(SANITIZED) SOVIET CIVIL UNREST

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP85M00158R000600050005-8
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
8
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
September 2, 2009
Sequence Number: 
5
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
October 17, 1983
Content Type: 
MEMO
File: 
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PDF icon CIA-RDP85M00158R000600050005-8.pdf257.81 KB
Body: 
Approved For Release 2009/09/02 : CIA-RDP85M00158R000600050005-8 Iq Next 4 Page(s) In Document Denied Approved For Release 2009/09/02 : CIA-RDP85M00158R000600050005-8 Approved For Release 2009/09/02 : CIA-RDP85M00158R000600050005-8 Approved For Release 2009/09/02 : CIA-RDP85M00158R000600050005-8 Approved For Release 2009/09/02 : CIA-RDP85MOOl58R000600050005-8 DCI/ICS/ 83-3236 13 October 1983 MEMORANDUM FOR: VC/CIPC ES/CIPC HUMINT 7 SIGINT COMIREX SUBJECT: Meeting on Soviet Civil Unrest 1. On 7 October 1983, I attended a meeting chaired by Stan Moskowicz, NIO/USSR-EE, on the magnitude of civil unrest in the Soviet Union. Attendees included representatives from FBIS, DDO, CRES, SOYA, State, Army, Air Force, and DIA. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the level of knowled about the topic 2, NIC, discussed his preparation of the National Intelligence memorandum, April 1983, on "Dimensions of Civil Unrest in the Soviet Union." He stated that, recognizing that the forces for continuity within the USSR are strong, he nevertheless searched for instances of demonstration, strikes, riots, and political violence since 1970, finding some 280 examples. These are not reflections of political or intellectual dissidence; rather, they are largely blue collar in nature. Less than half were caused by consumer shortages; however, when combined with those based on nationalities problems, they amount to the majority. They include industrial unrest and assassination attempts; in general, Estonia has the largest number of examples. He cited the unique contribution of FBIS reporting from Western Europe on the topic. A key point he noted was the time lag in reporting on civil disturbances- over 50% of the re orts are more than ear after the inciden 3. He stated that he encountered two views: a. That the data exaggerates the actual level of occurrences (few multiple-source reports, emigres are unreliable, etc.). b. That the reports are merely the tip of the iceberg. (C) 4, of the DDI Analytic Support Group discussed his statistical approac to the problem. He noted a significant disparity among sources in reporting on different areas, and a similar disparity among sources SECRET. Approved For Release 2009/09/02 : CIA-RDP85MOOl58R000600050005-8 Approved For Release 2009/09/02 CIA-RDP85MOOl58R000600050005-8 ./ V V I\ L 1 in reporting on different types of incidents. In comparing classified and unclassified reporting, only 7 of 105 incidents were reported in both, leading to a high level of statistical uncertainty that most incidents are reported. An unclassified study on Soviet civil unrest currently being prepared for Andy Marshall, OSD/Net Assessment, will provide a totally independent data base and a useful tool for comparison. Discussion Points: believes that a variety of data bases exist, but that much of e data is untapped. example. (Military requirements have the highest priority; a - The question of priorities was raised "soft topic" may not be reported/disseminated.) The NIO commented that the topic will never equate to high military priorities, but that it is unique in that every USSR resident may have some knowledge of the topic. A DIA representative stated that they have initiated a major study on the vulnerability of the Soviet East German, Polish, and Rumanian regimes to civil unres and the priority of the topic is being emphasized The prototype study is on Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands (the approach is via Administrative Area, not Military Region), and will include an examination of the geographic, ethnic, social,'and industrial factors involved. - Another participant suggested modeling the approach to civil unrest on that of civil defense (again, all Soviet residents would have a potential exposure to the topic). 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 SECRET Approved For Release 2009/09/02 : CIA-RDP85MOOl58R000600050005-8 Approved For Release 2009/09/02 : CIA-RDP85M00158R000600050005-8 - The State representative questioned the applicability of the ASG's statistical "capture/recapture" methodology due to the lack of homogeneity within the USSR. Projections may not be valid from one region to another, thus requiring a regional approach such as DIA's. - Another participant stressed the importance of identifying the customer and the need for this information. Is it for DOD wartime planning or to assess current Soviet "guns vs. butter" policy, or both? A DIA representative cited current Soviet efforts indicating increased emphasis on consumer good production. - The SOVA representative stated that they have prepared. two requirements: one on nationalities, one on dissidents. - The NIO then addressed analysis. Approved For Release 2009/09/02 : CIA-RDP85MOOl58R000600050005-8 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2009/09/02 : CIA-RDP85MOOl58R000600050005-8 J