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December 20, 2016
Document Release Date: 
January 31, 2008
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November 9, 1982
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Approved For Release 2008/01/31: CIA-RDP85M00363R000300500008-0 Approved For Release 2008/01/31: CIA-RDP85M00363R000300500008-0 Approved For Release 2008/01/31: CIA-RDP85M00363R000300500008-0 C--;1' s7ir=Aamcy INTERAGENCY INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT 9 November 1982 CUBAN INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES INIMICAL TO US INTERESTS Table of Contents P age Summary PART 1: Current Cuban International Activities Hostile to the United States Overview of Geographical Scope and Methods 1 Latin America 3 Africa 5 Middle East 7 Other International Actions ,,, 8 PART II: Possible Additional Cuban International Actions 10 Hostile to US Interests in 1983-1984 Overview 10 Latin America 10 Africa and the Middle East 12 Other areas 13 PART III: The Military Threat Posed by Cuban and Soviet 13 Military Assets in Cuba Trends in the Acquisition of Military Equipment 14 ANNEX: Cuban Military Forces 15 Cuban Presence and Activities in Latin America 17 Cuban Presence and Activities in the Caribbean 18 Cuban. Presence and Activities'in Africa 19 Cuban Presence and Activities-in the Middle East 21 Cuban Presence and Activities in the Far East 22 This Interagency Intelligence Assessment was requested by the Special Assistant to the President for National Security, Judge William Clark. It was prepared under the auspices of the NIO/LA by the Office of African and Latin American Analysis, CIA, and coordinated with the National Foreign: Intelligence Board. 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/01/31: CIA-RDP85M00363R000300500008-0 N10/LA 9 November 1982 CUBAN ACTIONS INIMICAL TO L'S INTERESTS: SL' ARY The likelihood of an accc nmodati n with Castro in the next t w years The Castro regime is engaged in a broad range of activities designed to promote radical change and undermine US influence worldwide. Fran the Cuban perspective, the US is, and always will be, the principal threat. Ue believe these actions will continue as long as Fidel Castro and his guerrilla-veterans remain in power. Only the intensity varies, ' df etermi ned by the conditions in each country and Cuba's ability to exploit them. Six former US presidents tried to negotiate Cuba Into accommodation; all failed and the available intelligence information suggests that there is virtually no prospect for a genuine accommodation with Cuba on major issues in the next two years. This, despite the fact that a modus vivendi may continue on some secondary but potentially troublesome issues like air piracy. PART 1: Current Cuban international activities hostile to the US In overview, Cuba has active subversive and military operations in Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East while also using diplomacy, propaganda, and covert action for anti-US purposes world-wide. I n L ati n America and the Caribbean --Cuba is directly supporting active insurgencies in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Colombia and is laying the groundwork in Honduras, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, and Chile. Hundreds of Latin American terrorists and guerrillas have been trained in Cuba in recent years. --Havana GIs heavily engaged in the consolidation of power in Nicaragua and Grenada. -Where guerrilla strategies are presently non-productive, Havana is relying on a mixture of diplomacy, propaganda, and non-violent covert action to undercut US influence. In Africa: --Cuba now has over 40,000 military and civilian personnel propping up Angola and Ethiopia and working in more than a dozen other countries. Other African targets of Cuban-assisted subversive groups are South Africa, Namibia, Zaire, and Morocco. In the Middle East: --Cuba has aligned itself closely with the PLO and the radical Arab States (Libya and South Yemen). Approved For Release 2008/01/31 : CIA-RDP85M00363R000300500008-0 ? I , 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/01/31 : CIA-RDP85M00363R000300500008-0 ""' In Europe: -Cuba uses political and economic tactics to create and 2xplalt differences between Washington and its, allies. PART 2: Possible additional Cuban activities hostile to US interests in 1983-84 During the coming 12-13 months, these activities will continue and in certain areas, will expand. The very nature of the Castro regime precludes anything but an adversary relationship between Havana and Washington. Latin America will continue to be a priority target. -Subversion will continue apace, especially in Central America, but also in Colcmbia and Chile. --Cuba will try to encourage and take advantage of the leftist drift in Suri name* and Bolivia. --Concern over change in Panama's orientation could cause Havana to begin supporting subversive efforts there. --If the Sandinistas are seriously threatened from without, Havana would almost certainly send additional combat forces unless deterred by the credible threat of US military forces. -It is not certain, however, that Cuba's promotion of subversion will steadily increase in all cases. Under certain circumstances, Castro could be willing to reduce his revolutionary profile temporarily if convinced it would advance his overall goal of diminisping US influence in the hemisphere. --Cuba can be expected to promote strongly the creation of a regional organization that excludes the US. --Cuba will probably retaliate strongly with jamming of US domestic radio and counterbroadcasts if Radio Marti goes on the air (Castro might also threaten another Marcel-type exodus of refugees- to the US). I n Africa, Havana will Maintain its military Support for Angola :end Ethiopia: -Cuba's reluctance to withdraw troops from Angola, as long as the stability of the Marxist-Leninist government is in doubt, will hinder a Namibian settlement. -A military threat to Mozambique from South Africa could bring an increased Cuban military presence there. Approved For Release 2008/01/31: CIA-RDP85M00363R000300500008-0 Approved For Release 2008/01/31 : CIA-RDP85MOO363ROO0300500008-0 Elsewhere, Cuba is likely to: -Continue its cooperation Sri-".,h the PLO, Libya, and oVner radical Arab states. PART 3: The military threat posed b Cuban and Soviet military-related asses in Cuba. Cuba has over 250,000 persons in its armed forces, and an air fore with more than 250 MIG fighters. -Cuba serves as abase for Soviet intelligence gathering and orooaaanda activities in the Western Hemisphere. -Expand its efforts to create or exacerbate tensions between the US and its European allies. --In the event of war between the US and the USSR, Cuba could serve as a recovery and turn around base for Soviet air and naval units attacking the US. 25X1 --During a major world war; the US Naval Base at Guantanamo would be vulnerable to Cuba's increasing military capabilities. A more serious potential threat is Cuban capability to harass or interfere with sea and air routes in the Caribbean/Gulf of Mexico/Straits of Florida areas. This would be of particular concern because of the amount of US commfree -- particularly oil -- that passes through this region and when unhampered transit from southern US ports and through Caribbean sea lanes would be required, such as for US reenforcement of NATO. 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/01/31: CIA-RDP85MOO363ROO0300500008-0