CUBAN INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES INIMICAL TO US INTERESTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00363R000300500008-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 31, 2008
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: November 9, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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INTERAGENCY INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT
9 November 1982
CUBAN INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES INIMICAL TO US INTERESTS
Table of Contents
P age
Summary
PART 1: Current Cuban International Activities Hostile
to the United States
Overview of Geographical Scope and Methods 1
Latin America 3
Africa 5
Middle East 7
Other International Actions ,,, 8
PART II: Possible Additional Cuban International Actions 10
Hostile to US Interests in 1983-1984
Overview 10
Latin America 10
Africa and the Middle East 12
Other areas 13
PART III: The Military Threat Posed by Cuban and Soviet 13
Military Assets in Cuba
Trends in the Acquisition of Military Equipment 14
ANNEX: Cuban Military Forces 15
Cuban Presence and Activities in Latin America 17
Cuban Presence and Activities in the Caribbean 18
Cuban. Presence and Activities'in Africa 19
Cuban Presence and Activities-in the Middle East 21
Cuban Presence and Activities in the Far East 22
This Interagency Intelligence Assessment was requested by the Special
Assistant to the President for National Security, Judge William Clark. It was
prepared under the auspices of the NIO/LA by the Office of African and Latin
American Analysis, CIA, and coordinated with the National Foreign: Intelligence
Board.
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 N10/LA
9 November 1982
CUBAN ACTIONS INIMICAL TO L'S INTERESTS: SL' ARY
The likelihood of an accc nmodati n with Castro in the next t w years
The Castro regime is engaged in a broad range of activities designed to
promote radical change and undermine US influence worldwide. Fran the Cuban
perspective, the US is, and always will be, the principal threat. Ue believe
these actions will continue as long as Fidel Castro and his guerrilla-veterans
remain in power. Only the intensity varies, ' df etermi ned by the conditions in
each country and Cuba's ability to exploit them. Six former US presidents
tried to negotiate Cuba Into accommodation; all failed and the available
intelligence information suggests that there is virtually no prospect for a
genuine accommodation with Cuba on major issues in the next two years. This,
despite the fact that a modus vivendi may continue on some secondary but
potentially troublesome issues like air piracy.
PART 1: Current Cuban international activities hostile to the US
In overview, Cuba has active subversive and military operations in Latin
America, Africa, and the Middle East while also using diplomacy, propaganda,
and covert action for anti-US purposes world-wide.
I n L ati n America and the Caribbean
--Cuba is directly supporting active insurgencies in El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Colombia and is laying the groundwork in Honduras,
Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, and Chile. Hundreds of Latin
American terrorists and guerrillas have been trained in Cuba in
recent years.
--Havana GIs heavily engaged in the consolidation of power in
Nicaragua and Grenada.
-Where guerrilla strategies are presently non-productive, Havana is
relying on a mixture of diplomacy, propaganda, and non-violent
covert action to undercut US influence.
In Africa:
--Cuba now has over 40,000 military and civilian personnel propping
up Angola and Ethiopia and working in more than a dozen other
countries. Other African targets of Cuban-assisted subversive
groups are South Africa, Namibia, Zaire, and Morocco.
In the Middle East:
--Cuba has aligned itself closely with the PLO and the radical Arab
States (Libya and South Yemen).
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In Europe:
-Cuba uses political and economic tactics to create and 2xplalt
differences between Washington and its, allies.
PART 2: Possible additional Cuban activities hostile to US interests in 1983-84
During the coming 12-13 months, these activities will continue and in
certain areas, will expand. The very nature of the Castro regime precludes
anything but an adversary relationship between Havana and Washington. Latin
America will continue to be a priority target.
-Subversion will continue apace, especially in Central America, but
also in Colcmbia and Chile.
--Cuba will try to encourage and take advantage of the leftist drift
in Suri name* and Bolivia.
--Concern over change in Panama's orientation could cause Havana to
begin supporting subversive efforts there.
--If the Sandinistas are seriously threatened from without, Havana
would almost certainly send additional combat forces unless
deterred by the credible threat of US military forces.
-It is not certain, however, that Cuba's promotion of subversion
will steadily increase in all cases. Under certain circumstances,
Castro could be willing to reduce his revolutionary profile
temporarily if convinced it would advance his overall goal of
diminisping US influence in the hemisphere.
--Cuba can be expected to promote strongly the creation of a regional
organization that excludes the US.
--Cuba will probably retaliate strongly with jamming of US domestic
radio and counterbroadcasts if Radio Marti goes on the air (Castro
might also threaten another Marcel-type exodus of refugees- to the
US).
I n Africa, Havana will Maintain its military Support for Angola :end
Ethiopia:
-Cuba's reluctance to withdraw troops from Angola, as long as the
stability of the Marxist-Leninist government is in doubt, will
hinder a Namibian settlement.
-A military threat to Mozambique from South Africa could bring an
increased Cuban military presence there.
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Elsewhere, Cuba is likely to:
-Continue its cooperation Sri-".,h the PLO, Libya, and oVner radical
Arab states.
PART 3: The military threat posed b Cuban and Soviet military-related
asses in Cuba.
Cuba has over 250,000 persons in its armed forces, and an air fore with
more than 250 MIG fighters.
-Cuba serves as abase for Soviet intelligence gathering and
orooaaanda activities in the Western Hemisphere.
-Expand its efforts to create or exacerbate tensions between the US
and its European allies.
--In the event of war between the US and the USSR, Cuba could serve
as a recovery and turn around base for Soviet air and naval units
attacking the US.
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--During a major world war; the US Naval Base at Guantanamo would be
vulnerable to Cuba's increasing military capabilities. A more
serious potential threat is Cuban capability to harass or interfere
with sea and air routes in the Caribbean/Gulf of Mexico/Straits of
Florida areas. This would be of particular concern because of the
amount of US commfree -- particularly oil -- that passes through
this region and when unhampered transit from southern US ports and
through Caribbean sea lanes would be required, such as for US
reenforcement of NATO.
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