NSPG MEETING OF 21 JUNE 1983

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00363R000100130002-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2009
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: June 23, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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JCS review completed
SUBJECT: NSPG Meeting of 21 June 1983
NSC review completed.
2 3 JUN 1983
1. The NSPG met on Lebanon from 0945-1045 hours on 21
June 1983. Per the agenda (attached),.Judge Clark led off
with a few introductory remarks, saying in essence that the
meeting was called to discuss a) the Israeli request (relayed
by David Kimche) that a partial withdrawal be considered, and
b) how to deal with Syrian intransigence on the withdrawal
issue. With regard to the former, a central consideration is
how the Multi National Force (MNF) should be moved into the
void created by the Israeli withdrawal. The DCI then
presented an intelligence assessment, a digest of which is
attached.
2. Secretary Shultz then spoke, saying that he wanted
first to establish what our strategy should be and then go
into tactical considerations such as deployment of the Multi-
National Force (MNF) into the area from which the Israelis
withdraw. Broadly speaking, said the Secretary, there are
three objectives to which the President has adhered since the
start of the Lebanese War in June 1982:
a. There should be a total withdrawal of all
foreign armed forces from Lebanon.
b. Lebanon's sovereignty and independence should be
restored.
3. The Secretary saw two broad courses of action for the
U.S. to pursue at this juncture. The first would be to
continue as we are doing, that is, seeking to drum up and/or
maintain support for the withdrawal agreement. There are
indications that the Saudis are willing to put up five to six
billion dollars to persuade the Syrians to come along. We
could let the situation play itself along until the Jumayyil
and Begin visits in late July and see what develops. The
problem with this course is that the Israelis with their
virtual open announcement that they are going for partial
withdrawal have cut ground out from under us. The Syrians can
now say to the other Arabs that their strategy is working:
that the Israelis will eventually pull out of Lebanon
anyway--without there having to be a withdrawal agreement.
Further, the U.S. is finding it hard to sustain the argument
that an Israeli withdrawal.will bring about a Syrian
State Dept. review completed
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withdrawal. The Israelis for their part have been very
restrained in reacting to Syrian provocations, and it is hard
to imagine this will continue for another five weeks until the
Begin visit. A surgical strike into the Bekaa is an obvious
option. In short, there are some real risks to a "rocking
along" policy.
4. The second course would be for the U.S. to reengage
itself in Lebanon, focussing on the withdrawal issue. The
objective would be to obtain a "date certain" by which time
Israel, Syria and the PLO would all have completed withdrawal.
The. Saudis would have to be approached, to see if they are
willing to put up their chips. The U.S. would have to "cement
in" their total involvement and participation. The Syrians
would be told that their withdrawal should not be considered
as locked to an Israeli withdrawal agreement. In a sense, it
could be portrayed as a victory for Syria. The Israelis would
be told that we are not proposing a renegotiation of the
agreement. However, because of developments, the side letter
(copy attached) will not stand up and must be altered. We
could not expect them to change one condition, that is, the
return of prisoners/bodies. In sum, the agreement would be
put into effect in reverse: the security arrangements would go
into effect with the start of the withdrawal, but only after
withdrawal is completed would the ratification instruments be
exchanged and the normalization measures go into effect. The
Saudis, the Secretary noted, say that the Syrians regard the
latter point as particularly important.
5. The second course, the Secretary noted, is consistent
with the President's three objectives (para 2 above). If this
strategy is agreed upon, the following tactical moves should
take place. We should go to the Saudis first. A leak would
be ruinous, but the Saudis can keep secrets, and the approach
should be to Fahd alone. The next step would be to go to
Begin. The person chosen to do that would spend as much time
as necessary for the Israelis to become comfortable with the
concept.
6. The Secretary concluded his presentation by saying he
favored the second course. The impending Israeli withdrawal,
instead of being a step on the way to a dig-in line would be a
step on the way to a full withdrawal. The MNF, which was
originally deployed into a friendly area, now faces a
different prospect: in effect the MNF is being asked to take
casualties in the place of the IDF. It is necessary for the
"concept" of MNF deployment be changed, so that the MNF, in
moving into the vacated areas, (i.e. the Shuf and Alayh) moves
into a better environment than exists now.
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7. General Vessey then spoke, stating that he would add
three more broad objectives to those cited by the Secretary:
a. Train and equip the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF).
b. Create conditions for furthering the President's 1
September 1982 peace plan.
c. Avoid a superpower confrontation in the area.
8. General Vessey then gave a review of the progress
made by the U.S. to date with the LAF. A total of 170 armored
vehicles have been provided with another 250 to come. I
addition, there have been 800 trucks, 1400 radios and a
quantity of weapons. Eight MTT's have been operating in
Lebanon and 11 of 18 LAF battalions have completed their
battalion training programs. Four new battalions have been
created and one of these will be trained by the end of July.
Of the four LAF brigades, two are ready for deployment. In
short, the LAF is in a better readiness posture than the
Lebanese Government gives it credit for. General Vessey said
he strongly favors the Secretary's proposal. Here the
Secretay interjected that it will be necessary to try to
strike a deal between the Phalange and the Druze in order to
ease the MNF-LAF deployment into the Shuf-Alayh area.
9. The President noted that the USSR believes that as a
superpower it should be involved in any negotiated settlement
in Lebanon. Given this goal, he wondered to what extent the
USSR would seek to put a monkey wrench into U.S. efforts. The
President added he remained stubbornly against letting the
Soviets have any negotiating role.
10. The Secretary said that the essence of the problem
is whether we can put together a package which is attractive
enough to Asad. If this were the case, the Soviets would
probably not be able to block an agreement, as Asad is a
rather independent individual. A companion problem is whether
the Israelis would buy such a package.
11. Ambassador Kirpatrick spoke of the UNIFIL situation,
noting that one more extension is probably the most that can
be hoped for. The Soviets will seek to pare this extension
down from three months. In short, UNIFIL may not be around
any more after early fall.
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12. Concluding the meeting, Judge Clark said that there
seemed to be a consensus of the group in favor of the
Secretary's proposal. Defense and the Joint Chiefs were in
support. A specific plan of approach should now be drawn up.
The Secretary said he would provide a plan before his
departure. One possibility would be for Philip Habib to
contact the parties (other than Syria). Another possibility
would be for Kenneth Dam to lead a team to the Middle East
The latter option would be difficult, however, with the
Secretary also out of the country between 17 June and 6 July.
13. The President inquired about the possibility of an
armed attack being mounted against the MNF and whether the
U.S. is positioned to counter such an attack. General Vessey
said there is a carrier never more than 48 hours away plus
gunfire support ships close by. The problem with use of the
latter is that innocent civilians could be hit. Ambassador
Habib observed that a military attack against the MNF could
not be put together without our having sufficient advance
warning to counter it. The principal danger would be from
small-scale hit and run attacks.
Chief, Near E st and
South Asia Division
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System II
90765
National Security Planning Group Meeting
Tuesday, June 21, 1983
MIDDLE EAST.
A g e n d a
I. Introduction (5 minutes)
William P. Clark
II. Intelligence Assessment (15 min.) William J. Casey
A. Israeli domestic political scene
B. Lebanese scene
1) Prospects for the Gemayel
2) The Druze and Phalange
3) Shia unrest in the South
4) Factional fighting in the
North
C. Palestinian reaction to Israeli
withdrawal
D. The Syrian perspective,
E. Soviet objectives following the
Lebanon-Israeli agreement
III. Policy Options (20 min.) George P. Shultz
A. Responding to Israeli-Lebanese
proposals for partial withdrawal
B. Strategy for Syria
IV. Options for future mission and
deployments of the MNF (15 min.) Caspar Weinberger
V. Summary
The President
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Dear Ambassador Draper,
This is to confirm that it is the position of Israel that the
implementation of the Agreement between Israel and Lebanon signed this
date is premised on the'following:
the receipt of information concerning Israeli soldiers missing in
action and the return of Israeli prisoners of war held by Syria,
Israelis held by the "PLO" and the remains of Israeli soldiers who
have fallen since June 4, 1982, prior to the commencement of the.
Israeli withdrawal pursuant to the Agreement;
-- the withdrawal of all PLO armed elements from Lebanon; and
-- the withdrawal of Syrian forces simultaneously with the Israeli
withdrawal.
TC L
The withdrawal of all PLO armed elements from Lebanon is consistent
with the relevant provisions of Article 4.2 of the Agreement.
In the event such returns and withdrawals do not take place on
schedule, Israel will be at liberty to suspend performance of its
obligations under the Agreement. In that event, Israel, Lebanon and the
United States will consult on an urgent basis. If the matter remains
unresolved, Israel will be at liberty to declare the Agreement null and
void. Israel will continue to ensure its security in all appropriate ways.
Sincerely,
L;~.~
David Kimche
Director General
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
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