NSC MEETING ON CENTRAL AMERICA SEPTEMBER 23, 1983; 11:00-12:00

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00363R000200230006-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 21, 2007
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: September 23, 1983
• Content Type: MISC

Approved For Release 2007/11/21: CIA-RDP85M00363R000200230006-3
NSC MEETING
ON CENTRAL AMERICA
SEPTEMBER 23, 1983; 11:00-12:00
I. Introduction William P. Clark
(2 minutes)
II. Intelligence Overview Robert M. Gates
(5 minutes)
-- Nicaragua - the Cuban-Soviet connection; major changes.
-- The resistance and the latest efforts in the field; update
on resistance targets.
-- El Salvador - the guerrilla perspective.
III. The Diplomatic Front George P. Shultz
(15 minutes)
-- Stone and the Contadora process; the view from Central
America.
-- Current legislative approach:
- Continuing resolution;
- Boland/Zablocki;
- FY 85 budget proposals.
-- Regional impact of our diplomatic/leglisative situation.
IV. The Military Equation
Paul Thayer/
John W. Vessey
(15 minutes)
-- El Salvador - how are they doing militarily; can they keep
it up? Training, equipment, morale, effectiveness.
-- The Regional Military Training Center/US base access.
-- Ahuas Tara II/fleet exercises - regional impact.
-- Regional military efforts (CONDECA) policy implications.
V. General Discussion (15 minutes)
-- Is the policy working? What more should we be doing?
VI. Wrap-up William P. Clark
(5 minutes)
SECRET
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR
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Within the past month, Interior Minister Borge stated
publicly in Managua that Nicaragua would have to stand alone for
its defense.
In his 26 July 1983 speech to the Cuban people, President
Fidel Castro made it plain that in the event of a military
confrontation with the US, Cjba could not expect to receive help
from abroad and would have to fight alone. In the months
preceding his speech, he had been delivering the same message to
various high level visitors. diplomats, for example, have
25X1
25X1
told us that Castro has received signals from the 25X1
Soviets making it clear that they will not come directly to his
aid if he has a military confrontation with the US. Moreover,
when a high Yugoslav delegation visited Havana in late May and
early June, it reportedly learned that Cuban officials had
discussed with Soviet leaders their concern about a US attack on
Cuba and the Soviets made it known that the USSR would not go to
war with the US over Cuba.
In mid May, a Cuban official reportedly said that pressure
from the Soviet Union to avoid any possibility of a direct
confrontation with the uS has worried Castro. The C#ban official
said Castro believes that the Soviet Union is now more reluctant
than at any previous time to become directly involved in any
confrontation between the US and Cuba.
SECRET
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Table "
Central America: Foreign Financing Gap 1978
Million US $
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983a 1984b
Current account -1084
Trade balance -594
Exports (f.o.b.) 4016
coffee 1586
Imports (c.i.f.) 4610
Net services and transfers -490
Amortization 357
Foreign Financing Gap -1441
-755 -1566 -2069 -1605
-431 -1058 -1151 -601
4783 5110 4615 4093
1777 1689 1328 1290
5214 6168 5765 4695
-324 -508 -918 -1004
510 454 842 683
-1265 -2020 -2911 -2288
-1874 -2247
-614 -962
4026 4178
na na
4640 5140
-1260 -1285
527 609
-2401 --2856
Capital account 1512 1138 781 2070 1888
Foreign direct investment 186 187 165 189 148
Medium- and long-term loans 1211 1016 1218 2212 1766
Official 576 614 1113 1475 6-5
Private 636 402 105 737 4
Net short-term capital 115 -65 -602 -331 -26
(including errors
and omissions)
Change in gross reserves 71 -127 -1239 -841 -400
This table is classified CONFIDENTIAL
a Projected, assuming 0 percent real economic growth and moderate commodity prices.
b Projected, assuming 0 percent growth in 1983 and 3 percent growth in 1984 and
moderate commodity prices both years.
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Directorate of Intelligence
Office of African and Latin American Analysis
21 September 1983
NOTE FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
Bob,
told me yesterday that the
DCI and Judge ark would be discussing
Jamaica this afternoon. We have provided
some background material for Mr. Casey and
I have attached it for your information.
Attachment:
As stated
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