THE ZERO DILEMMA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00363R000300450015-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 7, 2007
• Sequence Number: 15
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Approved For Release 2007/09/07 :CIA-RDP85M00363R000300450015-8
When President Reagan put for-
ward his "zero option" for European
t'zeater missiles in November 1981,
the proposal was widely hailed as
masterly politics. But now the plan`s
useful life seems to be coming to an
end, putting; Mr. Reagan's flexibility,
if any, to the test.
T'he zero option called for the Sovi-
ets to dismantle all the old SS-4 and
SS-5 and all the new SS-18 nuclear mis-
siles with which they threaten West-
ern Europe. In return, NATO would
forego its planned deployment, begin-
ning in December 1983, of Pershing 2
anti ground-launched cruise missiles.
't'his proposal put the Soviets on the
defensive, quieted the then-growing
European peace movement, got Mr.
Reagan out of the corner he had
painted himself irxto with his disa-
vowal of SALT Il and his threats to
farce a new arms race and opened the
way to renewed arms talks.
The zero option, however, was al-
ways approved by arms control spe-
cialists wlao actually favored arms
control - rAot ail of them do - only as
an opt^ning position. If, as some Rea-
gan Administration strategists
argueet at the time, the zero option
was a final, non-negotiable position,
few seriotzs arms controllers expected
the Soviets to accept it.
IVFr.. Reagan's own view of the zero
optior. has never beers made clear; but
events are now moving to force hi
floated an idea "to reduce in n
hers" their European theater missile
force (apl>:~rently to about 150 SS-18's)
but said it was "inadequate and would
still leave us at a disadvantage."
Still, this is a substantial offer; the
Soviets now have about 600 missiles
and more tlxan a thousand warheads
pointed at Europe. And, despite ti
'White House protestation to the con-
trary, the European allies are alremdy
beginning to shy away from the zero
option they once welcomed.
T`hze Da~ush Parliament recently
IN THE NATION
The
Zero
Dilemma
3y `foan Wicker
voted, for the most ominous example,
not to pay its share o[ the costs of de-
ployment, ifthe zero option could not be
negotiated. And Prime Minister Paul
Schluter said the Soviet offer should be
welcomed as "something new."
"That offer, as it becomes more
widely known, may well rekindle Euro-
peon peace demonstrations, too. L-a ,r
Monday in Britaiaa, some 20,000 wrm~
formed a human chain of prot~~:.?
around an air base where NATO f 9a,:s
to deploy cruise missiles. Arid ~,os.^=~ rf
the strongest supporters of the :A'i u
deployrent plan also are ha4ing sec-
ond .e
Joseph'ilf.A.H. Luns, far ex mphe,
the pawky secretary-general of
NATO, said then that "the zero opti~m
is an ideal solution but we never said it
was the only solution." _
has votcKl to support uniiatc~ral dis,z.r-
nrament, Francis Pym, the for,sesva_
five foreign minister, has c;irsc:-dpi h~
an interview with Peter 0:~~:os +jf The
Washington Pori that the allies may
have ic. "consider alternatives" -
sperificaiy, "an agreement that while
not zero would he very much lower"
than present levels. 'The dc~.'ense rniris-
ter, John Nott, also has said publicly
that the zero't~ption may have to b~ re-
examined i? it proves unrealistic.
In C`rmany, t12e question is deeply
involved in the election campaign now
heating up. James M. Markham of
The New York Times reported lase
week that the oppn~:ition Social Dem~_-
cratic party had tsegun to "distance ~t-
self from the American position" --
that is, the zero option.
That's ironic, because the former So-
clog Democratic Chancellor, Helmut
Schmidt, is generally regarded as the
father of the plan for NATO deployment
of medium-range missiles. And it's im-
portant, bec~iuse the Social Demor_rats
intend to exploit what Mr. Markham.
called "a deep unease among West Ger-
mans over the possibility of deploy-
ment" of the NATO missiles, while
painting Christian Democratic Chan-
cellorHelmut Kohl as an uncritical sup-
porter of the American plan.
Mr. Schmidt, implicitly raising the
question of Mr. Reagan's intentions,
has statcXt that no one can expect "his
opening lx~sition to he fully accom-
plished." Conc,>ssions, he said, "mzxst
be made by both sides."
Perhaps the sharpest blow of all
::arse from President Mitterrand of
i^ rx~xce, ;enerally a hard-liner on E~rro-
l~:az~ security and a strong supporter of
NATO deployment plans. He told the
columnist Joseph Kraft that the Soviets
genuinely wanted a theater missile
agreement, and that it probably could
reached at something between Lea
SS-2U's and the z?:ro option. Mr. Mit-
with him."
Amid such pressures, theater mis-
sile *regotiatio:rs will resume in
Geneva on Jan. 17. Mr. Reagan does-
n't h~^.ve to accept the Soviet offer;
there's always room far hard bargain-
ing on a better deal. But how he re-
sponds should make it clear at last if
the zero option was Mr. Reagan's first
or final offer -- that is, whether he
wants an agreement to lessen the
Soviet threat, or NATO deplopxirent of
its owrx missiles. .
Approved For Release 2007/09/07 :CIA-RDP85M00363R000300450015-8