THE OUTLOOK FOR LEBANON

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00363R000200350053-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 25, 2007
• Sequence Number: 53
• Content Type: REPORT

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The Outlook for Lebanon
President Amin Gemayel's.efforts to resurrect the Lebanese nation from
eight years of civil war and foreign occupation appear doomed to failure. The
prognosis is for a prolonged de facto partition of the country into three
zones -- an-Israeli-occupied south (the "North Bank"), Syrian-occupied east
and north, and an unstable region around Beirut divided between several
warring Lebanese factions. Israel's withdrawal to the Awwali River in
September will effectively formalize this arrangement.
Amin's presidency has failed primarily because of the bitter confessional
rivalries that have bedeviled Lebanon since its creation by the French in the
1940s. The Maronite Christians, led by the Phalange Party, are not willing to
give up their domination of the country's power centers. The Phalange feels
it won the civil war (albeit because of Israel's invasion)'and fears that any
new power sharing formula that alters the 1943 National Pact will ultimately
lead to a Muslim takeover. In particular, Amin's 78-year old father, Pierre
Gemayel, is fully determined to resist any change in Lebanon's political
structure. As the creator of the Phalange and its dominant figure, Pierre is
capable of blocking meaningful movement toward reconciliation. Moreover,
Pierre can count on the backing of the tough, young leaders of the Lebanese
Forces militia who have long been alienated from Amin and cherish the memory
of his hardline brother Bashir.
On the Muslim side the shock of the Israeli intervention has worn off.
the Muslim militias, with Syrian aid, 25X1
are rearming even in West Beirut. Druze leader Walid Jumblatt is continuing
his father's crusade for a fundamental restructuring of Lebanese politics to
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give the Muslims in general and the Druze in particular more power to reflect
the Muslim's majority status. Muslim elder statesmen like Sunni leader Saeb
Salam and Shia leader Kamal Assad are again losing their prominence to younger
men like Walid and Shia Amal militia leader Nabih Barri -- a trend reminiscent
of the early days of the 1975-1976 civil war. Amin, however, continues to
refuse to deal meaningfully with Jumblatt and Barri because he knows their
vision of a new Lebanon is unacceptable to the Gemayel family and the
Phalange.
Even if some temporary agreement is worked out to facilitate a Lebanese
Army move into the Shuf to replace the IDF, it is not likely to last. The
confessional hatreds -- passed from father to son for generations -- are
simply too strong. If Amin tries to use the Army to impose his will on the
Shuf, the Druze will retaliate with artillery attacks on Beirut, seek Amal and
Syrian support and try to split the Army on confessional grounds. Their
chances of at least limited success are fairly good.
Israeli and Syrian Actions
Both Jerusalem and-Damascus have come to accept de facto partition as all
but inevitable. Israeli leaders, including Prime Minister Begin and Defense
Minister Arens, believe Amin is too weak to rule effectively and may not
survive at all. Israel's strategy now appears to be to ignore the Gemayel
government unless it is willing to ratify the 17 May Israeli-Lebanese
Agreement and, instead, make a series of ad hoc arrangements with the various
Lebanese factions. Aren's 16 August visit to East Beirut was intended to
restore IDF-LF ties undermined by the recriminations following the Sabra- 25X1
Shatilla massacre. Israel ironically is also giving
arms to Jumblatt's Druze to strengthen their ability to resist LF and PLO
moves into the Shuf. Feelers have been sent out to other factions. In the
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south, Israel is strengthening Major Haddad's forces and other local Shia
militias. Whether Israel can successfully play all these factions against
each other remains to be seen, but Jerusalem seems persuaded that it has no
alternative to a prolonged stay in the south.
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the Syrians are pleased with the trend towara
partition which President Assad believes will maximize Syrian influence in
Lebanon and give Damascus a major role in all Arab-Israeli developments.
Syria gains major political benefits, including a stranglehold over the PLO,
by staying in northern and eastern Lebanon, areas of traditional Syrian
hegemony. Assad can be expected to do all he can to fan the flames of unrest
in the Shuf and Beirut to keep Amin weak while avoiding a direct military
clash with Israel. Syrian allies like Jumblatt and former President Franjiyah
will be encouraged to insist the 17 May agreement with Israel be scrapped as a
precondition for national reconciliation.
Implications for the US
The MNF presence in Beirut is critical to maintaining whatever semblance
of stability the capital enjoys. Should it be withdrawn, Amin's remaining
credibility would collapse and civil war erupt again along the Green Line. US
prestige in the region would suffer.
On the other hand, expansion of the MNF's deployment by patrols into the
Shuf risks almost certain higher casualties. Deployed in Beirut and the
airport the MNF is away from the major battlefield, at least for now, and the
Marines are likely to face primarily occasional artillery fire and sporadic
terrorism if they stay put. In the Shuf, the MNF will be exposed to all the
dangers the IDF has faced as every extremist in the Middle East seeks to
damage US prestige by attacking the Marines.
De facto partition will be messy. The risk of an Israeli-Syrian war in
the Bekaa Valley will remain ever present and would increase if civil war
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breaks out in Beirut. For the foreseeable future, however, partition is here
to stay because it meets the interests of Israel and Syria and is consistent
with the realities of Lebanese politics.
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