditionally strategic areas, but included opera-
tions in places as remote as the Falkland Islands,
Tanganyika, the Hejaz, and Cocos Islands. Much
more striking were the changes of World War II
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that took hundreds of thousands of Americans to
such unlikely spots as Ulithi Atoll, that make
commonplace in American thought the Hump,
Kasserine Pass, Eniwetok, and Coral Sea. Cur-
rently we have become vitally concerned with new
names: Abadan's refineries, Shinkolobwe's pitch-
blende, and the oil of Leduc. The turn of events
has given America and consequently her Armed
Forces heavier responsibilities than ever before.
The new technology demands much greater geo-
graphical detail and accuracy. The long range
guided missile, when it acquires range, command,
speed, destructive power and accuracy, must still
find the right targets. Since existing charts and
maps have errors of many miles in some parts of
the world, finding the target becomes a major
problem, and constitutes a challenge to the geo-
graphic intelligence of the future.
Polar Intelligence
One of the expanded horizons of geographic in-
telligence is in the north polar regions. The old
Mercator view of the world of sailing ships has
been amplified by polar projections and the realis-
tic views of Richard Edes Harrison, well-known
cartographer. The fact that the United States
and Canada are really polar neighbors of the So-
viet Union is a familiar theme both of the Sunday
supplements and military strategic estimates. The
implementing of plans to meet this new challenge
of the air age is a greater task than the mere recog-
nition of new problems. An immediate require-
ment since World War II has been to collect new
geographic intelligence and operational experi-
ence on cold weather operations to overcome the
admitted Soviet lead in this field. Such opera-
tions as Muskox, Frostbite, Icebox, Frigid, and
Williwaw in the Arctic, and Higkjump in the
Antarctic, have been directed to that end, as have
also the daily weather flights from Ladd Field to
the North Pole. Our general strategy has been
revised to strengthen Alaska, string radar barriers
and weather stations in belts across Canada, and
to rebuild base facilities in Greenland and Iceland.
We have mapped the Arctic, learned to sail in the
northern seas, to cross tundra and ice, and devel-
oped clothing, fuels, lubricants, housing, and elec-
tronic gear suitable to the extreme temperatures
and raging storms that are common to the north.
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We have also found out with guidance from vet-
eran Arctic explorers that operations in extreme
latitudes are entirely possible with proper prepa-
ration. Though the likelihood of large land cam-
paigns in the polar area is not great, the extension
of aircraft range and the advent of guided missiles
make it imperative that intelligence officers have
an awareness of the new problems of Arctic war-
fare and their influence on strategy and tactics.
The Arctic cannot be defined by merely drawing
the Arctic circle around the globe at latitude
66?30'. A more descriptive line is the northern
limit of trees, above which there is only tundra
or ice. Below this the subarctic begins, and in-
cludes the northern limit of cereals, the continental
taiga of all but southern Canada, much of northern
Russia, and certainly the eastern half of Siberia.
The low latitude Tibetan plateau is Arctic-type
tundra, and winter operations even in the conti-
nental forest areas such as the Great Lakes, St.
Lawrence Valley, Hokkaido, the Baltic, and Cen-
tral Russia, involve "Arctic" problems for mili-
tary purposes.
The topography of the Arctic varies from the
broad plains in Russia, parts of Siberia, and
around Hudson Bay to the high plateaus of Green-
land and Tibet, and towering mountain ranges.
often poorly mapped, in the Yukon, Alaska,
northeastern Siberia, Kamchatka, the Himalayas,
Pamirs, Altai, and Hindu Kush. The Antarctic,
largely ice covered like Greenland, includes high
plateaus and towering mountain ranges in some
areas.
Drainage is a major geographical factor in the
Arctic. Many of the greatest rivers of the world,
such as the Mackenzie, Yukon, Ob, Yenesei, and
Lena, are not only Arctic but flow in a generally
northerly direction. Many major rivers of China,
Southeast Asia, and India-Pakistan have their
sources in Tibet. Overland travel in the Arctic
is generally easier in winter than in summer, for
tractor trains can travel on the frozen rivers.
With the coming of summer the river mouths to
the north are still frozen while the southerly
reaches thaw and overrun the banks to form vast
lakes in the valleys. Canoes with portage from
one body of water to the next are a principal
means of transport. The frozen surface of winter
turns into an impassable bog for tracked vehicles
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in the summer because the frozen subsoil prevents
adequate drainage. Roads or railways built across
such terrain need new ballast season after season
and even so trains frequently are derailed. The
epic struggle of the Canadian Government in
building the Hudson Bay Railway to Port
Churchill is an example of transport difficulties.
Coasts and landing beaches in the Arctic vary
from those which are eminently suitable in all re-
spects for amphibious landings to those which are
impossible because of forbidding overhanging
cliffs. Most are open and exposed, although
Greenland, Iceland, and Norway have deep fjords.
By our definition the true Arctic areas are de-
void of forest cover. Some are glacial like the
interior of Greenland, northern Baffinland, North-
ern Novaya Zemlya, Ellesmere Land, and Ant-
arctica; more are tundra that offers no real cover,
but in the summer may include edible berries and
a profusion of wild flowers. The subarctic's
forests are scrub growth and often extremely diffi-
cult of passage either for vehicles or men on foot.
The hydrographic conditions of the Arctic are
of special naval concern. In contrast to the con-
tinental land mass at the South Pole surrounded
by shelf ice and stormy seas, the Arctic is a shal-
low sea basin surrounded by land with entrances
at Bering Straits, through the northern Canadian
archipelago or from the Atlantic approaches near
Greenland, Spitzbergen, and Novaya Zemlya.
The great ice pack is virtually impassable to ships.
Those caught in it, if they escape destruction, over
a period of many months may move hundreds
of miles with the clockwise drift of the ice and
emerge at another point. Due to the pressures of
current and wind the ice piles in ridges and irregu-
lar masses. A few parts of the pack are flat and
thick and the possibility of using them as floating
air bases has been exploited by both the Russians
and ourselves. Winter shore ice builds out from
bays in virtually all of the Arctic Ocean to meet
the permanent ice pack and also closes much of
Bering Sea, the Sea of Okhotsk, Hudson Bay, the
Baltic and even parts of the Caspian and Sea of
Azov. Icebergs from Greenland's fjords move far
south and constitute a hazard in the North At-
lantic shipping lanes. The classic example was
the Titanic disaster.
In the short summer season cracks open in the
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129
ice pack near shore, and ships may be able to
make their way through the northwest passage
around North America and the northeast passage
around Eurasia. Usually, such ships are specially
strengthened, are of shallow draft to allow them
to use the primitive ports, and are preceded by
powerful icebreakers to clear the way. Aerial
reconnaissance minimizes the chances of being
caught and crushed, but a change in the wind may
often bring that threat. Amphibious landings
can be quite difficult if ice close to shore will not
support heavy equipment, or if storms have blown
up a great barrier of tumbled ice on the beach.
A sudden storm may trap both big ships and
landing craft by driving the ice pack toward shore
and thus removing the frequently limited open
water.
The life forms found in the Arctic are of special
interest to men awaiting rescue. In the extreme
north there may be polar bears, walrus, and seals,
but the interior of Antarctica offers little. Es-
kimos manage to live in good health on meat and
blubber, and so can military personnel if it is
necessary. Farther south there are many small
animals, fish, and in summer birds that can be
trapped or shot by the trained men.
It is the weather of course, that offers the great-
est challenge to military operations and survival.
The temperature range is from over 90? F. in the
summer in the Yukon Valley to a winter ? 90? F.
in northeastern Siberia. In the subarctic, summer
is a time of torment because of flies and mosquitoes.
Snow and fog may cut visibility for many days
or weeks on end, affording cover but also limiting
travel or navigation. The aurora borealis (or
australis at the south pole) restricts radio recep-
tion. Compasses are unreliable and it is to be
remembered that the magnetic poles neither coin-
cide with the geographic nor are they entirely
fixed. Daylight and darkness conditions, reach-
ing the extreme of 6 months of day and 6 of dark
have important implications both for observation
and for morale. In winter cold, all human move-
ments are slowed by the protective clothing worn.
Logistics needs are increased by the kind of hous-
ing required and the greater quantities of fuel and
food consumed.
Urban geography of the Arctic is largely Soviet,
for the only cities of importance in the area are
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Russian and Siberian. They have tried to develop
mining, lumbering, and commerce along the north-
east passage as well as building military bases.
Aside from some Alaskan and Canadian mining
and trapping, and the new military bases, perhaps
the most important economic development in the
free world Arctic has been the uranium discoveries
near Great Bear Lake. In the approaches of the
Antarctic it is the international rivalries of the
whaling industry that are of particular interest.
In summary, the great circle routes across the
Arctic represent the most direct flight lines for
strategic bombers and guided missiles to reach the
key populated and industrial regions on earth.
The Arctic then is of great concern for aviators
who must navigate across it and who may be forced
down in it. It is of further concern as an area for
detection and interception of such air strikes. It
is also an area rich in mineral resources awaiting
exploitation. Finally, it requires continued study
as a route of travel and invasion by military forces.
Its problems are being solved with growing skill,
ingenuity, and confidence. The requirements of
its climate have produced new developments in
housing and weapons.
TRANSPORTATION AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS
INTELLIGENCE
A second major component of intelligence
knowledge is that of transportation and telecom-
munications. Information about these facilities
in all parts of the world is needed for planning
both our strategy at the highest echelons and tac-
tics at lower command levels. All forms of such
intelligence are used on occasion by the Navy, even
though other agencies collect and process much of
the information.
Ports and Harbors
Port and harbor intelligence includes every con-
ceivable type of information on these facilities.
Harbors refer to natural locations that may be used
as anchorages by ships or as protection and setting
for man-made port facilities. Harbors may be
bays, rivers, or combinations of both. When a
port completely lacks protection and shoreside
berthing facilities, it is called a roadstead. Some
ports have been created by means of artificial har-
bors. In the broad sense, a port includes not only
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the piers and wharves used by shipping, but also
all the transfer, storage, and land transportation
facilities used in connection with shipping. In
fact a port area includes frequently a considerable
tributary area with manufacturing, fuel and water
facilities, banking and customs houses; that is, the
whole range of the appurtenances of modern
commerce.
Sources of information on ports are numerous.
Naval observers, as described in chapter 9, can col-
lect some port information. Commercial steam-
ship companies collect much information, too, for
their own operations. Individual masters and
sometimes crew members make reports to their
governments as needed to supplement collection.
There are various chamber of commerce and port
commission studies available for the asking, as well
as tourist guides, foreign government maps, com-
mercial photographs, and data from business
houses supplying foreign orders. All are useful
sources of information.
Port data are so complex and detailed that most
naval powers prepare specific port studies on in-
dividual foreign ports. This is a Navy responsi-
bility in our country, but the Navy is not the sole
user. The Army needs such data for establishing
ports of embarkation. The Navy needs to know
what servicing facilities would be available to the
fleet. Some foreign ports are studied for their
military or commercial importance and vulnerabil-
ity to attack. During wartime the individual uses
of ports may give many clues to the enemy's
activities.
Shipping
Ocean shipping is the principal means for the
bulk movement of freight internationally. It is
characterized by the large tonnage carried by in-
dividual ships at very low ton-mile costs, fre-
quently over very great distances. The routes
most vital to this commerce of the world are: (1)
the North Atlantic from Canada and the United
States to the English Channel, North Sea or Medi-
terranean areas; (2) the Suez route through the
Mediterranean to India, Australia or the Far
East; (3) the South Atlantic route from Europe
and North America to Argentina; (4) the South
Africa run from Europe or North America to
South and East Africa with extensions to Aus-
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tralia and Indian Ocean points; (5) the trans-
pacific routes from North America to Asia; (6)
the Panama routes linking many continents and
several coasts.
A handful of countries build most ships and
these same countries are the principal operators of
substantial numbers of ships. The United States,
Britain, and Norway are the three big operators,
though in time Japan and Germany may regain
their former positions.
The Navy is concerned not only with the areas
where ships operate and with the total carrying
capacity of various merchant fleets, but also with
the building capacity of various shipyards and the
repair facilities. Because of its operational and
strategic needs, it must also know the speed, age,
tonnage, dimensions, appearance, fuel, draft,
ownership, location, and use of every individual
merchant ship in the world.
Collection of most shipping information is
largely a matter of organization and thoroughness,
and most of it can be derived from regular com-
mercial information services. Lloyd's Register
provides ship particulars and Lloyd's List gives
vessel movements. A series of trade journals in
Britain, the United States, France, Japan, and
other countries report building, give vessel plans
and pictures, discuss trends in chartering, marine
insurance, rates, conference agreements, and so
forth. It is only the Iron Curtain countries which
hide or disguise their shipping information thus
requiring other nations to take special measures
in order to develop comprehensive worldwide re-
ports on merchant vessels.
Shipping intelligence has many forms. It may
be absorbed into other intelligence as a part of a
larger subject. Summary statistics of all sorts are
prepared, and card indexes of vessel activity and
large wall plots showing estimated location of all
vessels are used for operational purposes.
The uses of shipping intelligence are many.
Any blockade operations require detailed ship
movement information together with manifest
data. Protection of shipping against submarines
and aircraft requires location data. When an H-
bomb hidden in a nondescript neutral freighter
becomes a possibility, shipping intelligence needs
will be further increased.
Railways
Since railways represent the principal arteries
of land transport and have the greatest tonnage
capacity for movement overland from place to
place, they are of considerable military interest.
The Transportation Corps of the Army is chiefly
responsible for collection and processing of land
transportation data. Essential informational
needs include detailed maps of the lines, descrip-
tions of bridges and tunnels, a working timetable,
a gradient profile chart, and lists of motive power
and rolling stock. Even though a railway may
seem relatively static, its capacity is affected by
many factors: the maintenance and improvement
of the right of way (including ballast, ties, rails),
the addition of automatic block signals or train
control, the realinement of track to ease ruling
grades and reduce curvature, the strengthening of
bridges, the switch to new motive power such as
dieselization or electrification, and the traffic load
with its seasonal and directional differences.
Data may come from newspaper stories, the
order books of equipment manufacturers, trade
statistics, and trade journals such as the Railway
Gazette published in London, which is the best for
world coverage. Information from behind the
Iron Curtain is harder to obtain, but there are
publicly announced 5-year plans, radio broadcasts
of new construction and attainment of traffic goals,
and the reports of refugees.
The use to which such information is put varies.
It may contribute to a strategic estimate involving
a country's capability to meet overall war require-
ments or provide specific data concerning the coun-
try's ability to move forces to a particular front.
The Navy is interested in many details on rail-
ways, arising out of such matters as the movement
of landing craft or submarine subassemblies over
particular lines that may or may not have limited
clearances. Preliminary to an amphibious land-
ing the Navy may have air support missions which
will include selecting railway targets such as tun-
nels, bridges, and yards. For both amphibious
and land operations, similar targets are sometimes
involved in connection with naval gunfire support.
The success of naval ships in providing gunfire
support to land operations during the Korean War
illustrates naval use of intelligence regarding both
railway systems and roads.
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Roads
Roads generally serve as feeders to railway
lines, although in a few parts of the world they
constitute an independent, fairly usable network.
They have the military advantages of reaching
more places than railways and being more flexible
in alternate routes. If trees block a road, vehicles
occasionally can drive through fields around the
obstacle. Most military transport organic to land
units is intended for road use. In most foreign
countries roads are typically poor by American
standards, having a low tonnage capacity and a
rapid deterioration rate. Maintenance thus be-
comes a problem when they are used for heavy
military traffic.
Road maps are available in most foreign coun-
tries, but they are frequently inaccurate, and their
condition is subject to change with the seasons.
Road reports should not only describe the seasonal
condition of roads, bridges, and shoulders, but
should also note the availability of surfacing mate-
rials, local labor, and repair machinery. Bridges,
steep grades, and narrow single lanes are typical
limiting factors to the usefulness of a road.
Pipelines
The bulk movement of petroleum, gas, and water
is increasingly being accomplished by pipeline.
Modern technology permits the dispatching of
several different products in succession through a
line with metering, sampling, and water plugs to
keep each one separate. A recent development is
the use of radioactive isotopes to identify particu-
lar shipments by Geiger counter.
Pipelines represent a mass means of delivery
relatively free from interference by weather.
Underground lines are reasonably safe from at-
tack, but the pumping stations, storage tank farms,
and other surface installations remain vulnerable
points.
Pipelines may have more than economic signifi-
cance. Some United States lines, for example,
represented a countermove against German sub-
marine attacks. Others in Burma, France, and
Alaska provided direct tactical support. Aerial
reconnaissance will usually reveal the construction
of new lines, but lacking that opportunity, infor-
mation on the manufacture and delivery of the
necessary pipes and pumps will give many clues.
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132
Inland Waterways
Inland waterways in many foreign countries are
a major element in the transportation system.
Their usefulness depends upon their general loca-
tion and direction of flow. The current, control-
ling depth, turns, constancy of channel, subjec-
tivity to freezing, bridge clearances, and cargo
transfer facilities are important details. Reports
on foreign waterways are processed primarily by
the Army Transportation Corps, and the sources
of information are official documents of foreign
governments and direct observation. From them
are obtained answers to logistics questions. Aerial
mining of waterways, and destruction of locks or
dams by bombing can be made possible through
adequate intelligence.
Aviation
Civil aviation rightly comes under the general
cognizance of air intelligence. Although avia-
tion competes with railways only in countries
where railways are lacking, it is important to know
the role it plays in the rapid movement of critical
freight and personnel. Today, airlines under
many flags not only blanket their home countries,
but extend internationally into far reaches of the
earth. Thus they also provide a unique instrument
for observation and collection of information.
Our own widespread aviation interests are in a
position to report on foreign aviation progress
everywhere this side of the Iron Curtain. Trade
journals in many languages are likewise extremely
helpful. We are interested in new transport air-
craft performance and production, the frequency,
reliability, and control of air lines, the provision
of navigation aids and. airfields, and the training
of personnel. In time of war or other emergencies,
commercial aircraft and aviation facilities play
important auxiliary roles. The degree of subsi-
dization of aviation may give clues to intended
use. Deutsche Lufthansa went so far as to con-
vert "commercial" Ju-52's into bombers and para-
troop transports when war came. Italy's commer-
cial air service to Rio de Janeiro reported ship
movements off Brazil to German raiders in the
early days of the war.
Considerable aviation intelligence is assembled
in convenient form by such unofficial yearbooks as
Jane's All The World's Aircraft. The Navy's
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own large interests in aviation make all such in-
telligence of considerable interest.
Telecommunications
Telecommunications include telegraph, tele-
phone, radio, television, cable, and all related serv-
ices and equipment. Each type of signal has its
own advantages and disadvantages of cost, avail-
ability, secrecy, range, number of channels, and
so forth. While the National Security Agency
is the agency with direct cognizance over intelli-
gence in this field, earlier references to the collec-
tion of intelligence from communication sources
indicate the importance of such information to all
branches of the military service.
The interruption of communications in any mod-
ern state, especially a highly centralized one, can
bring its national life to a standstill. Such sys-
tems thus become prime targets in war. Further,
an understanding of the various channels of sig-
nal traffic is basic to maintaining the security of
classified information. Therefore, knowledge of
a nation's telecommunications is helpful for a
variety of purposes.
Information on world systems comes from such
sources as trade journals, records of purchases of
new equipment from leading manufacturers, and,
of course, observation and the piecing together of
many bits of information.
SOCIOLOGICAL INTELLIGENCE
Sociology is the study of man and his human
environment. It deals with all the phenomena
arising out of the group relations of human beings.
There is still some disagreement whether sociology
has reached a stage of development which would
entitle it to rank as a science, but it is uniformly
recognized that the methods used in sociological
research and the conclusions reached may be
strictly scientific when based on extensive observa-
tion and careful analysis.
In the introduction to this chapter it was stated
that no one of the eight components of strategic
intelligence can be considered alone; they are all
interdependent and closely interwoven. This is
particularly true of the sociological component
which is closely allied to the geographical, politi-
cal, and economic, and which strongly affects
armed forces, particularly with relation to man-
1,33
power. The cultural traditions of a people and
their intellectual achievements based on a sound
educational program, have tremendous effect on
their scientific capabilities. Sociological assess-
ment of a nation also embraces anthropological
and psychological factors.
The aspects of sociological intelligence which
are important to military planners are those which
determine the military potential of a nation, but
the analyst will soon find that his task is in no way
restricted. True interpretation must weigh all
facets of sociological significance, and it is im-
possible to ignore any of them.
The importance of sociological intelligence has
never been more clearly evident to Americans than
in recent years, for the understanding of foreign
peoples has become essential to the successful ad-
ministration of American aid programs all over
the world, both civil and military. Throughout
their service careers naval personnel visit many
foreign ports, and those on special naval missions,
stationed at bases abroad, and on attache duty are
intimately associated in their daily life, profes-
sionally and socially, with people whose culture,
customs, and traditions are different from their
own. An appreciation of the forces and factors
which govern the behavior of foreign peoples is
therefore a prime objective of sociological intelli-
gence. All naval officers, and particularly those in
intelligence activities, can with profit be avid stu-
dents of sociology as it applies to the assessment of
the capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable
courses of action of a foreign country.
The sociological component comprises the fol-
lowing major considerations: Population; charac-
teristics of the people; religion, education, and
public information; morale and public opinion;
health and public welfare. A brief examination
will be made of the significance of these elements
in sociological intelligence.
Population
Intelligence on the population of a country is
much more than a mere numerical count. To be
valuable it must provide data on density and
geographical distribution; classification by age
groups and sex; growth or decline; immigration
and emigration; future trends and government
policies which affect population problems. Sta-
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tistics are given meaning through interpretation
by averages and percentages, and by comparison
with familiar standards. Populations in many
countries of the world since World War II show
marked departure from the patterns of past dec-
ades, and it has become increasingly important to
obtain up-to-date information before coming to
any conclusions.
Lt. Col. Robert C. White makes some pertinent
observations on population change in an article
entitled "Sociological Factors in Strategic Intel-
ligence" published in the Military Review, No-
vember 1949:
From an intelligence standpoint, it is the
increase, stability, or decline in the size of a
population upon which we first focus our in-
terest. The future size of the population of a
foreign nation may be of more importance
to us than its present size. Knowledge of
future size will help us keep our estimate of
a foreign power's war potential correct.
Consider what has been happening to the
world's population in the past 150 years. We
are living in a period of unparalleled (but
uneven) growth in the world's population.
Since 1800, the population of the world as
a whole has more than doubled. This rapid,
almost explosive, growth first started in
Europe, where the population since 1800 has
trebled. The number of Chinese and Jap-
anese has increased greatly, also, but their
increase did not commence until well after the
middle of the nineteenth century. In other
regions, the timing of rapid population
growth has varied.
The clue to rapid population growth is to
be found in the changing relationship be-
tween birth rates and death rates. Before
the Industrial Revolution, high birth rates al-
most negated high death rates, and there was
little natural growth in population. The ef-
fects of the Industrial Revolution?in raising
standards of living, sanitation, and health,
and therefore in reducing infant mortality
and in increasing life expectancy?were felt
first in Western Europe, the United States,
and Canada. Therefore, the populations of
these areas increased rapidly during the nine-
teenth century. However, in more recent
decades, because of cultural changes, such as
the decline of the large family ideal, for ex-
ample, there has been a drop in the birth rate.
Thus, the margin between birth and death
rates has been narrowing. The tendencies in
these areas, therefore, is for population to
level off, even to decline. With the extension
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134
NAVAL OFFICERS
of modern industrialization, sanitation, and.
medical care to other parts of the world, this
same pattern of changing death and birth rate
has appeared. Thus, China, India, the Soviet
Union, and other areas more recently affected
by industrialization are now in the stage of
population growth that was characteristic of
Western Europe several generations ago. It
is likely that they, too, will in time pass into
the stage of stable or even declining popu-
lation.
The intelligence analyst is also concerned with
a nation's labor force and available military man-
power. He must know the age-sex distribution of
the population, the number of males and females
of a given age or within a certain age group. The
labor force is found between the ages of 15 and
65, while military manpower can be derived from
the number of males between the ages of 15 and
45, with particular emphasis on the 18 to 35 group.
There can be considerable margin of error in these
statistics if account is not taken of those who may
be disqualified for either labor or military service
by reason of physical disability.
The geographical distribution and density of
population are further vital considerations in so-
ciological intelligence. The density of population
per square mile of arable land has much more in-
telligence significance than the density per square
mile of total land. The concentration of popula-
tion in certain areas of a country is likewise valu-
able knowledge. Since, for example, a sixth of
the population of Argentina is located in Buenos
Aires, destruction of her capital city would be a
crippling blow to that country.
Population analysis (demography) requires ex-
pert understanding of statistical terms and the
methods employed in the compilation of data.
Progressive countries of the world have govern-
ment sponsored census bureaus and keep popula-
tion registers, but less than a third of the world's
population has ever been officially counted or reg-
istered. Some peoples of the world are just not
age conscious. An American or European child
when questioned will readily report his age to
the fine degree of 61/4 or 13 years 5 months. In
the villages of the Orient the same question will
be greeted with either a blank stare or a smiling:
"I don't know."
Experiences of World War II in the enlistment
of women both in the Armed Forces and on the
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home front have placed new emphasis upon their
contribution to the usable portion or manpower
factor of a nation's total population. This brings
us to a consideration of the entire situation with
respect to labor in the country: wages, working
conditions, organization, legislation, and control.
The government policies on population control
often are responsible in many countries for con-
siderable shifts in population. The development
of new industries or the exploitation of newly
discovered resources can also cause internal move-
ments of large numbers of people, and will require
reassessment of population distribution.
Characteristics of the People
In studying a nation's people, the intelligence
officer must identify and evaluate those racial,
ethnic, and cultural characteristics which are
sources of national strength or weakness. He must
determine the sociological forces which cause dis-
sension among them, resentment against the gov-
ernment, or susceptibility to psychological in-
fluence from abroad. The latter will be discussed
fully in the section of this text entitled Psycho-
logical Operations.
Race and nationality are not synonymous terms.
There is no German race or French race or Chinese
race. The anthropological classification of race
is in three main divisions: Caucasian, Mongolian,
and Negro. These are further divided into sub-
races characterized by such physical characteristics
as shape of skull, color of hair or complexion, stat-
ure, facial structure, and physical vigor. Few
nations of the world have a population of only one
race. Most are a mixture; for example, the white
population of the United States and European
nations comprises a mixture of three of the Cau-
casian subraces, and there are many Mongolian
subraces in the Chinese nation. If a country's
population is composed of more than one main
race, there is always a possibility of internal strife
and racial discrimination. Hitler, for example,
effectively used the idea of an "Aryan" super-race
to develop a feeling of racial superiority among
the Germans. The tragic consequences of this
doctrine are a blot on the history of Europe.
Ethnic groups, another important consideration
in sociological intelligence, are people bound to-
gether by ties and traits of both race and
nationality. In the United States, for example,
there are large communities in various sections of
the country composed of such ethnic groups as
Czechs, Poles, Irish, Swedes, and Finns. Ethnic
groups often maintain, at least for two or three
generations even in America, the customs, tradi-
tions, religion, and language of their forefathers,
and assimilation into the nation to which they have
migrated is completed only after several centuries.
The countries of Europe provide similar examples:
the Germans of Alsace-Lorraine, the Swedish eth-
nic group in Finland, and the Serbs of the old
Austro-Hungarian Empire. In Asia the Parsees
of India are a striking example of how a people,
originally Persian, have become a force in the com-
mercial and industrial development of the country
of their chosen residence.
The presence of such groups in a nation may
weaken national solidarity, or make a nation vul-
nerable to psychological warfare. It may also re-
sult in violent hatred and prejudice. During
World War I, for example, German-Americans in
many communities were the innocent victims of
slander and even mob violence.
The cultural characteristics of a people are those
derived from language, social structure, social
values and patterns of living, artistic and intel-
lectual expression. Differences in thinking and
acting occur to the extent to which such forces
control or influence collective behavior. The
presence in appreciable numbers of aristocrat and
peasant, clergy of strongly opposed religious sects,
intellectuals, artists, and illiterates in a nation's
population are significant subjects for sociological
intelligence. Careful examination of these ele-
ments yields greater understanding of a people's
history, customs, and traditions and is essential to
evaluation of public opinion, attitudes toward
foreigners, and national morale.
Religion
Religion has always been a potent force in the
history of the world, and religious differences have
caused much war and strife. "There is no God
but Allah, and Mohammed is his prophet" became
the war-cry of Moslem hosts, the bloody Thirty
Years War between Catholic and Protestant arm-
ies in 17th century Europe, and in our own time
the Moslem-Jewish struggle for the control of
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Palestine, as well as the Moslem-Hindu riots in
India and the formation of Pakistan attest to the
influence religion has upon the actions of men.
In many countries the constitution establishes a
state religion, and religious sects are powerful
political parties.
The intelligence researcher often finds the an-
swer to problems of national attitudes by analyz-
ing the tenets of the religion of dominant or
minority groups. Religion can determine the
moral fiber of a nation or it can produce social
handicaps which become strategic vulnerabilities.
Often a well organized church or religious group
supports numerous schools at all educational levels,
and makes a valuable contribution to the improve-
ment of social conditions and the rehabilitation of
social unfortunates.
Education
Education has always been a measure of prog-
ress. The strategic significance of education has
become even more pronounced in this modern age
of scientific and technical achievement. A na-
tion's technical capabilities will be governed by
the extent to which it can produce men and women
with technical skill, and the cultural level of its
people will be determined by the extent to which
a spirit of scientific inquiry and academic freedom
are fostered by its government and society.
Intelligence on education must be specific in
order to be usable: the number of schools at all
levels of education; the number enrolled and the
number graduated; the curricula and teaching
methods; the qualifications of faculties; the con-
trolling and accrediting agencies; and in the field
of higher education, the distribution of graduates
by subject of specialization. It is important to
know, for example, that a given country is produc-
ing engineers and physicists at an accelerated rate,
or that there is a shortage of trained teachers in
the secondary schools. Adult education by exten-
sion courses and evening trade schools must also
be evaluated.
The number of students engaged in graduate
study at institutions in other countries and the
use which is made of them upon their return may
be of great significance in a sociological estimate
of a nation. This is of special interest to America,
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136
since we have increasing numbers of foreign stu-
dents attending our colleges and universities. The
question is: What happens to them when they go
home? Will their experience influence the thought
of their fellow countrymen?
Public Information and Opinion
Intelligence interest here centers in the methods
of disseminating news and the influence upon na-
tional attitudes exercised by newspapers, maga-
zines, radio programs, and motion pictures. Are
the people left free to form their opinions on what
they see, hear, and read or are true facts withheld
through rigid government control of the press and
other avenues of public information? Do foreign
publications have a wide circulation and what is
the extent of any foreign propaganda in the
country?
The answers to all these and similar questions
are invaluable to the sociological analyst. Cer-
tainly in this field he must be constantly aware
of current trends and possess sufficient background
to assess them in the light of the people's history
and traditions.
Health
Information for intelligence on health condi-
tions in a foreign country is concerned not only
with the health of the indigenous population but
also with the effect of health and sanitation con-
ditions upon foreign troops which may operate
in the area. Environmental factors such as to-
pography and climate, nutrition and dietary hab-
its, plant and animal life, and the food supply
situation all pose problems for the military
analyst. Can an invading force live off the land?
Is there an abundance of potable water? Will
special installations be necessary for garbage and
waste disposal or are existing utilities adaptable?
Medical intelligence has an important role to
play in determining the prevalence of disease, par-
ticularly those to which an invading army would
be exposed. Will extensive malarial control be
necessary? Are there certain health regulations,
quarantine measures, or sanitary precautions to
consider? The country's medical resources must
be also evaluated in terms of the number of doc-
tors and nurses, the quantity of medical supplies,
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hospitals, and medical training, research, and
development.
Public Welfare
The status of public welfare in a country is an
important element in sociological intelligence be-
cause it so directly affects the happiness and mental
attitudes of the people. The standard of living,
housing, and opportunities for gainful employ-
ment are factors which must be considered.
Sweden, for example, has no slum areas in her
large cities, and her government's achievement in
providing clean and comfortable housing for the
worker is notable. It has been attained, however/
only through high taxation, and many a Swede is
unhappy because of the tax drain on his pocket-
book. As a result, it may be easy for him to forget
the great benefits to himself and to the nation
which accrue from high standards of public
health and sanitation.
The evaluation of a standard of living is no easy
task for the analyst, for the peoples of different
countries do not place the same value upon certain
human comforts and possession of certain advan-
tages. The average American family needs an
automobile; many Europeans consider the posses-
sion of one not only unnecessary, but even a great
nuisance. We put ice in our drinking water and
keep our beer in the refrigerator. The average
Britisher does not like either water or beer that
cold. Comparison of wages in different countries
has meaning only when such wages are expressed
in terms of their buying power within each coun-
try. A dozen eggs in one country may represent
5 hours of work by a machinist, while in another
country a machinist would have to work only 1
hour to earn enough to buy 3 dozen eggs. Other
commodities, however, may be so much more expen-
sive in the latter country that the machinist may
not enjoy as high a standard of living as he would
in the country where eggs are dear. Assessment
of living standards, therefore, cannot be based on
limited observations, but must be made from aver-
ages over periods of years, and evaluated in rela-
tion to the entire socio-economic situation of the
nation.
Unemployment will always create problems for
a nation. Crime has a higher incidence, and dis-
satisfaction with the existing government grows
with the misery of the unemployed. Communism
feeds upon such conditions. Employment, of
course, brings prosperity and its attendant com-
fort and happiness.
The manner in which a foreign country has met
its public welfare problems is an indication to
the analyst of strength, vulnerability, and morale.
A people who enjoy social security and a happy
daily life are not good subjects for propaganda
influence from without, and they will combat any
effort to change their satisfactory status, even to
the point of armed resistance.
Sociological intelligence is a fascinating field,
and deserves more than the summary treatment it
has received above. The intelligence officer should
consider the aspects so briefly discussed as an
introduction and inspiration for more intensive
reading and study. The philosopher's observation
that "the most interesting thing to man is man"
has real significance in intelligence, and the study
of foreign peoples in relation to one's own socio-
logical heritage has its reward in furthering the
cause of international understanding and peace.
137
POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE
Political intelligence on a foreign country is an
evaluation of the effectiveness of its government
in achieving the national objectives of its people,
both domestically and in foreign relations. It is
an assessment of the political strength and inter-
national influence of the nation in respect to unity,
stability, and efficiency, as well as the determina-
tion of the degree to which its government repre-
sents the will of the people. The political com-
ponent of strategic intelligence is closely associ-
ated with the sociological and economic, for
government exercises a profound influence on the
economic and social life of a people, and con-
versely its nature is to a large extent established
by economic and social forces.
The purpose of this section is to delineate the
elements essential to a political estimate of any
foreign country: the constitutional system, gov-
ernmental structure, political dynamics, national
policies, and the way in which its government pro-
vides for public order, safety, and security, con-
trols subversive activity, obtains intelligence, and
disseminates information.
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The Constitutional System
Governments derive their powers from consti-
tutions or codes of laws which set up the basic
framework and describe the rights and privileges
of the individual citizen. A constitution is not
necessarily a single written document. The Brit-
ish "constitution," for example, is largely an un-
written code built upon custom and usage. A
consideration of the constitutional system of a
country begins with a study of its origin and devel-
opment. What political, economic, or social
groups dominated political thought at the time
of its adoption? To what extent does it reflect
the public opinion of that time? Oftentimes the
circumstances under which a constitution was for-
mulated endow it with lasting respect and author-
ity. The principles of a constitution in theory
are often quite different from its principles in
practice. Attention must be given to its flexibility
and the ease with which it can be amended. Have
there been disagreements as to its interpretation?
What economic and social provisions does it con-
tain? Are there any unusual provisions? The
American Constitution, which establishes execu-
tive, legislative, and judicial branches of govern-
ment, has served as a model for constitutional
systems of later origin in all parts of the world,
but in various countries, the powers granted to the
different branches and the rights of citizens will
vary widely. In some republics the chief executive
may be a mere figurehead; in others he may have
dictatorial power. Prime ministers often exercise
much more leadership and have greater responsi-
bilities than kings. The office of prime minister
can be most precarious for it is usually dependent
upon the support of a majority in the legislature
and failure is followed by the resignation of the
prime minister and his cabinet.
Legislatures will vary in composition and effec-
tiveness. When two houses are provided for by
the constitution, one may be more advisory than
legislative in function, and it may have a history
of gradual weakness, such as the House of Lords
in Great Britain. The Senate of the United States,
on the other hand, has always had more power
and prestige than the House of Representatives,
but the Speaker of the House can succeed to the
Presidency.
A strong judicial branch of an established gov-
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138
ernment will exercise tremendous influence in
maintaining the spirit of the constitution, even
though its interpretations will reflect the coun-
try's economic and social changes. The strength
of the judiciary will usually be determined by its
independence of thought and action insofar as it
can resist political pressure and the lobbying of
special interest groups. The confidence of the
people in government is largely controlled by the
judgments of the courts when their powers are
exercised in a way that is an effective check on
both executive and legislative branches.
The civil and religious rights of citizens guaran-
teed by the constitution are important considera-
tions in a political estimate, not only in theory but
in practice. Freedom of speech, press, religion,
and the rights of assembly and trial by jury so dear
to the American citizen do not find exact counter-
parts in the constitutions of all other countries.
Important also are the rights and privileges ex-
tended to foreigners in the country. Can they
move about freely, and engage in business enter-
prises with the same protection accorded to
nationals? The Americans are very jealous of
their "constitutional rights" and justly proud of
their political heritage. The analyst must make an
assessment of the presence or absence of similar
feelings among foreign peoples and the extent to
which they would tolerate any abrogation of par-
ticular political rights.
Structure of the Government
The consideration here is of organization and
procedure in central, regional, and local govern-
ment. It is an evaluation of the government in
operation. Are there any conditions or situations
which have required special organizations or oper-
ations by the government and are practices at vari-
ance with the provisions of the constitution?
What are the major agencies of each branch of the
government and how do they operate? What are
the significant features of regional and local gov-
ernment organization? Often an understanding
of the political forces of local government is essen-
tial to the evaluation of the government as a whole.
Many countries have colonies or dependencies
which must also be examined in their relations to
the mother country, including their own govern-
mental structure. International relationships
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such as participation and membership in the
United Nations Organization or any regional pacts
may have important influences on a political sys-
tem through the creation of special commissions.
The operations of such agencies can have a decided
impact upon internal affairs as well as formulate
national attitudes toward other countries and in-
crease support for cooperative endeavors.
Political Dynamics
The extent to which the people participate in
political activity, their fitness for political respon-
sibility, the sources of political power, the electoral
and political party systems are some of the main
factors to assess in a political estimate of a foreign
country. The major political parties must be eval-
uated, taking into consideration their membership,
program or special interests, organization, and
methods of propaganda.
Throughout his study of these aspects of politi-
cal life, the analyst will find that comparisons
with American counterparts will give meaning
and perspective. He cannot merely ascertain the
constitutional framework which sets up the party
system, but must note actual practices, both his-
torical and current. Pressure groups within par-
ties, lobbying tactics, the amount of money avail-
able and expended for promotional purposes, and
the manner in which the objectives of such pres-
sure groups affect American interests are essential
considerations.
The biographic component of strategic intelli-
gence is here effectively applied. The personali-
ties, qualities of leadership, and motivations of
prominent politicians will provide the answer to
many problems of changing political influence.
National Policies
The intelligence significance of knowledge of
a country's domestic and foreign policies will be
made apparent in succeeding chapters in their dis-
cussion of the economic, sociological, and political
factors which determine a country's position in
the community of nations. The interplay of these
factors will be shown in the examination of United
States foreign policy and the relationship of party
and government in the U. S. S. R. Detailed treat-
ment of important elements of national policy is
therefore superfluous here.
139
Suffice to say, military intelligence is particu-
larly concerned with those policies pertaining to
national defense and their influence on domestic
and foreign policies. Are the military establish-
ment and civilian lawmaking bodies in agreement
on what defense policies should be? To what ex-
tent do the various branches of government in-
fluence or decide defense policies? What is the
popular reaction to defense policies? Do the
people accept rearmament programs, conscription,
food rationing, and production controls with forti-
tude or do such defense measures result in much
grumbling, support of black markets, or actual
rebellion?
Again the influence of individual leaders, both
within their own party and on the populace as
a whole, can be studied with profit.
Public Order and Safety
Within the scope of political intelligence are
those organizations which maintain public order
and safety, that is, the police and penal systems.
Is the police system adequate in size, well-organ-
ized at all levels of government, and effective in
protecting citizens against lawless elements of so..
ciety ? The strategic analyst would also be con-
cerned with the morale of the police force, the in-
tegrity of law-enforcement officers, and the extent
to which the system is susceptible to political in-
fluence. If the police of a large city, for example,
are controlled by a certain politician and used
for furthering his political ambitions, the fact
should be carefully noted. The attitude of the
average citizen towards law enforcement is also
significant.
Consideration of the penal system would in-
clude not only its organization and operation, but
also criminal codes, trial procedures, incidence of
crime, conditions in prisons and reformatories, and
the effort made by social forces in the country to
rehabilitate felons and juvenile delinquents. In
this respect there is considerable overlapping of
the political and sociological components.
Subversive Activity
Active or latent subversive groups in a country
are exceedingly important factors in the assess-
ment of weaknesses in its political system. The
presence of subversive activity in political parties,
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labor organizations, or government agencies can
profoundly affect the operation of the political,
economic, and social forces of the nation. In recent
years we have seen the results achieved by Com-
munist subversive activity in Poland, Czechoslo-
vakia, Hungary, and Rumania. We have also seen
in the case of Italy, how a people aroused to its
menace can keep Communists from obtaining con-
trol by defeating them at the polls. The extent to
which subversive elements have penetrated or in-
filtrated a country is thus the analyst's concern.
He must identify the subversive groups and show
how they operate. An innocuous appearing
society for the improvement of cultural relations
with the U. S. S. R., with a membership of several
thousand students, may well be the front organi-
zation of a growing Communist Party, the ulti-
mate objective of which is the overthrow of the
existing political system.
The peoples' attitude, their traditions, and the
economic and social conditions which foster sub-
versive groups must be taken into account. If,
like the Gallic tribes of Julius Caesar's time, they
are "conspiring among themselves and eager for
revolution," intelligence upon the nature, poten-
tial strength, and leadership of such groups is es-
sential. Finally, an estimate must be made of how
subversive activity of any kind may affect the
policies of the United States and other world
powers towards that country.
Intelligence System
The United States intelligence system and the
development of intelligence activity in other coun-
tries of the world have been fully treated in pre-
ceding chapters of this text, and are indicative of
the scope of the information required. What is
the mission of each intelligence agency? Are
funds available for effective operations? What is
the public attitude towards intelligence activities?
What is the relationship of the various agencies,
their methods of operation, and who are the key
figures in their personnel?
Propaganda
Political propaganda may be defined as the dis-
semination of information or ideas designed to in-
fluence the political behavior of the people of a
country by affecting their beliefs or attitudes con-
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140
cerning facts or values. It may be either direct or
indirect in approach. The source of control may
be located in the country itself, such as at the
permanent headquarters of a political party, or
it may be directed from outside the country, as for
example, in the case of Kremlin control of propa-
ganda in a satellite country.
For strategic intelligence purposes the assess-
ment of political propaganda emphasizes an evalu-
ation of its effectiveness. How much distortion
of fact will the people accept? It will depend,
of course, on the degree to which they have op-
portunity for becoming aware of the true facts.
In a country where the party in power maintains
rigid control of press and radio the people may
be kept completely in the dark. If freedom of
speech is a jealously guarded national heritage,
the people will be more enlightened and better
educated politically. Propaganda may then be
recognized for what it is and may have to be
disseminated through more subtle media and by
more indirect means.
Political propaganda is never more clearly evi-
dent than in an election campaign. The analyst
can learn much from a careful study of the cam-
paign speeches of leading candidates of opposing
parties. Often a clever slogan or sobriquet has
a tremendous psychological effect.
The effectiveness of the propaganda factor in
political intelligence can only be evaluated by
consideration of certain sociological aspects of the
nation, particularly those discussed in the preced-
ing section entitled "Characteristics of the People."
Good propaganda will always exploit the racial,
ethnic, and cultural elements of which national
character is composed.
The principles and techniques of propaganda
will be treated more fully in a later section dealing
with psychological warfare.
Political Factors in Strategy
The ultimate purpose of strategy is to make it
possible for a nation to approximate its basic
goals. Its intentions, which are derived from
these goals, are influenced by a variety of political
factors. Inevitably, therefore, strategy is affected
by the same political considerations. Initially,
of course, those responsible for formulating na-
tional strategy must choose objectives which are
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in accord with the basic goals of their own nation
and with those of its allies. Thereafter, political
factors must be considered in such matters as esti-
mating the dimensions and timing of war prepara-
tions by a nation and its allies, considering the
extent of possible losses by the military forces
which might be acceptable at any given time, and
selecting instruments of war and the use to be
made of them. Conversely, in connection with the
capabilities of the enemy, consideration must be
given to the effect of political factors on his own
strategic planning and how these factors may
cause him to react to a state of war or measures
short of war.
Mr. Chester Wilmot, eminent Australian jour-
nalist, has advanced the thesis that much of the
tension following World War II might be at-
tributed to a failure to take political factors into
account in strategic planning. He has suggested
that military strategy is affected both by political
factors as they develop and by long term political
objectives. By way of illustrating the influence
of political factors he has cited the Mediterranean
campaign of 1943 and the strategic decision of the
allies to invade Italy. A decision to land troops
on the Italian coast appeared advantageous be-
cause of the enemy's inferior military strength.
In addition, however, such a decision was made
more attractive because Mussolini's political
strength had become seriously impaired by 1943
and represented a real weakness in the Axis
partnership. Thus developing political factors,
when combined with the military situation, mate-
rially supported the decision made.
In illustrating the importance of considering
long term political objectives in the planning of
strategy, Mr. Wilmot has suggested that a great
political advantage could have accrued to the
western allies in the post-World War II period
had they, rather than the Soviets, liberated Ber-
lin, Prague, and Vienna. A significant power ad-
vantage might have been retained in Germany,
even if Berlin had been given up later as a result
of zonal agreements. The effect in Czechoslovakia
might have been even greater. The mere presence
of the Red Army in Prague became a source of
material strength to the Czech Communists and
undoubtedly affected the negotiations conducted
between the Benes government and the Soviet
141
leaders in Moscow in June 1945. Mr. Wilmot's
point is that the decisions which resulted in the
halting of the allied advance into Germany and
Central Europe might well have taken into greater
consideration the possible progress of events after
the war was over.
These illustrations suggest the importance of
political intelligence and the variety of tasks
which must be performed in connection with it.
Since military strategy and politics are insepara-
ble, the naval intelligence officer must understand
the significance of politics in military decision.
ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE
Economics, simply defined, is the study of how
people make their living and satisfy their mate-
rial wants. Economics thus represents a very
sizable part of total activity, for most people are
destined to spend the majority of their waking
hours either earning their living or spending what
they have received. Economics in practice is much
broader in application than the definition first
suggests because we live in organized societies, and
therefore as a social science, economics is con-
cerned with group behavior. As a discipline, eco-
nomics attempts to explain and interpret this
behavior and predict its consequences. Economic
laws, like other social laws, are tendencies and
trends, and thus the precise answers and controlled
experiments common to the physical sciences are
lacking in economics because of the difficulty in
measuring all significant variables. The result is
that the applications of economics in the field of
intelligence may be ineffective or even dangerous
in the hands of one who is not well grounded in
its principles and who is unaware of the pitfalls
in the use of data and concepts.
Economic intelligence is concerned with the col-
lection and processing of information relating to
the extent and utilization of natural and human
resources and the industrial potential of nations.
Economic military intelligence is not a delimited
part of the larger field; rather it is a viewpoint
that gives full regard to the military implications
of economic events. Specifically, this means that
we want to know how strong other countries are?
the limits to their economic capabilities for mak-
ing war; also whether they are preparing for war
and the extent of such preparation; and, finally,
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their economic vulnerabilities. When the need
arises, such weaknesses may be attacked by mili-
tary means or by the techniques of economic
warfare.
Sources of Economic Intelligence
The Department of Commerce, Office of Inter-
national Trade, receives reports from commercial
attaches and consular agents all over the world.
Its commodity and area specialists review large
numbers of foreign periodicals and other reports
in order that both private individuals or concerns
and government agencies may have the best pos-
sible information on conditions abroad for con-
ducting business affairs. The State Department
also has extensive interests in economic intelli-
gence since its consuls do so much of the collecting,
but some of its direct collection responsibilities
have been reassigned to other agencies, particu-
larly special types. The Tariff Commission is in-
terested in foreign costs of production, foreign
tariffs, and trade restrictions. The Treasury and
the Federal Reserve Board are concerned with
monetary and fiscal developments. The Depart-
ments of Agriculture and Labor are active in their
respective fields and have some representatives in
our diplomatic missions overseas. Private agen-
cies also have specialized interests in particular
fields of economic intelligence and prepare reports
used by business men. For example, some are con-
cerned with petroleum, mining, construction, elec-
tric power, foreign trade, manufacturing and, of
course, transportation and communications which
have been treated separately. Some of these
private concerns do a very thorough job within
their own fields. Even such popular magazines
as Fortune and the London Economist make nota,-
ble contributions in the reporting of foreign de-
velopments.
The military services have the responsibility for
filling any gaps in the economic intelligence they
need for their own planning, and the task of tap-
ping what is already available in order to apply
it to their own ends.
Primary Military Interests in Economic Intelligence
Military intelligence has the responsibility of
keeping track of any change in economic factors
that affect a country's ability to wage war. These
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142
include new discoveries of mineral deposits, new
crops and changing methods in agriculture, new
industrial processes that affect the demands for
labor and material and affect output and costs,
changes in business, labor, and government that
react on efficiency and allocation of resources,
trends in capital investment, new depreciation
and tax policies, trends in the price level, bank
reserves, and inventory levels.
Preparations for war become important to
watch in an age when a sudden attack can be so
crippling. Economic intelligence may well give
warning of such action, for industry must also be
mobilized for war. Clues may be provided by
the stockpiling of critical materials, the develop-
ment of higher cost substitutes and synthetics for
what normally is imported, and conversion of
civilian industry to the production of war goods.
Such clues need coordination with political in-
telligence to determine motivation. Since some
economies are at all times regulated by the gov-
ernment and "mobilized," the detailed study of all
changes in their regulations, priorities, and al-
locations may produce important leads in judging
modifications of plans or timetables for military
actions.
Study of economic vulnerabilities is continuous
also, for a dynamic economy is faced with chang-
ing pressures and shortages. Especially when a
war becomes hot, and military action and economic
warfare are modifying the enemy's economy, a
close watch is essential so that counteractions will
have maximum effect. Considering the wartime
hazards to collection, such an assessment will be
possible only if a prior basic analysis was prepared
when there was time to gather and assess the origi-
nal set of facts.
Analytical Criteria
Assessment of economic data must include the
application of many different criteria, all of which
are important, such as the study of particular in-
dustries with their problems of production and
pricing; the whole fiscal and monetary system with
questions of the price level, savings, investment,
and employment; the problems of ownership and
income distribution; the problems of consumption
and of institutions. Micro-economics with its
attention to supply and demand of particular
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commodities and its concern with competition,
monopoly, and monopolistic or monoposonistic
competition is best known to the beginning student.
Macro-economics is more recent, but offers some
singularly effective analytical tools for intelli-
gence purposes. The approach is in terms of the
interactions of particular events on the economy as
a whole. Some of the most useful results are ap-
parent in the national income accounting analysis
done by the Department of Commerce. In effect
it is the old "Tableau Economique" of Quesnay
brought up to date to combine modern accounting
procedures with present economic thinking into a
large number of mutually supporting tables. The
intelligence significance is that even if a foreign
country tries to hide its activities almost anything
that it does in the economic sphere will have reper-
cussions that will leave telltale signs. If it tries
to hide much basic information, such data may be
derived anyway by analytical techniques that have
been developed so fully in the last decade or so in
the United States. Some of them are highly com-
plex and lie beyond the scope of this study, but
their importance is not to be minimized. This sug-
gests that the requests for certain types of eco-
nomic data which may mean little to the layman
frequently include keys to very big secrets. There-
fore, the economic data collected by naval attach&
or observers abroad may be ultimately as impor-
tant as information on strictly naval subjects.
European Illustrations
Hitler's Mein Kampf made clear his political
views and intentions long before he came to power,
although its significance was not seen by the public
at large. Once the Nazis came to power, however,
economic intelligence disclosed German prepara-
tions for war. Economic regimentation began as
early as 1933, with many telltale signs. State-
directed planning was the rule, and heavy arms
orders were fed to industry. Labor was mobilized
through the Deutsche Arbeitsfront and the pro-
duction of civilian goods was progessively reduced.
The conquest of Czechoslovakia was an important
addition to German economic potential because of
the acquisition of the Skoda works and an addi-
tional labor supply. German ingenuity went to
work on developing substitute materials for those
that would be cut off by war. All of these de-
143
velopments pointed to a growing capability of
carrying on a major war effort. The success of
German preparations was indicated by the length
of time they were able to fight against a coalition
of nations numerically and industrially stronger.
One of the most interesting exploits of economic
intelligence involved the German oil industry.
Especially after the dissolution of her friendship
pact with the Soviet Union, Germany had only the
Rumanian Ploesti fields and minor wells in Hun-
gary and Poland as sources of petroleum. To take
the place of natural petroleum, German chemists
had developed new processes for extracting oil and
gasoline from coal, which brought costs down to
a fairly reasonable level. It was natural that the
strategic nature of these German automotive fuels
prompted special attention by allied intelligence
and target specialists and it became most impor-
tant that attacks be centered on all facilities of
the industry to paralyze German transport and
aviation. Planners remembered well that in
World War I German transport came to a halt be-
cause of a shortage of lubricants. Some excellent
intelligence on German oil facilities came from
secret sources, but the most accurate and com-
plete was obtained from the Germans themselves.
German rail tariffs, like our own, include not only
class rates but specific commodity rates on a place
to place basis. In order to subsidize the vitally
needed synthetic oil industry, special commodity
rates were set up for each oil refinery. Just as in
America, German law required that these rates
had to be published, and the Germans methodically
printed such information in rate bulletins and in
an obscure technical traffic magazine. Allied in-
telligence subscribed to this magazine through a
Swiss address, and regularly found each new secret
oil refinery listed with information as to the open-
ing date for the new rates,. It was then a simple
matter to pinpoint the facility on the map and de-
stroy it by bombing. Before the war was over,
German aircraft were grounded in considerable de-
gree by the shortage of fuel.
Less successful were Allied attempts to cripple
Germany's ball-bearing industry which was being
augmented by supplies from neutral Sweden.
The British, too, were getting considerable quan-
tities of Swedish ball bearings, but attempts to buy
up the entire production were unsuccessful. The
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Swedish SKF concern had expanded facilities, and
deliveries were being made to Germany in return
for safe conduct to Swedish ships bringing in es-
sential imports to the homeland. Some of the
most spectacular and costly Allied air attacks deep
in Germany were aimed at destroying ball-bearing
plants, notably at Schweinfurt, but the chief ob-
jective was not gained. Germany restored pro-
duction much more rapidly than anticipated and
redesigned her war equipment to require fewer
bearings. The war was almost over before the
Swedes were persuaded to cut off further ship-
ments, and by that time ball bearings were no
longer a determining factor in the German war
effort. The whole experience illustrated the im-
portance of correct assessment of economic intelli-
gence as well as its collection.
German economic intelligence about the Allies
was fairly good, notably in the data collected on
Allied ocean convoys. Due to censorship leaks,
secret radio broadcasts, and marine insurance re-
insured in neutral countries, German U-boats were
frequently able to pick off the most critical ships in
our convoys with disastrous results. It took con-
siderable effort to minimize these leaks.
Pacific Illustrations
Japan's military ambitions were made clear not
only through the controversial "Tanaka Memo-
rial," the activities of the Black Dragon Society,
and the attacks on China, but also from economic
intelligence. Some fundamental changes in the
Japanese economy were noted and set forth in a
Harvard University study by Mrs. E. B. Schum-
peter (et al.), The Inclust2-ialization of Japan and
Maneh,ukuo, that appeared just before the war.
Although this was a study based on overt sources
for public purposes, it revealed for the first time
considerable detail on changes in the Japanese
economy. In 1937, as a war measure, the Japa-
nese had banned the publication of all economic
data; they were aware of its great significance.
A great void developed in year books, trade re-
turns, periodicals, and industry publications. In
fact, they were so successful in hiding informa-
tion that their own planning was hampered, and
postwar search of Japanese government records
indicates that many vital economic records were
not even maintained, and thus represent gaps that
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interfere with analyses of Japan's position. The
Schumpeter study did reveal, despite the incom-
pleteness of data, that the Japanese economy was
switching from primary dependence on export
production of such items as textiles and ceramics to
heavy industry, chemicals, and instruments, all
needed for war purposes. Further, the study re-
vealed that Japan had been converted during the
late 1930's from an island kingdom to a conti-
nental power, for much of the new industry was
located in Korea and Manchuria.
In passing, the pitfalls of jumping at too easy
conclusions are evident in connection with postwar
Japan. That defeated nation, hard hit by war
and with shrunken boundaries, has faced major
dilemmas. Some people have advocated concen-
tration on light industries that use labor rather
than imported raw materials, and thus minimize
balance of payment difficulties. Unfortunately,
however, from the Japanese point of view, these
are the very industries being developed by the
nations which are the chief potential markets for
Japanese goods, so a weakened Japan, unlikely
to be a military threat, is developing heavy indus-
tries whose production will outstrip that achieved
during the peak of her militaristic period. This
has American encouragement. The military in-
telligence assessment cannot be based upon eco-
nomic data alone, as these economic facts of the
new Japan must be linked to political and geo-
graphic changes both in Japan and in the world
as a whole before they attain real meaning.
Current Problems
Some details of the Soviet economy will be pre-
sented later. Economic intelligence today from
that area must be based on careful analysis of open
Soviet broadcasts of information, statements in the
Soviet press, study of Soviet foreign purchases,
"Wringer" reports from all kinds of persons who
have been behind the Iron Curtain, and such lim-
ited observations as diplomatic personnel are al-
lowed to make. What of Soviet activities here?
We know that for a long time Soviet purchasing
agents were able to tour our factories and buy our
patents. The volume of economic data published
by both government and private concerns is so
tremendous that little is hidden, and that fact
itself may give us partial protection because it
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places a heavy burden of analysis on the Russians.
Could we hide information from them? Un-
doubtedly, there are many particulars easy for
them to collect, but it should be emphasized that
analytical techniques today are such that the hid-
ing of the broad facts of our economy from the
enemy would require repressive measures incom-
patible with the efficient operation of a private
enterprise economy. Hiding facts from ourselves
could seriously cripple the planning and pricing
activities of American businessmen. A competi-
tive system is presupposed in economic analysis to
be one with freedom of information. In conclu-
sion, then, short of radical security measures, the
United States must be reconciled to losing more
information to totalitarian enemies than it gains,
but much can be gained through intensive exploi-
tation of available sources and careful analysis.
TECHNICAL AND SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE
The developments in military science which have
been produced in recent years by science and tech-
nology constitute but one aspect of the profound
change which the industrial revolution has caused
in the environment of modern man. B. H. Lid-
dell-Hart, the British military expert, analyzes
the subject in his book, The Revolution in
Warfare:
Science and technology have produced a
greater transformation of the physical condi-
tions and apparatus of life in the past two
hundred years than had taken place in the
previous two thousand years. Yet when men
turn these tremendous new powers to a war
purpose, they employ them as recklessly as
their ancestors employed the primitive means
of the past, and they pursue the same tradi-
tional ends without regard to the difference of
effect. Indeed, the governments of modern
nations at war have largely ceased to think of
the postwar effects which earlier statesmen
were wise enough to bear in mind?a consid-
eration which led in the eighteenth century to
a self-imposed limitation of methods. Mod-
ern nations have reverted to a more primitive
extreme?akin to the practices of warfare be-
tween barbaric hordes that were armed with
spear and sword?at the same time as they
have become possessed of science-given in-
struments for multiple destruction at long
range.
The revolution in warfare has thus been
two-sided?on the one side, in the instruments,
145
the technique of warfare; on the other side, in
the character of warfare.
Technical and scientific intelligence are directly
concerned with the "instruments and techniques"
in which so profound a change has taken place.
Consideration of a new instrument, or weapon, is
meaningless without taking into account the con-
ditions under which it is to be used and the method
of its employment.
To match the increased speed and scope of war,
scientific research and development were, during
World War II, expedited as never before, and in
this postwar period of world tension they con-
tinue to be pressed with the greatest possible ur-
gency, particularly in the fields of atomic energy,
jet propulsion, and guided missiles. Technical
and scientific progress continue to force the revi-
sion of ancient and time-tested military concepts,
and to dictate even more revolutionary changes in
the design of ships, planes, and tanks which for-
merly embodied those concepts. Intelligence of a
new weapon originated by an enemy perforce leads
to feverish efforts to develop a counterweapon,
in which the enemy in turn is vitally inter-
ested. Tactical surprise, which in earlier wars
had been achieved by novel dispositions of armies
and fleets, was in World War II gained also by the
unleashing of new weapons such as the atomic
bomb, and by improvisation, such as skip bomb-
ing, in the employment of weapons already de-
veloped. Never before have the twin qualities
of flexibility of mind and the ability to gaze in-
telligently into the crystal ball of the future been
so vital to military men and to the political leaders
to whom the security of the nation is jointly
entrusted.
Science and technology were placed at the dis-
posal of the ground, sea, and air forces of the
United States during World War II, and in many
cases new weapons and items of equipment de-
signed for one specific branch of the armed forces
were adopted by the others as well, or were fitted
to the needs of more than one service. For ex-
ample, new aircraft went to both Army and Navy
to be used for different tactical purposes, and the
principle of rocket power was used by the infan-
try in the form of the bazooka, and by the Navy
for antisubmarine warfare and for strafing enemy
positions by LC (R) s; both Army and Navy em-
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ployed rocket-equipped aircraft. The VT fuze
was utilized as an antipersonnel weapon by the
Army and as an antiaircraft weapon by the Navy.
Therefore, it is advisable not to consider the tech-
nical and scientific category of strategic intelli-
gence from the specialized viewpoint of but one
branch of the armed forces. Although we are
concerned primarily with naval strategic intelli-
gence, the technical and scientific component em-
braces the contributions of research and develop-
ment to land, sea, and air power.
Definitions
The official Navy definition of the technical and
scientific category of strategic intelligence is suffi-
ciently broad to permit a general discussion. In
terms of Naval Intelligence, technical and scien-
tific intelligence is defined as:
"Disclosing the development of new materials,
techniques, and munitions of war."
The words "technology," "science," "research,"
and "development" are too well known to require
definition, as are the adjectives derived therefrom.
However, it is advisable at this point to break
down the term "scientific research" into three
parts, and to define each of them. 'These three
parts are:
1. Pure research.
2. Background research.
3. Applied research and development.
For definition of these phrases we turn to appen-
dix 3 of Science: The Endless Frontier, a report
to the President, dated July 1945, by Vannevar
Bush, wartime Director of the Office of Scientific
Research and Development:
1. Pure research,.?Pure research is re-
search without specific practical ends. It
results in general knowledge and understand-
ing of nature and its laws. This general
knowledge provides the means of answering
a large number of important practical prob-
lems, though it may not give a specific solu-
tion to any one of them. * * * The unpre-
dictable nature of pure science makes
desirable the provision of rather special cir-
cumstances for its pursuit. Pure research de-
mands from its followers the freedom of mind
to look at familiar facts from unfamiliar
points of view. It does not always lend itself
to organized efforts and is refractory to direc-
tion from above, in fact, nowhere else is the
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principle of freedom more important for sig-
nificant achievement. . . .
2. Background research,.?The preparation
of accurate topographic and geologic maps,
the collection of meteorological data, the de-
termination of physical and chemical con-
stants, the description of species of animals,
plants, and minerals, the establishment of
standards for hormones, drugs, and X-ray
therapy; these and similar types of scientific
work are here grouped together under the
term background. research. Such background
knowledge provides essential data for ad-
vances in both pure and applied science. It
is also widely used by the engineer, the physi-
cian, and the public at large. In contrast to
pure science, the objectives of this type of re-
search and the methods to be used are reason-
ably clear before an investigation is under-
taken. Thus, comprehensive programs may
be mapped out and the work carried on by
relatively large numbers of trained personnel
as a coordinated effort. . . .
3. Applied research, and development.?
Applied research and development differs in
several important respects from pure science.
Since the objective can often be definitely
mapped out beforehand, the work lends itself
to organized effort. If successful, the results
of applied research are of a definitely practi-
cal or commercial value. The very heavy ex-
penses of such work are, therefore, undertaken
by private organizations only in the hope of
ultimately recovering the funds invested. . . .
The distinction between applied and pure re-
search is not a hard and fast one, and indus-
trial scientists may tackle specific problems
from broad fundamental viewpoints. But it
is important to emphasize that there is a per-
verse law governing research: Under the
pressure for immediate results, and unless de-
liberate policies are set up to guard against
this, applied research invariably drives out
pure. The moral is clear: It is pure research
which deserves and requires special protec-
tion and specially assured support.
The Time Element in Research and Development
The importance of scientific progress, which de-
pends on basic scientific research, to our Nation in
time of peace and war is summed up by Dr. Bush
in his report as follows:
Progress in the war against disease depends
upon a flow of new scientific knowledge. New
products, new industries, and more jobs re-
quire continuous additions to knowledge of
the laws of nature, and the application of that
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knowledge to practical purposes. Similarly,
our defense against aggression demands new
knowledge so that we can, develop new and
improved weapons. This essential new
knowledge can be obtained only through basic
scientific research.
Science can be effective in the national wel-
fare only as a member of a team, whether the
condition be peace or war. But without sci-
entific progress no amount of achievement in
other directions can insure our health, pros-
perity, and security as a nation in the modern
world.
Dr. Bush, in the above quotation, states that a
form of warfare, war against disease, continues,
in peacetime, and that our security against aggres-
sion by other powers is intimately bound up with
our prosperity and our national health. Research
specialists in the medical field may be said to be
intelligence officers of a certain kind, to whom the
qualities of alertness, thoroughness, patience, and
imagination are as essential as they are to mili-
tary intelligence specialists. Now more than ever
must scientific research specialists coordinate their
effort with military intelligence specialists, in
view, of the susceptibility of all nations to sudden
attack directed against centers of population and
industry. Developments in aircraft and guided
missiles have increased the range and speed of de-
livery of atomic bombs and toxic warfare agents.
Thus scientists as well as specialists in strategic
intelligence may be said to be today in our first
line of defense.
Not only must the state of our own scientific
research and development be of interest to us, but
we must also disclose, as promptly and completely
as possible, the trends and achievements of sci-
entific research and development in potential
enemy nations. In his report, Dr. Bush empha-
sizes the time element in modern war, and the
necessity for peacetime scientific preparedness:
The bitter and dangerous battle against the
U-boat was a battle of scientific techniques?
and our margin of success was dangerously
small. The new eyes which radar has sup-
plied can sometimes be blinded by new sci-
entific developments. V-2 was countered only
by capture of the launching sites.
We cannot again rely on our Allies to hold
off the enemy while we struggle to catch up.
There must be more?and more adequate?
military research in peacetime. It is essen-
147
tial that the civilian scientists continue in
peacetime some portion of those contributions
to national security which they have made so
effectively during the war. This can best be
done through a civilian controlled organiza-
tion with close liaison with the Army and
Navy, but with funds direct from Congress,
and the clear power to initiate military re-
search which will supplement and strengthen
that carried on directly under the control of
the Army and Navy.
During peace, the time element in our own sci-
entific research and development is closely related
to the time element in obtaining strategic intelli-
gence of scientific progress in other countries, in
precisely the same way that the two were related
during the war recently concluded. Furthermore,
internal security and counterintelligence, as ap-
plied to technology and science, are of continued
importance.
In World War II the deliberate and planned
violation of security which took place in connec-
tion with the atomic bomb was the disclosure to
the world of the fact that it existed and that it
worked. Security was also relaxed in connection
with the VT fuze, one of the important new weap-
ons produced by the Office of Scientific Research
and Development. As in the case of the atomic
bomb, a significant factor was the time element.
Originally, the VT fuze had been allocated only
to the Navy because of the possibility that the
enemy might learn the secret if VT fuzed shells
were fired over land. However, in the autumn of
1943, it became necessary to use VT fuzed shells
for the protection of London and port areas in
southern England which were eventually to serve
as major staging areas for the Normandy invasion.
The details of this situation are described by
Dr. James P. Baxter III in his book, Scientists
Against Time. Highly secret information re-
ceived by the Allies indicated that the Germans
intended to employ robot bombs against England.
Some months before any were used, however, a
detailed description of the new buzz bomb became
available to OSRD. With this information, it
was possible to construct a duplicate of the new
German bomb and to conduct intensive tests.
These tests revealed that the buzz bombs would
activate the VT fuzes and that certain models of
these fuzes could be effectively employed against
the bombs. As a result of this new information
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developed by careful research, a high level deci-
sion was made to utilize VT fuzes as a means of
aiding in the protection of the threatened areas of
England. This emergency decision made available
a helpful countermeasure which was ready for use
in ample time. The urgency of the situation and
the time element dictated the decision.
The importance of the time element in the grand
strategy of the Allied Nations in 1942, and the
reasons for selecting Germany as the main target
for attack instead of Japan, were explained by
Secretary of War Patterson in an address before
the American Chemical Society, 8 April 1946. In
his speech the Secretary gave the following rea-
sons for assigning priority to the European War:
One was to take advantage of the concen-
tration of forces. Russia was fighting Ger-
many, but not Japan. Another was the
shorter distance to Germany; the shorter dis-
tance meant shorter time in getting into ac-
tion. But the reason that seemed to me as
compelling as any was the danger of the Ger-
man scientists, the risk that they would come
up with new weapons of devastating de-
structiveness. There was no time to lose in
eliminating German science from the war.
There was no comparable peril from Japanese
science.
The wisdom of this decision is seen now in
retrospect when we ponder the remarkable ad-
vances made by German research and development
in the latter half of World War II, particularly
with respect to rockets, jet propulsion, and guided
missiles. The race for new weapons and counter-
weapons was ultimately won by the Allies, largely
because of better mobilization and organization of
scientific brainpower and because of greater armed
might and industrial capacity, but the margin was
close.
The secret of our success in developing many
new and improved types of weapons and equip-
ment during World War II, and producing them
in quantity and delivering them in time to be
effectively employed against the enemy, lies in the
coordination of our scientific and industrial po-
tential, in close cooperation with the armed serv-
ices. Our top strategic planners allocated mate-
rials, scientific brainpower, and industrial compe-
tence in accordance with priorities dictated by the
overall grand strategy, and, by means of technical
and scientific intelligence, kept abreast of scientific
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research and development in enemy countries, and
assessed the performance of our new weapons in
action as they were developed.
The Technical Intelligence Center and Missions
The vital interest of the Office of Naval Intelli-
gence in technological and scientific fields led to
the establishment of the Technical Intelligence
Center to deal with foreign technical subjects, in-
cluding ordnance in all its phases, electronics,
naval vessels and merchant ships and their char-
acteristics and equipment, chemicals, synthetics,
medicines, and aircraft (in collaboration with the
Technical Air Intelligence Center).
During World War II the Technical Intelli-
gence Center had a dual purpose:
1. To keep the strategic and operations planners
and the Navy at sea and in forward areas
informed at all times of such technical de-
velopments on the part of the enemy as might
affect operations, tactics, or planning in any
phase of the war.
2. To make available to bureaus of the Navy
and other interested technical and scientific
activities any information on foreign tech-
nology which might lead to development of
effective countermeasures on our part, the
perfection of Allied weapons, or the evolu-
tion of new materials and techniques.
The Technical Intelligence Center profited by
constant use of all the normal sources of intelli-
gence within and outside the country. Of unusual
significance was the detailed interrogation of cap-
tured personnel, particularly those with scientific
or technical background, with the Center itself
conducting an examination of some of the most
important prisoners.
In maintaining liaison with other technical ac-
tivities, the Technical Intelligence Center was
responsible for directing the collection of specific
items in fields of intelligence of extraordinary
importance to American scientific research and
development. To this end, the center coordinated
the activities of our naval representatives abroad,
particularly those of naval technical missions
eventually established first in Europe and later
in Japan.
With the successful invasion of the European
continent on 6 June 1944, and the advance of
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Allied forces into the German homeland, the ex-
ploitation of German technical developments for
possible use against Japan became a project of
urgent importance in the final phase of the Euro-
pean conflict. The determination of the nature
and extent of German technical aid to Japan was
in itself a project of vast significance. Strategic
planners recognized that the rapid exploitation
of this project, with correspondingly efficient
development of countermeasures, might affect to
a marked degree the duration of the war. There,
the naval technical mission in Europe, working
from lists of intelligence targets of prime impor-
tance, was assigned the job of investigating and
reporting on German technology; the Technical
Intelligence Center in Washington coordinated
the activities of the mission and assured proper
distribution of its discoveries and reports. The
detailed operation of NavTecMisEu teams in the
European theater was an interesting and exciting
chapter in the history of Naval Intelligence. The
successful examination of German industrial
plants, the painstaking and difficult search for
records and files which were often partially de-
stroyed or buried in cellars, and the continual and
often dangerous hunt for key personnel by teams
which travelled by air, train, jeep, and even on
foot, resulted in an exceedingly valuable and com-
prehensive record of German technological efforts.
While the Japanese war ended too quickly
thereafter for the United States to put into effect
the countermeasures which resulted from this
thoroughgoing investigation, the advantages ac-
cruing to the American military and to private
enterprise from a careful digest of German re-
search, developments, and techniques can hardly
be overestimated. An organization similar to
NavTeeMisEu was created under the title, Naval
Technical Mission Japan, with much the same
ends in view. A brief account of the establish-
ment, purpose and accomplishments of this group
is contained in the following quotations from
Summary Report, United States Naval Technical
Mission to Japan:
In the summer of 1945 . . . the United
States Navy established a mission to deter-
mine the position of the Japanese in the field
of naval technology.
How did the design and construction of
their warships compare with ours ? What
149
range and power had their guns? How heavy
was their armor and what was its metallurgy ?
Were they ahead of us in electronics develop-
ment ? The Navy wanted the answers to these
and a thousand other technical questions.
To obtain the desired information, investi-
gators had to enter Japan with the occupation
forces, before manufacturing plants, equip-
ment, materials, and records could be de-
stroyed and experienced personnel dispersed.
NavTechJap, which became the abbreviated
designation for the United States Naval Tech-
nical Mission to Japan, was established on 14
August 1945 by directive of Commander in
Chief and the Chief of Naval Operations . . .
The purpose of the Mission was to survey
all Japanese scientific and technological de-
velopments of interest to the Navy and
Marine Corps in the Japanese islands of
Kyushu, Shikoku, Honshu, Hokkaido; in
China; and in Korea south of latitude 38? N.
This involved the seizure of intelligence mate-
rial, its examination and study, the interroga-
tion of personnel, and, finally, the preparation
of reports which would appraise the techno-
logical status of the Japanese Navy and Japa-
nese industry.
The mission remained in existence from 1 Sep-
tember 1945 until 1 November 1946; its accom-
plishments were stated to be as follows:
A total of 185 separate reports comprising ap-
proximately 10,000 printed pages were prepared
and 500 copies of each were printed.
Approximately 3,500 documents were seized and
shipped to the Washington Document Center and
the technical bureaus of the Navy Department.
Approximately 15,000 pieces of equipment were
seized and shipped to the United States for labora-
tory investigation. The largest items were two
18.1-inch guns shipped from Kure, each 75 feet
long and weighing 180 tons.
The shipment to the United States of the 15,000
pieces of enemy equipment by the mission was but
a continuation on a far larger scale of a pro-
cedure established during the war, under which
items of equipment captured in the field were for-
warded to designated laboratories or test centers
in the United States for detailed analysis and
testing. In this phase of technical intelligence,
the center served as a clearing house for items sent
in, and for requests from Washington to forward
areas for specific 'articles. By this means, the
connection between reports of new weapons and
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the pieces themselves was maintained, and ade-
quate exploitation of the information assured.
Another responsibility assigned to the Techni-
cal Intelligence Center was that of evaluating and
processing information on naval and merchant
ships and their characteristics. All possible
sources of information were continually scanned
for data, comprehensive or fragmentary, on the
existence or characteristics of new ships, or for
alterations in existing vessels. The collation of
this kind of intelligence with a detailed analysis
of all types of photographs, including aerial and
surface shots, during the war resulted in far
greater knowledge of enemy ships than had ever
been available before. The size, probable per-
formance, equipment, and appearance of the bat-
tleships Tomato and Musash,i, secrets so closely
guarded in Japan that even men who had worked
aboard the vessels knew little about them, were
revealed with amazing accuracy by this method.
Another instance of the detailed processing of
ship data occurred in connection with the conver-
sion of the Japanese battleships Ise and Hyuga to
carry aircraft on a "flight deck" abaft the main-
mast. Prisoner-of-war reports were carefully
checked with the Preliminary Design Section of
the Bureau of Ships, and, without benefit of photo-
graphs or sketches, a drawing was prepared of
the possible appearance of the two vessels. The
close similarity of the drawing to the ships them-
selves, as revealed in the second battle of the
Philippine Sea, is testimony to both the possibili-
ties and value of expert processing of ship in-
formation.
Throughout the war the Technical Intelligence
Center made available to strategic planners and
to the fleet the latest information on the enemy's
naval vessels, including such important factors as
the speed, armament, armor, and specialized equip-
ment of each enemy unit.
As a means of assuring the distribution of in-
formation on naval and merchant vessels, the Tech-
nical Intelligence Center took over the basic work
accomplished by the Identification and Charac-
teristics Section in the publication field, and pre-
pared standard reference manuals on the fleets of
the world, together with a comprehensive volume
on merchant vessels. The ONI 22 series on the
naval vessels of Japan, Russia, Britain, and the
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United States and other countries contains all
available information on dimensions, armament,
protection, and propulsion of each ship, as well
as carefully prepared plan and profile drawings
and detailed photographs. These publications
serve innumerable uses as basic reference manuals
and provide source material for recognition train-
ing, naval staff work, and study at the Naval War
College. ONI 209, A Manual of Merchant Ships,
includes statistical information on over 13,000
vessels now afloat, in a convenient, readily avail-
able index, and profiles of approximately 8,000 of
these ships. Included also is a section originally
designed to assist in the recognition of German
raiders and blockade runners in the Atlantic,
South Pacific, and Indian Oceans. In addition
to these standard works, the center distributed
other information on weapons and equipment
through the medium of special publications, and
also in articles in The ONI -Weekly and its suc-
cessor, The ONI Review.
As a result of the flood of information from the
European theater subsequent to the Allied pene-
tration of Germany, an expeditious method had
to be promulgated to assure adequate distribution
of vital intelligence data to those technical activi-
ties best qualified to analyze the information and
develop any latent value it might contain. At the
same time it was apparent that much of the tech-
nical data from abroad was of interest and im-
portance concurrently to a number of widely
scattered organizations, and, as mentioned above,
to private industry.
A technical library of all reports and related
data was therefore established in the Technical In-
telligence Center which permitted immediate ref-
erence by subjects to all available information. A
staff of experts was assigned the task of analyzing
and briefing each incoming item of information.
Members of the staff were required to know the
needs of various technical organizations and to be
familiar with projects being carried on by them,
in order to make immediate distribution of needed
data. At the same time accession lists were dis-
seminated, containing brief abstracts of the con-
tents of incoming documents, by means of which
interested activities were apprised of the existence
of these reports. Processing this type of informa-
tion, translating, duplicating, and disseminating
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was a tremendous task, and one in which the entire
Office of Naval Intelligence participated, and of
which it can be justifiably proud.
ARMED FORCES INTELLIGENCE
Even though nonmilitary methods of warfare?
political, economic, and psychological ? have
grown in use and importance, their ultimate suc-
cess will be largely conditioned by physical force
or the threat of fts use. Military strength has his-
torically been the basis of national power, the hard
core of all the elements through which a nation
realizes its strategic objectives in peace and war.
Armed forces intelligence is therefore derived
from timely and accurate information of military
strength, both in being and potential. It is an
evaluation of the aggregate power of all the armed
services, as well as a detailed analysis of each serv-
ice. As a component of intelligence knowledge
it has a particularly strong relationship to the
other components, for armed forces are definitely
influenced by a nation's geographic position, the
adequacy of its transport and communications
systems, its sociological, political, and economic
structure, its scientific capabilities, and the per-
sonalities of leaders in each arm of the military
establishment. Because of these relationships;
armed forces intelligence is most complex, and in
order to make valid deductions the intelligence
officer or strategic analyst must have not only pro-
fessional competence in military matters, but also
a wealth of background knowledge in those aspects
of national life which govern military affairs.
In an age of amphibious landings, combined
operations, and "tri-elemental" warfare, Naval In-
telligence is concerned with all the elements of land
and air as well as sea power. Coastal zones may
be dominated by either ground or naval forces, or
by carrier-based or land-based air forces. Ex-
tensive sea areas may also be controlled from the
adjacent land. World War II provided striking
examples of the effectiveness of close coordination
of armies, fleets, and aircraft in achieving victory.
The naval intelligence officer will often be as-
signed to a joint or combined staff where he will
be closely associated with his opposite numbers
in the Army and Air Force. It is incumbent upon
him, therefore, to become familiar with the mis-
sion, organization, and professional nomenclature
151
of the other services. He should be a keen ob-
server of their operations, learn the capabilities
of their weapons, and appreciate their problems.
The ensuing discussion of the armed forces will
point out the various elements which must be con-
sidered in the development of this component of
intelligence knowledge.
THE ARMED FORCES IN GENERAL
Control
Political, administrative, and command control
must be clearly distinguished. They may be
vested in the same officials or be separated by an
elaborate system of checks and balances. In most
countries a semblance of civilian control of the
armed forces is preserved, but actual control is not
always the same as that prescribed by the consti-
tution. Usually in democracies a single cabinet
member of the executive branch, a civilian, is in
charge of all military affairs. In Latin American
democracies, however, it is often true that civilian
control over the army exists only in theory, for
the military may have acquired control over the
executive branch by force of arms.
Civilian control of the military sometimes takes
fantastic forms. During the past several years
the Soviet Government has been trying to intro-
duce a certain amount of "culture" into the officer
corps of its armed services. It appears that "cul-
ture" does not require an officer to become a con-
noisseur of the arts but relates to neatness in dress
and better table manners. The official officers'
guide contains the following directives:
Don't comb your hair during meals; don't
stretch your legs out; and don't open your col-
lar . . . The fork is held in the left hand,
the knife in the right hand, and not vertically
but horizontally . . . To eat with the knife
alone is quite indecent. . . . Don't exhale into
the faces of others.
Any important change in the top control struc-
ture effected in time of war must be carefully
noted. If such a change involves the formulation
of a joint general staff or other unified control, its
composition and the methods whereby coordina-
tion is achieved and differences resolved become
significant.
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Composition and Size
The armed forces of a nation may include in
addition to army, navy, and air, certain compo-
nents with police and border security functions,
which are integrated into the armed forces in time
of war or emergency. The United States Coast
Guard, for example, under the Treasury Depart-
ment in peacetime becomes a part of the Navy in
time of war. In East Germany the B ereit-
sehaf ten or "Alert Police" constitutes the nucleus
for an army, and the "Sea Police" can become a
navy. An estimate of the armed forces of the
U. S. S. R. will include consideration of the se-
curity forces of the M. V. D.
Data on the size of the armed forces consists of
more than figures on the total personnel strength
of each service. The relationship of the strength
of the armed forces to total population must be
shown, and significant trends in size and propor-
tion indicated. Comparative figures over a pe-
riod of years are essential.
Position in the Nation
The chief factors to consider in determining the
position of the armed forces in the nation are the
legal or constitutional basis for their existence and
organization, the traditions responsible for popu-
lar attitudes toward them, their role in political
life, and the fiscal support they receive. When-
ever the prestige and power of the armed forces
appears to be due in part to foreign influences,
the development of such influences should be care-
fully traced. Knowledge of these matters will
provide the researcher with the proper perspective
for detailed study of individual arms and services.
In many countries the size of the armed forces
and the proportion of the total military budget
allotted to each arm are specifically restricted by
law. An examination of such laws will help to
ascertain whether the present government pre-
serves their letter and spirit or whether the armed
forces have come to their present status without
regard for legal basis. Public law may also pro-
vide for organizational structure; for example, in
the United States, the National Security Act of
1947 represented a fundamental change toward
unification of the American military establish-
ment. An understanding of our present military
structure can only be gained through familiarity
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152
with the provisions of this law and its amend-
ments.
The attitude of the people toward the armed
forces is important in determining the position of
the military as a whole or the prestige of an in-
dividual arm. In Great Britain, for example, the
Royal Navy is the senior service, the result, of
course, of the place of sea power in British history
and traditions. In America, the Army has been
the senior service since the time oithe Revolution-
ary War when national objectiv"& were achieved
through effective use of ground forces. Reverence
for military leaders and popular approval of stern
military discipline have been important elements
in the willingness of the German people to go to
war. The victories or defeats of past wars may
have contributed to the present attitude of the
people of a nation toward war and military or
naval affairs. National emergencies can likewise
change the people's attitudes. In the United
States, for example, popular enthusiasm for mili-
tary matters and the prestige of military men
have always been greater in wartime than in pe-
riods between wars. In countries where conscrip-
tion is resented the armed forces will not enjoy
popular esteem, civilian control is apt to be more
firmly established, and the efficiency of national
defense may even be impaired. The morale and
accomplishments of the military establishment or
of an individual service may instill admiration
and respect in the popular mind, and become an
incentive for the most capable citizens to seek
military service. In countries where citizen
soldiers far outnumber professionals, the public
attitude will be conditioned by the treatment ac-
corded reservists while on active duty.
The political influence of military men must also
be assessed. Does the party in power take particu-
lar steps to keep popular military figures removed
from the political scene? Do political leaders re-
quire military support to further their objectives?
Associated with such considerations are the ex-
istence of political factions within the services
and the extent of political intrigue. Measures
taken to insure the loyalty of members of the mili-
tary establishment and the manner of dealing with
subversive elements are important in respect to
some countries. For example, in the U. S. S. R.,
political reliability is a requirement for promotion
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in the officers corps, and a special organization
within the military services is charged with the
political indoctrination of enlisted personnel.
In determining the national position of the
armed forces the manner of allocation and control
of appropriated funds are just as important as
the amount of the appropriations themselves.
What proportion of the total national budget is
allotted to the armed services? Are any items for
military purposes concealed in the budget figures
as published? Often the executive branch of the
government will have considerable funds available
for expenditure without public accounting. The
Manhattan project, for example, which developed
the A-bomb during World War II, cost over two
billion dollars, but the expenditures were never
published as items in a military budget for secu-
rity reasons.
The national objectives of a country will be re-
flected in its military budget. A striking example
can be found in the present tremendous rise of
United States military expenditures to meet the
threat of aggression in Korea. It also reflects the
growing realization that America can no longer
rely on her ocean barriers. New problems of na-
tional security require extensive funds for research
to improve existing weapons and equipment.
Manpower
Analysis of a nation's manpower was initially
treated in the preceding discussion of the sociologi-
cal component. The same principles apply here,
but more attention is given to manpower from
the military point of view, differentiating between
manpower as a whole and that section of it which
is drawn upon for the armed forces. Statistics
must be presented showing availability and quality
of men fit for military service. How many young
men annually reach military age, and what is the
average number inducted? The basic military
service laws and the general conscription system
should be studied. What are the actual practices
in granting deferments, and what proportion of
the number available is affected by such reg-
ulations?
In estimating the quality of military manpower,
attention must be given to physique, intelligence,
education, amenability to hardship, aptitude for
handling and maintaining technical or complex
269196-54--11
153
equipment, and general attitudes, such as accept-
ance of discipline, esprit de corps, and loyalty.
The discussion to this point has concerned armed
forces as a whole. The balance of this section will
deal with ground, naval, and air forces separately,
and the detailed information regarding each which
is needed in the production of accurate armed
forces intelligence.
GROUND FORCES
Administration of the Army
The best way to present overall organization is
by a chart showing the main subdivisions of the
War Ministry, or the Department of the Army,
and the chain of command to territorial headquar-
ters and field forces. The structure of the High
Command should be included and comments made
on the functions of main bureaus and staff divi-
sions. Maps showing the boundaries of military
districts and the location of headquarters are
essential.
The various arms and services of the Army must
be accurately described, using nomenclature in the
language of the country. Any distinctive insig-
nia worn by certain troop units should be described
or illustrated.
Tactical Organization
The overall organization of the Army into tacti-
cal commands can also be presented in chart form,
supplemented by a description of basic tactical
units and field staffs. If there are any differences
between the tactical organization in time of war
and that of the peacetime Army, note should be
made of them. Additional charts can be prepared
to show the detailed organization of divisions and
smaller independent combat units, including
strengths and allotment of weapons and vehicles.
Comparison with similar organizations in the
United States Army is always helpful. Descrip-
tions should be carried down to the smallest ele-
ments, such as rifle squad or tank platoon.
The organization of service units, engineers,
signal, transportation, etc., should be given in the
same detail as that of combat units. Nomencla-
ture should be carefully recorded, for it varies
considerably in armies of the world. American
equivalents again serve as good standards of corn-
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parison. Therefore, for background purposes, the
following brief discussion of United States Army
divisions is appropriate.
The Infantry Division
An infantry division is typically composed of
three regiments of infantry, a medium tank bat-
talion, a combat engineer battalion, an antiaircraft
artillery automatic weapons battalion, and four
field artillery battalions. It is designed to hit
hard, maneuver over any terrain, absorb reinforc-
ing units easily, and show considerable staying
power. In specific situations it may require addi-
tional artillery, armor, engineers, or service units.
It gives close support to armored units, seizes,
holds, or envelops objectives, and engages in neces-
sary close combat. The ratio of combat to service
troops is 1 to 1. In its present composition it is
a more powerful striking force than its World
War II counterpart, for each regiment also has a
medium tank company. The combat engineers can
build roads, bridges, ferries; lay mine fields and
obstacles; build shelters, landing strips, water-
works; and in emergency fight as infantry.
Infantry weapons include rifles, bayonets, auto-
matic rifles, machine guns, mortars, carbines, pis-
tols, grenades, light antitank weapons, recoilless
rifles, flamethrowers, and tanks. Infantry has the
advantage of being able to move inconspicuously
in small groups, taking full advantage of terrain.
Battle effectiveness over a period of time requires
rotation of units, proper supply, and medical
service.
When Army infantry is used in amphibious
operations, the battalion landing team is the basic
organization. Necessary boats and amphibious
vehicles take the place of much of the motor
equipment.
The Armored Division
The armored division is the basic large armored
unit, a balanced force of ground arms designed
to be tactically and administratively self-sufficient
for missions requiring great mobility and. fire-
power.
Typically, it is composed of 15 battalions: 4
tank, 4 armored infantry, 4 armored field artillery,
1 antiaircraft automatic weapon, 1 reconnais-
sance, and 1 armored engineer. In addition, there
are the necessary headquarters and service troops,
including combat commands as required. It is
very flexible in organization and employment.
An armored division is especially suited for
deep penetration and seizure operations, mobile
defense, and destruction of hostile armor. If
it cannot lead an assault, it can attack through an
infantry division after obstacles have been
breached or bridged. Maintaining its momentum
is important to full effectiveness.
CONFIDENTIAL 154
The Airborne Division
Just as amphibious operations require special
techniques and equipment, so too do airborne as-
saults. All equipment must be transportable by
air. The ground units depend upon the Air Force
for airlift just as amphibious units depend on
the Navy. Airborne divisions frequently are or-
ganized in three combat teams, each with an in-
fantry regiment, an artillery battalion, an engineer
company, and a medical detachment. Other per-
sonnel include a parachute maintenance company,
antitank and pathfinder platoons.
The airborne division enters combat in three
echelons: an assault group, either parachuted or
landed from assault transports; a followup group,
landed in the air head either by assault or regular
transports; and a rear echelon of maintenance
and administrative personnel.
The division is no more mobile than any other
without its airlift. Its radius of action is deter-
mined by the aircraft it uses. Typically, it re-
quires 751 Fairchild Packets (C-119), 161 Chase
Avitrucks (C--123) , and 16 Douglas Globemasters
(0-421).
Because of dependence on airlift, which in turn
depends on good weather, airborne operations are
usually limited to short duration strikes against
key targets in the enemy rear where opposing
forces will be weak or scattered. Operations are
usually intended for early joining with other
ground forces, raid and withdrawal, or special aid
to guerrillas. An independent operation, such as
the seizure and expansion of an air head, is possi-
ble, but requires a major effort since medium tanks
and heavy artillery are not available to an airborne
unit. Sufficient air superiority must be main-
tained to prevent the enemy from taking effective
counteraction over a period of time.
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The strategic mobility of airborne forces, sub-
ject to the command of the theater headquarters,
is a threat to the enemy by its very presence in
the theater of operations. At present the radius
of action for large-scale airborne operations is
about 730 miles; it could be extended to 1,000 miles
with the aid of carrier-based aircraft.
Order of Battle
In time of war, a large part of the total military
intelligence effort is devoted to enemy order of
battle: specific information on the strength and
disposition of opposing forces. Strength is meas-
ured in terms of personnel, units, and armament.
Disposition refers to the locations of identified
units, their headquarters, and movements. For
the operational commander such information on
the enemy is imperative, and he must also try to
keep from the enemy corresponding information
on his own forces. This denial to the enemy of
order of battle intelligence was well illustrated
early in the Korean War when General Douglas
MacArthur's headquarters asked correspondents
to refrain from identifying military units in the
Korean operations and reporting the whereabouts
of headquarters or troop movements.
Order of battle intelligence is expanded to in-
clude tactical doctrines and methods, combat value
of troops, records of performance of identified
units, and personal data on unit commanders. If
the information gathered by the intelligence re-
searcher in peacetime is painstaking in attention
to details, the task of the combat intelligence offi-
cer in the field will be made easier.
The need for including data on weapons and
equipment in order of battle information is well
illustrated by an experience of the United States
Marines in Korea. The First Marine Division
had made contact with an enemy unit. By inter-
rogating a prisoner, the Marine Intelligence officer
learned that this unit was a full North Korean di-
vision. Consulting his order of battle file, he
further learned that an artillery battalion is at-
tached to each North Korean division and that its
armament consists of 18 76-mm. guns and 18
122-mm. howitzers. Thus he was able to supply
his commander with valuable combat intelligence
on the firepower of the enemy.
Order of battle data can be effectively recorded
155
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on a situation plot for a given area of operations
by pins and symbols as far as identifications and
locations are concerned. A card file giving de-
tails on individual units is an indispensable
reference.
Strategy and Tactics
Since the strategic military problems of a nation
are influenced by such factors as geographical
position, nature of terrain, economic capabilities,
and political system, the analyst's task is to study
the land fortifications and costal defenses in the
light of the nation's strategic concepts. Detailed
information must be gathered on the location, pur-
pose, characteristics, and manning of defense in-
stallations. Presentation on a map will give a
good graphic picture. Whenever possible, sketches
or ground plans of individual fortifications should
be included.
The basic tactical doctrines of the Army offen-
sively and defensively must be carefully studied
in comparison with those of the United States
Army. How is artillery used in support of ground
forces? Cavalry? Tanks? Are there any pre-
ferred types of field fortifications or ground ob-
stacles? What use is made of reconnaissance?
What tactics are employed in close combat? The
doctrines established in special operations must
also be included, such as amphibious landings, air-
borne operations, and guerrilla warfare. Opera-
tions in desert, jungle, or mountain terrain require
special tactics. Similarities and differences with
respect to United States doctrine should be pointed
out.
Personnel and Training
The rank structure and system of pay and al-
lowances of a foreign army can be presented in
tabular form, with the United States equivalent
providing a basis for comparison. Any particu-
lar differences may require a descriptive explana-
tion. When pay is given in the terms of the
country's monetary system, the equivalent in dol-
lars at a stated rate of exchange is necessary.
Military pay should also be evaluated according to
the standard of living in the country.
Additional considerations with respect to per-
sonnel are the methods of procurement, terms of
service, and any quality factors not covered under
manpower. An assessment of military leadership
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against a background of the military history and
traditions of the nation is valuable in a strategic
estimate.
Details on the ground forces training program
should include training of the individual soldier
as well as that of all types of units. The army
school system for officers and enlisted men, regular
and reserve, the character of training maneuvers,
and the overall effectiveness of instruction are
pertinent considerations.
Closely allied to training are the reserve and
mobilization systems. The total number of
trained reserves should be presented by age groups.
In regard to mobilization plans an estimate should
be made of the actual numbers which could be
called up and ready for field service on M-day, M
plus 30, M plus 60, etc.
Logistics
Logistics enters into every phase of military
activity: production, procurement, storage and
issue, transport of supplies, maintenance and re-
pair on the field, and evacuation of both equipment
and personnel. Many a battle or war has been lost
through logistics failures and contrariwise superb
logistics support made victory possible for Ameri-
can armies in the farflung campaigns of World
War II. More recently the failure of Chinese
Communist Forces in Korea to sustain offensives
for long periods of time has been due to their in-
ability to maintain the nesessary amount of ma-
teriel at the front to support their operations.
The better logistics of the United Nations, on the
other hand, has enabled a numerically smaller
force to contain the enemy attacks.
The analyst or researcher thus considers all
the factors of logistics in preparing an estimate
of a foreign army. He very quickly finds that he
needs accurate knowledge of industrial production
and economic affairs in order to make his analysis
complete.
Army logistics are of particular concern to the
Navy because the transport of men and supplies
for any overseas operation is a naval responsi-
bility. Logistic planning in the United States
Army is based on the "division slice," that is, the
total number of men in both combat and com-
munications zones. For example, a theater di-
vision slice totals 40,000 men: 30,000 in the combat
CONFIDENTIAL
156
zone (20,000 in the division area, 10,000 in corps
and army service areas) and 10,000 in the com-
munications zone.
H. G. Martin in Brassey's Annual for 1951
makes some interesting comparisons between the
division slice of American and Soviet Armies:
Within two months of the outbreak of war
the Soviet Army could probably mobilize
about 300 divisions; at the peak of its effort
in the late war its total of divisions amounted
to about 600. The Soviet Army achieves
this multiplicity of divisions by a process of
streamlining vigorously applied. Marshal
Vasilevski believes that it is the men in the
firing line who win battles. He sees to it,
therefore, that in the Soviet Army there shall
be as many men as possible in the firing line?
at the expense of the rearward services?and
that the ratio of weapons to men shall be
higher than in Western armies. He has be-
gun right down at rifle company level.
Whereas in a rifle company in the United
States Army there are thirty-seven men whose
primary jobs are cooking, signalling, M. T.
driving, or clerking, in a Soviet rifle company
all but two are there for one purpose only?
to shoot at the enemy . . .
Clearly the West has something here to
learn from Marshal Vasilevski's methods.
Russia, with a plethora of cheap manpower,
has given us, with our manpower shortage,
a striking lesson in economy of administra-
tive overheads. Clerical staffs, cooks, or-
derlies, M. T. drivers, signals, engineering
and medical services?Marshal Vasilevski
prunes the lot ruthlessly.
Of course, his is a comparatively simple
problem. He can afford to cut overheads
because he is dealing with men accustomed
to conditions that more civilized Westerners
would find intolerable. For instance, in the
Soviet Army there is no personal documen-
tation of soldiers below the rank of major;
the medical battalion of a division is only
eighty strong.
Moreover, Vasirevski is faced by the fact
that in Russia there is no educated class of
minor technicians. Thus with the best will
in the world he could not have provided the
Soviet artillery with the men to do the sur-
vey, work out the computations, and man the
? observation posts on a western scale. Per-
force, he must there cut overheads at the
sacrifice of some flexibility of fire of his ar-
tillery.
Finally, he has a comparatively small zone
of communications to deal with. If war
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should come, the Soviet Army would advance
from its bases in Occupied Eastern Europe
in an attempt to overrun the western fringe.
Throughout, Vasilevski would be fighting al-
most on his own doorstep; but not so the
United States or even the British armies?
theirs would be an overseas campaign, fought
through a zone of communications that must
add greatly to the magnitude of the divisional
slice. Nonetheless, when we have made all
these allowances we still are left with our
lesson to learn. The West cannot afford to
put so few of its soldiers into battle.?Bras-
my's Annual, The Armed Forces Yearbook,
1951, pp. 261-2.
Materiel
Intelligence on ground forces materiel is gained
through detailed information on ordnance, signal,
and engineer equipment, quartermaster, chemical,
and medical supplies. Tables of characteristics
must be prepared for specific items in each cate-
gory of ordnance and quality as well as quantity
described. Quartermaster supplies include uni-
form, insignia, decorations, individual and unit
equipment. Any experimentation with new items
of materiel should be noted. Often the Quarter-
master Corps is currently engaged in a number of
research projects to determine the adaptability
of such things as clothing for certain weather con-
ditions, and the Engineers may be testing a new
type of portable bridge. Information on medical
supplies, facilities, and equipment are important
in evaluating the combat effectiveness of the army
in the field. The existence, for example, of a
national blood bank for military use should not
escape the analyst's notice.
Obviously every nut and bolt cannot be de-
scribed, and so the problem becomes one of se-
lection of significant items representative of type
and class. Photographs or sketches are always
helpful. It is in this subdivision of armed forces
intelligence that technical intelligence makes its
greatest contribution. Conclusions reached by
the technical evaluator often have far wider im-
plications than those apparent from the examina-
tion of an individual piece of equipment.
NAVAL FORCES
To make an appraisal of the naval forces of a
foreign country the factors considered are in prin-
ciple much the same as those for the ground forces.
Organization, strength and disposition, strategic
and tactical doctrine, personnel, training, logistics,
and materiel have a similar bearing on the deter-
mination of strengths and weaknesses. Com-
parisons with the U. S. Navy and American
equivalents of nomenclature will give proper per-
spective to the study of foreign navies.
Organization
In addition to diagrams showing the overall
command and administration of the navy, maps
outlining the naval districts, and discussion of the
functions of the more important department and
staff components of the naval establishment, spe-
cial attention should be given to naval communi-
cations. The organization of naval communica-
tions networks, and the various existing naval
communications facilities can also be graphically
presented on charts and maps.
Tactical and administrative organization of the
forces afloat should include shipboard organiza-
tion of typical units. Shore support activities,
and their relation to the fleet should be described.
If quasi-naval organizations, such as Coast
Guard, Coast Artillery, Coast Watchers, and Ma-
rine Corps are not adequately covered in the pre-
ceding sections on the armed forces as a whole,
these should be properly included here.
Strength and Disposition
The disposition of ships into fleets and forces,
names, types, and status of individual units can
be presented in tabular form. Such information
is never static, so the analyst should keep a card
file on each naval vessel on which entries can be
made to keep location and status up-to-date. The
number of vessels in "mothballs," those used for
reserve training, and those undergoing extensive
repairs or alterations in shipyards should be clearly
indicated.
The total number of naval personnel should be
broken down according to rank and rate, regular
and reserve. The proportion serving in ships and
at the shore activities of the naval establishment
should be shown.
Policy and Doctrine
The capabilities of the navy in fulfilling its mis-
sion with the forces available are fundamental con-
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siderations in a strategic estimate. What factors
influence naval thinking and strategic concepts?
Are naval problems of real national concern, or
must the navy wage annual battles with the legis-
lature to obtain an adequate operating budget?
How is naval doctrine formulated? Is it in-
fluenced particularly by war experiences? Has
the navy developed independent of foreign influ-
ences? What are the naval traditions of the
country?
Every country which has a navy will also have
a naval construction and development program.
The political and economic factors bearing upon
such plans must be noted. The Scandinavian
countries, for example, are developing navies suit-
able for coast defense and operation in restricted
waters. The U. S. S. R. has been concentrating
on submarines, destroyers, and light cruisers. Any
foreign alliances the country may have will also
influence naval policy and planning.
Personnel
The considerations which applied to army per-
sonnel can serve as a guide to examination of the
personnel of the navy: corps and services, rank
and rate structure, procurement, conditions of serv-
ice for both officers and enlisted men, uniforms
and insignia. United States Navy equivalents of
rank are important items of information in ob-
serving naval honors when United States naval
vessels are visiting foreign ports or when a foreign
naval vessel comes to our shores.
Reserve, Mobilization, and Training
The recommissioning of ships in time of war,
the naval reserve organization, the extent to which
the merchant marine can augment the navy, and
the adequacy of the mobilization system are major
considerations. The effectiveness of the training
system for officers and men must be assessed, in
basic and specialist schools ashore, on shipboard,
and in maneuvers of fleets and forces. Any spe-
cial methods of instruction should be described;
for example, the extent to which visual aids are
employed, the realistic nature of exercises, or the
use of educational facilities outside the navy.
Logistics
In addition to a description of the system of
procurement and supply of naval materiel, the
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policy in the construction, repair, and maintenance
of naval vessels should be noted. Are naval or
private shipyards in the country capable of doing
all kinds of such work? Must the navy rely on
foreign sources for any essential items? Where
are the main naval depots located? Does the navy
have fuel supply problems?
Ship Design and Characteristics
Of interest for strategic intelligence purposes
is the adequacy of ship design for operations in
certain areas. A ship designed for use in the
waters of the North Sea may be entirely unsuited
for tropical waters due to lack of an air condition-
ing system. Arctic operations also require special
ship design features. If amphibious operations
are included in the navy's capabilities, careful at-
tention should be given to the charactertistics of
landing ships and craft. If there are aircraft
carriers in the fleet, their strategic characteristics
must be assessed in relation to the capabilities or
vulnerablities of naval air forces.
158
Materiel
Tabular summaries of the characteristics of all
types of naval materiel are required: guns and
ammunition, torpedoes, mines, antisubmarine
weapons, electronic and communications equip-
ment. Any deficiencies in quality or supply of
particular items which affect the capabilities of
certain ships, or of the navy as a whole, are
significant considerations in strategic intelligence.
AIR FORCE
A strategic estimate of a nation's air forces
must give consideration to the same factors as
previously applied to the army and navy. The
naval air arm, if such exists, can either be included
with land-based air or discussed in connection
with the navy. The analyst must take care to
emphasize salient points of strength and weakness.
In the light of the mission of the air forces, a
careful study should be made of their capabilities,
both as regards aircraft and personnel. Doctri-
nal concepts in the utilization of available aircraft
in time of war must be studied.
Tactical Air Support
Two types of tactical air support, close and
general, must be considered. In close air sup-
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port, air action is integrated with the fire and
movement of friendly ground forces against hos-
tile targets or objectives. General air support
comprises air operations against enemy air activi-
ties, ground elements, installations, and lines of
communication which assist the supported ground
forces but are not in such proximity that inte-
gration with their fire and movements is required.
The capabilities of the air force in respect to both
types of support, must be determined. The maxi-
mum number and types of aircraft that can be
assigned to such missions initially and on a sus-
tained basis are important factors. Evaluation
criteria will be performance in past wars and
the emphasis given tactical air support in cur-
rent training programs. The air forces doctrine
in tactical air operations must be compared to that
of the USAF and the USMC.
Strategic Air Capabilities
Here the analyst is concerned with the maxi-
mum number and types of bombers available ini-
tially and on a sustained basis. Range, bomb-
load, maintenance of aircraft, availability of pilots
and crews, location of bases, and many technical
matters enter into such an estimate.
The country's air defense system, that is, its
ability to resist foreign air operations, is closely
allied to offensive capabilities. Interest will cen-
ter on the air defense organization, warning and
intercept systems, including electronic equipment,
types and deployment of aircraft defense units,
and the effectiveness of antiaircraft artillery. De-
tails will include types of radar, antiaircraft guns
and fire control equipment, guided missiles, bal-
loon barrage, searchlights, airborne electronic
equipment, and techniques in electronic counter-
measures. The average analysts will require a
great deal of expert technical assistance in the
compilation of such data.
Another capability to which attention should be
given is related to strategic air reconnaissance.
With what types of planes is reconnaissance con-
ducted? What types of cameras are used? How
skillful are the nation's photographic technicians
and photo interpreters?
Air Order of Battle
Air Order of Battle, similar to that of the army,
provides data on identification, strength, and gen-
159
eral disposition of the units, personnel, and equip-
ment of the air forces. Units are described by
types, mission, and location, with comments on ex-
tent of training, experience, and combat readiness.
Aircraft and equipment are identified according
to the numbering system, special markings, and
insignia. Source and number of aircraft acqui-
sitions are included.
The background for order of battle data is a
thorough study of the organizational relationship
of major and subordinate commands and units,
general control, and administrative and staff func-
tions at all echelons. Again as a standard of com-
parison it is helpful to have an understanding of
the organizational components of the United
States Air Force, the types of aircraft included
in the complement of each, how service and supply
functions are administered, and what facilities are
needed for effective operation.
Training
The training program of a nation's air force is
most significant for the strategic analyst. He
must evaluate its effectiveness in meeting the cur-
rent requirements of the air forces, its capability
for wartime expansion, and the adequacy of train-
ing equipment and facilities. Primary, basic, and
advanced flight training are each considered with
respect to duration in months, location of schools,
curriculum content, number of trainees admitted
annually, types of aircraft used, special training
aids, and quality of instruction. A consideration
of operational training will include such aspects
as gunnery, rocketry, bombing, navigation, instru-
ment training, night flying, and combat tactics for
each type of aircraft. The training of ground offi-
cers and airmen in such key specialties as opera-
tions, weather, engineering, supply, communica-
tions, and radar must not be overlooked.
Many foreign countries have sent air forces per-
sonnel to the United States for training or obser-
vation. The analyst should attempt to determine
the effect this contact with American training
methods has had upon training policy and doctrine
in the country from which the visitors have come.
Often their experiences have strongly influenced
relations between the two nations in areas other
than military.
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Air Facilities
INTELLIGENCE FOR
Strategic intelligence regarding a foreign air
force includes a complete description and assess-
ment of the air facilities of the nation. Each fa-
cility must be analyzed to determine its suitabil-
ity for combat air operations and capability for
airlift activity in support of combat operations.
Maps, diagrams, and photos are necessary ad-
juncts to a thorough appraisal. Current and pro-
jected construction should be included, and special
attention given to possibilities for extension of
runways and general expansion of installations.
Climate and topography are often controlling fac-
tors in a nation's development of air facilities.
Any limitations caused by these factors in certain
areas should be ascertained. The meteorological
services of the country and the use the air forces
make of them are pertinent in this connection.
Other Considerations
The study and evaluation of personnel, reserve
and mobilization systems, logistics, and materiel
of foreign air forces will embody the same gen-
eral considerations as were previously outlined for
the army and navy, with variations in details as
applicable.
BIOGRAPHICAL INTELLIGENCE
Biographical intelligence has the important
function of providing information on individual
persons in foreign countries and, as has been pre-
viously suggested, this component of intelligence
is essential to all of the others. Knowledge about
leaders in government, politics, science, education,
military services, and business will not only be
helpful in evaluating aspects of these general
fields, but also may provide valuable clues to prob-
able courses of action. The background, person-
ality, enthusiasms, and prejudices of such indi-
viduals constitute vital considerations in an eval-
uation of national strengths and weaknesses. In
the sociological component the people are consid-
ered collectively and characteristics common to
groups are ascertained; biographic intelligence re-
fines this study, centering interest on the dominant
figures within the groups.
Obviously the intelligence researcher cannot
keep extensive data on all individuals. His pri-
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NAVAL OFFICERS
mary task is therefore one of selection, but he can-
not be limited to only those prominent in the con-
temporary scene. He should always be conscious
of the fact that leaders of tomorrow may now be
in relative obscurity, but there may be signs point-
ing to rising eminence or power.
The sources of biographical information are
many. In a great number of countries volumes
similar to the American "Who's Who" are pub-
lished at regular intervals, and official registers
list persons in government service. The daily
newspapers and a great variety of periodicals will
always contain additional information. Most
valuable of all are character and personality esti-
mates from those who know or have known the
individual professionally and socially.
The paragraphs below will serve as a guide to
the content of the ideal biographical file. It will
not always be possible to obtain all the data for
every individual but the goal is defined.
Vital Statistics
The items to include are those usual for identi-
fication purposes: full name, nationality, reli-
gion, residence address, date and place of birth,
general appearance, parents, etc. Uniformity in
spelling geographical names and in trans-literat-
ing from foreign languages which do not use the
Latin alphabet is essential to a good biographical
file. Valuable aids in this respect are standard
gazeteers such as that published by the Board of
Geographic Names of the Department of the In-
terior, and the Style Manual of the United States
Government Printing Office.
Education
The data here should include schools attended,
degrees conferred, and academic honors. Extra-
curricular activities can also be significant. If
the individual became the disciple of a certain
professor at an early age it may be reflected in his
later thought and attitudes. His foreign language
proficiency is another important consideration.
Personality
Thus far the biographical file has merely com-
piled a vita for the selected individual. When
we come to personality, intelligence begins to be
produced. An evaluation must be made of the
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personality traits which govern his behavior:
moral force and character, intelligence, personal
characteristics, opinions, and loyalty. Does he
have marked qualities of leadership? Is he a man
of strong convictions or are his opinions easily
changed by others? Are his ideas of right and
wrong well defined? Is he honest?
Those who have associated with the individual
can supply the best answers to questions concern-
ing his mental abilities, but much can be derived
also from any books or articles he has written or
his published utterances. Does he quickly compre-
hend new ideas and can he rise to the occasion
when he meets the unusual? Is he well educated
in the sense that he has a broad understanding of
local and international affairs? Has his perspec-
tive been enhanced by travel abroad and contacts
with a great variety of people? Does he have cer-
tain distinct prejudices? Is he pro- or anti-
American?
Personal characteristics comprise another con-
sideration. Is he energetic or lazy? What are his
drinking and eating habits? What are his usual
forms of recreation? In what social circles does
he move? Is he bold or cautious? What is the
state of his health and does it affect his activity?
Is he loyal to his country and his superiors?
Does he inspire loyalty in others?
Family
Family position or influence must not be over-
looked. Often an ambitious wife is "the power
behind the throne." Family ties are important
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161
influences in the lives of men, and are often mir-
rored in their careers. Is he a family man? Has
he used family connections in any way to achieve
certain goals or ambitions? Does he have children
whom he is encouraging to follow in his footsteps?
Relationship of Factors
Only a final consideration of all the above fac-
tors in the aggregate will give a complete picture
of the individual's administrative ability, profes-
sional competence, disposition, tact, sobriety, inter-
national sympathies and attitudes. Biographical
intelligence thus can be used to great advantage in
strategic estimates. It is intimately related to any
field where names make news.
The objective of the foregoing discussion has
been to outline broadly the logical division of in-
telligence knowledge into component parts, and
to indicate to a degree their nature, comprehen-
siveness, interrelationships, importance, uses, and
sources. The applicability and utility of this great
body of knowledge in relation to current world
problems is suggested by the following three
chapters which are, in effect, topical summaries
in the field of international relations: elements of
world power, factors in the foreign relationships
of the United States, and salient features of World
Communism and the U. S. S. R. These chapters
will also contribute to the development of the
naval officer's perspective in his approach to mat-
ters of intelligence concern.
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CHAPTER 6
ELEMENTS OF WORLD POWER
In approaching a study of international rela-
tions a naval officer assigned to intelligence duties
should keep in mind three basic points. First, a
nation's power position in relation to other nations
of the world is determined by its comparative
strength in various of the categories described in
the previous chapter as the components of intelli-
gence knowledge. Second, a nation's strategy to-
ward other nations is influenced directly or
indirectly by its own relative standing in one or
more of these categories. Third, in the exercise of
national power there have developed in the course
of modern history certain recognized procedural
patterns which apply to relationships between
nations. A valuable aid to such a study is an
understanding of the elements of world power and
their effect on the behavior of nations.
For many years, problems of international
power relations were viewed in a somewhat de-
tached manner by the United States, and its
peoples tended to adopt an idealistic approach.
World War II and subsequent events had a tre-
mendous impact on that point of view and ap-
proach; the United States found itself directly
involved in problems of world dimension and its
idealism attacked. However, as an aid to finding
solutions, America's idealism is a vital factor, a
very real force that must be preserved, for it repre-
sents the symbol of personal freedom and justice in
a chaotic and frustrated world. But idealism is
not to be confused with a denial of realities or of
the basic facts relating to them. Perhaps for the
first time in American and world history there is
much more at stake than the survival of present
political institutions. The very structure of our
social life is threatened. Modern technology
makes all parts of the world accessible to every
other, and philosophies opposed to our own are for
the first time organized and regimented on a world
scale. Therefore, a sober concentration on solu-
tions to problems of international relations is
essential, not only for our own survival, but also
for the survival of those peoples with whom we
have kinship of spirit and tradition.
163
STRATEGIC GEOGRAPHY AND RESOURCE
POTENTIAL
Consideration of a nation's total power potential
involves all elements of its national power and
especially those of geography, resources, industrial
capacity, manpower, and technology. In study-
ing these elements separately, the intelligence offi-
cer, whatever his individual role, must have an
appreciation of the whole, an understanding of
how the particular facts he collects and assesses
ultimately compose the total estimate of a nation's
power. It will be helpful to discuss the elements
of world power from the point of view of the
United States.
Geographical Environment
Let us begin with a consideration of our geo-
graphical environment. In this world, man lives
principally on the large scattered islands known
as continents, and on lesser archipelagos. He has
made his greatest progress and shows the greatest
ambition in the temperate, lowland, regions. His
growing numbers and changing technology have
brought new stresses in the age-old fight for con-
trol of resources. In ancient times, the struggle
was for hunting, grazing, and agricultural lands.
Historically speaking, as a newcomer on the
planet, man has only recently developed written
languages and a real technology. The industrial
revolution and modern economic society date only
from the time of our most immediate ancestors,
within the last two centuries. Snowballing prog-
ress and new ambitions have centered major rival-
ries on control of natural resources, manpower,
transport routes, strategic positions, and mass
markets.
We in America find ourselves occupying a rich
continent newly settled in large numbers, with a
culture largely western European, which was
earlier subject to the civilizing influenced of Rome,
Greece and the Middle East. Our continent,
North America, in one sense is isolated by two
great oceans from the principal land mass of the
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world: Eurasia-Africa. In another sense, our iso-
lation is quite ephemeral when our map is not the
traditional Mercator but a globe or polar projec-
tion. In an age when jet aircraft, even following
the traditional routes, cross the ocean in a few
hours, and guided missiles on the drawing boards
will cross it in a few minutes, any vestigial ideas
of geographic isolation must be discarded.
Our technology is now so complex that what-
ever our military isolation or defenses at home
may be, full exploitation of our industry and our
acquired consumption habits require access to re-
sources far from our own frontiers. Possibly
only the United States and the Soviet Union would
be capable of maintaining their present living pat-
terns from the resources within their own bound-
aries. Even then our own high standard of living
would definitely be cut, and higher production
costs would be accompanied by plaguing short-
ages of key materials for which only inferior sub-
stitutes would be available.
Economic isolation is only one aspect of the
problem, for should we retreat within our own
walls, the smaller nations of the world, if organ-
ized or dominated by an aggressive power, would
in time far surpass even our own great industrial
and military potential, and today's new weapons
would banish any possibility of real defense in
depth. War in devastating form would come to
our own hearths.
Geographical Patterns
Let us then consider what are the geographic
patterns that govern what we and other nations
must defend for survival, and what are the routes
of attack, for these patterns should be basic keys
to conflict and strategy in the world, without re-
gard to political organization or to ideology so
long as mankind wars with his own species.
We are concerned with the position, the terrain,
the climate, the vegetation, the shape and size of
land, the resources, and the population of each
area or sovereign state. The power position of
each nation will be affected in some degree by
each of those elements. Power depends on mate-
rial factors, such as resources, capital goods, tech-
nology, and manpower; it also depends on in-
tangible factors that are harder to measure objec-
tively, such as the energy and central driving pur-
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164
pose, the steadfastness and traditions of a nation.
Some peoples, who by every objective test should
have disappeared long ago from the earth, have a
staying power that has helped them to survive oc-
cupation, dismemberment, and deportation.
Our first concern is with the tangible factors,
the physical patterns. The reader should refer to
a globe, if possible, and also to a good atlas, in-
cluding maps of physical relief, climate, and re-
sources distribution. Space here will not permit
particular study, region by region, but the ap-
proach and viewpoint can be delineated. Think-
ing of the military and political and economic
aspects, study your maps to observe the land and
the water pattern of the world. Where are the
land bridges that armies use? Where are water
trade routes channelized for contending naval
powers to dispute control? The patterns of
mountain ranges, and of deserts are important, as
well as the vegetation lines that indicate the shifts
from tropical rain forest to savannahs to desert
to steppe to temperate forest, and so on until the
tree line and the various crop lines mark the polar
or high central Asian regions. These changes give
clues to the significance of regions in their poten-
tial for supporting man and his crops and ani-
mals, and for their effects on military movement.
Throughout history military barriers to traffic-
ability and movement have dominated campaigns
and their outcome. Changing technology has
modified this only in part, for as men have in-
vented devices to overcome these barriers, so have
they frequently found other tools to neutralize
these advances. Deserts are of prime importance
as barriers, whether they be dry deserts of the
temperate and tropic areas or the frozen wastes
where survival is always a problem. Mountains
serve as great defense lines against military move-
ment, though, of course, the test of the barrier
lies in the passes through it, not in the individual
peaks of the main ramparts. Even open plains
are a major obstacle when by season they alter-
nate between soft mud and windswept snow or
cold. In some degree, swamps and marshes,
jungles and rain forests, oceans and rivers chan-
nelize and restrict military movement, unless the
means to bridge them are at hand. Invading
forces from the sea find that coasts are not uni-
form in nature, and that only a few beaches and
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ports lend themselves to mass invasion. Of
course, there are man-made obstacles to military
movement, but in contrast with nature's, they de-
serve scant attention here.
With these general clues to factors affecting
military movement, both history and the contem-
porary scene can be viewed in a new light as one
studies problems of military and naval campaigns.
A good grasp of the general position of countries,
the barriers of terrain, vegetation, und climate
that aid or hinder them, is basic to an understand-
ing of their power position. Clear recognition of
the difference between oceanic and continental
climates may give clues to the success or failure
of campaigns. As a further uid to full under-
standing, one should study maps from several
approaches. The geographic position of coun-
tries takes on new meaning when maps are turned
in unconventional directions. It is only custom
and convenience that makes us consider north as
"up.,,
Controlling Resources
Historians theorize that modern civilization be-
gan as the last ice age receded, allowing the two
keys of geography and resources to open the door
to progress. In the ancient world of Egypt and
Mesopotamia in the west, and in the protected val-
leys of Sinkiang and Kokonor in the east, simple
communal living rapidly blossomed into complex
civilizations. In the Middle East, rich alluvial
plains with wild rice in abundance led to settled
farming and the further domestication of animals
which had begun in nomadic days on the grass
lands of Asia. Sedentary living led to building
cities, codifying laws, and written communica-
tion. In time, smelting metals, farming, and
trade became widespread.
Today the controlling resources include more
than plentiful food, for the age of reason, ex-
perimentation, and exploration brought mechani-
cal inventions that depend on a wide range of
natural resources. The key to national power
today is not alone food, but energy derived from
coal, oil, and, to a lesser extent, water power, and
iron, which is still the chief metal, since the bronze
age was left behind thousands of years ago. These
are then the major elements of real power, but
there are a host of others, strategic in nature,
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whose particular properties support the alloys
and specialties of metallurgy, the growing chemi-
cal, plastics, and electronic industries, newly dis-
covered methods in agriculture, and, of course,
that new key to power, the development of nuclear
energy.
Food patterns are still important, for indus-
trialization and modern transport have developed
dense concentrations of population which depend
for survival upon orderly flow of their sustenance.
Wheat, rice, corn, barley, sugar, fats and oils,
fruits, beans, fish, meat and dairy products fill
thousands of ships on the ocean highways of the
world, and load the great rail networks across the
continents. Shipments of tea, coffee, tobacco, and
chocolate may also be considered essential, for they
contribute to morale, one of the intangibles in
national power.
Industrial Location
Modern economics has given importance to the
theory of location of industrial activity. In
simple terms, it recognizes that locations of raw
materials, power, labor supply, and markets all
interact with transport costs and material char-
acteristics to determine where industry is to be
found. Changing technology alters the force of
the various elements in the equation, but generally
speaking, industry is drawn to the source of the
materials it uses (if they are weight-losing in
processing) , to save transport costs. Thus the
modern dependence on mechanical power derived
from coal, oil, or hydro-electricity tends to draw
industry to these materials. Pittsburgh, the
Ruhr, Manchuria, the English Midlands all dem-
onstrate this tendency.
Some countries by strenuous efforts have tried
to overcome their natural deficiencies, but they
face a losing battle. Italy's large industrial popu-
lation tries to earn enough through trade to pay
for imported coal. Japan, now restricted to her
home islands, also depends heavily on imported
materials. Even the United States, though well
supplied with fuel, must consider the full military
implications of replacing the ore from the nearly
exhausted Mesabi range with ores from abroad,
thus losing the advantage of cheap haul through
the Great Lakes.
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INTELLIGENCE FOR NAVAL OFFICERS
Coal is still the dominant fuel of the world
and must be ranked highest among essential mate-
rials for economic, and consequently military,
strength. It generates steam to provide electric-
ity, has a major role in metallurgy, and can be
used to make a host of chemical products including
gasoline. Oil is a second important source, as a
principal source of fuel for millions of internal
combustion engines, and also as a raw material
for the chemical industry which, among other
things, supplies rubber substitutes.
Iron and steel follow closely after fuel as major
essentials, but the dominance of these particular
resources should not make us disregard the vital
though smaller role of copper, lead, manganese,
sulphur, zinc, aluminum, nickel, and tin.
Modern industry is built upon a great number
of major and minor materials. Salt, phosphate,
potash, mica, asbestos, industrial diamonds,
graphite, nitrates, mercury?all are essentials.
The metals that alloy with iron must be available
if tools are to keep their cutting edges, if armor
plate is to stop projectiles, or if springs are to keep
their resilience. Likewise tungsten, antimony,
chromium, palladium, and molybdenum must be
added to manganese and nickel to expand the list
of essential alloys.
From our fields and plantations, in addition to
food, come cotton, flax, and other hard and bast
fibres?jute, abaca, sisal, ramie, and hemp. We
also depend on wool, leather, hides, and bone.
Rubber, though increasingly available in syn-
thetic form, is provided from the tropics. Our
temperate area forests, wastefully cut until re-
cently, provide us with principal building mate-
rials, with paper, a modern-day essential, with
raw materials for plastics, with distillates, and
naval stores.
Even water is an important resource, not only
to quench our thirst and to water- our crops, but
also for industry which consumes it in enormous
quantities. It provides transport routes and hy-
dro-electric power, the latter of which can create
nitrates for fertilizer and explosives directly from
the atmosphere. Our electric power system, draw-
ing upon the energy of water, coal, oil, and gas, is
a prime target for any enemy, and its growing size
is an index of our strength.
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166
Our resources are of two types: replaceable and
irreplaceable. To date, modern technology and
field exploration have kept our standard of living
rising despite a profligate waste of irreplaceable
resources. Perhaps the sea can be made to yield
what can no longer be found on dry land, but defi-
nite dangers to our economic and military strength
loom not far ahead.
Strategic Materials
We define strategic materials as those critically
short in relation to our need for them. One of the
prices of World War II was that it greatly ex-
panded the list of strategic materials the United
States should stockpile or protect overseas, if our
security is to be maintained. The appearance of
an item on the strategic list should immediately
set in motion measures to offset the potential dan-
ger of shortage. What steps are taken depend
upon circumstances at the time, but among the
possibilities are new searches at home for these
materials, production controls and consumption
restrictions, measures to assure overseas supply
sources, creation of import stimulants and export
quotas, assignment of necessary manpower to ex-
ploit sources of these materials, initiation of con-
servation and recovery measures, the adoption of
special measures to prevent crippling sabotage of
our limited supply, and the development of sub-
stitutes. Actually, in the case of many materials
which are running short in usable form, there
may be marginal and submarginal deposits that
can be exploited, but the cost may well be inordi-
nate in time, manpower, and capital equipment.
Resources in the ground or in the forest do not
of themselves make for strength. Many richly
potential stores of materials lie in undeveloped
and weak countries. It is only with capital ac-
cumulation, know-how, manpower, and transport,
that these resources are translated into power
through production and delivery for use.
Capacity To Produce
0 ur assessment of a country's power must there-
fore measure not only its stores of materials but
also its actual capacity to produce. Quantitative
data of major semimanufactures and finished
products give a part of the answer. These data
in turn must be linked to plant capacity indices.
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Are all plants operating at full capacity ? Are
trained manpower, raw materials, power, and
transport available to work more shifts? Next,
we ask, can any of these plants readily be converted
to the production of war goods? Tractor plants
may make tanks. Automobile plants may switch
to aircraft engines or subassemblies, or it may be
that plant expansion will provide the answer to
real military strength. If the building materials
and machine tools can be set aside for use in new
factories, rather than go directly into war produc-
tion, the eventual output of war goods may be very
high. All of these matters are interrelated and
very complex. Knowledge is still too inadequate
concerning the relative effectiveness of price and
tax incentives, or of government orders and con-
trols, to give categorical answers in all situations.
It should be stressed that military power is not
measured alone by the production indices of out-
put, capacity, conversion, and expansion, for
civilian consumption may compete with military
requirements. Thirty million tons of steel in one
country may count for more militarily than one
hundred million in another, if the latter country
uses virtually all of its steel for civilian consump-
tion, as against heavy military use in the first. On
the other hand, given a big enough crisis, the rich
consumer country has a bigger cushion that can be
diverted to military ends, or may at least launch
a great program of plant expansion. These are
imponderables that are solved only by careful and
qualified analysis, not by catch phrases and popu-
lar fancy. For the length of the war, the sud-
denness of its coming, the temper of the people,
the dispersion of facilities as protection against
surprise air attack, are all variables that affect the
answer. There have been numerous examples of
the complexity of a partial mobilization in the
time since the Korean War began. How far can
taxes be pushed to curb inflation without drying
up needed capital for expansion or reducing tra-
ditional incentives? Will controls aid fair dis-
tribution at low prices, or will they create a huge
bureaucracy and reduce total supply? Well-
informed and patriotic Americans find themselves
arriving at different answers.
A number of agencies and offices of the executive
branch of the United States Government, assisted
by private research groups and congressional staff
167
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studies, are involved in guiding the planning for
war mobilization. From their work come the
plans that direct stockpiling of essential materials,
the mobilization manufacturing and control plans,
and the assessments of national strength. A com-
plete assessment of our power must be compared
step by step with that of our allies and our rivals
to draw up the balance sheet that will indicate
where there is need to expand, to divert, and to
contract for national security essential to survival,
but at the same time saving the mainsprings of
long-range progress and traditional patterns of
living. These agencies study agriculture, giving
consideration to the methods used, manpower and
materials demands, regularity and quantity of
various crops, and availability of additional lands
for expansion. The extractive industries of min-
ing, forestry, and fisheries yield data on output per
worker, capital requirements, availability of re-
serves, and new processes becoming available. The
basic metallurgical and chemical industries have
indices of production, changing methods, and
varying efficiencies; for example, blast furnaces
serve as an index of productive capacity, yet one
country may run them harder and faster than
another to increase current yield of pig iron even
at the expense of destruction of capital equipment.
Study of the permanent munitions industries is
important to the total picture, too. The shipyards,
the explosives manufacturers and arsenals, and
the atomic plants, are typical cases. Certain civil-
ian goods industries are particularly susceptible
to military conversion. The television industry of
America may have given civilians home receivers
instead of those same resources going into a com-
plete air defense radar net, but at the same time,
the existence of a huge electronics industry will
supply the conversion capacity in war for radar
on an immense scale, and the coaxial cables and
microwave relay networks may speed military
communications. The engineering and machine
tool industries are important, because their ability
to produce will determine ability to turn out novel
weapons of war in time to use on a mass basis.
Economic Vulnerability
Once such broad, general studies have been made
of our own resources, and, with the aid of intelli-
gence, of those of other countries, there are spe-
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cific studies and individual conclusions which
must next be undertaken. One area of concern is
that of vulnerabilities, both here and in foreign
countries. Is the flow of raw material subject to
interruption, as, for example, the Soo Locks or
the TAP line? Are there technological bottle-
necks in such industries as ball bearings or avia-
tion gas? Is capacity limited by poor transport
facilities; for example, the Baku oil fields and Ven-
ezuelan iron ore? Is a specialized labor force
available? Can watchmakers work on precision
instruments? Do we have sufficient oil well rig-
gers? In what degree are different industries in-
terdependent or are they competing for a common
labor or power supply? Is steel available for final
products or for steel plant expansion?
National power, too, is linked with defenses, for
a great industrial machine unguarded is an invi-
tation to attack. Defenses may be active, made up
of radar nets, jet fighters, balloon barrages, and
AA guns, or they may be passive and equally
effective, such as duplication of facilities, region-
ally decentralized into far reaches of the country,
or locally dispersed from the center of urban areas
to offer targets of lower density and therefore less
attractiveness. In some cases facilities may re-
treat to hilly country or even underground.
Transport Assessment
Increasingly, transport is being subjected to
analysis and study, for it is a major factor in
power. Britain's plan for agricultural develop-
ment in Tanganyika, many other "backward" area
development plans, and Soviet strength all have
suffered from poor transport. Even the United
States must consider the repercussions in the long
run of low railway earnings, and of inadequate
highway modernization. Assessments must there-
fore be made of facilities, as to capacity, efficiency
in ton-miles per day, and per worker, repair and
fuel needs, the bottlenecks in marshalling yards,
bridges, tunnels, and steep grades.
It is difficult to measure foreign progress ade-
quately due to incomplete statistics. Figures are
rarely comparable, frequently are withheld, and
often lack meaning due to inadequate qualification
and definition. If only a few figures are to be
chosen, the key ones for national power should in-
clude electric energy production, steel production,
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168
and transport data such as car loadings, and ton-
miles hauled.
Manpower Assessment
Manpower has already been mentioned; it rep-
resents a significant measure of power both for
the present and for the future of a country, when
coupled with information on geography, raw ma-
terials, and industry. Mere numbers alone, or
even the military age numbers, are only the begin-
ning for a power analysis. The data on numbers
must be supplemented by detailed breakdowns on
distribution by geographical location, and by den-
sity in relation to developed resources. Trends
are important. Is the population stationary, ris-
ing, or falling? If it is rising, what is the rate
of increase? At what height and when will the
population level off? The sex-age group distri-
bution or pyramid will tell what the labor force
and the military supply will be now, 10 years from
now, and even farther in the future. The supply
of females of child-bearing age, related to other
data, will forecast shifts in the population. Quali-
tative population analysis will help to assess some
of the intangibles of national power. The break-
downs by education, cultural background, and
technical skill are important. Tables on national
origin, political parties, and religion may give
important leads to questions of national cohe-
sion. Economic groupings, tied to national and
personal income statistics or land holdings, may
answer questions on the appeal of communism or
land redistribution. Although social scientists
may quarrel with the statistical validity of mass
personality traits, from a purely pragmatic view
there seems to be definite value in studying typical
traits of national character, for they may give
clues to determination, objectives, subjectivity to
hysteria or impatience, and other elements that
influence an assessment of foreign nations'
behavior.
In the long run, national population trends will
have their effects on the power position and foreign
policies of countries. Medical, economic, intel-
lectual, and religious environment factors affect
birth rates and death rates as well. A shift in
either rate will affect population growth. Al-
though we have come a long way from the pessi-
mism of Malthus, the growth of the total world
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population can be a subject of grave concern.
Density data as such are meaningless in isolation,
for Australia will never catch up with the United
States, despite her area, and China has nothing like
the overall density of the Netherlands, yet is prob-
ably more "overcrowded." Net reproduction
rates, adjusted for migration and possible life
span changes, are key data to power calculations.
Total Power Potential
These elements reviewed in the foregoing sec-
tion, then, are the basis for estimating the total
power potential of a nation. No one element is
dominant, neither industry, nor resources, nor
manpower, but all are considered jointly with
questions of geographical location, climate, and
topography. Also important are the questions of
vulnerability, of trends as well as of present situa-
tion, or capacity to produce munitions as well as
total industrial capacity. By no means can the
intangibles of national spirit and determination be
ignored, and in this day and age the ability to
adapt national life to so-called "Cold War" may
rival in importance the strictly conventional mo-
bilization of the nation. This brings us to the
next topic, the bridge between the assessment of
national resources, in the broad sense, and politi-
cal relations among nations, namely, geopolitics.
GEOPOLITICS AND STRATEGY
The formal study of all the aforementioned
power factors in relation to geography and na-
tional strategy is called geopolitics, a term that
has been made unsavory only because of its mis-
application by Nazi theorists. The scientific
study of geopolitics is not only proper, but es-
sential to our national well-being. It is of par-
ticular interest to intelligence analysts because of
its possible influence on the thinking of foreign
political leaders and, hence, on the strategic plan-
ning of various nations. A knowledge of geo-
political concepts may give clues, therefore, to esti-
mates of national behavior. Treatment of this
subject here can only be cursory.
Mackinder and Mahan
In 1904, an Englishman, Mackinder, introduced
the concept of the world island with its heartland,
safe from assault by seapower. The heartland is
169
described as the territory encompassing much of
the Soviet Union and the suzerainties under nomi-
nal Chinese control, such as Sinkiang, Mongolia,
and Tibet. The lands around the edge of the
world island, which can be dominated by seapower,
are referred to as the marginal crescent. The
Americas are regarded as an outer island. Of
course, such concepts are meaningful only in a
limited sense, for new map projections, air travel
and guided missiles rob the heartland concept of
considerable meaning. The concepts are impor-
tant, however, because they have influenced the
thinking and policies of many leaders since Mack-
inder's time. The idea "whoever controls the
heartland controls the world island; whoever con-
trols the world island controls the world" is an
oversimplification, and although it has an ele-
ment of truth, it is not a substitute for the careful
and detailed analysis of national power previously
recommended.
Mahan of the United States Navy was the great
exponent of sea power. His voluminous writings
do not precisely delineate seapower, but general
concepts can be derived from them. Seapower is
related to the control of the commercial arteries of
the world. It is the outgrowth of proper access to
the sea coupled with the industry necessary to sup-
port merchant ships and navies. The right bal-
ance of fleets, control of strategic bases and fuel
supplies, good training and morale, all combine to
create sea power. Mahan felt that no nation has
the ability and capital to be both a great sea power
and a great land power, either one resulting in a
serious drain on resources. Although in some
way a comforting doctrine, it may not be com-
pletely valid.
Other influential writers in this field were Ratzel
in Germany, Semple in the United States, and
Kjellen in Sweden. Ratzel believed that geog-
raphy dominated history, and he considered the
state as a living organism. Coordinating his
theories of selection and survival with those of
Darwin, he attributed a spatial aggrandizement
instinct to states? a theory somewhat difficult to
support as a universal law. Semple was a disciple
of Ratzel. Kjellen considered the state as not
just a legal entity but as a living being. It was
he who coined the expression "geopolitics," and in-
fluenced the pan-German movement, believing that
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one German state should spread from Scandinavia
to the Near East.
The American, Spykman, instead of opposing
seapower to land power, envisioned seapower as
joining with land power in one part of the world
to fight similar combinations elsewhere. Consid-
ering interior communications to be poor, he put
stress on control of the rimland rather than the
heartland and believed that the United States must
oppose any attempt to dominate the rimland or
crescent.
German Interpretations
Under the aegis of Hitler, Germany adapted
Mahan's and Mackincler's doctrines to her own
ends, with General Haushofer as the chief
prophet. The Auslands organization and Geo-
politic Institute combined studies of geopolitics
with an intelligence collection program for plan-
ning Germany's strategy.
Haushofer considered that a Soviet-Japanese
combination of land and sea power would be dan-
gerous. Because of improved land transport, he
tended to discount seapower and thought that if
Germany could move to dominate Eurasia, its
position as world leader would be assured. Spe-
cifically, he favored a number of policies which
markedly influenced Hitlerite Germany. These
included autarchy, (national economic self-suffi-
ciency), "lebensraum" (enough space for a vigo-
rous, growing people), and a three-way split of
the world, in which the United States would domi-
nate pan-America, Germany would dominate
Europe including Russia, the Middle East, and
Africa, and Japan would dominate Asia and the
South Pacific. He saw German control of the
marginal crescent as a means to add seapower to
her land power. Also he believed that a nation's
frontier should be along a natural boundary, for
any other frontier represented no more than a
temporary truce line in time of peace. Peacetime,
further, was viewed just as a breathing spell be-
tween wars, a time to out-flank and encircle the
enemy. International agreements were to build
balance of power, not world security.
All the great powers in considerable degree
have operated geopolitically, whether they recog-
nized the fact or not. Their use of geopolitics may
have been more or less benevolent, or it may have
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170
NAVAL OFFICERS
been aggressive. The Truman Plan of contain-
ment represents an application of Mackinder's
theories. Although unable or unwilling to strike
at the heartland, the United States has been de-
termined to prevent the heartland leaders from
seizing all of the marginal crescent that might
allow them to add seapower to their land power,
and thus dominate the world.
Many of these geopolitical concepts need re-
finement and modification in the light of the
changing conditions. Atomic concepts of war-
fare and power may well modify accessibility in
the military sense. The Arctic no longer repre-
sents a dead space, but rather a crucial direct air
route between the power centers of the world.
The concept of imperial domination has been re-
placed by that of consultation as a guiding rule
in the relationships between many world states.
Airpower Concepts
To Mahan's doctrine of seapower and the Ger-
man-Soviet doctrines of land power have been
added the doctrine of air power, first formulated
by General Billy Mitchell and Douhet, and later
vigorously presented to the public by Major de
Seversky, an ardent enthusiast. While this doc-
trine has given rise to heated debates involving
the concepts of a dominant arm versus balanced
military forces of approximately equal strength,
it may be concluded that sea power, land power,
and air power each have their potentialities and
limitations in the determination of national power.
To summarize, it must be admitted that history
has been strongly influenced by geography, that
defense in depth is a valid and compelling mili-
tary doctrine. Though the heartland and rim-
land ideas have strong elements of truth, how-
ever, modern world power is based not only on
location and size and shape, but also on resources,
demography, technology, and transport.
Power Politics
The United States in its public conscience has
disparaged power politics as an unworthy force,
and as a poor approach to world relations. Yet
the existence and use of power politics is ines-
capable, whatever this doctrine is called. We are
concerned with power to control the minds and
actions of men, particularly men organized to do
jointly what individuals could not do. Power is
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not force in its actual exercise, but it does imply
fear of force. United States power has been in-
creased by possession of the A-Bomb, even though
its use is potential. This power would be reduced
if controls were placed on its use, such as prior
approval by the United Nations or even by Con-
gress, since speed of reprisal may be the most
potent deterrent to a would-be aggressor. Eco-
nomic power can also be used for national power
purposes. Control over exports of finished goods
and raw materials needed by other countries is an
enormous source of power. There will be power
politics so long as nations keep their sovereignty.
If a few "enlightened" nations eschew its use,
they will be destroyed by the unenlightened.
Power politics may be used merely to hold exist-
ing positions, the status quo, to improve position
through expansionism or imperialism, or to main-
tain prestige by demonstrating that power.
INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL RELATIONS
It is very hard to be entirely objective in dis-
cussing international political relations. Each
nation tends to view its own conduct as above
criticism and the conduct of others as frequently
reprehensible. Even more, nations may often be
unjustly charged with responsibility for an in-
ternational situation because of the great difficulty
in accurately and correctly identifying the events
which led to the particular situation.
Any assessment for intelligence purposes must
be impartial and analytical: motivations both of
the nation and its leaders must be carefully stud-
ied. Certain general guides which may be help-
ful in making any evaluations involving interna-
tional relations are presented in this section.
The "Status Quo"
There is nothing especially sacrosanct about the
status quo, though this is a pretension of those
who are satisfied with it. The Congress of Vi-
enna, the Versailles Treaty, and the United Na-
tions have all had some part in maintaining things
as they were. It should be pointed out that status
quo does not refer to freezing of existing boun-
daries, though on occasion it may take that form,
but rather to maintaining an existing balance of
power. Those who maintain existing situations,
even though unfair, may have the weight of inter-
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national law behind them and be the upholders of
"peace." All challengers, of course, are called
"war mongers," regardless of the cause for which
they struggle. Certainly, those who would resort
to force carry the burden of justification for their
acts, and their propaganda is rarely adequate, or
accurate.
Imperialism
As opposed to the status quo, imperialism repre-
sents an attempt to bring about a favorable duinge
in a current world power situation. It refers to
a nation's policy aimed at an extension of power
over another area with or without the approval of
the peoples concerned. The motives, and the
means, for gaining this additional power may be
economic, political, military, or ideological, or a
combination thereof. Any analysis of this phe-
nomenon of national behavior will result in the
conclusion that it is exceedingly complex.
For many years, the term imperialism has been
in disrepute as the result, partly at least, of its
association with the policies of colonialism and
territorial aggrandizement carried on by various
European nations during the latter nineteenth
century at the expense of backward areas. Dur-
ing that time, a predominant motive was eco-
nomic competition, coupled with the search for
larger markets and sources of food and raw ma-
terials. However, there were other motives, such
as the desire for expanded political power and
prestige which might exert a dominating influence
in world affairs, the real or assumed need for pro-
viding greater guarantees for national security,
and the search for sources of potential military
manpower as well as areas of expansion for sur-
plus population.
There are curious inconsistencies in the inter-
pretation of this term. Mussolini found it an
expression of a nation's vitality. Marx and Lenin
explained it as entirely a product of capitalism, a
"dying" stage in which there was an inevitable
struggle between national monopolies in the inter-
national arena. They reasoned that by definition
communism could not be imperialistic because it
did not have the same need for new markets and
trade. In popular fancy, imperialism has been
associated with the "machinations" of Wall Street
and the munitions makers, the Japanese Zaibatsu
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emperor-worship, or the exploitation of colonial
subjects. But these interpretations are inade-
quate, since imperialism predates modern capital-
ism by thousands of years and, from the American
viewpoint, communist and socialist states have
demonstrated positive imperialistic tendencies, re-
gardless of the labels used.
The policy of imperialism has been considered
one of the causes of war. Wars actually arise for
many reasons which are usually composite and
complex in nature. There are so called "defen-
sive" wars, designed to keep the status quo, but
which often seek a permanent change in power to
prevent effective challenge to present positions.
Other wars are deliberately designed to expand
the power position of a country, even when it is
not threatened. The power vacuum theory applies
in some cases, too, when the strong powers, rush-
ing to dominate a newly weakened or discovered
area, clash in their efforts for supremacy. This
situation has been more recently demonstrated in
Greece and Korea. A few aggressive nations,
either for supposedly lofty or for very base rea-
sons, have also set out deliberately to conquer the
world by one means or another.
Can compromise be considered a solution to the
ambitions of such aggressive states? Repeated
examples from history, some quite recent, seem to
suggest that, at best, compromise may only shift
the time table for further aggression. This may
not be wholly bad for the compromiser, providing
he can use this time to good advantage. Rearm-
ing and defense pacts, important and inescapable
as they may be, are not in themselves an absolute
guarantee of peace, for they may create a vicious
circle of counter moves by the opponents, with no
solution short of military, economic, and psycho-
logical conflict.
Many excuses have been given for imperialism?
the "white man's burden," a "sacred trust," "leb-
ensraum," "ethnic unity," "defense against en-
circlement," and others more idealistic, such as
"liberty, equality, fraternity." We considered
both world wars anti-imperialist, and of course
for opposite reasons they were so regarded by
many Germans and Japanese fighting against us.
The Monroe Doctrine could be considered either
status quo or imperialist, depending on the view-
point and circumstances of assessment. How-
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172
ever, from an objective point of view, it should be
understood that these terms, the status quo and
imperialism, are intrinsically and morally neither
good nor bad. What these terms actually mean
when applied in international relations depend
upon the objectives, motivation, and circumstances
of particular national policies.
World Powers
World powers today can be grouped into three
general classes. The great powers are the United
States and the Soviet Union. The United King-
dom may still be considered a great power, too,
although now less able to stand alone in the world.
The regional powers, which wield considerable
influence in particular parts of the world, include
such countries as France, Argentina, Brazil,
China, and India. In a third category are the
client powers, such independent states as Uruguay,
Costa Rica, Luxembourg, and Egypt. Even
though their independence may be important to
their citizens and even to mankind, their continued
independence is at the sufferance of the larger
powers, and their conduct is largely conditioned
by external events. Under international law each
sovereign state is equal, and American policies in
considerable measure have aimed toward support
of this doctrine; however, law cannot hide the fact
that states are not equal in power and never will
be. A country like India, with hundreds of mil-
lions of people, cannot be equated in all circum-
stances with a state like Liechtenstein, even
though each is sovereign. This has been recog-
nized by the United Nations by its system of per-
manent seats in the Security Council, and the veto
system, which is not wrong in itself, but only in
its abuse. The tests of a great power, behind all
the polite words and agreements are (1) to be
able to threaten force, (2) to have the ability to
pay the price in a showdown of force against force,
(3) to have the capacity to wage active, autono-
mous war with its own resources.
This realistic approach to power is not meant to
show cynicism for the efforts which certain coun-
tries, including our own, have made to achieve a
better world for all on the basis of soverign
equality; far from it. It is merely intended as an
examination of the basic forces of existence and
survival that lie behind our best efforts.
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6
OF WORLD POWER wENTIAL
Nationalism
The armed forces of any nation, if they are to
carry out their assigned missions, must have a
sense of nationalism, to know why they are fight-
ing for their country. Extreme nationalism may
be unworthy in a world that considers itself civil-
ized, when the brotherhood of man, in the best
Christian sense, is a worthy goal. But national-
ism of itself is not bad. It may be the only means
of attaining worthwhile goals. We love our rich
and beautiful America; we want to raise our fam-
ilies in peace and happiness; we believe in the
American heritage of freedom and individual
dignity. The willingness of military men to
sacrifice their lives for such goals is, in effect, an
expression of nationalism.
Nationalism has its basis in the demand of par-
ticular groups for complete sovereignty. Inter-
nationalism on the other hand admits the sur-
render of some aspects of sovereignty to a broader
control. Each has its proper place, and the
United States for valid reasons orients its policies
both ways. No nation is willing to surrender all
sovereignty until there are guarantees that what
is held most sacred will not be harmed. But in
countless fields, from the assignment of radio fre-
quencies to the control of drugs, we willingly sub-
ordinate our complete control in the interests of
world order.
Nationalism, in many ways an intangible force,
grows out of race, religion, language, or historical
and geographical circumstances. Small countries,
lacking real power, sometimes substitute an exag-
gerated feeling of nationalism. In some ways
nationalism, as we know it today, is a relatively
new development. In both ancient and medieval
times, loyalty was shared between local people and
local rulers, as a matter of mutual protection in
the unsettled times in which they lived. In the
Western world, a broader spiritual and cultural
community was effected through the Christian
church in its struggle for survival and growth.
The development of a money economy, the end of
serfdom, and the Renaissance brought larger states
and a gradual transfer of loyalties to the symbol
of the monarch and the state. An expanding
interest in philosophy and many other multiple
forces combined to help the concepts of democracy
and self-determination emerge. A new liberal
173
nationalism gave the chief loyalty to the state, and
the ruler became at most a symbol. But some-
times the forces of nationalism, instead of leading
to liberalism which recognizes the rights of minor-
ities, leads to totalitarianism and more strongly
authoritarian states. Democracy, as we know it,
is a very fragile thing, even though it has a con-
siderable will to live among those who understand
it. Nationalism and individualism, therefore, are
frequently in conflict, but nationalism per se is
not to blame, but rather the use that is made of it,
for nationalism may be the champion of freedom.
The United States, therefore, needs nationalism,
internationalism, and individualism; all three are
inherent in its traditional political and social
heritage.
Some countries, including our own, also face the
problem of national minorities. The major group,
united by race, religion, or language, may not be
the sole occupants of a political state. National
minorities, people bonded together in varying de-
gree by different forces, may be no problem at all,
or they may constitute a threat to the solidarity
and power of the dominant group. In the United
States, for example, there are a great many sec-
tional differences, social and political, -which
appear more serious to foreign observers and
critics, than they really are. India, for example,
has religious minorities that continue to hamper
complete national solidarity.
Balance of Power
So the world is organized into multitudinous
groups, sometimes working together, sometimes at
cross purposes, gathered politically into larger
units known as sovereign states or dependencies.
These units in turn settle their differences by war?
military, economic, and psychological, or by sub-
stitute devices which will be examined in the pages
ahead. One means of avoiding war, or of jockey-
ing for position to be at the best advantage, is
through power politics, as already mentioned.
Another means is through balance of power ma-
neuvers, by which nations may achieve an equaliz-
ing of forces to avoid or postpone war. This
equalization may be achieved without destroying
the individuality of the separate states. However,
balance of power entails many devices and, in some
degree, each affects the policies of all states. One
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device is the familiar "divide and rule ;" another
is to prevent unions of competitive states. It is
often stated that British policy in the past has
been to seek a balance of power in Europe with
Britain as the strategic key to the balance. When
Napoleon was rampant in Europe, Britain was
allied with other states against France. When the
Kaiser and Hitler threatened, Britain was arrayed
with the French and others opposed to German
expansionism. In connection with the balance of
power approach, it must be remembered that situa-
tions constantly arise requiring vigorous remedial
steps which may or may not be successful.
The National Interest
What constitutes the "national interest" by
which states always claim to be guided? Perhaps
its origin was in the personal interest of the ruler,
and with the change to nationalism, the idea of
national honor developed. Some wars have been
fought for reasons of national honor. Honor alone
may be too idealistic or Quixotic for some; the
jailing of a citizen for the pulling down of a flag
may not be considered excuse enough to plunge
nations into war with great cost in lives and
resources. National interest, however, if accu-
rately assessed, is a realistic, practical considera-
tion of events from the viewpoint of national
welfare, both present and future. American na-
tional policies in earlier years were largely inter-
nally oriented, due to the farm interests in domes-
tic land expansion. Industrial growth had its
political and national consequences when a new
interest in raw materials and markets dictated
naval expansion. Tremendous responsibility for
interpreting the national interest?economic, mili-
tary, and "war of life"?rests with the President,
as well as the Congress. For example, U. S. par-
ticipation in the Korean War was interpreted as
essential for reasons of national interest.
It is because events in far away places like
Korea and Iran and Germany are cumulative in
their effects toward a buildup of destructive force
that they cannot be ignored. America's national
interest is and must be the determining factor in
American reaction to any world events.
National Character
This discussion raises a related question, that of
"national character." Is there such a thing?
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174
America has attempted major reforms in Germany
and Japan through political, economic, military,
and educational changes. Will these changes be
permanent? The answer is not simple. It may
be that class characteristics are more valid in defi-
nition than net characteristics, and particu-
lar groups or classes may dominate policies and
national viewpoint. Militarism, or communism,
or idealism may dominate in different situations.
Cultural patterns do affect the definition of "na-
tional character." It was suggested earlier that
national character may be susceptible to analysis,
but it is important to remember that it is com-
plex and not wholly predictable.
Sovereignty
Sovereignty has been referred to earlier as a
characteristic of states. It grew out of a combi-
nation of two doctrines, that of the divine right
of kings, and that of the free will. Combined
and transferred to the state, it has been the out-
come of the necessity for an unchallengeable and
supreme power to make and enforce the rules that
bind society together. Such centralized power is
the essence of government. Further, there can be
no international law with real meaning unless
there is sovereignty to consent to it. Perhaps the
corollary doctrine is that one sovereign state
should not interfere with another, though this is
more difficult of accomplishment. Sovereignty
does imply an equality among states, but only le-
gally speaking, since this is a practical impossi-
bility. A state can voluntarily accept restraints
on its affairs without destroying sovereignty.
Though states are legally equal, they may not have
equal rights in all respects, and their independence
of action may be more ephemeral than real. With
the passage of time some states have lost their
sovereignty and ceased to exist. This happens
when, voluntarily or involuntarily, the final au-
thority over their actions passes to another state.
International Law
International law is subject to considerable
abuse and even more misunderstanding, yet it
holds together the fabric of international society.
Its elements of administration, enforcement, and
adjudication have come from many sources. Do-
mestic legal concepts throughout the world are
not uniform enough for international law to be
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complete. Some law is based on common law, on
precedents; other law is administrative and ad
hoc, with judicial decisions playing a smaller role.
International law comprises both kinds, drawing
on evidence in the form of direct treaties, confer-
ence agreements, treaties of third parties, deci-
sions of international and national courts, state
papers, opinions of unofficial bodies and individual
scholars, and even upon the "general principles of
justice."
Some of the earliest recognized international
law relates to the sea, which is one reason why the
Navy has always been so interested in this field.
The commerce of the Hanseatic League led to the
foundation of international rules of conduct, and
Grotius is credited as the father of formal study of
international law. At an early period inter-
national law also dealt with the rules of war. It
deals with conduct both on public and private
levels, and also becomes a part of the domestic law
of most states. Its limitations are that it is appli-
cable only in certain situations, that it is some-
what uncertain and slow to develop, and that it
cannot be legislated or executed in the ordinary
sense. But it is developing and should grow in-
creasingly important. Now criminal law is being
added to international law, and the theory of non-
intervention is undergoing change, while the
rights of neutrals are being reduced. There is
general condemnation of genocide, and support of
a bill of rights for individuals. Even if these
rights are not yet universally accepted, they are on
their way to inclusion in the law. Genocide in-
cludes not only actual killing of ethnic groups, but
also sterilization, breakup of families, or submer-
sion of culture. The international bill of rights
includes the concept of due process of law, denies
involuntary servitude except in wars or emergen-
cies, and allows no arbitrary restrictions on free-
dom of movement, public trial, religion and press,
assembly, and similar elements familiar to Anglo-
Saxon jurisprudence.
International law holds that jurisdiction over
particular cases may hinge upon the territorial
principle ( where the act occurred) , the nationality
principle (that of the guilty party) , the protection
principle (through national interest) , the princi-
ple of universality (as concerning pirates) , or the
passive principle (that of the injured party).
175
The principle of territorial jurisdiction is most
firmly established. Where individual parties sub-
ject to one jurisdiction are required to appear be-
fore another jurisdiction, their possible extradition
is a matter of treaty.
Recognition of one state by another under inter-
national law may be either de facto or de jure. De
facto means that although no formal treaty is
signed and representatives are not exchanged, for
all practical purposes the one state admits to the
sovereignty and authority of the other over a par-
ticular territory and people. This may have its
naval application, when our government does not
choose to recognize a foreign government. Naval
commanders must be very careful that they take
no action that could be interpreted as de facto
recognition. De jure recognition, of course, is
that granted by formal treaty and exchange of
envoys.
The Laws of War
One of the chief concerns of international law is
war, for in its modern form war invades every
aspect of life. Early writers could not agree on a
definition of war. It obviously refers to the use
of force between states, but not all such cases con-
stitute war. War, from the point of view of in-
ternational law, is not per se bad, for the law deals
only with its conduct, how it was begun, the be-
havior of neutrals and belligerents, and its ending.
The legal recognition of a state of war affects mat-
ters of contraband, blockade, and censorship.
Domestically it affects contracts and government
controls. Such questions arise as to whether a
state of war can only be declared by Congress, or
whether a Presidential declaration of an "emer-
gency" which requires action by armed forces is
legally war. Under international law, the formal
declaration is not necessary. Only one of the par-
ties needs to intend war. However, police actions
and armed intervention are not necessarily war.
There is the presumption of intent to make war by
certain overt acts, especially if so regarded by the
victim, but even now there is no sharp definition.
The question of defensive versus aggressive war
also arises. These are equally difficult of defini-
tion; it is not so simple as who fired the first shot,
for some self-defensive acts and proper exercise
of sanctions would then be ruled out. In practice,
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regretfully it must be said, the winner was the
"defender," the loser the "aggressor." In sum-
mary, then, war, as such, is not illegal; it is the
prerogative of the state.
Causes of War
Much has been written about the causes of war,
and such studies should be of concern to the in-
telligence officer, because he has a continuing in-
terest in studying cause and effect patterns, par-
ticularly in the field of war. However, the causes
of war are not easy to find, although many have
been suggested. An "instinct of pugnacity" in
man, hate, military general staffs, munitions mak-
ers, and many others that do not stand the tests
of universality, have been suggested. War usu-
ally is not an end in itself, but serves as a final
means of settling disputes, preserving rights, and
remedying wrongs. Granted that it is a profligate
means, increasingly so as it threatens the survival
of the race, mere recognition of this fact does not
solve the problem. Wars will continue to occur
until a substitute is found, and other means to en-
sure security, defense, and justice must be pro-
vided before weapons will be surrendered. Dis-
armament, limitation of weapons, education,
treaties outlawing war all have great merit, but
they do not solve the basic problems of war, which
are most complex.
Psychologically, war springs out of fear, sus-
picion, greed, lust for power, hate, revenge, jeal-
ousy, and envy. When great tension has been
built up, war represents a release from pressure.
There are also economic causes: aggressive im-
perialism, both territorial and economic, and com-
petition for markets, energy sources, or essential
raw materials. Wars may start from government
protection of private interests abroad, without par-
ticular reference to the general welfare. On the
other hand, failure to protect citizens and prop-
erty abroad with decisive action may also lead to
war. Disregard for the rights of "backward peo-
ple" and population pressure, at least in its indi-
rect effects, are additional causes. Political
causes include balance of power maneuvers, secret
treaties, violations of unjust treaties, disregard for
minority rights, deliberate organization for war,
and even ineptness in government. There are
many others: exaggerated nationalism, competi-
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176
tive armaments, religious and racial differences,
general ignorance, and even war psychology, in-
duced by press, radio, motion pictures, text books,
family influences, social inequalities, social sanc-
tions, and a lack of spiritual ideals.
If all the above causes could be removed, would
war then disappear? The possibilities are poor
according to some theorists who believe that war
is cyclical, that it is related to survival of the
fittest, that heredity and environment cause it,
that it is a culture trait, an instinct, an institution,
and part of the stepladder of evolution. These
theories are far from encouraging. Accordingly,
preventive devices, such as a world state, have
been suggested. Critics of this plan, however,
have pointed out that super-sovereignty might
largely result in a shift from international wars
to "domestic rivalry" just as difficult of solution.
It is obvious that great difficulties are involved in
determining the causes for war and that there is
as yet no general agreement as to either causes or
effective solutions. Until such a time, the grim
realities of modern total war must be faced.
Prevention of War
The prevention of war is a major task of the
larger nations of the world, although it should
be stressed that prevention is by no means their
only task nor does the word imply a philosophy
of "peace at any price." Since the prevention of
war is aided by any limitation of warlike tenden-
cies, the means available to do so must be em-
ployed to the maximum degree. There are sev-
eral means. One is negotiation, the use of diplo-
macy and conferences. Actually hundreds of
minor incidents are settled by diplomacy, and thus
do not become causes for war. A third country
frequently offers its "good offices" in a dispute, or
even goes so far as to mediate the quarrel. Com-
missions of inquiry may be established to aid the
settlement. Conciliation may move on to arbi-
tration, voluntary or compulsory, but even arbi-
tration does not necessarily force acceptance of
decision. Such measures seem to work best on
problems of private law and economic matters,
rather than on strictly political matters. Concili-
ation is on the borderline between straight nego-
tiation and the compromise of arbitration. A
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ELEMENTS OF WORLD POWER CONFIDENTIAL
third general approach is through the use of judi-
cial means, but in the international sphere accept-
ance of a court decision is dependent on the will-
ingness of the parties. Major political issues,
therefore, have seldom been solved in world courts.
When diplomacy fails to solve problems of war,
security measures may be of help. These take
many forms. Disarmament and arms limitation
have had United States support but with limited
success, because few countries are willing to co-
operate whole-heartedly. Unilateral disarma-
ment coupled with neutrality laws has met with
no more success. Ratios of limitation, or stand-
ards of allocation, are most difficult to establish.
Security through education alone is illusory, for
even if we are progressive and educate against
war, will our enemies do the same? Passive re-
sistance has been proposed and even used, as by
Gandhi's followers, but they were opposing the
British who have a conscience and are responsive
to public opinion. Aggressors generally do not
have scruples, and then passivity only hastens
slavery. The Kellogg-Briand pact made a novel
approach to war: it outlawed "aggressive war,"
177
but not "defensive war," and of course each sover-
eign state reserved to itself the decision as to the
nature of the war it fought. The issues of iso-
lationism as an approach to peace have been de-
bated in the United States and elsewhere. Still
another approach to peace is through collective
security, which may mean alliances or even a world
body and world police force.
Peace between nations is a long-sought goal;
the dimensions of the problems involved are best
realized perhaps by those who first attempt to
define war itself, isolate its causes, and find its
cures. The purposes of this chapter have been
much less ambitious, and limited to a considera-
tion of the basic elements of power and the general
prerogatives and behavior of states in their power
environment. However, since war is expressive
of a particular power relationship between world
states, a better understanding of the elements of
world power should lead to a fuller appreciation
of problems of war. Other power relationships
between nations, such as those expressed in terms
of foreign policies, are the general subject of the
following chapter.
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CHAPTER 7
THE UNITED STATES AND THE WORLD
While the preceding chapter on Elements of
World Power dealt largely with concepts and
principles, this chapter will review more specific
developments in foreign policy, in international
organization, and in economic relations that are
of particular intelligence concern. All facets of
the problems presented by the topics of this chap-
ter obviously cannot be discussed because of space
limitations, but it is hoped that those mentioned
will stimulate further thinking and study. It is
also appropriate to suggest here that the solutions
of problems arising out of relationships between
states can seldom be considered in terms of ab-
solutes: good or bad, white or black. The com-
plexities of these relationships give rise to a va-
riety of alternative choices which often have rela-
tive values. It is for this reason that good in-
telligence must reflect shades of meaning in order
that all potentialities may be fully recognized.
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY
The creation of the foreign policy of the United
States is the role of both the executive and legis-
lative branches of government. Indirectly, of
course, it is affected by every kind of individual
and group reaction. Its abstract nature makes it
difficult of analysis, but it is the product of certain
major fields of common concern. One is national
security, which relates to our geographic loca-
tion, military strength, industrial power, and man-
power, as described earlier, and which is changing
due to new forces at work in the world. A sec-
ond major concern is related to our economic situ-
ation, namely, the degree of industrialization we
possess, our world trade interests, our raw ma-
terial needs, our problems of unemployment and
price levels, the availability of funds for invest-
ment, and related phenomena. A third major con-
cern is peace, and all that it implies, for peace is
a predominant desire of the American people.
Formulation and Execution of Foreign Policy
The constitution of the United States reserves
matters of foreign policy to the Federal Govern-
ment, a concept which has been upheld in many
court decisions. The Federal Government can
negotiate treaties, legally "declare" war, receive
foreign diplomats, appoint ambassadors, and regu-
late foreign commerce. States, of course, can
make lesser arrangements with foreign countries,
if Congress approves. The President, as head of
the executive branch of the government, is chiefly
responsible for foreign policy, for through the
Secretary of State he handles official communica-
tions with other governments, decides upon their
recognition, and determines states of belligerency
and neutrality. The actual declaration of war is
a congressional right, effected by the two houses
meeting in joint session. Congress can strongly
influence foreign policy through its legislative
acts, such as the tariff, and the House of Repre-
sentatives has a special power through its initiation
of appropriations. The President and the Senate
share the right to make treaties and appoint en-
voys. Senate ratification of a treaty negotiated
by the executive branch requires a two-thirds
majority vote of those present. A device increas-
ingly popular is the "executive agreement in
place of the treaty. Its ratification requires a
simple majority of the members of both houses,
which is often politically more expedient than the
standard treaty. Congressional interest in for-
eign policy is illustrated by the large number of
Congressmen traveling abroad to investigate a
great variety of subjects and conditions. For-
eign policy usually cuts across political party lines,
and the party platforms in recent years have not
differed materially in this respect. In matters of
foreign policy, while the American people re-
spond readily to moral and ethical principles, as
mentioned previously, they, as any national group,
react most rapidly to the needs of self-defense.
A brief historical survey of the development and
dominant features of American foreign policy will
provide a useful background for the better under-
standing of its current operations in connection
with other world governments.
179
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Isolationism and Expansionism
The exact meaning of George Washington's
injunction against entangling foreign alliances
has been long debated. It has been generally
agreed, however, that his concern was in perma-
nent alliances with foreign nations, and that he
did not mean to impose a ban on all close relations
to meet temporary situations. If a recommended
policy of isolationism is to be implied from his
remarks, certainly at the time it was a suitable
policy for a weak country far removed from the
European scene and well occupied with an inland
frontier. But even though in the past the United
States has avoided close political contacts, its
trade and economic relations have always been
tied in with the rest of the world. While true
that the Monroe Doctrine, for example, was iso-
lationist in one sense, in another it was interven-
tionist because it was unilaterally proclaimed by
the United States in sympathy with the Spanish
rebels in Latin America. Nor can it be forgotten
also that this doctrine for many years relied for
support on the strength of the British Royal Navy.
Internal expansion across the North American
continent was followed before the end of the nine-
teenth century by expansion into Alaska and over-
seas into the Caribbean and the far reaches of the
Pacific. The reasons for expansion beyond the
continental limits of the United States are many
and certainly cannot be blamed on the economic
lobbyists alone. For example, many sugar inter-
ests were actually opposed to intervention in Cuba
and, in the Philippines, the United States might
have withdrawn from there as readily as it did
from Cuba had it not been for the postwar revolt.
Our difficulties with Colombia over the Canal Zone
were restricted to control over a narrow strip of
land, coupled with handsome remuneration to the
injured party, an unheard of act in that day. Our
interests in Nicaragua, Haiti, Santo Domingo, and
other nearby countries never led to actual coloniza-
tion, although a later approach to inter-American
relations has been that of mutual consultation
rather than unilateral action.
The Open Door in China
In China, United States policy was long that of
the open door; self-interested, yes, but at the same
time it may have saved China from being carved
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180
up into colonies like most of the rest of Asia.
America's interest in China dates back to the days
when our clipper ships traded at Canton for tea
and silks. In the middle of the nineteenth cen-
tury, China was forced to open additional treaty
ports to foreign commerce, with concessions
granted to a number of countries including our
own. China had gradually lost many outlying
territories and suzerainties. The French had
taken Indo-China and dominated Yunnan,
Kwangsi, and Kwantung together with the leased
port of Kwangchowwan. Russia had taken the
Amur Valley, had railway concessions in Man-
churia, and dominated Outer Mongolia. Ger-
many had Kiaochow and dominated Shangtung.
The British held Hong Kong, Kowloon, and
Weihaiwei, and controlled the Yangtze Valley.
Earlier they had taken Burma, and had a degree
of control over Tibet. Italy attempted to obtain
Sanmen Bay in Chekiang, but was not successful.
Japan, as is well known, persistently pressed for
territory and privileges, acquiring the Ryukyus,
Formosa, Korea, and later Manchuria. In 1899
Secretary John Hay proclaimed our open door
policy to put an end to further territorial seizures.
We never really backed it with force until 1941,
and since then the progress of events has swept
away the opportunity for its application. It was
a generally favorable factor in our relations with
China for many years.
The First World War and Its Aftermath
First trying to be neutral, we finally entered
World War I as a crusade for democracy, with
the issue of freedom of the seas a major considera-
tion. After the war we found ourselves at odds
with our allies and facing new and unfamiliar
problems. Reparations, war debts, financial boom
at home, then worldwide economic collapse were
aftermaths of the war. Economic nationalism
and autarchy, foreign aggression and dictatorships
of right and left followed. The deterioration of
world affairs in the 1930's brought us back to war
again.
The Second World War
With much of the world in flames our neutrality
acts were quickly shown to be no guarantee of
peace. We transferred our ships to neutral flags
to rush supplies to Europe. The sudden collapse
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of western Europe under the German onslaught
brought a vast rearmament program, and overage
destroyers, preserved from the first war, were ex-
changed with Great Britain for bases. By the
summer of 1941 the Navy was in effect at war to
protect the western half of the Atlantic, despite
the doubtful legal status of such protection. Our
policy stiffened in the Far East as well, although
we were woefully unprepared for major action.
Many Americans had to revise their thinking dur-
ing that period, though the full shock of discover-
ing that we were arrayed against strong antago-
nists in a worldwide struggle was not felt until the
attack on Pearl Harbor.
Moves for Security
Our international relations after 1940 under-
went successive policy changes as our leaders and
people began to assess the meaning of events as
they unfolded. Our primary concern was with
our security. In the summer of 1941 off Argentia,
Newfoundland, Churchill, and Roosevelt met to
agree on common principles and war aims. We
emphasized that we were not interested in terri-
torial gains, and recognized the right of people
to choose their own form of government. We
agreed upon a postwar cooperative order that
called for free access to raw materials and mar-
kets, subject to existing commitments. We called
for disarming aggressors, pending the arrange-
ment of a general security system. We cham-
pioned freedom of the seas, and expressed the
famous four freedoms of the Atlantic Charter,
freedom from want, freedom from fear, freedom
of speech, and freedom of religion.
Most of the successive important international
conferences dealt largely with the prosecution of
the war, but several important doctrines related
to the present world order were enunciated and
agreed upon during that period. At Casablanca,
in 1943, Britain and the United States announced
the "unconditional surrender" doctrine. 'Whether
right or wrong, this stand may well have had a
permanent effect on the war and its aftermath.
Although Stalin was invited to attend the next
meeting held in Quebec City, he failed to come.
China participated in the negotiations of Novem-
ber 1943 at Cairo where the Atlantic Charter was
reaffirmed, and where it was agreed to strip Japan
181
of all territories outside the four main islands,
with minor exceptions. The Teheran meeting
later that month? was the first time Roosevelt,
Churchill, and Stalin actually met in person. Be-
cause of Soviet neutrality in the Pacific, Chiang
Kai-shek was not invited. The broad strategy of
the war in Europe was planned, and the demand
for a "second front" was renewed. The Russians,
of course, had a second front on the European
continent in 1939-40, but at that time they chose
to be neutral. Antagonisms and differences of
opinion were evident even in this first meeting.
Churchill favored an attack into the Balkans
through the Vardar Valley, while Roosevelt called
for a frontal assault on Western Europe because
of military and political considerations including
recognition of Soviet interests in a second front in
Europe. While this may represent an over-sim-
plification of the strategic views held, it suggests
the nature of the differences that developed.
Idealism
Meetings nearly a year later at Dumbarton Oaks
considered proposals for the postwar international
peace machinery. Continuing differences over
policy caused President Roosevelt to agree to a
trip to Yalta to try to reach a better understand-
ing with the Soviets, for as allies they were in no
sense as reciprocal of plans, men, and supplies as
were our British partners. The Yalta conferences
dealt with the treatment to be accorded Germany,
and the difficult task of forming a workable
United Nations Organization. Representation in
the organization was the first problem. The
United States modestly requested only one vote,
but since the independent members of the British
Commonwealth wanted one vote each, the Russians
demanded seventeen, one for each constituent re-
public. The U. S. S. R. finally settled for three,
technically taking one for the Ukraine, and
another for Byelo-Russia, in addition to one for
the U. S. S. R. There was agreement that in the
present state of the world the major powers should
retain a veto over substantive decisions of the Se-
curity Council. We thought also that we had won
the promise of free elections and independent
states in eastern Europe. This proved illusory,
to say the least. In an effort to shorten the Pa-
cific war and thus save American lives, we reacted
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favorably to a Soviet promise to declare war on
Japan, and tentatively accepted Russian domina-
tion of the Kuriles, Southern Sakhalin, Dairen,
and the Manchurian railways. The assessments
of this meeting, with its secret agreements, remain
highly controversial.
In the spring of 1945 the meetings in San Fran-
cisco established the United Nations Organization.
President Roosevelt died in April and Germany's
final collapse came in May. At the time of the
Potsdam meeting in August, of the original Big
Three only Stalin was still in office, for Attlee
had replaced Churchill. The Soviets were ready
to enter the war against Japan, and did so soon
after the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Naga-
saki. A completely demoralized Japan facing in-
vasion of her home islands, surrendered in re-
sponse to the Potsdam Declaration. At Potsdam,
general plans for the former German satellite
states were formulated and the zones of military
occupation for Germany and Austria were estab-
lished. A Council of Foreign Ministers to repre-
sent the Big Three, plus France and China, was
created.
Realism
In reviewing the record of these wartime con-
ferences, it is interesting to note the shifts of
position that occurred. Our first concern was that
of security, for we were engaged in a struggle for
survival, but as the end of the war came in sight,
we entered a phase of idealism. With the benefit
of hindsight it is now easy to see that the Soviets
carefully adhered to the long-term policies which
have placed them in opposition to ourselves. Any
lingering doubts about the Soviet's real intentions
were quickly dispelled in the months following the
war. Countless efforts to show good will and to
go more than halfway were met with no response
from the Soviet delegates, who continued an atti-
tude of suspicion and distrust. The record shows
that we wanted peace and were willing to make
any reasonable concessions, but no agreement
proved better than the Soviet intentions of living
up to it.
New problems arose to plague the foreign min-
isters and their deputies faster than the old ones
could be solved or shelved. Satellite treaties, in-
terference with elections, atomic energy, the
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182
Italian treaty, and control of the Danube were
debated at great length. Only the strongest of
protests through the United Nations brought
about the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran,
thus averting what might have developed into a
Soviet military penetration of the Middle East.
The Morgenthau Plan for Germany and repara-
tions on the scale demanded by the Soviets were
finally abandoned. The position of the United
States toward Germany gradually shifted when
it was realized that Germany's deficits would even-
tually be paid by the American taxpayer, and that
a prostrate Germany meant an impoverished Eu-
rope. Gradually the United States passed beyond
the idealism stage and began to see the shape of
the Soviet menace.
Cold War
Various aspects of the cold war further accen-
tuated this menace. In a major test of strength
the Soviets imposed a land blockade of Berlin in
1948. Controversial issues leading to this action
included the quantity and kind of West Zone rep-
arations to the Soviet Union, the currency reform
which started West Germany toward economic re-
covery, and the action taken to unify the Ameri-
can, British, and French zones of occupation.
Another factor was the Soviet desire to eliminate
a Western Island in East Germany. The Soviet
blockade was met with counter blockade action by
the western allies and an arduous though success-
ful airlift. Although the blockade was finally
lifted, a few false moves on either side might have
led to war.
Steps taken by the United States to strengthen
the economies of western European countries and
later their military forces, as mentioned previ-
ously, were all part of the cold war which in-
creased in intensity with the outbreak of armed
conflict in Korea in 1950. Trouble spots in Indo-
China, Malaya, Iran, and the Arab world only
served to accentuate the dimensions of this smol-
dering menace.
Relations With Latin America
Any discussion of United States foreign policy
must include developing relationships with the
Latin American countries to the south. Pan-
American relations have improved greatly since
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the time of the enunciation of the Monroe Doc-
trine, the end of our territorial expansion, and
our difficulties with Spain over Cuba. The for-
mation of the Pan American Union in 1890 led
the way to better relations with the Latin-Ameri-
can republics, culminating in the well-publicised
"good neighbor" policy in 1933. We eschewed
unilateral intervention among all the American
states. Our policies have now centered on pre-
serving the independence of republican govern-
ments, recognizing the equality of each country,
maintaining their territorial integrity, and urging
the observance of existing treaties and the peace-
ful settlement of disputes. Continental solidarity
has been the goal, coupled with nonintervention
in internal affairs, but with extensive cooperation
in all other matters. The degree of success has
been fairly high. Eventually, all the American
republics entered World War II and a number
shared in lend-lease, and made available antisub-
marine air bases as required for convoy protec-
tion. The treaty of Chapultepec, ratified at Rio
de Janeiro in 1947, binds all states on a two-thirds
vote to come to the aid of any member state that
is attacked. One of our more persistent remain-
ing problems has been sporadic disagreement with
ambitious and energetic Argentina.
Far Eastern Relations
United States foreign policy in China since
World War II has been more controversial and
the facts involved may be slow to emerge with any
clarity. It is clear, however, that the former
"open door" policy of equal access by any nation
to China has been swept away during the course
of the twentieth century by world events. Chi-
nese nationalism flared up as early as the Boxer
rebellion when there were demands for the expul-
sion of foreigners. In 1911 came the revolution
headed by Sun Yat-sen that destroyed the Manchu
Empire. His Kuomintang party has favored ex-
pulsion of foreigners and political tutelage of the
people until a proper, constitutional government
can ultimately function. Sun Yat-sen's revolu-
tionary techniques were studied and adapted by
Lenin, for in the early 1920's Soviet and Kuomin-
tang relations were quite close. After Chiang
Kai-shek made his successful march north from
Canton in 1927, he tossed out his Russian advisers
183
and broke relations with Communist Chinese
forces which withdrew into the interior, finally
making Yenan their headquarters for many years.
General Mao Tse-tung was the leader of this dis-
sident group. In 1931 the Japanese made new
advances into Manchuria, establishing a puppet
state; in 1937 the war moved south of the Great
Wall to extend Japanese control to all the major
rail arteries and port cities of northern and cen-
tral China. During World War II the Chinese
fought a desultory war against the Japanese, for
all their normal supply routes and most of their
industry were in Japanese hands. Nationalist
and Communist forces were united in an uneasy
truce against a common enemy.
At the end of the war the United States helped
to ferry large numbers of Nationalist divisions to
the coastal cities, north China, and Manchuria,
together with supplying considerable amounts of
war surplus equipment. The Communists were
equally determined to control these territories, and
swept out of the back country to lay waste the
railways of the area. With Japanese equipment,
probably turned over by the Soviets, they proved a
strong opponent to the Nationalists. General
Marshall's mission failed to find a solution to this
problem acceptable to the parties concerned.
Truce violations, attrition, inflation, and armies
changing sides brought disaster. Before it was
over, all China was Communist, aside from
Formosa and mainland guerrilla forces of mixed
allegiance.
FOREIGN POLICIES OF OTHER NATIONS
It is not possible here to discuss the guiding
foreign policies of all other nations, but a few ab-
breviated examples will at least illustrate the com-
plex and shifting nature of policy manifestations,
usually in support of some fairly persistent basic
national drives.
France
France was long the problem child of Europe.
Arrayed against the Hapsburgs and the Holy
Roman Empire, she aimed at territorial expansion
and predominant continental power which re-
quired conquest and the sponsoring of "independ-
ent" German states. Louis XIV also looked to
French-Spanish union, and control of the Low-
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lands, but was opposed by the British. Napoleon,
in the name of the French revolution, though with
somewhat modified objectives, did sweep much of
Europe. But after his defeat, French policy in
Europe largely abandoned expansionism in favor
of secure frontiers. French expansionism was
later to be active again overseas. It as only at
the turn of the nineteenth century, some years
after Germany had united into a strong nation,
that 400 years of British-French rivalry in Europe
came to an end, and certain colonial difficulties
were settled by giving Britain dominance over
Egypt and France control in Morocco. Follow-
ing the second invasion of their homeland by the
Germans in World War I, security became almost
an obsession for the French. They favored a
breakup of Germany, the demilitarization of the
Rhine, and defense in depth. The withdrawal of
the United States from European affairs may have
been a factor in the French sponsoring of the
"cordon sanitaire," consisting of alliances of the
States bordering Germany to prevent any resur-
gence of military power. Italy, following World
War I, felt that not all wartime promises had
been kept and withdrew from her former allies.
The French occupation of the Rhineland in 1923
was- an attempt in part to force Britain into a
position of greater support, but the British were
not too amenable, and gave some support instead
to the Germans. Government changes in France
and Germany brought closer cooperation between
the two countries temporarily, and the French
withdrew from the Rhineland.
Growing German nationalism was clearly re-
vealed by the 1936 remilitarization of the Rhine-
land in violation of the Versailles treaty, which
collapsed much of the French defense plan. This
change made it difficult for France to offer any real
military support to Eastern and Central Europe
in the event of German aggressions. While France
worked harder to build up the Maginot defense
tine, she left her frontiers with Belgium and
Luxemburg unprotected. French and Italian re-
lationships were very confused: rivalry was strong
in places like Tunisia, yet a partial understand-
ing gave Italy a free hand in Ethiopia. War
came to Spain. It was a proving ground for Com-
munist and Fascist armies, with a few misguided
liberals on the fringes, and the common people
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were the victims. The Polish corridor question
was boiling. Buying time, or doing wishful
thinking, Britain and France, though rearming,
watched Austria, Czechoslovakia and Memel go
to Germany. The Low Countries still thought in
terms of neutrality. The sudden shock of the
German-Soviet agreement of 1939 was the last step
before the partition of Poland and the beginning
of World War II. France, still feeling the heavy
cost of the first war, subjected to the divided pol-
icies of unstable governments and the weakening
influence of the Front Populaire, was ill-equipped
for war. What had been the greatest army in
Europe fell before the Germans, destroyed partly
by the politicians behind its back, partly by poor
strategy, partly by fatalistic apathy.
United Kingdom
British policies are famous for their thorough
relation to long-range British needs. Well-suited
to an island people close offshore from a ferment-
ing Europe, they are naturally keyed to British
self-interest and have opposed entanglements on
the mainland. The British have aimed at a bal-
ance of power on the continent, to prevent its
domination by any one group which could then
threaten British security. For the last four cen-
turies the British have had no European terri-
torial ambitions, although they have been active
overseas. They have taken what steps were neces-
sary to protect their islands, to keep world trade
routes free, and to assure the security of their
overseas holdings. These aims have naturally
enough made seapower a prime weapon. The
British usually make short-term alliances in Eu-
rope as required, though they have long continued
close relations with Portugal, a remnant of earlier
needs to counter Spain. Whenever the Rhine es-
tuary and the Scheldt River are threatened, the
British always fight. They have long felt Russian
rivalry overseas, since the Russians have long
sought access to the Indian Ocean and the Medi-
terranean, both intimately related to Britain's im-
perial lifeline.
Postwar concentration of power in the hands of
the Soviet Union and the United States has re-
quired some British adjustments. As a result,
Great Britain has associated closely with the
United States in such common undertakings as the
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United Nations and NATO. In areas such as the
Middle East and the Far East, however, British
and American interests have not always been co-
ordinated. In Europe the British have been con-
sistent with their basic policies in delaying on the
Schuman steel plan.
The purpose of this quick review of various for-
eign policies has been to emphasize that in the
world, as it actually is, any nation that is to sur-
vive as a great power is motivated by self-interest
and will do whatever is necessary for survival.
Aware of these facts, the intelligence officer is
better able to understand and interpret the foreign
policies of nations.
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
From the philosophical and even the practical
outlook, men have long recognized the existence of
a world community. The western world, for ex-
ample, is joined in common spiritual values.
Transport improvements and trade needs have
also made materialistic interdependence very
great, which in itself has demanded a degree of
world organization. We have progressed from bi-
lateral treaties to the partial recognition of in-
ternational law, and increasing reliance is being
placed on multilateral agreements and the creation
of permanent international bodies with many
powers. The achievements of international co-
operation have been many. Examples are the In-
ternational Red Cross, control of telecommunica-
tions, control of rivers for international use,
standard weights and measures, weather report-
ing, hydrographic services, copyright rules, health
regulations, and controls over slavery and nar-
cotics. The failure has been at the political level
and as a result, when states go to war, many of
these cooperative and successful economic or tech-
nical arrangements are jeopardized.
The League of Nations
There were many early attempts at multilateral
international settlements, typified by the Congress
of Vienna in 1815. At the end of the 19th century
and in the years prior to World War I, the Hague
Conferences attempted to set up an international
order, but the first comprehensive attempt, spon-
269196-54----13
185
sored by President Wilson, was the creation of the
League of Nations in conjunction with the Ver-
sailles Treaty.
The League was effective in the economic and
social fields. It failed on the key question of secu-
rity and power because of an unwillingness of its
members to make it really work, to implement in
full what it could do. The League could impose
sanctions on aggressors, but being a pioneer effort,
it was not designed to have unlimited power. Al-
though the Covenant established the League, the
interpretation of responsibilities rested with the
individual states. It was largely a body of war
victors, their friends, and their self-governing
former colonies. Later other powers joined, with
the exception of the United States which alone of
the major powers remained aloof. America's un-
willingness to participate directly in the League
was based in part on its unfortunate experience in
power politics and unpaid war debts. We did,
however, remain interested in the League during
the years it functioned, and always had an observer
present at its meetings, occasionally considering
the idea of entering, with reservations, to protect
our position. When it finally suited their con-
venience, Germany, Italy, and Japan withdrew
from the League to pursue their courses of con-
quest. The Soviets were expelled for their attack
on Finland.
The League was paralled by the World Court
whose judges were able to settle many disputes in
those cases where countries voluntarily submitted
to its jurisdiction. The League was also closely
allied to such bodies as the International Labor
Organization, which in their specific field of con-
cern, were able to do good work. The importance
and success of all of these supplementary activities
were dwarfed, if not lost to the public eye, by the
magnitude and seriousness of world security prob-
lems which the League failed to solve thereby
dooming itself by inaction. Italy bombed Corfu
in 1925, and the League failed to act decisively.
The Lytton Commission did study the war in
Manchuria in 1932, but had no way to enforce its
recommendations. The Paraguay-Bolivia Gran
Chaco War was not settled by the League. In the
Ethiopian War sanctions were ordered against
Italy, but not all members carried them out.
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The United Nations Organization
Some of the same basic elements which made up
the League are to be found in the United Nations
organization. It has a General Assembly of all
member states, a Security Council with the big
powers and regionally representative members, a
Secretariat, an International Court of Justice,
ECOSOC (the Economic and Social Council),
and finally the Trusteeship Council.
The ECOSOC is made up of a large group of
activities including: ILO (International Labor
Organization), FAO (Food and Agricultural Or-
ganization), UNESCO (United Nations Educa-
tional, Scientific, and Cultural Organization),
ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organiza-
tion), the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development, the International Monetary
Fund, WHO (World Health Organization), IRO
(International Refugee Organization), ITO (In-
ternational Trade Organization) , UPU (Univer-
sal Postal Union) , ITU (International Telecom-
munications Union), WMO (World Meteorologi-
cal Organization) , and IMCO (Intergovernmental
Maritime Consultative Organization). ECOSOC
concerns itself with matters of economics and em-
ployment, transportation and communications.
statistics, fiscal affairs, population, social prob-
lems, human rights, the status of women, and
narcotic drugs. It has as suborganizations the
Economic Council for Europe, the Economic
Council for Latin America, and the Economic
Council for Asia and the Far East. ECOSOC
by its very nature does some of the less spectacular
and more successful work of the UN. Officially
it has 18 members, appointed to 3-year terms, but
it operates with many ad hoc committees and
nongovernmental organizations. It has no ex-
clusive jurisdiction, no permanent members, no
veto problem, no coercive power; it is largely
fact-finding and coordinating. Those recommen-
dations bordering on domestic matters require do-
mestic enactment to become effective. In a prac-
tical sense, it is at work on the causes of war 'aside
from those which are political or military. Ac-
tually the ECOSOC fights communist objectives;
while the communists are trying to destroy eco-
nomic order to hasten world revolution, ECOSOC
is attempting to restore order. Despite this, the
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Soviet Union has joined several of the ECOSOC
activities when it has been advantageous to do so.
The General Assembly represents all member
nations, each with one vote, though any size of
delegation may be sent. This body discusses any
matter it chooses and may pass recommendations
to the Security Council. A two-thirds vote of
the General Assembly, plus the approval of the
big five in the Security Council, can amend the
charter of the organization.
The Security Council has 11 members, includ-
ing the United States, the United Kingdom, the
Soviet Union, China and France (all with the
veto power) and 6 other members for 2-year
terms "elected" by the General Assembly on a
regional basis. For example, a typical distribu-
tion is 1 British Commonwealth member, 2 Latin
American members including 1 from the ABC
powers (Argentina, Brazil, Chile), and one mem-
ber each from a Soviet satellite, a West European
state, and an Arab League state. The Security
Council deals with major political disputes and
can impose sanctions. It has a military staff to
aid in this duty. It also has an armed forces
committee and an atomic energy committee.
The Secretariat, of course, provides administra-
tive and research services while the Trusteeship
Council is responsible to the General Assembly
for the mandates and trusts administered by mem-
bers. Some of these are former German colonies,
others, the former Japanese holdings now under
UN control.
Regional Organizations
The United Nations has attempted to avoid the
failures of the League of Nations. Certainly it
cannot be blamed for failure to end the cold war,
because its success depends upon the honest in-
tentions of its more powerful members. Merely
having the machinery for peace does not solve the
problems of the world communist movement and
Soviet ambitions; in fact, the UN organization
was not originally designed to fight this kind of
battle. For this reason many types of regional
international organizations have been created with
definite functions to perform. The development
of some of these organizations, patterned after the
relatively successful Pan American Union, was
stimulated by such events as the fall of Czechoslo-
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vakia to "internal" forces. For example, Bel-
gium and Luxembourg have long had a customs
union. With the addition of the Netherlands to
this combination, and an extension of purposes,
these countries established "Benelux," an economic
union, sensibly designed to overcome some of the
handicaps of small size. Such a merger is com-
plex, for it not only removes tariff walls, but re-
quires agreement on fiscal and monetary policies,
the same regulation of prices and business, and a
single legal code. Such changes do not come over-
night. Benelux attempts at economic unity were
paralleled by the grouping of the Brussels Pow-
ers, namely, the Low Countries, Britain, and
France, into a military alliance with increasing
standardization of weapons and organization. In
like manner the U. S. Marshall Plan on the eco-
nomic level was matched by NATO, wherein the
United States joined with the Brussels Pact coun-
tries plus Canada, Portugal, Norway, Denmark,
Iceland, Italy, Greece, and Turkey to form a mili-
tary alliance. This movement was given signifi-
cant support by the United States Military Aid
Program and the assignment of General Eisen-
hower to the top command. The Schuman Plan,
aimed at the integration of coal and steel industries
in western Europe, has been a significant effort
toward economic unification of the participating
countries, notably France and Germany.
Still another regional development has been the
Council of Europe, not unlike a miniature Gen-
eral Assembly of the UN. It has only consulta-
tive powers, but conceivably could result in Euro-
pean federation. Although Winston Churchill
was one of its early proponents, the British posi-
tion is affected by triple interests, European,
British Commonwealth, and United States co-
operation.
The growth of these various original organiza-
tions has been stimulated by the unwillingness of
the Soviet Union to cooperate within the UN.
Examples of this unwillingness are many. Prior
to the outbreak of the Korean War the UN had
tried for several years to solve the problem of
this divided country, but the Soviets would not
allow UN observers in North Korea. Even
though the UN had demonstrated its ability to
aid in the settlement of problems in such areas as
Palestine and Indonesia, it could not even gain
access to Czechoslovakia. Early attempts to
create a permanent UN police force remained com-
pletely deadlocked. The United States offered
to supply two divisions, ten to fifteen air groups,
and two naval task groups; the United Kingdom
was willing to commit half the Royal Air Force;
all told, some two million men were offered. But
the question of the veto power deadlocked fur-
ther discussion. The questions of disarmament
and atomic energy met with similar difficulties,
since both conventional and mass destruction
weapons must be considered in any real disarma-
ment plan.
The United States' position on atomic weapons
was a generous offer to share its knowledge with
the world, including world ownership of materials
and facilities and complete inspection to prevent
secret violation of rules. However, there could be
no veto of swift punishment for all offenders.
Even though such a plan is realistic if atomic con-
trols are to be workable, they strike at the heart
of the Soviet system of secrecy and isolation. Ac-
cordingly, the Soviets, with a vast land power
strength in conventional weapons, made the
counterproposal that the United States destroy its
atomic weapons, which constituted a vital source
of military power, and that the veto power be
retained by the five major powers. In the light
of Soviet previous conduct such an arrangement
did not seem to be consistent with survival. Of
course, subsequent to the UN debates on the con-
t1-01 of atomic power, it was learned that the Soviet
Union was making rapid atomic progress herself
by combining espionage with the best scientific
brains at her disposal.
The issue of veto is one of the most crucial in
the UN. The United States, like the Soviet
Union, believes in the veto, but recognizes it must
be used in moderation if the organization is to
function at all. Actually, the charter of the UN
does not discuss the veto. It calls for 7 of 11 votes
affirmative to pass motions, except that motions
which are substantive in nature, not just proce-
dural, require affirmative votes of the big 5 among
the 7 or more votes. A state which is a member
of the Security Council can be deprived of its
vote when it is a party to a dispute, unless the issue
involves a threat to the peace which is then called
a "situation." Actually the veto power is abso-
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lute, for the question of whether an issue is a
"situation" or a "dispute" has been considered a
substantive one, and no power will vote itself out
of a veto on a crucial issue. By vetoing any at-
tempt to declare an issue to be procedural, a big
nation never loses its decisive power. This is com-
monly referred to as the double veto. A state can
veto a decision to make a question procedural, then
veto it again as being a substantive matter.
In exasperation many national leaders watching
the record of mounting Soviet vetoes in the post-
war period have turned to regional plans, or have
recommended expulsion of the Soviets, or have
talked of a new UN designed to be a real world
government. The UN obviously is not perfect,
but many of its functions are very useful.
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS
As a basis for reviewing economic relations be-
tween world states it is well to remember, first,
that states depend on various resources for their
power, and second, that economic interdependence
and political ambitions have brought them into
continuous contact with each other. It has already
been pointed out that the greatest progress in in-
ternational organization has been in the economic
sphere. This is natural because economics, like
intelligence, is largely a matter of hard-headed
realism, and economic interdependence is fre-
quently dictated by compelling economic reasons.
The United States and the Soviet Union continue
to trade, even if on a reduced scale, because there
are sound reasons for each to do so. In varying
degree, trade is carried on indirectly even by bel-
ligerents in most wars. This is of itself neither
good nor bad, and is hardly different from other
measures dealing with the conduct of war, such
as the Geneva Convention for the treatment of
prisoners. However, from the viewpoint of the
individual state, it is bad when individual citizens
secretly trade with the enemy in contravention of
national policy.
Economic Systems
Economic relations are, of course, directly af-
fected by some of the main forces at work in the
economic world expressed in terms of economic
systems. Perhaps the two extremes of these sys-
tems are "free enterprise," on the one hand, where
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economic decisions are made by individuals, and
communism" on the other, where the state is the
source of all decisions. There are other varia-
tions, of course, but these are the two major ex-
tremes of present-day concern. In between are
state socialism, as practiced in Scandinavia, and
systems which in general support free enterprise
but impose certain controls. The British Labor
Government, for example, attempted public owner-
ship of the basic industries, allowing "freedom"
elsewhere. In general, the United States has kept
private ownership, but has increasingly added cen-
tral controls.
A brief summary of the historical development
of this Anglo-American economic system is illus-
trative of the complex forces which shape such
systems. The modern era of economics began
when the rigidities of society inherent in a system
of "status" gave way to business by "contract."
The new money economies and trade were coupled
with royal grants of monopolies of all possible va-
riety. The 18th century brought strong new phil-
osophies of individualism, and the beginnings of
the industrial revolution. It was Adam Smith's
Wealth, of Nation8 in 1776 that called for an eco-
nomic revolution that would match the political
revolution in America. No simple pattern of
orderly development followed, for many of the
old restrictions were only partially removed, but
in considerable degree free competition and au-
tomatic forces were the rule. The pressure of
competition encouraged the exploitation of new
inventions, and material progress was very real.
The inefficient and obsolescent plants went bank-
rupt. New enterprises, or those able to adjust to
changing conditions, reaped profits that were
plowed back into new machinery and other capital
equipment. The corporation, an artificial legal
being, became dominant in many fields over the
partnership or individual enterprise.
Very early, however, the need for regulation of
monopolies was recognized, not as a contradiction
to free enterprise, but as a necessary policing step
to maintain it. In the United States the Granger
laws and the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887
were typical of these controls. The Sherman
Antitrust Act was of broader applicability. In
the years that have followed, the American system
has become increasingly more hybrid, and govern-
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ment has a voice in almost every phase of eco-
nomic life including labor laws, security regula-
tion, and agricultural supports. Increasingly,
too, the power of government has been expanded
by the emergency use of price controls and alloca-
tions, and taxing power and spending power have
enormous indirect effect on the direction of eco-
nomic life. Social security and direct public in-
vestment in electric power and atomic energy rep-
resent further departures from abstract "free
enterprise."
Trade Relations
The effect of economic systems on international
relations is often to be found in the circumstances
of trade between nations. Since current trade re-
lations reflect those of the past, a brief resume will
be helpful to general understanding.
The world of Adam Smith was dominated by
mercantilist concepts. The preceding centuries
had seen national states established and the switch
from feudal barter to money economies. Spain
had poured gold and silver from the New World
into Europe, but for countries without a supply of
gold and silver for their expanding economies, the
only way it could be obtained was through priva-
teering ( a polite word for legalized piracy) or
through the regulation of international trade to
keep exports greater than imports in order that
this difference could be received in bullion. This
intense interest in the acquisition of gold and silver
was a primary feature of mercantilism. There is
not space here to expose all its economic fallacies,
but any elementary text on the subject will make
clear, as did Adam Smith, that real wealth lies in
resources and labor, not in gold or silver, from
the national point of view. It is no compliment
to present-day thinking that most of the false
concepts of the mercantilists are still with us in
one form or another and still accepted by many
people.
The pressure of mercantilist theories had its
effect in the struggle for colonies with supplies of
precious metals, and in restrictive regulations to
hamper freedom of shipping and of commerce,
thus adding to the tensions and pressures that
bring war.
After Adam Smith, the following period of the
classical economists was reflected in governmental
189
policies leading to a breakdown of many tariff
barriers and trade restrictions. England in par-
ticular became the champion of free trade, though
actually the greatest free-trade area in the world
is the United States itself, where no real tariffs
are in force among the 48 States. In no small
sense, United States world leadership in economic
progress can be attributed to its continent-wide
free trade.
Moderate tariffs during the 19th century were
coupled with the use of the automatic gold stand-
ard for exchange. The gold content of the coinage
of each country set the par of exchange, while free
market fluctuations of the exchange rate were held
to narrow limits by the ability of traders to ship
gold to pay trade balances as an alternative to buy-
ing bills of exchange. A continued imbalance of
imports against exports of a particular country,
including "invisible" trade (such things as ship-
ping services and immigrant remittances), if not
corrected rapidly by shipments of gold and ad-
justment of the price level, was caused by the
processes of international investment. A coun-
try borrowing capital from abroad in effect re-
ceives that loan in goods, and this is reflected in a
so-called "unfavorable" balance of trade; namely,
more imports than exports. When the interest
payments come due and when the principal is re-
paid, then exports exceed imports. The details of
the mechanism are of no concern here, although it
may be noted that the terms "favorable" and "un-
favorable" balance are in themselves rather mean-
ingless carry-overs from mercantilist days.
World War I severely altered international
economic relations. It had marked effects on the
finances and money systems of the world, and new
trade patterns developed. Impoverished by war,
attacked by inflation at home, in heavy debt
through reparations demands or borrowings, many
countries sought to redress their position by ex-
change controls and tariff barriers. Many had
abandoned the gold standard during the war
period, and now were on paper standards. Post-
war unemployment was frequently countered by
import restrictions and "buy at home" campaigns.
Although intelligent people could see the ultimate
damage to export sales of such restrictions, it was
the easy course to take countermeasures and add
more restrictions, even though the gains would be
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temporary. Facing the political dangers of un-
employment, in some cases even revolutionary
danger, it was easiest to sacrifice long-range stand-
ards of living in some degree in order to maintain
employment through autarchy. This analysis, of
course, is greatly oversimplified, but the facts of
spiraling trade controls, quotas, and exchange
manipulations are the important ones to remem-
ber. The dangers of war inherent in policies
which deny some countries equal access to markets
and resources have been expressly recognized by
American leaders from the time of the Atlantic
Charter. However, at subsequent similar meet-
ings, corrective action on an international scale has
lagged behind recognition because of the many
intricate problems involved.
Attempts to free international trade have been
vastly complicated by domestic economic controls
in all parts of the world. State socialism is likely
to lead to state buying in place of individual trade,
as is the case in Britain's dealings with Argentina,
and price supports at home mean drastic trade
regulation, as is the case with agricultural imports
in the United States.
So-called normal trade patterns have also been
strongly affected by world events since 1939. On
a scale undreamed of before in world history the
United States through lend-lease poured out a
tremendous flow of munitions, foods, and indus-
trial materials to its allies, to save the world from
German-Japanese fascism. As a practical meas-
ure it provided a means for arming the allies in a
common cause and obviated many of the debt
difficulties of World War I. It was based on the
stated premise that free nations must stand to-
gether in the face of a great common danger.
Trade Agreements
The particulars of recent trade policy include
names and doctrines with which the naval intelli-
gence officer should have at least a limited
acquaintance. Although there are some multi-
lateral international trade agreements, especially
on certain commodities, most trading arrange-
ments are bilateral in nature. The particular
treaty devices adopted by the United States have
led, however, to many multilateral effects. When
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190
two countries sign a treaty of friendship and com-
merce, opening their ports to each other's ships,
they frequently promise "national" treatment to
each other's businessmen and citizens. This means
they guarantee foreigners equal treatment before
the courts, and usually the right to engage in busi-
ness on the same basis as nationals, though there
may be a few exclusions. For example, we re-
serve coastwise shipping, domestic air service, and
fishing in American coastal waters to our own
nationals.
Our treaties are also usually made on a bilateral
"most-favored-nation" basis, which really means
"equally favored." The net effect is that if new
tariff concessions are extended by either party to
a third country, the signatories agree to extend
the same privilege to each other. There are minor
exceptions, such as the British Commonwealth
preference agreements, and special American con-
cessions to Cuba and, for a time, to the Philip-
pines. Furthermore, we usually extend "most-
favored-nation" treatment on an unconditional
basis, which means that no new quid pro quo is
required because agreement as to what constitutes
equivalent concession is very hard to reach. Our
aim is to minimize the restrictions on trade, al-
though some of the most ardent free-enterprise
businessmen often favor high tariffs and small
quotas.
In 1934, the United States returned to a form
of additional trade negotiation it had used in
earlier years, the now well-known Reciprocal
Trade Treaties. In exchange for additional con-
cessions on selected items that were most impor-
tant in trade with a particular country the United
States, by executive agreement, lowered its im-
port tariffs (still on a "most-favored-nation"
basis) even more. While these concessions are
less subject to direct pressures by protectionist
interests, the most elaborate safeguards are pro-
vided by means of public hearings to give full
voice to affected American industries. We do not
grant concessions on items we have in surplus
We have special penalties on "dumping," and even
we use the "quota," a weapon more powerful than
the tariff. In addition, when changed conditions
require new protection for an American industry,
these agreements have escape clauses.
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Multilateral Agreements
Multilateral agreements in the control of trade
are best exemplified by the activities of the Food
and Agricultural Organization, which establishes
international quotas and price controls on certain
agricultural commodities. Further, the Interna-
tional Trade Organization of the United Nations
establishes the fundamental machinery to collect
trade data and takes corrective action to remove
trade inequities that might lead to war. This or-
ganization, which the United States has cham-
pioned as a companion to the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund, is a beginning, but
so far has demonstrated little concrete accom-
plishment, since the obstacles it must overcome are
tremendous. Of course, so long as the world is
fundamentally divided in objectives, most of these
agreements can have only limited success. The
present ITO agreements give lip service to free-
dom of trade and no discrimination, but are so
hedged with escape clauses that their practical ef-
fect is very limited. The choice has been to have
the machinery established, or to have nothing,
since the policy of free trade has not as yet been
made possible.
The milieu in which our trade policy is applied
is not entirely of our own making, but results from
events in all parts of the world. When immedi-
ate post World War I restrictions had eased
slightly, and several of the major powers returned
to the gold standard in the late 1920's, the New
York stock market collapsed and we stopped in-
vesting in Germany. Those investments had
given Germany the apparent power to pay repara-
tions, and thus in turn enabled Britain and France
to pay war debts. The collapse of the Kreditan-
stalt bank in Austria spread financial panic in
Central Europe, and the flight of short-term capi-
tal began, eventually leading to a heavy gold in-
flow into the United States. This threatened. ex-
change stability abroad, and eventually forced
most nations off the gold standard. In 1930 our
passage of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, as an
answer to mounting unemployment at home, was
soon matched by British abandonment of their
traditional free trade policies, which had already
been weakened. "Buy British" and Empire pref-
erence became the rule. A special British trad-
ing arrangement was made with Argentina in
191
1933, the first of many, due to the close commercial
relations between the two countries. The United
States and Britain did not join in a reciprocal
trade agreement until 1938. World War It
brought virtual free trade between the two coun-
tries, for after the British exhausted most of their
foreign investments paying for munitions during
our "cash and carry neutrality" days, lend-lease
and the postwar loans became major trade factors.
Postwar Britain has been heavily engaged in state
trading.
The Soviets, since their seizure of power in
1918, have used state trading exclusively, though
during the temporary N. E. P. period they did
grant some private licenses for trade. The Min-
istry of Foreign Trade controls all Soviet trade
today, setting up foreign corporations abroad to
do its buying. Special commodity trade combines
under the Ministry set their quotas in accordance
with an overall economic plan. In the United
States, Antorg, a New York corporation, is the
sole Soviet representative Amtorg's more sinis-
ter espionage activities have already been men-
tioned.
Foreign Investment
Many trade difficulties have been linked directly
with problems of international investment or capi-
tal flows, both long-term and short-term, from one
country to another. It should be pointed out that
long term private investment takes two forms, di-
rect and portfolio. Direct investment is illus-
trated by the great activity of United States firms
in establishing branch plants in the Western
Hemisphere countries. Portfolio investment re-
fers to the purchase of securities in foreign con-
cerns without the direct responsibilities of con-
struction and management. The United States
government has encouraged private investment
abroad as a necessary measure to improve interna-
tional economic good health. One of the economic
problems is that the heavy American export flow,
which has materially aided many countries and
also maintained high employment at home, must
be paid for in one or more of several ways: (a) by
taxpayers helping to pay the costs; (b) by govern-
ment or priVate citizens making investments
abroad; (c) by an equal flow of imports. The
fourth alternative, that of ending this export
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trade, has not been seriously considered in the
present world situation. Since imports either
have not been available or have come in competi-
tion with domestic goods, they have not been of
major assistance. According to various econo-
mists, the best answer is investment now, with two-
way trade as soon as possible. Our interest in
private enterprise naturally favors private invest-
ment, even though the problem is political in many
respects, because outward movements of capital
cannot really be considered investments unless
there is a strong possibility of later dividends and
repayment. Private investors are more likely to be
influenced by such factors, and to place their
money soundly, since they have no reason to weigh
political considerations. One great trouble has
been that private investors have frequently lacked
incentive for foreign investment. Political in-
stability and chaos, fluctuating exchanges, heavy
taxes, and confiscation have all meant loss to previ-
ous investors. Consequently, the trickle of such
private funds abroad since the world depression
has been quite small, except in a few "safe" areas.
Government loans have had to replace such private
flows.
War Debts
Financial adjustments growing out of the two
world wars, as has been indicated, have been dom-
inant forces in world economic relations. In the
first war the United States loaned enormous sums
which actually went abroad in the form of goods.
There was not enough gold abroad to pay for them,
yet we were unwilling to accept repayment in
kind; namely, more goods. We felt that the con-
tractual obligation was separate and apart from
the question of reparations receipts by our debtors.
Consequently, there was extreme bitterness of both
sides, and payments with minor exceptions were
halted.
Germany surrendered at the end of World War
I on the condition that no punitive damages other
than war losses, were to be collected. But the Al-
lied estimates of losses were astronomical. Of
course, they were not completely paid, but in the
process of trying, Germany experienced the com-
plete inflationary destruction of her money system,
and the accompanying despair has been identified
as a factor in the rise of Hitler. The policy after
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World War II was quite different. The United
States kept title to lend-lease goods. Perishables
were written off as one of the costs of the war.
Durables were either returned, or transferred after
the war at the best figure we could negotiate.
Some of these mark-downs were tremendous. Of
course, the significance of the mark-down has
meant little in most cases, since our policy has
in considerable measure been one of underwriting
the foreign exchange deficits of those countries
important to our defense which followed prudent
fiscal and monetary policies.
Following World War II some war debt settle-
ments were made. In the case of a few countries,
reverse lend-lease had been sufficiently great to
cancel out direct lend-lease. Great Britain agreed
to settle a lend-lease "debt" of $24 billion for $650
million to be paid over a 52-year period at 2-percent
interest. Also, in various countries some settle-
ment funds were made available under the Ful-
bright plan for the interchange of scholars, when
such funds were otherwise blocked because of ex-
change difficulties. However, no agreements were
ever reached with the Soviet Union which re-
ceived 500,000 vehicles, 14,000 planes, 7,000 tanks,
2,000 locomotives, 11,000 freight cars, and 600,000
tons of ships.
Reparations
The end of the war brought with it the problem
of reparations. The Soviet Union had suggested
that it should receiVe twenty billion dollars worth
of German reparations, separate and apart from
any "war booty," which was a flexible term that
could well include any property in territories oc-
cupied by the Red Army. At the time, the United
States was not demanding reparations but, under
the influence of the Morgenthau Plan concept, was
thinking in terms of converting Germany from
an industrialized nation to an agricultural state
which could never again threaten the world with
serious aggression. There were many astute ob-
servers who had misgivings about such a plan
because of its economic consequences, not only for
Germany but for all of Europe. While we did
recognize that Germany had no export surplus
with which to pay reparations, we envisioned that
the dismantling of German war and heavy indus-
tries could supply capital goods reparations re-
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THE UNITED STATES AND THE WORLD ruENTIAL
quired for the rebuilding of wrecked factories in
a number of countries.
By one way and another, several countries did
collect some actual reparations. Poland was com-
pensated by receiving important German terri-
tories. The Soviet Union stripped much from
the territories occupied by Russian troops, and
appropriated German external assets in Eastern
Europe even when they represented goods or se-
curities stolen by the Germans. At fictitious
prices the Soviets also bought control of most
industry within their zones. The United States
picked up portfolio German assets in Switzerland
and Latin America. Dismantled plants in West-
ern Germany were moved to Russia, partly as rep-
arations, partly to pay for food imports from
Eastern Zone.
Economic Recovery
Within a short time, the United States finally
recognized in official policy that German economic
recovery was essential both to European economic
recovery and to avert chaos and communism.
However, this required such sizable money grants
from the United States that any reparations passed
to other countries became actually equivalent to
grants in aid from the United States. Therefore,
the first charge on German exports was considered
payment for imports, which substantially ended
any large shipments of goods to the East. Be-
cause of initial confusion, the three Western Zones
ultimately set up unified economic controls, but
some dismantling continued for a time, even after
the official view had swung to the point where it
was felt a halt should be called. The failure of
the Soviets to receive all that they demanded be-
came an additional factor in East-West tension.
In the case of Japan, the Potsdam Declaration
set forth general conditions for postwar treat-
ment. War industries were to be destroyed, but
a viable economy was to be left. External assets
were taken over, and, for a period, considerable
amounts of capital goods were shipped to the
victims of Japanese aggression. The Soviet
Union regarded its enormous prize of Manchuria,
acquired in less an a week of war, as "booty,"
not a part of reparations. This was very costly to
China, destroying for years to come any real hope
of economic advance. In time the United States
269196-54 14 193
came to the position of making up Japanese trade
deficits, first for relief purposes, then for economic
recovery. This ended further reparations, and
the Peace Treaty of 1952 fairly well closed the
matter, despite the reservations held by the Philip-
pines, Indonesia, and a few others.
In the interests of an economically and polit-
ically stable world, the United States felt obliged
to extend economic aid not only to Germany and
to Japan, but also to our allies, since they lacked
the recuperative powers that we possessed. Their
heavy purchases of food, industrial materials, and
increasing amounts of capital goods in this coun-
try, caused the so-called "dollar shortage."
Therefore, lend-lease military aid was followed
first by UNRRA food and clothing, and then by a
series of other measures. We sponsored the
European Payments plan to try to restore multi-
lateral trade in Europe, and then the European
Recovery Program, a combination of self-help,
American technical guidance, and Marshall plan
goods, with stress on permanent improvements
of output rather than current consumables. The
Economic Cooperation Agency was the American
governmental body set up to administer these
functions.
The Marshall Plan and Military Aid
The Marshall plan was an astute and states-
manlike offer to the world, although the Soviet
Union condemned it as an effort on our part to
achieve world economic domination. Because of
the Soviet position, their satellites had to with-
draw acceptance of invitations to Paris to discuss
the plan, and the further division of the world into
East and West continued American aid and
European response raised the physical indices of
European production well above prewar levels, but
still left Europe woefully weak militarily against
the threat from the East. The Truman plan of
containment with military aid for Greece and
Turkey became necessary in order to save the
West's strategic position in the Mediterranean.
The Soviet answer to the Marshall plan was not
only invective, but also the creation of the Molotov
plan, which tied the satellites even closer to the
U. S. S. R. The Cominform, the latest manifesta-
tion of the supposedly dead Comintern, was also
brought into the open.
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Scarcely had the phenomenal and substantial
economic recovery of a number of countries seemed
to justify the Marshall plan and point toward its
termination when new problems arose. The
growth of the Soviet military menace to Western
Europe, and indeed to the whole free world, indi-
cated a new and general need for accelerated re-
armament. However, military demands on the
budget and material of the Marshall plan countries
threatened to undo much of the progress that had
been made. Vigorous measures by the countries
concerned were hampered by both internal polit-
ical problems and public apathy toward defense.
United States military aid was a response to the
economic and political problems faced. Both
Britain and France were experiencing particular
economic difficulties because of additional burdens
imposed by the wars in Malaya and Indo-China.
In the opinion of many government leaders, the
important economic fact of military aid was that
the issue of arms shipments versus more economic
aid was one of expediency, not of fundamentals.
Economic aid, if reflected in arms manufacture in
Europe, might be cheaper than arms shipments;
but if the latter meant arms sooner, the higher
cost might be justified.
The Allies had recognized even before World
War II ended that strong economic measures of
international cooperation were needed to provide
the basis for a working world community. The
prewar arrangements for bringing stability to ex-
change rates were studied and strengthened at
Bretton Woods in 1944. The International Mone-
tary Fund to stabilize exchanges (short-term capi-
tal movement) , and the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development to ease long-
term capital movement problems were created.
However, these measures alone, important as they
were, could not provide enough support to restore
the world economy. That is why the European
recovery plan and "Point Four," a world-wide
plan for development of backward areas, came
into being. The military aid program was harder
to foresee, for the cold war was not of our making.
International Transport
Without transport there would be neither in-
ternational relations of importance, nor modern
war machines. Consequently, the intelligence of-
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194
ficer should know something of the workings of
transport?the devices used, the control and man-
agement, and the regulation, both national and
international. Some of the most complete inter-
national controls have developed in Europe, where
modern technology with high speed and cheap
movement contrasts most sharply with the small
political units crowded into a compact geographic
area.
Modern economic life is closely linked with
railways, the chief form of land transport
throughout the world. They acquire significance
because of their combination of a fixed right-of-
way and mechanical power, forming networks
that allow the delivery of freight and passengers
without transshipment and at low ton-mile costs
anywhere in a, big territory. Such networks re-
quire a standardization of track gage, clearances,
couplers, and brakes. We have developed a great
North American net with a track gage of 4 feet
81/2 inches, covering Canada, the United States,
and Mexico. A second great network of the same
gage covers most of Europe outside of the Soviet
Union and Iberia, though there are many Euro-
pean local feeder lines of narrow gage. There
are smaller networks in Manchuria-China, Argen-
tina, and India-Pakistan, though some of the
latter systems are more handicapped by a variety
of gages. The standard being developed in Africa
is 3 feet 6 inches. Australia hopes to convert her
state systems to the American-European stand-
ard. The Soviet standard on their extensive sys-
tem is 5 feet. Europe's railway controls include
international agreements on technical standards,
car interchange, rates, timetables, and accounts.
Many of these arrangements go back to the last
century.
The commerce of international rivers and some
connecting canals are also subject to joint regu-
lation. The Danube and the Rhine are outstand-
ing examples, although under German and then
Soviet domination, international control of the
Danube in particular is illusory. A more general-
ized type of treaty usually regulates the use of
rivers flowing through or on the borders of more
than one state in all parts of the world.
Roads are more local in nature, although this
characteristic is changing as long-distance truck-
ing develops abroad as it has in America. How ?
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ever, there are agreements as to licensing, liability,
and traffic signals. Roads still remain mostly
feeders to railways in many foreign lands.
Pipelines, except by bilateral treaty, have not
figured as directly in international agreements,
although a few, such as those from the Persian
Gulf to the Mediterranean, are of very great politi-
cal and strategic concern.
International regulation of ocean shipping has
been somewhat different from that of land trans-
port, for international law has recognized the high
seas as free to all users, with questions remaining
only about the limits of territorial waters, use of
oceanic canals and straits, and the rights of bellig-
erents and neutrals. Just as railways have been
very important to economic advance, so too has
cheap ocean transport been made reliable by large
steel steam or diesel vessels. The role of the
merchant marine and its problems should require
no explanation for any naval officer. Only re-
cently has specific international regulation be-
come more extensive. Conferences on safety at
sea and rules of the road are being supplemented
by discussions of wage rates, subsidies, and work-
ing conditions. In the future, the regulations set
by international agreement might increase.
Regulations governing air transport among
countries are very complex, an inevitable develop-
ment, since aircraft have such great military and
political implications and, unlike ships, are not
obliged to stop at the frontier of a country, but can
fly to any place on the globe irrespective of bound-
aries. Early discussions of air law matured in
1919 into the first detailed set of rules. Public and
private air law were merged under a single body,
195
the International Civil Aviation Organization,
after the Chicago meetings in 1944. Regulations
govern the licensing, inspection, registration, and
technical standards of aircraft, communications,
statistics, routes, and rates are all controlled either
through the ICAO, the International Air Trans-
port Association, or by bilateral agreements.
Communications, too, bind together the whole
world and consequently are internationally con-
trolled. These controls include not only the Uni-
versal Postal Union, but also the International
Telecommunications Union, which assigns radio
frequencies, establishes rules on telegraph and
radio codes, and controls access to and use of these
facilities.
Within this chapter have been presented some
of the major geographic, economic, and political
forces that shape the environment of the world of
which the United States is a part and in which the
Navy must do its job?fields of concern which must
inevitably affect the thinking and action of in-
telligence officers. Obviously this review is not a
substitute for the years of background reading and
study and the constant day by day interest in fol-
lowing current developments that are required for
proper analytical assessment of events for in-
telligence purposes. The only aim has been to re-
fresh the thinking of the naval officer, to stimulate
him to do further reading in areas beyond his ac-
quaintance, and thus to improve his intelligence
perspective. The following chapter will outline
the problem the United States and the free nations
of the world face in the menace of communism and
its chief exponent, Soviet Russia.
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CHAPTER 8
WORLD COMMUNISM AND THE U. S. S. R.
The reality of the menace of communism as a
militant political force is evidenced by the fact
that Communist dictatorships now control one-
third of the population and almost one-quarter of
the inhabited areas of the world. In many non-
Communist states, organized groups propound the
doctrines of communism and exercise considerable
political influence. But communism is not only a
political force. Supported and directed by Soviet
Russia, world communism has become the most
extensive mass movement based on philosophical
teachings since the advent of Christianity, and
more disturbing, it is a tremendously powerful
force subversive to the democratic way of life as
enjoyed by the United States and other freedom-
loving peoples of the world. Thus it constitutes
the greatest problem we face today. However,
for the citizenry of the United States, and for the
naval officer, this problem must not only be iden-
tified; it must also be understood if adequate so-
lutions are to be found. It is therefore appropri-
ate to review briefly the doctrines of communism,
their historical development and utilization, and,
finally, some of the elements of power of the So-
viet State which is the chief advocate of Com-
munist doctrine.
THE BACKGROUND OF COMMUNISM
Communism, in theory, is far from new. Ex-
pressions of it are found in Plato's writings and
in literature even before his time. From time to
time in various areas, efforts were made to put
certain fragments of this theory into practice.
Marxist "Scientific" Socialism, or modern com-
munism, as a social philosophy evolved out of
conditions which existed in 19th century Europe
and drew extensively upon the intellectual think-
ing of the 18th century philosophers. The Age
of Reason in 18th century Europe brought an
awakened interest in philosophy, economics, and
politics, a questioning of old beliefs, and a search
for new approaches to the problems caused by
social and economic change. Although the indus-
197
trial revolution eventually led to a higher standard
of living, it also brought unusually harsh condi-
tions of labor for many people. The individual
initiative and healthful environment of an agri-
cultural life and the simplicity of handicraft man-
ufacture were increasingly replaced by the regi-
mentation of the factory, the unhealthful
conditions of the mine, and the complexity of
highly organized industry.
In trying to adjust to life in this new order, so-
cial philosophers of the period began to consider
once again the age-old question of how the com-
mon man can improve his standard of living. At
the same time, economic conditions were being
analyzed and economic principles were being for-
mulated into a broad body of doctrine by the
so-called classical economists. Some of their doc-
trines, with considerable elaboration, form the
skeleton of modern economics, but many of their
explanations of economic functions were based on
very artificial or even false assumptions. Other
writers not only tried to explain the world as it
was, but sought solutions to some of the inequities
of existence. Variant forms of cooperative life
and socialism were suggested as replacements for
the laissez-faire capitalism of the day. Some
short-lived experiments in cooperative societies
were made on a small scale, but most of these were
abandoned when it was found that new problems
replaced the ones they were trying to solve, or
that all failings could not be attributed to capital-
ism alone.
One of the intellectual theorists of this period,
Karl Marx, was to exert an influence on Western
civilization out of all proportion to the signifi-
cance of his teachings, which have been thoroughly
discredited. Very much a product of his age,
Marx conceived of himself as a prophet, a realist,
a materialist, and a social scientist utilizing "scien-
tific" methods. This unique mixture of mis-
sionary fervor and spurious scientific theory was
to be translated into action to an amazing degree
by a small band of devoted followers.
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INTELLIGENCE FOR
THE THEORY OF COMMUNISM
The Communists rely heavily on their body of
theory. Since they regard Marxism as "scien-
tific," they derive from his theories both their
long-range plans and day-to-day action, utilizing
what they believe to be strictly logical deductive
methods. Both Lenin and Stalin emphasized the
importance of theory when they wrote, respec-
tively: "Without a revolutionary theory, there
cannot be a revolutionary movement," and, "Only
a party guided by an advanced theory can act as
a vanguard in the fight." The Communists' pro-
grams of action are, in effect, applications of their
theories. It is for this reason that an understand-
ing of the theory is essential.
Communism presents an interpretation of man
and his history, a reason for cause and effect, a
guidepost for goals, and a justification for the
means of attaining them. Its doctrines have been
closely integrated to embrace all of man's activi-
ties: social, economic, political, and philosophical.
For the confirmed Communist, they alone provide
the satisfactory ? "scientific" ? explanation of
man's being, the solution to his many puzzling
and conflicting problems, and the opportunity for
a realizable better life on earth. For the Com-
munist, the only alternatives are to accept his doc-
trines or to oppose them?a middle ground is
impossible.
Although rejecting all religions as "opiates" of
the people, communism in the eyes of its adherents
has become a substitute religion; even more, it has
given them a sense of purpose, a symbol for per-
sonal dedication. While Communistic writings
are voluminous and complex, they are all built
upon a series of basic concepts which might be
called the creed of communism. The first is the
concept that all life is material in a state of con-
stant change; hence, there is no immortal soul and
no God. The only moral code is that which serves
the cause of communism. The second is the belief
that all history is the result of the laws of economic
determinism which were discovered by Marx; the
basic conflict has always been and continues to be
the struggle between social classes. The third
concept is that capitalism is an instrument of op-
pression and the primary source of opposition
which must be destroyed, together with the State
which of necessity supports it. Destruction can
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NAVAL OFFICERS
only be brought about by violent revolutionary
methods because the ruling class will never relin-
quish its autocratic power voluntarily. There-
fore, such methods are essential and acceptable for
the liberation of the oppressed classes by the van--
guard which is, of course, the Communist Party,
considered in a collective sense. In the minds of
the Communists it follows logically that true com-
munism can only be realized in the world when
all opposition has been eliminated eveywhere.
The Marxist Philosophy
The theory of communism is built on the philo-
sophical teachings of Marx which have three pri-
mary features. The first is Dialectical Material-
ism which, simply stated, is a theory of reality,
a philosophical explanation of the universe and
man. While borrowing heavily from the thinking
of the German philosopher Hegel, Marx substi-
tuted materialism for Hegel's idealism, and at-
tempted to demonstrate that the universe and man
originated from material forces in a state of con-
stant motion. Therefore, to Marx, matter was
all-important, mind was of secondary value, and
consequently the soul, immortality, and God could
not exist. He explained development as the re-
sult of the action of opposing forces. The first
force was called the "thesis ;" the second force, the
"antithesis;" and the result of their opposing ac-
tion, the "synthesis." The "synthesis" became a
new "thesis" and the whole process repeated itself
ad infinitum. The historical application of this
theory of reality was most ingenious. For their
"thesis," the Marxists took the point of view that
primitive society was classless, with tribal owner-
ship of property. The "antithesis" was class so-
ciety, with capitalism as its most extreme form.
The "synthesis," of course, was true communism
which would combine all the advantages of man's
progress with the idyllic simplicity of primitive
society.
In addition to his theories of reality and de-
velopment, Marx set forth three fundamental prin-
ciples which he called the "unity of opposites,"
the "negation of the negation," and the change of
quantity into quality. While abstruse if not ab-
surd, these principles have been applied most in-
geniously. The first justifies the combination of
oppression and freedom within a country in the
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sense that the enemies of communism are oppressed
while its adherents are free to enjoy its benefits.
The second justifies Communist warfare against
the capitalistic state because it produces freedom
for the masses. The third proposes that the trans-
formation of one thing into another is qualitative
and extreme; therefore, a violent revolution is
required to change society from capitalism to com-
munism. Reform is purely a quantitative matter
and no fundamental change ever occurs.
The historical application of Marxist dialectical
materialism also involved the division of society
into classes and an explanation of history on the
basis of class struggle. By its very nature, this
struggle was identified as the means for the even-
tual and inevitable transformation of society. In-
terestingly enough, Marx never took the trouble
to define his term, "class."
The second feature of the philosophy of Marx
is his doctrine of the economic processes, includ-
ing production and distribution. Two aspects of
this doctrine are his labor theory of value and
his theory of surplus value. While not only in-
accurate but also false, his theory is that the
value of commodities is a result solely of labor
and, further, that profit represents nothing more
than unpaid labor. In essence, this economic doc-
trine is a theory of increasing exploitation of labor
with the lot of the workers becoming progressively
worse until they inevitably rise in revolt. In ap-
plying this doctrine, the Communists regard the
economic processes as the base for the entire so-
cial structure of capitalism, including government
and law, science, religion, art, and philosophy.
The arena of the class struggle is the economic
base. Since the theory suggests that the economic
processes of capitalism must inevitably be de-
stroyed, it follows logically, in the minds of the
Communists, that the balance of the social struc-
ture must also be destroyed because it would no
longer have a foundation upon which to rest.
The third feature of Marx's teachings is his
theory of the State and of the revolutionary proc-
ess. Since he believed the apparatus of the State
to be nothing more than "a machine for the op-
pression of one class by another," he was convinced
that it would "wither away" when the true Com-
munist society came into being. However, ac-
cording to his concept of the revolutionary process,
this transformation of human society was not to
be accomplished in one step, but rather in several.
In the first, the bourgeoisie would assume power;
in the second, the proletariat would take control.
This second, transitionary period he labeled the
"Dictatorship of the Proletariat," during which
time the State would be continued, but as an arm
of the masses. Only later, at some future time
which was never defined, would all semblance of
the State disappear and the true Communist
society emerge based upon the philosophy: "from
each according to his ability, to each according to
his needs." It is this theory of the State and of
the revolutionary process which has been particu-
larly subjected to interpretation and manipulation
by Communist leaders who followed Marx.
Communism and Socialism
Any discussion of communism must also include
socialism which was already a well-known term in
the time of Marx. While space does not permit
a detailed consideration of socialism as a system
of thought and a course of social action, four
points regarding it should be mentioned. First,
socialism is revolutionary by its very nature be-
cause it seeks a basic change in social institutions
by a number of methods. This question of method
is one point of difference between present day
Socialists and Communists. Second, there are
many kinds of socialism, of which Marxist social-
ism or communism is only one. Third, as a social
philosophy, socialism includes doctrines which are
not only economic in nature but also political, edu-
cational, cultural, and sociological. Fourth, to
the Communists, socialism is a means, not an end?
a tool with which to build a world Communist
society. This Communist viewpoint that social-
ism is a lower phase of communism is one reason
why some scholars conclude that any movement
toward socialism will ultimately redound to the
advantage of communism.
The Development of the Theory
The total body of Communist theory which has
evolved during the past 100 years is the product of
the thinking and the writings of 4 men: Karl
Marx, Frederick Engels, Vladimir Lenin, and
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Joseph Stalin. Marx has been described as the
"originator" of modern communism, contributing
its basic concepts. Called the "collaborator,"
Engels worked closely with Marx to systematize
these basic concepts; his contributions included
organizational ability and aggressive leadership.
Lenin and Stalin made practical application of the
Marxist theories to the social conditions of their
own times.
Communist historians regard Lenin as the "de-
veloper." Enlarging upon the theory of the
dictatorship of the proletariat, he was able to
apply it successfully in Russia. Since he believed
that the proletariat was not as yet capable of ad-
ministering the State, he advanced the theory of
the Communist Party as the core and "the van-
guard of the proletariat, the general staff of the
revolution." Interestingly enough, he did not con-
ceive of the party as proletarian by nature; in
fact, many of its leaders have been and are intel-
lectuals and of middle-class origin. Nonetheless,
the party "expresses the interests of the proletar-
iat." Lenin expanded upon the theory of im-
perialism as the final stage of capitalistic develop-
ment. He also enlarged upon the strategy and
tactics of world revolution and played a major
part in the organization of the Third Interna-
tional. In effect, he restated the Marxist philos-
ophy in order to apply it more effectively to the
Russian State.
Stalin's place in Communist history is that of
the "continuer." His particular contribution to
theory is the concept of consolidating socialism in
one country first (Soviet Russia). He converted
the party into a strong administrative bureaucracy
and further defined its functions within the dicta-
torship of the proletariat. In rejecting the
"withering of the state" theory, he modified the
Marxist philosophy. At the same time, he ampli-
fied it by introducing the concept of State plan-
ning and emphasizing the industrialization of the
country and the collectivizing of agriculture.
Just as the theory of communism is the product
of the work of these four men, so likewise is the
growth and expansion of communism into its pres-
ent position as a world political force attributable
to their influences.
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200
THE GROWTH OF COMMUNISM
Karl Marx
A German philosopher and economic historian
who had settled in London, Karl Marx was among
the more unconventional writers of the mid-19th
century period. His massive work entitled Daa
Kapital includes some remarkably well docu-
mented and detailed descriptions of the objection--
able working conditions in the coal mines, the
mills, and the factories, as they existed in his time.
Radical as it was at the time, his analysis was an
outgrowth and a perversion of some of the theories
of the classical economists who are today often
regarded as conservative. In the light of present
day economics, many of his analytical conclusions
are easily proven false. Marx is also well-knovvnL
for his economic interpretation of history, even
though he was not the sole originator of this con-
cept. While this concept becomes absurd by ex-
cessive application, it is important enough as an
analytical approach to history to have made a
contribution to the thinking of non-Marxist
historians.
Marx was definitely a materialist; for him all
reality was autodynamic. He viewed life as a
struggle for material goods, without a question of
the hereafter. For Marx, there was nothing out-
side, above, or below nature. All was nature in a
state of eternal, dialectical flux. From his ideas
emerged the doctrine of the class struggle between
the oppressed who were the workers and the op-
pressors who were the bourgeoisie. Because he
believed the false doctrine of surplus value, Marx
saw wealth being concentrated more and more in
the hands of the few, with the wage earners unable
to buy what they themselves produced. Such a
situation, according to Marxist doctrine, leads to
overproduction and unemployment, to imperial-
ism in finding new markets, and to war. On the
basis of his economic interpretation of history,
Marx also expected that in time the desperate
proletariat would rise in violent revolution to de-
stroy the bourgeois oppressors and create a strong
dictatorship which would exist only until the last
traces of the old society had disappeared. In the
new society, when the workers owned the means of
production and no profits were paid, the need for
a dominant organized State to regulate the work-
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ers would disappear, and a new classless, stateless,
and happy society would result.
To a degree, Marx was a frustrated personality
rebelling against the social conditions of his age,
and, originally at least, quite willing for violent
death to be the fate of the "enemies" of the work-
ing class. But his false assumptions and incom-
plete analyses led him to false conclusions. His
materialistic approach to life is rejected by all
who recognize that life also has spiritual values
which transcend its material benefits. Men live
by bread, but not by bread alone.
The Marxist doctrines had a curious appeal, at-
tracting a varied but limited group of followers
in the beginning. Among these were some dis-
contented intellectuals who imagined themselves
in the vanguard of bold new thought; those who
philosophically favored the destruction of existing
institutions and moral values; those just too gulli-
ble and ignorant to see the ultimate results of a
social system that promised peace and plenty in
exchange for a violent revolutionary struggle;
and, finally, the unscrupulous opportunists who
would support any movement that promised per-
sonal rewards at the expense of society.
In connection with the "inevitable" aspect of the
social and economic doctrines advanced by Marx,
it should be noted that the American social struc-
ture has been a particular puzzle to the strictly
Marxian analysts, because its development has con-
futed their basic assumptions. Despite the
growth of capitalism in the United States and the
appearance of huge corporations, the standard of
living has steadily improved and the ownership
base has remained very broad. Public acceptance
of sound regulation has produced a pattern of life
far different from the dire prophecies of the Marx-
ists, although many of the present-day adherents
of Marxist philosophy refuse to recognize Ameri-
can accomplishments.
The First International
The age of Marx has been described as a time
of tumult and trouble. In 1848 Marx and Engels
published the Communist Manifesto, marking a
true turning point from the many Utopian social-
ist plans to a world revolutionary movement.
They called upon the workers of the world to arise,
since they had "nothing to lose but their chains."
201
Revolution broke out in Paris just a few days after
this document was printed, but it, as well as its
counterparts all over Europe, was short-lived.
Many of the German participants fled to America
and England. In the years that followed, Eng-
lish, French, German, Italian, and other working-
men met, and eventually in 1864 formed the In-
ternational Workingmen's Association, commonly
known as the First International. Marx was a
leading figure in the organization. Its purpose
was to unite and advance the workingmen's move-
ments in all European countries, but it eventually
fell to pieces because, for one reason, many of the
participants had paramount interest in their own
national objectives. In the Franco-Prussian War,
with the Germans at the gates of Paris, French
workers rose to create the Paris Commune, whose
bloody suppression was another factor in the de-
struction of the First International. In 1872 the
headquarters were transferred to New York, but
in a short time the organization dwindled away
and was finally disbanded in 1876.
The Second International
Formed in 1889, on the 100th anniversary of the
French Revolution by delegates from 17 countries
meeting in Paris, the Second International existed
until World War I as a rather loose federation of
socialist parties and a society of professional revo-
lutionaries. It had liaison and information-
gathering functions and pressure was exerted to
unite divisive socialist groups. The organization
is difficult to describe in general terms because of
its diverse elements, ranging from Marxists to
those who favored gradual reform within the
framework of existing institutions. The con-
servative elements largely supported the Allied
war cause in World War I, while the Russian mem-
bers favored a policy of revolution. It was this
split that led to the creation of the Third Inter-
national in 1919, often known as the Comintern
or Communist International.
Those parties who refused to affiliate with the
Comintern, and who had left the Second Inter-
national, formed their own organization. In 1923
they joined with the remnants of the Second In-
ternational to establish the Labor and Socialist
International (LSI). The national character of
the socialist movements affiliated in its large mem-
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bership weakened its international effectiveness,
and it finally ceased to exist.
The Russian Revolution
While the intellectuals debated and the revolu-
tionaries climbed soap boxes or plotted coups in
cellars, events of significance were transpiring in
the land of the tzars. This vast and predomi-
nantly agricultural nation had remained in rela-
tive isolation from the economic and political
changes in Europe and America, and the despotic
power of the tzars had preserved aspects of the
feudal system long after they had been destroyed
in the rest of Europe. Marx never went to Russia
nor did he envision that his doctrines would be
applied there. However, the combination of many
circumstances in that ultraconservative empire was
to bring about a violent change.
Russia experienced an aborted revolution in
1905. Some of the surviving revolutionary lead-
ers who were not exiled to Siberia escaped to Ger-
any, France, and Switzerland; others stayed
"underground" in European Russia. Marxist
philosophies were strongest among certain groups
in Germany. When the intelectual theories of
Marx were combined with the practical revolu-
tionary techniques of Lenin, in part influenced by
Sun Yat-Sen, a potentially dangerous force had
come into existence.
The terrible attrition of World War I, the
misery of the lower classes under the cumulative
oppression of the Tzarist regime, and some German
conniving brought civil war to Russia again. The
overthrow of the Tzar was followed first by the
relatively moderate socialistic government of
Kerensky, and then by the skillful seizure of power
by the Bolsheviki under Lenin. Their ruthless
methods, and the dissension among opposing
groups, led to eventual consolidation of power in
the hands of the Communist Party.
COMMUNIST RUSSIA
It should be pointed out that the resulting gov-
ernment in Russia, for all its lip service to Marx,
has yet to create a true Marxist state. The ideal
of the classless society with its common ownership,
no exploitation, no government, and "from each
according to his ability to each according to his
need" has not materialized, nor are there any signs
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that it will. From a detached intellectual point
of view, true Marxism, shorn of revolution, might
have a certain appeal to those who are willing to
overlook practical problems of human behavior
and who are unaware of the serious scientific and
philosophic errors in the Marxist analysis. But
Marxism in practice, as sponsored by the Soviet
Union and its international following, is quite an-
other matter, which should be ample proof of the
fallacies of its theory. Even the communists will
admit that Soviet Russia is in the transitional
stage of Socialism, or public ownership of the
means of production. But what has developed is
State Capitalism with a ruthless exercise of total
power by a dictatorship. Thus a doctrine, orig-
inally philosophical, has developed into a force
seeking world domination.
Reshaping Society
The Russian communist leaders have been emi-
nently practical men, willing to compromise or
adapt their principles to accomplish their goal
of consolidation of power. They have expertly
carried out the techniques of revolution by seizure,
of power following infiltration. They haw
worked hard to reshape mankind to their type of
society. Institutions and ideas that conflicted
with their own have been ruthlessly destroyed.
Religious activities, with their emphasis on moral
values, have been stifled, except when for tactical
reasons temporary concessions have seemed advis-
able. Those who had a stake in the older society,
such as property owners, officials, and community
leaders, have been liquidated or shipped to slave
camps. The flexible doctrine that any means are
justified by the end has opened the door to a
complete new code of behavior in individual and
collective life. The individual is no longer dig-
nified as such, but subordinate to the party goals.
An important feature of the Soviet state is cen-
tral planning. Some may think that the differ-
ences in planning by Communist and non-Commu-
nist states are only differences of degree, but such
a conclusion is not only an oversimplification, but
precludes correct analysis of the problem. The
Soviets plan production, confiscate resources with-
out compensation, and then exercise rigid control
of practically all human activity to conform to
the plan. Of course, a degree of central planning
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is essential for any State; for example, all coun-
tries collect data on price levels, credit needs, and
similar items of national concern. A number of
States have also created central banks to control
money supply and price levels for the minimum
purpose of stabilizing their economy. Some non-
Communist countries use degrees of planning and
control to meet their own needs that are less gen-
erally accepted in the United States. However,
there can be no question that what we know as
democracy is not compatible with the Soviet pat-
tern of life. The Soviets have combined the doc-
trines of Marx, which embody Hegel's dialectics,
Darwin's survival of the fittest, Ricardo's economic
materialism, and the economic interpretation of
history with the revolutionary techniques of
Lenin and Stalin's Communist Party dictatorship.
This is the antithesis of democracy.
Forwarding the Revolution
Lenin believed that the approach to revolution
should vary with the type of country involved.
In major nations it should begin with the ballot
and then be followed by violent revolution. The
client powers were to be oriented toward the Soviet
Union and then finally absorbed. Dependent
peoples could be taken over by directly sponsor-
ing revolution, while backward people could be
absorbed when convenient.
Once Russia had become a Soviet state, though
still weak, there arose the question of what was
to be the next step. This resulted in a struggle
for power among the Bolshevist leaders. Trotsky
was ready to go ahead with revolution on a world
scale. On the other hand, having already experi-
enced foreign intervention in the invasion of Rus-
sia and Siberia by the Allies after World War I,
other Soviet leaders thought that an issue should
not be made of world communism until it was
strong enough to be assured of success. Stalin,
although no less interested than Trotsky in world
revolution, wanted to attain undisputed leadership
in Russia first. Also, he firmly believed that an
adaptation of Marxism was necessary to permit
the establishment of a party composed of workers
and peasants. In a double maneuver to strengthen
the party and increase agricultural output, he
instituted the bloody and ruthless collectivization
of farms. Less than a century before, the peas-
203
ants had won their freedom from serfdom, and
now they were deprived of their land again. In-
dustry was also nationalized. A succession of
police organizations enforced compliance and
stamped out opposition.
Party Control
Party members, as well as passively resisting
Russian citizens have faced execution and Siberian
exile, for successive power struggles within the
party have tolerated no division of leadership or
dissent. The principle of government is the "in-
terlocking directorate ;" that is, officials wear two
hats, one as heads of government ministries re-
sponsible for management and administration,
and the other as members of the Praesidium where
policy is formulated and control exercised. For
almost 30 years Stalin was the dominant figure
in both government and party; he was chairman
of the Bureau of the Council of Ministers, the
executive organ of the Supreme Soviet, and also
General Secretary of the Communist Party, in
which role he presided over meetings of the Prae-
sidium, a powerful combination of the former
Politburo and Orgburo effected by a party reor-
ganization in 1951. Thus party control was made
absolute, and party loyalty became a paramount
virtue, the stepping-stone to prestige and influence.
Russian Traditionalism
Stalin was not only an improviser and believer
in expediency, but a natural product of his en-
vironment. Consequently, under him, many pol-
icies and views of tzarist times continued to shape
the behavior of the U. S. S. R. The traditional
Russian obsession with security has made "perni-
cious foreign influence" a major concern of both
propaganda and actual policy. Many geopoliti-
cal ideas have found expression in Soviet Russia.
The central cores of power are Moscow and the
area east of the Urals, both of which are partly
shielded by the Ukrainian food circle and by the
Arctic wastes. The next lines of defense are the
border S. S. R.'s : Karelo-Finnish, Byelo-Russian,
Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Ukrainian, Mol-
davian, the three Transcaucasian, the Kirghiz,
Uzbek, Turkmen, Tadzikh, and Kazakh. Next
comes a belt of protecting satellites : Poland,
Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, East
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Austria, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, Outer Mon-
golia, Sinkiang, China, and North Korea. Rus-
sia has evidenced interest in adding Finland,
Yugoslovia, Greece, Turkey, and Iran to the list.
The Russian policies of imperialism have found
new expression in many forms. By party activity
and strikes, the Soviet Communists have engi-
neered trouble in France and Italy. By support-
ing Communist military forces they have
attempted to further their designs in Korea,
Indo-China, and Malaya. Through intrigue, espi-
onage, subversion, and sabotage their influence has
been felt in every part of the world.
While the young Bolshevik government was
struggling to establish itself, it emphasized con-
solidation at home so long as separate Ukrainian,
Byelo-Russian, Transcaucasian, and Central Asian
governments followed parallel and friendly
courses. However, as soon as the time was ripe,
all these territories were reabsorbed into the new
Soviet-pattern Russian empire. The Soviet
Union has seemed quite intent on regaining all
former tzarist territories. This it has largely ac-
complished, except for the Finnish defiance and
the United States ownership of Alaska.
Another feature of Soviet policy has been to
make strategic moves to further traditional Rus-
sian objectives. Among these are domination of
the Baltic and Black Seas, including eventual con-
trol of their entrances, the acquisition of warm
water ports on the Pacific, Atlantic, and Indian
Oceans, sponsorship of the Pan-Slavic movement,
and the attainment of economic self-sufficiency.
To these have been added two special Soviet ideas:
overcoming capitalist encirclement, and hastening
the day of world revolution.
Soviet World Objectives
Soviet moves seem calculated to assure that the
Soviet Union itself will survive, and beyond that
point, will expand its territories as far as possible.
This requires early consolidation of power in the
countries of eastern Europe, leading to possible
political merger into the U. S. S. R. Other pos-
sible objectives are to retard and weaken such
blocks of power as may develop, particularly in
western Europe and the Near East; to destroy
Anglo-American friendship; to undermine French
cooperation in the Anglo-American alliance; to
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204
keep Japan, Red China, and Germany sufficiently
weak until Soviet control is complete; to absorb
Austria; and to establish a dominating influence
over the Dardanelles, the Suez Canal, and the
Middle East oil fields. Further objectives include
stirring up trouble in colonies and former colonies,
taking over or destroying the socialist movement,
infiltrating trade unions especially in key indus-
tries, and using international organizations for
propaganda purposes to strengthen the Soviet
Union and its satellites. All of these plans are
self-evident from the record of recent years.
Building Power at Home
Meanwhile at home the Soviet Communists are
exerting strenuous efforts to industrialize the
country, with heavy industry and armament com-
ing first, and consumer goods being produced only
in the amount necessary to prevent uncontrollable
unrest. To meet the production goals, labor is
moved by the millions to new industrial sites, to
mines, and to railway and road construction areas.
This at the same time disposes of dissident groups
or ethnic minorities and keeps costs low, since
slaves under the bayonet and whip need only min-
imum material rewards.
THE THIRD INTERNATIONAL
From the apparent scope of Soviet activities it
should be quite evident why they are of concern
to the free countries of the world. As much as
we may deplore the absence of all the democratic
advantages in certain parts of the world, we be-
lieve that foreign peoples must live their own
lives according to the pattern they choose. We
have hoped that normal social evolution in time
would correct and improve conditions abroad.
But when a powerful State not only aggressively
disseminates economic, political, and social doc-
trines diametrically opposed to our own, but also
develops great military power in a determination
to dominate an ever increasing part of the world,
the problem becomes quite different. Peaceful co-
existence with a Communist Russia, just as with
Nazi Germany, presupposes not only an isolation-
ist tendency on our part, but a basic change in
Soviet objectives. Since the U. S. S. R. has openly
and avowedly embarked on a course of world
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conquest, there is little to indicate such a while the war with Nazi Germany was in prog-
possibility.
The issue is more complicated than simply one
of imperialism versus the status quo. Some people
mistakenly believe that our quarrel is not with
communism but with Russian imperialism. The
two are inseparable, for a basic aim of communism
is world-wide destruction of noncommunistic in-
stitutions and society through violent revolution.
Such an ideological struggle involves more than
military forces; it affects every aspect of life.
The Utilization of Theory
The consummate skill and cunning with which
the Communists translate theory into action has
been demonstrated by the use made of the Third
International, or Communist International (Corn-
intern) , as an instrument for world revolution and
conquest. Unlike the earlier Internationals, this
later world organization has emphasized rigid
party discipline. National parties are not separate
sections to be loosely federated, but rather tightly
integrated units of one world movement. The ap-
plication of Communist principles in the Russian
State has not only given reality to the theory
but also has made available tremendous physical
resources. With the Soviet Union as the "Father-
land," the Communist state in being, Communists
the world over have had a tangible object to which
to transfer their loyalties. At the same time, the
Comintern has provided a means for close inter-
national ties. The resilient strength of this world-
wide organization has been indicated by its ready
adaptability to the sudden shifts and changes in
Soviet policy. On numerous occasions the various
national Communists have revealed their point of
view that what is advantageous for the Soviet
Union is advantageous for them. Thus it has
become exceedingly clear that international Com-
munism is an integral part of Soviet global
strategy.
In the period between World Wars I and II,
the Comintern openly held a series of world con-
gresses to formulate Communist policy which was
admittedly linked closely with the interests of the
Soviet fatherland. However, in 1943, to allay the
suspicions of the western powers, this organization
was dissolved as a gesture to show that subversive
activity in Capitalist countries had been suspended
205
ress?but not for long. In 1947, the Communist
Information Bureau (Cominform) was created as
a result of an international meeting of Communists
held in Poland. It was not supposed to represent
a revival of the Comintern, but to serve only as a
European bureau for the exchange of ideas and in-
formation, and to bring a degree of coordination
to "democratic" movements. These descriptions
of the Comintern and Cominform are what the
Communists themselves admit publicly. Actually,
this is a small part of the story, for the evidence is
overwhelming that the Comintern was almost ex-
clusively the instrument of the Soviet Union. Al-
though this organization was officially dissolved in
1943, its principles were not: they merely assumed
new modes. The Qominform, even more rigidly
subservient to Moscow, appears to be an apparatus
for world propaganda, subversion, and espionage.
Subsidiary Applications of Theory
As has been already indicated, communism in
various countries is the tool of international com-
munism controlled from the Soviet Union. There-
fore it is a domestic enemy to be combatted. by the
police, the courts, and the educational system, as
well as the armed forces. Few can doubt that the
United States itself is under attack by unorthodox
weapons that cannot be challenged alone by the
battleship, the tank, or the bomber. Required is
a joint effort of all social forces in the nation.
No Communist Party in any country should be
confused with ordinary political parties, because it
is essentially an underground movement. True, it
may have a conventional organization which nomi-
nates candidates for political office, and many fel-
low travelers vote for these candidates and take
part in the overt activities of the party. But it
has been thoroughly documented in recent years,
in the United States at least, that the core of the
Communist Party is made up of disciplined people
who operate at a conspiratorial level.
As set forth in published evidence, the Com-
munist Party of the United States openly em-
braces the principles of Marxism-Leninism and
advocates the overthrow and destruction of the
United States Government by force and violence.
Its pattern of action clearly indicates guidance and
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direction of a foreign origin, as well as close as-
sociation with the international Communist move-
ment. Its methods also reflect its relationships
with the Soviet Union and the Cominform. As do
other Communists, those in the United States fol-
low the "hard core" principle, which discourages
large numbers and favors fewer members who are
active and intensely loyal. Such party members
associate themselves with worthy public causes,
adopt misleading party names and alliances, en-
courage labor strikes and disturbances, and at-
tempt to infiltrate into government, the armed
forces, and police agencies. Espionage is a com-
mon feature, aimed at the transmission of vital
information to the Soviet Union to serve Com-
munist aims and objectives. Likewise, in its
fanatical loyalty to Communist principles, the
American Communist Party has a sabotage poten-
tial which can be directed against the United
States at any time.
In depreciating the seriousness of the Commu-
nist menace, some Americans have expressed the
opinion that Trotsky was a dangerous Bolshevist
type because he wanted to hasten world revolu-
tion, but that Stalin was interested only in Rus-
sia's domestic progress, although he used drastic
measures to save time. Others regard Trotsky as
an idealist betrayed by the heartless tyrant Stalin.
It seems clear that both of these men were dedi-
cated to the principle of world revolution. Stalin,
supposedly concerned solely with internal develop-
ment, was just more patient and thorough in his
plans. He built his world organization in dupli-
cating and parallel form. There are the overt
organizations whose mission is to do as much as
possible to create dissent, to recruit, to propa-
gandize. There are also the covert organizations
for the collection of information, for sabotage, and
for infiltration of every type of social group. All
represent powerful weapons whose capabilities
will not become apparent unless widespread mili-
tary war breaks out, and even then will be difficult
of assessment.
Obviously many of these organizations are par..
ticularly potent against a democracy such as the
United States. Already the Bill of Rights has
been used as a defense by those who seek to destroy
its principles. Patriotic Americans sometimes
propose measures to "smoke out subversives" that
CONFIDENTIAL
206
as a cure may be as bad as the disease. Certainly
the problem cannot be solved by strict censorship
measures or disregard for the rights of citizenship
or due process of law. Yet there are times when
national survival may require stringent measures,
applied with intelligence and discernment.
Factors in the Growth of Communism
The significant growth of world communism,
especially in the post-World War II period, is the
result of many factors, among them being: effec-
tive organization and organized deception, world
conditions which favored the acceptance of Com-
munist theory, and the war prestige of the Soviet
Union.
As already shown, the Communists, even before
the end of the war, had developed active organi-
zations which were both international and domes-
tic in nature. Armed with theory translated into
organized action, they were prepared to move into
national vacuums created by the disorganization
of social structures in the aftermath of war and
Nazi tyranny. The preparatory efforts of Lenin
and Stalin, who had stressed the importance of
organization, made possible the maximum utiliza-
tion of every opportunity which presented itself.
The operations of the Communist Parties of Italy
and France are notable examples of the Soviet
effort to influence political activities within non-
Communist states. The underlying technique in
all instances was carefully calculated organized
deception.
The terrible destruction of World War II, its
dislocation of national economies and political
structures, and its imposition of widespread hard-
ships and untold suffering on large segments of
the world's population all combined to create re-
ceptive attention in many areas to the glittering
Communist promises of security and a better life.
The situation for many people was such that they
felt they had nothing to lose, and everything to
gain. As a result, some succumbed, unaware of
the harsh, ugly realities of Communist rule. Not
to be underestimated, therefore, is the appeal of
theory as a factor in the rapid growth of the Com-
munist movement.
Backing up the organizations and the theory
have been the Soviet Armies which gained great
prestige during the war. In the postwar period,
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the threat of their power, to say nothing of their
proximity, has introduced the factor of uncer-
tainty if not of intimidation, particularly for the
nations of Europe. In addition, the wartime in-
trusion of Communists, openly devoted to their
"cause," into places of leadership within under-
ground resistance movements in Europe and else-
where has proved to be an additional source of
strength.
Since the Soviet state is a motivating force for
world communism, it is appropriate to consider
certain of its elements of power.
THE SOVIET STATE
Historical Background
As stated in chapter 5, the assessment of a state
is more than a description of its strategic position,
its resources, and its industry. It is also essential
to study its people and their background. The
historical beginnings of Russia are lost in vague
antiquity. Geographically, Russia was considered
the dividing line between the races and cultures of
Europe and those of Asia. To the east in Asia
were nomadic tribes of Mongolians, Tatars, and
Turks. Perhaps by the sixth century A. D.,
Slavic tribes from northeast of the Carpathians
began to move into the wooded areas of western
Russia and to spread along the river valleys to
the Baltic. In the ninth century the Vikings es-
tablished trading posts at Novgorod in the west,
and also at Kiev in the east. Both became im-
portant centers of government and culture. Satel-
lite colonies and subject territories spread across
much of European Russia. Novgorod became a
merchant city in the Hanseatic League of the Mid-
dle Ages. Kiev established contact with the East-
ern Roman Church at Constantinople, and thus
became Christian, also receiving the Cyrillic al-
phabet, and many features of art and architecture.
The power of Kiev declined under increasing
tribal attacks from the east, and Muscovy, because
of its more sheltered position in the upper Volga
basin, became the new center of power.
During the 13th century all European
Russia except Novgorod was conquered by the
Mongols of Genghis Khan and his successors, who
dominated the country for 21/2 centuries and em-
planted many of their own racial and cultural
207
characteristics. During the 13th century Russia
was also invaded from the west by the Swedes,
who conquered Finland and attacked Novgorod,
and by the Teutonic Knights, who invaded the
Baltic coast and established such cities as Riga.
In the 14th century Lithuania and Poland, joined
through royal marriage, dominated territories
from the Baltic nearly to the Black Sea. The
Lithuanian part is now Byelo-Russia, and the
Polish part is now the Ukraine. The princes at
Moscow gradually Odned power and finally won
freedom from Tatar control.
At this time the Ottoman Turks overran the
Middle East and took Constantinople, forcing the
Eastern church to move its headquarters to Mos-
cow. Ivan III assumed the title of Tzar (Caesar)
when he married the niece of the last Byzantine
emperor in 1472. Then began a period of expan-
sion of power. Traders and settlers pushed out-
ward all the way to the Arctic shores and in 1648
reached the Pacific. During the following 200
years there were recurrent conflicts with the Turks,
Tatars, Poles, Swedes, Lithuanians, and the Teu-
tonic Knights.
Peter the Great, in the late 17th and early 18th
centuries, tried to westernize his country. Forcing
out the Swedes, he moved into the Baltic states
and established St. Petersburg as a great Russian
seaport. Catherine the Great, 1762-96, won back
the territories occupied by Poland, and her armies
also pushed to the shores of the Black Sea. Later
the Caucasus and Finland were conquered. Rus-
sian explorers pushed far afield, establishing set-
tlements not only in Pacific Siberia but along the
Alaskan shores. By 1812 a colony was established
just north of San Francisco at Fort Ross. To
some degree Russia was involved in intrigue in
California and Mexico even after the Fort Ross
post was sold. The problem was finally eliminated
by our purchase of Alaska in 1867.
Meanwhile in Europe Russia had been at war
with Napoleon, and after his famous winter re-
treat, the Russian armies marched across Europe
to France, hailed as liberators from the tyrant.
In the years that ensued, Russia held a dominant
position in Central and Eastern Europe, helping
to suppress revolts in Austria and Prussia, but
aiding the Balkan states to win freedom from the
Turks.
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In the Crimean War of the 1850's the British
and French joined with Turkey to block Russian
expansion into the Mediterranean. Again in
1877-8, Britain, Austria, and Germany aided
Turkey to prevent Russian conquest of the Darda-
nelles. Thwarted in this direction, Russia wrested
control of the lower Amur basin from China, and
just before the end of the century laid railway
lines through Manchuria and took Port Arthur.
Rivalries with Japan in Korea brought a war that
the new trans-Siberian railway could not sustain
logistically. This led to Japanese domination in
southern Manchuria, Korea, and south Sakhalin.
Participation in the first world conflict came
when Russia declared war in behalf of Serbia
against Austria. Germany was able eventually to
overrun much of White Russia, the Ukraine, and
Finland; Rumania took Bessarabia; and the Turks
entered the Caucasus. With internal revolution
and chaos rife in Russia, the western Allies in-
vaded Murmansk, Archangel, Far Eastern Siberia,
and Baku. At the end of the war, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Finland, Poland, and Bessarabia were
all separated from Russia, and the Ukraine gained
autonomy. Revolt in Turkestan lasted until 1923.
Marshal Pilsudski in 1920 mounted fresh attacks
from Poland which led to the capture of Kiev, and
his forces reached Odessa. Russian counter-
attacks would have destroyed Poland again but
for British and French intervention.
Russia made a few overt moves, aside from re-
absorbing the Ukraine, Turkestan, and Trans-
caucasia, until 1939 when her pact with Hilter led
to the repartition of Poland, the absorption of the
Baltic states, and war with Finland. German
armies in 1941 began Operation Barbarosa that
laid waste territories extending from the Arctic to
the gates of Moscow and down to the Caucasus.
An awakening patriotism and ruthless govern-
mental measures supported by American lend-lease
aid, enabled the Russians to turn the tide after the
defense of Stalingrad, and to sweep west into
central and eastern Europe. In the Far East their
last minute entry into the Pacific War gave them
the Kuriles, the rest of Sakhalin, and, eventual
domination of the Asiatic mainland, through the
Chinese Reds, all the way to Southeast Asia. The
wars, hot and cold, of recent years are all too
CONFIDENTIAL
208
familiar for elaboration here. So much for the
bare outlines of military and political change.
Military .Geography
Geographically the U. S. S. R. is a vast conti-
nental territory, sweeping some 6,000 miles east
and west and 3,000 miles north and south. Much
of it is a great plain that reaches from Poland
across Eurasia to the Yenesei River, interrupted
only by the moderate Ural Mountains. The mili-
tary approaches to this territory are few. The
Arctic, frozen much of the year, has few transport
routes across it, and the soil is swampy and the
area insect-ridden during the brief season when it
is not frozen and wind-swept.
The Soviet Union is protected in most of its
other approaches by high mountains and by great
deserts. In the west, the Pripet Marshes are a
barrier; the Balkan frontier has the Carpathians;
the Caucasus ranges are very high. Formidable,
too, are the great mountain belts near Iran,
Afghanistan, Sinkiang, and Mongolia. The Pa-
cific flanks are also mountainous. Mongolia and
much of the Turkestan area are deserts. The
principal surface approaches are in the Mur-
mansk area, through the Baltic to Leningrad, from
Germany on either side of the Pripet Marshes, or
from the Black Sea. Entry is also possible, geo-
graphically speaking, along each shore of the
Caspian from Iran, through the Dzungarian Gap
from Sinkiang, or at the Pacific end of the country
via Dairen, Vladivostok, or the Amur River.
These military approaches, of course, are not
wide open, since Soviet defenses are strong and
the Red Army is likely to occupy most of them
before any outside force could come near. Fur-
ther, mere entry into Soviet territory is not the
same as occupying the seat of Soviet power. Key
regions of greatest strategic significande include:
(1) Moscow, (2) Leningrad, (3) the Donbas, (4)
the Caucasus, (5) the Urals, (6) Tashkent, (7) the
Kuzbas, (8) Lake Baikal, (9) Chita, and (10)
Khabarovsk. These include the major industries
and sources of raw materials. Two additional fuel
sources that feed the industrial areas must be
added : the Pechora and the Karaganda coal fields.
The areas listed above are so widely distributed
that the power of the Soviet Union, like that of a
hydra-headed monster, cannot be destroyed by the
occupation of any single one of them.
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What are some other strengths and weaknesses
inherent in Russia's geographic position? It has
already been pointed out that the country is vast,
well protected on most frontiers, and with widely
scattered centers of industry. The vastness is a
defense, but it also poses grave problems of trans-
port. Given advance preparations, the Soviet
Union from its interior position can strike out-
ward at adjacent Alaska and at Japan, strengthen
its position in China, overrun the Middle East to
reach the Indian Ocean and the Suez region, send
forces throughout Scandinavia, and of course, re-
inforce the Balkans and move its heaviest forces
westward beyond Poland to sweep Europe as far
as the Pyrenees. It is hoped that NATO strength
in time will minimize this likelihood. It may be
that concentrated attacks upon the Soviet Union
at unexpected points would create exceedingly dif-
ficult problems for the Russians in moving troops
and supplies. This possibility has been antic-
ipated by the Russians, for large forces are main-
tained at all points where attack might come, a
policy which only a country with a large man-
power pool can carry out. It has also been met by
the virtually autonomous nature of many of the
scattered industrial complexes. Munitions need
not be moved from one end of the country to the
other in all cases, for sources of supply are usually
duplicated.
Economic Development
One of the significant features of economic de-
velopment has been the percentage shift of indus-
try to the area east of the Urals, although recon-
struction and even new construction in the area
overrun by the Germans has also been very sub-
stantial. The major installations of the steel in-
dustry are in the Donbas of the Ukraine, in the
Urals, and in the Far East. Iron ore is found in
each of these regions. Coal is currently mined in
large quantities in the Donbas, the Kuzbas, and
in the Karaganda and Pechora regions. Iron ore
and coal move in opposite directions between the
Urals area and the Kuzbas, equalizing rail traffic,
while Karaganda coal moves both to the Urals
and to the Tashkent area. Pechora coal moves
both to the Leningrad and Urals areas. These
bulk movements will be vastly improved in the
years ahead as lagging transport facilities, both
209
rail and water, are improved. Already double
tracking and electrification are improving many
of the railways. New short-cut routes will carry
coal to Tashkent from Karaganda and to the Urals
from the Pechora. New dams on rivers and canals
will bring water transport to supplement the
railways.
The machinery and other complex industries
have long been associated with western centers
such as Moscow, Leningrad, and Gorky, but now
new plants, plus plants moved in the face of Ger-
man invasion, turn out these products at widely
scattered points all the way east to the Pacific.
Tanks, aircraft, and railway equipment cannot
be associated with a few areas alone.
The Soviet Union is richly endowed with vir-
tually the whole range of materials needed for
modern industry and war. Perhaps the major
shortcomings are in molybdenum, and to some ex-
tent tungsten, though Communist China can sup-
ply the latter. Although they have enough to
meet minimum war needs, they have need of more
bauxite, bismuth, cadmium, zinc, uranium, abra-
sives, quartz, and talc. Petroleum shortages are
frequently mentioned, but refining and transport
capacity are probably more immediate problems
than reserves. The country is also rich in other
respects. It contains perhaps one-quarter of the
timber stand of the world, enormous hydroelectric
potentialities, and very considerable agricultural
possibilities.
Manpower
The people themselves as a resource deserve
mention. They are hardy and accustomed to
Spartan living. Their numbers are not definitely
known, but probably exceed 200 million. Al-
though divided into many races, they showed con-
siderable unity in the war against Germany before
it was over. The population growth is such as to
provide a high military manpower potential.
Technology
The Soviet Government has been very conscious
of the need for catching up with the industrial
development in Western Europe and America.
Through 5-year plans, and frequently, ruthless
measures, rapid progress has been made in heavy
industry, the basis for both further expansion and
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for munitions. Although their total capacity lags
far below ours, direct statistical comparisons are
dangerously misleading. Since consumer indus-
tries receive a very low priority, only enough to
prevent overall lowered production or revolt, by
far the greatest effort is in further expansion of
heavy and munitions industries. In contrast, our
own so-called minimum civilian needs even in war-
time swallow up very large quantities of labor and
materials.
The rugged simplicity of Soviet weapons is in
striking contrast to the frequently indifferent re-
sults in consumer goods. Basic research and tech-
nical progress are given every encouragement, and
have resulted in such outstanding achievements as
some of the world's best tanks, artillery pieces, and
jet fighter aircraft. Their emphasis on subma-
rines is of special interest to the United States
Navy. Their achievement in atomic weapons has
been reached by much more than highly skilled
espionage; it represents technical skill and organ-
ized industrial effort. They have found a number
of sources of uranium and are now carrying on a
major atomic effort in several parts of their vast
domain.
Perhaps their two major industrial weaknesses
are an inadequate transport system and the pres-
sure that would be felt in the oil industry during
a sustained all-out war.
Natural Resources
Food supply has long been a matter of concern
for the Soviet government. In the past the coun-
try was chiefly agricultural, and it still is in con-
siderable degree, despite the strenuous efforts to
industralize. The key area agriculturally is a
long belt of steppe land reaching across the
Ukraine and out east of the Volga. Although
much of it has the rich Chernozem type black soil,
rainfall is scanty and uncertain. This limited
and unreliable ability to produce food for a rap-
idly expanding population has serious implica-
tions. Even if new areas were brought under
cultivation, less than 10 percent of the total land
in Russia is arable, and much of this is marginal.
Conquest of eastern Europe therefore represents
an important strengthening of the food position.
The Soviets have worked hard to develop new
cold-resistant fast-maturing crops to expand pro-
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210
duction into the subarctic. The principal crops
are wheat, rye, barley, potatoes, and sugar beets.
Flax is raised in considerable quantities, and in-
creased production of cotton in Turkestan, and
near the Black and Caspian Seas, is bringing self-
sufficiency. Meat has been in short supply for
many years.
The Soviet Union may well be the richest coun-
try in the world in mineral resources. Not; all
of it has been thoroughly prospected, but vast
resources of petroleum, coal, iron, manganese,
chromium, magnesium, aluminum, gold, platinum,
potash, and phosphate have already been found.
There are very considerable amounts of copper,
nickel, lead, zinc, graphite, mica, asbestos, fluor-
spar, quartz crystals, sulphur, and some titanium,
tungsten, molybdenum, tin, and corundum. Co-
balt, cadmium, and vanadium may be available as
byproducts from ores known to exist in Russia.
Where a few of these materials are in short supply
for industry, the satellites make up most defi-
ciencies. Molybdenum comes from East Germany,
antimony from Czechoslovakia and China, tung-
sten from China, and mercury for a time came
from Yugoslavia. It is harder to assess the actual
position in uranium production, but in addition
to the old pitchblende mines in the Czechoslovakia-
East Germany area, which have been thoroughly
exploited, there are additional deposits in Poland
and Bulgaria. More may be available in Man-
churia, and it is rumored in several public reports
that vast amounts can be exploited in western
Tibet. Within the Soviet Union there are known
uranium deposits at Ukhta in northern Russia,
in the Caucasus, southeastern Turkestan, the Altai
Mountains, Tannu Tuva, and near Lake Baikal.
Undoubtedly, exploration has revealed more.
Their chief need for mineral exploitation is more
engineers, more production and refining equip-
ment, and better railway transport.
Soviet oil production has not kept pace fully
with potential needs, but there are multiple sources
under exploitation. The Caucasus area still leads
in production, centering at Baku, Maikop, and
Grosny. The trans-Volga and Emba River fields
are being expanded. Other smaller fields are in
the Gergana Valley of Turkestan, at Nebit Dag
east of the Caspian, in the Kama River Valley, on
Northern Sakhalin, and in Kamchatka. Still
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other newer fields are in the Pechora, the Yenesei,
and Maya Valleys, and the Tamir Peninsula. The
Lvov fields in former Poland are now within the
Soviet Union. In addition, satellite Rumania has
the Ploesti fields. Production is conceivably only
one-tenth that of the United States, but consump-
tion by civilian motor vehicles and railways in the
Soviet Union is negligible compared to ours.
The Russians have made considerable improve-
ments in electric power production. The greatest
dam in Europe before the war was the 900,000
kilowatts-capacity Dnepr plant, comparable to
Hoover Dam in power output. Since the war it
has been restored, and a whole series of dams are
either completed or projected along the Don and
Volga. Potentially, there are large numbers of
additional sites. Hydroelectric power is also de-
veloped in the Kola Peninsula, the Caucasus, and
in southeastern Turkestan. Today output may be
about one quarter that of the United States.
Sociological Characteristics
What manner of people have the Russians be-
come ? The question is difficult to answer in a few
words. Representing a mixture of many cultures,
they seem in many ways mystical, fond of phil-
osophizing, perhaps too willing to shrug off mis-
fortune, but able to endure discomfort and incon-
venience. Because of ignorance and poverty, only
strong methods have been able to change the masses
in their habitual ways. The people as a whole
have never lived in a western democratic society,
and their present government is certainly not con-
cerned with human rights or individual dignity.
Although this is not meant to be an indictment of
the Russian people, there is now a question of
whether or not the people themselves, in their
own society, may net be changing for the worse
by our standards. The Russian nobility, prosper-
ous farmers, and business classes of the past were
killed or driven from the country. The peasants,
used to a simple and hardy life, bound by a love
for their soil, have been uprooted by the millions
to go into industry or to collective farms. The
years of revolution, war, famine, and repression
have affected family life and individual outlook.
The present generation has known nothing else;
only the old people remember an earlier life. The
Soviet government has tried in this generation to
211
reshape attitudes and behavior, using any means
regardless of the cost to individuals. It has
speeded modern improvements and corrected some
former shortcomings, but only at a terrible price
in human suffering and damage to the finer sen-
sibilities of the people. The Soviet totalitarian
state has not only brought planning to the econ-
omy, but police terror, spying, and regulation into
every aspect of life. The social and political con-
sequences of communism are just as great and as
serious as the economic.
Communist minorities in the early days of revo-
lution manipulated themselves into power and in a
conspiratorial manner have ruthlessly maintained
their hold. Division of authority is not tolerated,
and when rivals have appeared, they have been
purged by standards so extreme that their fam-
ilies and associates, regardless of individual guilt,
have also faced execution or imprisonment. Ter-
ror is the weapon used. There is no voice other
than the voice of the Party, whether it be in the
press, the school, or the political forum. The de-
tailed regulation of life with millions of informers
makes anticommunist intrigue exceedingly diffi-
cult. Children are praised for testifying against
their parents. Education and politics become the
ritualistic repetition of Party dogmas, with devia-
tion a major sin. Yet despite a generation of re-
education and suppression, there are still stresses
in Soviet society. Minorities to some degree still
have Nationalist aspirations. Normal human
feelings cannot be so suppressed that some do not
rebel at cruelty. The years of sacrifice, always
with the promise of a better future, have not
brought an easier life to the masses, instead a new
privileged class, the Party members, has arisen.
Only a few others are also favored: scientists,
artists, and military leaders. The top leaders
seem to combine a very real devotion to the Party
with an apparently considerable degree of cyni-
cism about some of the outward symbols used. In
any event, extremes of privilege are very great,
ranging according to rank within the Party, the
military, and down through the intelligentsia to
ordinary workers and peasants, finally reaching
the "untouchables" of Soviet society, those out of
favor with the Party and the slave laborers. No-
body knows how many laborers are in penal servi-
tude, but the number may be twenty or thirty mil-
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lion, representing ordinary criminals, political
minorities, the indiscreet, kulaks and petty bour-
geoisie, or just people unfortunate enough to be
within reach when more labor 'was required.
The new generation takes this society for
granted. Children old enough to go to school
join the Young Pioneers, and if found worthy, are
then graduated with suitable ritual to the Kom-
somols. In time, by rigid selection, a few join
the elite Communist Party. Its numbers, kept to
hard core strength by constant self-examination,
are subjected to rigid tests and tasks in order to
increase their usefulness to the Party.
Political Institutions
A facade of legal government, a written consti-
tution, and even elections exist, but it is the Party
that rules through the Central Committee and
the Party Presidium. It may be that there is
freedom of expression and debate within the Party
Presidium, but it is also likely that, in consider-
able degree, while Stalin was dictator, the mem-
bers waited for his nod. It is also possible that
if some got illusions of grandeur, Stalin played
them off against each other, or they suddenly died
and enjoyed elaborate state funerals.
The Party leaders live in country villas in the
suburbs of Moscow, and ride to the Kremlin in
limousines with police escort; but they also work
very long hours. During Stalin's regime, late
night conferences were customary. It is not yet
possible to assess the consequences of the poli tical
realignment which followed Stalin's death. How-
ever, there seems to be no reason for anticipating
major changes in fundamental policy or in the
basic organizational structure of the Party or the
Government.
Evolutionary Prospects
As has been pointed out, a better standard of liv-
ing for the masses has been sacrificed to capital
expansion and military strength. The Red Army,
largest in the world, represents abstractly a counter
force to the Communist Party. But precaution-
ary measures, undertaken to prevent this eventu-
ality, have been intensified, especially following
the great purges of 1937 that uncovered treachery,
imaginary or real, to Stalin. Every military unit
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nowl includes a political officer and, in addition,
there are secret informers throughout the ranks
that watch for any dissidence. Also the security
forces, under the MVD, have their own elite mili-
tary units designed to deal with insurrection.
It cannot be emphasized too strongly that those
are most optimistic who hope for internal reform
in the Soviet Union which will? change its world
outlook. Although there may be some guerrilla
bands, some dissident elements, and undoubtedly
a host of unhappy citizens, the odds are against
any upset short of major war and upheaval. Party
control of all propaganda, education, and social
activity, even including the Orthodox Church,
makes the odds very great indeed.
As has been suggested earlier, we do not have
just a Soviet problem, one of ambitious State albeit
with a different philosophy. We have a world
Communist movement which draws men of many
races and many classes into a world struggle for
domination, and which receives strength and suc-
cor from the Soviet homeland. The people of
some countries have been won over more easily,
perhaps, because by comparison Soviet domination
seemed to represent an improved way of life. The
Communists have also learned to take the legiti-
mate grievance, set up a coalition or popular front,
and then after infiltration of key posts to unmask
their complete power and win control of the new
government.
Soviet Armed Forces
The Red Army is the most powerful land force
in the world. Its strength is usually quoted as
175 divisions, not including powerful satellite and
security forces. Increasingly, the heavy arms
production of the Soviet Union is being reflected
in higher firepower and more armor and vehicles
for this army. Amenities for troops are kept at
a minimum. Under combat conditions they
largely live off the land, and advance in every kind
of vehicle, mechanically and animal powered. The
haphazard aspects of their military behavior are
not necessarily weaknesses: some are strengths, for
they are free from the high logistics costs that we
bear. Their willingness to take casualties makes
them formidable adversaries. If a minefield
blocks the way, hostages, labor forces, or their
own troops simply march through and detonate
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the mines to allow more combat troops to pass.
Although large numbers defected or were demoral-
ized in the earlier stages of the German onslaught,
extreme repressive measures, plus patriotism, plus
personal indifference to death, created a powerful
force that swept across Europe.
The Red Air Force has specialized in tactical
air support, and has long been known for its good
quality fighters. The Korean War demonstrated
that the MIG-15 jet fighter was one of the finest
interceptors in the world. Creation of a strategic
air force has been suggested by the copies of
United States B-29's that have been seen in in-
creasing numbers by foreign observers. This
development, which probably includes more
modern types, takes time, but fits logically with
their presumed atomic capabilities.
The Red Navy in the past has been largely a
coastal defense force scattered among the several
widely separated coasts of the Soviet Union.
However, it is no mean force, for its submarine
strength is the greatest in the world, and although
reports are scanty, the same German technical
knowledge in this field has been available to them
as to us. The Soviet Navy's performance is
largely unknown, since its exploits in World War
II were limited, but there have been frequently
reported stories of new surface vessel construc-
tion that reflect Soviet interest in building an ef-
fective fleet.
A chief difference between these Red forces and
our own is their use of political officers and also of
213
large para-military security forces. Unlike our
doctrine, every Soviet military unit not only has a
military commander but a political officer who
can influence a commander's decision by making
him accountable to the Party. The political
officer has additional duties in insuring loyalty
and in carrying out an intensive indoctrination
program at all levels. The security forces are so
organized as virtually to guarantee that the Red
Army itself cannot rise against the government.
These security forces also have major responsi-
bilities for guarding the frontiers against any-
thing other than major attack, and also for ad-
ministering the slave labor camps with their
estimated twenty million victims.
In summation, the armed forces of the Soviet
Union and the closely integrated satellite forces
collectively represent the greatest military power
in being in the world. They are famous for their
artillery, their tanks, their rockets, and their
fighter planes. They are politically oriented to a
fanatical degree. They are hardened by their
normal living conditions and by the most rigorous
training. However, they are not invincible, nor
is their political training a perfect shield, if the
record of World War II gives any guide for the
future. With full recognition of their strengths,
the naval officer should study them with a view
toward possible exploitation of their weaknesses,
both in conventional military warfare and in those
areas where intelligence can also aid so greatly:
the economic, the political, and the psychological.
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CHAPTER 9
THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE: COLLECTION
Intelligence as activity is embodied in the steps
or phases of a perpetual cycle consisting of collec-
tion, processing, and dissemination kept in motion
and continually reactivated by use on the part of
strategic planners and operational commanders.
Any item of collected information becomes intel-
ligence through processing and reaches its poten-
tial consumer through dissemination.
A cycle which comprises these functions is not
peculiar to intelligence; the steps are common to
any activity or industry which produces a finished
product from raw materials. In the automotive
industry, for example, the process of manufacture
begins with the acquisition of raw materials, the
ores from which the necessary metals are made.
The metals are then fashioned into the component
parts of engine, chassis, and body, which are as-
sembled into a finished product, an automobile.
The next step puts the product in the hands of
distributors or dealers who sell it to the ultimate
user, the individual motorist. The phases of such
an industrial cycle, procurement, manufacture,
distribution and sales are analogous to those of all
intelligence activity. First, information must be
collected; second, this information must be sub-
jected to certain evaluative processes by which it
becomes intelligence; and third, the intelligence
must be put in the hands of potential users
Finally, its use, either in planning or in operations,
will uncover needs for additional information
which will reactivate the cycle.
Let us relate the operation of the intelligence
cycle to the commander and his mission. In pre-
liminary staff planning, the commander's needs
and responsibilities in respect to intelligence will
require answers to the following questions:
1. Is my information on the enemy and the area
of operations complete, accurate, and timely?
2. What collecting agencies or units do I have
available for filling in the gaps in my infor-
mation?
3. What is the correct interpretation of this
information in the light of my mission?
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4. To which of my subordinates or superiors
will certain items of intelligence be useful?
In supplying the answers to the commander's
questions, the supporting duties and functions of
his intelligence officer are clearly prescribed as
they relate to the three steps of the cycle, for collec-
tion, processing, and dissemination are indicated.
The matter of use requires more explanation.
It has been stated above that use reactivates the
cycle. Returning to our industrial analogy, we
find the user, the man who bought the car, in the
same position as the commander who "bought" the
intelligence. The owner of the car reports that
its performance in general is quite satisfactory,
but that improvement in driving comfort would
be effected with the addition of foam rubber seat
cushions. Satisfied owners are essential to sales,
so the company acts on the complaint by procuring
additional raw materials, in this case foam rubber,
and later models of the car have better seat cush-
ions. Thus user experience results in a better
product.
Suppost now that the commander in the midst
of his planning finds that his information on Blue
Beach may not be completely up-to-date because
of enemy activity in that particular area. Have
beach defenses been improved? A collection task
arises and his question can be answered best by
amphibious reconnaissance of the beach. The re-
port of the amphibious patrol will then be evalu-
ated and the new intelligence considered in the
commander's plan. The cycle was reactivated by
the need for additional information in the plan-
ning stage of the operation. Likewise, the opera-
tion itself will cause the reactivation of the cycle
when in retrospect it is realized that information
was incomplete on the range of a certain type of
mortar used by the enemy. The capabilities of
this mortar must be reassessed in the light of com-
bat experience: a job for his intelligence officer.
Again the experience of the user results in a better
product, which in this case is intelligence of value
to the commander in making sound military
decisions.
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The steps of the intelligence cycle do not always
follow in the logical sequence of collection, proc-
essing, and dissemination, although this order is
normal procedure in the flow of raw information
from producer to consumer. Circumstances may
influence the sequence; certain information re-
quires no processing, since it is finished intelligence
at the time of collection. This would be true in
the case of a single indisputable fact required by
a user. Information required by a user can be
supplied on many occasions from the files of ONI
without the need for the assignment of an ad-
ditional collection task to a field unit.
The individual steps in the cycle likewise do
not represent treatment by different intelligence
activities at distinctly different times. The same
activity may be collector, evaluator, and dissemi-
nator of a certain item of information. Collect-
ing agencies themselves normally subject the in-
formation collected to a certain degree of
processing, and those who determine the final
interpretation of an item of information are
often best qualified to determine its potential user.
The cycle is flexible, therefore, in its application
to specific subjects and intelligence tasks.
Collection, processing, and dissemination and
the work of the intelligence officer in each will be
discussed more fully in the three chapters which
follow.
REQUIREMENTS IN COLLECTION
Information for intelligence comprises docu-
ments, facts, and observations which throw light
on any of the varied aspects of a subject under
study. In form, information may consist of
written articles or reports, messages, oral presen-
tations or briefings, maps, photographs, graphic
visual aids, and physical objects. In nature, in-
formation may be general or specific; detailed or
fragmentary; true or false. Only when this raw
undigested accumulation of material is subjected
to the processes leading to final interpretation does
it become intelligence to be disseminated to ap-
propriate users.
There are four basic requirements in the collec-
tion of information for intelligence: (1) GUID-
ANCE, the direction of the collection effort by means
of collection plans at all levels of command; (2)
COVERAGE, the availability of suitable collecting
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activities to fulfill the tasks imposed by the col-
lection plan; (3) REPORTING, the form and means
of forwarding information from the collecting
activity to the processing agency; (4) RECORDING,
making information readily available for present
and future processing by proper cataloging, filing,
and indexing,
Guidance
Collection requires specific guidance and control
to make it efficient and valuable. Collectors must
know what information is needed, and how soon
it is needed, in order to expend their efforts effec-
tively. Since collection of information for intel-
ligence is a responsibility of a naval commander,
it is from him that direction of the collection effort
must come. The commander's function in this
respect will be more fully discussed in chapter 12,
?
Intelligence Staff Procedures. The guidance of
collection throughout the naval establishment is
effected through certain basic requirements set
forth at the highest command level by the Chief
of Naval Operations. They are expressed in broad
terms for the general guidance of all the Navy's
collecting agencies and activities and constitute a
basic collection plan from which are derived the
collection plans of subordinate commands. The
Director of Naval Intelligence, for example, as
CNO's Intelligence Officer, bases his collection
plan upon the requirements listed by CNO, but
DNI expresses them in much more detail and as-
signs specific collection tasks to the agencies and
activities which can best obtain the required in-
formation. The field activities, such as the Oper-
ating Forces, the Attache System, and the Naval
District and River Commands, formulate their
own collection plans, based in turn on the require-
ments of DNI, but again expressing in detail the
specific items that can be obtained through the
exploitation of sources peculiar or particularly
available to each. Thus the general intelligence
requirements become more itemized and specific
as they are incorporated into the collection plans
of lower echelons of command. Some intelligence
tasks are long-range and continuing, others are
initiated by immediate needs. The collector must
be aware of the purpose, nature, and urgency of
these tasks, and he must work within the frame-
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work of an organized plan in accordance with
local conditions.
Collection directives are subject to such periodic
revision as may be demanded by the world situa-
tion and the needs of the Navy. Emphasis will
vary, interest will rise and wane, and objectives
will differ in various parts of the world. Intel-
ligence producing units, such as a geographic desk
in the Office of Naval Intelligence, should have
the closest possible contact with the field activity
which is best qualified to collect the particular
kind of information required for sound estimates
or careful planning. The relations between col-
lector and processor should always be as intimate
as possible. Each report's value should be ap-
praised and the reporting officer notified. Much
welcome guidance can be given by suggestions
through personal conferences, official inspections
at stated intervals, and official evaluations and
commentaries of field reports. Praise for indus-
trious collection and good reporting are mutually
rewarding for both collectors and processors.
Coverage
Coverage is achieved when the collecting agency,
through conscientious exploitation of all sources
of information, fulfils its assigned mission. Thor-
ough coverage depends upon a carefully formu-
lated collection plan, one which completely realizes
the collecting potential of the area or target in
question. Through the collection plan, potential
sources for information of significance are most
likely to be discovered and exploited; thus, it may
be possible to anticipate and fulfil requirements
for particular data. In connection with coverage,
the utilization of operational collection units will
be discussed in chapters 12 and 13.
Collection Agencies
As was noted in the previous sections on the
organization of Naval Intelligence, the respon-
sibility for the collection of all types of informa-
tion for intelligence required within the Naval
establishment rests with the Chief of Naval Op-
erations. Under him, the Director of Naval In-
telligence, as head of the Naval Intelligence organ-
ization, is responsible for the exploitation of all
sources in the collection of information of naval
interest, guided by such pertinent policies, pro-
269196-54-15
217
cedures, and objectives as are set forth by the
National Security Council. The broad scope of
naval interest has been presented in the first chap-
ter, and needs no further elaboration. Any infor-
mation or intelligence that might support the
Navy in carrying out the missions assigned to it
or to its component parts, including naval aviation,
amphibious forces, and the Marine Corps, is con-
sidered to be of naval interest.
The collecting activities available to the Director
of Naval Intelligence are (1) the Office of Naval
Intelligence, the "home office"; (2) the field activ-
ities consisting of the Operating Forces, the Naval
Attach?ystem, Naval District and River Com-
mands, including Sea Frontiers; and (3) the naval
sections of intelligence activities sponsored jointly
by Navy with other military services.
The Collector, Ashore and Afloat
Every person in the Navy is a potential collec-
tor of information of value to intelligence. A
seaman on liberty in foreign or United States
ports, a lieutenant unexpectedly invited aboard a
foreign naval vessel, a welder in a naval shipyard,
or a clerk in the office of a District Intelligence
Officer, may be in position to supply a missing bit
of information. Just as the intelligence required
by staff planners differs from that required by sub-
ordinate commanders only in scope, point of view,
and level of employment, so do collectors of
information differ only in the orbit of their move-
ment, their background of education and experi-
ence, and their position in the naval establish-
ment. The collector, like the newspaper reporter,
is concerned with the five W's and the H: who,
what, when, where, why, and how, but he is more
than an inquiring reporter, for he must be city
editor and editorial writer as well, combining the
discrimination of a city editor in determining what
is "fit to print" with the editorial writer's perspec-
tive in interpreting events of the contemporary
scene.
In collection activities, the intelligence officer
must have the personal qualities possessed by the
successful reporter. It is difficult to give a rela-
tive order of importance to these qualities, for
their significance will be determined by the aspects
of the collection task, and they will vary with
assignments. Answers come from questions, so
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first of all, the intelligence officer as a collector
must have an inquiring mind, an insatiable intel-
lectual curiosity about the world in which he lives.
In order to give direction to these qualities, he
must have a thorough grasp of the object, nature,
and scope of the intelligence operations in which
he is engaged. In this respect intelligence is
knowledge?knowledge gained by the intelligence
officer through study and experience. The better
his background of information is on a given sub-
ject, the more valuable and discriminating will be
his effort in collecting additional information. He,
must be thoroughly familiar with his agency's
existing file of information so that he will not
waste time in collecting what is already available.
It is on the gaps of information that he should
expend time and energy. He must ever be an
avid student, with a discerning awareness of the
significance of what he sees, hears, and reads.
In addition to mental alertness, the intelligence
officer must have physical energy. He cannot sit
at a desk and expect information to come to him.
Collecting normally requires a certain amount of
"leg-work": things to see and people to interview.
Here the qualities of initiative, tact, and resource-
fulness are paramount. If a source of information
dries up, replacement must be found; if efforts in
one direction are futile, leads must be discovered
and pursued in other directions with perseverance
and patience.
Emotional stability is yet another quality de-
sirable in a good intelligence collector. The busi-
ness of tracking down information may be tedious
and unexciting; the collector may meet with re-
buffs and closed doors. He must be able to cope
with these frustrations and devise ways to over-
come them, subduing any momentary pique that
initial difficulties might engender. Moreover, his
ability to judge facts objectively must not be
impaired by personal attitudes.
Sometimes the collector in the field will receive
spot requests for information which to him appear
to be insignificant and purposeless, devoid of back-
ground and meaning. In such cases he must
comply without questioning the reason for the re-
quest. Normally, the collector will be informed
of the purpose, but sometimes urgency or com-
munications security will not permit thorough
briefing, and message requests preclude lengthy
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explanations. To someone in the intelligence
organization, this bit of information is of vital
importance, and the collector must seek to obtain
it with the same zeal he would use in performing
intelligence tasks which seem to have more
meaning.
Intelligence agencies do not wish to stifle indi-
vidual characteristics, for interplay of personali-
ties in an intelligence organization is highly de-
sirable, but the qualifications discussed above are
basic. Some are innate, others can be acquired.
It is the collector's responsibility to strive for the
ideal through self-examination and improvement.
The Office of Naval Intelligence
The organizational structure of the Office of
Naval Intelligence was presented in chapter 2.
It is the "home office" into which all information
reports flow and where they are processed and dis-
seminated for use. Here collection programs are
established which are translated into positive col-
lection guidance for field activities. ONI also
provides the liaison with other government de-
partments and agencies which insures a full fund
of knowledge and eliminates duplication of col-
lection efforts. Although ONI fits into the intel-
ligence cycle most appropriately in the processing
phase, it must not be overlooked that the research
activity carried on by analysts is in a large sense a
collection activity as well, for evaluation requires
the patient gathering of a mass of related
materials.
OPERATIONAL COLLECTION OF INTELLIGENCE
Articles 0504 and 0506 of Navy Regulations
state that "a commander shall maintain an effec-
tive intelligence organization and keep himself
informed of the political and military aspects of
the national and international situation" and that
CCa commander shall keep his immediate supe-
rior appropriately informed of intelligence in-
formation that may be of value."
These two articles make each commander re-
sponsible for the collection, processing, and dis-
semination of intelligence within his own com-
mand and the dissemination of intelligence to
higher echelons. Without good intelligence it
would be impossible to conduct a successful naval
operation, unless there was an overwhelming supe-
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riority of forces, and even then much time, money,
and many lives would be wasted unnecessarily.
The commander must be assured of continuing
reliable intelligence as to the disposition, strength,
composition, and movement of enemy forces, as
well as intelligence on the weather and other
factors of the area of operations. He must use
every means at his disposal to gain information
of the enemy forces opposing him, and of enemy
forces in other areas, which may affect the prepara-
tion and execution of his plans. A failure to ex-
ploit every source of information may deny
important information of enemy dispositions,
movements and operations, and consequently make
impossible a decisive exploitation of enemy
weaknesses.
The difficulties involved in obtaining adequate
information and in arriving at reliable conclusions
are many. These difficulties are due principally
to the enemy's efforts to foil attempts made to gain
information. In concealing his movements he will
make use of camouflage, darkness, and weather.
He will resort to any tactical measures that offer
a reasonable chance of obtaining secrecy or sur-
prise. He will enforce both strict censorship and
communication security measures to prevent leaks
of information. He may distribute false informa-
tion and institute other measures to deceive the
collecting agencies of the opposition. He will
sometimes adopt a course of action that may ap-
pear illogical. Thus in planning and operations,
the designs of the enemy are more or less unknown
factors.
Combat operations during wartime constitute
one of the primary sources of information about
the enemy. The observations and experience of
personnel involved, when properly evaluated, are
immensely valuable in furnishing intelligence con-
cerning enemy strength, disposition, materiel, tac-
tics and capabilities, to say nothing of valuable
target information and geographical detail.
Collection by the Fleet
The Fleet has at its disposal certain units that
are ideally constituted to provide the means of
collecting certain types of information. It is im-
possible to list them in order of importance, for
in certain conditions and at a particular time each
may be of prime importance in a vital collection
219
task. The discussion here will be of a more gen-
eral nature, since details of such employment of
operational units will be presented in chapter 13
against a background of certain naval operations
of World War II.
Collection by Surface Vessels
In both peace and war the surface vessels of
the Navy are collectors of intelligence. Most na-
tions send their vessels on cruises in peacetime, not
only for training personnel and testing equipment,
but also to collect a great variety of intelligence.
Reports can be made on such subjects as weather
observations, channel soundings, sonar conditions,
port and harbor installations, radio and radar
transmissions, and many items of political, eco-
nomic, and sociological interest. It will also be
possible to enhance the value of these reports with
appropriate photographs. Collection by ship's
personnel underway or in foreign ports requires
vision in guidance and diligence on the part of
the collectors.
In actual war conditions, the emphasis in col-
lection may shift to more current information of
a tactical nature for which there is immediate
need. There will always be gaps in our basic
encyclopedic intelligence which must be filled as
opportunity presents itself. For example, naval
operations in World War II took place in parts of
the world far from the beaten track, and the oper-
ating forces not only had to find the enemy and
observe the weather, but also had to take many
soundings and do other jobs that unfortunately
had not been done before the war. Even so, op-
erations could not be wholly successful without the
encyclopedic type of information as a frame of
reference within which to study current enemy
behavior.
One of the tasks performed by surface vessels
in collection is hydrographic survey. This infor-
mation is needed by the Hydrographic Office to
revise and improve the navigation charts used by
merchant and naval ships alike. In many parts
of the world navigation charts date back into the
last century, and only the most obvious corrections
have been made since. Subsequently, islands have
been found to be mislocated and soundings in-
adequate over reefs and other obstructions. There
are geological changes, sometimes of great vio-
lence, that require resurvey.
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In World War II, existing charts were found
to be so inadequate that additional survey ships
were commissioned and given elaborate photo-
graphic and printing equipment to prepare new
charts in the field for direct dissemination to the
operating forces. The nature of hydrographic
needs has changed with naval warfare itself, put-
ting new demands on collectors. For example,
amphibious intelligence poses information require-
ments in surf and swell conditions, tides and cur-
rents. Successful submarine operations require
not only data on depths and currents, but also on
temperature and salinity.
Electronic Reconnaissance
The appearance of radar in World War II and
the subsequent advancement in the development of
electronic devices have provided our fleets and
forces with a new and important capability in the
collection of information by means of electronic
reconnaissance. Much of this capability rests with
communications intelligence which will be dis-
cussed in a later section, but reconnaissance by des-
ignated ships and aircraft of the Fleet, within
range of enemy radar or radio installations, pro-
vides a means for the collection of data concerning
their identification and location, as well as trans-
mission frequencies, characteristics, and employ-
ment.
The devices and techniques of such collection
require technical explanations beyond the scope of,
this volume. Obviously, this is a job for elec-
tronics experts, but the intelligence officer who
finds himself associated with electronic collection
activities can be of great assistance in on the spot
guidance and preliminary interpretation of the
collection effort. In an age when science and
technology are constantly changing concepts of
warfare, electronics represents a field of which the
intelligence officer can ill afford to be ignorant.
Collection by Submarines
Submarines are especially suited for collection
of information through reconnaissance because
they can remain concealed and unsupported for
long periods in enemy waters. Thus they can
reconnoiter successfully and return safely and
secretly in situations where other collection agen-
cies could either not obtain the desired information
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NAVAL OFFICERS
at all, or could only do so at great cost and with
the risk of giving the enemy an indication of
intentions.
One limitation of the submarine in reconnais-
sance work is the necessity of relatively deep water.
In order to remain submerged, and therefore con-
cealed, the submarine must confine its movements
to waters of ten or preferably twenty fathoms.
Close approach to the area to be reconnoitered may
thus be limited by bottom topography. In plan-
ning any submarine reconnaissance, the depth of
water must be given special consideration.
Submarines are capable of several different
types of reconnaissance:
1. Periscope reconnaissance.
( a) Visual. Best results are obtained from
the shortest possible range. Binocular viewing
by two or more observers at a time is recom-
mended; for this purpose, an auxiliary viewer
may be used, which projects the periscope field
on a ground-glass screen. It is also advisable to
use a voice recorder at the time of observations,
and to make sketches of significant details.
(b) Photographic. Makes a complete record
of observations; allows photo-interpretation if
a photo-reconnaissance strip can be made. All
major amphibious operations in the Pacific dur-
ing World War II were preceded by submarine
photographic reconnaissance.
2. Radar or radio reconnaissance. Obtains in-
formation of the locations and characteristics of
enemy transmitters on shore, ships or aircraft.
Special search receivers and associated equipment
are required. The intelligence officer should brief
submarine personnel in advance on the known loca-
tions and characteristics of all enemy transmitters
in the reconnaissance area.
3. Sonar reconnaissance.
(a) Listening. With the use of special equip-
ment, this type of reconnaissance can provide
sonar information, similar to that of radar and
radio. It not only contributes to scientific and
technical intelligence, but may be of value in
future undersea operations against the enemy.
(b) Echo-ranging. Obtains information of
the locations of minefields and other underwater
obstacles. Special sonar equipment is required.
The intelligence officer should provide charts of
known or suspected mines and other obstacles
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and should recommend search tracks, course
lines, and radar contact points. Minefield re-
connaissance by submarine is hazardous, and re-
quires a high degree of training.
4. Meteorological reconnaissance. With spe-
cialized personnel and equipment, submarines can
gather weather data in enemy waters. They may,
for example, remain on station for long periods as
mobile weather stations.
5. Hydrographie reconnaissance. Submarines
are excellent collectors of data on thermal gradi-
ents and landmarks such as fixes, profiles, and
orientation points. They are also able to deter-
mine current and tide conditions and verify depths
through soundings.
Periscope photography, discussed above, is par-
ticularly promising as a reconnaissance technique.
Its chief advantage is that it supplies a complete
and permanent record, which in certain cases lends
itself admirably to photo-interpretation.
The subjects of periscope observation, both vis-
ual and photographic, are mainly enemy shipping,
harbors, coastal areas, and beaches. Periscope
photography of such subjects is preferable to aerial
photography, especially for the production of am-
phibious intelligence. It often reveals areas and
details, such as profiles and orientation points, not
normally obtained from aerial views. It is able
to penetrate camouflage, which is usually designed
to give protection from aerial observation. The
side view which it affords is better for certain
purposes than a vertical view, for example, in
determining the gradient of a beach. Further-
more, certain objects notably offshore obstacles,
boat lanes, beach exits, and natural or man-made
means of cover and concealment, are more readily
and plainly visible to submarines than from the
air. Periscope photography can also be useful for
verifying the results of aerial photography.
A disadvantage of individual periscope photo-
graphs is their narrow angle of view?only eight
degrees at high power, which is generally used.
Because of the scale desired?not less than 1: 5000,
preferably 1: 2500?the range cannot exceed a
mile or two with certain types of cameras. For
various reasons, including bottom topography, so
close an approach is not always possible. Cameras
of greater focal length would of course permit
221
photographs of suitable scale to be taken at longer
range.
In spite of these disadvantages, individual peri-
scope photographs can provide information of
great intelligence value. Those of the following
types present data of particular intelligence value:
1. Broadside shots of naval and merchant ships,
including the ship's entire length, supple-
mented by close-ups showing the names, num-
bers, and unusual features. In wartime, pre-
attack and post-attack photographs of enemy
shipping are useful for damage assessment
and verification of sinkings.
2. Port and harbor facilities, such as docks,
cranes, warehouses, and shipways.
3. Landmarks and orientation points.
By taking a series of overlapping photographs,
a submarine can make a so.-called "strip" or "pano-
rama". If the true bearing of the periscope is
changed between photographs, the result is a
sweep panorama, which cannot be used for photo-
interpretation but can be grouped to make com-
posites for general information. Sweep pano-
ramas can be taken in a short time, in areas of
limited sea-room, and without much preparation.
Thus they are often used, especially for coverage
of harbors, coastal areas and beaches, when condi-
tions are not favorable for stereo-photography.
Photo-reconnaissance strips, also called "under-
way panoramas", are made by taking a series of
overlapping photographs (the extent of overlap
being approximately 60 percent), with the peri-
scope trained to the same true bearing while the
submarine holds a constant course. Objects ap-
pearing in two successive photographs can be
viewed and interpreted in stereo.
This is the most useful type of submarine pho-
tography for intelligence purposes. However, it
requires planning and preparation, takes time
( which may expose the submarine to discovery by
the enemy) , and requires sufficient sea-room for
the submarine to follow a continuous track while
making photographs.
Amphibious Patrols
When certain essential information is lacking
or it becomes necessary to confirm and amplify
information received from other sources, amphib-
ious patrons can be employed to gather hydro-
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graphic data, report meteorological conditions, ex-
amine beaches and terrain, locate enemy installa-
tions, determine enemy strength, capture enemy
prisoners, and make demonstrations to effect de-
ceptions. As a general rule, amphibious patrols
confine their activities to the covert acquisition of
information and fight only in self-defense.
Amphibious patrol personnel must be specially
selected and trained to do their job in all types of
terrain, such as mountain, jungle, and arctic. The
elements and principles of scouting and patrolling
must be sufficiently instilled in them to become
instinctive. The aggressive type of action in-
volved, combined with the strain of maintaining a
high degree of security, necessitates exceptional
physical condition and agility. All individuals
must have confidence in their ability to handle
themselves with ease in water.
Additional training is required in the technique
of entering hostile territory from the sea, in rec-
ognizing unusual characteristics of terrain and
hydrography, and in special communications
methods and procedures. All patrol personnel
must be able to handle small boats on the sea at
night and to estimate such factors as current, wind,
speed, and direction without difficulty. Accurate
recognition, sketching, map and aerial photograph
reading, and the ability to write objective factual
reports are also essential in the successful opera-
tions of an amphibious patrol.
Underwater Demolition Teams
During World War II one of the most useful
sources of information in the hours just prior to
amphibious landings was the result of the labors
of the underwater demolition teams (UDT's). In
early Pacific operations they proved their effective-
ness in carrying out their assigned mission of beach
clearance and they were able to operate success-
fully even in daylight provided there was adequate
fire support.
After the Marianas operation, when an intel-
ligence section was added to the staff of ComUDTs-
Pac, the mission of the UDTs was enlarged to
include reconnaissance as well as demolition. Two
intelligence officers were assigned by ComPhibPac
to the staff of ComUDTsPac and close liaison was
established. This activity expanded considerably
as operations grew larger and more complex, and
CONFIDENTIAL
by the end of the war, several intelligence officers
were on duty with ComUDTsPac. All were given
special instructions to prepare them for UDT in-
telligence work, and some were assigned to teams
for specific operations.
UDTs can obtain detailed beach information on
topography, soils and trafficability, location and
nature of obstacles, hydrographic data, location
and type of mines in beach approaches, the nature
of the shore line, defenses, visible exits, and prom-
inent landmarks along the beaches that can be used
for guiding in landing craft. If the teams are
launched in rubber boats from submarines at night,
they may be able to obtain considerable hydro-
graphic data without disclosing their presence. If
launched from submarine or surface vessels in day-
light, fire support may be necessary.
Reconnoitering enemy shores, along with demo-
lition of underwater obstacles, are important con-
tributions of the Navy's underwater demolition
teams, and the success of any amphibious opera-
tion may well hinge upon them.
222
THE NAVAL ATTACHE SYSTEM
Naval officers on duty in foreign posts provide
a large part of the information needed by the Navy
for planning purposes in war and peace. There-
fore it is desirable to deal in some detail with the
organization and function of the Naval Attach?
system.
The paramount duty of Naval Attaches is that
of intelligence collection, in the performance of
which they are an integral part of Naval Intel-
ligence and are under the cognizance of the Direc-
tor of Naval Intelligence. At the same time, they
are under the military command of the minister
or ambassador who heads the diplomatic mission
to which they are assigned. Although the attache
is not recognized under the law as a Foreign Serv-
ice Officer, he carries a diplomatic passport and
has diplomatic immunity. Thus, he is a member
of the official staff of the diplomatic mission of the
United States in the country to which that mission
is accredited and is the direct representative of
the Navy Department in that mission.
The naval attache in general defers to the wishes
of the ambassador or minister. Normally the
chief of the mission will not be concerned with
the attach? reports of classified technical and
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tactical naval information, particularly if they are
of no international political significance. The
attach? reports are forwarded directly to CNO
(DNI) , and if desired, copies are furnished to
the chief of mission.
The controlling factor in the assignment of at-
taches is the procurement of information of in-
terest to the Navy Department. The assignment,
as assistant attaches, of officers who have special-
ized in various technical or professional subjects
is usually limited to those stations which oiler
special opportunities to procure technical infor-
mation. Consultation with the State Department
in the assignment of attaches is limited, in general,
to assuring that the officer selected for the post is
persona grata to the State Department, which then
takes the necessary steps to ascertain that the selec-
tion is acceptable to the country to which the
diplomatic mission is accredited. When attaches
and assistant attaches are accredited to more than
one country, only countries whose mutual political
relationships are good are included in the same
group.
The number and stations of naval attaches vary
according to current requirements. In the cap-
itals of major powers, such as London and Paris,
a large complement is usually maintained, while
in Latin America, a single attache may be accred-
ited to several adjoining countries. Primary re-
sponsibility is usually the country of the attach?
residence; he will have secondary responsibilities
as required by naval interest or the current
situation.
The duties of the naval attache may be described
only in general terms, for the methods and tech-
niques to be followed depend almost entirely on
the good judgment and tactful discretion of the
attache himself. The opportunities and situations
which confront an attache vary so greatly in dif-
ferent parts of the world that uniform procedures
cannot be prescribed. He must be constantly on
the alert for every kind of information of possible
naval interest, using all his imagination, ingenuity,
and resourcefulness to uncover it and all his knowl-
edge of the country and of general naval subjects
to interpret it. He cannot neglect an item simply
because he has not received a specific request for it
and has no labeled folder for it in his file.
Naval attaches deal directly with the Admiralty
or Ministry of Marine, and, where the military,
naval, and air departments are combined, with the
Ministry of Defense. Official dealings with any
other ministry must be conducted through the chief
of the diplomatic mission to which the attache is
assigned. Ordinarily, naval matters will be re-
ferred to the attache by the chief of mission.
The attache can expect little official information
from a government on the real spirit which per-
vades its Navy, its concepts of strategy and tactics,
the extent and results of maneuvers, the charac-
teristics of its naval commanders, or the efficiency
of personnel and materiel. This information can
be obtained only through intimate personal and
social relationships with foreign nationals, par-
ticularly foreign naval and army officers.
Outside the Iron Curtain, the attache often has
many semi and unofficial sources of information
available to him. They include the naval and air
departments to which he has official access