(SANITIZED) SOVIET CIVIL UNREST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00158R000600050005-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 2, 2009
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: October 17, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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DCI/ICS/ 83-3236
13 October 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR:
VC/CIPC
ES/CIPC
HUMINT
7 SIGINT
COMIREX
SUBJECT: Meeting on Soviet Civil Unrest
1. On 7 October 1983, I attended a meeting chaired by Stan Moskowicz,
NIO/USSR-EE, on the magnitude of civil unrest in the Soviet Union. Attendees
included representatives from FBIS, DDO, CRES, SOYA, State, Army, Air Force,
and DIA. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the level of knowled
about the topic
2, NIC, discussed his preparation of the National
Intelligence memorandum, April 1983, on "Dimensions of Civil Unrest in the
Soviet Union." He stated that, recognizing that the forces for continuity
within the USSR are strong, he nevertheless searched for instances of
demonstration, strikes, riots, and political violence since 1970, finding some
280 examples. These are not reflections of political or intellectual
dissidence; rather, they are largely blue collar in nature. Less than half
were caused by consumer shortages; however, when combined with those based on
nationalities problems, they amount to the majority. They include industrial
unrest and assassination attempts; in general, Estonia has the largest number
of examples. He cited the unique contribution of FBIS reporting from Western
Europe on the topic. A key point he noted was the time lag in reporting on
civil disturbances- over 50% of the re orts are more than ear after the
inciden
3. He stated that he encountered two views:
a. That the data exaggerates the actual level of occurrences (few
multiple-source reports, emigres are unreliable, etc.).
b. That the reports are merely the tip of the iceberg. (C)
4, of the DDI Analytic Support Group discussed his
statistical approac to the problem. He noted a significant disparity among
sources in reporting on different areas, and a similar disparity among sources
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in reporting on different types of incidents. In comparing classified and
unclassified reporting, only 7 of 105 incidents were reported in both, leading
to a high level of statistical uncertainty that most incidents are reported.
An unclassified study on Soviet civil unrest currently being prepared for Andy
Marshall, OSD/Net Assessment, will provide a totally independent data base and
a useful tool for comparison.
Discussion Points:
believes that a variety of data bases exist,
but that much of e data is untapped.
example. (Military requirements have the highest priority; a
- The question of priorities was raised
"soft topic" may not be reported/disseminated.)
The NIO commented that the topic will never equate to high
military priorities, but that it is unique in that every USSR
resident may have some knowledge of the topic.
A DIA representative stated that they have initiated a major
study on the vulnerability of the Soviet East German, Polish,
and Rumanian regimes to civil unres
and the priority of the topic is being emphasized
The prototype
study is on Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands (the approach is via
Administrative Area, not Military Region), and will include an
examination of the geographic, ethnic, social,'and industrial
factors involved.
- Another participant suggested modeling the approach to civil
unrest on that of civil defense (again, all Soviet residents
would have a potential exposure to the topic).
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- The State representative questioned the applicability of the
ASG's statistical "capture/recapture" methodology due to the lack
of homogeneity within the USSR. Projections may not be valid
from one region to another, thus requiring a regional approach
such as DIA's.
- Another participant stressed the importance of identifying the
customer and the need for this information. Is it for DOD
wartime planning or to assess current Soviet "guns vs. butter"
policy, or both? A DIA representative cited current Soviet
efforts indicating increased emphasis on consumer good
production.
- The SOVA representative stated that they have prepared. two
requirements: one on nationalities, one on dissidents.
- The NIO then addressed analysis.
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