WEST EUROPEAN PUBLICS PESSIMISTIC ON INF ARMS CONTROL TALKS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00363R000300450010-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 7, 2007
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: November 29, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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 Approved For Release 2007/09/07: CIA-RDP85M00363R000300450010-3
November 29, 1982
WEST EUROPEAN PU6LICS Pf:SSIMISTIC ON INF ARMS CONTROL TALKS
Tnis report presents findings from USIA-commissibned
national public opinion surveys conducted between
October 8 and 30 in Britain, ranee, es e ,
a y, and the Netherlands. Personal interviews with
about 1000 adults were conducted in each country by
reputable firms--mostly Gallup affiliates. They were
completed before the death of Leonid Brezhnev and
after the change of government in West Germany.
Summary:
Surveys taken shortly after the resumption of INF talks show
that:
o Large proportions of the European publics remain unaware
of the ongoing INF talks. Unawareness of the Soviet INF
monopoly is even more widespread and is most extensive in
~dest Germany.
o West European publics generally are skeptical and pessi-
mistic about U.S.-USSR arms control efforts. tsany believe
that both sides are using INF negotiations to strengthen
their own position in the nuclear arms race.
o Against this background of unawareness and skepticism,
opposition to INF deployment--even when linked to arms
talk$--continues to be extensive, and has increased in
recent months in Zlest Germany, Italy, and France.
o Gn arms control issues, Europeans' perceptions of the
Soviet Union are more negative than their views of the U.S.
o Consistent with this, the zero-option proposal is preferred
Widely over the Brezhnev freeze plan as the IiJF proposal
"more likely to prevent war."
End Summary
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Publ ics Generally Not 6~Ie11 Informed About ItJF
Despite extensive official and media commentary, a large part
of European publics continues to be unaware that INF talks are
underway. Sizable proportions--ran in from on - in the
~detherlands to a t - -- re or
~--~sin orme about the talks -Tn Nest Germany and France, about
its Highly visa a ctivist anti-nuclear protests--does a
majority (67$) say they are aware of INF talks.
Still more widespread is the lack of awareness that the Soviets
have an INF mnn:o~ely. While most West Europeans (between 70$
and 85$) know that the USSR has nuclear missiles capable of
hitting ~~+estern Euroue, nearly as many (between 6433 in the
tJetherlands and c33~s in the FRG) do not know, or, more sig-
nificantly, are misinformed, that NATO has no comparable
rissiles stationed in their countries.
The high level of unawareness about the INF missile imbalance
generally has not changed over the past 15 months.
in Arms Talks is 6idespread
Jest European publics widely question the sincerity of both
the U.S. and the USSR in seeking nuclear arras reductions:
o A majorit in Ital (56~-to-31~) and large pluralities
in ri bin (49~-to-32$) and France $-to- e i ve
-e is not makin a genuine ~rr'L~~-~i-~a-cTr-arr--
agre with the Soviet Uni wou re uc he
um er o? nuclear weapons on both sides."
.n is
Views of Soviet sincerity in seeking arms control are more
widely negative, with between 52 ercent and 70 ercent 11
countrie a
nuclear arms reduction agreement with the U.S.
Doubts about the sincerity of both superpowers--but particularly
of the U.S.--appear to have spread in recent months. A July
1982 survey, using a comparable question, showed that, except
in France and Italy, majorities (538-to-59$) thought then that
the U.S. was making a genuine effort to reach a serious arms
reduction agreement with the USSR." French and Italian opinion
divided.
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,l_ ~ i -~-
FlGURE 1
ARRAS CONTROL SINCERITY OF U.S. AND USSR:
OCTOBER, 1982
PERCEIVED AS NOT SINCERE I eERCEIVED AS SINCERE
32
BRITAIN -~
FRANCE -~,
WEST GERMANY -~,
ITALY -~
NETHERLANDS -''
-80 -60 -40 -20 0 20 40 60 80
Percent
11
/ 38
' 19
-35 i~~~%%i:///
? US
? USSR
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IidF Ar::ts Control Goals questioned
In iceepiny with these views, sizable proportions of European
publics agree with statements asserting that the U.S. and USSR
are using the IIdF negotiations to pursue goals other than arms
control. For the U.S.:
o In Italy, Britain, and France, pluralities (40$-50$
range) agree that "the major goal of the U.S. in
negotiations is to stall for time in order to build up
its nuclear forces in Western Europe."
o In West Germany, however, a 54-to-42 percent majority
disagrees with this assessment of U.S. motives.
o In the Ietherlands, opinion is roughly divided between
those wno agree (27~s) and those who disagree (32$), but
the largest proportion (42~) express no view on the
issue.
For the USSR, doubts are more widespread than for the U.S.,
which is consistent with other comparative assessments of the
two superpowers. Pluralities in the Netherlands (40$) and
France (48~) and two-thirds majorities in the other three
countries agree that the main Soviet goal in INF negotiations
"is to keep all of its o~vn nuclear forces while preventing the
? U.S. from building up its nuclear'strength in *Aestern Europe."
Pessimism Uver Ii~F Talics Remains Widespread
Given the extensive doubts about tYie motives underlying the
superpowers' INF negotiations, ~r'est European publics generally
continue to be essimistic the outcome of the INF talks.
Sizable majorities (from 57~ in France o 72$ in Britain say
an agreement to limit medium-range missiles is unlikely by this
time next year. Only about one in ten are optimistic.
Pessimism about the likely success of the INF talks has in-
creased in France and particularly in the UK (19$) since ttie
Geneva talks began last year.
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Zero O tion Favored Over Soviet Freeze Proposal
Of the INF talks proposals made public last year by both sides,
majorities or pluralities continue to consider President
Reagan's zero-option proposal as "more li*ely to prevent war"
than the Brezhnev freeze plan (Figure 2).
o Majorities in West Germany (60$-to-30$) and Italy (66$-
to-25$) and a near majority in the UR (49$-to-23$)
place their confidence in the zero-option over the
Brezhnev proposal to have the USSR "stop adding to its
nuclear missiles in European Russia if the U.S. agrees
not to station any new nuclear missiles in Western Europe."
o In the Netherlands, uncertainty prevails (52$). Among
the rest, the U.S. proposal is preferred by a 35-to-13
percent margin.
has eclined by
ut__wt o t_.a cor`
_
i.YVM --__- -
responding_ fain _reg_istere __y the Brezhnev plan.
In a clinate of general skepticism, President Reagan's proposal
" b
y
is ~pAn as "a sincere effort to reduce nuc ear weapons
narrow pluralities in Italy 45$-t~-36$), Britain (49$ to 3i$)
an west Germany ~ 3ya-zv-~~~, . ~~ ..--....___-, - --- - .
e ch believe the zero-option is not
percent p_ura r
therlands.
N
h
.
e
e
sincere. Opinion divides evenly in t
redibility of the zero-option has eroded
i
n , c
Since last s r
significantl in Vies erma y , an o a esser extent in
France an Italy ( $ ?
Nonetheless, Brezhnev's plan gets much lower marks;~it is dis-
believed by sizable proportions (45$-55$ range). At most, only
one-quarter (in Britain) of West European publics believe the
Soviet proposal is credible.
* France is not included in these findings because of extreme
unstableness in the results from April to October.
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FIGURE 2
INF PROPOSAL MOST LIKELY TO PREVENT WAR:
REAGAN ZERO-OPTION AND BREZHNEV FREEZE
(APRIL,OCTOBER 1982)
REAGAN ZERO-OPTION
BREZHNEV FREEZE
~o -~
so -~
c so.
a~
U
L
~ 40
30 -~
UK FRG ITALY NETH
Legend
? APRIL
? OCTOBER
30
UK FRG ITALY NETH
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5u~aort for INF De~lovment Declines
~l'ile public opinion climate for actual INF deplo1;~lent appears ?
to have :~orsened soriewhat since last summer. Now, only in
Britain are there more supporters of Ii4F staticning than
opponents, but mostly only with conditions attached. In Italy,
a majority now is unconditionally opposed to Iir^ deployment.
In the i~:etherlands and blest Germany, opinion is divided.
SUPPORT/OPPOSITION FOR INF DEPLOY?lENT
October 1982
t?7est Italy
Britain
Nether-
France
Germany,
lands
Unconditional
42~
59$
39$
~
41$
Opposition
}-
'~-
Conditiona*
37
28
38
33
27
Acceptance
Unconditional
6
8
13
~
7
Acceptance
* Conditional accepters include those who "would accept"
INF deployment "only if arms talks with the USSR have
failed" or "as long as there are arms control negotiations
with the USSR at the same time."
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In the three ,najor continental countries, this apparently
represents a rise in opposition and corresponding drop in
conditional acceptance since last summer (Figure 3).'` Then,
~?dest Germans were more likely than not to say they "would.
accept" I~`F if linked to arms talks. Now, they are divided.
Also last summer, Italian opinion divided evenly, but now
opposition is most widespread here. And in France, opposition
no:v prevails for the first time since the question was asked
in July 1981.
Mixed Views on IIJF as Deterrent
Paralleling the drop in support for INF deployment in West
Germany and Italy is a decline in the belief that stationing
would prevent rather than invite a Soviet attack. In~both
countries, opinion is now split on this score, while-'last July
belief in the deterrent value of INF prevailed. ~
.-~---_
In the tdetherlands, the plurality (45~) is unsure whether or~~
not IVF risks or prevents war. However, in the UK and France,
the deterrent view prevails by two to one margins.
* Negative changes since last summer in opinion on INF
deployment may be exaggerated to some degree because of the
effect of information on INF incorporated in the questions. In
the July survey, people were given information about the Soviet
II1r^ monopoly and then asked their opinion on stationing when
linked to talks. No such information was provided in the
October survey.
Prepared by:
Stephen M. Shaffer (P/REU)
724-9140
t?1-11/29/82
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60-1
so
E 40
R
3 2 1 -
E
N 20
T
PUBLIC OPINION ON INF DEPLOYMENT
IN ITALY, 1981-82
UNCONDITIONAL OPPOSITION
------------------------N----------
CONDITIONAL SUPPORT
UNCONDITIONAL SUPPORT
..... x ................
0
JULY OCT FEB APRIL JULY OCT
TIME OF SURVEY
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PUBLIC OPINION ON INF DEPLOYMENT
IN NETHERLANDS
60--
UNCONDITIONAL OPPOSITION
so
r 40
R
C 30
E
N 20
T
1 0 UNCONDITIONAL SUPPORT ,..x..,,,....
-Jx......... ................................. .......
0
JULY OCT DEC JULY OCT
TIME OF SURVEY
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PUBLIC OPINION ON INF DEPLOYMENT
IN GREAT BRITAIN, 1981-82
60
50
E 40
R
C 30
E
N 20-
T
10 -~
CONDITIONAL SUPPORT ,.
x, %
UNCONDITIONAL OPPOSITION
............... ...x ................
UNCONDITIONAL SUPPORT
JULY OCT DEC FEB APRIL JULY OCT
TIME OF SURVEY
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PUBLIC OPINION ON INF DEPLOYMENT
IN FRANCE, 1981-82
60
50-
P 40 _ CONDITIONAL SUPPORT./
E ---------
C
E UNCONDITIONAL OPPOSITION
E
N 20
UNCONDITIONAL SUPPORT _.X
104 ............
TIME OF SURVEY
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JULY OCT FEB APRIL JULY OCT